With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. Dr. Christopher Yeaw, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around 2,000 warheads and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear powered Poseidon torpedo, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.

Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a major nuclear actor, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next four to five years and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, which was roughly 200 at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s CFR-600 reactors, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.

The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the P5 forum where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under an obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.

In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess 80 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.

The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.

In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.

Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

Introduction

Russia’s recent deployment of a conventionally armed, diesel-powered submarine to Indonesia should not be dismissed as routine naval activity. It is a calculated strategic signal. One that highlights a growing challenge for Australia and calls into question the resilience of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. While such deployments fall below the nuclear threshold, they reveal an emerging approach to strategic competition. The use of advanced conventional capabilities can undermine the systems that enable nuclear deterrence.

At the center of this challenge is the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt, are integral to this architecture. They support early warning, signals intelligence, and communications with nuclear forces. As such, they are not only strategic assets but also potential targets. Modern diesel-electric submarines—quiet, survivable, and increasingly capable—can operate in Australia’s northern approaches and threaten these critical nodes with precision strike options or intelligence-gathering missions that enable future disruption.

The Gray Zone Effect

This development reflects a broader shift in adversary strategy. Rather than relying on overt nuclear coercion, states such as Russia are exploring how to achieve strategic effects through conventional means. By targeting NC3 infrastructure using submarines, cyber operations, or long-range precision strike, adversaries can degrade the credibility of nuclear deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. This approach exploits the grey zone between peace and war, complicates escalation dynamics, and introduces ambiguity into alliance responses. It is not escalation dominance in the traditional sense, but escalation manipulation, and shaping the environment so that nuclear deterrence becomes less certain, less credible, and therefore less effective.

Recent Chinese naval activity reinforces this concern. The PLA Navy’s circumnavigation of Australia should not be viewed as routine presence or symbolic signaling alone. Rather, it demonstrates an emerging capacity to operate persistently along Australia’s littoral approaches and key maritime choke points—areas proximate to critical infrastructure that underpins U.S. and allied NC3. Such operations enable the mapping of undersea terrain, surveillance of communication pathways, and potential identification of vulnerabilities in systems such as subsea cables and relay nodes. In a crisis, these capabilities could be leveraged to conduct limited, deniable disruption of NC3 functions that degrade communication, delay decision-making, and complicate alliance coordination without crossing the threshold of armed attacks. In this sense, China’s activity mirrors and reinforces the broader trend: the use of conventional means to hold at risk the foundations of nuclear deterrence.

For Australia, the implications are significant. The traditional model of U.S. extended deterrence, anchored in the threat of nuclear retaliation, assumes that nuclear forces remain survivable, communicable, and politically usable. However, if NC3 systems are degraded or disrupted, that assumption weakens. Deterrence begins to erode not because nuclear weapons are absent, but because their employment becomes uncertain or delayed. In such a scenario, adversaries may calculate that they can act with greater freedom at the conventional level, confident that escalation can be managed or avoided. 

Policy Recommendations

This evolving threat environment demands a recalibration of Australia’s defense and deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. It must be reinforced by a comprehensive strategy that integrates conventional resilience, grey-zone competition, and a more explicit recognition of the role nuclear forces play in underpinning deterrence across all domains.

First, Australia should prioritize the hardening and resilience of NC3-related infrastructure on its territory. This includes enhancing physical protection, investing in redundancy and dispersal, and strengthening cyber defenses. Facilities such as Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt must be able to operate under contested conditions, ensuring continuity of communication and decision-making even in the face of sustained disruption. This may also require the development of alternative communication pathways, including space-based and mobile systems. Resilience is not merely a defensive measure; it is a core component of deterrence, signaling to adversaries that attempts at degradation will not succeed.

Second, Australia must significantly expand its undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ability to detect, track, and, if necessary, neutralize hostile submarines in Australia’s maritime approaches is critical to protecting strategic infrastructure. Investments should focus on integrated undersea sensor networks, maritime patrol aircraft, autonomous systems, and closer operational integration with allies. A persistent and credible ASW posture will complicate adversary planning, increase operational risk, and reduce the feasibility of covert operations targeting NC3 nodes.

Third, Canberra should deepen strategic dialogue with Washington on the role of Australia within U.S. nuclear deterrence architecture. This dialogue must move beyond general assurances and address specific contingencies, including how attacks on NC3 infrastructure in Australia would be interpreted. Greater clarity around escalation thresholds, attribution challenges, and response options will reduce the risk of miscalculation and strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. This should include regularized nuclear consultation mechanisms and scenario-based planning.

Fourth, Australia should take the lead in advocating for the development of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. Such a framework that brings together the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia, would formalize shared deterrence responsibilities and strengthen collective resolve. While politically sensitive, this arrangement could include elements of nuclear consultation, planning, and burden-sharing, similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. By distributing deterrence functions and signaling unity, such an alliance would complicate adversary calculations and reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence across the region.

Fifth, Australia must engage India more directly on the implications of Russian strategic behavior. As a key regional power with longstanding ties to Moscow, India occupies a unique diplomatic position. Canberra should clearly communicate its concerns regarding Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including the risks posed to critical infrastructure and regional stability. In parallel, India should be encouraged to consider the broader consequences of a hypothetical Russian attack on Australia, not only for bilateral relations, but for its strategic partnerships with both the United States and Australia. This dialogue would not seek to force alignment, but to underscore the interconnected nature of regional security and the potential costs of strategic ambiguity.

Sixth, Australia should explore options to visibly anchor U.S. nuclear deterrence in the region. This necessitates a proactive approach to alliance integration. Mechanisms such as enhanced consultation, increased transparency around nuclear policy, and potential participation in nuclear planning arrangements could reinforce deterrence by demonstrating resolve and cohesion. Initiatives under AUKUS provide a foundation for this deeper integration and should be expanded to include broader deterrence considerations.

Seventh, Australian defense policy must explicitly recognize the interdependence of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Investments in long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare are essential, but they must be understood as part of a broader deterrence framework. These capabilities contribute to resilience and denial, but they are ultimately underpinned by the threat of escalation. Ensuring that this relationship is clearly articulated in strategy and doctrine will strengthen deterrence coherence and improve signaling to adversaries.

Finally, Australia must broaden its strategic focus to account for multiple nuclear-capable adversaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. While China remains the primary focus of defense planning, Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia underscores the need for a comprehensive approach. Strategic competition is no longer confined to a single actor or domain. It is multi-faceted, simultaneous, and increasingly coordinated. Australia’s deterrence posture must reflect this complexity.

Conclusion

The central lesson is clear. Deterrence in the 21st century cannot be treated as a layered system in which nuclear weapons sit passively at the top. Instead, nuclear deterrence must actively underpin and reinforce every level of conflict, including the conventional and grey-zone domains. Adversaries are increasingly seeking to exploit gaps between these layers, using conventional means to achieve strategic effects without triggering nuclear retaliation.

To respond to this challenge, Australia must take seriously the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on which it relies. This means investing in the resilience of critical systems, strengthening conventional capabilities, and engaging more deeply with allies and partners on the role of nuclear alliances and forces in regional security.

In an era defined by ambiguity and threshold management, the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on integration, clarity, and resolve. By advancing new nuclear alliance structures, deepening strategic dialogue, which includes India, and reinforcing both conventional and nuclear pillars of deterrence, Australia can ensure that sophisticated conventional threats do not undermine the stability of the broader strategic order.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Silent Signals: Russian and Chinese Conventional Threats to NC3 and U.S. Extended Deterrence in Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

200 New B-21 Raider Bombers Could All Fail Thanks to a 1957 Tanker the U.S. Air Force Is Still Using was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iranian official says US ‘maximalist’ demands stall face-to-face talks

 SUZAN FRASER|AP News

ANTALYA, Turkey (AP) — Iran is not yet ready to hold a new round of face-to-face talks with U.S. officials, a senior Iranian official said Saturday, citing Washington’s refusal to abandon “maximalist” demands on key issues.

In an interview with The Associated Press on the margins of a diplomacy forum in Turkey, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh also said his country will not hand over its enriched uranium to the United States, rejecting claims made by U.S. President Donald Trump.

“I can tell you that no enriched material is going to be shipped to United States,” Khatibzadeh said. “This is non-starter and I can assure you that while we are ready to address any concerns that we do have, we’re not going to accept things that are nonstarters.”

Iranian official says US ‘maximalist’ demands stall face-to-face talks was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. New START, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this bilateral architecture. Its limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, combined with an intrusive verification regime, helped sustain stability even as geopolitical relations deteriorated.

However, Russia’s suspension of participation in 2023 and the treaty’s expiration in 2026 mark a significant turning point. The breakdown of the broader arms control framework—evident in the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020—suggests a structural shift in the valuation of negotiated restraint. Assessing the prospects for post–New START arms control, it is important to consider these developments within both the historical context of bilateral relations and the shifting dynamics of current great power competition.

Academic debates on arms control offer a helpful context for understanding the current impasse. Traditional arms‑control theory, rooted in rationalist models, views treaty agreements as tools for reducing uncertainty, preventing arms races, and stabilizing deterrence. From this perspective, verification mechanisms and numerical limits mitigate the security dilemma by reducing incentives for worst‑case planning. While other scholars emphasize the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and leadership perceptions. Arms control agreements often reflect internal political coalitions, institutional preferences, and the ideological orientation of decision makers. The current U.S.-Russian environment, which is characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalist rhetoric complicates the formation of pro-arms control coalitions. Moreover, constructivist analyses highlight the normative dimension of arms control, arguing that treaties shape expectations, legitimize restraint, and embed cooperative practices. The erosion of these norms over the past decade has contributed to a broader delegitimization of negotiated limits.

These theoretical perspectives underscore that the challenges facing post–New START arms control are not merely technical but deeply embedded in political and normative contexts. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s framing of the conflict as a confrontation with the West, combined with U.S. and allied NATO support for Ukraine, has created a political environment in which formal negotiations are viewed as strategically risky or politically unacceptable.

The U.S. seeks to address Russia’s large arsenal of non‑strategic nuclear weapons and its development of novel systems such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia, in turn, prioritizes constraints on U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional strike capabilities. These asymmetries complicate the search for mutually acceptable trade-offs. Furthermore, verification has long been a cornerstone of bilateral arms control. Russia’s suspension of inspections and data exchanges under New START has undermined transparency and raised questions about the feasibility of future verification regimes. Designing agreements that satisfy both sides’ security concerns will be a central challenge.

The U.S. increasingly argues that future arms control must account for China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Russia rejects trilateral frameworks, viewing them as attempts to dilute U.S.–Russian parity. Thus far, China shows little interest in formal arms control negotiations. This triangular dynamic introduces new complexities absent from earlier bilateral negotiations.

Despite the hostile political environment, arms control still matters. The strategic reasons for arms control include specific factors that deserve attention from states. Agreements reduce incentives for preemption and miscalculation, which can increase crisis stability. Data exchanges and inspections improve transparency by reducing uncertainty and reliance on worst-case assumptions. Arms races can impose significant economic burdens, even for the U.S.’ trillion-dollar defense budget and Russia’s constrained economy. Finally, U.S.–Russian cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime. These lasting incentives suggest that both states have structural reasons to pursue at least minimal engagement.

So, what are the pathways for Post–New START arms control? Political commitments to maintain New START limits, even without a formal treaty, could involve both sides making parallel political statements to uphold New START’s numerical limits. While these have no legal force, such commitments could help prevent rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and maintain stability and predictability.

Other paths could include more Issue‑Specific or Modular Agreements. Rather than pursuing a new comprehensive treaty, negotiators could focus on discrete issues, such as notifications of major strategic exercises, transparency measures for new strategic systems, and agreements to avoid dangerous military incidents. These modular arrangements could serve as building blocks for more ambitious frameworks. Next, revitalizing crisis‑management mechanisms by reestablishing military-to-military communication channels could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Such mechanisms do not require treaty-level negotiations and can function even amid broader political tensions. Finally, promote multilateral and norm-building initiatives such as broader dialogues involving China, NATO allies, and other nuclear-armed states to help shape norms around transparency and risk reduction. Multilateral workshops, data exchange initiatives, or voluntary reporting mechanisms may be more practical than formal treaties.

The expiration of New START marks a critical turning point in the history of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control. The structural, political, and technological challenges facing a successor agreement are formidable, and a new comprehensive treaty is unlikely in the near term. Yet the logic of arms control, rooted in the need to manage existential risks, remains important. Incremental, issue-specific, and politically binding measures offer a pragmatic path forward, preserving essential elements of strategic stability until conditions allow for more ambitious negotiations. The future of arms control will depend not only on geopolitical developments but also on policymakers’ ability to adapt traditional frameworks to a more complex, multipolar nuclear landscape. Without some form of negotiated restraint, the world risks entering an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time in over half a century.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Published: April 2, 2026

On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.

Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard testified in 2020, “We do not seek parity.”

That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.

The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.

Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.

Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.

Deterrence needs a similar framework. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. Dynamic Parity offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.

Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.

Skeptics argue that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.

Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.

Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.

Here is what that would look like in practice:

• Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.
• Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
• Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.

This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.

Execution is the signal. Russia’s 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.

Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.

Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.

Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is entering a far more dangerous strategic era. Military modernization, grey-zone coercion, and rapid nuclear expansion are reshaping the regional balance of power. Most notably, China is undertaking a historic expansion of its nuclear arsenal, investing in silo fields, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and dual-capable systems. Simultaneously, Russia’s willingness to use nuclear threats in Europe demonstrates that nuclear coercion is once again central to great-power competition.

In Washington, proposals such as Ely Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact reflect recognition that the current security architecture is insufficient. A more formalized collective defense structure in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.

However, this is not sufficient. A conventional Pacific Defense Pact does not fully address the most dangerous level of escalation to large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack. What the region now requires is a narrowly defined Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

A Narrow, Explicit Purpose

This would not be a sweeping defense pact covering every maritime incident, border clash, cyber intrusion, or grey-zone coercive act. It would have a clear and carefully delimited purpose. That is to deter large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack against member states.

Its clarity would be its strength. That clarity performs a second vital function. It minimizes the risk of entrapment by ensuring member states are not dragged into escalation over actions below the threshold of war. By explicitly excluding grey-zone coercion and limited crises from its nuclear remit, the alliance would reassure leaders that only truly existential threats trigger its highest-level commitments.

Participation becomes politically sustainable and strategically credible because it avoids automatic escalation over incremental provocations. The alliance would draw a line at catastrophic strategic aggression.

The Historical Record: Why Nuclear Deterrence Matters

The case for a nuclear alliance is not theoretical. It is grounded in historical experience. During the Cold War, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented direct large-scale war and nuclear attack in Europe. Despite ideological confrontation and proxy conflicts, neither side attempted a conventional war or nuclear attack on the other’s core territories. Nuclear weapons imposed restraint. They deterred not just nuclear use, but overwhelming conventional assault.

Similarly, within NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear guarantees has prevented full-scale Russian conventional attack on Alliance territory. Moscow has tested boundaries through

hybrid tactics and coercive signaling, but it has not launched a large-scale attack on NATO soil. Nuclear deterrence at the alliance level raised the costs to an unacceptable threshold.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict further illustrates how nuclear capability constrains escalation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear superiority allowed it to signal credible threats, while China’s emerging nuclear capability and mobilization signaled resolve. Mutual fear of escalation compelled negotiation, including intervention through U.S. triangular diplomacy. Nuclear weapons shaped behaviors without being used.

The India–Pakistan experience is equally instructive. Prior to overt nuclearization, the two states fought multiple full-scale wars. Since their nuclear tests in 1998, crises have erupted, but they have remained limited. Missile strikes, cross-border skirmishes, and periods of great tension have not escalated into all-out conventional war or nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence imposed a ceiling on the conflicts.

Contrast this with the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s and now confronts a nuclear-armed Russia without possessing its own nuclear deterrent. The result has been a prolonged and costly conventional war of attrition. The absence of mutual nuclear deterrence has made sustained large-scale conventional war possible. By comparison, Russia has not launched a direct assault on NATO territory precisely because nuclear deterrence underwrites NATO’s collective defense.

The pattern is clear. Where credible nuclear deterrence exists between adversaries, large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack is sharply constrained or avoided. Where it does not, prolonged and devastating large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack becomes more likely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategic Gap

The Indo-Pacific currently relies on a patchwork of bilateral extended deterrence arrangements centered primarily on Washington. These remain essential, but they are increasingly strained or at risk of being fractured by China.

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal complicates escalation management. A larger and more survivable force reduces the credibility of assumptions that escalation will remain controlled or asymmetrical. Meanwhile, the region contains multiple flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the India–China border where conventional conflict could rapidly climb the escalation ladder.

Frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad strengthen capabilities and coordination, while the proposed Pacific Defense Pact aims to guarantee that the U.S. and its allies can act in concert during crises or conflicts. But they are not structured as nuclear deterrence mechanisms. They do not institutionalize shared nuclear declaratory policy, crisis consultation at the strategic level, or joint planning for high-end escalation management. A nuclear alliance would fill that gap.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact

A Pacific Defense Pact, as envisioned in conventional terms, strengthens interoperability and signals unity. But without an explicit nuclear dimension, it leaves ambiguity at the highest rung of escalation. That ambiguity can invite miscalculation.

A nuclear alliance would not broaden commitments; it would sharpen them. It would: (1) establish shared declaratory policy on deterrence of large-scale war and nuclear attack, (2) institutionalize strategic consultation mechanisms during crises, (3) coordinate planning to ensure credible escalation management, and (4) reinforce extended deterrence while discouraging independent nuclear proliferation.

Importantly, such an alliance need not require additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Like NATO, it could rely on extended deterrence commitments and nuclear-sharing with structured burden-sharing and planning arrangements. Nuclear forces may remain nationally controlled, but alliance cohesion amplifies deterrent credibility. 

Clarity as Stability

The objective is not confrontation. It is clarity. By defining a narrow and explicit threshold—large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack—the alliance reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. It signals to potential aggressors that existential aggression will trigger unified strategic consequences.

Simultaneously, it reassures members that lower-level competition will not automatically escalate to nuclear commitments. This dual clarity strengthens deterrence at the top end and stabilizes politics at the lower end.

A Necessary Evolution

The Indo-Pacific is now the central arena of 21st-century strategic competition. Nuclear modernization is accelerating. Multi-nuclear dynamics are emerging. Escalation timelines are compressing.

History shows that nuclear weapons, and when embedded within credible alliance structures, deter catastrophic war. They prevent large-scale conventional war and nuclear attacks not because they are desirable tools of war, but because they impose unacceptable costs on those who contemplate it.

A Pacific Defense Pact is a step forward, but in the current strategic environment, it is not enough. To deter large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack in the Indo-Pacific, the region must move beyond a Pacific Defense Pact. It must build a nuclear alliance.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact: Why the Indo-Pacific Requires a Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence does not rest solely on possessing nuclear weapons. It also depends on the assurance that those weapons cannot be neutralized, constrained, or rendered ineffective by an adversary’s ability to maneuver, surveil, or strike first. Geography, therefore, matters. In the emerging strategic environment, Greenland occupies one of the most consequential geographic positions in the world.

Denial as the Foundation of Nuclear Survivability

The survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is the cornerstone of strategic stability. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the most secure retaliatory capability precisely because they operate undetected at sea. But stealth is not automatic. Submarines must transit known maritime corridors to reach patrol areas, and those corridors create opportunities for adversary interference.

For U.S. and allied forces operating in the Atlantic and Arctic, two choke points are decisive: the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Greenland and Svalbard. These routes connect the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic and serve as the primary pathways for submarines moving between bastion areas and open-ocean operating zones.

If Russian or Chinese submarines could transit these gaps freely, they would be able to threaten NATO SSBNs, target transatlantic sea lines of communication, and position themselves for nuclear or conventional strikes against NATO territory and U.S. nuclear forces. Denying that access—rather than reacting after the fact—is what preserves nuclear survivability. Greenland makes such denial far more feasible.

Greenland as a Strategic Gatekeeper

Greenland’s location enables persistent surveillance, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare operations across the Arctic–Atlantic interface. Sensors, airfields, space and radar infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes associated with Greenland enable the United States and NATO to monitor adversary movements and constrain their ability to maneuver undetected.

This is not about tactical confrontation; it is about strategic denial. Greenland’s geography makes it exceedingly difficult for Russian or Chinese forces to move quietly from the Arctic into the Atlantic, increasing the likelihood that such efforts would be detected, tracked, and, if necessary, intercepted. When combined with American technology, Greenland adds uncertainty, constrains their options, complicates operational planning, and reduces incentives for escalation.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy and the Olenya Complex

Russia’s own posture reinforces Greenland’s importance. Moscow has invested heavily in the Arctic, operating 32 bases, expanding air and missile defenses, and increasing submarine activity across the High North. The Kola Peninsula hosts a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear forces, supported by infrastructure such as the Olenya nuclear weapons storage facility, which underpins long-range aviation and missile operations.

Russia’s objective is twofold: to shield its own nuclear forces within a protected Arctic bastion, and to enable submarines and aircraft to push outward into the Atlantic when required. Those outward movements would be designed to threaten NATO’s reinforcement routes, hold allied territory at risk, and directly threaten U.S. strategic forces and American cities.

By enabling the U.S. and NATO to better monitor and deny access through the Arctic gaps, Greenland limits Russia’s ability to mobilize and deploy 40 percent of its submarine force. This denial mission directly strengthens Euro-Atlantic security by reducing the coercive value of Russian nuclear signalling or capacity for destruction.

China, the Arctic, and Global Deterrence

Although China is not an Arctic power by geography, it increasingly behaves like one strategically. Beijing’s naval expansion and interest in Arctic routes reflect its ambition to operate on a global scale. Chinese submarines operating in cooperation with Russia, or benefiting from shared intelligence and surveillance, could complicate the maritime balance in the North Atlantic.

Preventing Chinese submarines from accessing these waters is therefore as important as containing Russian forces. Even a limited Chinese presence would require diverting allied assets and introducing new strategic risks. Greenland helps pre-empt that outcome by reinforcing allied control over Arctic approaches and denying adversaries the ability to open a northern axis of competition.

This denial function links Greenland directly to Indo-Pacific security. The same U.S. nuclear forces that deter conflict in Asia depend on freedom of manoeuvre and survivability in the Atlantic and Arctic. If those forces are threatened in one theatre, credibility erodes in all others.

Air, Missile, and Early Warning Dimensions

The Arctic is also a critical domain for air and missile operations—America’s planned “Golden Dome.” Long-range bombers and ballistic missiles generally follow polar trajectories to maximize range and payload and minimize warning time. Greenland’s position enables early detection, tracking, and integration into broader air and missile defense architectures.

By denying adversaries access to Arctic airspace, Greenland reinforces strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strike calculations over the North Pole. This capability is essential in an era of increasingly compressed decision timelines.

Conclusion

Greenland matters because it enables strategic denial by denying Russian and Chinese submarines, aircraft, and missiles access through the Arctic and North Atlantic gaps that connect global theatres. That denial preserves the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, protects allied homelands, and sustains the credibility of extended deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

In an age defined by competition over access and geography, Greenland is not peripheral but essential to maintaining the balance of power and preventing great-power conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Greenland, Strategic Denial, and the Survivability of U.S. Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

That contradiction has come into sharp relief during the presidency of Donald Trump, whose blunt interest in Greenland exposed what European diplomacy had long obscured. The controversy was framed as eccentricity or provocation, but the underlying grievance was familiar. For decades, the United States has underwritten European security while European governments reduced their defense investments in favor of generous welfare systems and subsidized industry, confident that the American half of the alliance would absorb the risk. The Greenland crisis has simply made that imbalance visible.

Greenland’s Strategic Reality

Greenland occupies a unique strategic position. It sits in the western hemisphere astride the Arctic approaches to the “GIUK Gap,” hosting critical space and missile-warning infrastructure essential to NATO’s early-warning architecture. The 2004 Defense Greenland Agreement between the United States and Denmark, Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, explicitly limits the US defense area in Greenland to Thule (Pituffik) Air (Space) Base only.

With Arctic sea lanes opening and undersea infrastructure becoming a focal point of competition, Greenland’s strategic importance is no longer peripheral but central. The question now confronting Europe is whether the small Kingdom of Denmark and, by extension, Europe, can demonstrate even minimal sovereignty over a territory it insists is non-negotiable but has left undefended for some 250 years.

Article 3 of the NATO Treaty states: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Put plainly, Denmark is obligated to maintain—on its own and on a continuous basis—the capacity to defend all its territory. By that standard, Denmark has failed to meet its Article 3 responsibilities for a very long time, if it ever has.

Despite its strategic importance, Greenland remains vulnerable and economically neglected. This is not an accident or a bureaucratic oversight. It is the result of a long-standing assumption—that the United States would indefinitely guarantee European sovereignty and sustain its social-economic model. That assumption no longer holds. Strategic competition is shifting away from open confrontation toward constant pressure, probing actions, and fait accompli. In this world, sovereignty is not something you can merely declare. It is something you must demonstrate.

Trump, Europe, and the Sovereignty Question

Trump’s narrative about Greenland was widely dismissed as transactional or unserious. Stripped of tone, however, the message was structural: As the Arctic presents opportunity, Greenland is even more strategically vital to North American security than ever before, and someone must take responsibility for securing and developing it.

This tension among NATO allies reflects a broader post–Cold War pattern. Europe expanded its regulatory, economic, and political influence while allowing NATO military funding and capability to atrophy. The resulting system elevated process, norms, and legalism over hard power security, sovereignty, and deterrence.

The renewed United States demand for Greenland exposes the limits of that model. If Denmark cannot even mount a minimal defense of its own territory, the problem is not American overreach, but European credibility.

The UK Corollary

In a striking act of geopolitical idealism, the United Kingdom has agreed to cede sovereignty over Diego Garcia to Mauritius—an “own goal” that harms US interests. Long regarded as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Diego Garcia has been a cornerstone of US and UK power projection across the Middle East, East Africa, South Asia, and beyond for decades.

After years of legal and diplomatic pressure—culminating in adverse rulings from international courts and the United Nations—the UK concluded that continued unilateral control of the Chagos Archipelago was politically unsustainable in this rules-based international order. In 2024, London agreed to transfer sovereignty to Mauritius, a state increasingly influenced by Beijing, while attempting to preserve military access through a long-term, UK-funded lease.

On paper, operations continue. Leverage shifts from occupant to owner. Sovereignty matters: once surrendered, access rests on political permission rather than power. A future Beijing-aligned Mauritius could abrogate agreements or revoke leases, leaving the US and UK strategically stranded, “out of runway” and out of business in the Indian Ocean.

Like Diego Garcia, Greenland’s strategic value lies in assured access. Trusting that allies will always act in America’s best interest is folly. Access without ownership is always conditional; sovereignty without power is fragile. Both cases reveal the same risk—vital territory left exposed at a moment when great-power competition demands clarity, presence, and resolve.

Sovereignty Requires Adequate Organic Defense

Defending Greenland does not require national militarization on Cold War terms. It does not require large permanent formations or aggressive posturing. But it does require capability, presence, and integration of real forces tied to real geography. The fantasy of the [European] Liberal [global] Rules-based order is no longer sufficient alone.

A credible defense posture requires permanent ground, air, and naval forces. Presence must be sufficient to assert territorial control, secure the Arctic approaches, and protect key infrastructure. Additionally, it requires fifth-generation airpower, supported by NATO enablers sufficient to project air sovereignty and assert control over the airspace of the GIUK, along with integrated maritime and subsurface awareness to control approaches, advanced air and missile defense for critical nodes, and the logistics infrastructure required to sustain operations in an Arctic environment.

This is not an escalation; it is the minimum viable defense posture for the territory Denmark claims sovereignty over, NATO depends upon, and the Western Hemisphere demands. Anything less than that is not restraint; it is abdication.

What Denmark Can Do

For Denmark to retain its kingdom, it must fervently acknowledge that China and Russia are expanding their Arctic ambitions and that continuing to ignore or neglect this threat risks losing Greenland to another great power’s orbit. Denmark does not need to defend Greenland alone, but it must lead and meet its Article 3 responsibilities. Sovereignty cannot be subcontracted. First, Denmark must accept that a visible, persistent presence is non-negotiable. A battalion-sized force and a fighter squadron on Greenlandic soil are not a burden; they are a declaration of responsibility.

Second, Denmark must align force posture with geography. Arctic defense is not a side mission; it is central to Denmark’s strategic responsibilities and credibility. That requires prioritizing basing, sustainment, and readiness over symbolic deployments there or elsewhere.

Third, Denmark must integrate defense with economic development. Resource extraction, energy production, and infrastructure are not separate from security; they are its foundation. Without an economic base, defense remains episodic and less affordable. For the collective West, energy and critical element security is national security. If Denmark cannot execute these steps—even with allied support—then sovereignty is no longer exercised; it is merely asserted.

How Europe Can Contribute Without Posturing

Greenland offers Europe an opportunity to demonstrate what regional shared deterrence looks like. Contributions need not be equal in scale, but they must be meaningful in effect. Rotational air defense units, maritime patrol aircraft, icebreaking capacity, logistics support, and infrastructure investment tied directly to defense requirements would materially strengthen deterrence without grandstanding.

This is where Europe’s economic power must finally align with its strategic claims. Shared deterrence is not about symbolism or declarations. It is about complementary capability and sustained commitment.

Can Europe Move Fast Enough?

The decisive variable is time. Ten-year roadmaps and aspirational targets are irrelevant. Greenland’s exposure is immediate. The longer Europe delays, the more it reinforces the perception that sovereignty exists only on paper. Delay only serves to validate President Trump’s strategic demand.

Credible deterrence must begin within weeks, not months or years. Initial deployments need not be perfect, but they cannot be symbolic political statements devoid of the credible military capacity required for the mission. They need to be visible, permanent, and expandable.

The Consequences of Failure

Failure in Greenland would reverberate far beyond the Arctic. If Denmark cannot defend Greenland with allied assistance, then European claims of strategic autonomy collapse and NATO’s credibility fractures geographically. The United States will either act unilaterally or disengage selectively. Resource development will proceed without European leverage. Most damaging of all, failure would confirm a lesson Europe can no longer afford: that idealism and process cannot substitute for balance-of-power realism, and that international norms cannot enforce themselves. Where previous US presidential administrations relied on alliances, basing agreements, and quiet influence, President Trump has framed the issue in transactional terms: if Greenland was strategically vital, someone had to take responsibility for securing and developing it.

Conclusion

Greenland is not a crisis invented in Washington. It is the result of allied neglect and free riding. Persistent underinvestment in defense, miscalculation of threats, and a readiness among many allies to subordinate their sovereignty to international norms have produced a growing crisis of confidence in the United States. This can only be reversed with real power projection and a NATO commitment to peace through strength.

Denmark does not need to match American power. It needs to demonstrate agency, urgency, and empathy. Denmark and greater NATO must listen to its most powerful ally and address its security concerns with great alacrity. Rather than escalating the rhetoric, Denmark should admit its negligence and mitigate the shortfall now. Europe does not need to replace the United States or drive it out of the alliance. It needs to stop pretending that sovereignty is cost-free or that it can be reliably substituted with treaties in perpetuity.

This President demands more of the alliance to defend America’s northern approaches. If Denmark and the rest of NATO cannot meet that demand, the United States will. What is being asked is reasonable. The Arctic is now NATO’s second front. If Europe cannot meet that demand here, it has become sovereignty insolvent and should stop speaking of autonomy elsewhere. Because in the end, reality does not respond to intention, only to real and persistent power.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Can Denmark Defend Greenland from Trump? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As of today, ChatGPT-5 Pro is said to have an IQ of 148, as tested officially by Mensa Norway. It is now significantly smarter than most adult humans in the United States (who average 99.7). Grok 4 may be weeks away from becoming even smarter, but the progress at which AI reasoning inches ahead matters little when humans write code for these programs. However, AI has started to write its own code. In tandem, Mark Zuckerberg is building a super team dubbed the “superintelligence AI” lab and he offered a single person, Daniel Francis, $1.25 Billion for a four-year contract (or a $312 million per year salary). Further, Zuckerberg has gone on to poach the top AI talent from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, nearing 24 people in total out of a team of only 44.

Unfortunately, U.S. companies are also allowed to funnel money into Chinese AI companies, in part because it is a less expensive alternative than U.S. developed AI. China, as a near-peer adversary cannot be allowed to reach superintelligence first because whoever wins the AI race to superintelligence will have nearly unlimited computing ability and will be able to launch devastating cyber-attacks with ease.

If there are two teams approaching the finish line in a winner-take-all superintelligence race, then there is also a direct implication for long-term deterrence on global war. Imagine the following scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The U.S. is ahead in the race to superintelligence, but China works diligently to steal code, launch cyber-attacks, and intimidate U.S. scientists. Eventually, China assassinates critical AI scientists, prompting the U.S. to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China to stop its attacks. Yet, just before all-out war, China ceases its efforts, having become successful in its bid to cripple the U.S. AI industry so it can reach superintelligence first.

SCENARIO 2: The U.S. is ahead, but China is only barely behind. China uses its innovative AI models to wargame nearly unlimited sequences and calculates what it believes is the perfect attack to prevent the U.S. from reaching superintelligence first. In this scenario, the attacks never ramp up. Instead, it results in a massive, unprovoked first strike that incapacitates the U.S. This might be a nuclear strike or simply an EMP strike that decimates the U.S. power grid. Either way, China wins again.

SCENARIO 3: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress. Public companies continue progressing toward superintelligence, but one or both achieve it in a military or national laboratory behind closed doors. They ponder the best way to use it, leveraging it like the nuclear football in global diplomacy (i.e., setting the briefcase on the floor next to the President). They may have accessed superintelligence but lack confidence in the technology to use it for the near future.

SCENARIO 4: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress, and both achieve superintelligence behind closed doors. Then one day, one of them launches an attack on the other, prompting the other side to launch its own superintelligence response. The two AI agents battle across every sector of society, arm-wrestling for control. Seemingly trivial differences between one model and another let one win in one sector and the other win in another.

This article does not presume that the outcome of a superintelligence race is represented in one of these four scenarios. Rather, it argues that AI will inevitably complicate the landscape of deterrence as it may give confidence of victory in otherwise stable situations. This moment in history is nothing less than the moment when scientists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein wrote President Roosevelt to warn of the potential use of fission in bombs.

The United States government must think carefully about the current state of AI in the world and what it will mean for deterrence strategy. We need to have a planned response if a superintelligence cyberattack is launched against the U.S. This includes physically isolating our command-and-control systems and planning for surprise attacks, itself planned by another country’s AI technology. Worse yet, military planners need to consider how to detect and respond to multiple grey zone micro-attacks that may be a component of a larger cascading attack.

We are amid our generation’s Manhattan Project moment. The 2023 Oppenheimer movie culminates in the detonation of the 1945 Trinity test. Perhaps if the United States plans well, in 80 years, we may all be able to enjoy a movie about Zuckerberg forming his superintelligence lab.

Rob Kittinger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The AI Revolution’s Outsized Impact on Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The NIDS View Podcast: Regional Security Under Pressure: Japan, Taiwan, and the Future of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

Signed in July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. Article VI of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article VI serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.

The latest SIPRI report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.

In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).

This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.

Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.

Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is the third trilateral meeting between these countries this year. The issue of terrorism in Pakistan was a top agenda in all three conferences. Apart from trade cooperation and CPEC, it matters most. The truth is that terrorism-related threats have their sources in Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus not only contended with internal insurgents but also with non-state actors based in Afghanistan. These players are aided by regional instability, ideological havens, and a rushed Western departure.

In the Global War on Terror, Pakistan was at the receiving end of a conflict it never initiated, yet it paid with blood and billions of dollars over the past two decades. This involvement led to the deaths of over 70,000 Pakistanis and resulted in losses exceeding $150 billion to Pakistan’s economy, post-9/11. The trauma is deep and the cost staggering, whether it was the school massacre in Peshawar, terror attacks on urban centers, or assaults on security forces. Even today, Pakistan continues to grapple with terrorism, a remnant of the Global War on Terror.

A 2024 report noted that more than 1,600 civilians and security personnel were killed in terror bombings and gun attacks. 2024 appeared to be the deadliest year, as more than 685 servicemen were killed in 444 terrorist incidents. In March of 2025, Pakistan ranked second in the Global Terrorism Index, as terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.

A new phase in Pakistan’s war on terror began with the launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024, a multi-faceted counterterrorism initiative aimed at breaking the chain of terrorism-related violence. A distinguishing feature of this operation is its full acknowledgment of cross-border terrorism, particularly that originating from Afghanistan. The operation focuses on improving intelligence capabilities, strengthening diplomatic ties with the Taliban government in Kabul, and aligning border management with broader security measures.

Operation Azm-e-Istehkam could potentially mark a systematic reform in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, built on a structure centered on intelligence-driven operations, regional cooperation, and social and economic reforms. However, for the operation to be implemented successfully, it must be accompanied by progress across the Durand Line. External sanctuaries in Afghanistan will continue to undermine the internal security gains achieved by Pakistan as long as the country remains a permissive environment for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.

As far as China is concerned, its interest in the Pak-Afghan rapprochement is twofold. One is that it aims to prevent any spillover of terror into Xinjiang province through radical networks. China wants to counter any strategic threat to CPEC, particularly since their officials have already been attacked by insurgents in Baluchistan. China also seeks to hamper the increasing influence of India in Kabul.

Furthermore, the economic presence of China can be used to influence the Taliban to tone down their attitude towards Pakistan. Beijing can contribute to creating integrated security architecture by offering aid, developing infrastructure, and offering trade incentives, especially the prospect of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. This might include collective management of the border and repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as coordinating intelligence.

In July, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Tianjin, China, emphasized the need for Afghan stability and greater cooperation among regional states. Beijing’s message was more than mere diplomacy. It signaled a strategic recalibration. This stance was echoed by Pakistan Foreign Minister Dar and was followed by a series of high-level talks between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing.

Previously, in May 2025, a trilateral dialogue was held in China between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The meeting produced a symbolic willingness to reinstate diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul at the ambassadorial level. More importantly, it opened an avenue for future regional security cooperation, not only against TTP terror but also against threats such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which have also drawn Beijing’s attention.

These trilateral engagements offer Pakistan two opportunities to internationalize its concerns over cross-border terrorism and the chance to tie those concerns to broader regional stability and economic growth.

China’s mediation introduces a new variable into the equation, shifting the dynamic from a binary of conflict and impunity to a triangle of pressure, cooperation, and mutual interest. Provided it is adequately utilized, the trilateral effort between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has the potential to evolve from a symbol into a solid plan—and out of weak diplomacy into stable security.

Qurat-UL-Ain Shabbir is a research officer at CISS.

Can Trilateral Diplomacy Secure Pakistan from Terrorism? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The simulated conflict ended without regime change in Pyongyang, allowing Kim Jong Un to claim a political victory. While avoiding nuclear escalation may seem prudent, such an outcome could deal a lasting blow to the credibility of America’s extended deterrence in East Asia.

The Guardian Tiger scenario should not be dismissed as an academic exercise. It reveals a critical vulnerability in the psychological foundation of deterrence: the perception among adversaries and allies of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of its partners. If allies conclude that Washington will not cross the nuclear threshold even after a nuclear attack, they may question the value of the nuclear umbrella. Adversaries, meanwhile, may learn that nuclear coercion, carefully calibrated, can succeed.

In the simulation, North Korea escalated to a tactical nuclear strike against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the East Sea (Guardian Tiger I) and later against the Chinhae naval base (Guardian Tiger II), home to the Republic of Korea Navy’s Submarine Force Command and occasionally used for allied submarine visits. According to the report, American leaders debated nuclear retaliation but settled on conventional “pulsed” strikes.

In a real-world scenario, such strikes could plausibly involve precision-guided munitions from long-range bombers like the B1-B and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aimed at targets such as missile transporter-erector launchers, hardened artillery positions along the DMZ, and command-and-control facilities near Pyongyang. In the exercise, the US stopped short of regime change, seeking to avoid further nuclear escalation and prevent a direct war with China—a decision that would have allowed Pyongyang to absorb the damage, count the survival of its regime as a strategic win, and enter negotiations from a stronger position.

Extended deterrence depends on more than military capability. It is rooted in the belief, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that the United States is willing to defend its partners by all means necessary, including nuclear weapons. An American failure to respond in kind to North Korean nuclear use would plant seeds of doubt. Japanese and South Korean leaders could begin to question whether Washington would truly “trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul” if the stakes involved limited nuclear use rather than an existential threat to the United States.

That doubt could trigger cascading effects. Calls in Seoul’s National Assembly for indigenous nuclear weapons, expanded production of the Hyunmoo‑4 ballistic missile, and pressure on Tokyo to more seriously pursue nuclear sharing arrangements have already entered the political debate.

This concern is amplified by North Korea’s 2022 nuclear weapons law, which openly authorizes preemptive nuclear strikes in scenarios ranging from an imminent attack on leadership to undefined overwhelming crisis situations. Analysts note that the law’s language effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use, implying tactical employment to repel invasion and seize the initiative in war. Rather than viewing nuclear use as a desperate last resort, Pyongyang now appears willing to employ such weapons early. For example, a low‑yield detonation against South Korean or American forward-deployed forces to shock Washington and Seoul into political concessions.

The challenge grows sharper in the event of a dual contingency: simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Guardian Tiger II simulated such a scenario, with China launching a multi-domain assault on Taiwan while North Korea escalated on the peninsula. In such a real-world situation, US Indo-Pacific Command could be forced to divert the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from Yokosuka to the waters east of Taiwan, deploy B‑52H bombers to deter Chinese operations, and even consider repositioning some Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile defense batteries from South Korea to protect American assets in Okinawa and Guam.

Such shifts illustrate how a stretched American posture could reduce missile interception capacity on the peninsula and temporarily remove some nuclear-capable platforms from immediate Korean defense. North Korea could calculate that Washington, already balancing a larger confrontation with China, would avoid nuclear escalation in Korea to conserve resources and limit the risk of an all-out US-China war.

The political and strategic consequences would ripple across the region. In Seoul, public and elite opinion could shift sharply toward developing an independent nuclear arsenal—something 71 percent of South Koreans already support. South Korea’s nuclear latency, widely assessed by proliferation experts, suggests it could potentially produce a weapon in as little as 6 months if political consensus formed.

In Tokyo, the debate over counterstrike capabilities, missile defense expansion, and potential nuclear sharing with the United States would intensify, potentially accelerating deployment of Tomahawk missiles and further integration of F‑35A fighters, which, in the US fleet, are being certified for B61‑12 nuclear bombs, into allied defense planning. Beijing, meanwhile, could seize the opportunity to position itself as a stabilizing broker, offering to mediate between Seoul and Pyongyang while shielding the latter from full international accountability, further eroding American influence.

Avoiding nuclear escalation in a limited-strike scenario is understandable, but Washington cannot afford such a decision to be interpreted as weakness. Strengthening deterrence credibility in Northeast Asia will require more than declaratory statements. Clear and credible red lines for nuclear use must be communicated both publicly and privately. Integrated nuclear-conventional planning with allies should ensure that flexible response options, from proportionate nuclear strikes to overwhelming conventional retaliation, are executable on short notice. Contingency planning must explicitly account for simultaneous conflicts in Korea and Taiwan, with pre-positioned munitions, dispersed basing arrangements for nuclear-capable aircraft, and rotational deployments of dual-capable ships and submarines to maintain strategic presence even under force diversion.

Equally important is sustained alliance signaling. These include high-visibility joint exercises like the US-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, regular port visits by nuclear-capable submarines, and trilateral missile tracking drills with Japan. These measures reassure allies, complicate adversary calculations, and demonstrate that any nuclear use will incur unacceptable costs.

The Guardian Tiger exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how quickly deterrence can fray in the fog of crisis. A single decision to refrain from nuclear retaliation, however understandable at the time, could reverberate for decades and reshape the strategic balance in East Asia. In the nuclear age, preserving deterrence means guarding against both uncontrolled escalation and the perceptions of hesitation that could invite it.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

A Nuclear Umbrella in Peril: Lessons from North Korea’s Escalation Scenarios was originally published on Global Security Review.

The reality is that Americans live in an increasingly complex threat environment, and the credibility of the nuclear deterrent ultimately depends on America’s ability to respond to technical or strategic surprise. That includes being ready, if necessary, to conduct a nuclear test.

There are multiple and specific conditions under which the US might be compelled to resume underground nuclear testing, each involving serious strategic or technical concerns that cannot be resolved through non-explosive means as directed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program obligations.

From an American strategic perspective, it is possible that a future administration or Congress could determine that the long-standing moratorium on nuclear testing no longer serves American interests. For example, if credible intelligence revealed that an adversary, such as China or Russia, were conducting yield-producing tests, particularly to develop new capabilities or gain strategic advantage, then confidence in the existing deterrence balance could be undermined.

Adversary behavior is a factor the United States cannot ignore. China and Russia maintain active test sites and appear to be positioned to resume testing on short notice. If either nation were to conduct a low-yield test that altered the strategic balance, the US would need to respond—not necessarily by testing, but by demonstrating that it is able. Detecting and interpreting data from these tests may result in the restoration of confidence in the status quo.

Should a nuclear-armed adversary employ or threaten limited nuclear use, a carefully calibrated test could be used to demonstrate resolve, reassure allies, stabilize the situation, and deter further escalation. Such signaling would carry substantial diplomatic consequences and would only be contemplated under extraordinary circumstances.

In addition to strategic drivers that might lead to the resumption of nuclear testing, various technical issues might force America’s hand. For instance, the inability to certify the stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as technical issues with weapons or their components, might also be a driver to resume full-scale nuclear testing.

One such condition would be the emergence of significant doubt about the reliability or safety of an existing warhead type. As the stockpile ages, performance uncertainties can develop in critical components such as plutonium pits, high explosives, or firing systems. If these concerns cannot be resolved through laboratory experiments, modeling, or subcritical testing, a nuclear test might be required to validate performance or ensure safety margins. Such a step would follow a determination by the Nuclear Weapons Council and the national laboratories that non-testing alternatives are insufficient.

A second issue involves the development and certification of new warhead designs. While current policy emphasizes life-extension programs using legacy designs, future geopolitical or technological developments could prompt the US to pursue novel nuclear systems. For example, if the Department of Defense sought a warhead optimized for hypersonic delivery or deeply buried targets, such a design might require full-scale testing for certification—particularly if it deviates from previously tested architectures.

Lastly, there is also the possibility of future weapon development. While current policy focuses on life-extension programs, emerging mission needs may eventually require new designs. If those designs fall outside the range of previously tested systems, the US may have no choice but to test them to certify performance.

Should the United States confront a situation where confidence in warhead reliability or safety can no longer be assured through non-explosive means, or where geopolitical developments erode the credibility of deterrence, a timely and technically sound return to testing may become necessary. However, should the US resume testing for any reason, a great number of challenges will need to be met and overcome.

During the four decades of active nuclear explosive testing, the US developed a strong and thorough testing infrastructure and mindset. As nuclear explosive weapon technology evolved, so did the methods of executing tests and measuring the performance of devices. Facilities, mostly in Nevada, were built and staffed to provide an environment capable of supporting test activities and all the personnel required to perform the tests.

These tests required the expertise of scientists from multiple disciplines, engineers of various specialties, program managers, environmental control technicians, and a wide array of support staff. In addition to the technical workforce, entire teams were responsible for sustaining day-to-day life at remote test sites—providing essential services such as food, water, housing, sanitation, medical support, and logistics.

A rough estimate of the numbers of personnel required to execute an active testing program can be found in a 1981 Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Newsletter. There were 240 federal employees, 7,100 contractors (laboratory and university personnel), and 11,300 southern Nevada support jobs. Unfortunately, just bringing together the wide variety of personnel needed to execute and support testing is only meeting an obvious challenge. A more subtle challenge is relearning how to keep any explosive test from eaking out of the ground and into the atmosphere.

A resumption of testing would still require the US to meet the obligations of two in-force international treaties; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limits the explosive yield of any test to 150 kilotons (kt), and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which bans all above ground and underwater tests. Compliance with the 150 kt limit on explosive yield can be easily maintained because scientists from the national laboratories can confidently ensure the magnitude of the yield will not exceed the limit.

Compliance with the obligations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty presents a different challenge. The cadre of scientific, engineering, and technical experts who would conduct the test are unlikely to have ever faced the challenges of nuclear testing—ensuring the energy and radioactive debris is “contained” in the underground environment.

The cadre of experts who last tested a nuclear weapon, almost 35 years ago, had to “learn” how to meet this unique challenge. Most likely, none of the current cadre has ever been asked to deal with such a large amount of energy released in such a small time increment. Keeping a test contained underground is a vital national interest as a leak of radioactive materials from a nuclear test would cause significant harm to the nuclear enterprise.

Any resumption of nuclear explosive testing would represent a fundamental policy shift with far-reaching implications. A return to testing would affect arms control dynamics, global nonproliferation norms, and the strategic behavior of both allies and adversaries. For these reasons, the threshold for testing remains extraordinarily high, but it is not absolute. Given the challenges facing the United States, dramatic change may come when least expected. A requirement to test a nuclear weapon for strategic or technical reasons may be a part of that change.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joel Karasikis a contractor for the Defense Nuclear Weapons School.  The views expressed are their own.

It Is Time to Test Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

Meanwhile, the US Department of Defense (DoD) appears to be doing the opposite. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) recently axed its Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate, a move many analysts view as strategic self-sabotage.

This directorate, responsible for overseeing more than $340 million in AI and digital integrations in fiscal year 2024, represented a critical nexus linking battlefield innovations with institutional infrastructure. Its elimination, justified under “efficiency” mandates, alarmed defense observers who fear it fractures continuity, erases institutional memory, and sends a dangerous signal to adversaries willing to exploit perceived American weakness.

The Strategic Misstep

The CDAO was formed in 2022 by fusing key functions from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service, Chief Data Office, and Advana analytics, aiming to unify policy, technology, and digital services. Embedded within CDAO, the CTO led cross-functional teams in AI, cyber, logistics, and command-and-control systems, ensuring that new technologies remained interoperable and aligned with warfighter requirements.

Abruptly dismantling this directorate not only removes a pivotal vision and coordination role but also creates a void with no clear replacement. The result is fragmented efforts, lost synergy across mission areas, and a battlefield advantage handed to adversaries.

Expertise Lost, Momentum Undermined

Leadership and expertise take years, even decades, to develop. Figures like Bill Streilein, former CTO of CDAO and veteran of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, carried institutional memory and high standards into Pentagon AI programs. But when top-tier professionals are sidelined under the label of “streamlining,” they often leave and seldom return.

This pattern has already occurred. The Defense Digital Service (DDS), once lauded as the Pentagon’s “SWAT team of nerds,” lost almost all of its members by May 2025, prompting its demise. Nearly every DDS member, citing bureaucratic pressure from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), chose to depart rather than conform.

These departures are not benign transfers. They represent the scattering of core innovators and connectors whose insight and trust networks are irreplaceable. Without them, emerging AI systems risk becoming siloed projects rather than battlefield-enabling capabilities.

DOGE: Efficiency or Engineered Evisceration?

DOGE, instituted by a presidential executive order in January 2025, is authorized to slash perceived inefficiencies across federal agencies—often through AI-enhanced, automated assessments. Under the leadership of figures tied to Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, DOGE has repurposed its mandate to aggressively target leadership and innovation roles across the board—including in national defense.

DOGE has justified cuts using its proprietary AI systems to flag and eliminate “inefficient” programs, often without human oversight or contextual nuance. The CTO’s directorate was among its most high-profile targets, methodically identified and removed, despite its mission-critical nature.

To make matters worse, DOGE is reportedly comfortable with these decisions. One Pentagon official described it as a “theater of dominance,” not just cost-cutting, but deliberate erasure of institutional anchors to obfuscate the depth and breadth of the sacrifice.

The High-Stakes Fallout

Adversaries feast on the narrative that the US champions AI yet purges its own tech leadership overnight. “America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare,” such narratives go. These optics weaken American deterrence, erode allied confidence, and provide cover for Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang to reframe the battlefield narrative.

Domestic consequences are equally grim. The consistent removal of flagship tech roles projects a clear message to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) professionals; serve, and risk being discarded. That weakness is a recruitment boon for adversaries, national lab contractors, and tech-armed autocracies solving tomorrow’s warfare puzzles.

Real efficiencies lie not in gutting leadership but in fortifying it. Per the National Security Commission on AI, prioritizing disciplined recruitment and retention of technical talent, including a Digital Corps and AI fellowships, is key to American competitiveness. Instead, we witness the dismantling of precisely those anchor roles meant to shepherd AI innovation into combat-relevant systems.

The DOGE-Driven Dismantling of Tech Leadership

The concepts herein are alarming and reflect an institutional unraveling that directly undermines America’s global security posture and strategic deterrence in five critical ways. First, the elimination of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate from the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) strips away a core pillar of the Pentagon’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for battlefield advantage. This directorate was not redundant bureaucracy; it was the crucible in which ideas from national labs, industry, and warfighters were harmonized into operational capability.

By abruptly dismantling this team, the Department of Defense has extinguished a pipeline of institutional memory and strategic insight at the precise moment when rapid, informed, and integrated decision-making is needed. This brain drain parallels a historical pattern of self-sabotage and leaves adversaries uncontested in the tech talent race.

Second, the removal of high-level AI leadership is a propaganda gift to revisionist powers like China and Russia. These states are watching America voluntarily decapitate its own strategic leadership, an act they can now frame as proof of American decline. This strengthens their strategic messaging in influence campaigns aimed at allies, neutral states, and even American citizens.

“America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare” is not just a phrase, it is a weaponized narrative that demoralizes partners and emboldens adversaries to challenge American dominance in contested domains like cyberspace, space, and AI warfare.

Third, strategic deterrence hinges on credible capability and the perception of cohesion. DOGE’s algorithmic-driven targeting of leadership roles without contextual assessment introduces chaos into the acquisition and integration life cycle of military AI systems. Instead of creating synergistic effects across logistics, cyber, and command and control, the US risks building a fractured, siloed ecosystem that fails in joint operations.

By removing the very leaders who prevent stove piping, the US sabotages its ability to develop and field interoperable, scalable, and warfighter-ready AI tools. This systemic breakdown makes deterrence brittle, vulnerable to being cracked in future high-end conflicts.

Fourth, the US has struggled to compete with the private sector for AI and cybersecurity talent. By signaling that even elite government technologists are disposable under the guise of “efficiency,” this policy drives future talent away from public service. Those who might have joined a modern “Digital Corps” will instead seek stability and respect elsewhere, perhaps even abroad.

Strategic deterrence depends not only on weapons but on technologists who know how to deploy them. Gutting these roles ensures that tomorrow’s innovations will not make it past the lab, let alone onto the battlefield.

Fifth, DOGE’s use of automated assessments to eliminate “inefficiencies” without human oversight is a grotesque parody of reform. Its reliance on cold, context-blind algorithms to purge critical roles mimics adversary models of techno-authoritarianism, not democratic accountability. If allowed to continue, this will hollow out innovation across government agencies and military branches.

Efficiency is not the enemy, misapplied efficiency is. Strategic deterrence requires smart investments, not cost-cutting theater that sacrifices our warfighting edge on the altar of political optics.

Strategic Self-Sabotage Must Be Reversed

This is not merely streamlining, it is full-blown surrender. The dismantling of the CDAO’s CTO directorate and the broader DOGE initiative represents an engineered unraveling of the very leadership needed to project U.S. strategic deterrence in the AI era. Leadership is the vector through which technology becomes capability. Remove it, and you hand your adversaries not only the advantage, but the narrative.

Unless reversed, these concepts and actions will echo through wargames, deterrence failures, and battlefield losses. The US must stop cannibalizing its competitive edge and re-center its national security strategy on strengthening, not sidelining, its AI leadership.

Conclusion

Leadership is not just overhead on the funding spreadsheet; these leaders are our ammunition in the fight for global AI dominance. Removing them during a strategic inflection point is not reform, it is a self-made vulnerability, and as the US disables its own leadership of advanced technologies, it is dismantling future readiness.

The nation must insist on accountability. Cost-cutting means nothing if it costs the technological coherence to compete in tomorrow’s battles. In the strategic competition unfolding now, leadership is the weapon, and ceding it is surrender. This page out of the DOGE handbook should be shredded and burned. Remember, Iranian nuclear scientists were not dismantled by their own regime, they were destroyed by US and Israeli bombs.

Greg Sharpe is Marketing Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is retired from the US Air Force. The views expressed are his own.

The Quiet Dismantling of America’s AI Warfighting Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

The credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, is inextricably linked to domestic well-being. Economic prosperity, social cohesion, and the trust citizens have in their institutions are all part of that amorphous concept. Adversaries like Russia and China understand that it is in their interest to undermine American societal health; it is time Americans realize the challenge facing the nation.

For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence rested on a triad of capabilities, credibility, and communication. The United States fielded the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal and communicated credibility effectively. But credibility—the unwavering belief in America’s will to act—is the lynchpin.

This is where the home front becomes the front line. A nation that is prosperous, unified, and optimistic possesses the strategic endurance to maintain its commitments. Societal well-being is not a “soft” issue separate from “hard” power; it is a foundational strategic asset that fuels long-term political resolve.

The mechanisms connecting a healthy society to a credible deterrent are not merely theoretical. They are etched into recent history. Consider the 1980s under President Reagan. An economic resurgence and a renewed sense of national confidence provided the political capital and financial resources for a sweeping modernization of nuclear forces that saw the Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 stealth bomber enter service.

This was not just a military build-up; it was a clear signal to the Soviet Union, born from a nation that had the resources and the will to compete over the long haul. High public trust, buoyed by economic stability, sustained the political commitment for these massive, multi-decade investments.

Contrast this with the period following the 2008 financial crisis. The ensuing economic pain, political polarization, and public discontent led directly to the Budget Control Act and sequestration, which imposed punishing cuts on the defense budget. Allies and adversaries alike watched as Americans debated whether they could afford to modernize an aging nuclear triad. The signal was one of constraint and introspection, raising quiet questions in foreign capitals about the long-term reliability of America’s security guarantees. A nation struggling with internal economic and social crises inevitably projects an image of distraction and dwindling resolve.

Adversaries did not miss this lesson. They astutely integrated America’s domestic vulnerabilities into their national security strategies. China and Russia are engaged in a relentless campaign of information warfare designed to exacerbate our societal fissures. State-controlled media outlets like CGTN (Chinese) and RT (Russian), amplified by armies of bots and trolls on social media, relentlessly spotlight American inequality, racial tensions, and political gridlock.

Their goal is twofold: erode the confidence of Americans in their own democratic system and persuade the world that the United States is a chaotic, declining power whose deterrence is brittle and promises are hollow. By turning societal metrics into weapons against Americans, adversaries aim to achieve strategic gains without firing a shot.

Of course, the relationship between societal health and defense is not without its complexities. A valid counterargument holds that a society enjoying high well-being might become complacent, preferring to spend its “peace dividend” on social programs rather than defense. The post–Cold War era saw this exact debate, as calls to shift funding from “guns to butter” grew louder.

This presents a genuine leadership challenge that requires articulating why investments in national security are essential to protecting the very prosperity and stability Americans enjoy. The choice is not always between a new healthcare program and a new submarine. A strong, healthy, and educated populace, free from economic precarity, is the very foundation that allows a nation to project power and afford the tools of its own defense. A robust social safety net and a powerful military are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing pillars of a resilient state.

This calculus extends to the nation’s most critical strategic advantage: America’s network of alliances. The strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, is not purely a measure of its combined military hardware. It is rooted in a collective commitment to democratic values and the shared societal well-being of its members.

A stable, prosperous, and unified America reassures allies and strengthens collective deterrence. Conversely, an America seen as internally fractured and unreliable invites doubt, weakening the very alliances that magnify American power. When allied societies are confident in American leadership, collective credibility soars.

Therefore, Americans must rethink national security for the twenty-first century by placing American well-being at the very heart of our strategic imperatives. Bridging the economic divide not only broadens our tax base but also strengthens social cohesion, enabling sustainable defense budgets without overburdening taxpayers. Revitalizing education fuels scientific breakthroughs and cultivates the skilled workforce needed to modernize our nuclear command, control, and delivery systems. Upgrading infrastructure, from critical ports and highways to resilient cybersecurity networks, enhances our logistical agility, accelerates force deployment, and bolsters the credibility of our deterrent. By fostering political unity, we project resolve to allies and adversaries alike, inoculating our society against foreign information warfare and ensuring decisive, coordinated responses in times of crisis.

The defining contest of this century will not be waged on traditional battlefields but in a struggle of systems: our free, prosperous, and cohesive society versus an authoritarian model of centralized control. To secure our peace, we must fortify America’s Silent Shield at home. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, by extension, our global leadership, will always mirror the resilience and unity of the nation it protects.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

American allies are unanimous in rejecting extended deterrence that does not include the potential use of nuclear weapons. NFU would give a nuclear-armed adversary, such as Russia, a sanctuary from which to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Removing American nuclear forces as a credible deterrent cedes all bargaining power to Moscow, China, and any other would-be nuclear or conventional adversary.

Associated with this campaign is an effort to remove the president’s authority to employ nuclear weapons without at least two additional officials supporting such a decision. They also claim the president would have very little time to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should the US face a nuclear first strike. Of course, ending the president’s “sole authority” would only exacerbate the challenge.

There is a false argument often repeated that American nuclear weapons are on “hair trigger alert” and the president might make a reckless decision to launch, given the assumed minimal time available to determine whether a nuclear response is warranted. It is of course clear how such a decision-making process is significantly impeded if the president must receive concurrence from other officials to make a decision. Such a move reduces the credibility of American deterrence in the minds of adversaries.

Three other factors are also being brought to bear in this campaign to adopt a NFU strategy. First, there is an assertion that the president could be reckless and impetuous and might unnecessarily order the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is an assertion that a president’s order may be illegal and thus having a “second confirmation authority/opinion” is a good thing. Third, there is an assertion that American deterrence strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons against cities and urban areas—with the objective of killing millions of civilians.

All three assertions are false. The first assertion is belied by the fact that every president understands the dangers of nuclear war. President Donald Trump made several statements to this effect, so the notion he, or any president, would be “reckless and impetuous” does not bear scrutiny. His administration’s major investments in deterrence illustrate the seriousness with which the country seeks to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

The second assertion on the “illegality” of ordering nuclear use ignores the constitutional role of the president as commander in chief. States wage war regardless of whether the United Nations says it is illegal. Nuclear weapons are merely tools of war. They are not special. They simply pack more explosive energy in a smaller package than a conventional weapon.

The third assertion ignores the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which explicitly states that attacks against unarmed civilians and non-combatants violate just war principles and are prohibited. American nuclear deterrence strategy explicitly rules out the purposeful targeting of civilian populations and cities, a posture many nuclear abolitionists oppose as they advocate city busting.

Given US deterrence strategy strictly forbids the targeting of cities and civilian populations, there is no basis for believing that carrying out the president’s order to employ weapons will be or be seen as illegal by either civilian or military officials. Thus, there is no need for multiple individuals involved in releasing weapons, all while the president is working through an already compressed and stressful timeline.

A recent “study” by the University of Massachusetts and the Human Security Lab cooked the books by asking both military and civilian officials whether they would oppose an “illegal” presidential order requiring the US to launch nuclear weapons against civilians. Many respondents, having been coached to believe such orders were realistically probable, said they would oppose such orders or at least seek to question the orders. These results were then hijacked to create a false narrative that even military officials now doubt President Trump’s leadership and would not obey the commander in chief if ordered to employ nuclear weapons. Given the survey was conducted during the Israel and US military strikes against Iran, the results were designed to call into question the reasonableness of conventional strikes on Iran.

The campaign to call into question American deterrence policy is based on a willful misrepresentation of states policy and strategic reality. Annie Jacobsen dramatized this misinformation in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario, in which she described US nuclear deterrence strategy as crazy. She proposed jettisoning the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, whether used first or second, and taking such capability completely off the table. When asked what replacement she recommended, Jacobsen claimed such a question was beyond her expertise.

Leaving the nuclear deterrent off the table is part of a concerted disarmament campaign pushed by nuclear abolitionists. These groups were able to ensure the United Nations passed a treaty that bans nuclear weapons, which is as valuable as a treaty which bans war. While 73 nations signed the treaty, none are nuclear weapons states.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is seeking to stop nuclear modernization in the United States, which is strange considering Russia and China are in the midst of major modernization programs. There is nothing less effective than taking a knife to a gunfight, which is exactly what advocates of nuclear disarmament would impose on the free world. For nearly 80 years the US has made sure the nation fields the systems needed to ensure deterrence works. Now is not the time to abandon a successful strategy for the sake of feel-good activism.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Campaign to End Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

The digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s initiative to invest in critical telecommunications and emerging technology in foreign countries, is a vehicle to lower the barriers to cyber coercion and propagate the digital curtain. By embedding its “model of technology-enabled authoritarianism” in recipient nations, Beijing seeks to shape the digital ecosystems of other countries in ways that serve its strategic interests. Such attempts call for a proactive and coordinated response from the United States and its regional partners—one that builds a resilient, tech-driven organization capable of countering China’s digital expansion across the the Indo-Pacific.

The United States and China are engaged in a great power competition, one which has seeped into multiple theaters and domains. The Indo-Pacific region is generally understood to be the frontline of this contest.

However, China’s burgeoning technological capacity has led to cyberspace being a critical juncture in this competition; one where traditional borders fade, thereby allowing the proliferation of gray zone tactics. Such tactics are deployed in various ways—infiltrating critical infrastructure, cyber espionage, and disinformation campaigns—on key democracies in the region.

Considering the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific, China’s attempts to use cyber coercion to cleave the region from the United States’ sphere of influence highlights a calculated strategy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The region is home to over 50 percent of the world’s population, and 80 percent of global trade volume transits through its channels. It houses “seven of the world’s largest militaries, and five American treaty allies.”

Moreover, digital connectivity and internet adoption rates are the fastest growing compared to any region in the word, making it rife with opportunities and threats. These vulnerabilities not only indicate further volatility for regional governments but could also undermine American national security.

The list of cyber incidents already attributed to Chinese state-sponsored entities is extensive, and its targets are equally expansive. Advanced persistent threat (APT)—long-term, sophisticated, and entrenched cyber intrusions designed to hack, steal, and/or neutralize systems—have been a weapon of choice for those entities. For instance, APT-30 and APT-40, which targeted Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and New Zealand’s government, respectively, are reportedly linked to the Chinese government.

Furthermore, American intelligence and cybersecurity agencies recently confirmed that Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored entity, compromised American critical infrastructure ranging from telecommunications to water systems; its reach even included US territories such as Guam.

While the specter of ATPs and digital intrusions have entered the purview of several governments in the Indo-Pacific region, individual efforts to deter those threats are futile. This is often due to strategic inertia, a shortage of specialized workers, and asymmetric capabilities.

A consolidated effort by the United States and its regional partners is needed to build consensus, direct resources, and establish a digital enforcement body. This could address those issues while mitigating any potential upheaval from China’s tactics. Fortunately, the groundwork for such a partnership is already in place.

On July 1, 2025, the 10th Quad foreign ministers’ meeting was hosted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where he was joined by his counterparts from Japan, India, and Australia. It was the second such meeting since January, signifying the importance placed on the vision of the group by the Trump administration.

The measures agreed upon as a result are further evidence to that fact—initiatives to bolster maritime and transnational security, economic security, critical and emerging technology, among others. Therefore, the vast security mandates of those initiatives provide a viable path to constructing a techno-centric partnership while addressing the region’s strategic, skills, and capabilities gaps when it comes to deterring China’s digital incursions.

The decision to expand the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)—a technology-focused initiative to augment the maritime security landscape—provides a practical foundation for a techno-centric partnership. Its stated goal of developing a “common operating picture” for the IPMDA could lead to the basis for a strategic consensus among potential members.

Furthermore, incorporating insights from the first Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) workshop could assist in closing the skills gap for a regional digital workforce, further adding to the partnership’s feasibility.

Additional features which could be utilized for the partnership and address the capabilities gap include the Quad Cyber Challenge and the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. The Cyber Challenge seeks to enhance the cyber ecosystem, digital awareness, and resourcing among member nations.

The Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience, on the other hand, bears a more tactical responsibility of strengthening telecommunications infrastructure, specifically, undersea cables—arguably the most critical component of the digital ecosystem. Although these initiatives are focused on Quad member-nations, they could be expanded in a larger forum to engage ASEAN and Pacific subregional organizations such as the Pacific Island Forum, providing more opportunities for resource allocation.

There is institutional and strategic momentum behind the formation of a tech-centric partnership, not to mention the critical security imperative that exists. The broad consensus, coupled with the runway to take near-term action, makes this a prospective enterprise. Such concrete action is necessitated if the US and its regional allies expect to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and establish an active deterrent to China, which seeks to write the rules and draw the margins of the evolving digital age.

Abrar Rahman Namir is currently interning at Associated Universities and assisting in the Batteries and Energies to Advance Commercialization and National Security program as a supply chains and trade analyst.

Tech-centric Partnership in the Indo-Pacific to Deter Digital Curtain was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

While certification is contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its own submarine production rate, which is struggling to meet the planned two Virginia-class submarines per year, Australia would benefit greatly from their acquisition. Overall, it is worth noting that AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II are likely to significantly enhance US undersea capabilities in the long term. Pillar I includes the rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, from 2027. HMAS Stirling provides the United States with greater access for the forward presence of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific access is further expanded via the new submarine base that is planned for the east coast of Australia by 2043. The authorized consolidated Commonwealth-owned Defence Precinct at Western Australia’s Henderson shipyard will provide contingency-docking and depot-level maintenance for AUKUS submarines by 2033, potentially alleviating some of the burden on US-based maintenance facilities. Pillar II will provide the advanced technology necessary to enhance US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities, particularly for longer term advantages in mobility, survivability, lethality, and sustainability of allied forces.

Conversely, the SLCM-N is likely a significant factor in retaining American undersea capabilities. The SLCM-N will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly as the US needs to provide extended nuclear deterrence to 32 NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea. There are three options to consider when attempting to deter China, North Korea, and Russia.

First, the United States can provide Australia three to five conventionally armed Virginia-class submarines. This option is likely to significantly degrade American undersea capabilities through a lack of flexible response options for strategic deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Plus, Australia will need to manage three classes of submarines: the Collins-class, the AUKUS-class, and the SSN-AUKUS under this option.

Second, Australia can field a dual-capable submarines (DCS) mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. This option requires the establishment of a nuclear planning group (NPG) to plan for a DCS mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. These submarines would be capable of carrying the SLCM-N. This nuclear-armed option is unlikely to degrade US undersea capabilities, as Australia could support some US missions in the Indo-Pacific and provide flexible deterrence options. Australia will still need to manage three submarine classes under this option.

Third, the United States does not sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia, but instead bases submarines armed with SLCM-N in Australia, either on a permanent or rotational basis. This option does not degrade US undersea capabilities. However, under this option Australia should negotiate for extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. This option is not the end of AUKUS, but Australia will need to build sovereign SSN-AUKUS submarines to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines when they are retired.

Policymakers should not be afraid to consider a flexible nuclear-armed option in light of recent and historic Russian and Chinese rhetoric on AUKUS, especially when this rhetoric concerns “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability.” Having a nuclear-armed option would provide enough flexibility to backstop and limit conventional war.

On April 18, 2025, Russia’s envoy to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, defended military ties with Jakarta and did not deny claims that Russia seeks to station long-range military aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor, about 1400 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. Russia asserted that AUKUS is more of a threat to the Asia-Pacific than Russian ties with Indonesia, which are “not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Tolchenov added that challenges to regional stability

are more likely to arise from the rotational deployment of large military contingents from extra-regional states on Australian territory, including the provision of airfields for the landing of strategic bombers and port infrastructure for visits by nuclear-powered submarines. Particularly alarming are the currently discussed plans to deploy the US intermediate-range missiles in Australia, which would put ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, including Indonesia, within its range, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership.

These comments are consistent with Putin’s rhetoric against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This is not the first time Russia and China accused the US, UK, and Australia of risking an intensified arms race and military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. A report by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Centre stated, “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.” The report goes on to say that “[w]hile current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.” The report further criticizes AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation, which the report suggests will trigger a regional submarine arms race.

Chinese and Russian threats should not limit or contain AUKUS to non-nuclear options. This is particularly true when the US has historically provided non-nuclear long-range precision-strike capability. In the past this included the F-111 Aardvark, F/A-18F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II.

Under the UN Charter, members have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Hence, Australia and its allies should stand by the expression, si vis pacem, para bellum. Australia and its AUKUS allies should not back down from non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability or nuclear-armed deterrence options that provide more flexible responses.

Although, the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement may be contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its submarine production rate. It is worth noting that American undersea capabilities, particularly in the long term, may be greatly enhanced through other means under AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II.

In the new era of nuclear disorder, the key to maintaining American undersea capabilities will likely be the SLCM-N deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines. The SLCM-N will provide AUKUS flexible deterrence options and limit risk of conflict in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Natalie A. Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. She is the Australian Company Director of Alpha–India Consultancy. Natalie formerly contracted to the Australian Department of Defence. Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of any organization, employer, or affiliated group.

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS was originally published on Global Security Review.

5GW includes information dominance and manipulation, social engineering, economic coercion, cyber sabotage, and hybrid influence operations. It thrives on ambiguity, exploiting vulnerabilities without traditional combat. In 5GW, the lines between war and peace are blurred. No declarations, no clear enemies, just a relentless assault on stability. The goal is not to conquer land or destroy armies, but to cripple a nation’s spirit, economy, and infrastructure from within.

One of the most potent asymmetric tools of 5GW is economic manipulation. Palau, a serene archipelago of over 500 islands, were untouched by war until 2017. Palau dared to reject Beijing’s “One China Policy.” This move sent shockwaves through its fragile economy in the form of economic strangulation. In a masterstroke of economic coercion, China’s state-backed tour operators erased Palau from the Web.

Travel agencies stopped selling trips. Online searches yielded no results. Palau’s tourism industry, which accounted for 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), collapsed. Hotels emptied, airlines shut down, and the once-thriving economy suffocated.

This was not an anomaly, but a pattern. In 2016, South Korea agreed to facilitate the American THAAD missile defense system. China retaliated not with weapons but with economic muscle. Mysterious “fire and safety” violations suddenly appeared in South Korean businesses across China. A nine-month ban on Chinese tourism cost Seoul $6.5 billion. Retail giants like Lotte crumbled, thousands lost jobs, and yet, no war was declared.

The more interconnected the world economy becomes, the more vulnerable nations are to economic blackmail. Even Venezuela, despite its fiery anti-American rhetoric, was bound to the US economy. In 2018, despite Washington branding Nicolás Maduro a dictator and Caracas calling the US a “white supremacist regime,” the two nations still had $24 billion in trade, a quarter of Venezuela’s GDP.

Yet, when Washington imposed sweeping financial sanctions, Venezuela’s economy shrunk by 35 percent in a single year. After all, the United States does not just impose sanctions; it controls the very financial system that runs the world. The US dollar is the bloodline of global trade, and those who defy it find themselves cut off from international markets, unable to access capital or even conduct basic transactions. However, economic warfare breeds resistance.

Russia and China saw the writing on the wall. Between 2017 and 2020, Moscow slashed its holdings of US Treasury securities from $105 billion to just $3.8 billion and shifted towards China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), sidestepping American financial hegemony.

The true commanding heights of global dominance lie at the intersection of technology, finance, and unchecked ambition. China is not just selling 5G networks, it is embedding itself into the nervous system of global communication. On the other hand, the US does not just dominate finance, it controls the SWIFT banking system, ensuring economic warfare is just a sanction away. Similarly, corporations do not just innovate, they monopolize, influence, and quietly dictate policy behind closed doors.

“Surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.” A battle cry? Indeed. Not from a general on the battlefield, but from Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei, a company waging a war not just against competitors but against entire nations. Britain’s telecom networks are suspected to have Chinese backdoors.

Information is now what oil was in the 1970s, a critical commodity to be controlled. Today, data is the new crude, and the battle to monopolize its flow has already begun. Quantum computing, AI, and machine learning are the new oil rigs, and the nations that dominate these technologies will dictate the future. Unlike oil, information is easily stolen, manipulated, or even weaponized in ways no physical resource ever could.

The first lethal autonomous drone strike in Libya, recorded in March 2020, was a grim reminder of what is to come. A suicide drone, powered by AI, needed no human command—just a target. Fire and forget was the name of the game. Imagine the next phase: terrorist organizations deploying AI-powered swarms, able to strike with precision, invulnerability, and zero risk to human operatives. They would not negotiate, would not retreat, and would prove hard to stop.  

In a world where biological warfare is outlawed, the selective control of food, aid, and healthcare has replaced mass destruction with slow, calculated suffocation. Nations can now deny access to the very essentials of life to break their adversaries in a siege without walls and a war without battlefields. Over 40 percent of the world’s population faces water scarcity, and by 2030, drought could displace 700 million people. The Turkish-backed militias that had control over the Alouk water station in Syria in 2020 was a stark reminder—when resources are weaponized, suffering becomes policy.

Interestingly, the battle of perception is gaining momentum more than ever. In an era of clickbait headlines and disinformation campaigns, lies travel faster than truth. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that false news spreads 70 percent faster than real news. From the Soviet KGB planting the rumor in the 1980s that the US government created AIDS to modern deepfake propaganda, deception is the new artillery.

Even culture is not immune. Hollywood exported American ideals, Bollywood spread Indian influence, and K-pop turned South Korea into a global powerhouse. For instance, the Cold War was not just won by missiles, it was won when a West German band sang “Wind of Change,” which then became the anthem of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.

If hunger, water, and financial systems hare already weaponized, the next battlefield is clear—space and the seabed. Subsea communication cables are responsible for carrying 97 percent of global data traffic and are the arteries of the modern economy. They enable over $10 trillion in financial transactions every single day. Yet, these vital lifelines remain shockingly unprotected and are vulnerable to sabotage, espionage, and strategic disruption. A targeted attack on just a handful of these cables could cripple stock markets, paralyze banking systems, and sever military command structures—all without a single warship being deployed.

Meanwhile, the race for space dominance is accelerating. From $63.66 billion in 2024 to an estimated $74.4 billion by 2028, the global military satellite market is growing, fueled by the realization that power no longer lies in boots on the ground, but in eyes in the sky. Satellites provide precision-strike capabilities, secure communication, and real-time battlefield intelligence. The Pentagon warns that the US is already vulnerable, with China and Russia developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

In this realm, one can say that modern states wage wars without battlefields, where the goal is not to destroy but to subdue—crippling economies, infiltrating cyber networks, and manipulating narratives without a single shot fired. What is never openly begun is rarely officially ended. In 5th-generation warfare, silence is a weapon, perception is the battlefield, and survival means accepting that war never truly ends.

Syeda Fizzah Shuja is a Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College and an Mphil scholar in Peace and Counter Terrorism. Her work focuses on hybrid warfare and maritime terrorism. She can be contacted at fizzasyed2k@gmail.com.

The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields was originally published on Global Security Review.

Focusing on information operations is critical. Drones, for example, use artificial intelligence capabilities, as do defensive systems. However, conflict between near-peer adversaries and competitors is still unlikely as gray zone and hybrid conflict are the dominant avenues for competition. With the information environment transcending all domains of warfare, artificial intelligence capabilities become the go-to capability to ensure and maintain information advantage.

China’s AI-enhanced information operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated. For example, the Chinese advanced persistent threat actor Spamouflage Dragon uses generative AI to create online personas to influence public opinion. China and its proxy companies seek to develop or compete for AI supremacy within the information environment.

Of course, China will use anything within its arsenal to shape strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to its advantage, expand its influence, and create an ecosystem that is dependent on its technologies. For example, Baidu, known as the “Google of China,” invested billions into AI capabilities, creating the proprietary ERNIE model, which has been trained on billions of parameters, increasing the output’s quality and complexity.

However, China is also leveraging open-source AI models to shape the information environment. With the recent release of open-source large language models such as DeepSeek and Qwen, Chinese-linked subsidiaries, High-Flyer and Alibaba Group created a way to expand their influence, revise history, and likely create a dependent ecosystem for target countries. Unlike the much more expensive ChatGPT, for which the more basic model is free, China’s investment in generative AI models is free for the public and even surpasses ChatGPT’s in some respects.

There is a debate about how China’s proxy state companies were able to create these advanced models without US-based critical components. China allegedly did not have access to the advanced critical Nvidia chips for which most AI models are dependent. China seems to have created generative models just as suitable or even better than that of ChatGPT, but allegedly at a fraction of the cost and free of charge to the public. The US limited Nvidia chip exports to China, a market predicted to top $1 trillion in revenue within a decade. Still, the accusation is that the Chinese subsidiary leased or bought the more advanced Nvidia chips from Singapore, circumventing restrictions, and used ChatGPT to train its model.

Regardless of how China secured these critical technologies, the cat is indeed out of the bag. China has shown that it has the capability to develop new and emerging AI technologies. From the capabilities already built, it now has a baseline to create even more capabilities to develop its own AI chip ecosystem. With such capabilities, China will become more active within the information environment with the help of AI capabilities, and its motives are far from benevolent.

Why is the Chinese model free? China has several motives, but it is likely in hopes that data and information across the globe are the price tag for using the model while lessening a dependency on Western technologies and becoming a global leader in AI by 2030. Whatever data is obtained by the United States is icing on the cake. The West is not the primary target audience. Both models have servers in Singapore and China, where information is likely subject to Chinese laws, and terms and conditions are meaningless.

The Chinese will use AI technologies to gain an advantage in the information environment and seek to expand influence by creating an ecosystem for which other countries are dependent on their models. The incentive is to give countries this technology to foster dependency. The idea is similar to China’s debt-trap diplomacy—the Belt and Road Initiative. While ChatGPT’s basic model is free, China seeks to develop better models at a cheaper price to serve as leverage over countries that cannot afford the higher-end US-based models.

The United States is taking the right approach to maintaining its information advantage through AI development and investment. The billions pouring into creating AI data centers will play an important role in ensuring the United States has the edge in AI.

These data centers remain critical for identifying and countering any malign information operations against the United States, its partners, and its allies. When Iran attempted to influence the 2024 presidential election using the generative model GPT, OpenAI detected and shut it down. Without this expansive investment in AI data centers that keep information within the letter of US law and oversight, these interventions would be out of reach, and information operations may be even more challenging to detect.

However, this approach is insufficient without incorporating artificial Intelligence into all aspects of military operations. The DoD uses artificial intelligence within some branches, but given the expansive nature of AI, this is not enough. AI is expected to touch nearly all aspects of military operations, especially information operations, and may not have time to wait for its major AI initiative, Project Maven, to fully develop.

Some military scholars have called something like this a revolution in military affairs, but perhaps, given the impact of war, it could be classified as such. The concept is somewhat antiquated and outdated without some context, but it remains the best way to describe what should take place within the DoD. The foundation is already in place through the conceptual framework of multidomain operations.

Artificial capabilities are widely available through graphical user interfaces in deployable, ready-to-use form, such as ChatGPT or even internal large language models. The joint force should use these capabilities to the broadest extent possible. If anything, artificial intelligence, including large language models, will make joint and combined forces more lethal and accurate as they counter Chinese efforts within the information environment.

The DoD must adopt incentives for service members to understand the capabilities of AI and incorporate them in all training environments. These incentives can include bonuses for taking AI-driven courses. The DoD can also increase awareness and accessibility of AI courses on its education platforms which now have a paucity of artificial intelligence courses.

The DoD must also improve the training environment. With proprietary or off-the-shelf software, the DoD can incorporate AI offensive and defensive platforms within all training and mission-critical tasks. Even simply assisting with identifying generative outputs, e.g., deepfakes, will counter Chinese influence within the information environment, especially during hybrid conflict. Furthermore, military doctrine should recognize the importance of AI, especially information operations, with an emphasis on psychological operations.

While AI investment is critical to countering Chinese influence within the information environment, the only way to truly embrace multidomain operations is to ensure service members have the AI technical competency necessary to maneuver within the information environment deterring Chinese aggression.

US Army Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is a PhD researcher at King’s College London studying how artificial Intelligence will impact conflict. He can be reached at matthew.fecteau.alumni@armywarcollege.edu.

China’s AI-Driven Information Operations Are Here: The US Needs an AI RMA was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.

The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for regional proliferation.

Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the existing arms control framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.

The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.

Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a climate of uncertainty. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.

President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.

This approach stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.

The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by unconstrained proliferation and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to harness AI’s potential for economic, social, and global political empowerment. The implications of the AI divide are leading to a tech race that impact geopolitical power dynamics, exacerbating competition major powers like the US, China, France, and India. Depending on how the race ends, it could swing the balance of power in a negative direction.

AI Paris Summit

The recent AI Action Summit held in Paris emerged as a pivotal event that highlights both the opportunities and challenges associated with this evolving AI tech race. This summit serves as a beacon of innovation, encouraging France and India to collaborate more closely, while also exposing the complex interplay of international reactions, particularly from major powers like the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and China.

The summit focused on expanding AI’s boundaries while respecting environmental and ethical obligations. France’s President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to AI innovation, while maintaining high regulatory standards that draw parallels to Notre Dame Cathedral’s restoration. Such a strategy will likely accelerate AI ventures and foster innovation.

However, the regulation proposed was also a noose around the neck of the summit’s emphasis—deregulation. It is worth considering whether drastic deregulation will lead to genuine advances or the weakening of certain crucial safety nets as the world grapples with how to handle ever expanding data and the fragmentation that result from the intersection of geopolitical interests and the private ownership of data and capability. The US and China approach the issue differently than Europe, whose adoption of the AI Act (2023) will see the first comprehensive AI regulation in the world.

Many wondered how agentic AI will impact the balance of power. Whether AI will have a net positive or negative effect is uncertain. The rate at which agentic AI is developed and adopted in the three main economic blocs of China, Europe, and the United States will determine much.

India-France AI Alliance

India and France are forming a partnership to leverage AI’s full potential globally, sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices to create a robust framework for AI initiatives and global dialogue. During the summit, leaders from both countries addressed how their alliance could facilitate joint ventures, research collaborations, and talent exchange programs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Macron foresaw great potential for future cooperation in 2019 when they endorsed the Indo-French Roadmap on Cybersecurity and Digital Technology. India and France, founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, aim to develop a safe, open, secure, and ethical AI for human development and global commons.

Global Reactions

As the world watches the developments in Paris, reactions from other global powers, notably China and the United States, added another layer of complexity to the conversation around AI regulation and collaboration. In recent years, both states have invested heavily in AI research and development, seeing it as critical to their national security and economic competitiveness.

China’s approach to AI governance contrasts significantly with that of France and India. While the Chinese government prioritizes rapid innovation with minimal regulatory oversight, this led to concerns about privacy, surveillance, and ethical implications. The US, on the other hand, grapples with debates around data privacy, corporate responsibility, and the potential for AI misuse. As a result, the responses from these two states illustrate differing philosophies about how best to harness AI’s potential while safeguarding public interests.

The US and UK declined to sign a declaration on “inclusive and sustainable” artificial intelligence at the Paris summit, in a blow to hopes for a concerted approach to developing and regulating the technology. The document was backed by 60 other signatories on February 11, 2025, including France, China, India, Japan, Australia, and Canada.

The reactions from the relevant stakeholders highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and dialogue. As AI transcends borders, creating harmonized standards and frameworks could mitigate risks associated with its deployment.

Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

The summit concluded by emphasizing the need for proactive state engagement in AI regulation, prioritizing innovation while protecting individual rights and societal values. This, participants believed, would allow the world to fully capitalize on AI’s benefits.

As the world grapples with the realities of increasingly AI-driven technology, the voices of diverse stakeholders, including technologists, ethicists, policymakers, and civil society must be heard in shaping the future of AI. Under the flag of the AI Paris Summit, the India-France AI alliance is entering into a new and more unpredictable phase. By defying red tape and cultivating a spirit of cooperation, states are setting the pace for unlocking unprecedented opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges of this transformative technology.

Huma Rehman is a project consultant, consultant, and defense and foreign affairs analyst. She can be reached at X @HumaRehman1.

AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Informed by the works of Lieutenant General Tom D. Miller, particularly “The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base” and “Capability, Capacity, and Risk in Sustainment of Air Force Weapon Systems,” it is clear that the challenges and strategies surrounding maintenance of Air Force weapon systems are multifaceted. The first article highlights the foundational elements necessary for a robust defense sustainment industrial base, emphasizing the need for a resilient infrastructure. The second publication further develops this analysis, delving into the evolving landscape of capability, capacity, and risk management in the context of sustaining advanced weapon systems. Collectively, these works offer critical insights and recommendations on optimizing the sustainment process, ensuring readiness and effectiveness in a changing security landscape.

This passage highlights a significant juxtaposition of key themes present in the Secretary of Defense’s goals and Gen. Miller’s examination of Air Force sustainment challenges. To navigate these challenges effectively, specific focus must be placed on three pivotal areas: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and reestablishing deterrence.

In the effort to restore the warrior ethos, the military needs skilled personnel, modern facilities, and a sustainable defense industrial base. Workforce retention and a shortage of technical expertise undeniably impact operational readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, there is a pressing need to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.”

Miller’s analysis reveals that the sustainment workforce is facing severe challenges such as an aging workforce, a lack of recruitment, and significant technical expertise gaps. The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) is currently experiencing a 30 percent shortage in experienced depot maintenance personnel. This shortfall adversely affects the maintenance and throughput of mission-critical aircraft. A 2022 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that workforce shortages at Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) contribute to an average delay of 20 percent in aircraft depot maintenance cycles, diminishing operational readiness.

Transitioning from a counterterrorism focus to one that emphasizes great power competition necessitates a sustainment workforce capable of advanced manufacturing and software maintenance, but current training pipelines struggle to produce such expertise. The implications are stark; a degraded sustainment workforce directly undermines operational readiness, particularly in maintaining high-end platforms like the F-35, which are essential for effective deterrence.

In relation to rebuilding the military, the defense industrial base faces significant hurdles due to aging infrastructure, inefficient procurement processes, and inconsistent funding. Secretary Hegseth emphasizes the importance of this rebuilding process, stating the need to match threats with capabilities. Gen. Miller’s assessments indicate that the Air Force’s sustainment infrastructure is outdated and that funding for depot modernization is inconsistent. The average age of Air Force maintenance depots exceeds 60 years, with several facilities dating back to World War II. Supply-chain vulnerabilities also arise. Significant dependence on a sole supplier for 67 percent of critical spare parts for legacy aircraft creates potential crises during conflicts. Moreover, extended procurement cycles often delay readiness enhancements, averaging 8 to 10 years from requirement to fielding for sustainment modernization projects.

Thus, without rapid modernization of sustainment infrastructure and necessary acquisition reform, the Air Force will struggle to maintain aging fleets while simultaneously integrating essential next-generation capabilities for initiatives like joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and agile combat employment (ACE).

Reestablishing deterrence requires a comprehensive assessment of readiness to ensure that sustainment capacity effectively aligns with the threats posed by nations such as China and Russia. As stated in the SECDEF mandates, deterrence must be reestablished through defense of the homeland and collaboration with allies. However, Miller’s 2022 assessment points out a disconnect between current sustainment funding models and the operational requirements of deterrence in contested environments. For instance, from 2012 to 2022, the readiness rates for the USAF fighter fleet plummeted from 75 to 57 percent, with sustainment backlogs contributing significantly to non-mission-capable status. Only 40 percent of American sustainment infrastructure is currently forward-positioned in the Indo-Pacific, which is crucial for countering aggressive actions from adversaries.

To counter these challenges and bolster national defense strategy, courses of action should be implemented. First, revitalizing the sustainment workforce through expanded training and technological improvements is essential. According to projected outcomes, this could reduce depot maintenance delays by 15 to 20 percent within five years while raising mission-capable rates for advanced platforms.

Second, prioritizing infrastructure and acquisition reform will require streamlining procurement processes and integrating industry best practices. This reform could lead to a reduction in aircraft downtime and enhance rapid repair capabilities essential for operating within geographic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Finally, adopting a risk-based resource-allocation strategy aligned with high-threat mission areas can significantly strengthen deterrence, ultimately raising mission-capable rates of critical platforms.

By aligning sustainment actions with the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force can demonstrate improved deterrence capabilities, build enduring advantages, and modernize its force. An immediate investment in revitalizing the sustainment workforce, modernizing depot infrastructure, and aligning resources with operational needs is imperative. A reformative approach to sustainment is not merely an operational necessity; it constitutes a vital aspect of maintaining peace through strength. Without these necessary adjustments, the Air Force risks facing severe mission degradation in high-threat scenarios, ultimately jeopardizing national defense.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vance addressed the continents’ hostile stance on freedom of opinion. He suggested Europe is becoming the enemy they opposed during the Cold War, and with elections coming, challenged Europeans to step up and take charge of their own defense. Vance also argued that the most urgent issue shared by all nations at the conference was mass migration.

Europe is Not Unified

 Incidentally, in late 2024, Global Security Review (GSR) published an updated independent assessment of European political uncertainties. It shows that JD Vance’s statements made in February 2025 were factual and fully grounded, even if inconvenient.

The governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are fractured and dysfunctional. Another late 2024 GSR independent assessment of an endgame in Ukraine suggested an uncomfortable realpolitik-driven negotiated settlement, even before the Trump administration offered its plan after the Munich Security Conference.

That suggests two observations. First, the complete terms will never be made public but are already known to powerbrokers. Present neutrality of Russian forces in Transnistria and a lack of attacks on Ukrainian leadership suggests some form of agreed limitation of the conflict. Recently both Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio remarked on Zelensky’s duplicitousness. Apparently, he would agree to terms in meetings and then lie to the media about them. The ostentatious way Zelensky ended up confronting both President Donald Trump and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office, despite the rather realistic and transactional path to settlement, only reinforces this assessment.

The indignation and moral outrage over the conflict is mostly performative for the media and the public. It gives governments cover to prolong the conflict by providing aid, winning elections, and increasing the size of their bureaucratic apparatus, along with the corrupt mechanisms endemic to Ukraine. What online outrage does not do is enable a negotiated settlement of hostilities.

After the White House debacle, President Macron arranged an emergency meeting. While President Macron again pushed for “strategic autonomy” for Europe, the emergency meeting again showed that other European countries are not getting on the France bandwagon just yet. Together with the UK, France is the most likely to send troops to Ukraine, an idea that both Germany and Poland loathe. Italy is attempting a pragmatic balancing act between Europe and the US. Regrettably, the Baltic and Nordic countries, who are the frontline against Russia and invest the most in their defense, were not represented in a meaningful way.

Second, the claims of America “abandoning” Kyiv are hyperbolic, counterfactual, and premature. This is an ongoing negotiation. The facts are clear. The US provided 0.6 percent of its 2021 GDP to Ukraine and more than $160,000,000,000 in financial assistance and munitions, just about half of all assistance Ukraine has received. This aid, unlike European aid, has no strings attached and no expectation of repayment. The US also secured billions in loans from various banks for the benefit of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the US is strategically overextended and incapable of matching the more immediate threat (China). The Trump administration understands this. Many Americans know this, too, which is why 72 percent of registered voters want a negotiated settlement. That does not mean President Trump is surrendering to Putin or “abandoning” Europe. Nor does it make him a tool of Putin.

The West is in a bad strategic and operational position. Even after three years of supporting the Ukrainian war effort, weapons production across all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states cannot meet demand, let alone stockpile in case of war in the Pacific. While many speculate that Russia is in bad shape and is showing indicators of economic decline, they are stronger than Ukraine and its immediate neighbors.

For the West there are only two alternatives to a brokered peace: a dramatic escalation led by American conventional forces and resources or continuing to feed the war of attrition. Neither is a good scenario for the Ukrainian people who are dying by the thousands. President Trump understands this fact.

The Future of NATO

How Europe responds to the US remains to be seen. There are deeper fractures within and between the UK, France, and Germany than mainstream observers realize. The only ones significantly expanding their militaries and cooperating with the US are Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries.

As for the United States’ participation in NATO, it should be scaled back over time and be contingent on shared values with partner nations, especially when it comes to freedom of conscience and speech. Countries like Denmark, who believe Russia will invade Europe in 5 years, should expand their militaries and demonstrate not only commitment to liberal values but self-defense. The United States cannot fund its welfare state and those of Europe. Americans are not that wealthy.

American involvement in NATO should be primarily limited to (1) logistics (air and sea transport to Europe); (2) support in the form of weaponry, materiel, and war support materiel; (3) maintaining freedom of the seas; and 4) developing missile defense systems that can serve American and, when purchased, NATO. The United States also has unmatched space capabilities.

There should be no expectation of American boots on the ground simply because Europe neglected its security obligations for nearly 30 years. While there is still immense value in joint training and cooperation, the US should be seen as a rear guard and a last resort force. American taxpayers should not be the primary funder and provider of military forces and capability for Europe.

It is difficult to expect any long-term peace to be possible so long as NATO serves primarily as an anti-Russia platform funded by the United States. Europeans need to solve their own problems without vilifying the United States for solving American problems first. This means Eastern Europe needs to secure the buy-in of countries like Italy and Spain, who do not feel the Russian threat. As Vice President Vance suggested in Munich, Europeans must reflect on what they are defending and not just what they are against.

Europe is their continent and their home. It is their responsibility and duty to be the primary protectors of their individual nations and European society. Unfortunately, Europe does not appear to be ready to make a unified effort. Nonetheless, the proposal by the newly elected German chancellor, which calls for France and the United Kingdom to share their nuclear deterrent, might be a first concrete step in the right direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the authors’ own.

The US and Europe: A Reality Check was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, the president’s executive order directing the deployment of an active defense against missile and space-borne attacks is not the starting point for an arms race. The fact of the matter is, the Chinese and Russians started an arms race over a decade ago and recently accelerated it with their “breakout” in nuclear missiles deployments as well as the expansion and modernization of long-range strike platforms (to include fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

These expansions in offensive nuclear/space forces were not because America’s space and nuclear forces are too strong, but because they are too weak. The American nuclear enterprise is acknowledged to be “atrophied,” and the Space Force is not prepared to address such threats and incapable of addressing the threats posed by adversary space forces.

American vulnerability to homeland attack and, by extension, the nation’s critical space infrastructure, invites these threats. The US is delinquent in its duty to protect citizens by accepting a passive, hostage-style approach and labeling it “strategic stability.”

Second, detractors of homeland missile defense suggest that America is to blame for provoking China and Russia’s build-up. They are more concerned about space-based interceptors creating space debris than the impact of limited or mass attack upon the American homeland.

The US is the leader in advocating for the mitigation of debris generation, while China and Russia are the two biggest offenders. To think that these two adversary nations with kinetic ASAT capabilities and the political will to use them, despite debris generation, are only responding to US activity, shows a lack of understanding of these adversaries and their strategy. Lest Americans forget, both China and Russia see the United States as having more to lose from conflict in space than they do.

Third, opponents of Iron Dome for America believe that “real security” does not come from a credible hard power, but from “arms control, diplomacy and shared risk reduction.” While these are noble ideas, the historical record shows that arms control is often one-sided, with Russia cheating on every single arms control agreement it has ever signed and China showing no interest in anything other than American disarmament. UN votes on norms of behavior have not changed the situation one bit. China and Russia regularly exploit weakness. Iron Dome America seeks to remove this vulnerability from the equation. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated correctly, “Diplomacy is important, talk is important, [and] negotiations are important,” Hegseth said. “But, ultimately, beans and bullets and tanks and helicopters and hard power still [matter].”

Finally, they argue that the system being pursued “won’t work.” This argument fails to understand that the reason American ballistic missile defenses are so limited is mainly due to policy restraints and less about technology. Missile defense technologies, such as those proposed in the Strategic Defense Initiative, were not mature in the 1980s, but four decades later, numerous technologies are more advanced.

Also, The high cost of launch, for example, is drastically lower today than it was four decades ago because of efforts of companies like SpaceX. This single company demonstrated the capacity to launch hundreds of satellites a year, if not thousands in the same number of launches it took thirty years for the Space Shuttle to fly.

Today, the idea of having “space-based interceptors” does not mean the United States must place missiles or laser cannons in space. There are many ways to pursue this effort in ways that were not conceivable when Ronald Reagan envisioned a space-based missile defense. Agencies like the Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are pursuing numerous defensive layers as mentioned in the President’s Executive Order. All will collectively aid the system in protecting the homeland from boost to terminal phases of flight.

Iron Dome for America may not stop every missile launched at the United States, but fielding some measure of defense is better than simply ignoring the problem and hoping that good will prevail. History shows that idealism is all too often a key factor in the onset of war. Nuclear war is one Americans cannot afford to lose and should never be satisfied with leaving to chance.

Iron Dome for America is not just an idea, it is a requirement. The nation must get it right in order to ensure a more safe and secure home for Americans and the world.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of his employer or the United States government.

Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace was originally published on Global Security Review.

A decade ago, Paul Bracken warned of such possibilities in his book, The Second Nuclear Age. Because deterrence theory went out of vogue for so long in the West, analysts are now woefully unprepared to think about these challenges and their implications. Today, all possible threats to our Western notions of peace and stability have been jumbled into one giant intellectual recycling bin of deterrence theory. It is time to talk much more seriously about (1) the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and (2) the role of nuclear deterrence in a new era of nuclear disorder in the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear weapons play a unique and unprecedented role in how nations think about geopolitical order. They have fundamentally altered how countries think about alliances and the nature of international order. William Walker wrote about the establishment, in the late 1960s, of a nuclear order based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system “whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound,” and in which there was a degree of familiarity in essentially dyadic deterrence relationships.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system “whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits,” concomitantly with the provision of nuclear umbrellas and a stable Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession, but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems would provide the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for states to rely on the US for their national survival.

There are several elements that gradually developed after the second world war that characterized this nuclear order—dissuading countries from developing nuclear weapons. First, the number of nuclear weapon states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered merely bigger and better conventional weapons. Third, there are strong norms against possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no direct and immediate military threats to US allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely.

This and the prospects for nuclear proliferation are relatively limited. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) proposed in the late 1960s eventually attract more and more states, thus contributing to a norm against nuclear proliferation. It also contributed to nuclear and conventional arms control as concepts and policies in the international community. The world was able to more easily navigate crises and confrontations as thinking evolved about strategic theory and concepts and their application to real world politics and diplomacy.

The international (nuclear) order held together. It is now slowly eroding. China is modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces, all while growing increasingly bellicose and regularly threatening to invade Taiwan.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The West did nothing and never imagined this would be followed by a full-scale invasion eight years later—with regular Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Now, Australian academic Peter Layton is writing about “this nuclear threat business.” Until recently, this behavior was reserved for rogue states like North Korea. Such behavior was beneath great powers such as Russia and the United States. Not only does the West have to think about deterrence in a multipolar setting, but it must face nuclear dictators.

Nuclear arsenals in Asia are also expanding. From China’s rapid nuclear expansion to questions about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, the future is uncertain. There are renewed questions about the future of South Korea and nuclear weapons.

Arms control is also breaking down. Much to the chagrin of arms control careerists, who argue for unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral nuclear arms control as a public good sui generis, arms control is not carrying the day. Bereft of the intellectual foundations of deterrence that guided impressive negotiations in SALT I and II, and even START I, discussing nuclear strategy is now taboo in the West.

The nuclear order that existed during the Cold War and the post–Cold War peace dividend, especially in the Asia-Pacific, is eroding rapidly. For many nuclear historians, this trend is not new. Now is the time to grieve the loss of the utopian dream and think seriously about how to navigate this new era of disorder and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and promoting peace.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Order and Disorder in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies

Key Takeaways

• Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.
• U.S. Defense Leadership Changes: Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.
• Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments: Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.
• Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran’s growing missile capability.
• Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission: NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance’s credibility.
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates: Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.

International Developments

Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion

• Russia’s military spending will increase to 13.5 trillion rubles, estimated at 7-8% of GDP, its highest post-Soviet military budget.
• Significant investments in modernized nuclear and conventional forces to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.
• Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.

Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements

• Intelligence sources indicate Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China, raising alarms among Western security analysts.
• Iran continues uranium enrichment, prompting warnings from the UN about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.

China & Russia’s Nuclear Expansion

• Reports predict that by 2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
• Concerns grow over China’s accelerated nuclear development and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.

Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon

Escalation Risks in Space Warfare

• A RAND Corporation study warns that Russia may escalate conflicts in space early due to its heightened fears of a U.S. first strike.
• The study underscores Moscow’s increasing risk tolerance and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.

Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.
• U.S. extended deterrence remains under scrutiny, with debates over whether the Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization

• The U.S. Air Force confirms that the Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.
• Discussions continue over potential mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft to ensure nuclear survivability.

‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System

• President Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.
• Critics call it overly ambitious, but proponents argue that it is essential to counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Key Events

Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)

• Speakers: Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) & Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).
• Topic: Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)

• A 4-star USAF officer will serve as the featured speaker.
• Expected discussions on extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy.

Conclusion

The ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025, highlights key developments in U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues. With Russia’s increasing military budget, Iran’s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion, the U.S. faces a growing multipolar nuclear environment. Discussions on extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events will provide further insights into these critical security matters.

ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

These domains and areas are being weaponized for strategic purposes, as adversaries target cross-domain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests with the intent of weakening the Western security architecture and fragmenting alliance cohesion. The Trump administration must work closely with NATO allies to confront the many challenges that face them.

Strategic challenges, such as the Arctic, deep sea, and space, and the threats they pose require improved joint military readiness, enhanced deterrence by denial capabilities, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

“Over the last 15 years,” writes Scott Savits, “the Arctic has become a renewed theatre of military competition…. [T]op Russian officials have referred to the Arctic as Russia’s ‘Mecca,’ and a large fraction of Russia’s economy is based on Arctic fossil fuels and minerals.” Frustrating Russian efforts to gain a strategic advantage in the Arctic is of paramount importance to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Russia gaining an advantage in the Arctic will enhance its ability to establish escalation dominance against NATO in the event of a conflict with the alliance. Deterring Russia from broadening the scope of conflict, by threatening NATO’s vital interests in the Arctic, remains critical in dissuading other adversaries, such as China, from seeking to gain similar advantage.

With China developing and deploying new detection technologies in anti-submarine warfare, American nuclear submarine capabilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to detection and targeting. China’s “Death Star” satellite claims to possess detection capabilities that renders the ocean transparent for up to 500 meters beneath the surface, putting American submarines at risk.

In the space domain, it is estimated that loss of access to space would come at a cost of roughly One billion pounds per day to the British economy. The reported deployment of Russian anti-satellite weapons systems (ASAT) in space are clearly coercive moves designed to threaten NATO’s space assets.

Russia’s weaponization of space is especially concerning as NATO depends on space to conduct an array of operations across the spectrum of deterrence and defence. Most notably, NATO airpower relies on space-based and space-dependent systems to fulfil a series of critical security functions. Leveraging robust deterrence capabilities in orbit, through targeting Russian and Chinese space-based military and non-military assets, is critical to securing NATO’s vital interests in space.

Beyond seeking strategic advantage, China is also expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate since the end of the Cold War. The Pentagon forecasts that China will be a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035. The latest figures published by the Federation of American Scientists show that China now possesses at least 500 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—up 43 percent from 2020.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to undermine international norms by persisting in threats to use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Russia also deploys dual-use satellite technologies in space, capable of carrying nuclear warheads into orbit, in direct contravention of long-standing international treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the weaponization and nuclearization of space.

Meanwhile, Iran, a latent nuclear state, coerces the West by threatening the weaponization of its nuclear program. Iran also infiltrated the West by creating extremist networks through community centers, laundering money in major European and American cities that is used by criminal gangs to plot and execute terrorist attacks.

Proxies supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, can also launch increasingly devastating attacks. Furthermore, attacks like October 7, 2024, or September 11, 2001, do not warrant nuclear retaliation. A nuclear response to a terrorist attack, depending on the attack, is likely a disproportionate response.

China and Russia also engage in subversive activities within the cyber domain, sowing discord by using disinformation, intellectual property theft, and malign interference to destabilize NATO member states. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure can also inflict severe levels of damage. The appropriateness of cross-domain responses is yet to be decided.

The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, which lasted for 22 days, did not result in the triggering of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Yet, it was an attack on a NATO member state. The character of the attack complicated the process by which a viable and appropriate retaliatory response could be devised. In a multidomain threat landscape, hostile state actors conducting their operations in the grey zone can claim plausible deniability.

China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea also hold joint exercises, share intelligence, exchange military capabilities, and share a diplomatic and political kinship. This axis of Western adversaries shares the same geopolitical and economic objectives. They seek to replace the international rules-based order and establish alternative institutional frameworks to global order that undermine concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and national sovereignty.

Militarily, nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia, where Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers were provided to aid Putin’s war in Ukraine. Politically, emerging international blocs such as the BRICS demonstrate the extent to which countries like China and Russia are gaining traction in driving alternatives to the current order.

“As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the whole of digital and networked societies,” wrote Sean Monaghan, “so too will the capabilities required to deter them. A more complex threat environment will make predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more difficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.”

Hence, for deterrence to be effective today, credibility must incorporate more than hard power capabilities. Red lines must be communicated effectively across different channels. Resolve must be demonstrated through a force posture that includes a willingness to establish escalation dominance in a crisis scenario. The art of deterrence is also about determining and holding at risk what an adversary values.

As the outgoing US Secretary of Defence General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin said in 2022, cross-domain deterrence “is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause…. [It is] multidomain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”

Ultimately, deterrence is about credibly threatening to impose unacceptable costs, by denial or punishment, on a would-be aggressor. Those costs must convince the would-be aggressor that they outweigh any potential gains made.

Therefore, it is imperative for the US and NATO to increase cross-domain capabilities to match those of adversaries. Adopting a combination of different violent and non-violent means, to conduct deterrence credibly across multiple domains and at various levels of intensity, will enhance NATO’s ability to secure its vital interests in an increasingly volatile era of global strategic competition.

Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Deterrence and NATO’s Emerging Security Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current challenges include the disparity in nuclear capabilities, with Russia’s projected 7,500 warheads and China’s rapid buildup to 3,500 by 2035. The U.S. TRIAD faces maintenance issues, necessitating immediate investments in updated systems to avoid strategic vulnerabilities. Recommendations highlight the need to accelerate programs like the Navy’s nuclear-armed cruise missile initiative, expand the B-21 bomber fleet, and consider additional Columbia-class submarines. These steps are presented as crucial to addressing the growing threats from adversaries while ensuring strategic balance.

The report underscores the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent to sustain global power and uphold international credibility. Strategic insights from leaders like General McMaster and Secretary Frank Kendall advocate for overcoming budgetary constraints and reinforcing the defense industrial base. The document also highlights broader geopolitical concerns, such as the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, framing modernization as a central pillar of U.S. security policy.

ICBM EAR Report 13 Jan 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Arms control and disarmament advocates differ with this view, seeing the deterrent as a risk that must be reduced in size and function via various forms of diplomacy that range from one-party declarations and codes of conduct to formal arms control agreements. These sorts of undertakings are currently moribund within officialdom, though enjoying an eternal spring of hope among the single-issue think tanks, academics, and commentators who strive to sway government.

Paradoxically the current surge in hostilities between the United States and the axis of autocracy (China, North Korea, and Russia) could furnish the spark that revives official efforts at both improving deterrence and renewed arms control. For instance, an updated Budapest Memorandum might form one component of a settlement or freezing of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An Iranian “regime change” may also offer a path for a true and verifiable non-nuclear-weapon Iran.

The modality of any future arms control arrangement could vary greatly. Not all arms control arrangements are treaties. Given the current international situation among nuclear-armed states, treaties might indeed be the least likely of modalities. Some modalities that future arms control arrangements could take include unilateral American declarations, American-backed codes of conduct, American-backed norms, agreement within NATO (such as the Committee on Proliferation or the Nuclear Planning Group), unilateral American renewal of earlier Negative Security Assurances (such as those deposited with the United Nations), bilateral or multilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral memorandum or other agreed instrument short of a treaty, and/or bilateral or multilateral treaties.

The Process of Arms Control

All these arms control approaches present challenges to American and NATO forces. They also present opportunities to refine force posture and employment options. Three concrete steps are useful in ensuring American and alliance leadership receives constant feedback with operational decision-makers.

First, it is important to sustain collaboration. As government and American allies contemplate arms control arrangements, nuclear-force commanders should offer information on the challenges and opportunities that various permutations of an arrangement present to force posture and operations. Not all ideas are operationally possible.

Second, highlight the challenges that an arrangement poses to fielded forces. As part of any discussions, commanders should relate how they would adjust operations as nascent arrangements move toward implementation. This would likely be a stepwise evolution of operations in reaction to implementation of disclosures and intrusion that could accompany various forms of arms control measures. Policymakers rarely understand what their aspirational objectives mean for operational forces.

Third, highlight opportunities an arrangement creates for forces. Similarly, commanders should monitor the evolution of arms control arrangements and be on the lookout for arrangements that permit gleaning information about adversary forces—information that is useful in crafting the best force posture, plans, and operational tactics.

These feedback loops would evolve in phases over the time that an arms control arrangement is contemplated, refined, and implemented (or rejected).

The Phases of Arms Control

Any future arms control agreement should have six phases:

Phase 1 takes place during internal American contemplation of potential arms control arrangements. Classified analysis of changes to operations that an arrangement might necessitate are discussed. When inspections are proposed, any detrimental effects to operations from various forms of inspection are discussed. Discussing the benefits of inspecting adversary installations is also an important consideration. 

Phase 2 occurs during outreach with adversaries and third-country parties. Internal “food-for-thought” papers from the operational community are prepared for negotiators and strategic-communications personnel. Deliberate public statements such as editorials and conference presentations serve a useful purpose in explaining American interests.  

Phase 3 takes place during formalization of an arms control arrangement. When requested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, the president, or other officials, public statements are made for adversary consumption. 

Phase 4 is the implementation phase. This is the period in which an arms control arrangement comes into effect by treaty agreement or as a unilateral/bilateral/multilateral action. Classified reports on implementation progress of the new arrangement are prepared. When inspections are part of the arrangement, coordination between government agencies occurs.

Phase 5 is focused on sustainment. During this period an arms control arrangement is in effect. Classified reports address difficulties from the arrangement. 

Phase 6 is the sunset period. This is when the arms control arrangement ends or appears to be faltering. Analysis of the operational steps, timeline, costs, equipment, and personnel necessary to terminate the arms control arrangement is conducted. Classified reports on progress toward ceasing any earlier changes to operations and capabilities, necessitated by the arrangement, are conducted.

Conclusion

Arms control for the sake of arms control was always a bad idea. The United States is no longer in a position where it can enter into arms control agreements because it furthers an idealist ambition to promote peace. Today, arms control is only useful if it furthers American interests.

Taking a hard-nosed look at arms control in its various forms is necessary, but it must be acceptable for the answer to be no. The United States is no longer in a position to act altruistically. Russia is a superior nuclear power, and China may reach a similar status within a decade. The world has changed and American leaders must accept that its adversaries are no longer willing to follow America’s lead.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a professor at Penn State-Brandywine. Views expressed are his own.

An Uncertain Future for Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Semiconductors: The Backbone of Cyber Power

Semiconductors enable the computing power that drives everything from commercial applications to military operations. Advanced chips are critical for AI, autonomous systems, and national security infrastructure. As nations race to secure technological dominance, control over semiconductor production becomes a central element of cyber deterrence.

The production of semiconductors is extraordinarily complex and relies on a global supply chain. No single country is self-sufficient in this domain. Manufacturing processes demand rare metals, precision tools, and expertise spanning Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Companies like TSMC (Taiwan), Intel (United States), and Samsung (South Korea) dominate the field, with TSMC leading in advanced chip production. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML), a Dutch company, monopolizes the production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, critical for fabricating cutting-edge chips.

The Strategic Importance of Semiconductors

Semiconductors are more than just a commercial product—they are a strategic resource that nations leverage to project power in cyberspace. The United States has long recognized the importance of staying ahead in chip technology, aiming to maintain at least a two-generation lead over adversaries like China. This lead is not just about technological superiority but is also about cyber deterrence.

Cyber deterrence relies on the ability to defend, retaliate, or disrupt an adversary’s cyber capabilities. Advanced semiconductors provide the computational power necessary for AI-driven cybersecurity systems, intelligence gathering, and offensive cyber operations. For example, autonomous systems in modern warfare require sophisticated chips to function effectively. If a nation lacks access to such technology, its cyber capabilities are significantly weakened.

China’s Vulnerability and Response

China, despite being the second-largest economy and a global manufacturing powerhouse, has a surprising weakness in the semiconductor supply chain. It spends more on importing chips than oil and relies heavily on foreign suppliers, including its geopolitical rivals. This dependency creates a critical vulnerability in its cyber and AI ambitions.

Recognizing this weakness, China launched massive initiatives to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductor production. However, the barriers to entry are steep. Manufacturing cutting-edge chips requires material purity at a level of 99.99999 percent, and even a minor defect can render a chip unusable. The complexity of the global supply chain further complicates China’s efforts. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography machines, essential for advanced chip production, are legally restricted from being sold to China under export control agreements led by the United States.

China’s strategy focuses on targeting chokepoints in the supply chain while ramping up domestic production of less advanced chips. Success in this endeavor would significantly alter the balance of power in cyberspace, enabling China to compete more effectively in AI and cyber operations. However, for now, its reliance on foreign technology remains a significant deterrent.

US Strategy: Strengthening Deterrence Through Dominance

The United States took proactive steps to secure its dominance in semiconductor technology as part of its cyber deterrence strategy. Legislation like the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act provides billions in subsidies to bolster domestic chip production. The US also works to integrate government, industry, and academia to address challenges in manpower, education, and research and development.

The American approach to cyber deterrence is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain its technological edge by investing in leading-edge chips while ensuring a robust supply of legacy nodes for essential systems. Second, it actively restricts access to critical technologies for adversaries. For instance, since 2018, the export of EUV lithography machines to China has been prohibited, a move aimed at stalling China’s progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

This strategy aligns with the broader geopolitical framework, where supply chain control becomes a tool for exerting influence. By leveraging its dominance in semiconductors, the US can deny adversaries the tools they need to compete in AI-driven cyber capabilities, thereby strengthening its cyber deterrence posture.

The Role of AI and Advanced Chips in Cyber Deterrence

AI is a cornerstone of cyber operations, from defensive systems that identify and mitigate threats to offensive tools that exploit vulnerabilities in adversarial networks. The power of AI is directly tied to the availability of advanced chips, which enable greater computational efficiency and data processing.

In the AI arms race, semiconductors are the critical enabler. Nations with access to advanced chips can train larger models, process more data, and deploy more sophisticated algorithms. Conversely, those lacking access are at a significant disadvantage. This dynamic emphasizes the importance of securing semiconductor supply chains as part of national cyber deterrence strategies.

Geopolitics and the Future of Cyber Deterrence

The geopolitical implications of semiconductor dominance extend beyond cyber operations. Control over the chip supply chain influences alliances, trade policies, and even the balance of power in global governance. Governments increasingly push nations and companies to choose sides, creating a polarized landscape.

The US and its allies currently hold a strong position, but the race is far from over. As China invests heavily in self-sufficiency, the stakes in the semiconductor arms race continue to rise. The future of cyber deterrence will depend on the ability of nations to secure their supply chains, innovate in chip technology, and adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of AI and cybersecurity.

Conclusion

Semiconductors are not just a technological marvel—they are a strategic weapon in the cyber domain. As nations compete for supremacy, control over chip production and supply chains will play a pivotal role in shaping cyber deterrence strategies. The US, with its technological edge and integrated approach, aims to maintain its dominance, while China’s efforts to overcome its vulnerabilities will redefine the global order. In this high-stakes competition, the invisible hand of the market is guided by the visible hand of governments, ensuring that semiconductors remain at the heart of cyber power.

Adam Harris, PhD, is a career cyber professional who both practices the profession and teaches at the university level. The views expressed are his own.    

Cyber Deterrence in the Age of Semiconductors was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.

The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.

This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with Russia and China, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.

Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in Ukraine serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.

The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.

The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.

The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.

Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.

First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.

Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.

Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.

Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.

Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.

Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.

Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.