In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Given these doubts, European political leaders have expressed a determination to increase their defense budgets and upgrade their armed forces and defense industrial bases. For example, European Community leaders met in early March to discuss the urgency of rearmament and the possible shift in American commitment to the defense of Ukraine and/or Europe altogether. The president of the European Commission noted that Europe faces a “clear and present danger” from the possibility of an asymmetrical peace agreement favorable to Russia followed by a more ambiguous American commitment to the defense of Europe.

European concerns are understandable, but the possibility that free Europe can establish a self-sufficient deterrent against further Russian political coercion or military aggression, apart from US security guarantees, is remote. An effort to bisect American national security from that of Europe would be politically unwise, weaken deterrence, and open the door to piecemeal disintegration of the transatlantic partnership that served leaders during the Cold War and thereafter. Four aspects of this issue merit specific consideration.

First, NATO is the strategic and military embodiment of shared security commitment and risk among member-states. NATO’s totality of conventional and nuclear military strength, supported by its political unity, is the linchpin for credible deterrence against Russian revanchism. Collectively, NATO members have the resources, including conventional forces for modern combined arms battle and the defense industrial base for protracted conflict, to deter any repetition of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine or any Russian attack on the alliance. American commitment to European defense ensures that its strategic nuclear forces support deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including possible Russian nuclear political coercion or first use.

Second, President Trump, on his best and worst days, tends to see international relations as entirely transactional. This may work when dealing with trade or tariff matters but not matters of war and peace. American entanglement with the security of Europe is not only transactional; it is also existential. European and American defense and deterrence requirements are joined at the hip, notwithstanding occasional spats and acrimony over the details of military planning and defense economic priorities. American politicians complain that the United States should try to avoid getting stuck in another “forever war” in Ukraine but Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan.

A victory for Putin in Ukraine opens the door to European vulnerability that Russia will later exploit at a higher cost in blood and treasure for the United States and its European partners.

Therefore, it follows that the US decision in early March to suddenly suspend American military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine was ill advised and poorly timed. Although holding back equipment deliveries might take some months to impact events at the front, failure to share timely intelligence could impact immediately on Ukraine’s ability to strike key Russian targets, including logistics hubs, command centers, and troop concentrations. Thus, the suspension sent the wrong message to Ukraine and to Russia about allied steadfastness as preliminary ceasefire and peace negotiations were taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Third, messaging of American commitment to peace and security in Europe also involves the decisions about modernization of the American nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. This has a number of components. First, the US is replacing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad. The Trump administration also wants to deploy the sea-launched cruise missile, to replace some existing nuclear warheads with upgrades, and to provide additional limited nuclear options for contingencies short of general nuclear war.

Fourth, American defense planning for each potential theater of war will continue to emphasize a spectrum of options including both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US must maintain credible deterrence against the combined forces of China and Russi, not only with respect to the possible outbreak of conventional war in Asia or Europe, but also with regard to the threat of nuclear first use or first strike against American allies or the American homeland.

In this respect, another challenge to deterrence lies in the increasing capability of conventional weapons for use against targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons, and, conversely, the attractiveness for some parties of low-yield nuclear weapons for use against targets previously assigned only to conventional weapons.

The challenges in meeting the preceding standards for deterrence in Europe and beyond are enormous. First, they include the evolving international security environment in which an emerging multipolar realignment places a coalition of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at cross-purposes with US and allied visions for world order in Europe and Asia. Second, the challenges involve the significance of emerging technologies for long-range precision strike, missile and air defenses, cyber deterrence and war, space conflict, and continuing developments in autonomous warfare. Third, the costs for maintaining deterrence in Asia and Europe are enormous and Europe cannot expect the United States to foot the bill.

Some American allies in Asia and Europe expressed a willingness to increase their defense budgets and their degrees of readiness for local or regional conflict. More demanding times are ahead. In short, there is no “Eurodeterrent” without the United States and vice versa.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a distinguished professor at Penn State-Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Euro-deterrence and the Quest for Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, months ago, the president asked North Atlantic Treaty Council Organization (NATO) countries for a proposal by each state for putting peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. The Europeans dithered and then expressed consternation that Trump was keeping them out of the negotiations with Putin.

More pertinently, the president suggested that NATO countries increase their defense expenditure to five percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is a far more realistic assessment of the decline in European capabilities than that which calls for a growth of defense expenditure to three percent of GDP.

The British, French, and Germans all expressed varying degrees of outrage at Trump’s actions including the suggestion by some that he is creating a “Munich”-like outcome in his negotiations with Putin by conceding too much even before the discussions began. The fact is that Trump is playing his cards knowing full well that the Europeans have no plan.

Why Five Percent Is Impossible

When one looks at NATO’s defense expenditure, countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain are below the two percent threshold while France, Germany, and the Netherlands barely cross it.  Yes, countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are above the two percent threshold, but they are small nations with populations less than that of Chicago. Estonia has a mere 1.6 million people.

To get to three percent, let alone five, would require NATO countries to add tens of billions to their defense budgets and require cutting the social services that their citizens expect and value. As Politico pointed out, for France, which is one of the voluble proponents of European rearmament, to go from two to three percent of GDP would require Paris to add about 30 billion euros to its defense budget.

Given the country’s budgetary problems that is unlikely to happen. Five percent is a bridge too far. Britain, which is also facing economic headwinds, cannot afford such an increase. In Germany, despite the 100 billion euros committed to modernization, which largely went to refurbish existing equipment that was mothballed, Berlin made it clear it is a long way from substantially increasing its defense budget. Countries like Italy and Spain, given their own economic compulsions, will also find five percent impossible.

The Europeans raise the issue that even if they went to five percent their defense industries are not able to crank up production to meet the demand for new weaponry. That is not the primary problem for these countries. Instead, it is an issue of manpower. Europe is aging and lacks the population for expanded militaries. Worse, as part of the peace dividend, conscription was removed in most countries in the 1990s. This left Gen X, the millennials, and now Gen Z, without any memory of military service.

Reinstating conscription, as seen from the figures below, would be the way to give teeth to European militaries. Compulsory military service, however, is hugely unpopular among the younger generation and a push to draft people would lead to an electoral backlash that few politicians in Europe want to face.

As Table I shows, the major European militaries drastically downsized after the Cold War:

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, 2023, 2024 editions.

The above figures clearly show that remilitarization would require a major intake of manpower that the European countries would be unable to achieve because of the factors discussed above. Yet, this does not stop them from making bold pronouncements about future militarization efforts. Reality is something else.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy states the German case of weakness quite bluntly:

The decline in German numbers over the past 20 years is particularly striking: in 2004 Germany had thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and even almost one thousand howitzers. By 2021, these numbers had come down to the hundreds, as Germany only had 339 tanks and 121 howitzers. The German numbers for 1992 must be interpreted carefully, as they include weapons and equipment from the newly incorporated East German army. Still, when considering the available Leopard tanks, i.e., the West German tanks, Germany had around 4200. The German decline in military stock is thus massive.

Despite all the optimistic talk emanating from Berlin, German rearmament is a myth.  The country’s industrial capability, which is in the doldrums, will not allow it to rapidly militarize. And young people will not join the military in droves as Olaf Scholz and Ursula van der Lyon fondly believe. There is a reason Ukraine has not dipped into its pool of 18–21-year-olds for the current war. It would probably lead to mass flight from the country by younger Ukrainians.

If Europe cannot remilitarize easily and lacks the manpower to build Cold War–level forces, what can it do? The answer is simple. Write checks.

Ukraine requires reconstruction. The World Bank estimated that it would cost around $486 billion, while Zelensky put the number closer to $700 billion. It is a year since the World Bank made its estimate so one can safely assume that in the intense conflict of 2024 the damage to infrastructure may have added another $50 billion to $100 billion to the bill. The Europeans can make a $25 billion a year commitment to Ukraine for the next twenty years to aid reconstruction. This would lead to the rapid build-up of Ukraine’s economy and stop the population from fleeing the war-torn nation.

As things stand, Ukraine’s population is set to decline to around 30 million by 2050 and it will largely be a country of old people thanks to a decline in fertility. If Kyiv stands a chance, it needs a sustained dose of financial aid with no strings attached. A side benefit would be that China would not be the major post-war economic player in Ukraine.

From the European perspective, Brussels can go to Trump and say that yes, we engaged in burden sharing and it would be a lot less expensive than five percent of GDP and far less socially divisive than the imposition of conscription.

Xi Jin Ping suggested Chinese and Indian peacekeepers be inserted in Ukraine. This would change the future security architecture of the region. Russia will be far more comfortable with such a peacekeeping force rather than a crypto-NATO force posing as peacekeepers. It will be interesting to watch how this plays out.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Trump called Europe’s bluff. If London, Paris, and Berlin want to be relevant, it is time to write a big check. At least for now, Americans are no longer willing to subsidize Europe’s welfare states.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal.

The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These objectives, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, dismissed peace talks with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.

Russia’s Domestic Situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.

Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.

Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.

Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

President Zelensky dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China’s 12-point peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.

However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Geneva talks regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.

Hungary’s attempts to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.

Is Peace Possible?

The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.

Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent decision by Hungary’s Prime Minister, Victor Orban, to open its borders to Russian and Belarusian immigrants is an example of a NATO member-state failing to see the large security implications of an act that is not directly tied to security. The mistake could, however, have broader implications for Europe.

Hungary’s recent decision to implement a liberal immigration policy, allowing Russian and Belarusian citizens to enter as guest workers without vetting or security checks, poses a significant threat because it will allow Russian agents, and there are certainly Russian agents mixed within the larger mass of migrants, to freely move within European Union (EU) member-states. With the policy also allowing guest workers to bring their family with them, without vetting for ties to the Russian military or security services, makes the concern that Russian agents will infiltrate Europe even more likely. Russian efforts to undermine European democracies through disinformation and misinformation is already well known. There is certainly no need to make the problem worse.

This policy flies in the face of an EU ban on Russian airlines to the Schengen Area (the borderless area inside the EU that does not require a passports for travel) and individual bans of hundreds of people connected to the Kremlin and the War in Ukraine. This is also contrary to the actions of many other EU countries. For example, Finland closed its border with Russia, preventing all immigration, noting serious security concerns.

Hungary did not consult with the EU or NATO. Strangely, this act took place while Orban is serving as the rotational head of the EU. The body is now considering legislation designed to halt Hungary’s immigration policy.

Orban is the only head of an EU or NATO member-state that maintains ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Orban is sometimes called a pawn of Putin and one of his “useful idiots”—a term used by Soviet leaders to describe unsuspecting collaborators in the West.

However, it is unclear whether or not Orban is aligning himself with Putin because of ideological similarity, economic necessity, or both. During his time in office, Hungary voted to sanction Russia in the European Parliament and even condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More recently, however, Orban tried to rally Central Europe behind Russia.

The question regarding Orban’s motivations is vital because the EU needs to reverse this new policy as quickly and painlessly as possible or Russia will gain a significant strategic advantage. This is particularly important as NATO ramps up efforts to counter Russian aggression elsewhere across Europe.

The infiltration of Russian spies across Europe is no trivial matter. In Western democracies, personal freedoms make it harder to determine who is working for an adversary government. Once into the Schengen Area, movement is unchecked to 29 participating states. Given the recent attacks on the French high-speed rail line before the 2024 Olympics in Paris, there is clear reason to worry.

The attack that shut down France’s high-speed rail for almost a week was low-cost and required very little training on the part of the saboteurs. Simple arson and explosive attacks on the rail lines wreaked havoc on travel. The attack is suspected to have emanated from far-left French extremists, but that does not preclude Russia from encouraging, training, and equipping domestic groups from undertaking such attacks. The Russians also use their special forces for covert attacks against civil targets.

Hungary’s liberalization of immigration policy, favoring easy access for Russian and Belarusian citizens, is detrimental to the security of the European Union and NATO. At this early stage, Western leaders must ascertain whether it is possible to persuade Victor Orban away from openly supporting Russia in word and deed. This latest development gives Russia a strategic weapon that is useful in conducting warfare below the threshold of conventional war.

The Russians cannot be given greater operational freedom. It may become necessary to punish or alienate Hungary if it will not act in solidarity with other Western nations.

Dan Cox, PhD is a professor of political science at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards was originally published on Global Security Review.

Those European intelligence agencies tasked with countering malicious cyber actors are simply unprepared for the fight they face. Disinformation campaigns waged by the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians are also plaguing Europe. When Russia first began such efforts to shape election outcomes about a decade ago, their rather low-cost efforts were successful enough to encourage further disinformation efforts.

French efforts to sound the alarm about disinformation in Europe and Africa were largely unheeded and is now bearing fruit for China and Russia as several African nations are turning against the West and toward these autocracies. The cyber four of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, through their security institutions, targeted the UK and French institutions, financial markets, and security infrastructure at home and their prestige abroad.

In response to the exponential growth of cyberattacks, in April 2023, new regulations were passed in France to secure the computer networks of state institutions. The French government also recognized the importance of international security cooperation in combating cyber terrorism.

When the French rail network was vandalized in July 2024 the French Interior Minister warned of the possible involvement of foreign cyber warriors. Saboteurs had already carried out attacks against fiber-optic cables and other infrastructure. For months, French intelligence was on its heels as consecutive attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure occurred. Russian and other European nationals were arrested for varying destabilization attacks. French intelligence and police also launched an operation to find cyber sleeper cells.

The Olympics began as thousands of police and military personnel were operating across the country in an effort to prevent future terror attacks of any kind. If the cyberattacks on France prior to the Olympics are an indicator of a looming threat, France has its work cut out for it.

Cyber threats are more than just hackers exploiting the internet. On July 26, 2024, terrorists damaged lineside communication cables on three of the most important ligne a vitesse radiating from Paris. These attacks disabled signal technology at key junctions including in LGV Nord at Croisilles—connecting Paris with Lille. Eurostar rail networks were also disrupted ahead of the Olympics. Thus, damage to communication networks can take a physical form.

China is now engaged in open hybrid warfare against the West—more broadly. Policymakers, parliamentarians, and intelligence officials in the UK and France sometimes advocate for reforms to address these challenges, but little happens. The lack of cyber expertise within European intelligence agencies leads to numerous domestic security challenges. The French government, for example, was exasperated with the sabotage campaign that took place.

France accused Russia of cyberattacks during the election earlier this year—all to disrupt the country’s democracy. Authorities asserted that the Russian Federal Security Service was behind sustained attempts against the French institutions.

The UK took measures in response to cyber threats from China, demonstrating a proactive stance, but British efforts are not widely understood and accepted. Recent cyberattacks on the UK’s National Health Service and the Ministry of Defense highlight significant challenges faced by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in countering hybrid warfare tactics from state actors like China and Russia.

These attacks illustrated vulnerabilities in the UK’s cybersecurity infrastructure and raised concerns about the effectiveness of GCHQ’s strategies in mitigating threats posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

In July 2024, cyberattacks on the NHS disrupted critical healthcare services, compromised patient data, and operational capabilities. Attacks on Ministry of Defense infrastructure jeopardized national security by leaking sensitive information and undermined military readiness.

The presence of foreign spies within UK state institutions suggests these networks have successfully penetrated high-security environments, posing substantial risks to national security. The presence of a strong Russian security and intelligence infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and its reluctance to accept Western security-sector reforms is a threat to internal and external security for the region.

In Eastern Europe, reshaping intelligence and police services is part of the consolidation of democracy. In the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, intelligence agencies are experiencing a cultural hangover from a bygone era. In these countries, the process of bringing intelligence services into a Western way of operating is progressing slowly.

The war in Ukraine is also leaving a deep impact. European intelligence service strategies, operations, and collection processes in and outside their sphere of influence. They never realized how to introduce the reforms required to prevent Russian success. The Danish, for example, produced the PET Report, which uncovered espionage networks in Denmark. The PET Report has noted several cases that illustrated how a number of foreign states were actively carrying out intelligence activities against Denmark using cyber and other means.

In short, Europe is facing a challenging future when it comes to the malicious cyber activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. European intelligence services are unprepared for the adversary they face. The challenge is growing. The time is now for Europe to respond.

Musa Khan Jalalzai is an author, journalist, and member of Research Institute for European and American Studies, Director of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Analysis Centre London, and Fellow of Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism. The views expressed are his own.

The European Union’s Cyber War Challenge was originally published on Global Security Review.

NATO is now in its third decade of the post–Cold War era—a period during which all member-states ought to have fulfilled their GDP defense obligation. However, this was never done by the vast majority of NATO members. Most countries maneuvered to avoid this obligation.

European countries comprise 30 of the 32 NATO members, together with the US and Canada. Of the 30 European members, only 10 fulfilled their 2023 2 percent of GDP goal. This leaves a sobering 20 European NATO countries that do not expend the minimum on defense. The “honorable 10 European NATO countries” that do pay their dues are: Poland (3.9 percent), Greece (3.01 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 Percent), Finland (2.45 percent), Romania (2.44 percent), Hungary (2.43 percent), Latvia (2.27 percent), the United Kingdom (2.07 percent), and the Slovak Republic (2.03 percent). Outside Europe, the US spent 3.49 percent of its GDP on defense in 2023, while Canada spent 1.38 percent. Overall, it is the 10 honorable European countries and the US that carry Europe’s defense burden.

A decade ago, the Obama administration made it clear to NATO countries in their failure to meet funding obligations, “Everyone has to step up.” The Trump administration called for “burden sharing.” Yet no improvement was made.

The states failing to meet their obligation failed to grasp that today’s global security threat is not just limited to Europe. Their assumption that the US will always be available in an emergency to protect them is no longer viable.

The United States is overextended militarily and economically due to its worldwide security obligations. By necessity, America’s security focus has shifted away from Europe to two other strategic regions: the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. These increased global threats necessarily draw upon US defense resources—away from Europe. European countries failed to recognize this long ago. It is now time for Europe to have a reality check and to initiate new corrective actions to remedy the ongoing malaise—and the sooner the better.

Non-compliant NATO member-states justifiably deserve a nudge out of their self-imposed “NATO welfare cocoon.” While Russia is rated as the world’s third or fourth military power, it would pale in comparison to a fully funded European NATO superpower. Economically, it would become a European titan versus a Russian pauper. Demographically, it is NATO Europe’s billion inhabitants versus Russia’s 144 million inhabitants. The European component of NATO alone would have deterrence supremacy that casts a protective veil over European countries. As such, Russia would cease to be a bona fide threat to Europe.

To correct the present European security deficiency, the alliance end the manipulation by under-spending NATO member-states. NATO’s Secretary General has long failed to encourage, cajole, or coerce member-states into meeting their obligations. As such it is important that a new Secretary General be appointed from one of the obligation-meeting countries, who can more effectively influence those states that do not contribute adequately. Among those countries who meet their defense spending obligations, there are qualified statesmen ready to lead NATO. A fully funded NATO that can far more effectively deter Russian aggression is the objective.

A new-era Secretary General, to reshape NATO and redirect it toward Europe’s real-world milieu, could redefine the alliance’s perception of the threat it faces and reshape its principles. These principles may well include: (1) accepting that Europe is primarily Europe’s responsibility; (2) realizing America’s global defense commitments extend beyond Europe; (3) acknowledging that America’s army is no longer Europe’s defensive army; (4) insisting that all NATO member-states must meet their minimum 2 percent defense expenditure; and (5)  Acknowledging that Europe can no longer fear Russian aggression.

Peace for all of Europe is better assured through a stronger NATO. This must start with a change in leadership. Credible deterrence begins with the financial commitment of NATO’s member-states. Recent moves by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance demonstrate the real strategic threat Russia poses. It is a threat all alliance members must work collaboratively to deter. Russian threats to use nuclear weapons against NATO are only possible because there is a lack of commitment and capability across the alliance.

The underlying issue addressed here is that a fully funded NATO can become the dominant military power in Europe. The resulting nexus of such military supremacy is an interconnected Europe composed of NATO countries and those aligned with the alliance. Such a force is one that despite Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s bluster, he knows that war is a lose-lose proposition. Creating that perception in the mind of Russia’s president is the continued purpose of NATO.

Warren K. Christolon is an international geo-economics and security expert in London, UK Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Restructured NATO That Will Benefit All of Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Armenia’s biggest vulnerability is that it relies on Russia for defense, which has been a noncommittal security guarantor since at least 2016’s Four Day War. After Armenia was attacked by Azerbaijan on sovereign territory, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan pleaded for help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian dominated defense treaty alliance. In response the CSTO led sent a civilian delegate on “fact finding mission” damaged areas.

Following the week of attacks U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visited Yerevan and stated  Azerbaijan attack as “illegal and deadly”. This diplomatic serendipity to Armenia was a tremendous step for Washington’s advancing relations with Yerevan. However, the Speaker of the House is only one significant leader in the U.S. Government. Nations and non-state actors do not begin formal bilateral cooperation with the U.S. overnight. Cooperation requires many actors in diplomacy, private sector, military, law enforcement, lawmakers, and intelligence, to name some, who share common interest.

The U.S. probably has interests to work with Armenia due to shared democratic values, a bustling tech sector which cooperates with American companies, and diaspora members who carry a significant voice in domestic politics. Armenia very likely has interests to work with the U.S. for the sake of maintaining its sovereignty.  Yet one major point of concern for cooperation with Washington is that only Armenia recognizes the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) based on the Soviet Oblast’s referendum in the 1990s. The rest of the world, including Russia and the U.S., recognize Stalin’s redrawn borders placing the Armenian dominate population firmly within Baku’s authority.

The following are opportunities for Yerevan to press for its highest defense needs while soliciting the White House, Pentagon, and Congress for security assistance. Engaging these American actors probably will take more time, which is a luxury Yerevan does not have. Warm weather in the Caucasus is here again and Azerbaijan may attack again.

Need for Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)

The most significant threat Armenia faces from Azerbaijan are Turkish-made TB-2 drones (UAVs). According to some war fighting experts, the TB-2 and other drones give Azerbaijan a tremendous attack advantage, providing air-to-ground missile fire, while simultaneously giving real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to troops. The Turkish-made drone was so successful after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenian procured Russian defense systems that Ukraine decided to use the same weapons system in its war against Russia. Azerbaijan’s seemingly uncontested attack capability from the air can strike infantry vehicles, tanks, and deny logistics to the front lines.  Judging from sources online, Armenian Armed Forces and Nagorno-Karabakh Self Defense Forces do not seem to have a viable alternative to counter this great threat from the air.

Yerevan needs to understand that only IADS are the most capable counter to Azerbaijan’s threat from the air. To oversimplify, there are several air defense systems which can deny a threat including, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), surface to air missiles (SAMs), air artillery guns (AAGs), and air-to-air denial from jets.

One option for Yerevan’s new IADS is the Mistral, a French MANPADS which can counter Azeri threats from the air. It operates in many countries outside France, such as Cyprus, Georgia, Serbia, and others. Although the Mistral has yet to be proven in combat against Turkish drones, it could provide a barrier in the air against Azerbaijan’s greatest weapons. France is the highest favored country by Armenians, according to a U.S. think tank poll, and President Macron’s pro-Armenian rhetoric could lead to an air defense deal. As the TB-2 and other Turkish UAVs are some of the most popular in the world today, a counter weapons system would arguably find great demand.

Every Armenian engineer and defense manufacturer should focus on IADS procurement, and domestic research and development right now, from tracking incoming threats to eliminating them.

Soviet Era Doctrine & Personnel Reform 

It logically follows that Russian warfighting doctrine heavily influences Armenian warfighting doctrine. Both borrow from the Soviet Union. In 2011, then-Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe Mark Hertling and an unnamed Russian General held a conversation on training personnel. General Hertling told his counterpart that without an effective non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, Russian troops will never be trained effectively. Sure enough, lack of Russian NCOs have been one of the biggest operational issues during their Ukraine campaign. Russian NCOs “Are not in charge of tactics,” Russian military expert Michael Kofman opined to American defense news outlet Defense One “That’s why the Russian military is officer top-heavy. The officer corps handles all those issues that NCOs might.”

Armenia’s conscript-dependent military may desire to emulate the principles of a “professional military” (or “all-volunteer military” – these terms are used interchangeably). Yet, a significant overhaul in doctrine with war potentially imminent likely requires much more dedication in time, resources, and training to overcome critical personnel vulnerabilities. Yerevan can instead task its Ministry of Defense to train a robust NCO corps borrowing from Western doctrine such as the U.S. Call them, for example “Vartan’s Volunteers”, and establish prestige with joining a volunteer all-year NCO corps.

U.S. Medal of Honor Recipient and Afghanistan War Veteran Clint Romesha offered thoughts on what makes efficient NCOs to Task and Purpose, an American military news outlet,

While officers are the ones who put the plan together, it’s those enlisted leaders, the NCOs, who implement it. Even before those orders come down from the officers, the NCOs are moving proactively and preparing the troops, and they are usually the ones fighting with their junior soldiers on the front lines, leading them in combat.

This is not to suggest that Armenian NCOs, officers, or others are not competent. Rather, as some Armenian analysts call for Armenia to become a “Garrison State”, a strong, modern, defense doctrine needs to have “suits” (political and private sector), “stars” (generals and commissioned officers), and “stripes” (NCOs and conscripted) all understand their responsibilities and carry it out effectively. Immediate reform with NCO corps could be a short-term improvement to better improve command and control from the bottom-up, while doctrine is reformed top-down.

For recruitment and conscription guidance, Yerevan can look to nations which have successful programs. Singapore’srelations with Washington are strong and likewise with Yerevan. Singapore’s military has extensively trained with the U.S. and could probably provide insight on personnel, training, and logistics from a civilian to solider mentality. Furthermore, Armenia can utilize contractors from eclectic backgrounds, such as diaspora Armenians from U.S., France, Russia, Lebanon, Greece, or elsewhere. The Armenian government could expand its robust diaspora work-live programs for contractors to train conscripted soldiers, thereby increasing the rate of trained civilians. Moreover, a diaspora group of military experts could perhaps work with the Ministry of Defense as an affiliate council to study and suggest micro and macro-Armenian military inquiries.

Above all, Yerevan must think beyond “pro-Moscow” or “anti-Moscow”. The best militaries in the world borrow strategies, doctrine, operational planning, and more from others to enhance assets to their greatest potential. They do not prepare to fight the last war.

Training 

India’s major arms deal to Armenia may be the first step in a blossoming Armenian relationship. Azerbaijan is strongly allied with Pakistan. India and Pakistan historically share animosity.  Moreover, India views Armenia as a vital link to for its trade route from Iran through the Black Sea region. Indian Mountain Brigades are some of the best mountain troops in the world. It can be argued that Indian President Modhi could find training Armenia for combat in high terrain to test his best operational and tactical methods for the ongoing challenges with China in their own disputed territory.

French President Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have spoken over the phone many times since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. French Sniper Schools are some of the most well-respected institutions in the world. French sniper training to Armenian long-range fighters could prove to be vital for another defensive conflict judging from the rugged terrain and long lines of sight within Armenian territory.

South Korea is a nation which always must consider border security. Perhaps Armenia could learn from South Korean defense against neighboring North Korea, utilizing training programs, expertise on surveillance and counter surveillance, mining, reconnaissance, and communications to headquarters from the forward line of troops.

Equipment & Arms Procurement 

Yerevan needs to look beyond Russian suppliers for equipment and arms procurement. Diplomatic loyalty to allies and financial cost can often be problematic factors for nations who desire to bulwark defense capabilities. If Armenia’s ultimate goal is to earn Washington’s trust and purchase arms from the American private sector, Yerevan should engage US friendly countries to procure “surplus” while diaspora and Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs press American private companies and Congress to procure from the “source”.

Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan declined in relations during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War when Saudi Arabia called for peace instead affirming the Azeri position on territorial claims. Saudi Arabia might be under the impression that a crippled Armenia would mean Turkish dominance over the Caucasus region, and therefore may be inclined to send equipment and defensive weapons to Armenia. Yerevan can argue to Riyadh, perhaps making a case that a Turkish dominated Caucasus region would mean that Sunni Muslim nations in the central Asian steppe would be more inclined to follow Turkey rather than Saudi Arabia.

Greece shares over 2,000 years of mostly positive relations with Armenia. Today, Athens confronts hostile rhetoric from Turkey’s President Erdogan. In 2020, Greece accused Turkish troops of making an incursion within Greek territory. In 2022, Athens sent millions of dollars in defense equipment to Ukraine, according to a speech given by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to the U.S. Congress. A revamped Greek military considering perceived Turkish aggression and NATO duties to Ukraine could also aid Armenia.

Brazil just concluded the closest election in its history. Armenia can play to the new President Lula da Silva under the guise as the first Christian nation who desires to prevent another genocide on the grounds of protecting democracy and human rights. Lula may want a quick foreign policy victory as an ecumenical issue while Brazil remains divided domestically. The small but impactful Brazilian-Armenian diaspora can be utilized to this degree.

Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Christian minority (which shares ties to Armenian Apostolic Christians) recently suffered a tragic deadly loss of 41 believers in a fire. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi may be seeking an opportunity of good will to his non-Muslim supporters, assisting Armenia could be one. Furthermore, Egyptian-Turkish relations have gone through a rough patch since 2013. Yerevan could leverage Egypt if El-Sisi desires to press Turkey in the tense Eastern Mediterranean.

The above are just a few examples. Yerevan should indiscriminately look to the broader US community of allies. Yet most important, the Armenian Diaspora should focus all efforts on one primary goal: earning the trust of the US military defense industry and carry out private sector deals to Yerevan.

The Armenian Diaspora’s extensive networks were instrumental in pushing the recognition of Armenian Genocide by the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and state governments. Yet for all the Diaspora’s merits to raise awareness in history, new history can arguably be made if Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are ethnically cleansed from their homes. Armenian Diaspora can use their tremendously organized body to engage U.S. blue-chip defense contractors. Diaspora education can encourage the American private sector to push Congress for Yerevan to eventually procure American equipment. Once permission is granted, private sector defense contractors can immediately begin selling systems to the now-democratic former Soviet republic for self-defense purposes.

If Armenia Wants Western Defense Support, Doctrine and Partner Engagement Reform Must Happen Now was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s military doctrine dictates the use of nuclear weapons in response to any non-nuclear assault on Russian territory.

Russia’s military doctrine encompasses a broad range of potential national security threats, including local, or small-scale wars, regional, or large-scale wars, internal and foreign military threats, the Russian military’s budget, and a host of military-related technical, political, social, and economic issues. Additionally, the doctrine defines the circumstances under which nuclear weapons are to be used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in response to a threat to Russia’s national security.

The current edition of the Russian military doctrine—when compared to the national security strategy and military doctrine published in 1993—significantly lowers the threshold under which the use of nuclear weapons is permitted. While the 1993 doctrine allowed the first use of nuclear weapons only when the “existence of the Russian Federation” is threatened, the versions published since 2000 explicitly state that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to all weapons of mass destruction attacks” on Russia and its allies.

Furthermore, the doctrine released in 2000—and all subsequent versions—allows for nuclear weapons use “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” Succinctly put, Russia’s entire national security strategy is predicated on the concept of nuclear de-escalation.

Historical Context: NATO Intervention in the Balkans

In the year before the release of Russia’s 2000 military doctrine, Russia’s military and political leaders warily observed as NATO executed an efficient and precise conventional military operation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1999, Russia was facing renewed tensions in Chechnya in the aftermath of the disastrous war that broke out following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

It was clear that the United States (and its allies) possessed far greater conventional military capabilities than Russia. Plus, the underlying ethnic and religious issues in Kosovo which led to NATO taking action were seen by Russia as almost identical to those underlying the first Chechen war. These similarities, combined with Russia’s historical view of Serbia—the successor state to the Republic of Yugoslavia—as its “little brother,” led to Moscow developing deep anxiety that the United States would involve itself in another within Russian borders.

In 2000, Russia released an updated military doctrine in which it outlined the concept of de-escalation through a limited nuclear strike. This idea put forth the notion that if Russia were subjected to a major non-nuclear assault that exceeded its capacity for conventional defense, it would “de-escalate” the conflict by launching a limited—or tactical—nuclear strike. While this policy has never been publicly discussed with relation to any particular conflict, the concept of nuclear de-escalation undoubtedly was on the minds of Western leaders during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence During the Cold War

The Soviet Union’s collapse and the effective end of the Cold War in the 1990s left Russia and the United States with significantly less reason to fear that one would launch a massive, surprise strategic nuclear attack on the other. The role nuclear weapons played in the international geopolitical framework was fundamentally altered. Nuclear weapons no longer were the centerpiece of security relationship based on the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Instead, they became status symbols; at the very most, they were considered the ultimate insurance policy against unforeseen aggression. Nuclear weapons maintained their role as the penultimate security guarantee; however, they had very much moved to the background of the international security stage. Many, particularly in the West, believed that global nuclear disarmament was an attainable goal.

During the Cold War, deterrence was effective in maintaining peace between the two superpowers because both states ensured that the other would be deterred on all levels in the event of escalating tensions. At the time, the security relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was heavily dependent on the concept of parity.  Conventional forces were deterred with conventional forces of equal strength, while nuclear arsenals were positioned in support of mutually assured destruction.

As the Soviet Union broke apart, following years of economic stagnation, the United States and its allies were demonstrating their significant conventional military capabilities in their 1990-1991 campaign to expel Iraqi occupying forces from the oil-rich state of Kuwait.  Russia’s military and political leaders grew increasingly wary about the imbalance—to Russia’s disadvantage—in conventional power projection and efficacy.

Shifting Security Perspectives in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia’s Asymmetric Deterrence Strategy

This anxiety amongst the Russian military’s top brass further developed during the U.S.-led NATO 1999 intervention in Kosovo. The United States’ conventional military power became a clear and distinct threat to Russia. There were many similarities between the origins of the Kosovo conflict and Russia’s own internal war with Chechen separatists during the first Chechen War. What Russia feared most was that the U.S. would intervene in what Russia considered its’ internal affairs. If the U.S. were to launch a non-nuclear (i.e. conventional) assault against the newly formed Russian Federation, Russia’s conventional forces would be of little benefit.

As nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War was predicated on the concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), deterrence strategy required that effective and credible forces were maintained at every level—conventional and nuclear to be effective. The Soviet Union’s collapse decimated that military’s conventional force projection capabilities. The subsequent Russian military’s ability to deter any conventional U.S. or NATO military action against Russia was rendered ineffective.

The efficacy of the United States’ high-precision conventional weapons was demonstrated in both the Balkan and Iraqi campaigns of the 1990s. Unlike nuclear weapons, these precision-guided “smart bombs” were highly usable and effective—in stark contrast to nuclear weapons. Framed in this context, Russia’s military planners became painfully aware of their strategic disadvantage. Thus, the concept of nuclear de-escalation was born.

Before the conclusion of NATO’s Kosovo operation, Russia initiated the development of a new military doctrine that would deter any conventional or nuclear strike against Russia.  Responsible for the supervision of this effort was then-secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Vladimir Putin. Coincidentally, it was Putin who would sign this doctrine upon its release in 2000, having just become president.

De-escalation revises the scale of a possible nuclear strike. While Cold War deterrence was predicated on the threat of inflicting an overwhelming degree of damage on enemy military and civilian targets, de-escalation rests on the concept of “tailored damage.” The doctrine defines “tailored damage” as inflicting “damage subjectively unacceptable to the opponent [and] exceeds the benefits the [opponent] expects to gain as a result of the use of [conventional] military force.” In other words, Russia’s military planners believed that the threat of a limited or tactical nuclear strike against enemy targets would be an effective deterrence against a conventional attack by the United States or NATO.

Today, the concept of “nuclear de-escalation” continues to be in play, presenting a significant challenge to western military strategists. If Russia were to mount a successful invasion of the Baltic states, it is likely that Russia would consider these countries to be sovereign Russian territory, meaning that any conventional NATO military operation designed to restore the independence of the NATO members would likely be met with a limited nuclear strike. That is, of course, unless U.S. or NATO cyber or other non-kinetic capabilities can disrupt Russia’s nuclear command-and-control apparatus.

Escalate to De-Escalate: Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Voting for him seemed like the only chance for Iranians to end the corruption and mass murder of the post-revolution years. But, sadly, the more Khatami grew in his presidential role, the more distant he became from the people and the more obedient to the Supreme Leader. Although he later denied it, before the end of his presidency, he said: “the president is no more than a middleman in Iran.”

By now, the United States seems to be realizing that too, albeit very late. Khatami left in 2005, with a legacy of student arrest and murder and the raid on Tehran University in 1998. His successors Ahmadinejad and Rouhani and their record of repression are much the same.

The Iranian people carry the trauma of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. However, it is clear that they do not want another war, and the low voter turnout of the recent election sends a clear message that they do not support the regime, either. Starting with the people inside Iran, promoted by the Iranian diaspora abroad, the virtual campaign of #NO2IRI paid off and should be a wake-up call for Iranian authorities.

Resentment against the regime is high, and its reasons are abundant. The Iranian people are suffocating from shooting citizens on the streets in November 2020 to shooting down Ukrainian flight PF752 with missiles. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suppressing human rights for over 40 years. First, the mass cleansing of the opposition inside Iran in the 80s, enforcing anti-women and anti-freedom regulations and then targeting dissidents abroad in the 90s. Today, complete control of state media and social media filtering put freedom at risk more than ever. One must either express support for the regime or say nothing at all.

So if Iranians want neither this regime nor war, what do they want?

Iranians may have taken part in the 1979 revolution, but the outcome blindsided them. Today, they blame President Carter for his lack of support to back the Shah. Thirty years later, in 2009, they blamed President Obama for not standing firm on the Green Movement protests. President Obama regrets the same in his book, “A Promised Land.” Rightfully, Iranians are terrified that President Biden will sacrifice them to make a weak deal with a rogue regime. In his first presidential interview, new President Raisi said, “He will not meet with the U.S. President.”

The United States should not be afraid of the regime. The Iranian people showed their courage by staying home and not participating in a predetermined election. The U.S. should do the same by standing high on the foundation of America: democracy and freedom for all.

President Biden and his national security team have the chance, for the first time since the revolution, to make it right with the people of Iran:

1. The U.S. can and should add all human rights demands to the negotiating table in Vienna and stand by them. Such demands should go beyond merely asking to free American hostages in Iran. They must include higher international law standards, such as prevention of torture and access to free and fair trials, equal rights for women, minorities, and LGBTQs. Iran will not like it and claim domestic sovereignty, but it too signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945. Human rights for all is what President Biden has promised. With his leadership, the Europeans will follow.
2. The White House should support the Iranian people in every way short of the use of force. Iranians want the President to condemn regime atrocities strongly. Since January 2021, the State Department Farsi section has lost followers on social media. Human rights content is far more critical than scattered messages on Jazz or birthday wishes. The State Department should transform its Farsi page and tailor it to the target audience of Iranians. Information on fundamental human rights and needs, privacy protection, and accessible VPNs should be the contents of USABEHFARSI. It is wrong to think the U.S. will blame the people by supporting them. The Iranian regime always blames the U.S; the U.S. should always stand by what is right and what the regime despises.
3. The word on the ground among the Iranian diaspora is that Iran lobby groups such as NIAC (National Iranian American Council) did not establish themselves independently and that the CIA played a role in setting them up as a concession to the regime. The U.S. government should set the record straight, denounce these regime lobby groups, and stay as far from them as it can. These groups have only worked against U.S. interests and the regime in the last decade.
4. The U.S. Justice Department’s actions against Iranian malign activities should go beyond shutting down IRGC websites. Instead, it should focus on those individuals who create division and hate among Americans, claiming the U.S. is at fault for everything wrong in Iran. A specific Task Force is now needed to target those individuals, their travel, and finances.
5. Meeting with Iranian groups from all perspectives must be a top priority within the State Department. In the last decade, the regime lobby groups have gotten close enough to the U.S. government and bought time for the regime. This should change, and the U.S. should hear out everybody.

The path ahead for the United States to deal with the Iranian government is neither war nor fruitless diplomacy, rather fierce advocacy for human rights and the freedom of the Iranian people. The regime has the money and the tools of repression, but it doesn’t have the people’s support.

The United States now has the chance to do the right thing for the people of Iran. The regime needs to know the world is watching. The Iranian people will surprise themselves and the world with their courage to change and a better future.

The JCPOA is Dead—Renewal Not Required was originally published on Global Security Review.

Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which recently passed the House and Senate, authorizes $7.1 billion (over $2 billion more than requested) for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a subset of the Department of Defense budget for targeted investments in the Indo-Pacific region. Other geographic areas across the globe were mentioned in GPR briefings and the NDAA, but almost as an afterthought when compared to the emphasis placed on the Indo-Pacific.

To face current and future threats, the United States’ national security strategy needs to evolve at the speed of relevance. The current geopolitical and economic environment demands more forward-looking and predictive thinking from civilian and military leaders, rather than reactive views based on recent history and antiquated doctrine. Casting an eye beyond the regionally-focused and traditional planes of national security is essential to competing and succeeding in the era of great power competition.

This latest shift to the Pacific comes over ten years after the Obama Administration announced a “pivot” or “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region in 2011. Yet the Obama-era pivot never really came to be and only served as a catalyst for PRC military modernization, the PRC militarization of the South China Sea, and the launch and execution of a series of aggressive trade endeavors, including the Belt and Road Initiative. All this was done with impunity as the United States remained focused on the Middle East.

The shift to the Indo-Pacific announced by the GPR and backed by the NDAA has come too slowly and too late. Focusing on a single geographic region for the past twenty years has allowed problems to fester in areas and ways outside of the strategic focus of the United States. Technology and competitors have outpaced the speed of U.S. national security strategy.

The United States seems poised to take its eye off the ball again. Before the NSS and NDS have even been publicly released, over 100,000 Russian troops have amassed on the border of Ukraine and seem poised for invasion. More surreptitiously and less immediate, the United States strategy needs to acknowledge an emerging center of gravity in Africa. In December 2021, the Wall Street Journal reported that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is executing plans to establish a naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast in Equatorial Guinea to the alarm of U.S. government officials.

The juxtaposition of the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific against the PRC’s plans to establish a base in West Africa highlights three truths the United States must confront regarding its national security strategy: (1) great power competition is not defined by U.S. military doctrine; (2) great power competition is not defined by geography; and (3) great power competition will not be won by the U.S. military alone.

1. Great Power Competition Is Not Defined By U.S. Military Doctrine

As hard as U.S. military strategists may try to shoehorn it in, great power competition does not fit neatly into the boxes historically prescribed by U.S. military doctrine. United States national security policy towards China over the past decade assumes a clean division between peace and war. But this approach quickly loses efficacy in the face of PRC strategy.

As one example, China has spent at least the past decade aggressively influencing international technical standards. Such standards are agreed upon among regional and global bodies with the shared goal of ensuring functionality, interoperability, and safety among products, services, and processes. While seemingly mundane and highly technical, such international technical standards have a profound influence on how the world adopts and uses new technologies.

Initially, China’s standards strategy was mostly limited to protectionist domestic policies, designed to keep foreign products out of China. In more recent years, however, China has increased its profile on international standards-setting bodies, where participants endeavor to develop consensus-based rules deemed in the best interest of industry and consumers.

In numerous cases, governments, businesses, and others have attested that China uses a variety of tactics to skew the outcomes of standard-setting deliberations, including by abusing leadership positions and pressuring Chinese representatives to vote for PRC proposals regardless of their merits. These practices not only cut against long-standing rules and norms, but they also reduce the technical quality and long-term relevance of international standards.

In addition to influencing international standards bodies, the PRC sets de facto standards by creating dependencies on Chinese technology products and services through its Belt and Road Initiative.   In essence, the PRC exports technology at a subsidized cost, and signs agreements with governments across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean that formalize and solidify standards favorable to China. Such arrangements make it legally difficult or cost-prohibitive to switch to alternative products, thereby forcing consumers into using PRC technology.

More insidiously, the PRC is influencing standards as part of a military-civil fusion strategy to exploit networks and critical communications infrastructure. Most notably, Huawei, China’s most successful telecommunications company, is believed to be backed and controlled by the PRC military. Since Huawei was founded in 1987, the company has faced allegations across the globe ranging from corporate theft to trade agreements and sanctions violations to purposefully installing backdoor vulnerabilities on its products.

The United States government has taken note of this behavior as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designated Chinese tech companies, including Huawei, ZTE, and others, as “threats to national security.” And in November 2021, President Biden signed a bill into law barring the FCC from authorizing products made by companies considered a threat to national security. But these measures are largely defensive and only apply domestically.

To compete with China, U.S. strategy must counter PRC strategy on the global stage, not just in the Indo-Pacific. In terms of international standards, few bodies are more important than the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU is a treaty-based United Nations organization with representation from almost every nation in the world. The ITU governs the global use of the electromagnetic spectrum, assigns satellite orbits, and plays a significant role in setting global telecommunications and internet standards. 

In 2022, the ITU is scheduled to convene in Bucharest, Romania to elect its next Secretary-General. Responsible, forward-looking, and transparent leadership of the ITU is vital to global industry as well as international security. Currently, there are two leading candidates. One is Rashid Ismailov, former deputy chief of the Russian communications ministry and, as it happens, a former executive at Huawei. The second is Doreen Bogdan-Martin, from the United States. Bogdan-Martin is currently the Director of ITU’s Telecommunication Development Bureau, where she is working to transform the global digital landscape to improve connectivity, close gaps in infrastructure, and make the digital future more inclusive and sustainable. If elected, Ms. Bogdan-Martin would be the first woman to lead the ITU.

Although Bogdan-Martin has the support and endorsement of the U.S. government, this will not be enough to win the election. The winner of the election must obtain the majority of the votes from representatives across the 193 participating nations.

Notably, the largest and, therefore most critical, block of voters for the ITU election reside not in the most powerful countries in the world, but in Africa. And Africa deserves the attention of national security professionals for other reasons as well.

 2. Great Power Competition Is Not Confined By Geography

While the U.S. remains regionally focused and competing within traditional planes of national security, the world is in the midst of an era not defined by geography, but by networks and new technologies. The greatest untapped potential is in Africa, and the PRC realized this some time ago.

Despite the pervasiveness of the internet in all aspects of life in advanced economies, much of the developing world still lack access to affordable and reliable connectivity. Nearly 3.7 billion people (or roughly half of the global population) do not have internet access. Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites are projected to increase global satellite internet capacity by tenfold by the end of 2021 and by thirtyfold by 2030. Because of their proximity to Earth, LEO satellite constellations can circle the globe many times a day, providing continuous and high-quality connectivity for any given area.

The goal of bringing the internet to underdeveloped nations is not a novel aspiration. But previous efforts were hampered by a lack of access to electricity in the poorest countries. While there is still more work to be done, due to a concerted effort by the World Health Organization, a $5 billion investment by the World Bank, and advances in off-grid technologies, the global electrification rate has increased dramatically over the last decade; as of 2020, over 90 percent of the world’s population has access to electricity.

The potential to bring reliable internet to remote and underserved populations across the globe could have profound impacts on the availability of information and how it is received, consumed, and transmitted, as well as on national security, the economy, and the international world order. Because of market demand, the potential for economic growth, and population demographics, no region of the world will be more affected by the increased availability of the internet than Africa.

Thus far, fifty African countries have signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative. Huawei is engaged in 25 projects throughout the continent and has already secured seventy percent of Africa’s 4G network. Further, PRC companies have built over 100 commercial ports in Africa over the past twenty years and fund other major infrastructure projects throughout the continent.

The PRC’s efforts to develop a base on the western coast of Africa in Equatorial Guinea should come as no surprise. In the spring of 2021, U.S. Africa Command Commander General Stephen Townsend testified that China was seeking to establish “a port where they can rearm with munitions and repair naval vessels.” General Townsend further stated: “The Chinese are outmaneuvering the U.S. in select countries in Africa. Port projects, economic endeavors, infrastructure and their agreements and contracts will lead to greater access in the future. They are hedging their bets and making big bets on Africa.”

Although the United States has made efforts to blunt China’s influence in Africa, unilateral efforts have not achieved desired effects. In October, President Biden’s Principal Deputy National Security Adviser, Jon Finer, met with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea to seek favor, but this comes on the heels of a series of U.S. diplomatic and legal actions over the past decade targeting Equatorial Guinean government corruption and kleptocracy. Prospects of curbing Equatorial Guinea’s blossoming partnership with China appear dim.

To effectively counter great powers – especially in Africa – the United States cannot do it alone.

3. Military Power Is Not the Sole Path To Success In Great Power Competition

Just two months ago, Australia canceled a long-standing $88 billion diesel submarine contract with France, opting instead to procure nuclear submarines through a trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom. Seemingly surprised by this development, President Macron immediately recalled French ambassadors in the United States and Australia and canceled a symbolic security cooperation event in Washington commemorating the 240th anniversary of the Battle of the Capes. According to France Foreign Affairs Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian: “It was a stab in the back. We had established a relationship of trust with Australia. This trust has been betrayed.”

While the United States government has not articulated the rationale behind the decision, Australia has indicated dissatisfaction with French contract performance and the urgent need for a stronger submarine force to challenge the PRC in the South China Sea. Analysts have observed that even if this particular crisis passes quickly, the United States’ alliance with France will remain damaged, suggesting that the strategic value of the pivot to the Pacific outweighed the potential harm to relationships with France.

Australian submarines in the Pacific likely will be inconsequential to the outcome of great power competition. Frayed partnerships and a lack of meaningful presence in other parts of the globe will not. The consequences of the diplomatic fallout between the U.S. and France, however, may go well beyond the South China Sea, the United States, and France. Instead, it will hurt shared efforts everywhere, including in Africa.

Although Françafrique has waned in recent years, France still maintains considerable influence in Africa founded on deep personal relationships and “family-like” networks as well as a common language in many instances. Additionally, France retains the largest military presence in Africa of any foreign power. Throughout the last two decades of counterterrorism operations, France has provided U.S. special forces with otherwise unattainable placement and access. The value of French partnerships in Africa cannot be overstated.

France would also benefit from U.S. partnership. In some African countries, France is still viewed negatively as a neo-colonial power. The United States, on the other hand, is a preferred partner in many nations on the continent. According to General Townsend: “We were never a colonizing power in Africa, and we are regarded as an honest broker by many nations.” As one recent example, in April 2021, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari asked Secretary of State Antony Blinken to move the U.S. Africa Command headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa. This is significant as the Nigeran government was the most vocal opponent of establishing a U.S. Africa Command presence on the African continent when the command was first created in 2007.

To effectively deter the PRC in Africa and anywhere else, the United States, France, and other like-minded nations are stronger and more effective together. As demonstrated by the submarine deal gone awry, however, we are not on the right track. As recently as early December 2021, France declined to join the United States in boycotting the Beijing Olympics, signifying a huge setback for U.S. diplomacy and the continuation of a widening rift between the strategic alignment of democratic nations. Similarly, Singapore and other key U.S. partners expressed frustration by not being among the 100 nations invited to President Biden’s virtual Summit on Democracy in favor of blatantly authoritarian governments. China and Russia are undoubtedly reveling in these developments.

Conclusion

The threats emanating from China and the Indo-Pacific region remain significant, but such a strong focus on one specific geographic area overlooks how great power competition is understood and employed by our competitors. We are in the midst of an era that will be defined not by geography, but by new technologies and networks. Technology and our competitors have outpaced the speed of U.S. national security strategy.

The United States needs to take heed and recognize that the modern battlefield for great power competition is happening everywhere, all the time, and in the shadows of legal agreements and commercial partnerships. And at the moment, an important center of gravity is emerging in Africa.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official views of Freedom Technologies, Inc., or any other entity.

It’s Time to Stop Pivoting: Great Power Competition is Everywhere was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of the AUKUS agreement, EU member states must come to terms with the loss of primacy and the shift of the U.S.’s geostrategic center of gravity to the East to counter Chinese expansionism. The old Eurocentric western security architecture is essentially in shambles, hindering NATO’s integrity as well. The emerging “Quad” alliance between the U.S., U.K., Australia, India, and Japan diminishes NATO’s importance in the Indo-Pacific. The French and other traditional allies and partners—members of EU and NATO—collectively appeared more enraged than China, highlighting the clumsy formation of AUKUS that was accelerated by the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle. AUKUS marks a turning point in global geopolitics that will have a domino effect on several parts of the world—one being the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the diplomatic blow of AUKUS and Angela Merkel’s retirement from frontline politics, France’s first reaction was to strengthen its ties with Greece and increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing a rearmament deal that modernizes the Hellenic Navy and commits to an important Defense Assistance Agreement. The latter includes a clause of mutual defense assistance—similar to the mutual defense clause (Article 42.7 TEU) of the Treaty of the European Union—in case one of the two states is attacked on its territory.

Analysts note a relation between AUKUS and U.S. support for France to pursue a more proactive role in the Eastern Mediterranean through the game-changing Franco-Greek deal that bolsters the Greek armed forces with three Belharra frigates (+1 option). Athens previously ordered 18 Rafale fighter jets and has plans to acquire six more in the future.

France already showed its intention to support Greece against Turkey during a prolonged 82-day crisis that brought Greece and Turkey (two historic rivals and NATO members) to the brink of conflict. Back in 2020, the Turks deployed their seismic research vessel Oruç Reis accompanied by a flotilla of warships to conduct surveys on the Greek continental shelf (as described in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS III) that Turkey claims with the unsubstantiated Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) naval doctrine. The Mavi Vatan opposes UNCLOS III provisions and is based on the arbitrary assumption that all islands are deprived of the right to exert jurisdiction on the continental shelf. However, the Law of the Sea is binding on all states to the extent that it represents customary international law, and although Turkey is not a signatory to it, it has to comply with it.

French President Emmanuel Macron openly criticizing Turkey’s activity on the Greek and Cypriot continental shelf/exclusive economic zone (EEZ) said, “I don’t consider that in recent years Turkey’s strategy is the strategy of a NATO ally… when you have a country which attacks the exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of two members of the European Union.” In contrast, on another occasion, he clarified that “France has been very clear. When there were unilateral acts in the eastern Mediterranean, we condemned them with words, and we acted by sending frigates.” After signing the Franco-Greek deal in Élysée Palace, he also noted that “it will help protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of both states.”

France’s intervention came as no surprise since it has competing interests with Turkey over Syria, Lebanon, and Africa. As Professor of Geopolitics Kostas Grivas explained, France has a large presence and significant geopolitical interests in Africa. Its strategic depth is in Africa, incorporating more than the Francophone states.

The Mediterranean is bridging France with the African continent; thus is imperative to maintain control of it, especially after the recently discovered energy resources attracting a great deal of interest. This brings France closer to Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus in a containment effort against Turkey’s expansionism left unanswered by the EU’s inability to guard its outermost borders.

The Turks, as expected, expressed their frustration with the newly formed Franco-Greek strategic alliance by putting pressure on Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish frigates obstructed the Maltese-flagged research vessel Nautical Geo hired to conduct research related to the EastMed gas pipeline. The ship attempted to work on the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (delimitated with Egypt) and Cypriot EEZ (delimitated with Egypt). Turkey, however, is claiming the same continental self with the Mavi Vatan doctrine.

With an increased military presence, the Turks aimed and succeeded in forcing the Americans on yet another equidistance statement. A State Department spokesman said the U.S. “encourages all states to resolve maritime delimitation issues through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law,” an announcement that overlooks the fact that the Turkish frigate obstructed Nautical Geo’s work on Greek and Cypriot delineated EEZs.

The Connection Between AUKUS, the Franco-Greek Pact, and the EastMed Pipeline was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yes, Turkey is a NATO member and an important regional actor, but Turkish democracy has waxed and waned. Despite these challenges, one key group—the Hizmet movement, inspired by the teachings of Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen – has been a staunch advocate for Turkish democracy. But Hizmet has been demonized by Erdoğan as an “enemy of the state” and repeatedly scapegoated by Erdoğan’s regime. As Erdoğan owns the megaphones in Turkey, he has used them so frequently against Hizmet that he has created an alternate reality that, unfortunately, has recently been amplified in the West.

From 1923 when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey up until the Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) took office in 2002, the Turkish state was defined by anti-religious and anti-Kurdish military-cum-judiciary rule. During this period, the Turkish state frequently scuttled popular democracy through military intervention in the name of protecting the regime. In 1960, 1970, and 1980, military coups overthrew the civilian governments.

After decades of the military pulling the strings, the AKP called for real reforms and won popular support in 2002. The AKP’s success was driven by both the cultural capital provided by Hizmet’s international outreach and political support from Western powers eager for a moderate Islamic foothold in the region in the aftermath of 9/11.

At the time, Hizmet and the AKP shared a vision of a democratic Turkish state (2002-2011) with civil society bolstered by moderate Islam. The AKP, dominated by its relatively liberal faction that was genuinely committed to creating a democratic Turkish state and Hizmet, a Sufi-influenced socio-religious movement focused on promoting universal human understanding and democratic values, cooperated and coexisted. This convergence of a social movement (Hizmet) and a political force (AKP)—but without any programmatic alliance—ushered in Turkey’s most democratic period, characterized by rule of law, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, an independent judiciary, and regular elections.

During this period, Hizmet helped prepare Muslim students to compete for positions in state institutions and Hizmet participants emerged as effective democracy advocates, helping to sway public opinion to support meaningful constitutional reforms in 2010. The movement’s increased visibility and civic contributions, however, produced two unintended consequences: resentment from opposition groups and fear within the Erdoğan-led Islamist faction of AKP that the movement could erode Erdoğan’s political power.

On the heels of successful and popular constitutional reforms in 2010 limiting the military’s political power, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan sought to deploy Hizmet as a political tool to solidify his own power. He demanded that the movement’s growing global network align behind his leadership and promote him as a leader of the Muslim world.

Gulen personally opposed both the concentration of power in a single executive as well as the politicization of his ideas. Although the final decision was left to the movement’s volunteers, Gulen advised against granting Erdoğan’s request which fueled the latter’s growing resentment and suspicion of the movement.

In 2014, Erdoğan narrowly won the presidential election after three terms as Prime Minister (2003-2014). After taking office, he bolstered his power by transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential system and changing the constitution. Erdoğan also marginalized perceived opposition including the AKP’s liberal faction, independent media, Kurdish opposition, and Hizmet.

In 2016, Erdoğan used the pretense of the failed military coup to further consolidate power. Despite lacking any credible evidence, Erdoğan alleged that the Hizmet movement and Gulen had orchestrated the coup. Both Hizmet participants and Gulen himself have repeatedly denied any involvement. These allegations, as well as hundreds of thousands of arrests, not only imprisoned Gulen’s supporters—and others including Pastor Brunson—but also cast anyone with tangential Hizmet connections as a traitor. This ostracization as well as purges of Hizmet participants and allies deprived hundreds of thousands of livelihoods and access to social institutions.

Despite Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism, Turkey has remained an essential ally for Western powers. To maintain political and economic ties, Western leaders have walked a fine line, neither embracing nor alienating Erdoğan’s regime. Even actions that flouted Turkey’s status as a NATO member, such as purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system and attacking the U.S.’s Kurdish allies in the fight against ISIS, have produced few consequences.

Western powers, including the United States, however, must recognize that Erdoğan is the real threat to Turkish democracy. His regime will continue to persecute critics, undermine regional stability, and weaken key alliances. Erdoğan has made it abundantly clear that he will continue to act with impunity and distort facts to undercut those that stand in his way, particularly movements like Hizmet that have been longstanding champions of Turkish democracy. Erdoğan cannot be allowed to rewrite history.

Turkey’s Faltering Democracy and Western Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of border walls between nations has more than quadrupled” precisely at a time when cultural and economic globalization has both simultaneously and paradoxically promoted and invited greater human mobilization and internationalization of production, workforce, and education. The reappearance of the border-centered discourse has, in recent months, coincided with one of the most consequential mass population movements since World War II – The Syrian Refugee Crisis – displacing more than 12 million people in 2015 alone and quickly becoming the focal point of election slogans and innumerable public debates in some of the most traditionally open and astutely liberal polities. Legal and illegal, documented and undocumented border crossings by migrants, immigrants, and refugees prompted, in no small measure, reflections on national identity and social co-existence in a globalized, highly volatile, and increasingly mobile world. The pre-Brexit referendum debates evidenced dissatisfaction with pan-European arrangements of open borders, resulting demographic changes, and stringent economic austerity measures. A turn toward the “America First” approach was made out of perceivably lapse border controls between the United States and Mexico and a poorly administered U.S. immigration system. Alternative for Germany (AfD) party platform in the 2017 election cycle echoed political themes of “It’s about us, our culture, our home, our Germany” and “Get your country back!” that gave momentum to the nationalist movements in Merkel’s multicultural Germany and translated into seats in the Bundestag. The March 2018 Italian election campaign manifestos revolved around the country’s 600,000 migrants of mostly African descent, who were no longer welcome in the Mediterranean “La Patria” or fatherland. Anti-migrant sentiments and slogans are reinforced further by a tangible security apparatus, which manifests a determined proclivity toward the hardening of borders and increasing land and maritime border surveillance. It is no accident that since its creation in 2005, Frontex, the European agency tasked with the management of the continent’s external borders has enjoyed a generous budget and a steady increase in financial support (Agier, 2016) as migration is ever more tightly bound with security.

Given the above-cited precedents, what prompts the periodic resurfacing of nationalistic sentiments and isolationist tendencies? How should tensions between liberal proclivities to hospitality towards strangers be reconciled with communitarian values and patriotic fervor? Why do visions of exclusivity tend to prevail over cosmopolitan aspirations of undivided humanity? Do walls demarcating borders succeed and when do they matter most?

The developments of recent months give rise to a number of questions, which the subsequent pages mean to intimate at and explore but by no means definitively answer. The contemporary migratory landscape and political responses to the changing patterns of movement of people outlined in this article, however, offer a fertile ground for further reflection on the contours and character of our liberal polities and contents of our responsibility toward strangers or a distant ‘other’.

Migration and Its Consequences

 The question surrounding the status of minorities within the social and legal milieu is one of significant historical weight in Europe, a continent burdened by the legacy of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian imperialism and subsequent travails of the World War II experience of mass genocide forced repatriations and ethnic expulsions. It is all the more pressing in view of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and resulting in mass population migrations of refugees. In 2015, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) monitoring system, more than one million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe, resulting in a humanitarian crisis of considerable proportions and by 2017 the total number of asylum-seekers reached 3.5 million. Mass movements of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan into Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Turkey, and Sweden to name a few, have posed significant social and security dilemmas not seen on the Continent since the wars in former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina of the 1990s. Population displacement of vulnerable at-risk populations due to war and protracted conflict, especially of women and children, carries with it existential risks and societal implications requiring long-term assistance and diligent care. The IOM found that close to seventy percent of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean have fallen victim to exploitation, abuse, human trafficking, imprisonment, and rape. Traumatized and exploited survivors, in turn, suffer debilitating long-term health consequences that require diligent medical help and legal assistance. Meanwhile, EU polities have struggled to come up with a concerted response to the refugee influx, spurring Parliamentary debates on the shape and character of EU’s refugee integration policy, financial support, and job creation, revamping of border security, reform of the asylum system and implementation of a humane return policy (EU Parliament News, 2017). Apart from a lack of pan-European consensus on a unified response to ongoing refugee flows, unilateral “open door” policies adopted by Sweden and Germany have proven politically controversial and socially and financially unsustainable. The integration of nearly 1.1 million refugees into German society has met with public disapproval. In a January 2016 Insa public opinion poll, forty percent of Germans wanted Merkel to quit over her “refugees are welcome” policy.  A number of EU member states declined to follow a similar path opting instead for refugee admission quotas resulting in a continent bitterly divided over integration, security, and financial sharing of burdens. All too often, however, the world’s response to mass atrocities is a compromise between a trial and error.

Mass population displacements due to protracted conflicts around the world have grown in scale and brutality. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that some 65.3 million people were forcefully displaced by conflict and persecution in 2015 alone. The all too familiar shipwrecks carrying refugees across the Mediterranean, walls and barbed-wire fences, the camps in Calais, and the barrels of the gun have become the discomforting images that once again test our laws, our morality, and our humanity.

Walls and Borders in Historical Context

At the conclusion of World War II, there were fewer than five border walls in the world. By the end of the Cold War in 1989-90, the number steadily increased to fifteen. Despite the celebratory triumph of liberal values over Marxist-Leninist ideology that put an end to the symbolic ‘Iron Curtain’ represented by the Berlin Wall, more physical barriers have been erected than ever before with a singular purpose of keeping people in as well as out. According to researchers at the University of Quebec at Montreal, there are at present 65 walls standing or under construction. Old as well as new democracies guard themselves against, what Ai Weiwei’s recent documentary dubbed the ‘Human Flow’ (Amazon Studios, 2017). Despite its idealized pioneering project of visa-free entry, the Schengen Agreement, the EU is a leader in the construction of new border walls. Austria is erecting a physical border to deter migrants from traveling through Hungary and Norway and Slovenia are building walls to keep immigrants from Russia and Croatia. Spain’s 7-mile steel structure blocks immigration from Morocco and both Egypt and Israel erected massive steel barricades with Gaza. Bulgaria, Turkey, India, Myanmar, have all built walls on their borders and the United States is testing eight prototypes of barriers to be eventually erected on its nearly 2,000-mile-long Southwest border with Mexico. The EU, in the meantime, signed an agreement with Turkey to halt the flow of asylum-seekers and stop them from crossing the Aegean Sea. Containment of population flows by means of material barriers to entry conflicts with long-held liberal visions of undivided humanity and its accompanying humanitarian impulse and ethics of care proffered by the EU as an idea and an institution. Despite considerable elisions of ideological differences that separated people and fractured relations between the East and West at the height of the Cold War, the union of like-minded democratic states confoundingly gives rise to more physical walls that had historically estranged East and West Berliners.

Contemporary Patterns of Migration

Between 2005 and 2014, some 40,000 people died trying to cross borders across the world (Jones 2016, 4). According to the International Organization for Migration, 10,000 of them died since 2014. In 2016 alone, more than 4,000 people have died trying to cross the Mediterranean. No monument has been raised to commemorate the victims. No special mention or a minute of silence has been dedicated to this modern-day atrocity. To borrow Judith Butler’s words, those ‘precarious’ lives lost in war or in transit may simply not be ‘grievable’ enough (2009). After all, from the comforts of ones’ home or office, one cannot imaginatively enter into a condition of conflict displacement, making the perilous journey of a refugee or an asylum-seeker not sufficiently ‘intelligible’ to the Western mind to ‘matter’ on a social scale (Butler, 2009). On the contrary, the sheer depersonalized statistical certainty of people perishing as a result of a hazardous border crossing is met with distracted indifference and reinforces the perception of modern-day migration as an underground enterprise rife with deception and danger that make death if not inevitable, certainly highly possible. The undocumented, the paperless, the undesired, and the uninvited – left in despair or helplessness that only war can bring – have increasingly turned to networks of smugglers who in their attempt to breach the ‘walls’ of the security state apparatus expose the victims of their own unlucky stars to the arsenal of civil and criminal state responses. The 2011 Human Rights Watch Report recorded instances of arrests and detentions of migrants held in overcrowded detention centers that did not meet minimum human rights standards. Failure to separate men from women on religious grounds, the internment of unaccompanied children in unsanitary and poorly ventilated cells, and use of physical violence by guards prompted the European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece to hold Belgium and Greece liable for violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights by exposing migrants to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’. On the U.S.-Mexican border, border patrols use live ammunition to deter crossings (Agier, 2016). Non-response to migrant crossings is also a response. In 2011, the ‘left-to-die’ migrant boat off the coast of Lampedusa failed to meet with a concerted rescue effort from commercial and NATO ships in the area and Spanish and Italian Coast Guard vessels resulting in the death of sixty-three people (including two babies) and launching the European Council investigation that exposed a “double standard in valuing human life.”

It would be too facile, however, to confine the phenomenon of the proliferation of border walls to the limitations of our imagination or a symptom of a decline or failure of liberal values. Globalization, warfare, threats of terrorism elucidate tensions between democratic ideals and realpolitik propped up by a muscular security apparatus of state power retrofitted for operations in the theatre of a perpetual state of modern-day displacement. Neither pinning our hopes on the human rights conception of free movement of peoples and the subsequent desire of states to thwart such lofty aspirations seems especially helpful in elucidating the return of the wall as a psychological, legal, political, and physical barrier, which amplifies socio-economic divisions and reinforces hierarchies of power. Nor will the desire for security and preservation of identity – hijacked by political elites – offer sufficient explanatory justifications for the dramatically high numbers of barriers separating states and peoples in the 21st century. It is not any of those taken separately that captures the lived reality on the ground. Taken together, however, they present an ignoble image of the world undone by specular failures of institutional and ideological regimes of global governance currently in place.

Precedents to the Refugee Crisis and a Path Forward

 The less emphasized story in the debate on walls and borders is one of the wide-ranging failures of the Western liberal regimes that now opt to wall themselves off against the existential threats from abroad; threats, which the West bears significant responsibility for creating. There are, at minimum, six consequential events of the last two decades that directly contribute to the refugee crisis of today. The ongoing population displacement, which gives rise to disenchanted Western publics’ search for populist solutions to elite entanglements, can be said to have germinated with:

1. George W. Bush’s misconceived Afghanistan and Iraq Wars resulting in sectarian divisions, instability, and conflict in the Middle East.
2. Failure of multiculturalism in Europe (recall Angela Merkel’s or David Cameron’s statements to this effect) resulting from an inadequate level of cooperation across multilateral institutional domains on migrant integration and assimilation.
3. Military incursions of Western powers into the Middle East (Libya, Yemen, Syria), which undermined existing institutional capacities and crippled the region with a lack of strategic purpose and defined military objectives.
4. Moral, legal, and political paralysis of the UN System as global humanitarian crises ensue.
5. E.U.’s ill-conceived and unevenly implemented refugee policy post-2015
6. Uneven patterns of globalization resulting in wide inter-regional developmental divergences and economic disparities driving mass migration.

Until the West rectifies the past wrongs brought about by foreign policy misadventures; men, women, and children will continue to wash up on Europe’s inhospitable shores stoking anti-migrant sentiments, criminalization of movement, nationalism, and isolationism. This entails ensuring that needlessly protracted conflicts are settled – even if and when politically inconvenient for one of the parties involved – and that the very places of origin of displacement are again made safe for the purpose of rebuilding and resettlement. Institutional mechanisms that respond to the movement of people must also put an end to routine humiliations of migrants, immigrants, and refugees on account of their dispossession, religious denomination, place of origin, or race in the form of regional quotas or particularly pernicious public pronouncements made by candidates or parties at election time. Western powers should be wary of displacing the battlefield in the ‘global war on terror’ and needlessly projecting it onto the civilian sphere protected by a plethora of civil, political, and human rights, which become regularly abrogated. International law should be an active, rather than a passive, and a proactive, rather than merely reactive, mechanism of protection and intervention. As a framework for global law, it should complement state and regional laws rather than serve as a back-up instrument activated and used in cases of state failure to abide by the law’s original doctrines and precepts.

Humanity, inevitably, is on the move, it is high time the laws that regulate borders moved with it eliminating thus the condition of exclusion and social irrelevance on account of ones’ foreignness and uncertain legal status. This means that inherent features of the globalizing world – migration – are no longer treated as an aberration but a norm in need of protection and safe passage.

References

Agier, Michel. 2016. Borderlands. Cambridge: Polity.

Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? New York: Verso.

Jones, Reece. 2016. Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. New York: Verso.

Humanity on the Move: Migration in the Age of Walls and Borders was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current global pandemic that has affected us all has elicited extensive media attention.  A variety of theories have abounded on how the virus originated, i.e., that it is a biological weapon created in the lab by the Chinese, or by the U.S. military, or that it is fueled by the effects of 5G networks on our immune system. In addition, divergent views have emerged regarding the “hysteria” surrounding the pandemic, some preaching for a strict societal response, and others claiming that the surrounding panic is more detrimental for society than the danger of the virus itself. Leaders have responded differently to the crisis and have received both praise and criticism for their actions. Some leaders responded as soon as they heard warnings from the World Health Organization, which called it a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” in January, while others did not pay immediate attention to warning signs.  Some responded with the concept of building “herd immunity” throughout the society, others called for total lockdown. Some leaders are demonstrating transparency to their citizens and to the world community to tackle the challenge, while others resort to hiding information or disregarding efforts at a global response. All actions and reactions have received immense scrutiny through media platforms, as per the modern-day norm.¹

In this age of mass media, infinite narratives, and political polarization, where “objective” information often becomes blurred as subjective, could this pandemic be shining a light on what “responsible leadership” really means? Could a truth be emerging instead of a subjective opinion? In a public health crisis, conspiracy theories can kill.  Citizens look to their government for protection and are placing their safety in the hands of their leaders.  During such a critical moment, a leader must act in the best interest of the population and the world at large, or else be labeled as a leader who mishandled an epidemic and put lives at risk, something that is never taken lightly.  Even populist politicians, who have shown a general tendency to ignore scientific advice, have heeded policy recommendations from the scientific community to tackle the spread of the virus, demonstrating that denial is not a viable option. The role of the media remains critical in such an instance, as the media have a responsibility to present factual information and constructive solutions to the problem and have a duty to be critical of the mismanagement of leadership rather than encourage the spread of disinformation or politicizing the crisis. This crisis has the potential to reshape the way we view responsible leadership and see the value in constructive journalism and scientific data.

The sharing of information in our world today has evolved dramatically.  Some have coined the term “post-truth world” to illustrate the present-day difficulties of discerning truth from falsehood. We now have access to more information and evidence than ever before, yet facts seem to have lost their power somehow. Furthermore, the popularity of populists these days points to the tendency of people being attracted to what they consider more “genuine” messages as opposed to the narrative from the “establishment,” which has now been categorized as “elitist,” with little regard for the common folk.  Mainstream media, academia, science, and establishment politicians have all been placed in this category. The Oxford Dictionaries define “post-truth” as: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”  Societal trust in institutions has waned, as the general population has grown more inclined to believe that institutions such as academia or the media are simply platforms through which the establishment tries to control the narrative in society. In other words, there is a crisis of confidence. Today in the political West, instead of merely having left-wing versus right-wing politics, we increasingly see the division lying between anti-establishment and establishment political parties. Amidst this crisis of confidence, the current “information age” is a perfect breeding ground for the perpetuation of multiple competing narratives, mistrust, confusion, sensationalism, polarization and creates what seems like a “post-truth” environment.

Social media play an immense role in this “post-truth” concept. On social media, everyone has a voice and a space to share his or her belief system. People enjoy writing their thoughts and sharing comments, receiving attention, and building networks of like-minded people online. But what social media also perpetuate is polarization and sensationalism.²  To take the example of YouTube, its algorithm is constructed on the basis of encouraging the viewer to spend as much time as possible on its platform.  Therefore, when one searches for something specific to watch, videos with similar content appear as recommendations for what to watch next, reinforcing one’s point of view continuously, whether or not it is based on factuality. In addition, one’s activity on social media is recorded as data to which external companies have access.  These companies can then take advantage of one’s tendencies and beliefs to convey a particular world view to specific targets to help certain political campaigns. There have been multiple instances of troll farms creating fake accounts on social media and influencing users to be attracted to a particular viewpoint. Most of the time, this goes on without our even being aware of it.  In other words, we have lost touch with objective reality in some ways, are increasingly polarized, mistrustful, and are giving in to sensationalism, which news media channels have also taken advantage of as a way to increase their ratings. Social media offers impressionable youth and troll factories the opportunity for mischief without consequences. This type of reality is bound to breed, increasing distrust.³

Despite all the misinformation about the virus that is floating around, this pandemic has revealed an interesting twist in the form of an emerging truth.  People can say what they want to say, but the truth is that there is simply no getting around the actual numbers such as the number of cases, number of deaths, needed hospital beds, ventilators required, and witnessing the effects of one leader’s response compared with another on this set of variables. There is no room for downplaying something whose results are visible and affect the whole of society. No amount of denial or refusal to accept scientific facts is going to help in this situation.  Today’s pandemic requires that each leader take responsibility for the crisis to ensure the best outcome for his or her country, state or city, and the world at large.  In a public health crisis such as this one, we cannot ignore scientific expertise.  It is through their advice and assessments that we as a society can fully understand what is unfolding, and it is up to each leader to either heed their warnings or not. We do, however, continue to see politicized narratives and blame games from leaders who may not have reacted quickly enough, who instead attribute blame elsewhere while playing into their constituency’s worldview.  But even this practice has lost momentum and credibility in most places due to the critical nature of the crisis as it pertains to public health and the health of the economy.

China’s response to the virus has proven to be very controversial. Once the situation was made apparent domestically, draconian measures were implemented in the city of Wuhan, and the central government entrusted the scientific community with the handling of the situation, which now appears to be under control. So, on the one hand, the measures that were taken were in tandem with the expert advice of the medical community, and internal misinformation on the severity of the crisis was stopped once the central government took action against the virus. However, there was a significant problem in the handling of the outbreak when it first appeared. The problem initially was that the Wuhan province denied the severity of the virus, denied it was transmissible to humans, and did not share the information fast enough with the local population nor the central government, which allowed the virus to gain a tenacious hold. This original lack of transparency from Wuhan had severe consequences not only for China but for the international community.  Not acting quickly enough does not tame the spread of the virus. At the same time, it is still possible, and not revealing the extent of the problem to the international community doesn’t allow for enough preparation time for what is to come.  Institutions such as the WHO are only as effective as nations will enable them to be.  Its response will only be as successful as the information it receives and to which it has access. U.S. intelligence reports state that China may not have been transparent with the total number of infected cases or deaths that it officially reported, which also does not give the international community a sense of future trends in other countries.  China is now actively lending its help to the international community as a sign of solidarity and cooperation by sending supplies, rallying for global coordination, and hosting video conferences with other countries to share experiences, initiatives that the West is receiving criticism for not leading.⁴ But the international community’s outlook towards China remains distrustful due to their early mismanagement of the crisis and dubious declaration of official counts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and some right-wing media in tandem with Fox News were early on heard downplaying the disease, saying it was a “hoax.” However, once the numbers caught up to them, there was no getting away with that type of rhetoric anymore.  Credibility is lost when one toys with matters of life and death on this scale. Trump has had to listen to medical experts such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has consistently advocated for more robust measures such as imposing more prolonged and stricter lockdowns alongside increasing testing. Even though Dr. Fauci has become the target of an online conspiracy theory that he is trying to undermine the President, Trump has had to follow his advice and apply more appropriate policies.  Dr. Fauci has won the approval of 78 percent of Americans, while just 7 percent disapprove, according to the Quinnipiac national survey.[5] At this current time, Trump’s handling of the crisis is approved by about 41% of Americans.[6] Although the Trump Administration has previously shown a distaste for relying on scientific expertise, it is particularly harmful to do so during a pandemic.  If leadership tries to sow distrust in public health officials during a time when their advice is especially crucial, the results could be disastrous. Evidence shows that Mr. Trump, however, continues to mishandle information. He tweeted that the HHS Inspector General’s reporting on hospital shortages was wrong and fake and is criticizing the WHO for not having dealt with the virus aggressively enough to divert attention away from his own administration’s slow reaction, messages that encourage distrust in the information we receive from public health institutions and medical experts during a critical time. President Trump later decided to cut U.S. funding to the WHO, which is bound to have detrimental effects in nations that heavily rely on support from the organization. The U.S.’s “America First” strategy sends a clear message to the international community that it does not intend to provide global leadership during this crisis as it has done in the past. This also goes for the U.S.’ allies in Europe, with whom no efforts to coordinate the travel ban coming from the E.U. was made. The German view of Trump has been made apparent when a shipment of 200,000 masks destined for Berlin was supposedly re-routed to the U.S. The fact that Germany would even think of blaming the U.S. for this speaks volumes.⁷ Also, international action at the U.N. Security Council has been hampered by the U.S.’s objections over terminology and insistence on calling it the “Wuhan Virus.”⁸  Also, for the same reason, any hope of G7 foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on the fight against COVID-19 was killed.⁹ Trump has also ignored calls to create a global task force for COVID-19. When a leadership vacuum is produced, others rush to fill the void. In this case, it is China, as the U.S. backed away from activating any conventional international consortium to fight the virus with a united front.¹⁰

Narendra Modi, India’s right-wing populist prime minister, has ordered the most extensive lockdown in human history, pointing to the fact that despite one’s inclinations, inaction is simply not an option during this pandemic. Nevertheless, he is still acting irresponsibly in many ways. Modi dismissed the severity of the epidemic at first. When he yielded to the example of others in the international community and ordered the lockdown, he only gave the population of India four hours’ notice. This, in turn, led to mass labor migration across states largely on foot, surely an inviting breeding ground for the spread of the virus.  In addition, instead of actively mitigating the dissemination of misinformation, the government allows for the spread of utterly false information that has no scientific validity on how to cure the virus, such as by drinking cow urine or bathing in cow dung. Modi has also not stopped the politicization of the coronavirus as being a virus that originated from the Muslim communities, which are now the target of Hindu communities who think it is a ploy to destroy them. Hospitals are underfunded and underequipped, and minimal testing is being carried out. The difference is that some provinces in India are faring much better than others, and these so happen to be mostly the ones that are not governed by Modi’s BJP party. A couple of the southern provinces, such as Kerala in southwest India, are doing much better. They are the example of what the federal government should be doing, which is to follow the advice of the scientific community, reject false information, and limit grandiose expressions of misdirected success stories by leadership.

Germany has proven to be particularly responsible in dealing with the crisis. They tested extensively, made people stay home, used a system of early detection of cases, and had time to prepare for the influx of patients in hospitals. Also important to note is the way Chancellor Angela Merkel was very upfront about the seriousness of the epidemic and resisted any urge to sugarcoat anything, thus making people understand the importance of the situation and follow orders from the start. According to a German public opinion survey, 72% of respondents said they are satisfied with the government’s handling of the crisis. Interestingly to note also is that establishment parties in Germany have gained popularity during this crisis, while the popularity of anti-establishment parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has dropped.¹¹

South Korea has so far established itself as one of the more successful models for responding to the virus.  It is regarded as successful because it was transparent with other countries and with its own population from the outset. A combination of extensive testing and meticulous contact tracing allowed them to control the virus spread effectively. Health managers knew exactly what to plan for, and they used science to guide them through every step of the way. Taiwan is another excellent example.  The government acted immediately as of January with border control and the wearing of facemasks.  While they were reacting quickly, other countries around the world were still debating whether to take action or not. Some of the decisive measures implemented were a ban on travel from China, the introduction of strict punishments for anyone breaching home quarantine orders, a ramp-up domestic face mask production, island-wide testing, and punishment for those who spread disinformation about the virus. Most importantly, there was substantial public trust for the medical experts who held daily briefings on the matter.

Brazil is a good example of how the public can react when a leader does not act responsibly in the face of a public health crisis of this proportion. Jair Bolsonaro still hasn’t gotten the memo that distrusting the scientific community and generating misinformation can be dangerous. He has described the illness as a “cold” and has accused the media of manufacturing hysteria. The governors of Brazil have gone ahead and imposed lockdowns using their own powers, but Mr. Bolsonaro has encouraged Brazilians to ignore them. His irresponsibility towards the crisis has stirred a strong reaction from the public. Through his recklessness with the lives of Brazilians, he has hastened the possibility of his own departure on the political scene. Brazil’s Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta’s approval rating soared to 76% over his handling of the coronavirus crisis as he actively informed the population of the current situation and the appropriate measures to take. In comparison, the approval for President Bolsonaro’s handling of the crisis slipped to 33%, a poll by Datafolha showed.¹² Data also showed an increase in support for Brazil’s various governors, who demonstrated to be more in line with the advice of the scientific community than the President. So even part of Bolsonaro’s support base, people who elected the populist leader to reduce the rampant corruption in Brazil, has deemed him irresponsible when faced with this crisis. Bolsonaro later went on to fire the Health Minister after he advocated for a more unified voice from the government on television.

Meanwhile, the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko sneers at the lockdown measures being implemented all over the world. Lukashenko has not imposed a single restriction since the outbreak of the pandemic, claims that the situation is under control and that it suffices to drink vodka and take a sauna to cure the virus. Neighboring countries have expressed concern about his unorthodox response to the crisis. Without much of a state response, the citizens of Belarus have taken on the responsibility themselves to manage the crisis. People have volunteered to raise money for hospitals and needed supplies, private companies have allowed their staff to work at home, and football fans have called for competition to be suspended. The Metro has its carriages cleaned every day, and the Belarusian Orthodox Church has asked people to stay away from churches for now and are holding masses online. According to SATIO, a Minsk-based survey, about 48% of Belarusians stopped attending public events, and many have self-isolated.¹³ Cafes and restaurants have also decided to close or shift towards takeout and delivery. Some parents have stopped bringing their kids to school, which has forced the government to compromise and extend “spring break” by two weeks. That same survey stated that 70% of Belarusians favor a total ban on public events, and more than half would like to see education institutions close and have people work from home.¹⁴  Sixty-two percent of those surveyed feared the health system would collapse in the face of this pandemic.¹⁵ In a country without free media, the average citizen is left confused about the state of affairs and on what the government is doing. Social media has become a platform for citizens to gain awareness. A very influential post by a doctor on Vkontakte depicted the situation in the hospitals as “out of control.”¹⁶ The doctor was later called in by prosecutors.  Citizens of Belarus have taken to social media to criticize the President and his unethical response to the current pandemic under the hashtag #прашчальнаесловапрэзидзента, or “the president’s parting words.”¹⁷

Each of the examples examined has demonstrated that despite regime type or political affiliations, and despite general tendencies of some politicians to ignore science, it is evident that those who respect the advice of the medical community, who do not waste time propagating false information, who remain transparent and who engage in international efforts, have been deemed leaders who are tackling the virus more responsibly. Conversely, those who ignore experts, sow confusion among the public and demonstrate a lack of transparency and willingness to cooperate are seen as acting irresponsibly. Irresponsibility during a public health crisis ultimately leads to more infections, deaths, and general disapproval. There is no room for “post-truth” in the management of this crisis.  Denying it will cause outright danger to society. Mishandling it for political purposes is reckless, and encouraging false narratives steers the goal away from tackling the issue and responding with urgency. There is a clear binary between what is responsible here and what is not. The relative success that some countries have demonstrated in curbing infections has resulted from quick action, trusting the advice of the medical community, executing a sober strategy, and remaining transparent. The case of COVID-19 will show that responsible leadership is needed and that objectivity exists when assessing what is constituted as competent in the management of this crisis.

In this hotly discussed arrival of the “post-truth” era, people may have stopped demanding the truth because they have understood that they are excluded from any decision-making or ability to change their environment. “Infotainment” or information presented as entertainment has become commonplace. But now, during the coronavirus pandemic, faced with questions of life and death, there seems to be more of a demand for truth. The media have an essential responsibility to point out misinformation and deficiencies, ensure the correct dissemination of factual information, and refrain from politicizing a matter of urgency.  The media sources that do this will be labeled as more legitimate, while others who are trying to sow discord will lose credibility.  Trust is found in circumstances where people are seen to work together toward a greater goal. Rebuilding trust in society is going to take a while since our crisis of confidence stems from many complicated structural factors, including the economy and democratic processes. But what this crisis can teach us or at least shed light on is the importance of reliable information, leaders who make it their priority to protect us, and media that want to help us understand what is going on rather than confuse us more or leave us in the dark. If we work together as a society to combat this common enemy and take responsibility, people may feel the return of a sense that they can control their environment and contribute to a greater good – a feeling that would help stabilize our crisis of confidence.  The pandemic is shedding light on what is considered “responsible leadership,” both nationally and internationally.  This development is refreshing and essential in a world that has created so many different versions of the truth.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of the U.S. government or any U.S. government agency.

¹ A previous version of this article was published on April 17, 2020, by Loftus, Suzanne, “COVID 19: Post-Truth Age – Or Facts Making a Comeback?” The Globalist, April 17, 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/coronavirus-pandemic-covid19-media-social-media-misinformation-post-truth-populism/.

² Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

³ Simon Blackburn, “How Can We Teach Objectivity in a Post-Truth Era?” NewStateman, February 18, 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2019/02/how-can-we-teach-objectivity-post-truth-era

⁴ Evelyn Cheng, “Xi Calls for Coordinated Response to Coronavirus at G-20 Meeting,” CNBC, March 26, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/xi-calls-for-coordinated-global-response-to-coronavirus-at-g20-meeting.html.

⁵ Quinnipiac University Poll: https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3658

⁶ Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, “Poll: Majority of Americans Disagree With Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus Pandemic,” U.S. News & World Report, April 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-04-23/poll-majority-of-americans-disagree-with-trumps-handling-of-coronavirus-pandemic.

⁷ Matthew Karnitschnig and Judith Mischke, “Berlin Lets Mask Slip On Feelings for Trump’s America,” Politico, April 6, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-lets-mask-slip-on-feelings-for-trumps-america/.

⁸ https://www.france24.com/en/20200407-un-security-council-expected-to-hold-first-coronavirus-talks-thursday

⁹ Katie Simpson and Alexander Panetta, “G7 Ministers Spike Joint Statement on COVID-19 after U.S. Demands it be Called ‘Wuhan Virus,'” CBC News, March 25, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/g7-covid-19-coronavirus-wuhan-pompeo-trump-1.5510329.

¹⁰ John Haltiwanger, “The U.S. is ‘Not a Global Power’ Thanks to Trump’s Disastrous Coronavirus Response as China Fills the Void, Former U.S. Officials Warn,” Business Insider, April 15, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-chaotic-coronavirus-response-has-created-void-china-is-filling-2020-4?r=DE&IR=T.

¹¹ Sabine Kinkartz, “Coronavirus: Angela Merkel’s Approval Ratings Up Amid Health Crisis,” DW, April 3, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-angela-merkels-approval-ratings-up-amid-health-crisis/a-53001405.

¹² Anthony Boadle and Pedro Fonseca, “Brazilians Scorn Bolsonaro’s Coronavirus Efforts, Back Health Officials: Polls,” Reuters, April 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazilians-scorn-bolsonaros-coronavirus-efforts-back-health-officials-polls-idUSKBN21L1W8.

¹³ Anna Perova, “Uvereny, chto stanet khuzhe. Belorusov oprosili naschet ikh otnosheniya k koronavirusu,” Tut Novosti, April 1, 2020, https://news.tut.by/society/678769.html.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Linas Jegelevicius, “Belarus and Coronavirus: Lukashenko’s Business-As-Usual Approach is ‘Mind-Blowing Negligence,'” Euronews, April 21, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/21/belarus-and-coronavirus-lukashenko-s-business-as-usual-approach-is-mind-blowing-negligence.

¹⁶ James Shotter and Henry Foy, “Belarus Faces Growing Criticism for Dismissive Coronavirus Response,” Financial Times, April 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/925c16e9-bd18-4678-936a-0539588facfa.

¹⁷ Tatiana Zinkovich, “The President without a Plan: Alexander Lukashenko still insists nobody’s going to die from COVID-19. What on earth is happening in Belarus?” Meduza, April 16, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/04/16/the-president-without-a-plan.

COVID-19 and Responsible Leadership in a “Post-Truth” Age was originally published on Global Security Review.

The spread of the virus caught the U.S flatfooted and disoriented as Washington found itself with no capacity to contain the virus effectively nor willingness to lead a unified front of the leading nations to blunt the crisis.  The lack of U.S leadership to call countries to act, to set the agenda and to chart a path beyond the point of crisis, raised doubts about its role in the world and opened the way for China and Russia to cast themselves as the new leaders filling the shoes of the United States.

The public health crisis laid bare the limits of international organizations and global institutional frameworks as they seem to be watching from the sidelines. By downplaying the severity of the novel coronavirus and delaying the declaration of a worldwide health emergency for two months, not to mention Beijing’s growing influence on its decision making, the WHO failed its core mission to alert the international community about the COVD-19 and its possible ramifications, contributed to the ongoing crisis. In parallel, the inaction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to organize a response to the global pandemic further undermined the legitimacy of the world’s highest deliberative body.

Furthermore, the crisis has exposed the structural deficiencies of the European Union. As healthcare (in addition to national security, terrorism, and fiscal policies) remains the responsibility of national governments, so Brussels no capacity nor authority to lead an organized response, conceding to the member states to take the lead on the issue. Moreover, the combination of the pandemic, the economic implications of the crisis and the continued failures of member states to agree on recovery programs, could also conspire to reverse the gains that the European project has made in the last few decades and radically shift the European political landscape.

Meanwhile, in the face of global institutional paralysis, the nation-state reasserted itself. This has been particularly evident in the EU, where the virus accentuated the existing distrust between the EU members and revealed deep-seated structural weaknesses of the Post-Westphalian frameworks. As the member states, closed down borders, refused to aid one another and focused on distinct crisis management methods, they revealed their deep-seated Hobbesian selfishness, undermined intra-European solidarity and increased the sense of coming apart while reinforcing the sense of the indispensability of the nation-state for expertise, control, and assurance.

The absence of the U.S. leadership and the disorganization and preoccupation of its European allies with their domestic health crises has disabled NATO’s ability to function effectively and act decisively against the pandemic. NATO’s inexperience to deal with such a challenge, led some members even to signal that the virus was not something they needed to act upon. However, the fast spread of the coronavirus made a crippling impact on the U.S. naval activities and NATO military exercises. The spread of COVD19 on the USS Theodore Roosevelt paralyzed, albeit not operating under the auspice of NATO, an American aircraft carrier, the first time since World War Two. NATO was forced to scrap its largest military exercise, DEFENDER-Europe20. Furthermore, several other exercises linked to DEFENDER-Europe20, including and not limited to the Dynamic Front, the Joint Warfighting Assessment, and the Saber Strike and SwiftResponse have been postponed as well, underscoring the fragility of NATO’s military operations and deterrence posture in Europe while questioning its credibility and purpose again.

The global pandemic intensified and accelerated the global great power rivalry as Beijing and Moscow have moved quickly and effectively to take advantage of the openings created by the U.S. retrenchment and inward-looking policies to fill the void of  Washington’s global leadership. Although both China and Russia are revisionist powers by nature, and both are trying to weaken the U.S., their objectives and visions of the world order differ markedly. While Russia intends to undermine the current international order, China is seeking global leadership within the order.

China intends to cast itself as a global savior. It wants to tout its authoritarianism as the key and decisive factor in defeating the pandemic while chipping away at the U.S. dominant status. With massive lockdowns, the imposition of electronic surveillance measures, and the arrests of those who may have exposed its deficiencies, Beijing managed to put this fast-spreading virus under control, striving to create a strong case for authoritarian rule. As Beijing dispatched the bulk of masks, ventilators, respirators, protective suits, test kits, and medical workers to Europe, China tried to boost its role and international status as well as advertise the efficiency, effectiveness, and indispensability of its authoritarian model. In parallel, Beijing organized and led international forums, videoconferences, and panel discussions to highlight, publicize and politicize its policy decisions while attempting to displace the U.S. as the world’s first responder, the global crisis manager, and the world role model.

Russia did not let a good crisis to go waste either as it unleashed a barrage of disinformation campaigns aiming at on the one hand to sow distrust and discord in the West, and on the other to burnish its tainted image, portraying itself as a good neighbor willing to assist all countries in dire need of support. Pro-Kremlin media outlets accused a Harvard professor of creating the COVID19 and blamed the U.S. army for disseminating it. In the same vein, the Kremlin sent medical equipment, health responders and other forms of medical aid to European countries not to assist the virus stricken states, but to aggravate public health calamity, undermining public trust in the healthcare systems, the local governments, and democratic institutions. Moreover, Russia shipped medical gear to New York to undermine the U.S. role as a leading health care provider and to showcase Russia’s clout.

The U.S. Can’t Afford to Lose its Leadership Role

The United States could have galvanized allies, partners, and even competitors into action against the pandemic and avoided the global authoritarian pushback as the U.S. has extensive experience in mobilizing broad coalitions to address challenges to similar nature. The U.S. led all-out efforts to contain the spread of infectious outbreaks in the early 2000s. Both President Bush and Obama successfully employed the G-20 to contain the spread of HIV and Ebola outbreaks. In 2003, George W. Bush mobilized around $90 billion, the largest amount of money ever committed by any nation to a single disease, for his emergency program to ensure HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention, and research, saving over 17 million lives. While rallying the UN Security Council (UNSC) behind his plan and assembling thousands of medical workers, Barak Obama deployed the 2,800 troops in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to detect, contain, and eliminate Ebola.

An international order strained by the virus had already faced challenges more significant than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian states such as China and Russia have been threatening to undermine the Liberal World Order that has subdued great power conflicts and kept global peace in the last few decades. In Asia, Africa, and a vast swath of Europe, China has been expanding its clout and trying to control a considerable share of global commerce flows. While invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and attacked Eastern Ukraine, Russia carved out a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space and created the first major crack in the international security architecture. With supporting Bashar al Assad in Syria, backing Iran and alienating Egypt and Turkey from the United States, Moscow increased its influence in the Middle East and challenged the U.S.  unipolar moment in the region. Moreover, Russia’s hybrid attacks on the West that includes and not limited to disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks threaten the cohesion and legitimacy of the Western political establishments while making Russian narratives effective factors in shaping attitudes, public opinions, and false perceptions in Western societies.

Considering visible authoritarian pushback, the United States can’t afford to give up its global role as its disengagement would far outweigh its costs. It would weaken NATO, undermine the EU and deepen Moscow/Beijing tandem’s bilateral ties with individual nation-states in Europe while helping mushroom authoritarian regimes across the old continent. In parallel, the re-assertiveness of the nation-state coupled with the increasing nationalism, growing inequality, and economic recession could also play into the hands of the revisionist powers and lead to the unprecedented social and geopolitical ruptures in Europe. Consequently, the growing political divergence, division or fragmentation of the EU in any sort, could shatter the European project, the cornerstone of the U.S. international security architecture and precipitate the final collapse of the world America made.

Given the growing dangers of the great power rivalry and ongoing power shift to the East, both sides of the Atlantic need to be reminded of what is at stake here, as the survival of the Liberal World Order as we know it lies in the strength and unity of the transatlantic community. Thus, U.S. engagement and leadership can make an enormous difference over how the world could look like the 2020s and 2030s. Washington’s passive role will be dangerous. U.S. isolation and retrenchment in the 1930s created a breeding ground for Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and imperialist Japan, inviting the most destructive conflict in history.

The U.S. engagement and commitment to its allies after World War Two, spearheaded by the Marshal Plan, laid the groundwork for strong NATO, the prosperous European Community, and final victory over the Soviet Empire. The newly emerged the Liberal World Order, after the collapse of the communist bloc in the1990s, led by the United States, benefited billions of people around the world. It helped Europe thrive, raised the standard of living, lifted billions out of poverty, brought unprecedented economic prosperity, opened political systems, and kept the world a peaceful place.

Thus, none of this would have been possible without the U.S. strong global leadership and willingness to work closely with allies and partners through NATO, the EU, and other global and regional international frameworks. The pandemic has shown how interdependent and integrated the world has become in the last three decades. Considering the global trends such as the revolutions in the communication and information technology as well as dramatic changes in population, resources, economics, governance, and security, not to mention “the rise of the rest,”  any radical shift towards isolation or autarchy would have devastating effects on social, cultural, political, economic and military aspects of the West.  To meet and overcome these challenges, the United States needs to call into action not only allies and partners, but leaders in business and civil societies to coordinate their actions. Notably, the U.S. needs to think more comprehensively about NATO-EU strategic partnership and invest more in their approximation efforts as the cooperation between the two will be vital in determining the winners and losers as well as shape and characteristics of the Post-COVID world.

Will the United States Lead the Post-COVID World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past year, conflict in Libya has escalated dramatically. In April 2019, the rebel forces of General Khalifa Haftar – supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – led an offensive to seize the Libyan capital of Tripoli, home to the UN-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj – backed by Turkey and Qatar. Since then, the conflict has continuously intensified, killing hundreds and displacing 150,000. In recent weeks, violence has increased around Tripoli, with heightened shelling and attacks by Turkish armed drones.

As COVID-19 now spreads across the country, Libya’s already precarious health system risks collapse. As of March, clashes between the warring factions had damaged 27 health facilities. According to a former senior coordinator for US Assistance to Libya, COVID-19 patients are “competing for medical attention with the war wounded.” This has left Libyan authorities pleading for a ceasefire to redirect efforts toward the pandemic. Yet attacks on health facilities have multiplied, and a lack of medical equipment and professionals, as well as cuts to electricity and water supplies, compound the situation further.

For migrants, the situation is especially dire. Even before COVID-19 reached the region, disrupting refugee resettlement and grounding flights, Libya’s almost 700,000 migrants and refugees, and over 200,000 internally displaced people faced conditions of high precarity. “[A]rbitrary arrest by non-State actors, detention for indefinite periods of time, bonded labor, harassment and general exploitation,” according to the International Organization for Migration, already led many to flee across the Mediterranean to Europe. Nonetheless, EU and Italian efforts to decrease migration from Libya over the past three years have succeeded, despite strong condemnation from human rights groups. The ever-deteriorating humanitarian situation is leading the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to warn that more refugees now will attempt risky sea crossings.

For Europe, this presents an all-too-familiar challenge. Long before the most recent escalations, stabilizing the conflict in Libya had emerged as a key security matter for Europeans due to concerns about extremism and the country’s position as a departure point for refugees. Yet disagreement within the EU has hindered the bloc from taking meaningful action.

Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey have stepped up to fill the void left by a lack of European – and American – leadership. In late 2019, Russia, who supports Haftar, sent mercenaries to Libya in an attempt to further assert influence in the Middle East. Turkey responded by deploying troops in support of al-Sarraj’s government. A day after European officials issued a joint statement condemning this foreign interference for “fueling the crisis” and urging an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” Presidents Putin and Erdoğan jointly called for a ceasefire in the region.

Europe’s weak sway over the situation was further confirmed after a German-led international conference convened on January 19 to “[unify…] the International Community in their support for a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis.” The “Berlin Process” brought together not only high-level European officials, but also the leaders of Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, among others. The joint communiqué released after the conference called on all parties to respect the 2011 UN arms embargo and end foreign interference in the conflict – a demand Libyans themselves have been making since long before Turkey’s most recent action.

Yet on January 25, the UN Support Mission in Libya reported that the previous ten days had seen numerous cargo and other flights landing at Libyan airports “providing the parties with advanced weapons, armored vehicles, advisers and fighters.” Clearly, any European diplomatic success achieved in Berlin had been short-lived.

Such immediate and blatant flouting of the conclusions of the Berlin Process confirms that external actors’ ambitions in Libya continue to prevent meaningful international action to resolve the conflict. Beyond the recent escalations in Turkish and Russian interference, nationalist and anti-immigrant European leaders have hindered agreement on EU migration policy, and thereby, a collective response to the Libyan conflict. In March 2019, Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing nationalist Italian party “The League,” blocked an EU mission rescuing and transporting migrants from the Libyan coast to Europe. Likewise, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, with Hungarian support, later objected to restarting this same mission.

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Yet in the face of the COVID-19 crisis and with the glaring void in global leadership left by the United States, the EU is stepping up to the geopolitical plate. In an attempt to finally fulfill French President Macron and European Commission President von der Leyen’s ambitions for the bloc, Europeans are working to coordinate a much-needed international response to the health crisis. France is spearheading G7 meetings and calling for debt suspension to allow African countries to manage the pandemic; and an EU-organized international fundraising conference raised $8 billion for laboratories working on a COVID-19 vaccine.

Such solidarity demonstrates that the EU is capable of meaningful coordination in times of crisis. As COVID-19 spreads throughout war-ridden Libya, dramatically exacerbating an already devastating situation for civilians and migrants alike, the EU must harness its recent show of global leadership to rise above the warring factions and spearhead a resolution to the conflict. A failure to do so would not only fuel criticism that the EU is unable, or unwilling, to forcefully exert leadership in hotbeds of conflict, but also perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian tragedy.

It’s Time for the EU to Lead in Libya was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the following, I will take stock of the lessons and conclusions I have drawn from the global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, focusing on the main actors of international politics and the world order. Drawing from international relations theory, I make the somewhat surprising claim that a Realpolitik lens would suggest self-interested cooperation among countries in the age of COVID-19. The countries of the world would fare better at managing the coronavirus pandemic if they were to cooperate—cooperation is in their national interest.

But first, a disclaimer. The lesson of Captivity is that we, as human beings find it challenging to see the most critical processes in the present, and we can rarely predict what the future may bring. As we are currently in the middle of this pandemic crisis (or perhaps only at the beginning), we cannot see clearly in the captivity of our current situation, from the captivity of our contemporary perspective. Nevertheless, I will attempt to draw out the most important lessons, while remaining cautious about predicting significant trends in the future.

What is Realpolitik?

Although Realpolitik was conceived by Prussian journalist-politician Ludwig von Rochau for domestic politics in the 19^thcentury, it has since become a prominent concept in the theory and practice of international politics. Henry Kissinger defines Realpolitik as “foreign policy based on calculations of power and the national interest.”¹ According to Kenneth Waltz, Realpolitik “indicates the methods by which foreign policy is conducted and provides a rationale for them.” Waltz lists the elements of Realpolitik as follows: “the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state.”² The 20^th century theorists of Realpolitik argue that such a concept (not necessarily under the same name) has been an ever-present thread running through the history of thinking about international relations. Kissinger associates Realpolitik with Napoleon III and Bismarck, while Waltz traces the concept back to Machiavelli in the Italian Renaissance and Thucydides in ancient Greece. Realpolitik is as old as humankind.

International Cooperation based on Self-Interest

Overall, the response of countries and governments around the world to the COVID-19 epidemic has been a significant failure, and this has been primarily a failure of global governance. The virus has spread globally, but in its management,  we barely find any traces of international cooperation. It has been handled entirely on the level of the nation-state. This is not surprising to those who look at the world through a Realpolitik lens.

International politics is characterized by anarchy, as there is no world government. Nation-states consider their interests first and shape their foreign policies accordingly. That is why it is telling that even Henry Kissinger, a diplomat-scholar often associated with Realpolitik, advocates for international cooperation on COVID-19 in his recent Wall Street Journal article. I agree there is a role for global governance in stopping this pandemic. Nation-states cannot do it on their own. Let’s see why.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) as a community and as an institution was virtually invisible in the period following the outbreak. Italy, the first and most dramatically affected member state in the EU, received assistance from China sooner than from the EU. It is no coincidence that the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had to apologize to the Italians for the EU’s delayed reaction. The EU’s image and the popularity of the pro-federalist position are significantly undermined by the fact that each EU member state has responded to the epidemic on a national level. In contrast, action at the EU level has been almost wholly absent.

Even the fact that the EU eventually provided substantial funding to help member states take action improved the EU’s image only slightly. It is also clear that a strictly national approach combined with a failure to share best practices has resulted in very different levels of effectiveness in slowing the spread of the disease in each member state. Consequently, the problems each member state now faces are very different, hence the possibility of EU-level cooperation and solutions is next to nothing.

China

Undoubtedly, China is primarily responsible for the outbreak and global spread of the epidemic. The Chinese Communist leadership practiced one of the worst traditions of their Soviet predecessors, the so-called “Chernobyl method,” at the beginning of the epidemic: denial and silencing. The existence of the outbreak was denied, and doctors who sounded the alarm were silenced and arrested. Then by mid-January, the Communist leadership realized that the coronavirus was a real problem and needed practical solutions. Subsequently, the government introduced strict measures in Wuhan and a few other parts of China, from curfews to mandatory mask-wearing to quarantining of those suspected of illness. All these measures were enforced by the iron fist of the Chinese police state. With these measures, the spread of the coronavirus in China was slowed down and then halted by March.

However, in the meantime, from November to January, the virus had already spread to most of the world. If China had not denied the existence of the epidemic and had closed its borders late last year, it could have spared the world its current level of suffering. In parallel with the rigorous management of the epidemic, China has also been working since the beginning of the year to spread misinformation about the American origins of COVID-19, and to portray itself as a “benevolent superpower” by sending masks and ventilators to many countries around the world. China is once again playing the game of international politics very shrewdly (applying a distorted sense of Realpolitik), and this time it is trying to strengthen its international image, its soft power, which has always been a weak point.

The United States

The number of Americans infected with the coronavirus is now over 1.7 million. This shows that American society has so far failed to deal with the coronavirus epidemic. I’ve identified five reasons for this, which fall into two groups: governance-related and socio-cultural factors.

The first group of reasons includes the fragmented nature of the U.S. government system and the public health management failures of the federal and state governments. (1) Unified action against a nationwide epidemic has been made impossible by the federal structure of the U.S. government, which has produced a fragmentation of authority and capabilities. While the federal government has deep financial pockets, it lacks many public-health authorities. At the same time, the state governments lack financial leverage and have limited legal authorities of their own. (2) President Donald J. Trump and his administration delayed by several months the necessary preparations for the epidemic despite having the world’s most extensive intelligence apparatus. Many constituent agencies were alerting the White House to the news of the coronavirus as early as November 2019. (3) State (and local) governments also woke up too late to the threat of the coronavirus (especially in the state of New York and in New York City, from where the virus spread all over the country). As I mentioned, state governments lack the financial resources to deal with such an epidemic, so they need the help of the federal government. The Trump administration has not responded to state requests for assistance very effectively either, and for weeks the president himself has been embroiled in a highly partisan war of words with the mostly Democratic governors of the most heavily infected states.

However, the delayed responses of political leaders alone do not fully explain the current catastrophe situation in the United States. There are also very deep-rooted socio-cultural reasons for the failure to manage the coronavirus. (4) American society has traditionally exhibited a high degree of individualism and a strong attachment to individual freedoms, and the role of the “state” is consequently limited. While in much of the world, a full lockdown has been imposed by central governments and enforced by police, in the United States, most “lockdowns” have been nothing more than a stay-at-home advisory from state governors. The federal government formulated even more restrained advice. (5) Finally, an essential socio-economic reason behind the extent of the outbreak in the United States is the privately operated and fragmented health care system—some of the demographic groups most exposed to the coronavirus do not even have access to adequate healthcare.

U.S.-China Competition

The dominant geopolitical competition of the 21^st century is unfolding between the United States and China. As a result, there is much discussion about which great power the current situation will propel forward and which will fall far behind. The jury is still out. Both great powers have been hit hard by the virus, but it currently appears that America has taken the harder blow. However, we must be careful with such a comparison because we do not exactly know what is going on in China, as the Chinese Communist leadership does not provide real data about either the epidemic or the economy. Joseph Nye shares this view in his recent Foreign Policy article; despite significant speculation to this effect, the coronavirus will not decide the competition between the United States and China, since more important factors play a role in it. His article fits into the debate of recent years among U.S. political scientists and historians about U.S.-China competition, in which Graham Allison and others warn that China, building on its significant resources (cheap labor, global trade network, fast-paced economic and technological development), will soon overtake the United States economically and push it off the top of the international system. On the other hand, Nye, Michael Beckley, and others emphasize that the United States has important structural advantages (geographic location, democratic political system, R&D capabilities, soft power, etc.) over China, and, on the other hand, the Asian superpower has many internal problems and weaknesses (demographic crisis, corruption, social inequality, regional disparities).

I share the latter point of view, but with one qualification. The United States starts from a good position in its competition with China, but its abovementioned domestic problems (fragmented government structure, polarization, weak healthcare system, growing social inequality) pose serious risks for the United States in this rivalry. The United States can compete with China and maintain its position of international leadership only if it remedies these deep domestic structural problems in the years to come. It is certainly relevant to the competition that China—having managed to control the epidemic domestically—has been building a new international role for itself, extending aid to many countries in fighting the pandemic. At the same time, the United States is currently hardly able to deal with its internal problems managing the pandemic, and cannot play any real international role in the fight against the coronavirus. What is more, the Trump administration has even withdrawn its support from the World Health Organization (WHO).

The Global Economy

The global economy is facing an unprecedented recession. As part of the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, most countries in the world have shut down significant portions of their economies. Prolonging this situation for months is leading to a severe economic downturn. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the recession has been brewing for quite some time. China’s economic growth – even based on unreliable official data – plummeted to around 3 percent in the last quarter of 2019, an incredible dive compared to the 7 percent expected by Beijing or to China’s average growth in recent decades. As a result of COVID-19, China’s economy suffered a 6.8 percent contraction in the first quarter of 2020; for the first time since 1976, the Chinese economy has shrunk and not expanded. The economic downturn in the European Union had also begun earlier. In the last quarter of 2019, the EU achieved 0 (zero) percent growth. Therefore, the economic crisis may have happened even without the coronavirus pandemic.

The United States recently joined China and the EU among the crisis hubs. The number of unemployed in America has risen to 43 million in the last ten weeks. The U.S. GDP posted a 4.8 percent decline in the first quarter of this year, and analysts expect an almost unprecedented 30 percent (!) contraction in the second quarter. World oil prices reached historic lows in April. We have to gradually reopen the economy everywhere as soon as the public health situation allows. However, I would caution against the overly optimistic view that reopening the economy now will avert the economic downturn. Even if the economy was reopened today, the virus is here to stay (until there is a vaccine), and many people will be afraid to resume their previous lifestyles completely; therefore, economic recovery will remain limited. And the coronavirus has already done much damage to our economies. The long-feared global economic recession is no longer on its way. It has already begun.

World Order

In the United States and elsewhere around the world, there has been a serious debate for some years now about how the world order is changing, what has characterized the international order so far, and what can replace it in the future. The abovementioned two articles, by Henry Kissinger and Joseph Nye, are also part of the continuation of these debates. Kissinger’s article is titled “The Coronavirus Will Forever Alter the World Order,” while Nye’s article counters with, “No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order.” Indeed, the coronavirus has not changed the world order (yet), but the world order is changing.

There are several ways we can talk about the world order. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, the international system changed from bipolar to unipolar. With the rise of China, however, a bipolar international system has re-emerged. This system, nonetheless, also bears some semblance to multipolar systems, as there are currently no two allied blocs behind the two superpowers like there were during the Cold War, and even America’s allies are busy building ties with China.

The United States established the current so-called liberal international order after World War II. After decades of successfully deepening and expanding this order, America has been gradually withdrawing from its leadership role under the administrations of Barack Obama and especially Trump. Kissinger writes in his article that to overcome the health and economic effects of COVID-19 and to defend the values ​​of the liberal international order, the world needs international cooperation, in which Washington must play a leading role. On this point, Joseph Nye formulates an idea similar to Kissinger’s: “Both for self-interested and humanitarian reasons, the United States should lead the G-20 in generous contributions to a major new COVID-19 fund that is open to all countries.” I agree with these suggestions because they combine Realpolitik and cooperation. Unfortunately, it seems there is little chance of the current U.S. administration leading such initiatives. Instead, it is imaginable that China will play such a role. It would certainly strengthen China’s position in the currently emerging new world order.

What the different international actors do not realize is that more cooperation would have helped avert the current pandemic or at least mitigate its spread and consequences. Theorists in international relations have long sparred over whether states are inherently more or less prone to cooperate. Realpolitik argues that cooperation is the exception, not the rule. A country will work with another country only if it is in its national interest. In this case, ironically, a Realpolitik lens would tell us that it is in countries’ national interests that they cooperate against the Covid-19 pandemic.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, billions of us have become captives in our own homes. Not only are we physically in captivity, but the economy (national economies and the world economy) has also become a captive of the coronavirus, and it is in this captivity that international politics also finds itself today. Moreover, just as the lesson of the novel Captivity shows us, our governments have been captives of their own circumstances and perspectives, and have not been able to see beyond them and to look at the crisis from a more holistic view. Such a view, in line with Realpolitik, would have shown us the path toward self-interested cooperation.

Once the immediate crisis is over, countries will need to rethink their cooperation in the fight against pandemics. A Realpolitik lens, however, shows that individual countries will only do this when they realize that such cooperation is in their well-conceived self-interest. Let’s hope they realize it. The sooner they do, the sooner our captivity ends.

¹ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 137

² Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1979), p. 117

Realpolitik & Cooperation in the Age of COVID-19 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Liberal internationalism was pursued without restraint by U.S policymakers seeking to fundamentally change the system of international relations. The U.S. tried to conform states to models of peace, freedom, cooperation, and prosperity. Today, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the possibility of multiple spheres of influence, while accelerating the trend of great power competition.

The theory of liberal internationalism consists of three primary components: Commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, and regulatory liberalism. In practice, commercial liberalism became the most dominant component of the project, which produced a globalized economic order creating incentives for nations all across the world. Free trade was seen as a means to unite and conform states to liberal principles by disconnecting their political interests from the nation-state philosophy. However, today the circumstances have drastically changed.

Numerous factors have played supporting roles in changing the tide against the United States’ favor, one of them being the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then, major actors like the EU, China, and Russia began to re-evaluate U.S. economic hegemony. Many of these powers over the years have desired to break free of the U.S denominated dollar system; however, this is easier said than done. It also exhibited that globalization made the international economic order more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Moreover, it illustrated that commercial liberalism was not an adequate solution to maintain a degree of global unity, and that mere free trade incentives are not sufficient to transcend the nation-state philosophy.

In recent years, states have grown dissatisfied with trade rules and regulations that have restrained their pursuit of independent macroeconomic policies. Since the U.S. dollar denominates the worldwide currency, the U.S. government can effectively freeze any international payment which flows through SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).  The U.S. Dollar provides Washington with the ability to enact crippling unilateral sanctions. Combined with America’s technological and internet control, the dollar has provided the U.S. with unprecedented power to utilize global surveillance to control and strangle all asset flows that are denominated in dollars.

On the multilateral front, instead of liberalizing, U.S.-dominated institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have brought more control and restrictions on foreign economies—particularly in poorer states.  In reality, the application of international economic liberalism has failed to benefit everyone; instead, it has created global inequality between countries and the people within those states.
Why did the liberal internationalist project fail? First, the U.S only emphasized commercial liberalism to lure countries and conform them to the models of the liberal world order- through its international economy. It turns out that more than money is required to conform a state to liberal principles. China was lured in only for the benefit of its own trade interests, not by the principles of the liberal world order.  Thus, over the years, China’s persistent illiberal, authoritarian behavior has continued to frustrate America.

Second, free trade didn’t exist for most of human history. States typically always maintained protectionist economies to protect their infant industries. Germany and the United States practiced protectionism when Britain and France were the chief upholders of free trade during the nineteenth century. For most of the 1930s and the Cold War, many states—including those in Europe—implemented policies of economic nationalism to develop their industrial strength and capacity. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union did the United States hold sufficient power and legitimacy to maintain a global free trade economic order. However, due to the power shifts from the West to the East, it is no longer feasible for the U.S to sustain global free trade, nor does the Trump administration plan on doing so.

Today the security dilemma has started to reappear once more, where China has finished “hiding and abiding”, and is catching up with the United States. Now Beijing is further revealing and revitalizing its military strength to pursue its future regional ambitions- even though it still has not been able to match the U.S military power yet. Moreover, China has become the number one trading partner of all countries within the Asian pacific- including U.S allies. Furthermore, China is trying to establish 5G and AI supremacy to narrow the gap between China and America on the battlefield. In reality, the U.S.-China trade war is a battle for 5G supremacy, and the winner will likely hold a significant advantage over the other.

The current dynamic between the United States and China resembles that of nineteenth-century Britain and Germany. While Britain was practicing free trade, a rising Germany was utilizing protectionism to enhance its economic, technological, and military power. During the 1870s, the wealth ratio between Britain and Germany was 3:1—by the early 1900s, the ratio between the two powers reached 1:1.

In recent years Russia has also increased its military strength. While modern Russia possesses nowhere near the military power of the Soviet Union, it has come a long way. After the corruption of the Yeltsin-era, the economic catastrophe of the 1990s, and decades of NATO expansion, Putin has managed to carve out a sphere of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe. He has been able to revitalize Russia’s military power to a point where it has become once again a worthy rival of the United States. That being said, Russian economic strength has faltered, primarily due to a lack of diversification from oil and gas revenues, but also due to U.S. and EU sanctions.

Furthermore, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea challenged the U.S.-led liberal order, exposing its reluctance to impose more costs beyond economic sanctions. Russia’s military modernization and application of asymmetric tactics have made it more difficult (although not impossible) for the United States to counter Russia through conventional means. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have proven that Russia is capable of capturing and holding territory in Europe. Moreover, Russia’s standing within its traditional sphere of influence has increased—primarily in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Crimea. A recent survey found that the majority of Crimeans are “happy” to live under Russian rule. Thus, an increase in the relative power of China and Russia—while still not matching that of the U.S—has caused Washington to be more cautious in calculating risks and re-evaluating its relative strengths and weaknesses.

Today, the rapid spread of COVID-19 has further accelerated global dissatisfaction with globalization, leading to a lack of cooperation and compromise. Consequently, the novel coronavirus has also accelerated the imposition of nationalist economic policies. In the heady days of globalization, many would argue that borders were no longer relevant. However, the current reality begs to differ.

Visions of a globalized economy led by the United States have evaporated. Many states are searching for alternative solutions that align with their interests. Unfortunately for them, the COVID-19 pandemic has further cemented U.S. dominance over the international financial system due to the U.S. dollar’s role as a global reserve currency. As the global economy grows more volatile, the demand for dollars increases as investors seek to safeguard their assets through purchases of U.S. treasury bonds. Regardless of the increasing strength of China and Russia, the United States will remain a formidable power for many years to come. Even as the economic balance has tilted in China’s favor, being the world’s biggest exporter and second-largest importer, the U.S. remains an anchor of the global economy. Forty percent of all global transactions are carried out in dollars, while just two percent of transactions are conducted in Chinese RMB.

Furthermore, U.S.-led international economic institutions are still a driving force in global trade. In contrast, Chinese and European institutions have not been successful in presenting a viable alternative to existing U.S.-led institutions and the dollar. Furthermore, the U.S still possesses an unparalleled naval presence, which provides it with the power to regulate, maintain, and choke any of the global sea-supply chains.

While the U.S. will maintain several advantages over its rivals, despite its diminishing relative power, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the faults of a globalized system. The world will likely return to an order defined by great power spheres of influence, as great power competition returns in earnest. With an acceleration of de-globalization and growing discontent with U.S. hegemony, the U.S. should show restraint in its foreign policy, rather than doubling down on the failed strategies of the past.

COVID-19 Will Accelerate Consolidation of Great Power Spheres of Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

“We have already drilled two wells in waters to the east and west of the island of Cyprus, and the [ship] Yavuz will be drilling our third well. Such activities will continue with determination,” Turkish Energy Minister Fatih Donmez recently said at the Turkey Energy Summit.

Current drilling by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government has provoked a wide array of actors in the Eastern Mediterranean including Israel and Egypt, both U.S. allies. Illegal Turkish drilling vessels in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are even accompanied by military vessels. The activity has many in Nicosia and abroad worried as international oil companies have major stakes in the region since the discoveries of hydrocarbons off of the Cypriot coast several years ago.

Why is the Eastern Mediterranean so vital to the world economy? The U.S. Geological Survey believes 122 trillion cubic feet of gas is in the area, however, the exact potential for gargantuan wealth to be found is yet to be confirmed. The area contains a vast amount of potential energy for Europe, which is heavily reliant on imported gas. This is especially true for the EU’s dependence on imported gas from Russia, the world’s second-largest exporter with a roughly 18.6% share of global production. European energy needs are extremely crucial for the global economy, and, of course, the President of the United States, as he is using the message of U.S. economic growth and record-level fossil fuel production as a foundation for his 2020 campaign.

Meanwhile, since the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, states that once held no close ties with one another are now actively working together to maintain regional security. For the past decade, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel engaged in trilateral talks on energy cooperation for electricity and oil (catching the attention of communities at home, an inspiration for the creation of a “Hellenic-Israeli Alliance” in the U.S. Congress). Gas pipelines are currently under development and will reach into Europe via the Greek mainland.

The “Energy Triad” made progress with neighboring Egypt as well. In fact, Israel has begun exporting gas to Egypt as obstacles impeding cooperation are removed while Cyprus announced a strengthening of ties with Egypt through economy and tourism. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi also seeks to strengthen and modernize Egypt’s navy in response to the threat posed by Turkey in the region to protect the country’s growing Mediterranean and Red Sea oil and natural gas interests.

“Countries that were once not talking are now coming together”, said Georgios Lakkotrypis, Cypriot Minister of Energy and Commerce in a recent interview. Talks between the four have brought Italy, Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority to the table.

The restructuring of alliances to hedge against Turkey is similar to the unofficial anti-China coalition forming in the South China Sea, as powers are converging against Beijing—so are Mediterranean powers against Ankara. Yet Moscow has emerged as another major player in the Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not only been instrumental in the aid of Syrian President Bashir Al Assad’s government but also recently sold the S-400 missile system to America’s NATO ally, Turkey. Congress then barred Turkey from acquiring the American F-35 fighter as punishment—further straining Turkey’s relations with the West and undermining its reliability as an ardent partner in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, since the Greek-led 1974 coup d’état in Cyprus and subsequent Turkish invasion, the island has been divided, with Turkish forces illegally occupying the north while the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls the south. With no military except for a small defense force, outfitted with small patrol boats and anti-tank weapons from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Cypriot government is essentially defenseless. But Russian influence in the region is further complicated by Cyprus’ decision to actively hold Russian money, leading to skepticism regarding the inclusion of Cyprus into the American sphere. However, a recent U.S. Congressional delegation announced that the Cypriot government is working to terminate the laundering boogeyman head-on.

What are the options for President Trump with an increasingly aggressive Turkey and a resurgent Russia in the region—as an entente of economic and military cooperation forms in the Eastern Mediterranean?

John Gay, Executive Director of the John Quincy Adams Society, a nonpartisan Washington, D.C. based organization whose stated aim is to steer foreign policy conversation in direction of “More strategy. Less war”, takes the issue of Turkish self-interest back to the President’s administration:

“Trump has rightly pointed out that many U.S. allies do not do much to defend themselves, instead preferring to rely on the United States to defend them. The best way out of this is for those allies to become more capable of defending themselves. This has a twofold benefit for the United States: first, they do more (or all) of the fighting; second, they have a stronger interest in their own survival and well-being than we do, so they can make more credible commitments and threats against those that endanger them than we can make on their behalf. That’s especially true with a state like Cyprus since we don’t have a formal alliance commitment to them. If we believe a strong, independent Cyprus offers benefits to U.S. security, letting them buy our weapons is a way to get that on the cheap.”

The first option for the President is to make arms and modern radar systems available for Cypriot purchase to improve the country’s defensive capabilities, including but not limited to: short- and medium-range artillery, guided anti-tank missiles, and surface-to-air missile technology. At present, Cyprus remains barred from purchasing weapons from the U.S. A bipartisan bill to lift the Cyprus arms prohibition, co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Marco Rubio (R-FL), failed to make it out of the Senate.

However, within the new National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section 1270I, the prohibition can be lifted so long as one major obstacle is overcome: Russia (See: Section 1270I, e, 1, a and b). For Cyprus to receive arms from the U.S., it must first cooperate with Washington to counter Russian money laundering in Cypriot banks and terminate any refueling of Russian naval vessels that frequent the island on Eastern Mediterranean patrols.

The President may waive these requirements for one year if he chooses (See: Section 1270I e, 2). Arming Cyprus could be an effective way to apply pressure to a NATO ally pursuing objectives contrary to the interests of the United States.

Another option for President Trump is to reduce, block, or obfuscate Turkey’s role in NATO. Erdoğan values its membership in NATO, but Turkey’s membership is only one means to arm and defend itself (as the case was made when they purchased weapons from Russia). President Emmanuel Macron of France has already vehemently condemned Ankara’s actions in the Cypriot EEZ and recently dispatched French naval forces to deter further Turkish actions in the area.

While European Council President Donald Tusk recently affirmed that “the European Union stands united behind the Republic of Cyprus and expects Turkey to respect sovereign rights of the member states,” the situation is further complicated by Erdoğan’s cooperation in certain areas, such as participating in the Defeat ISIS Coalition. “Turkey opened its military bases to the United States and Coalition partners in July 2015. Since that time, Incirlik Air Base has been critical in the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” the U.S. State Department said earlier this year.

However, taking action against Ankara may backfire, Turkey could pivot even further towards Moscow and Tehran. The three have already met to discuss the future of Syria without the consultation of the United States. Estranging Turkey from NATO cooperation could ultimately backfire as the U.S. could lose an ally for its future Eurasian interests.

The final, most immediate, and detrimental action against Turkey is economic sanctions—a move that may further exacerbate the state of Western-Turkish relations. Turkey is very dependent on foreign investor influence, especially Germany. Trade between the EU and Turkey is valued at approximately $220 billion. U.S. trade with Turkey is worth some $24 billion. While European and American political parties may be easy to jump to economic retaliatory means, they must also remember Erdoğan’s trump card.

The Turkish president has publicly stated that if Western powers take action against him, he will retaliate by sending over 3.6 million Syrian refugees to Europe. The Turkish economy has already felt a considerable impact with the recent devaluation of the Lira and, theoretically could save a significant amount of money by sending refugees to Europe if hit by further economic hardship (although Europe, and possibly the U.S., would almost certainly retaliate to impose further economic costs on Turkey).

President Trump must make a decision along with the support of lawmakers and the Pentagon that will uphold international law and standards on illegal economic activities by entities of one state in the EEZ of another sovereign state. Turkey’s illegal oil drilling shows no signs of abating in a region vital to the global economy and crucial to U.S. geopolitical interests.

Turkish Oil Drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ Threatens to Destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean was originally published on Global Security Review.

After withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—in May 2018, the Trump administration has embarked on a policy of “maximum pressure” towards Iran, denying Tehran the benefits it was meant to receive through the deal and reimposing sanctions on broad sectors of the Iranian economy. 

For its part, Tehran has responded by shooting down U.S. military drones, seizing foreign-flagged tankers in the Strait of Hormuz—threatening the freedom of navigation in the strategically critical maritime route—and violating its JCPOA obligations by stockpiling and enriching uranium beyond the agreed-upon levels.

To garner support for a U.S.-led operation to protect ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington urged its transatlantic partners—the U.K., France, and Germany chief among them) to participate in a maritime security mission. Their responses, however, indicated that, in contrast to the U.S., Europe didn’t perceive the Islamic Republic to be a threat to European interests that merited possible military action.

Tensions between London and Tehran peaked when the U.K. impounded an Iranian tanker near Gibraltar over suspicions that it was violating an EU embargo by carrying oil destined for sale in Syria. In a tit-for-tat escalation, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) navy seized a tanker flying the British flag in July for allegedly turning off its GPS locator, breaking the maritime traffic pattern in the Strait of Hormuz, and polluting water by dumping crude oil residue.

Initially, the U.K. was hesitant over the idea of its naval forces joining those of the U.S., and instead formulated plans for a European-led mission in the area. However, following Boris Johnson’s appointment as Prime Minister and the lack of continental support for a European-led maritime security mission (with Germany showing little more than complete disinterest), the U.K. announced it would join the U.S.-led operation. The move served to demonstrate Anglo-American solidarity and strengthen ties between the two countries—in part due to the Boris Johnson government’s prioritization of a post-Brexit free-trade agreement with the U.S.

France’s interests are more nuanced. Thus far, Paris has rejected joining any U.S.-led operation. Instead, Paris has been actively engaged in a lengthy diplomatic campaign intended to convince both Tehran and Washington to de-escalate and enter into negotiations. However, France was among the first few European countries to initially support the European-led naval operation that was proposed by the U.K. France has a direct interest in the Persian Gulf as it imports most of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia. French companies have business interests in Iran, in large part driven by the export of jets, aircraft parts, and automobile parts. A scenario in which tensions with Iran escalate would undermine France’s strategic interests in the region. Therefore, Paris continues to emphasize diplomacy and show restraint in response to the proposed U.S.-led maritime security operation.

In contrast with France and the U.K., Germany’s outright rejection of the United States’ proposal reflects the downward trend in relations between the two countries. This isn’t the first time Germany has declined to participate in a U.S.-led military operation. Germany previously refused to participate in U.S.-led airstrikes in Douma, Syria, as well as refusing to deploy ground troops to Syria. 

Like France and the U.K., Germany was in favor of maintaining the Iran nuclear deal. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s failure to convince U.S. President Donald Trump not to withdraw from the JCPOA was viewed in Germany as a significant political setback—both for German-American relations and for Merkel’s reputation at home.

Germany’s primary interests in Iran revolve around promoting stability in the Persian Gulf region, which remains critically important for global economic security, as well as resolving conflicts in the Middle East to prevent further mass-migration by refugees and other migrants towards Europe. For this reason, Berlin’s stance is that escalating the situation is neither necessary nor opportune. Germany’s preferred outcome is a diplomatic solution, and continually stresses its resolute opposition to a military solution. There is little political appetite or support in Germany for the United States’ Iran policy under the Trump administration.  The concern for German policymakers is that Berlin must avoid entrapment in U.S. policy and see itself drawn into a conflict.

In other words, Germany doesn’t share the same interests as the U.S., the U.K., or France when it comes to Iran. Unlike the U.K., no German ships or tankers have been harassed or seized by Iran, and, unlike France, Germany doesn’t rely on the Persian Gulf for its energy needs.

Diverging Interests in Iran Behind Germany’s Rejection of U.S. Maritime Security Mission was originally published on Global Security Review.

The risk of extremism and consistent alienation of citizens in European countries have both expanded and diversified. Some European Union member states in the EU require security sector reforms and the replacement of old communist security and intelligence infrastructure to tackle the hydra of radicalization and extremism.

The British state has abruptly clattered down to “earth with a very hefty collision, thanks to the Brexit hydra.”¹ The country is in a profound social and financial crisis—its machinery and security infrastructure are operating on a long-established streak. Security sector reforms are needed to make the system professionalize and competent. Mr. Tom Winsor’s police reform paper and the inquiry report into the Justice system both stressed the need for professionalization of police and law enforcement agencies, but no practical implementation has occurred.

The British state is in trouble and is sliding into the unholy-mess of Brexit, and its future is going to become gloomy outside Europe due to its economic and political confrontation with the EU.² The culture of racism, hatred, social, and political discrimination intensified after the 2016 Brexit referendum.³ Second, the Brexit crisis has become a permanent headache of government and civil society, which is going to damage the special relationship between the U.K. and the United States. The 2019 leak of a U.K. National Security Council meeting, in which cooperation on 5G infrastructure with Huawei—a Chinese technology company that is alleged to have close ties with the Chinese Communist Party’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army—was viewed by security experts as a matter of grave concern. If the company is permitted to operate with free-reign in the U.K., the country’s relationship and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. will be deeply affected.⁴

British civil society and the country’s intelligentsia are, in large part, opposed to Brexit, citing Britain’s century-long relationship with the continent. On February 13, 2019, the Guardian newspaper reported the concerns of more than forty former Ambassadors and High Commissioners about the entanglement of Brexit and its ramifications. In a written letter to the Prime Minister May, they warned that “British influence in the world will wane if the country leaves Europe’s trading and foreign policy bloc”.⁵

These all-embracing developments forced British Intelligence Chiefs to explain the importance of Britain’s intelligence sharing and security cooperation with the EU. On 20 June 2018, in a speech in Brussels, GCHQ Chief Jeremy Fleming’s statement was evident from his irritation about the dilapidating security crisis. He firmly demanded intelligence cooperation with the EU allies. In his speech, Fleming said; “After Brexit, the UK will continue to work with the EU. Fleming stated.⁶ On 14 May 2018, Chief of MI5, Mr. Andrew Parker consistently demanded cooperation with the EU intelligence agencies: “In today’s world, we need that shared strength more than ever. I can say confidently that the way we work together has prevented loss of life in the EU.”⁷ These statements were clear signs of irritation.⁸ 

The Prime Minister did not bring to bear the concerns of intelligence Chiefs about the consequences of Brexit. In the aftermath of these critiques, the government introduced the National Security Capability Review (2018),⁹ to tackle national security challenges, but the growing influence of extremist forces across the country¹⁰, cast doubt on the credibility and highlighted the weak approach of the May government to national security. The first major strategic failure of the review is that it did not elucidate the security road-map: “This lack of strategic clarity has been highlighted by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), the main parliamentary body scrutinizing its implementation.”¹¹ The country’s National Security Strategy also missed the boat to keep momentum with emerging threats and didn’t adequately respond to the exponentially growing threat of radicalization.¹² 

In its 04 June 2018 version, the U.K. Counter-Terrorism Strategy highlighted many vulnerabilities, citing the proliferation of jihadism, and a growing number of terror networks across the country, which prompted negative perceptions about its operational effectiveness, and popularity.¹³, However, several new amendments were added to the National Security Strategy, Strategic Defense and Security Review, and Cyber Security Strategy, to make effective law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure against radicalized forces, lone wolves and foreign espionage, but these amendments are not a proper panacea to the looming security crisis—more work is needed to make police and security agencies effective.¹⁴ 

From January to June 2019, more than 100 people in England were killed, and 100 more were injured in different incidents, but the police and law enforcement agencies have no security plan to address the concerns of communities. Interestingly, no single Muslim was found behind these attacks, while British Home Secretary Sajid Javed shamelessly linked terrorism to Islam. His recent verboseness against Islam appeared in a recent report of Christian Today newspaper: “Islam has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Britain…….“it is ‘lazy’ and ‘wrong’ to suggest terror has nothing to do with Islam. But I think it is absolutely fair to say that there is a special burden on Muslim Communities because whether we like or not these terrorists call themselves Muslims, the newspaper reported.¹⁵ The Home Secretary acted irresponsibly and did not take into account the concerns of Muslim communities.

Adding insult to injury is the country’s Snoopers Charter Surveillance (SCS) and the government’s war on civilian privacy. Liberty, a British human rights organization recently highlighted the powers of the Snoopers Charter Surveillance and data collection methods that were causing communities irksomeness: “When the U.K. government passed a law allowing the mass collection of data from all U.K. citizens…..The Investigatory Power Act, more popularly known as the ‘Snoopers’ Charter,’ allow for the indiscriminate collection of data”.¹⁶ The police has now practically started using the Snooper Charter Surveillance on a borough-level to monitor communities and their activities day-by-day.  

Recently, Liberty and Privacy International called on local communities to report the negative impacts of this consternating and offensive surveillance of local policing authorities, to the Police and Crime Commissioner. The way local police stations using modern surveillance technologies in streets and markets have put our privacy at risk. From car surveillance to mobile phone and drone technologies, the police forces have an unparalleled view into the lives of ordinary British citizens.

Individual liberty and human rights groups recently warned that excessive and offensive use of surveillance tools by the police might alienate communities from the state and government: “From facial recognition in streets to monitoring social media and mobile phones, the police are not open and honest about what tech they use, where they use it, who they use it against and what laws allow them to do so. However, surveillance tech is being used without the public knowledge or consent, on the ground that 95% percent civilians know nothing about the evolving and changing operational mechanism of police surveillance in cities, towns, and streets”.¹⁷

More worrisome is the unauthorized surveillance in which South Asian intelligence agencies are using their spies against their political opponents. They are cruising in cities and towns with impunity, and receive their salaries through a third person, or from their embassies.

This author has personally experienced eaves-dropping many times in high streets and shopping plazas in London.¹⁸ Foreign terrorist fighters present a significant threat to the national security and critical infrastructure of the country. Since 2014, we have seen large numbers of radicalized individuals traveling to Iraq and Syria, while Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), and Intelligence and Security Committee are showing their performance on papers in their annual reports. In reality, the state’s response has been feeble since the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.¹⁹ Intelligence wars between foreign entities on British soil is making thing worse. The security relationship with the EU community remains in flux, while internal political disagreement and deteriorating law and order are prompting a brain drain within civil society and intellectual forums.²⁰ 

EU resentment towards the U.K. raises several concerns—particularly the attitudes of France and Germany. In a knee-jerk reaction to U.K. electronic surveillance operations on its soil, Germany immediately canceled a Cold-War era agreement with U.K.²¹ In 2013, Germany, France, and Spain summoned U.K. Ambassadors to explain the country’s motive behind its intelligence collection practices. To distract from this and in an effort to disguise its own weaknesses, the British government published a security document, underlining the threat of 20 foreign intelligence agencies to the U.K.²² This was to prove that Germany and France were also spying on Britain.²³ 

British counter-extremism and counter-intelligence capabilities are broken. British law enforcement agencies face a multifaceted crisis, including the lack of a common operational mechanism, and a lackluster technical approach to domestic security.²⁴ The U.K. National Security Council also lacks the professional capacity to implement policy properly. Since the U.K. voted to leave the EU in 2016; huge questions surrounding its place in the international community were left unanswered. Prime Minister Theresa May sacked her Defense Minister, Gavin Williamson over the leaks of security secrets of the discussion of National Security Council about the Chinese Huawei crisis. This act of the Prime Minister proved that many things were not going in the right direction within her government.²⁵ Iinar research paper underlining crucial aspects of the NSC and its significance to national security, Institute for Government research associates Dr. Joe Devanny and Josh Harris assert that:

“The NSC is a relatively new committee, but it is only the latest iteration of over a century of Prime-Ministerial efforts to coordinate national security issues from the center. To date, there have been few sustained attempts to examine the NSC and its performance. Four and a half years on different Prime Ministers choose to approach the issue, structure, and appointment of senior advisors in different ways. It is important that the center of government can accommodate each Prime Minister’s preferred way of working. Few Prime Ministers now take office with much experience of National Security issues, and National Security coordination is rarely a key them in general election campaign. But no Prime Minister needs to reinvent the wheel once in office; their predecessors have grappled with similar problems of coordination for over a century.”²⁶

There are a number of national security and law enforcement agencies performing different stabilization roles in the country. However, if one examines their cycle of information, analysis, and operational mechanism, one can conclude that, without the introduction of meaningful security sector reforms, they will be unable to respond to looming national security challenges.²⁷

[1] Britain’s Brexit Armageddon, Tyler Durden, 15 May 2019

[2] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai, introduction pages 

[3] Whether it’s Brexit or Bremain, the UK is in long-term economic decline, David Brown, South China Morning Post, 28 May 2018 https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3012428/uk-leadership-race-can-hong-kong-born-rory-stewart-beat-us-born 

[4] The decline and fall of Britain, Brian Cloughley, 09 December 2016 https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/09/the-decline-and-fall-of-britain/, and also, Brexit Is Killing the Special Relationship: Britain’s partnership with the United States always depended on its usefulness—and that’s starting to fall off a cliff. BY STEPHEN PADUANO, Foreign Policy MAY 2, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/brexit-is-killing-the-special-relationship/

[5] National Security Capability Review another missed opportunity? Celia Mckeon Open Democracy 23 March 2018    

[6] National Security Capability Review: A changing security environment: Government response to the committee’s first report, 2017-19

[7] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai, introduction pages

[8] Brexit, BBC News, 20 June 2018. 

[9] Sajid Javed: What has the new home secretary said about faith? Harry Farley, Christian Today, 30 April 2018

[10] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai.

[11] Guardian newspaper, 13 May 2018

[12] BBC 24 June 2016

[13] National Security Capability Review, March 2018

[14] The Guardian newspaper 04 November 2015

[15] Fixing the EU intelligence Crisis, Musa Khan Jalalzai, New York, 2017

[16] Stand up to police spying, Liberty and Human Organization, https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/stand-police-spying

[17] Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2017-18, January 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/776111/Intelligence_and_Security_Committee_Annual_Report

[18] The National Security Council: National Security at the center of government, Dr. Joe Devanny, Josh Harris, Institute for Government report.

[19] The Guardian Newspaper, 11 October 2017

[20] BBC, 28 April 2018

[21] Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), BBC, 05 November 2015

[22] Intelligence in Vex. Musa Khan Jalalzai, VIJ Publishing, India, 2018

[23] Intelligence in Vex, Musa Khan Jalalzai.

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid

[26] BBC, 01 May 2019

[27] The National Security Council: National Security at the center of government, Dr. Joe Devanny, Josh Harris, Institute for Government report. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/NSC%20final_0.pdf

The Shifting Dynamics of Britain’s National Security Threats was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of course, much has been said about Brexit over the past years, so much so that it has become nearly impossible to escape the daily dose of Westminster’s drama. Economic experts have warned of the potential danger of exiting the E.U. without a deal, to then warn of the genuine damage that Britain’s Brexit limbo is doing to the economy. British entrepreneurs have been split on the consequences of the vote, with some embracing the opportunities that free trade agreements beyond the E.U. framework might bring, and others complaining of the reduction in market access and the difficulties in attracting skilled workers to the country.

Political activists, journalists, and experts have been mobilized as early as the Brexit vote, providing commentaries, analyses, and opinions on the thousand political, social and historical implications of the referendum result. Immigrants, from both the EU and beyond, have either stoically braced themselves hoping for a painless outcome, or packed their bags and given up on a country that has made its views so painfully clear. In short, and whatever political inclination one might have, one thing is sure: the Brexit quagmire has profoundly altered the fabrics of British society, irreversibly changing how the nation-state functions, exists and is perceived, both domestically and abroad. 

There is, however, one segment of British society that, arguably more than others, encapsulates the dramatic changes occurring in the post-Brexit landscape and, ironically, it is the same segment that has created the conditions for its demise. The irresponsibility of the British political class and its increasingly apparent detachment from various societal predicaments has led to a forceful renegotiation of the pact between government and individuals, whereby deep-seated resentments have found their way into a new wave of mainstream ultra-nationalism.

With the era of austerity—prompted by the collapse of the global financial system—weighing heavily on the shoulders of the poor and shrinking the middle class, the rescue of the super-rich by governments entrenched in neoliberal market logic has opened the door for a general reassessment of the political order, and for a growing mistrust towards the promised benefits of the current status quo. The global landscape further played a role in creating such a strong polarisation.

The E.U.’s eastbound expansion has put the Kremlin on high alert, encouraging Putin to a more proactive role in propping up Eurosceptic leaders, as he funnels millions into the pockets of parties such as the French Front National, the German Alternative for Germany, the Italian La Lega, and, allegedly, the British “Leave.EU” campaign team. Simultaneously, the legacy of the war in Syria has had far-reaching socio-political implications, effectively increasing the gap between nativist and non-nativist groups in Europe and framing European political discourse along the lines of the “Us vs. Them” paradigm.

It is in this context of fear, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement that nationalistic sentiments find their way to the dinner table, as mainstream society becomes progressively more exposed to narratives advocating for the reform of internationalism, a retreat from the global, and a general denunciation of the foreign. This was, after all, the pillar upon which the Brexit campaign was built, and the underlying message that resonated the most with the public. “Take back control” became the simplest and most effective way to channel the entire spectrum of pro-Brexit stances into a hopeful slogan, but also to tap into the primary driver of people’s anxieties – the widespread sense of abandonment and impotence, and the promise of social redemption. 

The Politics of Politics

It is likely that historians will write down Cameron’s decision to hold the E.U. referendum as one of the greatest political miscalculations in British history. As the story goes, the former British Prime Minister called the Brexit referendum in the hopes of consolidating the unity of the Conservative Party ahead of the 2015 general elections, effectively tying British membership to the E.U. to strategic considerations of party politics.

As leader of a party that had traditionally maintained a certain scepticism towards the European Union—perfectly encapsulated in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, in which she claimed: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels”—Cameron knew that the easy “remain” victory he had anticipated and hoped for would help him consolidate his leadership, draw the hardliners out of his party, and finally put the E.U. issue to bed. Even more, Cameron hoped that the promise of a referendum would be enough to stave off the risk that the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP)—which had made of anti-immigration and anti-E.U. sentiments the pillars of its political agenda—would attract conservative votes and play in favor of the Miliband-led Labour Party: “Look, we have heard the message loud and clear about the things you want to see changed. We will change those things”—he pleaded—“come with us, come back home to us rather than risk all of this good work being undone by Labour.” 

People did hear him, loud and clear. Not only was Cameron re-elected into a second term, but he had also won a majority that, however thin, allowed him to head the first majority conservative government for twenty years. The cheering in Downing Street, however, might have been short-lived. According to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Cameron did not expect to win a majority in 2015; rather, he thought that he would again have a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, who would promptly block the referendum in exchange for concessions on the alternative vote in local elections.

Had things gone to plan, Cameron would have arguably had his cake, eaten it, and enjoyed it too. He would have stabilized his party, silenced the E.U. issue among conservative MPs, inflicted a severe defeat to UKIP, scared the E.U. into renegotiating some of the most disputed aspects of British membership, and secured another five years into government without taking responsibility for a referendum that was promised but never happened. But with the ideologically-awkward, yet politically-convenient, Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition now out of the picture, Cameron had to deliver on the promise made: give British citizens an in/out option on the EU. As Tusk put it: “Paradoxically David Cameron became the real victim of his victory.”

With the referendum now sure to take place, further political miscalculations were made by the Prime Minister in the run-up to the vote. By late 2015, the House of Lords passed a motion with a majority of 82 to lower the voting age to 16, which was aimed at enfranchising youngsters to politics and give them a voice on the E.U. referendum. While Brexiteers predictably trembled at the prospect—as the “leave” and “remain” camps were segmented along  “old” and “young” demographic lines—Cameron too firmly rejected the idea, fearing that left-inclined young voters would turn the tide against the conservatives in future general elections. Thus, putting again party politics before the upcoming E.U. vote, Cameron disenfranchised around 1.5 million potential young voters that were likely to vote “remain.” In retrospect, considering that “leave” won by approximately 1.2 million votes, a young pro-E.U. vote could have indeed saved Cameron’s political career. 

The voting age miscalculation was not the only one committed by the government, but one of the many that occurred since the referendum was promised in January 2013. Above all, there was Cameron’s inability to appreciate popular moods concerning the question of Britain’s E.U. membership, which in turn severely restricted his chances of selling home the new deal he negotiated with Brussels after the 2015 elections.

The popular argument is that Cameron’s attempt to revisit the parameters of the UK-E.U. relationship was mostly unsatisfactory—or as The Sun put it, “pathetic” and “gutless”—and that he should have pressed for more concessions. While there might be some truth in this, since Cameron had repeatedly downplayed the chances of a “leave” vote to E.U. leaders—even commenting back in 2014 that he would easily win “by 70:30”—the three main miscalculations lied elsewhere.

First, Cameron believed that the concessions obtained from the EU, particularly in relation to the issue of immigration, would be enough to sway popular consensus towards the “remain” camp, as he misread people’s anxiety as stemming from in-work benefits for E.U. immigrants (which he managed to renegotiate) instead of from the numbers of E.U. immigration (which he could not).

Immigration ranked first among people’s top concerns, and although the “emergency break” on benefits was aimed at discouraging new migrants from moving to Britain, it was surely not enough to placate the fears of the British people. Second, Cameron failed to read the overarching mood and narratives driving the Brexit campaign, which had become increasingly polarising, slogan-driven, and dominated by strong popular emotions. There was arguably little room for in-depth analyses of the legal niceties of the summit’s set of conclusions, and many of the concessions obtained were either lost in the wind or swept under the carpet by Brexiteers, who simply adjudged they amounted to nothing as they were not binding. Third, and perhaps even more importantly, Cameron’s failure to bring home concrete results that practically addressed people’s fears, directly played into one of the most effective Brexit tropes, one which claims that Britain has given up its sovereignty to the EU.

When Ian Duncan Smith, Cameron’s former Work, and Pensions Secretary, lashed out at German Chancellor Angela Merkel accusing her of directly sabotaging the government’s efforts to control immigration, the British press went on overdrive. The Sun, which claims 33.3 million readers each month, promptly ran the news story titled: “Cam’s in her hans: Germany SABOTAGED David Cameron’s E.U. renegotiation, and he let them, IDS [Ian Duncan Smith] sensationally claims,” in which Ian Duncan Smith’s point was clearly made: “The Germans said from the outset, you are not getting border control. Full stop… We put ourselves in a compliant position to another country which doesn’t have your best interests necessarily at heart… We are now in a worse position than we were before.”

Here lay one of Cameron’s main miscalculations, or perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of his political naïveté. The prime minister hoped that he could both quell the “leave” side’s unrest by securing a better deal with the E.U.—which would have in turn afforded him an almost certain victory in the referendum—while simultaneously win over E.U. leaders, Merkel above all, by forcing them to make concessions on free movement.

Of course, no one in Brussels was willing to sacrifice the unity and fundamental principles of the Union to get Cameron out of the political jam he had put himself into. This meant that, when the E.U. deal was brought back home with accusations of German interference and of Cameron’s incompetence, Brexiteers were able to find yet another reason to push for the “leave” vote. As UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage commented: “[David Cameron] is not aiming for any substantial renegotiation… no promise to regain the supremacy of Parliament, nothing on ending the free movement of people and no attempt to reduce Britain’s massive contribution to the E.U. budget”.

With the deal being presented to the public as nothing short of a major disappointment, pro-leave elites came to be equipped with the perfect rhetorical weapon which allowed them to tie together the issue of immigration with the issue of sovereignty: if Britain wanted a chance at regulating the migration flux into its borders, it had to make itself “independent” from the European Union.

The final, fatal blow to David Cameron’s “remain” campaign was delivered by a series of misguided steps that the prime minister took as he attempted to keep the Conservative Party united and avoid public clashes between high-profile conservative MPs. Indeed, by the time he returned to London with an underwhelming set of promises on the future of Britain’s relationship with the EU, the pro-Brexit faction in Westminster was in full swing, relentlessly campaigning to give Britain a supposed “independence” from Brussels. With the European Research Group (ERG) moving conservative MPs towards a hard-Brexit stance that was directly opposed to the European ambitions of their party leader, two senior figures in the conservative party, Michael Gove—himself a ERG member—and Boris Johnson, came to the forefront of the “leave” campaign as early as February 2016, the former out of (primarily) principles, the latter out of (primarily) ambitions. 

In line with his overarching belief that “remain” would get an easy win, and that remaining in Europe was, by all means, the sensible thing to do, Cameron rested assured that both MPs would back him in the campaign out of loyalty to the premiership, out of friendship, and out of reason. The miscalculation, however, proved itself costly. Indeed, not only was Cameron forced to resort to convoluted maneuvers to soften the blow when his friends moved to the other side—first by attacking Johnson and then calling for a truce—but it also meant that the leave campaign could now benefit from the support of two, high-profile conservatives.

Indeed, both Gove and Johnson had different ideas from David Cameron when it came to Europe, as throughout their political career both had, more or less publicly, argued cases against Brussels’s legislative influence over London, as well as criticized EU’s laws on free movement. More than that, the former London mayor saw in the Brexit referendum the political opportunity of a lifetime, as he reasoned that, although Brexit was a major political gamble, it could offer the perfect chance to advance his trajectory to Downing Street, effectively guaranteeing him enough conservative support to prop him up to become next prime minister, either after the end of Cameron’s mandate or after his resignation.

On the other hand, Michael Gove’s Brexit stance was underpinned by a stronger Euroscepticism, by an ever-lingering sense of ideological fatigue, and by an equally strong Orientalism which had made him a central player during the “Trojan Horse’ affair—a scandal that eventually contributed in convincing Cameron to remove him from his role of education secretary. As such, while the £30,000 pay-cut might have played a role in spoiling his friendship with Cameron, his “Us VS Them” ideology informed his stance in relation to the issue of immigration, so much so that the speech with which he announced his support to the “leave” campaign was primarily framed along those lines: 

“E.U. immigration policies have encouraged people traffickers and brought desperate refugee camps to our borders. Far from providing security in an uncertain world, the EU’s policies have become a source of instability and insecurity… the E.U. is proving incapable of dealing with the current crises in Libya and Syria. The former head of Interpol says the EU’s internal borders policy is ‘like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe.'”

Crucially, that is not to say that both MPs jumped on the Brexit wagon light-heartedly. As Shipman notes, both Gove and Johnson remained on the fence for as long as it was possible for them to do so, sincerely torn between their beliefs and their loyalty, and between the comforting certainty of a “remain” vote, and the many unknowns of the Brexit gamble. But when Cameron presented the result of his E.U. negotiations, and with the Conservative Party already effectively fractured between “leavers” and “remainers’, both MPs saw slim chances of casting a vote in favour of Brussels, opting instead for what they believed was the natural outcome of a political career never shy of anti-E.U. sentiments. 

After February 2016 delivered two important and highly regarded MPs to the Brexit cause—which spread the feeling that “leave” was not, after all, utter lunacy—it should have been an all-out war for a prime minister whose chances of winning were getting increasingly slim. It was not. Instead, Cameron refused to confront either Johnson or Gove in television debates for fear that Brexit would turn into, as he commented, “a Tory psychodrama.”

Indeed, Cameron became more concerned with the idea of rebuilding the Conservative Party after Brexit than with Brexit itself and reasoned that a public confrontation against leading conservative MPs of the caliber of Johnson and Gove would demolish any appearance of party unity. Perhaps, Cameron still believed that “remain” would be the natural outcome of the referendum, or perhaps he was willing to sacrifice his political career for the good of the party. Regardless, the prime minister scrapped the idea of a “blue on blue” debate and opted instead for a confrontation with a very familiar face in the “leave” camp: Nigel Farage, on June 7.

Although the two never shared a stage—rather had allocated slots to make their case and take questions from the audience—the show unveiled the underlying logic behind the entire Brexit debate, giving a clear sense of what real drivers of the “leave” campaign were and which popular sentiments were underpinning it. Indeed, for as much as David Cameron attempted to play the “economy card”—claiming, at times arrogantly, that every expert had warned against the economic repercussions of Brexit—immigration remained the salient issue which many in the audience wanted to keep as the focus of the debate. This played directly into the hands of the UKIP leader, for Farage—a controversial figure in British politics whose 20-year long political career was built on anti-immigration sentiments—knew too well that his audience was not in the TV studios, but at home, and was eager to hear more about the dangers of the EU’s free movement policy.

Crucially, although many in the press were quick in attributing the victory to the more polished David Cameron, any mention of immigration virtually assigned a point to the “leave” side. Indeed, on the one hand, Cameron had no real answers to give, for there was no easy solution to the question of immigration; and on the other, Farage was quite happy to keep the debate on that specific issue, even if that meant casting himself as an untouchable hardliner in the “leave” camp. For example, when a woman from the audience raised the issue of Farage’s comments linking the Cologne sexual assaults to remaining in the EU, he promptly responded: 

“It’s a massive issue in Germany; it’s a huge issue in Sweden. I think Angela Merkel has made a big mistake by saying “please anyone come.” And what’s happened is, a very large number of young, single males have settled in Germany and in Sweden, who come from cultures where attitudes towards women are different.”

Although Farage’s stance sits at the far-end of the Islamophobic discourse that emerged during the Brexit campaign, it is useful to remember that such a narrative was widely and happily shared among Brexiteers. Ian Duncan Smith repeatedly claimed that a vote to remain would expose the UK “to terror risks.” Gove’s announcement that he would back the “leave” vote revolved around the security threat posed by the E.U. free movement rule, which, he claimed, “actively abets terrorists.” Johnson too, despite his long history of controversial comments, seized the opportunity to argue that Brexit would improve Britain’s security against the terror threat. 

Of course, this is not to say that the Brexit campaign was centered on the question of Muslims in Britain, nor that “leave” voters were solely motivated by their views on Islam. Instead, British discontent with the European Union encapsulated a wide array of popular beliefs and discontents with social issues, with the political class, and with the country’s economy. Even so, however, it is significant that Brexit came to be framed along the lines of security, terrorism, and multiculturalism, rather than, for example, practical considerations of economic stability.

Sure, Gove dismissed any attempt at rationality when he claimed that Britons “have had enough of experts,” but the “leave” team could not win the debate by merely rebutting technical arguments. Instead, they needed something that they could tie to both the global landscape and to the question of Britain’s E.U. membership.  As “Take back control” offered them the perfect slogan to silence pragmatism, the issue of Middle Eastern migrants and the widespread panic around terrorist attacks in Europe gave them the ideal ammunition to make their stronger case: leaving the E.U. could rid the country of Muslim migrants, and with them, of the risk of terrorism. 

These arguments had a profound impact on British society, which came to the inevitable conclusion that there was, in fact, a link between terrorism and Brexit. In January 2016, the vast majority of people polled by YouGov (77%) demanded a ban of the Islamic veil in British schools, and another 58% believed that many economic restrictions had to be imposed on asylum seekers. By February 2016, 56% believed that “a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society” existed. As Brexit slowly paved the way for a wave of Islamophobic sentiments across the country, by June 2016 immigration became the most important issue for voters. After the referendum, hate crimes against racial and religious minority reached an all-time record. 

The Turkish Question 

Much of David Cameron political credibility had also being compromised by his fearless stance in support of Turkey’s entry into the European Union, which in the run-up to the referendum vote became another significantly hot topic for British society, busy assessing the pros and cons of its membership to the Union. In that sense, Cameron was more Tony Blair than he was Margaret Thatcher.

Indeed, while the Iron Lady became responsible for introducing the concept of “Britishness” in an attempt to emphasize the need to preserve British national identity against the growing European one, the New Labour leader had long advocated the idea of a Turkish seat at the European table. Behind Blair’s support of Ankara lied practical considerations of foreign policy, as Turkey’s strategic value—further increased by the events that followed 9/11—trumped the socio-cultural factors that had made other member state sceptical, for a country boasting a population of nearly 80 million, 99% of which Muslim, was perceived by many European bureaucrats as a threat to Europe.

Ironically, one key argument which would underpin both Blair’s and Cameron’s stance concerning the Turkish question was more sectarian than pragmatic. Indeed both leaders believed that Turkey’s accession would contribute towards staving off the risk of a “clash of civilisation” between Muslims and non-Muslims, as it could strengthen Turkey’s resistance against Islamist fundamentalism while simultaneously shutting down “intense arguments about the incompatibility of Islam with democracy or Islam with human rights and modernity.”

Secure in his belief that Turkey, sitting at the border between Europe and the Middle East, could indeed bridge Christianity and Islam, in 2010 Cameron commented: “Turkey can be a great unifier. Because instead of choosing between East and West, Turkey has chosen both. And it’s this opportunity to unite East and West that gives Turkey such an important role with countries in the region in helping to deliver improved security for us all.”

However, with the Brexit referendum unveiling the country’s real mood about immigration—and even more so in relation to multiculturalism—Cameron sensed that his support for Turkey’s entry in the E.U. was misplaced. Indeed, the question of Turkey’s membership was quickly weaponized by Brexiteers—both outside and within Cameron’s own government—who began to spread claims that Britain would be flooded by Muslim migrants carrying crime, security threats and the risk of further strains on the country’s public services such as the National Health Service (NHS). As new posters reading “Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU: Vote leave, take back control” began to circulate, David Cameron spectacularly U-turned on his pro-expansion stance, ridiculing the Ankara government during a May 2016 interview, in which he claimed that it would not be able to join the E.U. “until the year 3000”.

Equally spectacularly, however, David Cameron maintained a somewhat ambiguous stance over this issue, which was made even more suspicious after leading Brexiteers such as Gove and Johnson had demanded from the government a clear commitment to veto Turkey’s entry. Arguably to their delight, this never happened. Whether because he feared that such a commitment could jeopardize Britain’s bilateral relationship with Turkey, or because he did not want to face future diplomatic awkwardness at European level, Cameron never clearly gave assurances that he would, in fact, veto Turkey’s accession, rather, he relied on the French government—which had conveniently called for a referendum on the issue—to stop Ankara from entering the Union. Again, however, Cameron’s political calculations played into the wrong hands: as questions about Britain’s loss of sovereignty lingered, his decision to pass the gavel to Paris on such a crucial issue made many wonder why was Downing Street “relying on somebody else” to stop Turkey’s accession. “Take back control” scored another important victory. 

The issue of Turkey became central in the Brexit saga. Indeed, by then the “leave” campaign had begun to show one of its ugliest faces, creating a sectarian divide that leveraged on pure prejudice against migrants—and even more so against Muslims. Crucially, while early efforts to sway public opinion towards the “leave” option had focused on issues of sovereignty and economics (with strong emphasis being placed for example on Britain’s E.U. membership fee), Brexit supporters were quick in shifting towards arguments that could be more easily understood, and that could have a more significant impact among the “anxious middle” in British society.

While it was arguably difficult to make an economic case in support of Brexit—for the E.U. remains the largest single market in the world and the world’s largest economy—the global context that framed the Brexit vote provided “leave” campaigners with anti-immigration ammunition. In the years that followed the rise of the Islamic State (IS), Europe had witnessed increasing anti-Muslim sentiments stemming from large numbers of migrants fleeing war zones in the Middle East, as well as from some high-profile Islamist terror attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and England.

Thus, fuelled by its furthest-right activists operating in the streets and online, anti-Muslim sentiments in Britain found unexpected legitimisation in the words of mainstream politicians such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, who promptly linked their Brexit ambitions to the issue of immigration, which was in turn connected to the question of opening British doors to Turkish Muslims. Completing the picture, Nigel Farage’s infamous “Breaking Point” poster—showing a large queue of non-white, Middle Eastern-looking migrants and a sign reading “We must break free from the E.U. and take back control”—further strengthened the connection between the “leave” vote and Muslim existence in Britain, regardless of their nationality or status.

Little did it matter that the majority of mainstream Brexiteers promptly distanced themselves from the radical views of the UKIP leader. In a short period, Brexit had not only come to be firmly discussed in terms of immigration and border control but had come to be framed within a “Us VS Them” paradigm that further allowed for a mainstream scapegoating of Muslims. It is thus unsurprising that a record surge in anti-Muslim hate crimes occurred in fact in the aftermath of the vote, as abuses such as “Get out – we voted Leave,” or “Shouldn’t you be on a plane back to Pakistan? We voted you out,” became the clearest, and ugliest, a manifestation of what the Brexit vote meant for many.

The Economy, Stupid

Any analysis of the Brexit referendum and the moods that it encapsulated would be incomplete without an assessment of the economic backdrop within which the vote occurred. Indeed, while party politics and the question of Turkey steered the outcome towards the “leave” side, revealing the significant political capital that issues such as multiculturalism and immigration have in such circumstances, it was the economic situation in Britain that provided the conditions for anti-Muslim sentiments to emerge. 

A plethora of studies have convincingly demonstrated that there exists a direct correlation between economic conditions and openness towards immigration and that, specifically, worse economic condition—such as high rates of unemployment—directly impacts how migrants come to be perceived by nativist groups. For example, Johnston and Lordan have found that “prejudice among native-born whites increases with the unemployment rate,” and that a mere 1% increase in unemployment can result in a 4% increase in prejudice among middle-class men in full employment.

Others have contended that “While a functioning welfare state can compensate the globalization losers… welfare cuts may do the opposite,” suggesting that austerity programs have a direct effect in attracting individuals to populist parties and in increasing anti-immigration sentiments. And others yet have contended that “once unemployment and austerity hits, people tend to turn against themselves by using their last democratic weapon: turning against democracy itself by voting for extreme right-wing parties.” In short, many notable studies (including post-Brexit ones) have given empirical and theoretical evidence in support of the broadly held belief that Britain’s economy played a key role in swaying public opinion against migrants and Europe. 

From a political perspective, Cameron’s decision to call for a referendum after years of austerity was, by all means, political suicide. Just months before the general elections of 2015, The Guardian ran an article in which it was stated that the government planned to slash out a further £55 billion by 2019, which added to the already £35 billion cuts since the Conservative Party seized Downing Street. The cuts were unforgiving. Funding for social enterprises providing help for the disabled, for refugees, or even for job seekers, almost entirely disappeared—forcing many to shut down.

Funding for councils was nearly halved, with public services for housing and leisure, libraries, and even roads maintenance collapsing. Proposals to freeze working-age benefits, to reduce the benefit cap of £3000, and to limit access to housing benefit for people under 21, loomed. Child poverty increased, police cuts turned into higher crime rates, food banks emptied, and 120,000 deaths came to be directly linked to Cameron’s austerity program under the unforgiving label “economic murder.” 

Ironically, the Cameron government was both relieved and surprised by the muted reaction to its austerity program, particularly considering that when Spain adopted equally severe austerity measures, the country went into something resembling a civil war. In truth, however, Britain’s discontent had a very different face, short of Spanish hot-blood and full of British aplomb. Indeed, instead of taking the streets, Britons took the polling booth and cast a vote that reflected years of frustration and disillusionment, preferring the unknowns of a “leave” vote to the economically unsustainable status quo. And while ascribing the Brexit vote solely to the economic disaster that the conservative elite-driven austerity caused might be reductive, enough research exists to substantiate the claim that the thousand cuts brought about by the Cameron government did play an important role in channeling anti-E.U. sentiments. 

For example, people in the poorest households were more likely to support “leave” than those in households with incomes over £60,000 per year; people out of work were equally more likely to favor Brexit than those in fulltime employment, as were people in low-skilled and manual labor. The most impoverished towns in England overwhelmingly voted for “leave’, with Boston (Lincolnshire) heading the group with 76% of people in favor of Brexit, and with South Holland (Lincolnshire) and Castle Point (Essex) following with nearly 74% and 73% respectively.

Interestingly, all three towns witnessed dramatic cuts on services and benefits. Lincolnshire, for example, suffered from severe cuts to the police force, which caused a sharp increase in “austerity crimes that led to an overall crime increase”; meanwhile, emergency funding for low-income families in Essex shrunk by 87%. All this accompanied a variety of other measures that dramatically shrunk towns” budgets and compromised the lives of millions. Significantly, the districts that suffered the most from the austerity cuts imposed by the government recorded a surge in votes for UKIP, “whose raison d’etre,” argues Fetzer, “was Britain’s exit from the EU.” 

While Cameron’s ruthless subscription to neoliberal logics of anti-welfare, state-slashing, poor-punishing, strict policies of pro-market madness might explain his inclination to subjugate Britain under a 10-year long austerity plan, his decision to call for an in/out E.U. referendum amid his austerity project remains puzzling at best. On balance, it could also be cynically interpreted as the clearest sign of how self-entitled, privately-educated elites had lost touch with the reality on the ground. Enveloped in a happy bubble of self-righteousness and privilege, Cameron severely misjudged how the economic impact of his austerity program was providing populist narratives of division and ultra-nationalism with powerful ammunition.

UKIP, conversely, sensed that trend, as since 2012 it moved from targeting the middle class and focused on the “less educated, worse off, insecure and pessimistic (white) voters.” To be sure, Cameron’s follow-up decision to use his face for the “remain” campaign was also profoundly misguided, as by 2016 his approval rating had sunk to 34%, with 58% claiming he was not “doing a good job.” When the Panama Papers showed to the public that their prime minister had benefited from a comfortable family nest of offshore money—which inspired the famous nickname “Dodgy Dave”—another good chunk of public confidence went missing. With 68% of surveyed Britons claiming they would not trust him on tax avoidance, David Cameron’s “remain” campaign inevitably came to suffer from another important blow.

Brexit Orientalism 

While the analysis of the Brexit saga’s economic backdrop provides a partial explanation of the sentiments with which millions of British citizens approached the referendum, it also sheds light on the dynamics that helped to frame the E.U. vote within an anti-Muslim discourse. Indeed, keeping in mind that the last decade has witnessed explosive tensions in the Middle East—first with the Arab Spring, then with the rise of IS, and then with the war in Syria—the popular mood created by Cameron’s austerity program helps understand why anti-Muslim rhetoric came to the forefront during the campaign and, more violently, after the vote. Two reasons can be found for this. 

First, Cameron’s view of migration contributed to the creation of a space for anti-migrant sentiments to emerge so forcefully during the Brexit campaign and, ironically, in limiting the effectiveness of his own “remain” campaign. Having already advocated “good immigration, not mass immigration” during a 2011 speech in parliament, Cameron repeatedly lashed out at Brussels’s free movement policies claiming that the weak economies of certain member states were preventing Britain from reducing its capacity for migration. As noted earlier, he sought to reduce immigration by making the prospect of living in Britain unattractive, first through the emergency break discussed with E.U. leaders in the 2015 summit, and second through the Immigration Act 2014, the goal of which was to “create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration” by making it increasingly difficult for non-British to access basic services such as employment, healthcare, housing, education, banking, and others. 

What is particularly striking, however, is that Cameron’s position was not limited to the issue of free movement in Europe, but extended to a racializing narrative that effectively created an overlap between the need to control migration and the issue of multiculturalism. In October 2011, the government’s view on this became abundantly clear, as a direct connection between the economic difficulties faced by many and the presence of minority communities across the country was spelled out:

“Excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country. Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and social pressures too. When large numbers of people arrive in new neighborhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same language as those who live there, perhaps not always wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a discomfort and tension in some of our communities… And there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while the better off reap many of the benefits. So I think it’s absolutely right to address all of these concerns because if people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues, they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest.”

Remarkably, the October speech followed another memorable moment in Cameron’s relationship with cultural diversity. Speaking in Munich in February 2011, he stated that multiculturalism had failed, because “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream…We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.” The speech was significant, as the juxtaposition of multiculturalism with terrorism effectively reframed interfaith and interethnic relationships along the lines of securitization. In the space of a few months, Cameron had thus managed to link multiculturalism—and Muslims specifically—to both economic issues and terrorism.

As such, while much of his follow-up measures created a strong degree of separation between the government and British Muslims (for example, during the Trojan Horse scandal, or when he rejected calls for annual meetings with Muslims, or when he threatened deportation for Muslim women who failed English language tests, or when he introduced the concept of “British values” to tackle extremism, or when his cabinet asked Muslim leaders to demonstrate that Islam is compatible with “British values’), they also contributed in conflating the issue of economic immigration with that of multiculturalism and race. Thus, by the time the Brexit campaign came to be centered squarely on immigration, “leave” came to be construed as a means to stop Muslims from entering, or living, in the UK. The high circulation of Islamophobic tweets in the immediate aftermath of the referendum effectively showed that Brexit had “framed “western” identity in non-inclusive terms and unleashed social anxieties about Muslims as the foreign “other’.” 

The second factor that contributed to bringing Brexit about, among other things, Muslim existence in Britain, ought to be found in UKIP’s political revival. Moving from being a fringe party of “loonies” and “closet racists”—as Cameron once described them—to becoming one of the fastest growing parties in British politics as early as 2013, UKIP traditionally ran on inflammatory political agendas centered upon strong anti-E.U. and anti-immigration sentiments. Its 2015 manifesto, for example, spells out the party main objectives and shows its aggressive stance in relation to the issue of immigration: 1) End immigration for unskilled jobs for a five-year period; 2) Tackle the problem of sham marriages; 3) Introduce a new visa system for workers, visitors, students, families and asylum seekers; 4) End access to benefits and free NHS treatment for new immigrants until they have paid tax and NI for five years; 5) Require all visitors and new immigrants to the UK to have their own health insurance; 6) End welfare tourism with a five-year embargo on benefits for migrants; 7) Allow British businesses to choose to employ British workers first.

UKIP’s nationalist agenda accompanied an even more concerning stance about Muslims and Islam. The investigative group Powerbase identifies many links between the party and Islamophobic organizations such as the Dutch Freedom party, the EDL, Pegida UK, Liberty GB (formerly British Freedom Party); as well as with European far-right parties within the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) umbrella. Even more, UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage had never made a mystery of his views on Muslims and Islam. In 2012 he argued:

“On the issue of Islamification, I think we have to do a bit more, probably starting in our schools to actually teach people about the values of our Judeo-Christian culture… There are over twenty police forces now in this country turning a complete blind eye to the operation of Sharia courts and Sharia law…  if you’re not prepared as a nation to stand up for your cultures and your values, then those cultures and values will be threatened.” 

In 2014, he blamed Muslims for anti-Semitism in Europe; in 2015 he claimed that people’s concerns over immigration were founded, as Muslims were attempting to create a “fifth column” to effectively “kill” Britons. He further added:

“There is an especial problem with some of the people who’ve come here and who are of the Muslim religion who don’t want to become part of our culture. So there is no previous experience, in our history, of a migrant group that comes to Britain that fundamentally wants to change who we are and what we are. That is, I think, above everything else, what people are really concerned about.”

 A few months later, he accused Muslims of having “split loyalties”; and later in 2017 he stated:

“There are quite big areas of east London that have become wholly Muslim areas… There are gangs of men out saying to women in short dresses there shouldn’t be there; to people in having a drink that they shouldn’t be there. There are parts of Paris and parts of Brussels that are even worse. Any woman, in a normal manner, if she walks down the streets, she will receive abuse.”

With such a long history of Islamophobic comments, it is perhaps unsurprising that when Farage became one of the most recognizable faces in the “leave” camp, the Brexit campaign turned squarely on a debate about multiculturalism, which focused on Muslims above any other ethnic group. Indeed, while pro-leave MPs and activists were “playing defense” on the economy for the entire duration of the campaign, a shift in focus towards the issue of immigration afforded them the greatest yet fighting chance. Farage himself knew too well that immigration had to be played up if “leave” wanted that chance. He was so sure of this that in April 2016 he declared:

“What I have urged “Vote Leave”—the official designated vehicle—we have got to get onto the other part of the pitch, we gotta start attacking the enemy’s goal, and where the enemies are at their absolute weakest is at this whole question of open door migration, the effects that it’s had on the lives of ordinary Britons over the course of the last decade, and the threat that it poses given the new terror and security threat that we face in the West… I would love myself and UKIP to work with you [Vote Leave] on this campaign. Because actually we are the form horses when it comes to immigration when it comes to the impact that it’s had on people in this country.” 

The official “leave” campaign never allowed Farage to add his name to the team, and promptly distanced itself from his most controversial moves. In a bid to secure a favorable outcome, Brexiteers across the political spectrum found themselves resorting to very similar arguments. 

Conclusion

Research conducted by Hope Not Hate showed that 49% of “leave” voters believed that “There are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter,” against a mere 19% of “remain” voters. Similarly, 54% of “leave” voters agreed that “Islam is generally a threat to the British way of life,” against 17% of remainers. Subsequent polls showed that 47% of “leavers” believed that the government was deliberately hiding the truth about the number of migrants living in the UK, and 31% believed that “Immigration to this country is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims a majority of the country’s population.” 

The conflation between the issue of E.U. migrants and the securitization of Muslims came to the forefront of the Brexit campaign as a result of clever political calculations on one side, and not-so-clever political mistakes on the other. 

Mistakes punctuated Cameron’s political career since the announcement of the referendum up to his resignation. Failing to read popular moods stemming from his aggressive austerity policy, the prime minister called for a simple in/out referendum on the future of Britain in the EU, incidentally at a time in which his approval rate was at historical lows. This was followed by a series of missteps that directly helped the “leave” side to build a case for Brexit.

First, Cameron returned from the E.U. negotiations without significant achievements. While it could not have been otherwise, as Brussels does not negotiate on the four indivisible freedoms, his mistake lied in his belief, or hope, that E.U. leaders would rescue him out of the political jam he had put himself into.

Second, Cameron failed to give practical reassurances on the question of Turkey’s entry in the EU, choosing to rely on the French government for a potential veto. This was further inflamed by his traditional pro-Turkey stance, which made his U-turn appear insincere and contributed to spreading conjectures about European power vis-à-vis Britain’s sovereignty.

Third, he put party politics above any other consideration or concern. This occurred when he called the referendum to strengthen his leadership; when he misjudged Gove and Johnson’s stance losing them to the “leave” camp; when he refused to debate conservative Brexiteers; and when he rejected the idea of lowering the voting age.

Finally, he blamed the failings of his austerity policy on migrants, further declaring the failure of multiculturalism and conflating Muslim existence in Britain with issues of terrorism and extremism. On the opposite side, Brexiteers displayed incredible flexibility in their willingness to capitalize on such mistakes. Recognizing their slim chances of winning on the economy front, “leave” MPs, activists, campaigners, and newspapers bet everything on immigration, further strengthening the link between immigration and terrorism.

The vilest manifestation of this trend was Farage’s “Breaking Point” poster, arguably a culmination of a 20-year long career built upon the demonization of minorities. But while the poster might have horrified some of the most moderate Brexiteers, the increased support for UKIP during the 2015 elections, and the relentless anti-Muslim narrative upon which UKIP had consolidated its appeal, proved that the “Muslim card” could indeed be a wise one to play. 

Brexiteers across the political spectrum capitalized on this. Gove, for example, claimed he “shuddered” after seeing the poster, yet his speech in support of Brexit was built within the framework of security, terrorism, and immigration. Hardly a surprise. His view that “The west faces a challenge to its values, culture, and freedom as profound in its way as the threat posed by fascism and communism,” had made him a key player during the infamous Trojan Horse affair.

To be sure, the entire “Vote Leave” campaign—the mainstream face of the otherwise ugly affair—came to be centered upon the Muslim-Immigration-Terrorism triad as soon as Brexiteers realized technical arguments on the economy were unbeatable. At the sound of “Murderers, terrorists and kidnappers from countries like Turkey could flock to Britain if it remains in the European Union,” they secured the long-awaited victory—condemning millions of Muslims to violence and discrimination in the process.

Brexit and the Politics of Islamophobia was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2017, Catalonia held an illegal referendum on independence from Spain, despite it having been declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court. While 92% of referendum voters supported independence, only 43% of registered voters voted. Amid police crackdowns and massive protests, the Spanish National Court ordered the imprisonment of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, two Catalan separatist leaders. In spite of this, Catalonian MPs voted to declare independence. In response, Spain imposed direct rule over Catalonia. However, the situation is not as straightforward as many commentators make it seem, as vital information key to understanding the unrest has been overlooked.

Both the United States Senate and an independent study conducted by the George Washington University have claimed that Kremlin-connected media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik created “zombie accounts” or bots to perpetuate a negative perception of Spain in the days leading up to the referendum. Half of the stories shared by RT highlighted police violence to deliberately disrupt internal cohesion in Spain.

Spain is not Moscow’s only target, however. Over the last year, the E.U. East StratCom Task Force reported 993 reports of disinformation cases, 152 of which targeted the E.U. and originated from Russia. Furthermore, eighty-three percent of Europeans believe “fake news” is a danger to democracy.  Disinformation is on the rise, and there is ample evidence that Russian disinformation is part of an orchestrated campaign to overwhelm democracies and free media outlets. Coined by Russian expert Mark Galeotti, the “Gerasimov doctrine” is a colloquial term that refers to the employment of non-kinetic or non-military methods to achieve political ends—to destabilize the E.U. and NATO from within through the exploitation of existing social, ethnic, and religious divisions.  The so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” merely describes an operational concept and isn’t a reference to a Russian military doctrine.

For decades, the trans-Atlantic alliance has remained stable, but history is no guarantee of stability in perpetuity. Despite mostly positive support for NATO amongst the citizens of its member states, Russia seizes upon existing dissatisfaction felt by a minority of citizens and pushes messaging that employs terms like “occupying power” to describe the alliance. The same goes for the European Union. Member states regularly disagree over issues such as refugee resettlement, Russian sanctions, and the resurgence of nationalism across the continent. Such subjects are prime targets for Russian disinformation campaigns, which are disseminated by Kremlin-controlled media outlets like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik, as well as on fringe websites and social media accounts to amplify the message further.

Disinformation is challenging to counter, despite increasing and widespread awareness. Some European states like France have enacted laws that compel social networks to disclose the source of funding for sponsored political content and allow for candidates to sue for the removal of contested news reports during elections. In 2018, the E.U. enacted a non-binding disinformation code of practice, aimed at targeting “fake news” in upcoming European elections.

Such measures, however, are merely reactive and fail to anticipate the continually adapting strategies of disinformation purveyors. To avoid laws that target foreign influence campaigns, state-sponsored actors are buying political ads in local currency. Actors are increasingly adept at masking their locations and are moving towards image-based disinformation campaigns, which are less regulated and significantly more difficult to legislate.

Rather than perpetually being one step behind, Europe should emulate the strategies of states like Estonia that have been dealing with Russian disinformation campaigns for years. Rather than allow for Russian disinformation campaigns to gather steam, the websites such as the Estonia-based Propastop continuously debunk disinformation. The Estonian government also operates a Russian-language news channel to serve as an alternative to RT. Moreover, all Estonian politicians and public administration officers do not give interviews to Russian state-controlled media outlets. This strategy of national resilience is also strengthened by Estonia’s National Center for Defense and Security Awareness (NCDSA), a non-governmental organization that aims to foster a society that is resilient and resistant to hostile foreign influence.

France: The Yellow Vests

Counter-disinformation tactics must be adaptable because disinformation comes in many different forms. Catalonia and Estonia are not the only case studies by far. France, for example, is currently dealing with an enormous surge of anti-government protestors who disagreed vehemently with an increase on the gas tax. These protestors are better known by their moniker “yellow vests.” Although the demonstrators’ original demand of suspending the gas tax increase was met, the next day, more than 125,000 yellow vest protestors took to the streets, clashing with police and looting stores as they went.

According to New Knowledge, 340 pro-Kremlin accounts created and magnified “the brutality of the French police, Macron’s inability to lead the nation, and anti-NATO or anti-migrant sentiments more than 20,000 times.” Since late October 2017, these accounts have posted at least 1,600 times a day on Twitter, retweeting false information to increase its believability. These accounts, as well as others, impersonated journalists and legitimate news outlets to craft a narrative of France being embroiled in a civil war and blaming Macron for its onset.

What does the Kremlin hope to accomplish through its disinformation campaigns in France? Ultimately, Russia wants to undermine the French government’s ability to govern effectively. If the French government’s focus is entirely domestic, it can no longer point fingers at Russia, continue its sanctions regime, and pose any serious threat to Russia. By amplifying societal discontent in France with disinformation through social media, Russia is creating a reality where French democracy is indeed under threat. As the yellow vest protests continue, it remains to be seen whether or not Russia has achieved its goals.

Georgia: Disinformation as the Status Quo

Unfortunately, Russian disinformation in Georgia is nothing new. During the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the former launched an intense pro-Russian propaganda campaign to spread claims that the Georgian government was violating the human rights of Russian speakers in Georgia. Although the accusations were widely discredited, they were used by Russia to justify the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While Georgian politicians are aware of threat Russian disinformation poses, they lack the political will to enact meaningful countermeasures.

According to the Georgia-based Media Development Foundation (MDF), this lack of response may be problematic given that almost 2000 anti-Western messages were detected throughout Georgian media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016, when most of the Russian disinformation campaign was centered on human rights, the dominant topic in 2017 was the polarization of the Georgian domestic political landscape. Pro-Kremlin actors focused on targeting everyday Georgian’s perceived loss of national identity paired with demonizing rhetoric of the U.S., NATO, and the E.U.

Russia’s disinformation campaigns in Georgia are based on a three-part strategy. First, create a threat. Second, foster distrust of Georgia’s Western allies and partners. Third, reinstate and reinforce the belief that Russia is the sole trustworthy partner. Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia used fake photos and videos to encourage conspiratorial thinking and increase radicalism in groups like Georgian Neo-Nazi parties. One example of this tactic is the “lab of death” narrative, where it was claimed that a U.S.-funded laboratory in Georgia which was giving untested drugs to Georgians, causing them to die.

In Georgia, the goal of such disinformation campaigns is quite different than in France. As Georgia is not presently a member of the E.U., the bulk of Russian messaging is intended to ensure that will never happen. Russia sees Georgia as lying within its sphere of influence, and any attempt to align with the West is seen as a threat. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war, for example, is primarily seen as the driver behind Georgia’s push to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan.

Despite the troubled relationship between the two countries, Georgia has adopted a pragmatic approach for its foreign policy, where it has downplayed tensions with Russia and even is in talks to create trade corridors through the frozen conflict zones of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Again, Russia’s disinformation campaigns are having the desired impact. Despite Georgia’s westward orientation, Tbilisi continues to adopt a less aggressive and more pacifist tone towards Moscow.

Europe Needs to Fight Back

From Western Europe to the Eastern Neighborhood, disinformation campaigns are having a severe impact on societal cohesion. In France, the “yellow vest” protests are ongoing. In Georgia, right-wing radicalism is on the rise, threatening Georgia’s turn to the West. Disinformation is even suspected to be involved with Brexit, and the recent German parliamentary election. In this hostile environment, Europe must reorient itself and learn from the E.U. East Stratcom Task Force and Estonia. Otherwise, the E.U. risks further fragmentation within itself and other Western democracies.

Russia’s campaigns are succeeding within Europe because countries are not adopting the appropriate countermeasures. Instead of simply acknowledging that disinformation is a problem, European countries must take proactive measures to debunk Russian propaganda. The E.U.’s East Stratcom Task Force is already doing much of this work, but it could receive further funding and publicity from all E.U. member states.

Counter-disinformation efforts can only be successful if they are marketed effectively. Furthermore, European countries ought to create more societal resilience programs, modeling them off the Estonian model. While not every European country has a Russian-speaking minority, each has segments of disenfranchised people who are vulnerable to disinformation. Put bluntly, the best way to combat the current successes of Russian disinformation is to fight back.

How Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns are Succeeding in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The seemingly omnipotent regimes in each of these countries are on increasingly shaky ground after years of corruption, public deception, and coercion. Protests in Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan have laid the groundwork for potentially positive changes in those countries. In Iran, many wish for a similar movement towards reform. However, they face critical challenges ahead if any changes are to be realized. Going forward, it would behoove policymakers, particularly those in Western countries, to closely monitor events in Iran.

From the outset, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran undermined the functioning of an effective government in the country. Revolutionaries established parallel institutions alongside each government apparatus which imposed obstacles on nearly every decision-making process in Iran. The Islamic Revolution enmeshed itself in domestic, economic, and foreign policymaking to ensure its interests were upheld. For example, the religious Guardian Council of the Revolution can impede the Parliament, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) meddles with the country’s economy and interferes with the Iranian armed forces whenever it deems necessary to do so.

Today, parallel institutions in Iran have amassed substantial power, and it’s unlikely they will relinquish it voluntarily. The Guardian Council is a hindrance to parliamentary decision-making on critical matters like international anti-money laundering bills, while the IRGC provides support, funding, and resources to foreign militia groups, and brings them into Iran.

During the 2009 Iranian Green Movement, the IRGC deployed armored vehicles into volatile cities alongside anti-riot security forces and attacked protestors, arresting and subsequently torturing them. When it came to fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iranians were never fully supportive of the IRGC’s actions. Many disregarded Tehran’s strong support for the Assad regime in Syria and disapproved of money that was badly needed at home being spent on expansionist programs.

Presently, Iranians are even more furious with the IRGC following widespread flooding in several Iranian provinces, further underscoring the regime’s inability to manage a crisis effectively. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of infrastructure and economic development projects in Iran are awarded to firms connected to the IRGC. Many projects have been entirely unnecessary or were improperly planned.

During a visit to areas affected by the flooding, IRGC commanders were confronted by angry and disappointed residents, in some cases being on the receiving end of “long live the Shah” chants. Their solution is to bring in al-Hashd ash-Sha’abi—or the Iraqi Shia Militia of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—to the province of Khuzestan under the guise of providing aid. In reality, the group is there to suppress protesters and dissenters. Khuzestan is home to a significant population of Iranians of Arab descent, so it’s ironic that foreign Arabs are charged with suppressing dissent.

During the 2009 Green Movement, protests across Iran in 2017, and in the aftermath of the 2019 flood, the IRGC has repeatedly shown that it holds no reservations about using brutal tactics to oppress the Iranian people. Thus, once the IRGC begins to feel that it is losing its grip on power, it’s likely Iran will descend to the verge of civil war. Practically speaking, any foreign actors intent on constraining the IRGC should establish an agile taskforce to monitor, identify, and block every IRGC financial transaction and trade deal from North Africa to East Asia.

The Islamic Republic’s long and tragic record on human rights has been overlooked by the West—primarily Europe—for the sake of business and commercial opportunities in Iran. Iran’s rank of civil and political rights was stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, Iran’s human rights ranking out of a score of one hundred) improved by just eleven points over two decades—from six to seventeen. It is a false hope to believe that the current system in Iran will bring about any positive or substantive changes to both Iran and the broader region.

With or without sanctions, with or without the nuclear deal, with or without the IRGC being officially designated as a terrorist organization, the theocratic regime in Tehran will continue as it has for forty years. The Iranian presidency was held first by a moderate, then by a reformist, then by a fundamentalist, and now by a moderate—yet any case for true peace within the country or with the rest of the world is nonexistent. Real reform in Iran would mean the release of imprisoned members of the Baha’i faith, journalists, women’s rights activists, and citizens of the U.S. and U.K. accused of espionage. This is, however, unlikely as the regime’s survival is increasingly dependent upon the repression of dissent.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iranian opposition groups increasingly felt that the international community was turning a blind eye to the regime’s repressive policies. For some time, the Iranian opposition movement appeared to stagnate. In recent years, however, the Iranian diaspora has led to a resurgence of opposition. As older generations hold meetings and conferences around the globe, younger groups such as Iran Revival are breathing new life into the fight against the regime of the Islamic Republic.

Iran Revival’s members are primarily younger Iranians who have left the country. The group has established a ten-point transition path for Iran. Since the group’s establishment in September, it’s social media following has grown substantially and the group’s Instagram features numerous videos filmed by Iranians residing in Iran. The U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, met with representatives of the group during Nowrooz, the Iranian New Year. Officials in other Western governments would do well to engage with groups that have a vision for Iran such as Iran Revival. Engagement with opposition groups is essential if the country is to have a peaceful path to political transition.

Iran—similar to Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan—displays the right criteria for a possible regime change. The country is facing severe economic woes, Iranian opposition groups are organizing themselves more effectively over issues like corruption and women’s rights, and possible alternatives to the current regime are emerging. No authoritarian regime in history has survived indefinitely, and the one currently ruling Iran will be no exception.

Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Venezuela Have One Major Similarity was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extremist propaganda has spread beyond Libya to reach Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. While this isn’t a new phenomenon, North African states continue to suffer from substantial terrorist attacks. Recently, the Tripoli-based Libyan National Oil Company and the High National Electoral Commission were attacked by militants seemingly linked to ISIS (Daesh). Extremist movements are increasing their propaganda output and continue to pose a severe threat to internal and regional security.

Tunisia is engulfed in a deep economic crisis. As such, international financial institutions are demanding significant economic structural reforms, which have triggered protests and prompted an increase in propaganda originating from networks in Libya to exploit socio-economic issues to attract disaffected young people to their ranks.

On October 28^th, 2018 a woman with no previously-known militant background (according to Tunisian authorities) blew herself up. The attack occurred just as the country’s vital tourism industry started to recover more than three years after two deadly terror attacks. More recently, on March 7^th, 2019, a post office in Tunis intercepted 19 letters containing potentially deadly toxins addressed to notable journalists, politicians, and trade unionists. Local authorities revealed that the substances were produced in a Tunisian laboratory. This is a critical security issue that needs to be addressed—both domestically and regionally, and possibly in cooperation with the European Union. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are strategic partners for Europe—ensuring their stability is essential to avoid further crises in the region.

On March 10^th, 2019, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’s (AQIM) al-Andalus media foundation released an audio clip of a speech given by AQIM official Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi. The address championed the Algerian protests against current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and encouraged protesters to demand Sharia-based governance. Despite Algeria having recently initiated a massive counter-terrorism operation to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the country’s borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, extremist propaganda still represents a serious issue.

Algier’s counter-terrorism efforts are increasingly complicated by illegal migration and human trafficking along Algeria’s southern border. Terrorism and criminality are increasingly interconnected, and the need to break the nexus between the two has increased following the social unrest that led to the ouster of the 82-year old Bouteflika. Stability in Algeria is critical—for the security of Algerians, and the broader region. The country’s next leader will face a challenging economic situation, persistent threats from terrorist networks in Mali and Libya, and increasing extremist propaganda targeted to influence the country’s younger generations.

According to the British government’s Foreign Travel Advice, “terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Morocco. You should be vigilant at all times.”  Two Scandinavian tourists were brutally killed in Morocco in December of 2018. While local authorities reported the attackers were not affiliated with ISIS, the attack—coupled with ISIS’ territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq—has lead to growing scrutiny over the group’s increasingly asymmetric dimension.

One component of the Moroccan counter-terrorism strategy is moussalaha—a reconciliation program. Launched in 2018, it is a de-radicalization program to combat violent extremism. According to the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, human rights and anti-radicalization experts provide psychological support and rehabilitation of charged and jailed people for terror crimes. On March 10^th of 2019, Moroccan authorities announced a repatriation program to allow militants of Moroccan origin to return in safety. The returnees were subject to judicial investigations for their alleged involvement in terror-related activities. The Head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation estimated 1.668 Moroccans joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

In Egypt, several cells affiliated with Wilaya Sinai (Islamic State in the Sinai) remain operational and continue to threaten security and stability in the Sinai. Egypt continues to suffer from ongoing attacks against Christians and other religious minorities. The elimination of the territorial holdings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq could force militants to flow into Egypt.

Furthermore, despite the group’s territorial defeat, ISIS-affiliated propaganda and the group’s shift to an asymmetric entity from a territorially-based entity will continue to threaten North African security. ISIS, in addition to smaller, localized groups, are capable of radicalizing young people in a complex regional context, one deeply affected by economic crises. Extremist propaganda represents an illusory—but convincing—opportunity for young people to turn from losers to winners. Breaking the nexus between terrorism and criminality (especially smuggling) is essential to promote regional stability and security.

The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is hardly surprising to many—Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn has been espousing an anti-European and pro-Russian campaign for some time now. While Hungary has not outright rejected all of Europe’s values, he is firmly against immigration and increasingly receptive towards the overtures of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia agrees to supply Hungary with natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline—bypassing Ukraine.

The European Union imports the majority of its natural gas from Russia. For some time, this relationship has relied on the free flow of gas through Ukraine. In recent years, the trading relationship between the E.U. and Russia has been under increasing strain due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and rising prices.

For Eastern European member-states, this has meant a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to energy acquisition. Therefore, it will be critical to monitor a recently signed agreement under which Russia will supply natural gas to Hungary beginning in 2020, “regardless of agreements on gas transit between Moscow and Kiev.”

The gas transit arrangement between Russia and Ukraine will expire at the end of 2019. Given that Ukraine and Russia remain in a de facto state of war, it is unlikely that a new transit agreement will be implemented. What does this mean for Hungarian natural gas imports? According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian gas exports to Hungary will transit via the TurkStream pipeline.

Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is growing.

Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is an increasingly contentious issue in the realm of international relations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline—a project led by Gazprom—will directly connect Germany with Russia, bypassing Ukraine.

Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 has been repeatedly criticized by the United States. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both strongly opposed the pipeline because Nord Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependency on Russian energy while simultaneously harming Ukraine’s economic and national security.

It’s not likely that Russia would move to cut off European gas supplies if the E.U. failed to support specific policies, but the possibility is nevertheless a matter of concern for both European and American policymakers. Furthermore—beyond the energy sector—further amelioration in an already warm Hungary-Russia relationship is a matter of concern for the E.U. as many worry Hungary could serve as a Trojan horse in an increasingly fragmented European Union.

Why does the Hungarian-Russian relationship matter?

The European Union is based on the principle that democratic states are stronger and more peaceful when they act together rather than alone. Unfortunately, for the past few years, neither the E.U. nor Hungary has seen eye-to-eye.

Under Prime Minister Orbàn, Hungary has been accused of breaching democratic norms. Orbàn’s government has severely weakened the plurality of the country’s media while cracking down on civil society as well as educational freedom. Orbàn has touted Hungary as Europe’s first “illiberal democracy,” going so far as to object to E.U. sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, in June 2018, Hungary was the only E.U. member to vote against providing increased aid to Ukraine.

The destabilization of the European Union and other Western institutions is a crucial objective for the Kremlin, and one that has been successful with regards to Hungary. Natural gas deals that thumb the nose at the European Union coupled with Orbàn’s anti-European rhetoric all act in Putin’s favor. Even more concerning is the International Investment Bank (IIB)’s imminent move to Hungary.

The IIB is a Moscow-based development bank that is seen by many European officials as a cover through which Russia can subvert European institutions. Orbàn has already granted the IIB immunity from any regulatory or prosecutorial authority and has accorded IIB officials with diplomatic status in Hungary. For European and American policymakers, the Hungarian-Russian relationship is one that merits increased scrutiny for the foreseeable future.

Hungary’s Relationship with Russia Poses a Risk for Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ukraine will remain aligned with the West and the United States; all major candidates support both E.U. and NATO integration and have pledged to, one way or another, reestablish Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas and Crimea.

Presently leading public polls is the well-known comedian, Vladimir Zelenskiy. He’s made the case that Ukraine can reestablish control over the Donbas and Crimea through negotiations with Russia. On the other hand, his main rivals, current President Petro Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have advocated for a more hawkish approach.

Tymoshenko’s rhetoric has been aggressive, but she has indicated that she favors a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Poroshenko, on the other hand, has ramped up defense spending to five percent of gross domestic product to prepare the country for a possible large-scale war with Russia.

The three leading candidates have much in common. All view Russia as Ukraine’s primary national security threat, they all support the political order that was established after the 2014 Maidan protests, and they all support de-oligarchization in the country, even though they’re all heavily linked with powerful oligarchs—or are oligarchs themselves.

Zelensky announced his intention to run for the presidency on New Year’s Eve on the popular Ukrainian television channel “1+1,” owned by Igor Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian oligarch currently residing in Israel. Kolomoisky was de-facto exiled by Poroshenko, after being accused of defrauding PrivatBank—Ukraine’s largest bank—of billions of dollars. The bank has since been nationalized, with many in Ukraine believing that Kolomoisky is seeking revenge against Poroshenko and is merely using Zelensky as a tool against him.

The incumbent, President Petro Poroshenko is himself an oligarch. He owns a large confection company called Roshen, and his assets are estimated to be approximately $979 million (USD). Although he won the 2014 election, his popularity has since fallen sharply. However, he has more of a chance than his main rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, of making it to the second round due to his having the entirety of the Ukrainian state apparatus behind him. For Poroshenko, this election is of crucial importance. If he loses, he would be hard-pressed to remain in the country due to the many enemies he’s made during his presidency.

Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s campaign recently accused Poroshenko of bribing voters through branches of the now-nationalized PrivatBank. Poroshenko’s campaign, in turn, accused Tymoshenko of entering into political and financial agreements with Igor Kolomoisky. Tymoshenko denied any links with Kolomoisky, but another oligarch, Sergey Taruta, said he would back Yulia Tymoshenko in the election.

Apart from Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, and Zelensky, there are 36 other candidates in the running for the presidency. Their candidacies are mostly symbolic, but their participation will likely preclude the possibility of a victor in the first round of the election. In a case where no candidate receives an absolute majority, the second round of voting will be held on April 21.

Over 34 million Ukrainian citizens will be eligible to cast their vote on March 31. However, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region will prevent several million from participating.

The Role of Oligarchs in Ukraine’s 2019 Presidential Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

Periodic skirmishes and tensions between Pakistani and Afghan security personnel along the disputed border greatly aggravate an already-deteriorating bilateral relationship, with each side accusing the other of insincerity when it comes to counter-terrorism. On April 15, 2018, Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanged fire in Afghanistan’s Khost province at a border post handled by the Pakistani army in the Laka Tigga area of the Lower Khurram Agency. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Pakistani soldiers, with five others being injured.

Kabul continuously blames Islamabad for the ongoing violence and the resiliency of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Afghan officials claim that Pakistan is doing nothing to address the presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Pakistan vehemently denies these claims.

The Durand Line has complicated relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since the founding of Pakistan in 1947. More recently, conditions in Afghanistan have considerably deteriorated. Levels of insecurity, lawlessness, and drug trafficking are all increasing, and Afghan warlords are gaining increasing amounts of influence. The opium trade, along with that of other drugs currently account for nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP, according to some estimates. According to one study, the Afghan border with Pakistan has become a hub for illicit drug exports.

In an effort to address the cross-border flow of militants and drugs, Pakistan initiated construction on a border fence in 2018 along the Durand Line—the roughly 1,622 mile-long border (2,611 kilometers) shared with Afghanistan. Pakistan believes the barrier would improve the security environment in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. A senior officer in the Pakistani army stated that “[the fence] would greatly help to stop cross-border movements of militants.” Afghanistan resolutely opposes the fence’s construction.

Pakistan considers the Durand Line to be the established international border between itself and Afghanistan. The Afghan government rejects Islamabad’s claim and sees the Durand Line as an artificial border that was created by the British and agreed to by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. The demarcation subsequently resulted in the separation of members of the Pashtun ethnic group.

The Afghan government views the Durand Line border as an artificial border between two countries which was signed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. In the final days of British colonial rule—before the founding of Pakistan—Pashtuns residing on the Indian side of the Durand Line, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (known as the “Frontier Gandhi”) were opposed the creation of Pakistan. At the time, the Pashtun identity was based on nationalism rather than religion; thus Pashtuns were opposed to the formation of an Islamic Pakistan.

When it became clear that the British were intent on partitioning India into two sovereign states, the Pashtuns demanded their own territory, Pashtunistan, which would either be an independent state or incorporated into Afghanistan. Instead, the British were intent on establishing a stable Pakistan and it was decided that the Pashtun-dominated North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was to become part of Pakistan.

Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, Islamabad has routinely attempted to refute the Afghan argument that the Durand Line is an “artificial border.” Pakistan regularly dismisses Afghan claims as invalid.

During a recent visit to Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, both countries agreed to take series of deescalatory steps, one of which being minimizing cross-border clashes. including fire exchange in borders. In this meeting, Islamabad accused Kabul of taking action against militant groups who continue to attack Pakistani soldiers across the borders in Afghanistan. The Pakistani statement says that “Pakistan urges Afghanistan to focus on taking effective counterterrorism actions, including plugging in of large gaps existing along the Afghan side of Pakistan-Afghanistan border,” adding that “it is also important that the Afghan government refrain from playing the blame game.”

Pakistan, however, will remain committed to destabilizing Afghanistan. Pakistan continues to utilize terrorist groups in Afghanistan as proxies, ensuring Afghanistan remains preoccupied with internal affairs. Both countries must—in good faith—move to address the issues caused by the colonial-era border. Balochistan and portions of the Pashtun tribal areas currently under Pakistani administration should be restored as Afghanistan’s sovereign territory.

Kabul, for its part, should be mindful of its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is landlocked and relies on Pakistani ports. Marvin G. Weinbaum, a former Pakistan and Afghanistan analyst at the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, estimates that Pakistan’s wide-ranging exports to Afghanistan amount to roughly $1.2 billion per year, while it imports over $700 million worth of Afghan goods.

The United States and the European Union need to review their respective policies for Afghanistan in order to foster long-term regional peace, rather than pouring billions of dollars into a war that can’t be won. The disagreement over the Durand Line will continue for the foreseeable future and will present a significant challenge to the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to view the border dispute as a settled matter, as it defines the matter as a matter of national security. On the other hand, Afghanistan will continue to highlight the unsettled and disputed nature of the border as the root cause of the deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relationship.

Durand Line Border Dispute Remains Point of Contention for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such rhetoric is unusual for the head of state of a country that claims to have brotherly relations with the Russian Federation and is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU)—but not necessarily surprising.

Belarus and the European Union: Embargoes, Diplomacy, and Slow Progress

Belarus and the European Union have been steadily increasing their cooperation for several years. In 2019, Belarus welcomed the foreign ministers of both Hungary and Austria to the country to assist them in opening embassies. These visits, in conjunction with high-level diplomatic visits to Italy and Poland by Belarusian officials, reveals, more than anything, Belarus’ willingness to work with the West—and hedge against Russia.

While it’s likely that economic matters are pushing Belarus to work more closely with the E.U., the growing state of rapprochement is nevertheless a positive development. Increased trade and investment between Belarus and the E.U. will provide more opportunities for social, political, and economic engagement.

Despite the overall improvement in E.U.-Belarus relations, there’s been little to show in terms of concrete partnership agreements. This primarily has to do with Lithuanian concerns over a Belarusian power plant located close to the city of Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital. Lithuania has repeatedly pushed for the power plant’s closure, citing risks to the safety and well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, some European states continue to impose new conditions in the ongoing negotiations for visa-free travel.

The European Union has a policy of promoting and advocating for human rights and democracy in Belarus. It encourages these values by introducing new mechanisms and so-called “democratic” clauses into negotiations with Belarus to induce changes to Belarusian policies that don’t align with European values. Belarus’ continued use of capital punishment is a particularly contentious issue for the E.U.

Belarus and Russia: An Enduring But Turbulent Relationship

Despite the close bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus, the two countries have recently been increasingly at odds with one another. In January of 2019, Russia began to gradually increase its mineral extraction tax and reduce its oil export duty. While this is undoubtedly financially beneficial for Russia, it means that Belarus will lose one of the main benefits of its relationship with Russia: cheap oil and revenue from Russian oil duties. Over the next five years, Belarus is expected to lose eight to twelve billion dollars (U.S.)—even as it remains dependent on Russian oil and gas.

In spite of this disagreement, however, Russia and Belarus continue to engage in negotiations to further the implementation of the 1999 Union State Treaty, which established goals of introducing a single currency, customs regulations, courts, and legislative chambers for Russia and Belarus.

Where Does This Leave Belarus?

It’s unlikely that Belarus would willingly cede its sovereignty. Perhaps most importantly, entering into a union with Russia would mean giving up much of the power he currently enjoys. Moreover, there is no strong political will for a Russia-Belarus union.

When looking at Belarus’ relationship with the European Union alongside its relationship with Russia, it comes as no surprise that Lukashenko himself is walking a tight rope. On one hand, Belarus’s traditional slant has always been towards Russia and Eurasia. However, the E.U. can offer much in the way of trade, energy, and economic diversification—and is a way for Minsk to hedge against deterioration of its relationship with Moscow. For two decades, Belarus has played a game of “Monkey in the Middle.” Amidst increasing tensions between Russia and the West, however, it remains to be seen how much longer it can continue to do so.

Belarus: The State in the Middle was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donbas has been in a state of frozen conflict since May of 2014. As the upcoming Ukrainian presidential elections near, many have started to wonder what the future holds for the Donbas.

Since the conflict originated in 2014, more than 10,000 people have been killed and over one million have been displaced. Unfortunately, Assistant Secretary-General Miroslav Jenca, a United Nations official associated with the ongoing Minsk accords, acknowledged that negotiations“appear to have lost momentum.”

Ukraine’s Options Going Forward

If the UN-backed negotiations have effectively stalled, Ukraine must evaluate its alternatives. There are over 44 candidates who hold varying views as to what the country’s options are. In the running for the presidency is the incumbent President Petro Poroshenko, the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky, and the former Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Boyko. For Zelensky and others, the answer is direct democracy. Zelensky argues the solution is for Ukraine to hold a referendum on the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine’s current President Poroshenko has opted to push for an international peacekeeping solution, calling for a UN-backed mandate. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, has a much more aggressive proposal. Her plan focuses on economic modernization, job creation, and reconstruction efforts for the Donbas region and tougher sanctions on Russia. She has spoken out against amnesty proposals for separatist fighters within the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, both of which are backed by Moscow. Tymoshenko has also criticized the “special status” policy that was adopted for the Donbas region under the Minsk Two protocol.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland have earmarked some $14 million (USD) for Ukraine as part of a UN project to “promote social cohesion and strengthen regional governance in eastern Ukraine.” While the three governments providing the funds likely expect it to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict, how that money is spent, however, very much depends on the candidate in office.

Poroshenko Seeks Greater Euro-Atlantic Integration for Ukraine

It’s no surprise that Poroshenko seeks closer ties with the West — even going so far as to pass a Constitutional amendment that reflects Ukraine’s E.U. and NATO aspirations. Poroshenko likely believes that if Ukraine is more closely aligned with Western institutions, Russian aggression will, at the very least, be tempered. In fact, Poroshenko has stated that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas is due to Ukrainian politicians “talking about the necessity for Ukraine to… stay away from all alliances.”

However, there are a number of practical obstacles to achieving this reality. First is the question of Ukraine’s disputed territory. If Poroshenko believes that NATO membership will induce the alliance to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, he is mistaken. The fact remains that many NATO members would likely not support Ukrainian membership in the alliance precisely due to the disputed nature of the country’s territory.

The Ukrainian Conflict Will Remain Frozen for the Foreseeable Future

There is no incentive for either side to seriously engage in meaningful negotiations. The gap between expectation and reality is widening. If a candidate such as Tymoshenko emerges as Ukraine’s next president, as some election observers suggest, the gap between expectation and reality will only widen further.

Similar to the case of the Republic of Georgia’s disputed South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, neither side has any reason to try and alter the status quo. Going forward, absent a major “black swan” event, the Donbas will continue to play host to a frozen conflict with little chance for a negotiated settlement.

The Future of the War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

A report recently released by the Henry Jackson Society’s Global Britain program offers a more comprehensive view of what this new role for the U.K. should look like. The authors, James Rogers, and Bob Seeley, MP, argue that a Global Britain approach should be centered around three fundamental freedoms: Freedom for Trade, Freedom from Oppression, and Freedom of Thought.

Arguing that these three key freedoms are essential for liberal democratic states to succeed in a more competitive world order, the report confirms several significant recent developments regarding the current world order which have already seen successful policy-driven implementations over the last two years.

The first development is the return to a competitive state-based international order. Though the United States retains its global supremacy as the world’s sole superpower, and alongside NATO’s success in ensuring trans-Atlantic peace for 70 years, various regions in the world have recently become more competitive and unpredictable, which has led to a greater risk of conflict.

This shift from a unipolar world order at the onset of the 21st Century to one of multipolarity in 2019 was outlined in the National Security and Capability Review in 2018, which highlighted both a revisionist Russia across Eurasia and an expansionist China, particularly in the South China Sea and wider Indo-Pacific region.

This development has led to the U.K. increasing its diplomatic capabilities and defense engagement across East Asia and the Pacific, establishing nine new diplomatic missions in Pacific island states whilst increasing cooperation with allies such as Singapore and Japan. The new strategic alliance forged with Japan, in particular, is an example of how increased bilateral defense engagement with strategic partners should be a cornerstone of a Global Britain approach.

As part of the U.K.’s activity in East Asia, it has increased significantly the Royal Naval presence transiting through these crucial waters. Conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations both in 2018 and early 2019, the Royal Navy missions in Chinese-disputed international waters affirms the report written by James Rogers and Bob Seeley, MP citing the centrality of both Freedom for Trade and Freedom from Oppression within a Global Britain vision. Britain’s presence will soon be increased, as the U.K. Defense Secretary announced earlier in February that the Royal Navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, will likely be making its first operational mission to the Indo-Pacific.

The second recent development in the international system which this report addresses are the attempted erosion of the rules-based global order by states employing increasingly sophisticated and criminal methods of subversion. From the state-sponsored terrorist attack in Salisbury, U.K. in 2018, to the unrelenting hybrid warfare being conducted against Ukraine since 2014, to the increased military and diplomatic assistance provided to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Russia has sought to systematically undermine liberal democratic states and institutions. Specifically, the Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to divide NATO and the E.U., for at least the past decade. Thus, Freedom from Oppression and Freedom of Thought are two essential strategies the UK should seek to further pressure the Russian regime into ceasing its malign activities.

China seeks to reshape both international law and existing institutions across the Indo-Pacific region, in an attempt to establish hegemony in a less overtly aggressive, though potentially more unpredictable and dangerous manner compared with Moscow’s approach. Maintaining international shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean is not just a UK security concern, but a global one. China has sought to project its influence across the region through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road program). Additionally, Beijing has continued to militarize port facilities in Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. A heightened Royal Naval presence across the Indo-Pacific, building on its successes in 2018, should form a central pillar in a strategy to manage possible bullish Chinese maritime behavior undermining the rules-based order.

This report seeks to address the growing concern as to what precisely the U.K.’s role should be in the world, especially in the light of the U.K.’s imminent withdrawal from the European Union (E.U.). By strengthening alliances with global partners including the so-called CANZUK group (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as Japan and Singapore, and by promoting the three universal freedoms, the U.K. can contribute to upholding and maintaining the liberal norms and values which have ensured global peace and security.

Global Britain: A New Vision was originally published on Global Security Review.

European leaders announced the establishment of a European Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to facilitate payments for oil exported from Iran to other countries. However, it’s in Europe’s interest to immediately cease all funding and support for the Iranian government.

There are three reasons it’s in Europe’s interest to scuttle the SPV.

First, Europe cannot easily implement the SPV.  Europe not only faces unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States but must also contend with the hardliners in Tehran. With less than a month until the SPV is operational, the Iranian parliament has yet to approve two critical anti-money laundering bills. One is known as CFT (Countering the Financing of Terrorism) and the other relates to the United Nations Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Expediency Discernment Council, an Iranian body that ensures bills align with the principles of Sharia law, has yet to ratify the Palermo Convention.

Second, the Iranian regime will use the SPV as a means to acquire funding used to support terrorism throughout the middle east. Therefore, the special purpose vehicle won’t legitimize oil payments to Iran. The Iranian economy is heavily dependent on the oil industry, which has been entirely taken over by government and military entities such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.  Consequently, there are little resources to go towards privatizing or modernizing the economy. The Quds Force has allowed Iran’s infrastructure to decay while it has spent considerable amounts of money in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Gaza (Hamas). Furthermore, Europe’s SPV has tacitly condoned Iranian missile tests, as the mechanism could have been employed as leverage to induce a freeze Iran’s missile testing program.

Third, the SPV will only be a short-term panacea for Iran’s complex and corrupt economy, should the Iranian government decide to make use of the vehicle. As the U.S. has imposed more sanctions on Iran, the country’s currency has become increasingly volatile. Plummeting currency value has created turmoil both in the market and throughout the population. Banks and investment funds are going bankrupt in ever-greater numbers, and are increasingly unable to provide their customers with access to their savings. As a result, there have been regular protests and strikes throughout Iran.

It is wrong to assume the SPV is anything similar to other international intermediaries.

While it may seem that the mechanism is merely a means of paying for Europe’s oil demand, it is, in fact, a means of providing funding for fundamentalist religious groups within Iran, nearly all of which saw increased funding in Iran’s 2018 fiscal budget. The role of these entities is not to facilitate socio-economic productivity in Iran, rather, it is to create and disseminate propaganda that condemns European values.

Europeans are wrong if they hope that by offering the SPV, Iran will cease its malign activities. In 2018, the Iranian government dispatched operatives to Europe in an effort to assassinate members of Iranian opposition groups. These activities and Iran’s support for terrorist groups should come as no surprise for Europe. It was less than two decades ago in the 1990s that Iran attempted to carry out assassinations in Europe. The regime halted its behavior only after survivors took legal action in European courts.

Europeans have long turned a blind eye to the Iranian government’s pervasive violations of human rights. Today, it would behoove Europe to take a strong stance against the illegal imprisonment of union workers, torture or mysterious death of prisoners, child marriage, women’s rights and religious freedom in Iran.

Recently, Europe has taken some necessary steps towards overcoming its tacit acceptance of Iran’s domestic and international actions. Germany barred Mahan Air flights in early 2019, and French sanctions have sent a message against missile tests by Iran. Poland is hosting a meeting in February concerning the future of the Middle East and has excluded the Iranian government. Europe can shed light on the suffering of the Iranian people by ceasing all support and funding for the regime in Tehran. Europe should not legitimize a hostile, totalitarian, and fundamentalist Iranian regime.

A Precarious Future for Iran-Europe Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Before World War II, Britain was the dominant global power—having control over important trade routes across the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. Control over maritime trade routes coupled with leading the industrial revolution in Europe enabled Britain to emerge as the dominant economic power in the nineteenth century. However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century—following its unification— Germany emerged as a dynamic continental power capable of both efficient production and trade. The end of the nineteenth century, therefore, saw the U.K. gradually lose its European primacy owing to competition from Germany in terms of industrial production, trade, and military strength. However, it was only after World War II that Britain lost its global dominance to the United States.

The situation after World War II saw the U.S. rise as the dominant power. The United States’ strong economy and superior naval strength enabled it to control global maritime trade routes. The geopolitical rationale drove the U.K. to become a strategic ally of the United States. Securing vital maritime trade routes worked in the interest of both countries. For the U.S., with coasts with both the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, securing its waters was a matter of security driven by geography. For the U.K. it was about keeping the vital channels of international trade open. But the disintegration of its empire also meant that the U.K. was left with a weak economy which needed to be rebuilt.

World War II devastated European economies. The founders of the European Union decided that the best way to ensure growth on the continent would be to join European countries economically and politically into institutions that would eliminate the threat of war. Thus, the idea of having a common market in continental Europe began taking shape. As European countries grew more united and rebuilt their economies, the U.K. saw an opportunity. It realized that the common European market could supplement if not replace its decreasing imperial markets. In other words, economic interest motivated the U.K. to join the E.U.

The U.K. also found that it benefitted in being an active member of the European security architecture. NATO and the E.U. became the bedrock of British national security. Participation in NATO allowed the U.K. to maintain some global power and redefine its position in post-war Europe. During the Cold War, the U.K. built its foreign and defense policy around its membership of NATO. The alliance that was formed to protect Western Europe from invasion by the Soviet Union, became central to how the U.K. would structure, equip, and deploy its armed forces for decades to come.

However, the end of the Cold War saw the U.K.’s defense spending reduced following the elimination of the Soviet threat. This resulted in major cuts being imposed on the British Armed Forces, a process that was mirrored in most European NATO member states. While the U.K. did not provide the bulk of troops and resources to European security operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Aegean Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, its contributions in terms of providing strategic guidance, expertise, intelligence, and equipment, proved effective and contributed to the E.U.’s international credibility on security issues.

The U.K. has thus been an integral part of European security architecture in the post-Cold War era. However, with Brexit, this could change. The impact of Brexit will at best introduce uncertainty and at worst permanently weaken Western defense by introducing new divisions in Europe. There are a number of issues on how the post-Brexit U.K. will continue to co-operate with bodies such as Europol and European Counter Terrorism Center. At the moment it is assumed that Britain’s co-operation in European security arrangements will continue after Brexit, but it is not certain—much depends on how negotiations take shape.

Given the importance of such bodies to both the U.K. and the E.U., it is safe to assume that both sides would try to find some common ground. Losing one or the other would have negative consequences on not just the functioning of the organization but also on the overall security in Europe, which recent terrorist attacks have shown is lacking. Therefore, the U.K.—with its large military budget, advanced weaponry, and a highly sophisticated intelligence services—has proved vital in maintaining both EU’s vital counterterrorism and homeland security efforts.

Prioritizing bi-lateral relationships

The real impact of Brexit would be on the bi-lateralization of relationships in the E.U. which could impact the E.U.-NATO multilateral dynamics. Already, the U.S. has prioritized its relationship with certain E.U. countries, for example, Poland and Romania. U.S. policy has been in cognizance with the Intermarium concept, an idea that is floated by strategic thinkers to understand U.S. policy especially with regards to Central and Eastern European countries. The U.K. has a strong military relationship with the United States. Compared to other European powers, the U.K.’s military strength and common foreign policy interests have enabled it to share the military burden with the U.S. when engaging in global and regional operations.

President Trump’s evident dislike of the E.U. and the NATO and his support for reviving the special relationship between the U.K. and the U.S. offers the former a tempting prospect of making its relationship with the U.S. the central pillar of its foreign policy. At the same time, the U.S. policy of working with Central and Eastern European countries provides much common ground for Britain to remain an influential power in Europe by building stronger ties with emerging powers in that region. A case can be made for a stronger partnership between Poland and a post-Brexit Britain.

The two countries have already signed the Treaty on Defense and Security Co-operation under which commitments have been made for cooperating on a number of issues ranging from cybersecurity to strategic communications. Under this defense and security co-operation agreement, Britain can offer Poland a number of benefits. It is important to note that although Poland has been an active member of NATO and is among the few countries that contribute two percent of its GDP to the NATO budget, it does not solely rely on NATO for its security. Poland over the years has focused on cultivating bilateral defense relationships with key countries to match its security considerations.

A post-Brexit Britain could provide Poland support on critical issues concerning its security. Britain has been one of the staunchest critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy in Ukraine. There is no reason to assume that London’s policy will change after Brexit. Britain has its own problems with Russia and it would be in Britain’s interest to throw its diplomatic weight behind Poland’s resistance against Russia. Moreover, Britain can also provide Poland with investment and trade agreements that could decrease Poland’s dependency on Germany for economic growth in the long-term. Solidifying Poland’s political position in Europe would enable Britain to remain relevant in European geopolitics. For Poland, having the support of an economic and diplomatic powerhouse would be crucial as it campaigns against German influence in Europe.

The Implications of Brexit for Security in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

What began as a small collection of infrastructure projects in neighboring countries in 2013, has now expanded to neighboring regions and continents, impacting 65% of the world’s population, and 40% of global GDP. Primarily funded by private investors, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China’s Exim Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s flagship of foreign policy and investment. Encompassing massive economic corridors, transportation routes, and critical infrastructure across 68 countries, BRI is nothing short of the most ambitious development project in history.

The incentive for the initiative stems from a shared desire to improve transcontinental connectivity in commerce and people-to-people ties by offering massive investment, inexpensive credit lines, and excess Chinese capacity in steel and cement — all vital to critical infrastructure projects. In turn, Beijing aims to realize the return on BRI investments through the expansion of its geopolitical and economic spheres of influence.

Initially driving investment in transportation routes between Eastern and Western China, an economic corridor through Pakistan, and deep sea port development in Sri Lanka, BRI projects quickly spread from Central and Southeast Asia to Eastern and Southern Europe. Already the EU’s second-largest trading partner, China offers Europe abundant opportunities to improve transportation in the Eurasian corridor by decreasing transportation costs, transit times, and carbon emissions.

As international trade routes operate now, importing Chinese products can be rather cumbersome. The most cost-efficient route can take up to 40 days on a container ship. To reach European markets from coastal China, a freight ship must sail through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, up the Red Sea, and through the Mediterranean Sea to round Iberia and Normandy, and finally pass through the English Channel to dock at the deep-water ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg.

With new high speed rail across Central Asia, trains could freight materials by land directly from China to the European Union. According to research from the Center for Economic Policy Research, new transportation routes created by BRI infrastructure projects will decrease shipping times and costs by 3.5% and 4% between BRI countries and by 2.8% and 3.2% with the rest of the world.

Although there are numerous ways in which Chinese investment — within and apart from BRI — can benefit Europe, the European Union remains wary of increasing Chinese influence within its member states, and with good reason. In 2017, China’s state-owned enterprise (SOE) COSCO Shipping, one of the world’s largest ocean carriers, bought up a 51% share in the Port of Piraeus — Greece’s largest port. Athens subsequently blocked a joint EU statement on Chinese human rights abuses at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Far from being an isolated incident, Chinese lobbying of the kind seen in the Port of Piraeus has become China’s M.O. in exercising economic sharp power in Europe. While the Belt and Road Initiative is an opportunity to foment economic development and stability across Eurasia, it is also the disguised economic engine of Chinese geopolitical statecraft.

Beijing seeks to insert itself into the European dialogue and policymaking process to undermine European unity to gain preferential access to European markets and limit the ability of the European Union to exercise collective foreign and economic policy that hampers China’s geopolitical ambitions. Where Russia seeks to challenge and disrupt Europe through disinformation and military posturing, China seeks to assert its will into European policymaking to manipulate the geopolitical climate to its advantage.

Countering Sharp Power

In recognition of the threat to collective policymaking, on 20 November, after less than 18 months of negotiations, the European Parliament, Council, and Commission committed to the creation of an investment screening mechanism. The unprecedented speed and unity on this issue marks the gravity with which the European Union perceives the threat of Chinese economic influence in the European theater. Although the mechanism applies broadly to all FDI in the European Union, the motivation to protect the EU’s domestic interests through its creation is evident.

The EU also appears acutely aware of the need the accompany investment screening with its own economic development initiatives. Greater EU investment in Southern and Eastern Europe would strengthen political ties with Northern and Western Europe. It would also provide an economic alternative to Chinese investment in European countries with higher unemployment, emigration, and hostility towards the political elite in Brussels.

The EU recognizes that without a significant economic alternative, Europe’s poorer countries are willing to file in line with China’s geopolitical ambitions so long as they reap the benefits from Chinese investment. China has already invested €600 million in the Port of Piraeus in an attempt to modernize the port, which is poised to bring in thousands of logistics jobs and an increased demand for further infrastructure investments from Greece, inland to Western Europe.

China’s success in pressuring Greece to block a joint statement against Chinese human rights abuses at the UN is undoubtedly alarming to European national security policymakers.  Nevertheless, it’s important to recognize that Greek politicians are beholden to their constituents, who might be willing to overlook criticizing Chinese human rights for the economic benefits that accompany Chinese investment.

Even with enhanced investment screening, the EU’s foreign interests remain vulnerable. On 21 September, following a 2017 “Joint Staff Working Document” on a “Euro-Asian Connectivity Mapping Exercise,” the European External Action Service adopted an “EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia,” hereafter referred to as the Euro-Asian Connectivity Initiative (ECI). Implicitly designed to respond to the geopolitical ambitions of the BRI, the ECI aims to further develop the EU’s own soft power through increased economic and diplomatic presence within its Eastern neighborhood and beyond.

Adapted to “pursue a ‘coherent approach’ to connectivity” which “encompass[es] all modes of transport links (land, sea and air) as well as digital and energy links in the Euro-Asian area,” the ECI will likely become an integral part of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the East, providing an economic and diplomatic framework for future relations. The question remains, will Europe’s ECI come into direct competition with China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

Although Europe and China have differing visions for Eurasia, many of their fundamental goals are shared. Both Europe and China recognize the potential for economic growth at home and abroad by bringing the two ends of Eurasia closer together. Fostering greater connectivity and trade through Central Asia would not only drive down the costs and time required of maritime shipping, but also provide economic stimulus for developing economies in the region and greater access to rich natural resources. As Central Asians’ mobility and wealth increase, greater connectivity  will encourage stronger people-to-people ties through shared education, research, innovation, culture, and tourism. China and Europe also share a mutual interest and commitment to the political stability and security of periphery countries at the nexus of Europe and Asia which can be strengthened through economic growth.

However, Europe’s vision for Eurasian connectivity is to encourage economic development, good governance, and open society through adherence to “principles of sustainability, transparency, market principles, open procurement rules, a level playing field, as well as equal treatment and equal access.” Likewise, Europe will likely require benchmarks for the respect of human rights and democratic governance to its investment proposals through the ECI. In addition to these laudable goals, the EU will, nonetheless, seek to develop its own soft power and influence throughout Central Asia, in part for its own merit and in part to counter the influence of China over the heartland of Eurasia.

In contrast, China is solely dedicated to reaping economic benefits and accruing political leverage over key routes of connectivity, reflected by its lack of insistence on governmental transparency, respect for human rights, or equal access to investment opportunities. Most BRI contracts are ultimately chosen by Beijing. However, Chinese investments often come with a ‘no strings attached’ policy which may appeal to countries reluctant to meet Western provisions for economic and political liberalization.

Baiting the Balkans

Even within non-EU European nations, the temptation of Chinese investment funding is strong. There are fewer bureaucratic delays and stipulations attached to massive infrastructure investment projects when dealing with an autocratic regime. China has the financial resources, enterprise, and political wherewithal to invest billions in new development projects overnight.

In the eyes of EU candidate countries, Chinese investment is a godsend. Among the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria for European Union membership, countries must have a well-developed and stable economy to integrate well into the single market without posing themselves a burden on the European economy. For EU hopefuls like Serbia, Chinese infrastructure investment reads like a golden ticket to economic prosperity and eventual EU membership.

With around €5.3 billion ($6 billion) in Chinese investments in Serbia alone, the Balkans has become China’s backdoor entry to securing greater influence in the European Union.

Yet Beijing’s investment overtures in the Balkans and Eastern Europe are the call of a siren for many would-be EU member states. As attractive as these investments may seem, Serbia doesn’t have to look far to get a sense of the risks that come with Chinese investment. Just 500 km from Belgrade, Montenegro embarked on an ambitious project in 2017 to connect their port of Bar to mainland Serbia, largely funded by China’s Exim Bank.

In theory, completing this project could be hugely beneficial to Montenegro. Yet two feasibility studies in 2006 and 2012 disproved the project’s economically viability due to the lack of traffic in the area. With an already burgeoning debt to GDP ratio, the Chinese loan “has sent Montenegro’s debt soaring and forced the government to raise taxes, partially freeze public sector wages and end a benefit for mothers to get its finances in order.”

China’s “if you fund it, they will come” approach to economic development may not actually yield the short and long term results it promises. What’s even more disappointing for the Balkans is the use of Chinese labor and capital to advance these projects — in Montenegro, 70% of the workers on the port of Bar project are Chinese. China is, in essence, driving Montenegro into debt to finance a project with highly questionable economic returns while using primarily Chinese labor in Serbia’s backyard. Belgrade should take note.

For now, the EU’s dualistic response to China’s increasing sharp power is encouraging. A stronger investment screening mechanism will ensure that European countries agree to infrastructure projects or loans on financially stable terms and will prevent China from buying up industries that could threaten national security. At the same time, EU funding initiatives will provide an economic alternative to Chinese investment and will bolster political ties with European, Central, and South Asian countries.

The Road Ahead

American hegemony over the post-Cold War liberal world order grew out of an alliance of Western countries adhering to free market economics, democratic soft power, and control over the global commons. While China has no ambition to replace the United States and become a global hegemon, but rather aims to displace the West’s influence by leveraging Chinese capital, technocratic policymaking, and foreign debt.

By amplifying its political and economic soft power through BRI investments, China simultaneously creates and controls the means by which its economic power is exercised through BRI countries. The renowned scholar of Asian geopolitics Parag Khanna tells us that the driving force of the 21st century will be the ever-closer economic and people-to-people ties between nations around the world. He is right to claim so. Connectivity — and the means to control it — is the new currency of geopolitics.

The European Union is gradually coming around to this way of thinking, but its implementation in foreign policy remains slow. The ECI marks a first step towards pursuing a greater presence in Eurasian connectivity projects and policymaking. As Europe moves closer to a state of strategic autonomy, it must develop a more comprehensive, efficient, and effective foreign policy regime to keep pace with China’s expanding influence. Great strides have been taken already by establishing a screening mechanism for FDI, establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and elaborating upon the European Union’s Neighborhood Policies. Nevertheless, Brussels needs to develop a more cohesive strategy to address Chinese sharp power influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

The European Union has yet to reconcile its own principles with its nascent role as a regional hegemonic power. Maintaining and promoting liberal international values of democracy, free market equality, and human rights are difficult to pair with the realpolitik of geopolitics in the era of connectivity. It remains to be seen if the EU has the political wherewithal to compete with China on 21st century terms. For now, the future of Eurasia hangs in the balance.

This article was originally published on The International Scholar.

Geopolitics in the Era of Connectivity: Beijing and Brussels Compete for Central Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The CAR’s population is primarily split between into two regions: most of the country’s minority Muslim population inhabits the Sahel, while the majority Christian community is located mainly in the savanna. The present conflict between both groups erupted in 2012 and continues today. The conflict was ignited when Muslim rebels of the Seleka group seized power from the Christians. In response, Christians formed the anti-Balaka faction. Since 2012, government forces have become involved, leading to a number of severe humanitarian crises that threaten to destabilize the country further.

Nearing the Tipping Point

In 2013, then-Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon stated that the Central African Republic had experienced a “total breakdown of law and order” that threatened both its security and stability and that of its neighbors. While government forces remain in control of the capital of Bangui, armed groups have taken over 70 percent of the country, subjecting civilians to regular attacks. The nature of the conflict has heightened ethnic tensions, as hundreds of localized groups beyond the Seleka and anti-Balaka factions taking control of territory throughout the CAR.

Fighting between the two rival groups and government forces has made life difficult for civilians, who are increasingly fearful of leaving their homes or allowing their children to attend school. The conflict in the CAR is at a tipping point and threatens to push the country into a state of famine. Peacekeeping and mediation efforts have stagnated, making it essential to promote an alternative approach to providing conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance in the CAR. Intervening organizations must engage at the community level to stem the flow of fighters entering the conflict.

Conflict at the Community Level

The violence in the Central African Republic has affected communities large and small. Towns and villages have been destroyed as young men are increasingly attracted by the possibility of income from joining a militia. Political disruption, violence, and a weak economy have perpetuated a lack of adequate medical services, hindered internal migration, and prevented communities from modernizing necessary infrastructure. Disease is nothing new to the CAR, but the conflict has exacerbated the inaccessibility of healthcare leading to increased mortality rates.

As violence spreads, higher numbers of CAR citizens have been forced to flee to refugee camps. As of 2018, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that almost 550,000 individuals had been internally displaced. The conditions in these refugee camps are less than adequate. In regular communities, access to medical facilities is limited, and transit to and from first aid areas is minimal. However, individuals in refugee camps are faced with “little or no humanitarian assistance,” and are often left to fend for themselves.

The Evolution of Humanitarian Issues in CAR

As of 2018, half of the CAR’s population requires humanitarian aid, more than two million people. The CAR is mostly comprised of rural communities that lack access to medical facilities or basic first aid, the capital of Bangui, for example, has just one major hospital. According to the CIA, many suffer from treatable diseases, such as malaria or malnutrition, due to a weak healthcare system exacerbated by violent conflict. With a poor transit system destroyed by a conflict that makes it difficult for rural residents to travel for medical care, mortality rates remain high. Even if they can make it to a medical facility, those who suffer life-altering injuries resulting from the conflict are often unable to afford medical services and pharmaceuticals.

The ongoing conflict has weakened the country’s economy, leaving 75 percent of the population impoverished. Attacks at a local level have increased, which have primarily come in the form of violent attacks on refugee sites and on educational and healthcare facilities. Growing numbers of internally displaced peoples has made it challenging to provide clean water at refugee camps, and obstacles to trade and farming have inflated the prices of food and other essentials.

Humanitarian aid groups face difficulties in their attempts to assist the affected population. Threatened with violence and robberies, the movement of humanitarian groups within the CAR has been limited. As of September 2018, seven of these groups have withdrawn their services from the nation.

A Solution Starts at the Local Level

To decrease the attractiveness of joining armed groups, there is a need for solutions at the community level to improve economic and living conditions. As shown by the largely ineffective peacekeeping missions in the region, external mediation with the government and militias has been difficult.

A focused and localized approach within the CAR’s communities could have a more lasting effect, providing other outlets for civilians while stemming the flow of new militia recruits. As such, there are five recommendations to engender an improved situation in the country:

1. Expand local peace agreements and non-aggression pacts

Recently, a number of peace agreements and non-aggression pacts at a local level have had a stronger effect on reducing violent conflict within rural communities. These peace deals bring prominent community actors and organizations together, including women’s organizations, religious leaders, and local government authorities, to mediate peace offers between rival groups.

2. Address the conflict’s religious and ethnic characteristics at the source

To prevent the conflict from strengthening at the national level, it is critical to address the issues at the core of the conflict at the local level. That means promoting tolerance in communities and helping local religious leaders and other respected leaders to influence their communities to pursue reconciliation. Since the conflict in CAR is of a religious nature, it is imperative to intervene with education for youth so as not to perpetuate divisions between ethnic and religious groups.

3. Provide alternative employment to young men

Young men in the CAR are the most likely to impede future peace agreements between rival groups. Thus, it necessary to provide alternative outlets for these individuals to prevent them from perpetuating the conflict at the national level. To keep them from joining armed groups, local groups and international mediators will need to create and provide new forms of employment in numerous communities. This is already happening in a number of CAR’s communities, but it is essential to expand these practices across the nation.

Currently, many work projects “involve restoring public goods, including schools, clinics, bridges, roads, as well as churches as mosques,” according to a piece published by Foreign Policy. The benefit of this is not only to make potential militia fighters unavailable while rebuilding the country’s infrastructure but to provide tangible skills and training in community roles that can develop into careers and boost both local and national economies. With the potential for a job, young men are provided with other income options that make joining militias less attractive.

4. Invest in technology and medical facilities in rural areas

Technology will bridge the equality gap between the people of cities and rural communities and will distribute vital information to rural dwellers who have little access to resources on politics and economics.

Rural communities desperately need access to medical facilities, especially with the spread of disease in areas hospitable to insects like tsetse flies and mosquitoes. This requires the creation of new medical facilities and improved transportation and communications infrastructure.

5. Crackdown on the sale of weapons

National and local governments must impose stricter regulations on the transfer of military-grade weaponry throughout the CAR. These weapons often end up in the hands of local rebels, who incite violence in communities, further exacerbating the conflict. To limit these sales, it is essential to shut down the black markets that distribute weapons to rebels.

Looking to the Future

The situation in CAR will take time to resolve. Promoting tolerance at the local level while helping respected leaders to arrange reconciliation, promoting understanding, and helping respected leaders facilitate dialogue between rival groups. While international assistance is necessary, successful mediation will require a broader effort from community actors and CAR citizens to resolve this conflict at the grassroots level.

Local Approach Needed in Central African Republic as Humanitarian Crisis Looms was originally published on Global Security Review.

These trends are particularly evident in Europe, where elections, treaties, and other events will reshape the continent. Before the end of 2018, the Italian government and the European Union were locked in a dispute over Italy’s budgetary plans. The European Commission sharply criticized the spending plans due to concerns that Italy’s approximately $3 trillion in debt combined with higher public spending could lead to a banking crisis that could spread to other countries in the Eurozone. While Rome did pass a revised budget to appease E.U. officials in Brussels, the ordeal has sewed divisions within Italy’s populist coalition government which are likely to persist throughout 2019. Tensions between Rome and Brussels will also continue, and possibly escalate.

The United Kingdom is scheduled to formally withdraw from the European Union on March 29, 2019. However, no agreement has been approved by the U.K. parliament that would avert a potentially catastrophic “no-deal” or “hard” Brexit. British Prime Minister Theresa May has come under considerable criticism from within her party over the tentative agreement her government negotiated with the E.U., but no alternative plans have been put forth. Regardless of the outcome, the U.K. will continue to strengthen bilateral relations with E.U. member states such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland.

In May, European Parliamentary elections will take place, while E.U. member states will appoint a new President of the European Commission in October. Despite a rise in nationalist and euro-skeptic parties, pro-European factions are expected to maintain overall control. A divided political landscape will make it difficult for the E.U. to implement any significant reforms. Furthermore, E.U. member states are divided when it comes to fiscal policy. Southern states like Italy, Portugal, and Spain are pushing for higher spending and greater risk-sharing, whereas northern states led by Germany are calling for greater fiscal responsibility in Frankfurt.

Ongoing Political Divisions in the E.U. and its Member States

E.U. member states after the U.K. withdrawal) to focus inwards. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced that her current term will be her last and resigned as leader of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party. The CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbaur as party leader in the latter part of 2018. However, the party is divided over a range of policy positions. Furthermore, the CDU’s coalition partner is facing an identity crisis of its own, which has already weakened the coalition government. Further disagreements and intra-coalition infighting could lead to early elections in Germany.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s institutional and economic reforms have fueled substantial, and in some cases, violent opposition. Large-scale protests have erupted throughout France. 2019 will see continued opposition to Macron’s reforms, opposition stoked by groups on both the far-right and the far-left ends of the political spectrum. Some of Macron’s economic reforms will succeed, but French citizens will be increasingly vocal in their rejection of his attempts to revitalize the French economy.

Domestic political concerns will require greater attention from both Paris and Berlin, decreasing both powers from critical external affairs. Political divisions will hamper initiatives to achieve greater strategic autonomy through the implementation of increased European military integration and the promotion of the Euro over the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve currency. Therefore, it is unlikely these major initiatives will see substantial progress in 2019.

Trade and China

Trade will be a significant area of focus. If the U.S. imposes higher tariffs on European-manufactured vehicles, for instance, approximately 10% of total U.S.-E.U. trade will be affected. In such a scenario, the E.U. would be forced to respond in kind, leading to a greater rift in transatlantic relations. Automobile tariffs would disproportionately affect the German auto industry, which manufactures one in every three cars produced in Europe. However, trade disputes will not lead to the collapse of the transatlantic alliance, as both the U.S. and E.U. have concerns over unfair Chinese trade practices.

Aside from trade, Europe has other concerns with China. Led by the governments in Berlin and Paris, policymakers across Europe are increasingly wary over Beijing’s economic activity on the continent. As a result, Europe has begun to exclude China from investing in critical infrastructures such as ports and telecommunications networks. China filed suit against the E.U. in the WTO, arguing that Beijing should be treated as a market economy. The case will come to a resolution in 2019, and the outcome will have a significant impact on the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S., the E.U., and China.

The complicated bureaucratic system of rules and regulations, however, put poorer or smaller member states at an economic disadvantage. As such, these states are more welcoming to Chinese investment and lending. Those states that are receptive to Chinese economic activity in Europe will likely continue to lobby against Berlin And Paris. The European bloc’s position towards China will be ambiguous, leading to more vocal action by those states that are concerned about China’s economic activities.

Escalating Tensions Between Russia and the U.S.

The relationship between Russia and the United States will continue to deteriorate. The U.S. is set to formally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans intermediate-range missiles. Washington has cited Moscow’s noncompliance with the treaty as the justification for its withdrawal. The collapse of the INF treaty will heighten tensions in Eastern Europe, leading to a military buildup. This will be particularly visible in Poland and Romania, both of which will continue to lobby the U.S. for increased military commitments. Moscow will continue to build up its military forces in Kaliningrad, and the Crimea, both of which will likely play host to Russian intermediate-range missiles should the U.S. decide to deploy its own in Europe.

U.S. discussions with Poland regarding a possible permanent deployment of U.S. troops will continue throughout 2019. The Kremlin, citing what it perceives as “NATO-encirclement” will maintain, or even increase its efforts to interfere in the domestic politics of European states through malign activity in cyberspace, possible covert actions, and support for Euro-skeptic and nationalist factions across the E.U. The European parliamentary elections in May will provide Moscow with an opportunity to bolster the ranks of nationalist and Euro-skeptic groups, further sewing divisions within the E.U.

It is also possible that Moscow will open a military base in Belarus, as had previously been hinted by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. However, Lukashenko has made increasing overtures to the E.U. and the U.S., which could lead to increased hostility from Moscow. Russia’s efforts to undermine the integrity of NATO and the E.U. will be particularly visible in the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

High Stakes for Ukraine as the Kremlin Deals With Domestic Challenges of its Own

Ukraine will face considerable challenges throughout 2019. Both the TurkStream and NordStream 2 natural gas pipelines are set to become active. The pipelines will circumvent Ukraine, providing Moscow with enormous economic leverage over Kiev. Ukraine will be deprived of substantial transit fees that it will now lose as the two pipelines exclude Ukraine from Russia’s natural gas supply lines.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated in the aftermath of Russia’s seizure of three Ukrainian Navy vessels in the Sea of Azov, and tensions are expected to continue throughout 2019. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine will continue, and Ukraine is set to hold presidential elections in March. Depending on the outcome, negotiations could reopen between Moscow and Kiev, however, it is unlikely the two parties will come to a resolution. It is in Russia’s interest to maintain a state of low-grade or frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which effectively prevents the former Soviet republic from joining NATO.

Russia, however, will face its own domestic challenges in 2019. The Kremlin has announced controversial economic reforms, including increasing the retirement age, raising the value-added tax (VAT), and imposing new taxes on certain consumer products and the tourism sector. The reforms are designed to bolster the government’s revenue but have generated considerable backlash from Russians across the country. It is the working class that will be hardest hit by the measures, which are due to come into effect this month. As such, there is likely to be a degree of social unrest. Meaningful changes are unlikely, however, as there is presently no viable opposition party capable of threatening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.

Overall, 2019 will be a year of volatility in Europe. Diplomatic, trade, and economic disagreements will persist between Europe and the United States, and within Europe itself. Tensions between Russia and NATO heighten anxiety for Eastern European states, which will lead to a buildup of military capabilities on both sides.

Political Uncertainty Will Plague Europe Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the U.K. attempts to redefine its role on the international stage once it withdraws from the European Union, London will move to embrace old allies and new partners in an attempt to forge stronger ties to emerging markets in the East.

The relationship between Japan and the United Kingdom has the potential to be of enormous mutual benefit to both parties. The two are both fiercely proud island nations with considerable geopolitical clout.  In a recently published audit of global geopolitical capability by the Henry Jackson Society, the U.K. was ranked second only to the United States, with Japan being ranked sixth. The study defined the U.K. as a global power, and Japan, despite being the third-largest economy worldwide, is described as a “hemispheric power,” meaning that it has the geopolitical capability to wield influence within the northern hemisphere.

The U.K.-Japan Relationship is Built on Security and Trade

Relations between the Japanese and British began over 400 years ago. The Anglo-Japanese partnership was solidified in 1854 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. The treaty defined the relationship between the two countries as one centered around mutually beneficial commerce and security. After relations improved following the end of World War II, trade and security once again became the foundation blocks upon which the Anglo-Japanese relationship was built.

Abe’s visit was, by no means, coincidental in timing. Abe intended to provide reassurances to both British businesses and undecided politicians over British Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit deal. Specifically, Abe made the case that May’s deal is the best option for Japanese businesses who rely on the United Kingdom’s access to the European single market. Japanese investment in the U.K. reached £46.5 billion in 2016, with over 1,000 Japanese businesses employing over 150,000 people.

The Japanese automobile manufacturers Nissan, Honda, and Toyota produce nearly half of the 1.67 million cars assembled every year in the U.K., of which the vast majority are exported. As the British auto industry employs just-in-time manufacturing processes, any future E.U. tariffs and border delays will have a negative impact on the industry.

Japan has long-relied on the U.K. as its gateway to Europe. While access to the single market may be reduced once Britain leaves the Union, there are still advantages for businesses operating in the U.K. A growing labor market and a highly skilled manufacturing base, technological prowess in research and development (ranked second in the world after the U.S.), stable trade relations, and the status of the English language as a lingua franca for international business and diplomacy are all significant factors in attracting and maintaining Japanese interest and investment.

Prime Minister Abe’s other key message for the U.K. is one intended to convey Japan’s desire for increased defense and security cooperation. Abe stated that the two nations are “partners as we strive to uphold rules-based international order and to promote global and regional security.” Abe’s statement follows significant developments in bilateral defense cooperation over the past 18 months.

British Prime Minister Theresa May sought to expand defense cooperation on her visit to Japan in August 2017. May highlighted that the two nations common global interests are underpinned by a strong defense relationship centered on a commitment to the “rules-based international system, free and open international trade and the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

This meeting between the two heads of government resulted in the Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, an agreement which seeks to further bilateral engagement on security issues including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and cybersecurity. Securing international sea lanes throughout the Indo-Pacific region from foreign aggression is another key objective, as is increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations. The declaration established the conditions for Japan, which has been reluctant to develop offensive military capabilities after the Second World War, to increase its regional military engagement.

A “Global Britain” Approach to Foreign Policy

Furthermore, the agreement set the stage for unprecedented levels of Anglo-Japanese defense cooperation throughout 2018. In a demonstration of a “Global Britain” approach to foreign policy, the Royal Navy deployed three ships to Japan: the HMS Albion, Sutherland, and Argyll.

The deployed ships supported a variety of missions, including enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and participating in joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The deployment significantly improved interoperability between the Royal Navy and the U.K.’s closest ally in Asia. Additionally, British Army personnel from the Honorable Artillery Company participated in exercises on Japanese soil alongside their Japanese counterparts for the first time, the only foreign military forces to do so alongside the U.S.

At a strategic level, these actions demonstrated the U.K.’s commitment to regional stability, international law, and the United Nations Law of the Sea; crucial components to the maintenance of a rules-based global system and essential to countering Chinese subversion and expansion across the region. Growing bilateral defense cooperation between the U.K. and Japan demonstrates that the relationship is more than one based solely on national interests, instead, it is one of a higher strategic significance.

As the U.K. prepares to leave the European Union, it is evident that trade is foremost amongst Japanese concerns. Considering the level of Japanese investment into British industry over the last forty years, this is understandable. However, once the U.K. has formally left the Union, engagement with allies like Japan should be the highest priority.

A Global Britain approach to foreign policy seeks to maximize the United Kingdom’s geopolitical capabilities as a global power. To do this, the U.K. must be seen as upholding the core values and standards of the rules-based global order. The U.K. can sustain its geopolitical capabilities while strengthening British influence around the world by reinforcing strategic partnerships with powerful allies like Japan while seeking out new opportunities for cooperation and engagement. Failure to do so would be detrimental to both British economic interests and overall global security.

U.K. and Japan Heighten Defense Cooperation Ahead of Brexit was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sanctions were first imposed in 2014 when the United States and European Union imposed visa restrictions and asset freezes on Russian officials in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in Ukraine.

Despite these sanctions, however, there appears to have been no change in Russian behavior. Given that the point of these restrictions was to change Russia’s rogue state mindset vis-à-vis Ukraine and interference in other states, it begs the question of how effective these measures are.

Russia has failed to change its behavior as the result of sanctions.

Russian activity in Syria has increased while Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns in the U.S. and European countries show no signs of decline. In 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England. Despite the evidence and testimony from chemical weapons experts, Russia continues to deny its involvement in the affair.

Lastly, if there is an event that is clear evidence that sanctions aren’t affecting changes in Russian foreign policy, it is the recent naval confrontation in the Kerch Strait. On November 25, 2018, a Russian Coast Guard vessel rammed a Ukrainian Navy tugboat — resulting in a series of dangerous actions as both Ukraine and Russia refused to back down, behavior that could have rapidly escalated the situation.

If sanctions had been effective, one might expect that such an action (i.e., the ramming of a Ukrainian Navy vessel) would have been deterred. By that logic, it’s reasonable to assume that the U.S. and E.U. would impose even more sanctions if Russia continued its pattern of behavior.

However, sanctions aren’t working.

Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia are targeted at the Russian elite, as a significant portion of Putin’s support base is comprised of then. It is believed that if Putin’s support base — mainly consisting of oligarchs whose fortunes are dependent upon the Kremlin — lost their ability to access funds and travel to Europe and North America — they would then demand Putin take steps to reverse his foreign policy.

However, that strategy doesn’t seem to be working in the way that Western states assumed it would. In fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia became the second-largest arms producer this year. Russia’s production rate is up 8.5 percent from 2017, which on an annual basis amounts to approximately $37.7 billion in weapons. India and China, both of which have purchased units of the S-400 air defense systems in the last year, are large buyers of Russian-produced arms.

The logic of Western sanctions fails to account for Russia’s political system.

Western sanctions don’t work because they fundamentally misunderstand the structure of Russia’s political system. In Russia, Putin gives the elites access to funding in exchange for their support and punishes those who step out of line, such as former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Such examples convince Russian elites and oligarchs alike that stepping out of line is not worth it. No matter the annoyances that come from Western sanctions, those are still not comparable to the negative reaction that would arise if they spoke out against Putin.

Companies owned or controlled by dissenting oligarchs could lose state support or funding, with the oligarchs themselves having political corruption and tax-evasion charges brought against them. Furthermore, the non-elite segments of the Russian population perceive sanctions as an aggressive tactic employed by the West to weaken Russia. In essence, Russia’s current political system rewards those who remain in line with the Kremlin — the consequences for speaking out are too high. At their current levels, sanctions will remain largely symbolic and will not lead to a reform of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Why Russian Sanctions are Ineffective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past year and a half, European foreign policymakers and thought leaders have adopted a new lexicon. Terms like strategic autonomy and defense union have become commonplace in the face of wavering American commitments to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Europe has come to realize that the United States is no longer the stalwart ally of the Cold War era. The shift in the discussion hints at a move towards greater European collective action on the world stage. With the resurgence of China, the return of Russia, the retreat of the United States, and the rise of the rest, Europe needs to define its own grand strategy.

With the resurgence of China, the return of Russia, the retreat of the United States, and the rise of the rest, Europe needs to define its own grand strategy.

The concept of American grand strategy is so well-established that it has all but become its own niche field within the realm of international relations studies. Over the last 70 years, the United States has pursued a grand strategy of "liberal hegemony," establishing international institutions for the advancement of democracy, free market economics, and human rights. Despite the change in expression and tone of American foreign policy from administration to administration, liberal hegemony has remained the blueprint.

The European Union, in contrast, has never had an overarching strategy to interact with and define the global landscape, though it has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which in principle guides collective European policy. In reality, European CFSP follows the foreign policy initiatives of a few member states and has demonstrated a preference to follow Washington's lead on major initiatives. For the past several decades, this system has worked extremely well for Europe; shared principles and foreign policy goals have allowed Europe to support most U.S. positions on foreign affairs and focus its energies on European economic development, integration, and domestic policy.

Yet, ever since the Iraq War, European and American foreign policy priorities, goals, and even principles have begun to diverge. The arrival of the Trump administration has further fractured the relationship and made clear to European leaders that the United States is no longer a reliable security guarantor or partner on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, defense, and free trade issues. In an increasingly multipolar world with competing major powers vying to alter the terms of the liberal international order, Europe can no longer afford to solely rely on the United States.

Unpacking Strategic Autonomy

What would European strategic autonomy look like? It would require developing greater self-reliance, capacity, and capability (particularly in terms of defense and collective security) to act alone to achieve European interests. At the same time, the EU would have to remain willing and able to cooperate with international partners on areas of common interest. The final push towards this ideological shift has come from two years of butting heads with the Trump administration over everything from trade to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA—the Iran nuclear deal) to NATO spending. As the transatlantic relationship changes, so must European strategy for dealing with Washington.

The concept of strategic autonomy provides an ideological framework for working on an independent basis to resolve issues of European concern in terms of collective security as well as foreign policy. Under such a framework, the EU would selectively seek partners to address climate change, forced migration, and the advancement of human rights and democracy, and would operate alone when necessary. Properly applied and refined, strategic autonomy could become a powerful and effective grand strategy by which Europe engages the international community. But for a European grand strategy to evolve and be effective, Europe must stand united.

Yet Europe remains relatively divided and reactive. All too often, substantive collective European foreign policy has required American initiative, remained reactive in the face of conflict, or stripped of substance due to internal divisions. This last scenario has become all the more threatening to a collective grand strategy given the influence of targeted Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe. Chinese FDI lobbying in Greece and Hungary has already derailed the EU critique of Beijing's human rights record and its activity in the South China Sea.

Despite the impact of Chinese FDI, the divergent priorities of EU member states remain the greatest obstacle to creating consensus in European foreign policy and strategy. The rise of Russian cyber warfare is of primary concern to the Baltic states but of less concern to Italy, France, Spain, Malta, Greece, and Hungary, who are primarily preoccupied with issues surrounding terrorism and migration. French and German foreign policy priorities are more comprehensive, but still focus largely on defense, international trade, and relations with the United States. Even among countries with common foreign policy priorities, perspectives often diverge on how to address them.

Strategic Autonomy as Grand Strategy

Yet there is cause to be optimistic at the prospect of collective grand strategy. In his July 2018 visit to the United States, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker reiterated the European commitment to multilateralism and free trade when possible, and resolved to take independent action and apply reciprocal sanctions when necessary. EU and national leaders continue to maintain strong support for the JCPOA and meet with Iranian leaders to find ways to encourage Iranian economic development. Most recently, in September 2018 the European Commission announced a proposal of a regulation to establish a framework for a collective screening mechanism of foreign direct investments into the European Union by the end of 2018.

Europeans are also taking steps to create a more cohesive collective security apparatus. On December 11 2017, 26 EU member states formally created the Permanent Security Cooperation (PESCO) set forth in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. In his now famous Sorbonne Speech in November 2017, Macron called for the creation of a European Intervention Initiative to enable Europe to act collectively and independently on behalf of its own defense. In May 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly stated that Europe could no longer rely on the United States and urged Europe to "take destiny into its own hands." Indeed, the United States now represents a serious threat to the current system of international affairs and the principle of open society.

In an increasingly multipolar world with competing major powers vying to alter the terms of the liberal international order, Europe can no longer afford to solely rely on the United States.

In order to determine its own future and protect the rules-based liberal international order which has enabled it to prosper, Europe must learn to work as one to create a robust grand strategy. Brussels and European states that are already pioneering European foreign policy initiatives should first aim to develop consensus on principles of action, eliminate redundancies in EU defense policy and industry, and establish more regular dialogue between EU leaders and foreign ministers to communicate concerns, coordinate priorities, and develop a coherent, single voice through the High Representative for CFSP supported by a chorus of member states.

Strategic autonomy must become the base upon which European grand strategy is formed. Operating as one, Europe can then seek allies to support a more inclusive rules-based world order, protect international institutions from aggressive and subversive international actors, and promote the principles of democracy and human rights on the world stage.

Under a cohesive grand strategy of strategic autonomy, EU member states should coordinate their strategic interests collectively and lead individually where they are most competent. Spain and Portugal, for example, maintain strong diplomatic and people-to-people relationships with the majority of Latin American countries, and could serve as the EU's voice with the continent. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have developed extremely capable cybersecurity and intelligence capacities and could pioneer European operations in cyberspace and intelligence gathering. France retains strong diplomatic ties with nations in North Africa and the Middle East, and could leverage those relations on behalf of collective European policy. France, Denmark, Poland, and Finland have well-developed militaries and could spearhead collective European defense operations and deployment to conflict zones.

Indeed, the framework for collective defense operations has already been laid through the foundation of PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) agreed to in July 2018 by France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. However, there is still much work to be done before Europe is capable of seamless joint operations; much of the defense industry remains fragmented due to protectionist national policies aimed at deterring the short-term losses that would result from developing a collective defense industry. To create a truly strategically autonomous union, equipment must be standardized and regiments made interoperable to work as a unified force. The European Army may never march by name, but European joint task forces will.

To create a truly strategically autonomous union, equipment must be standardized and regiments made interoperable to work as a unified force. The European Army may never march by name, but European joint task forces will.

Already, most EU countries participate in collaborative, NATO joint operations, but they are often highly reliant upon American leadership and forces. This was on open display in Trident Juncture held in October and November 2018 – the latest and largest NATO exercise since the Cold War. In a joint operation simulation of an Article 5 scenario calling NATO allies to defend an attack on Norway with 50,000 troops from 31 nations, the United States fielded 20,000 troops and an equally sizable proportion of its vessels, aircraft, and machinery. Without the United States' participation, NATO's capacity to defend Norway—or any other European state, for that matter—would be seriously compromised.

Rather than a replacement, PESCO or another EU-level organization should serve as a bulwark to NATO while ensuring an autonomous defense and operations capacity for the European Union.

In a strategically autonomous Europe, the EU would be able to field its own collective defense force, equal in size, strength, and sophistication of its American counterpart. Rather than a replacement, PESCO or another EU-level organization should serve as a bulwark to NATO while ensuring an autonomous defense and operations capacity for the European Union.

More important than its defense capacity, if European grand strategy is to succeed in revitalizing the liberal international order, Europe must continue to play by the rules. The United States has failed to consistently adhere to the principles of the international world order that it created, notably pioneering the creation of the International Court of Justice and then refusing to join it. By neglecting the rules it established and failing to create a more inclusive system, Washington has lost credibility and encouraged rising powers to challenge the established order. Europe cannot make the same mistake.

Regardless of the form that European grand strategy takes and the world order it promotes, the EU can no longer afford to remain passive. For Europe to preserve its place in the world, it must learn to lead as one.

This article was originally published by the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs and The International Scholar.

Refining Strategic Autonomy: A Call for European Grand Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

After a contentious election and subsequent runoff, Salome Zurabishvili claimed victory as the next President of Georgia. The 2018 Georgian Presidential Elections mark the final stage in a process introduced by former President Mikhail Saakashvili that aims to shift Georgia’s system of governance from a presidential to a parliamentary-based state. Georgia’s new president, Zurabishvili, will be the last elected via a direct popular vote. From this point on, executive power will rest almost exclusively with the Prime Minister.

Why is Georgia’s introducing constitutional reforms?

Changing the system of governance is meant to stop some of the more flagrant abuses of power that were formerly exercised by the ruling elite. The constitutional reforms effectively transfer executive power from the president to parliament. In Georgia, however, this will result in the ruling Georgian Dream party having substantial political power. Georgian Dream currently holds 115 out of the 150 seats and the next parliamentary elections are set to be held in 2020.

Additionally, the constitutional reforms will change how the president and members of parliament elected. The president, until now, were elected via popular vote. Going forward, Georgian presidents will will now be elected from a college of political officials, somewhat similar to the Electoral College in the United States.

Members of parliament will no longer be allowed to form electoral blocs, making it difficult (if not impossible) for smaller parties to meet the five percent threshold required for a party to be seated in parliament. Even more controversial is a new rule that will give unallocated seats to the majority party if the five percent threshold isn’t met by the party that won those seats.

Despite the loss of the presidency’s political authority, the elections garnered significant attention worldwide.

While the presidency will lose much of its power, the opposition party contends that the election was ‘stolen.’ Even with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker supporting the results of the election, Grigol Vashadze, the opposition candidate, refused to accept the results.

Around 25,000 gathered in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, to protest Zurabishvili’s election to the presidency and demanding snap parliamentary elections. More than 60 percent of Georgians claimed that they either did not understand the constitutional reforms or they did not agree with them. Former President Saakashvili, who now lives in the Netherlands, claimed the vote was rigged. There were allegations of fraud while others complained that by purchasing the debts of 600,000 people, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and funder of the Georgian Dream, was essentially buying votes for his candidate of choice.

International observers characterized the election as “free but unfair.” The main cause of concern? The 600,000 people whose debt was purchased by Ivanishvili. Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze personally announced the policy, which applied to nearly one-third of the entire adult population of Georgia. In essence, Ivanishvili offered to buy back the debt of much of the Georgian voting population. However, even while domestic politicians claim that the vote was rigged, no international observers have stated that the election itself was illegitimate.

Going forward, it’s likely international observers will call for peaceful protests but will urge acceptance of the result. The opposition will continue to fight against what it perceives was an unfair and illegitimate election. While there has been negligible signs of interference, Western governments should closely monitor for any malicious or hostile interference. Such a possibility isn’t unlikely, given Russia’s history of exploiting internal divisions in the post-Soviet space.

Georgian Constitutional Reforms Alter Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

The actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin should be easy to comprehend. According to prevailing wisdom, he is desperately attempting to solidify a sphere of influence along Russia’s borders and redeem a state with an aging population and stagnating economy from the humiliations it endured during the 1990s. To many in the West, however, Russia’s actions in the Sea of Azov on November 25th came as a complete surprise.

On Sunday, November 25, two Ukrainian gun-boats, the Nikopol and the Berdyansk, and a tugboat, the Yani Kapu, attempted to transit the Kerch Strait by passing beneath the newly constructed Kerch Strait bridge. However, Russian forces had placed a cargo ship beneath the bridge, blocking passage for any vessel attempting to transit between the Black and Azov Seas. The Kerch Strait is the only access point to the Sea of Azov—waters that are considered to be territory shared between Russia and Ukraine.

Soon after, four Russian FSB Border Guard patrol boats carrying “Spetznatz — the Russian equivalent of U.S. Navy SEALS,” seized the Ukrainian gun-boats and tug for a so-called illegal attempt to enter Russian waters. The four Russian vessels were supported by a smaller coastguard boat and two non-identified helicopters as the vessels repeatedly rammed the Ukrainian vessels, causing damage to them and wounding six sailors.

On the morning of November 26th, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed the developments on the Sea of Azov with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, assuring the latter of “NATO’s full support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its full navigational rights in its territorial waters under international law.” At Poroshenko’s request, NATO convened a Commission at the ambassadorial level in Brussels on Monday afternoon.

Poroshenko has since declared a thirty-day state of martial law and is operating under the assumption that Putin’s actions on Azov indicate a potential intention to fully consolidate Russian control of the Donbass region on the border between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, NATO is working to de-escalate tensions between Ukraine and Russia as we are left waiting for Putin’s next move.

However, the events of November 25th and 26th were not without pretext. Multiple factors have contributed to the tensions between Russia and Ukraine that should have indicated to those of us in the West that a high probability of Russian intervention in Ukraine was pending. Ukraine serves as a strategically significant buffer state between Russia and NATO.

Most Realist scholars of international relations believe that Russian leadership would never “tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West.” Therefore, intentional modifications to Ukraine’s orientation Westward are significant indicators to Russia that its border security may be vulnerable to NATO occupation; such indicators warrant an immediate reaction by the Russian government to decrease such a perceived vulnerability.

Russia Fears Further NATO Expansion to the East

The most recent indicator occurred just two days before the confrontation on the Sea of Azov when Ukrainian lawmakers voted in favor of amending the constitution to include NATO and E.U. membership as a strategic goal. Poroshenko described the vote as a message of Ukraine’s intentions of “parting completely and irrevocably” from Russia.

Given Russia’s keenness to prevent and counteract expansion by NATO and the European Union eastward, such a vote by the Ukrainian parliament sends signals to Russia that there is an increasing possibility that such an expansion may occur. NATO expansion has been considered a strategic threat by the Kremlin ever since the intention of NATO to eventually integrate Ukraine was announced during the 2008 Bucharest summit.

In a press statement after a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Bucharest, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that a “powerful military bloc on our borders… [is perceived] as a direct threat to the security of our country.” Furthermore, when the E.U. attempted to propel Ukraine’s path to membership via an Association Agreement, the Russian government responded with a counteroffer to then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych via a loan of $15 billion and a decrease in gas prices, which Yanukovych accepted. In 2014, Russia then responded to the anti-Russian protests and the subsequent political coup that erupted in Kiev by annexing Crimea and amassing forces along the border with Ukraine’s eastern Donbass Region.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Splits from Moscow

A second significant indicator signifying an intentional reorientation Westward by Ukraine was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s formal intent to separate from Moscow in October. Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, initiated a process to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. The decision, both geopolitical and religious, has been supported by the Ukrainian public since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

The dominance of the Russian Orthodox Church over Ukrainian Orthodoxy is considered by many to be a form of Russian hybrid warfare given the proximity of the Russian Orthodox leadership to the Kremlin. In response to the Patriarch’s decision, the Russian Church has severed ties entirely with the global Orthodox Church. A Kremlin spokesperson justified the separation as defending “the interests of Russians and Russian-speakers … [and] of Orthodox Christians.”

These two developments combined were sufficient to provoke Russian activity toward Ukraine as they indicated increased resolve by Ukraine to integrate Westward. As a strategic buffer state between Russia and the West, Ukraine’s integration is unthinkable to Russian leadership as it is perceived as directly threatening the country’s national security. Nevertheless, NATO membership is not feasible with the ongoing conflict in the Donbass.

Therefore, Moscow will do whatever it takes to maintain the conflict and unpredictability of its armed forces in the vicinity of Ukraine to decrease its perceived vulnerability and degrade NATO’s ability to present a potential security threat. As history has shown in Russia, a potential security threat is a legitimate security threat.

Tensions Between Russia and Ukraine Escalate to Four-Year High was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 11, elections will be held in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR, respectively). The outcome of the elections will determine the heads of government and state in both regions.

Western governments have strongly criticized the upcoming elections, and have urged Russian President Vladimir Putin not to recognize their results. Not only will the elections disrupt the Minsk process, threatening the increasingly unstable status quo in the region, they provide an air of legitimacy to the Russian-backed separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, allowing for a further consolidation of power.

Are the elections in violations of the Minsk Agreements?

European governments and the U.S. strongly disagree with the Kremlin over the legality of the DPR and LPR elections. The Ukrainian government—which sees the elections as violating both Ukrainian law and the Minsk Agreements—has already stated that it will not recognize the results. The United States and the European Union have also indicated they will not consider the results to be legitimate.

According to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the E.U. for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “all steps that would obstruct the advancement of the implementation of the Minsk agreement must be avoided.” The Minsk agreements state that elections must be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and be monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Kremlin-backed DPR leadership has rejected all criticism of the election, arguing that the Minsk Agreements only mention municipal elections, and as such, all criticism is “baseless” and the elections have a “solid foundation.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to answer questions whether Russia will recognize the results of the upcoming elections.

Filling the power vacuum in the Donbass

Some consider the upcoming elections as necessary to fill the power vacuum left after the assassination of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko in August 2018. Zakharchenko himself had previously postponed these elections for an indefinite period.

The identities of those behind Zakharchenko’s assassination remain unknown but there is rampant speculation. A popular theory attributes the assassination to Kremlin dissatisfaction with the corruption in the Donbass enabled by Zakharchenko and his right-hand man, Aleksandr Timofeyev. Russia and Ukraine have blamed each other for the murder.

Replacing Zakharchenko was not a complicated endeavor. Zakharchenko symbolized separatism in Eastern Ukraine and seemed to be genuinely respected by many in the Donbass region. Initially, Dmitry Trapeznikov was appointed as a successor. He was fired just days after his appointment by the Prosecutor General. Trapeznikov was replaced by Denis Pushilin, the former speaker of the DPR parliament.

Trapeznikov’s ouster, as well as Timofeyev’s swift disappearence from the political scene, were followed by a statement from Aleksei Chesnakov, a close associate of Russian presidential aid Vladislav Surkov. In his statement, Chesnakov blamed Timofeyev for ongoing corruption and criticized Trapeznikov for his lack of a legal mandate.

Pushilin—currently the acting prime minister and the presidential frontrunner—has ties to MMM, an infamous pyramid scheme that deprived millions of citizens across the former Soviet Union of their savings during the U.S.S.R.’s collapse and its aftermath in the 1990s. Despite his low popularity, Pushilin has enjoyed the Kremlin’s full support in the run-up to Sunday’s vote.

Viable presidential candidates have fallen out of the running.

The election campaign in Donetsk has been rather turbulent. Viable presidential candidates such as Alexandr Khodakovksy and Pavel Gubarev were quickly dismissed out of the running. Khodakovsky, who stood a real chance for the position, was not allowed into Donetsk on the date he needed to register as a candidate.

Pavel Gubarev did not collect enough valid signatures, according to the election commission. Igor Strelkov was disqualified on the basis of being a Russian citizen. Pavel Gubarev, one of the first political leaders of the 2014 separatist movement, was denied registration for not having collected enough valid signatures. It is interesting to note that the removal of strong candidates was accompanied by PR efforts to restore Pushilin’s reputation, and to position him as continuing the mission of Zakharchenko.

As a result, on November 11, only four relatively unknown candidates will be competing with Pushilin for the presidency: Vladimir Medvedev (deputy education minister of the DPR), Roman Yevstifeyev (head of the Museum of Afghan Veterans), Elena Shishkina (chairwoman of the Ukrainian People’s Tribunal for the Government of Ukraine), and Roman Khramenkov (former mayor of Yenakiieve and Horlivka).

Moscow’s approach

According to U.S. deputy ambassador Jonathan Cohen, the Kremlin is using the elections to support the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which are, in his words, “inseparable from the illegal armed groups controlled by Moscow.” Pushilin is considered to be less impulsive and more manageable for Moscow than Zakharchenko.

Given the Kremlin’s steadfast support for Pushilin, as well as a campaign to restore Pushilin’s reputation in the run-up to the elections, it is clear that Moscow views the Donbass elections as extremely important—whether it officially recognizes the outcome or not.

It is likely that Pushilin will claim victory on November 11. Less certain, however, is whether he will continue to abide by the spirit of the Minsk Agreements, which have been gridlocked for months. The most likely scenario is that nothing will change, breaches of ceasefires will continue, and Moscow—with its preferred candidate leading DPR—will continue pulling the strings of Eastern Ukraine.

Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius are analysts at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of HCSS.

November Elections in Eastern Ukraine Unlikely to Bring Major Change was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a lesson to be learned from recent events in Macedonia—and it must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identity and foreign policy in the Balkans. Any foreign policy decision that is seen as a threat to the continuity of the national identity is perceived as a security threat, and therefore, it is rejected as ontologically unacceptable. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans (still recovering from the traumatic experience of ethnic conflicts) require a different approach than what is advocated by the European Union.

President George Ivanov of the Republic of Macedonia, during his second inaugural speech in 2014, stated that he “will not accept ideas or proposals that would threaten the Macedonian identity, distinctiveness of the Macedonian nation, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian model of coexistence.” Ivanov added that “the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian citizens are a benefit for the Union only if we enter as equal in the mosaic of diversity of the European Union, with our own identity and dignity.” 

In his speech, Ivanov makes a clear distinction between Macedonia’s pursuit of its foreign policy interests and the need to ensure the continuity of the country’s national identity and explicitly states his reluctance to endorse any policy that would pose a threat to Macedonian’s self-image in the international arena. Taking this into consideration, one could legitimately expect that the recent political developments in Macedonia can shed new light into the complex relationship between a state’s national identity and its foreign policy. 

The Referendum in Macedonia

The referendum held at the end of September 2018 in Macedonia—in contrast to Ivanov’s 2014 speech—conflates of the concept of national identity with foreign policy into a single question: “Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” 

The “Prespa” agreement between Macedonia and Greece includes specific clauses about changes to Macedonia’s official name, in addition to modifications to an already-established historical narrative of its national identity. The text of the Agreement arguably indicates a degree of political control over the planned reconstruction of the historical elements of the Macedonian national identity: “The Parties shall establish […] a Joint Inter-Disciplinary Committee of Experts on historic, archeological and educational matters, to consider the objective, scientific interpretation of historical events based on authentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources and archeological findings. The Committee’s work shall be supervised by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Parties […].” As such, established historical narratives that contribute to the Macedonian national identity would be revised based on a politically supervised “objective, scientific interpretation of historical events.”

Also, the wording of the referendum question implicitly points out the conditional relationship between the national identity and foreign policy objectives. In other words, the Macedonian voters were reminded that the full implementation of the “Prespa” agreement (and the subsequent amendments to historical elements of the national identity) is a crucial precondition for the realization of the country’s foreign policy goal—joining the E.U. and NATO. 

However, a majority of Macedonians decided to boycott the referendum, illustrating a reluctance to answer a question in which they were asked to affirm the mutually exclusive nature of the relationship between Macedonia’s national identity and its foreign policy priorities. Voter turnout was low at 37 percent, thus failing to secure the 50 percent threshold required to make the vote legitimate. The concept of ontological security must be taken into account to understand why the Macedonian government was unsuccessful in legitimizing the referendum.

The Referendum in the Context of Ontological Security

The concept of ontological security, when applied to international relations, is defined as the unconscious and conscious possession of a fundamental national identity that justifies a country’s existence. It is argued that states pursue ontological security to ensure the continuity of the state’s identity. States must provide for their ontological security in addition to pursuing physical security objectives, such as ensuring the territorial integrity of the state. 

Ontological security of the state is especially important when the national ‘self’ interacts with the significant ‘other’ in the international arena. The harmony between the already established narratives and discourses that comprise the state’s identity of the state and foreign policy objectives is something governments take into consideration when conducting international relations.

In some cases, however, foreign policy is not conducted by the established narratives of the national identity. Thus, these foreign policy decisions are arguably ontologically unacceptable. To overcome this obstacle, policymakers selectively use specific narratives and discourses to emphasize certain parts of the national identity that could justify the new foreign policy. This strategic manipulation of narratives is done to bridge the cognitive gap between national identity and a foreign policy that is perceived as controversial or disruptive.

The referendum in Macedonia and the events preceding present an ideal case study for analyzing the importance of ontological security in foreign policymaking. Consistent reminders from both E.U. and NATO officials that an agreement on the name issue between Macedonia and Greece is a crucial precondition for Macedonia’s integration both entities made both of these foreign policy objectives ontologically unacceptable for many voters in Macedonia.

After years of difficult negotiations between Greece and Macedonia, an agreement was reached. Voters were faced with a referendum where they were asked whether they would accept the “Prespa” name-change agreement for the sake of Macedonia’s integration into the E.U. and NATO. Undoubtedly aware of the substantial cognitive dissonance between the already established ontological narratives and the requirements set by foreign policy objectives, the government initiated a strategic and selective reshaping of narratives to improve the controversial perception of these conflated policies—thus reducing the perceived threat to Macedonia’s ontological security.

The Macedonian Government’s Failed Strategy

A major theme of the government’s pre-referendum strategy was portraying the referendum as an opportunity to affirm the ‘European’ nature of Macedonia. The media and political elites in Macedonia told voters that they had the historic chance to vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia. The Prime Minister of Macedonia Zoran Zaev said that “September 30 is a day to write history, for European Macedonia.” For months before the vote, the European dimension of the Macedonian national identity was emphasized through political rhetoric. In contrast, the country’s new name—the Republic of North Macedonia—decided in the agreement between Macedonia and Greece, was hardly mentioned. 

This selective application of specific narratives and withdrawal of others to formulate a revised national identity represents a discursive manipulation aimed at bridging the cognitive gap between the national identity and the foreign policy goal. In other words, the Macedonian national identity was repeatedly ‘europeanized’ in political statements to portray the pro-European foreign policy as ontologically acceptable and compatible with the national identity—thus posing no threat to the continuity of the identity of the state. 

However, low voter turnout for the referendum indicates the government’s pre-referendum campaign was not sufficient. Voters were not convinced of two crucial things: that if they vote ‘yes’ they vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia, and that the continuity of the national identity – the ontological security of the state – will be maintained if the referendum was successful. Put in other words, the government’s strategy of selective usage and strategic manipulation with different narratives did not succeed in its aim to bridge the gap between national identity and foreign policy priorities. 

The events in Macedonia must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identities and foreign policymaking, especially in the Balkans. A volatile security context such as that of Balkan states leaves relatively less space for political differentiation between the physical and ontological security of the state. The region’s historical and geopolitical context gives the historical element of the national identity a central place in the politics of the Balkan countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the continuity of the national identity has been considered as a crucial component of the security and sovereignty of the states in the Balkans. 

Unfortunately, a crucial, yet oft-neglected, issue is that the E.U. conditional framework for states in the Balkans doesn’t entirely account for the importance of national identity in the region. On the contrary, E.U. conditionality criteria include clauses requiring that aspiring members enter into negotiations over their national identities. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans, which continue to recover from the trauma of multiple ethnic conflicts—mandate a different approach on the part of European institutions. The 2018 referendum in Macedonia should serve as a reminder that the geopolitical interests are not always the first choice in the Balkans, especially if they come at the cost of losing the ontological security of the state. 

Ontological Security in the Balkans: Lessons from Macedonia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 presidential election was historic not just for the outcome, but for the circumstances that contributed to that outcome, most notably Russian efforts to mislead the American public using fake news articles, fake Facebook accounts and fake Twitter accounts to disseminate all manner of misinformation.

It looks like Russia may be at it again — this time with a different target in mind. Russia is now using some of the same tools and tactics to spur opposition to hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” a controversial technology used in the production of natural gas.

Russia has run anti-fracking stories on its state-funded news outlet and possibly has purchased anti-fracking online ads. Russia’s efforts have earned the attention of Texas Republican Lamar Smith, who found it necessary to launch a probe into the matter, even though he dismissed Russia’s influence on last year’s election.

Here’s why Russia, a natural-gas superpower, is spreading anti-fracking messages, and why Smith, who has largely kept mum on Russia, wants to investigate.

Fracking allowed the United States to overtake Russia as the world’s largest producer of natural gas.

Russia enjoys the largest reserves of natural gas, and for years it reigned as the world’s top producer. That was until the U.S. natural gas boom. In 2005, natural gas production took off in the United States, thanks to improvements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that allowed producers to access previously inaccessible stores of shale gas at low cost. Gas output surged and prices fell. Over the next few years, gas overtook coal as the largest source of electricity in the country, and the United States surpassed Russia as the world’s most prolific producer of natural gas.

Russia still ranks as the world’s top gas exporter, supplying around one-third of the gas consumed by the European Union. The United States lags behind in exports, trading largely with Mexico and Canada. Because gas must be conveyed by pipeline, both the United States and Russia do most of their business with neighboring countries. Until recently, there was little risk of a turf war.

U.S. producers now want to sell gas in Russia’s backyard.

Now, however, the United States is trying to break into the European market by upping exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped overseas. European countries would certainly welcome another supplier of natural gas, given their history with Russia, which cut exports to Europe amid a 2008 dispute with Ukraine. In a speech given in Europe earlier this year, Trump said, “The United States will never use energy to coerce your nations, and we cannot allow others to do so.”

For now, the United States doesn’t pose a serious threat to Russian dominance in Europe, and it faces several hurdles to becoming a real competitor. It is costly to both cool natural gas to the point where it becomes a liquid and to heat it back up again. And liquefaction facilities are sparse on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia could always cut prices to ward off overseas competitors.

That doesn’t mean Russia is happy to sit back while U.S. producers gain a toehold in Europe. Russia’s economy is dependent on fossil fuel exports. So, in an effort to undercut U.S. producers, Russia has sought to raise concerns about hydraulic fracking, the technology that made American gas so cheap.

Russia is pursuing an anti-fracking campaign in an effort to undercut U.S. gas production.

There are plenty of reasons to oppose hydraulic fracturing. The chemicals used in fracking have been linked to infertility, miscarriage and birth defects. Fracking also has been shown to cause earthquakes. And drilling sites leak methane, a potent heat-trapping gas that contributes to climate change.

Russia has pursued a multi-pronged campaign to draw attention to these risks to stir public opposition to fracking within the United States. RT, Russia’s state-funded news agency, has published articles and aired TV segments that question the safety of fracking. In a report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, U.S. intelligence officials said RT’s anti-fracking programming likely reflects “the Russian Government’s concern about the impact of fracking and U.S. natural gas production on the global energy market.”

The House Science and Technology Committee is now investigating whether Russian entities bought anti-fracking ads on Facebook, Twitter, and Google. In letters to the CEOs of those companies, chairman Lamar Smith wrote that the committee is concerned that anti-fracking ads “have negatively affected certain energy sectors,” including natural gas.

In recent months, Smith suggested that Russia is bankrolling U.S. anti-fracking campaigns and called on Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to investigate possible ties between environmental groups and the Kremlin. Although, there is little evidence to suggest this is the case.

Russia doesn’t care about the environment. Its goal is to undermine the United States.

Russia isn’t concerned about the environmental impact of fracking. It recently issued tax breaks to incentivize fracking. It isn’t concerned about climate change either. Russian president Vladimir Putin is notoriously skeptical of the carbon crisis. He has said that rising temperatures “wouldn’t be so bad for a northern country like Russia.” In its pledge under the Paris Agreement, Russia gave itself room to increase emissions between now and 2030. The goal of its anti-fracking campaign is to undermine the United States.

This, notably, was also its goal in the 2016 presidential election. Intelligence officials say that Russia deliberately attempted to influence the election, having “a clear preference for President-elect Trump.” Russia infiltrated the Democratic National Committee, hacked into voter databases, and shared anti-Clinton messages on Facebook and Twitter. Experts say that Putin is determined to destabilize Western democracies.

Lamar Smith doubts Russia’s influence on the 2016 election.

Smith, who is working hard to expose Russia’s anti-fracking efforts, told the Texas Standard that he doesn’t believe Russia’s efforts to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election had any tangible effect. “I’ve heard the accusations. I’ve heard the assertions. I haven’t seen any hard evidence,” he said.

Smith’s dismissal of Russia’s role in the elections suggests a willingness to discount the meddling of a foreign power when it’s politically convenient. Last year, Putin supported Donald Trump, Smith’s preferred candidate. (The Texas Republican said he was the “first member of Congress to contribute to Donald Trump.”) Now that Russia is going after the oil and gas industry, a major donor to Smith’s campaign committee, the Texas Republican is taking a decidedly different stance.

Lawmakers have a duty to protect the sovereignty of the United States, both by warding off foreign interference in policymaking and by guarding the integrity of elections. Smith holds a more cynical view, dismissing Russian meddling on behalf of Donald Trump, and then lambasting Russia when its activities threaten his biggest donor.

The Fake News About Natural Gas was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 left Spain scrambling to reassemble a broken economy and combat soaring unemployment. European austerity measures and Catalonian dreams of independence have since occupied all of Madrid’s bandwidth and effectively back-seated Spanish foreign policy for over a decade. With the rise of Pedro Sánchez and the wounds of the financial crisis healing, Madrid has turned its attention back to Brussels and is ready to assume the role of a leading power in Europe. 

With the unexpected departure of now Former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, the heavily pro-European Socialist Party (PSOE) has returned to power with a decidedly European agenda. In the months following the vote of no confidence that unseated Rajoy and installed Pedro Sánchez, the new Prime Minister embarked on a grand tour of Europe to court Spain’s closest partners in an effort to drum up support for Spain’s new European agenda.

During a visit to Paris, Sánchez spent several hours with President Emmanuel Macron discussing the French leader’s ambitious Eurozone reform project, from which Spain and other Southern European nations heavily impacted by the euro’s failings stand to benefit. As Rome embarks on a decidedly eurosceptic agenda for financial reform and migration policy of the E.U., Madrid is well-positioned to reclaim the mantle of leadership of the Southern bloc of E.U. member states.

Underscoring this new role, in June, Sánchez offered the ship Aquarius, carrying refugees from Northern Africa that were denied access at both Italian and Maltese ports, the opportunity to dock in Valencia. The Sánchez administration made clear that La Moncloa would carefully and thoroughly review each migrant for refugee status and provide them full protection under the law.

Sánchez’s actions not only signaled Spain’s willingness to take on a more active role but also rekindled the debate over E.U. migration policy and became the main topic of focus at the subsequent European Council meetings, held a few weeks later.

Spain has also taken a slightly more vocal role in debates over NATO defense spending, refusing to increase its military expenditure. The Sánchez administration argued that its contribution to NATO is not limited to its defense budget but comprises its considerably large aid, development, and human rights initiatives as well.

Though the government maintained a respectful tone of disagreement — wary of provoking an unnecessary conflict with Washington — it is a notable shift in the rhetoric Spain has traditionally used with Europe’s closest ally. The notably more vocal and engaged Sánchez administration suggests a more active Spanish presence on the world stage.

As the United Kingdom prepares to withdraw from the European Union and Eastern European states continue to butt heads with Brussels, Spain’s position as a large and active pro-European voice in the E.U. is a welcome prospect. It is also an opportunity — one that Madrid should approach with vigor and enthusiasm.

Seizing the Mantle of Leadership Under Sánchez

Spain is a unique outlier in Europe these days—it has no eurosceptic or far-right parties in Congress, its political leadership remains enthusiastically pro-European, and it has a welcoming domestic attitude towards immigration.

Sánchez’s PSOE is also one of just three social democratic parties in power in E.U. states, alongside Portugal’s PSD and Germany’s SPD. This leaves Madrid in a position with great potential to influence European policy and claim its place amongst Paris and Berlin as a leading European power within the EU.

Given Prime Minister Sánchez’s prior working experience within European Union institutions, his fluency in English and French, and the appointment of strong and respectable cabinet members, in particular Foreign Minister Josep Borrell, there is considerable room for engagement with President Macron and Chancellor Merkel to advance European reforms and take on a leading role in European foreign policy.

Both Spain and Portugal maintain strong, positive diplomatic ties to Latin America, where the EU has recently shifted its attention, opening the door for trade negotiations with MERCOSUR after finalizing a new free trade agreement with Mexico in April. As Lisbon shares a strong, pro-European attitude and views Spain as its closest working partner in the EU, Spain can expect to enjoy the collective weight of Iberia backing its European agenda and policy initiatives.

Spain also maintains an active presence in the Sahel region of Northern Africa and is a member of the Western Mediterranean Forum. Commonly referred to as the 5+5 Dialogue, it brings together the European five — Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Malta — with the North African states of Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

The dialogue aims to provide a space to “discuss subjects of topical interest for the region and to identify new areas for practical cooperation.” As terrorism and forced migration continue to plague the Sahel and Central Saharan regions, Spain should increase its diplomatic and security engagement with its partners in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania.

With Brussels still hamstrung on European migration policy, it is incumbent upon Spain to engage with its partners in the Mediterranean to lead European efforts to strengthen North African rule of law and economic development. This could be done most effectively by providing civil support for elections monitoring and establishing working groups at both the national and local levels in the region. In particular, Spain should boost its support for the democratization and economic development of Tunisia, the sole surviving democracy of the Arab Spring, which could serve as a politically stable economic anchor for its neighbors.

As the United States withdraws its support for the advancement of democracy and human rights, Spain should also take the opportunity to leverage its strong human rights record, and take a more active role, both individually and within the framework of the United Nations. Here, Madrid can again leverage its relations with Ibero-American states, many of which are also strong supporters of the UN, human rights, and democratic principles. 

By working closely with its Latin American allies, especially within the scope of collective principles and values, Spain and Portugal can begin to forge a new transatlantic alliance with Latin America. Greater cooperation along these lines would not only help Brussels win new allies to preserve the liberal world order from which it has benefitted, but also win Madrid greater influence in both continents as a focal point in the relationship.

Spain has also developed a strong working relationship with China. As a recent paper from the leading Spanish think tank, Real Instituto Elcano pointed out, technological collaboration has become a major component of Sinohispanic relations. Spain should encourage further collaboration within the framework of European collective policy towards China and develop a joint strategy with Beijing for future scientific and technological collaboration.

Capitalizing upon stronger bilateral ties, Madrid can then better position itself to negotiate with China over issues of broader concern to the European Union, such as combatting climate change, encouraging multilateralism, and supporting E.U.-Chinese collaboration on the JCPOA and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Sánchez and his successors might also find a willing partner in Beijing to advance its own agenda for economic development and stabilization in Northern Africa given the high level of foreign direct investment (FDI) that Xi’s administration has funneled into African development projects.

By developing a stronger working relationship with Beijing, Madrid may also find itself better positioned to check Chinese human rights violations and security-compromising FDI in Europe. In any case, Spain will need a more comprehensive strategy to address the world’s largest economy and rising global power.

Cultivating Staying Power for Spain

For all the potential for evolution into one of Europe’s leading powers, there is still the risk of Spain devolving into internal crisis. The issue of Catalonian independence is far from resolved, and political leaders are divided on how to address it.

There is also the potential for Spain to fall back into financial chaos if issues over Eurozone reform are not addressed in time for the next global economic shockwave. Yet Spain remains the best candidate for the vacancy left by the United Kingdom and Italy in the European triumvirate.

For Spain to cultivate staying power in the role, however, Sánchez will need to work closely and assertively with Macron to address Eurozone reform and establish greater solidarity with the EU states most affected by the last financial crisis. It will also have to demonstrate a willingness to compromise with the Visegrad states over issues of ongoing integration.

Madrid should also continue to opt into organizations for greater defense cooperation and collectivization such as PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative to gain influence and encourage other EU states to follow suit.

At the moment, Spain, like Portugal remains inoculated against eurosceptic right-wing political extremism that has plagued Germany and France due to the strong living memories of life under the Salazar-Caetano and Franco dictatorships. While this buttresses Spain’s leadership credibility, Madrid should not become complacent. After all, only a few years ago it was nearly unthinkable that Germany would become host to an active and growing far-right, eurosceptic movement. 

Short of Brussels developing political savvy in communicating with the wider European public overnight, politicians from all Spanish parties should continue to engage in public diplomacy efforts to engage the Spanish public with the rest of Europe and help make European Union institutions, Spanish representation, and policymaking at the EU level more transparent.

As Spain emerges as a third leading power in the European Union, it should seek to actively expand its influence within and beyond Europe. Madrid must not shy away from the role of leader but embrace the opportunity to redefine its place within Europe and the world to secure its future and preserve the European project.

The New European Triumvirate: Spain as a Leading Power in the European Union was originally published on Global Security Review.

The E.U. first decided to impose sanctions in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which were expanded a few months later after Russia began a destabilizing hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, and after a Russian-made missile destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukrainian territory controlled by separatist forces backed by the Kremlin.

In 2018, E.U. members states joined the United Kingdom and the United States in expelling a record number of Russian diplomatic and intelligence personnel in response to the reportedly Kremlin-ordered attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, in which the nerve agent Novichuk was used on U.K. soil.

At the turn of the century, Russia saw itself as European. However, as E.U.-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated over the past decade, Russia has turned away from Europe, identifying instead as a Eurasian power. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promoted the idea of E.U. integration for Russia, and upon becoming president in 2000, Vladimir Putin pursued a similar path.

Russian-European Integration

The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, a whitepaper produced by the Kremlin that defines Russia's foreign policy, identified the E.U. as being critically important for Russia as one of Moscow's primary "political and economic partners." While the Kremlin still perceived NATO and the U.S. as Russia's foremost national security threats, in addition to impeding Russia's long-term goal of restoring its status as a "great power," the European Union was viewed favorably.

However, this perception did not last. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the U.S., Putin became increasingly vocal about the necessity for Russia to reestablish itself as a "great power" to adequately defend its interests in the post-Cold War era. Concurrently, the Kremlin, in both rhetoric and action, became increasingly assertive about what it considered its right to dictate the foreign policy of neighboring states, located in what Russia historically regards as its sphere of influence.

In 2004, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia (former Soviet republics) joined the E.U. along with multiple former members of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland. In response, the Kremlin denounced the E.U.'s expansion, accusing the bloc of creating divisions across the European continent.

The expansion of the E.U. into what Russia viewed as its sphere of influence, combined with the wave of "color revolutions" in several former Soviet republics between 2003 and 2005, led the Kremlin to begin regarding the E.U. as a power with expansionist ambitions that threatened Russian sovereignty and strategic foreign policy aims.

European Expansionism

Under Putin, Russia grew convinced that both the E.U. and the U.S. played a part in the "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which either could have—or did—shift the alignment of those states towards Europe, at Russia's expense.

The perception in Moscow of the E.U. as a distinct and separate entity from NATO and the U.S. faded between 2004 and 2008. From Russia's point of view, all three actors were working to impede Russia's foreign policy, and undermine its sovereignty by imposing on Russia an international order that was at odds with Russia's interests.

Less than eight years after desiring greater integration with Europe, Putin regularly accused the U.S. of unipolar hegemony and argued that the post-Cold War order was unfair. In a speech delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin asserted that the U.S. "overstepped its boundaries in all spheres—economic, political, and humanitarian." As a consequence, he stated that Russia would follow an "independent foreign policy."

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept released in 2008 subsequently downgraded the E.U. from a "main political and economic partner" to "one of the main trade-economic and foreign policy partners." In the same year, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied the regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia, situated along Georgia's border with Russia.

In response, the E.U. halted negotiations on what would be a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that would define Moscow-Brussels relations. In 2009 the E.U. launched its Eastern Partnership initiative with six former republics of the Soviet Union.

The following year, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was formed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The ECU was intended as a counterweight to the E.U. and was designed to consolidate Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space to guarantee its national interests better and increase its global standing.

Russia Turns Away from Europe—to Eurasia

In 2012, Moscow was overwhelmed by large-scale protests over the reported rigging of the 2011 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin, again, saw the protests as being part of a Western plot to destabilize Russia's political system and foment regime change. Putin, having returned to the presidency that year, began instituting structural reforms that would impede Western influence within Russia, while simultaneously promoting Russia as the conservative defender of traditional values.

The 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine that toppled the pro-Russian government of President Viktor Yanukovych was seen by Putin as yet another example of Western interference in Russia's historical sphere of influence. Just months after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea from Ukraine and stoked a devastating civil war in eastern Ukraine.

In recent years, Russia has gone on the offensive against the West, interfering in multiple elections and exploiting political divisions in Europe and the United States. From the Russian perspective, this is only logical. The Kremlin maintains that the E.U and the U.S. were engaged in a plot designed to destabilize and weaken Russia, so it attempts to do the same.

Relations between the E.U. and Russia largely reflect the broader relationship between Russia and the West. Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept eliminates any reference to the European Union, instead emphasizing "Eurasian integration," a reference to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the successor to the ECU. Currently, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are members.

The EAEU is intended to facilitate the economic integration of former Soviet republics into a single economic entity. Russia's reorientation towards Eurasia through the EAEU is a signal that it now sees the E.U. as something that, instead of cooperating with, must be confronted.

As Russia Identifies as a Eurasian Power, It Turns Away from Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

This September, Poland was also suspended from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary due to concerns over the level of judicial independence in Poland. Many in Poland and throughout the European Union have raised questions about the independence of the Polish judicial system from political interference, in light of a judicial reform law that came into effect on April 3, 2018.

40% of Polish Supreme Court justices are over 65—including Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf.

Not only does Poland's judicial reform legislation terminate the term of office for existing members by decreasing the retirement age and making it mandatory, it also gives the parliamentary majority the right to nominate a majority of their replacements.

In other words, all judges over the age of 65—over a third of all judges—will be forced to retire unless the president expressly approves an extension. Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf’s mandated six-year term is also set to be terminated early.Some judges have asked for presidential approval. However, many are concerned that only judges with politically agreeable views will be approved.

This law gives the PiS complete control over the supreme court, which acts as the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court is responsible for validating elections, thus implying that PiS could have the option to contest the outcome of unfavorable elections to a court that is politically dependent on the party.

Maintaining rule of law and other essential rights is essential for a functioning democracy.

In July 2017, a similar attempt was made to reform the constitution, in particular the judicial branch’s National Judiciary Council. That is the council which makes judicial appointments. The European Commission even threatened to trigger Article 7 of the EU treaty. However, protestors and observer’s collective sigh of relief was evidently short-lived.

The controversial bill was signed into law by President Andrzej Duda in December 2017. In January 2018, the Polish Supreme Court released a strongly worded statement claiming that the law goes “against the standards of the Polish Constitution, in addition to violating the principle of separation of powers, the independence of the courts and judges and the security of tenure of judges.”

Alongside the Supreme Court’s condemnation of the law, the European Commission elected to officially trigger sanctions under Article 7. These sanctions would strip Poland of its voting rights within the E.U. However, the chances of this are slim because enacting the sanctions requires a unanimous vote in the European Council, where Hungary has vowed to oppose it. The lack of meaningful response on the part of the council forced the European Commission’s hand in referring the matter to the European Court of Justice.

While this European Court cannot directly strip Poland’s voting rights, it can impose large fines. Despite the passage of the law, most of the Supreme Court justices also came into work after the law was implemented. There is widespread confusion over which judges are members of the court.

Poland is divided over its judges.

All of this controversy begs the question – why is there such a societal dislike of the judicial system in Poland? The majority of this rhetoric came from the PiS party, which has called judges a “caste of superhumans” and labeled the judiciary as “a state within a state.” Currently, polls indicate that Poles are split over the reforms, which 44% agreeing that judges should be forced into retirement at 65 with 33% disagreeing.

The rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union was founded. Therefore, the E.U. is bound to respond to any attempt to curtail it. While it is unlikely that that the Article 7 will enter fully into force, it is notable that the European Union felt it necessary to move to this step. It remains to be seen how the E.U. can respond effectively while maintaining strong partnerships with its more illiberal members.

E.U. Commission Refers Poland to European Court of Justice Over Rule of Law Concerns was originally published on Global Security Review.

For nearly a decade, peacekeepers backed by the European Union have kept watch over a shaky peace at the far corner of Europe – along the contested boundary left after the Georgian-Russian war. The patrol is the EU’s only peace mission of its kind. It also remains the only dispassionate witness and deterrent to flare-ups in a region taut with ethnic tensions, unpredictability, and unclear borders.

When the EU brokered the ceasefire between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, it also took upon itself the task of monitoring compliance, setting up a 200-person contingent known as the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). But Russia developed its own plan: It declared the disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent states, gave them its full military protection and effectively barred all international monitoring inside them.

Moscow’s veto ended the consensus-based, long-standing peacekeeping operations in the two Soviet-era administrative regions. Until 2008, the regions – which broke away from Georgia just after Georgia broke away from the crumbling USSR – had been monitored by both the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

“Now we are the only international presence, which means that we […] are the eyes and ears of the international community in a wider sense,” Erik Høeg, head of the EUMM, told Eurasianet.

But unlike the previous missions, the EUMM is not allowed into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It does its monitoring from the Georgian-controlled side. When German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Georgia in late August and joined the patrol, she, just as the patrollers do, had to peek through binoculars to take a look at South Ossetia.

Georgia: A solitary peacekeeping mission on the edge of Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Governments and institutions will be tested by considerable challenges over the next decade as the international order is restructured and global trends converge.

All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign. In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the International order and the global balance of power.

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by occurrences overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens an international order governed by rule-of-law. Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order.

Less of a U.S. presence on the global stage creates gaps for authoritarian powers like China and Russia. It also means a heightened risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Saudi Arabia, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

1. Sharpening tensions and heightened doubts concerning the U.S. role in the world will continue for several years.

In the short term, the U.S. will have a diminished presence abroad due to domestic political divisions. These political divisions compounded by with the Trump administration’s preference for unilateral action, which threaten to isolate the U.S. diplomatically.

Economic crises and inequality have contributed to widening societal and class divisions. The number of men who are not working and not seeking work is at its highest since the Great Depression. However, incomes have risen slowly, and investors see high rates of return on both domestic and foreign investments.

Politically, the country is still profoundly divided. However, growing solidarity and activism around critical issues such as healthcare have been useful in checking executive and congressional power.

2. The European Union will need to implement badly needed reforms to maintain its legitimacy.

The Brexit vote of 2016 and rising popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe initially seemed to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continued to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party. In light of a slew of populist and right-wing victories across E.U. member state, however, it’s clear that politics on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly polarized.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions.

For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

3. Ongoing uncertainty surrounding the future North Korea’s nuclear program threaten East Asian security.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Un has consolidated his grip on power through patronage and fear and has doubled down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history mutual distrust, warfare, and occupation makes cooperation between the different parties difficult.

A resumption of North Korean provocations, such as nuclear and missile tests, may destabilize the balance of power in the region and result in the North’s immediate neighbors potential taking unilateral action to defend their security interests.  Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear power, for security, prestige, and political legitimacy.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he’s had substantial success in terms of achieving those goals.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence–or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening U.S. alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time. However, long-simmering tensions between South Korea and Japan fueled by the South’s historical grievances may hinder Washington’s efforts to present a united front against North Korea.

4. Populism and dissent will spread across Latin America.

Leftist governments have been kicked out in Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala. Venezuela’s left-wing populist government is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to a sharp increase in lawlessness across the country.

Furthermore, while Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s become a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe or  Africa before being routed to Europe. Drug trafficking increases under as the rule of law decreases. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government—lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

5. Expect increasing assertiveness from Beijing and Moscow as both governments seek to lock in competitive advantages.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they perceive as historical wrongs before economic and demographic trends can present impediments and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the U.S., and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

6. The standoff between Russia and the West will continue throughout 2019.

Diplomatic spats, strategic political and political tensions will last between Russia and the U.S. In Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration may have few choices for relieving the strain because of increased checks on the president’s power and enlarged sanctions from the U.S. Congress.

In Moscow, meanwhile, forthcoming local and national elections will prevent the Kremlin from creating significant concessions. Consequently, sanctions enacted on Russia from the US along with the European Union probably will stay through the end of the year. Depending upon how investigations into Russia’s role at the 2016 U.S. Presidential election shape upward, Washington might even ramp up the political and financial pressure on Russia.

Similarly, North Korea will remain a factor in determining the direction of U.S.-Russian relations over the next several months. Russia will keep going along with the overtures that Washington has made to Pyongyang, but will skirt sanctions requirements and continue provide economic aid to North Korea as it sees fit.

7. China, for its part, may have domestic concerns to grapple with this year.

The Chinese Communist Party’s careful preparation for a change of direction was realized in the October 2017 party congress. The event reshuffled the highest ranks of the party and was a proof of President Xi Jinping’s near-absolute consolidation of power.

To date, all indications point to the Xi’s success in strengthening his grip over top decision-making bodies of both the Party and the state. Xi has already achieved the status of core leader of the Communist Party, the Chinese state and People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Xi has also managed to quickly promote a lot of his partners to prestigious positions in 2017 and 2018. Even more significant, party members nearly unanimously endorsed the addition of Xi’s philosophy of the Communist Party Constitution at the Party Congress, positioning him alongside the venerated figures of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong.

8. Expect Persisting Volatility in Southeast Asia

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

At-sea deployments of atomic weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly militarize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.

The presence of multiple nuclear powers with uncertain doctrine for controlling your stresses at sea incidents between nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

9. Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region’s fragile communal relations.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the Islamic State’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideologies—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given unbalanced gender ratios favoring males in several nations.

Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

10. The Middle East and North Africa will see continued, if not escalating instability.

Continuing conflict and lack of political and economic reform threaten poverty reduction, the area’s one last bright spot.  Resource dependence and foreign assistance have propped up elites even as it fostered widespread reliance on the nation by inhibiting markets, employment, and human capital.

With oil prices unlikely to recover to levels of the petroleum boom governments may have to limit cash payments and subsidies.  In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with a general public that is more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

11. Sub-Saharan Africa will struggle with authoritarian regimes

Practices have changed, civil society groups have proliferated, and citizens across the region demand better and more just governance.  However, many nations continue to struggle with authoritarian rule, patronage politics, and favoritism.  Many leaders remain focused on political survival as opposed to reform–with a few term limitations.

Global economic headwinds also threaten improvement by keeping commodity prices low and investment weak.  Some nations who’ve made progress toward democracy remain fragile and predisposed towards violence corresponding elections.  Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups can escalate into conflict.

12. Threats from terrorist and insurgent groups will persist and are likely to become more decentralized.

The threat of terrorism is likely to increase as the means and the motivations of states, groups, and people to impose harm diversify. Prolonged conflicts and the info age allow terrorists to recruit and operate on a large scale, demonstrating the evolving nature of the threat.

Terrorism kills fewer people globally than crime or disease, but the potential for new capabilities reaching the hands of people bent on apocalyptic destruction is all too real. This ultimate low-probability, high-impact event underscores the imperative of international cooperation and state attention to the issue.

Terrorists will continue to justify their violence by their very own interpretations of religion, but several underlying drivers are also in play. Within nations, the breakdown of state structures in much of the Middle East carries on to create space for extremists.

The world order is changing. The question is, how?

The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question. As power diffuses worldwide, seats at the table of global decision making are reshuffled.  Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled will be increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to build standards can be elusive as Russia, China, along with other actors such as the Islamic State seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor.

12 Predictions for Global Geopolitics for 2019 through 2025—and Beyond was originally published on Global Security Review.

The stated purpose of the new branch of service would be to protect U.S. space interests by overseeing debris and commercial movement. Implicitly, however, this could mark the first overt step towards the militarization of space, in order to maintain global hegemony and achieve strategic dominance over rival powers like China and Russia. Both countries have civilian and military space programs of their own, but could this move by the Trump administration lead to an arms race in space?

Ultimately, the creation of a sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces would have to be approved by Congress—and even if it isn’t, the Air Force would remain the service branch responsible for military strategy and operations in space as it is now. Regardless of what branch of the military is responsible, what are the ramifications for the militarization of space—by the United States and other powers?

Protecting National Interests Extends to Outer Space

The efforts of any one state to place armaments in space would disrupt the global balance of power, and encourage others to follow suit, setting in motion a race for strategic dominance that could well lead to weapons testing and further escalation. When on actor assumes a dominant position, rival actors will need act similarly in order to maintain deterrence and ensure the security of their respective national interests.

The rise of globalization and ever-increasing global inter-connectivity has led to a dependence on space-based technology like the Global Positioning System (GPS) for everything from simple navigation to the coordination of military operations. Such a reliance has made the destruction of satellites a priority for military planners in the event of a conflict.

As the potential for space-based threats grows, more world leaders will move to protect against the potential destruction of their space-based assets by deploying the necessary technology to deter such an attack.

Challenges of Arms Control in Space

Though the United Nations has advocated for a complete ban on the armament of space, it lacks the support of the United States in related Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) resolutions. Since the U.S. has such a well-developed military, civilian, and commercial presence in space, it would be senseless to attempt to incur a treaty without U.S. participation, as other states would still feel the need to protect their interests.

Beyond the question of U.S. participation in any international conventions, a strong space-based arms control policy would still be difficult to implement. In space, almost anything can be used as a weapon. With enough speed in orbit, an object no larger than a rock can destroy a satellite. Simply put, even if something is not designed to be a weapon, it can be used as one in space. If policymakers cannot effectively identify what constitutes a weapon in space, weapons cannot be regulated or prohibited, making verification and enforcement close to impossible.

Consequences of Armament and Aggression in Space

The consequences of weapons testing and aggression in space could span generations, and current technological advances only increase the urgency for policymakers to pursue a limitations treaty. As it stands, there are three major ramifications of a potential arms race in space:

The destruction of satellites

As both financial and technological barriers to the space services industry have decreased, the number of governmental and private investors with assets in space has inevitably increased. There is now an abundance of satellites in space owned by multiple states and corporations. These satellites are used to not only coordinate military actions, but to perform more mundane tasks, like obtaining weather reports, or managing on-ground communications, and navigation.

Should states begin weapons testing in space, debris could cloud the orbit and make positioning new satellites impossible, disrupting our current way of life. More pressing, however, is that if a country’s satellites are successfully destroyed by an enemy state, military capabilities can be severely hindered or destroyed, leaving the country vulnerable to attack and unable to coordinate its military forces on the ground.

Diminished future use of near space

Whether caused by weapons testing or actual aggression, the subsequent proliferation of debris around the planet would damage our future ability to access space. Not only would debris act as shrapnel to preexisting assets in space, but it would also become much more difficult to launch satellites or rockets, hindering scientific research, space exploration, and commercial operations.

From the past fifty-odd years of activity in space alone, the debris left behind in Earth’s orbital field has already become hazardous to spacecraft — a main reason why the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not continue with ASAT testing during the Cold War. If greater pollution were to occur, space itself could be become unusable, resulting in the collapse of the global economic system, air travel, and various communications.

Power imbalances and proliferation on the ground

Only so many states currently have access to space—which means any militarization be by the few, while other states would be left to fend for themselves. This would establish a clear power imbalance that could breed distrust among nations, resulting in a more insecure world and a veritable power keg primed for war. Additionally, deterrence measures taken by states with access to space would escalate, attempting to build up weapons caches not dissimilar to the nuclear weapons stockpiling activities of the Cold War.

In any arms race, it is inevitable that more advanced weaponry is created. Yet, this does not only pose a risk to assets in space. Should a terrestrial war break out, this weaponry may eventually be deployed on the ground, and space-faring states would be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by using these new developments against states that have not yet broken into the space industry or developed equally-advanced weaponry.

Into the Future

The militarization of space would inevitably increase the chances of war, and also threaten the industries that rely on space to carry out their daily operations. Without treaties and resolutions to regulate and limit armament in space, the international community risks facing extreme consequences. Furthermore, with the history of U.S. disinterest in UN efforts to regulate space, the implementation of a meaningful, multilateral agreement for arms control in space is unlikely.

Ultimately, the international community will need to regulate actions, militarization, and the possibility of eventual armament in space sooner rather than later in order to reduce the threat of major war, economic destruction, and global insecurity.

What are the Consequences of Militarizing Outer Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and investment tour. This latest diplomatic endeavor provides an opportunity to evolve UK’s Africa strategy in the context of forging a new path for a global Britain that seeks to maximize the opportunities of leaving the European Union. This is a crucial area of a global Britain approach, ensuring that the UK remains competitive in an ever-increasingly competitive global market.

In Cape Town, the prime minister announced an ambitious new approach to Britain’s spending on the continent, wishing to overtake the US by 2022 as the largest foreign investor in Africa, which would see Britain becoming Africa’s largest trading partner in the G7. This would seek to build upon the already high levels of existing British investment in Africa; with bilateral trade between the UK and Africa totaling $37 billion in 2016 and set to increase further post-Brexit.

With 29 business executives accompanying the prime minister and other officials on this trip, the overriding purpose of the mission is clear: to drum up business with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The key stops on the Prime Minister’s tour include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. These three countries, traditionally strong British allies, are widely regarded as the core engine of future African growth.

By 2030, household consumption across the continent is expected to reach $2.5 trillion, up from $1.1 trillion in 2015. A third of that will come from these three states alone. Other countries with high growth rate forecasts over the next decade include Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. They all maintain strong relations with Britain, leaving considerable scope for developing these ties further.

Britain’s combined imports and exports with African countries more than doubled between 2005 and 2014, however exports to Africa still only represents 2.5% of total British exports. Considering Africa is a continent whose the population is set to increase by half a billion people by 2030–43% of whom will acquire middle and upper class status–it is remarkable that Britain has not sent such a top trade delegation to Africa sooner.

In that sense, Britain is somewhat late to the party. The U.S., despite seeing exports to Africa halve from 2014 – 2016, still has a bilateral trading relationship with the continent worth $53 billion. However. even this is dwarfed by both China and the E.U.-27’s trade numbers with Africa: in 2015 worth $188 billion, and $269 billion respectively.

In particular Beijing’s role in Africa has solidified in recent years. This trend goes well beyond the seven fold increase in trade with the continent since 2005. China is also seemingly aiming to become the preeminent security actor across Africa in an attempt to displace the legacy role still played by the former European colonial powers. In addition to establishing its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, Beijing also has 2,466 troops currently on active duty across Africa.

In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sudan, with an 800-strong combat deployment sent to South Sudan in 2015, a country with significant Chinese oil investments. The security relationship between China and the UN contrasts sharply with the majority of western states, often more militarily risk-adverse regarding African deployments.

However, after meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, Mrs. May announced the two countries had signed a defense and security partnership which would see the British forces train full Nigerian army units to combat insurgents in the north-east of Nigeria. Furthermore, the UK will assist Nigeria in countering the use of improvised explosive devices used by Boko Haram, and in strengthening Nigeria’s lawless northern borders.

In order for the UK Government’s post-Brexit Africa strategy to really pay off, especially in the face of increasingly stiff international competition from the Chinese, Britain’s strengths as a security partner must be firmly emphasized as a reminder of why we should remain the firmest African ally. By leveraging Britain’s increasing role as a security actor in Africa, it should seek to press this advantage regarding trade deals post-Brexit.

Theresa May met members of the British military contingent based in Kenya, east Africa’s economic power and the focus of Britain’s greatest African security commitment. Kenya is utilized as a training area for British troops going on high readiness operations in other theaters, in addition to providing training and support for regional states engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab across east Africa. Ranging from Mali to Djibouti, Kenya to Gabon, the British military maintains a significant involvement across sub-Saharan Africa.

Currently providing training and support to no less than nine African states, small teams of specialized British personnel conduct a range of missions, from counter-terrorism to anti-piracy and anti-poaching. These missions are designed to build up the capability of host nations, by training their leaders and instructors in military skills often hard-learnt over recent British campaigns, now passed on to other states to assist in their own security development.

These training missions have tangible impact and results. For example, over 22 separate training missions by British forces in Uganda since 2011 have developed the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, who undertake the majority of the heavy fighting in Somalia under the African Union mission. The success witnessed by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has led to increased international confidence in the security situation in Somalia, resulting in a gradual reduction in African Union personnel from the Horn of Africa.

Mrs May will seek to highlight the threats posed to both European and international stability through letting the security challenges occurring across Africa go unaddressed. These challenges include the current situation in the DRC; ongoing Ebola outbreaks across the country, coupled with increasing civic strife has led to over four million internally displaced people throughout the DRC.

Considering the rising numbers of individuals wishing to flee internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, human trafficking and large scale poverty and corruption, Europe faces potentially a second wave of millions of migrants from the African continent escaping war and famine and seeking new opportunities. The case has already been made that Britain, in ensuring a strategic partnership with Africa, can do more to help mitigate these developments by training security personnel in the DRC to better cope with the country’s many crises.

Additionally, al-Shabaab poses a lethal security threat in the east of the continent, while Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates threaten its western areas. UK military assistance is a key part of the multi-national efforts to contain and ultimately defeat these terrorist organisations. Concurrently with training Kenyans, Ugandans and Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, Britain has also trained over 30,000 Nigerian soldiers since 2015 in counter-insurgency operations to help the fight against Islamic militancy in Nigeria.

By highlighting the threats facing African security, combined with the pragmatic methods with which Britain utilizes its armed forces in developing local-level state actor security, a Global Britain approach to a new Africa strategy should therefore seek to combine increased trade and investment into African economies, with a renewed focus on strengthening existing bilateral military relationships.

This twin-tracked approach based around trade and security will seek to achieve the government’s target to be the G7’s largest African trading partner post-Brexit; filling a geostrategic void left in the wake of a withdrawing US. If Britain is to assert itself as Africa’s most valuable G7 trading partner, then Britain must seek to fulfill African desires for investment whilst simultaneously offering the continent a type of security assistance that is beyond China’s military skills and capabilities.

Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has been threatened by invasions for centuries. The country’s western borders have always been distinctly vulnerable, with no mountain ranges, bodies of water, or other geographical features to serve as natural defenses.

The European landmass that borders western Russia is a large peninsula that lies between the Baltic and North Seas in the north, the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south.

In contrast to its European neighbors, Russia has few maritime access points. Its few ports are mostly unusable during the winter, and even during warmer months, the Arctic Ocean is far from Russia’s major population centers. Turkish waters to the south, much like Nordic waters to the north, can be easily blocked.

During the Cold War, airbases in the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland gave NATO air superiority which would, in the event of a conflict, enable the alliance to block Russian access to the Atlantic ocean through the strategic GIUK Gap.

The concept of containing Russian expansion wasn’t limited to the Cold War. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, both France and Britain made concerted efforts to contain Russian activities in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia. With limited defensive options available, Russia’s military doctrine has historically been offensive, with the aim of dominating its neighbors to prevent borderlands from being used against it.

Whereas the West views Russia’s fear of invasion as baseless, history has shown otherwise. The view in the Kremlin is that each era brings a fresh existential threat, be it overt or covert, conventional or asymmetric.

Russia’s history and geography have fostered the existence of a highly centralized and autocratic political system, with leaders obsessed with both internal and external security.

After World War II, Moscow saw the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and its western allies as a strategic threat. The incorporation of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, along with the creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, bolstered Russia’s feelings of security at the expense of the West’s.

NATO expands as the Soviet Union disintegrates.

As the Kremlin lost control over territory across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, its sense of security was eliminated entirely. At the end of the twentieth century, Russia’s security buffer had ceased to exist, and its western border was the farthest east it had been since the eighteenth century.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russian objections left few options when it came to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. One option was for a robust expansion of NATO, under the logic that Russia would always attempt to dominate its neighbors if not deterred by the threat of military force.

Alternatively, the NATO expansion could be delayed until Russia reneged on its pledges to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. However, NATO proceeded with its eastward expansion, arguing that it had done so on the premise of avoiding a confrontation with Russia, rather than preparing for a new or expected Russian threat.

After the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in March 1999, the alliance commenced a three-month bombing campaign against Serbia, a state with deep historical and cultural ties to Russia.

The campaign demonstrated the efficacy of NATO’s advanced conventional weaponry at a time when Russia was struggling to rebuild itself. Additionally, the concurrent NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries all but ensured that Russian leaders would once again be able to seize upon the tried-and-true narrative that NATO, led by the United States, was an existential threat to Russia.

Russia’s perpetual fear of invasion has always been a significant driver of its foreign policy.

While military conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have been attributed to aggressive Kremlin efforts to reestablish elements of the Soviet empire, it should be noted that, with the exception of Crimea (which houses the Russian Black Sea Fleet), Russia has not officially annexed any territory belonging to the states in which it has engaged in hybrid conflicts.

The Kremlin’s motives in Ukraine aren’t merely plausible deniability, the annexation of pro-Russian territories would only have the counter-productive effect of encouraging pro-Western forces to escalate their efforts.

Annexation would undermine Russia’s primary goal, which is to prevent countries in what the Kremlin considers to be its sphere of influence from joining NATO, essentially a strategy of reverse-containment.

The alliance typically rejects aspirants with unresolved border disputes, internal territorial conflicts, and insufficient military capabilities to provide for credible national defense. The presence of frozen conflicts in the Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine effectively blocks them from joining NATO.

Recommendations for Policymakers: Contain and Modernize

During the Cold War, the NATO alliance worked because the United States understand the reality of a Russian sphere of influence with which it had to balance to maintain global stability and security.

In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the timing of the Russian interventions coincided with those states’ respective overtures to both NATO and the European Union, entities viewed as inherently hostile to Russia’s interests.

The combined separatist territories, under de-facto Russian control, now form a protective barrier along Russia’s southwestern border. Just as Stalin used the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a security buffer against the perceived threat of western encirclement, Putin has done the same.

NATO members and partner states can better inform their view of Russian strategy by analyzing the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has employed hybrid warfare in both conflicts to great effect, in the form of conventional cross-border assaults accompanied by a combination of unconventional operations, information operations, cyber tactics, economic coercion, and political influence.

NATO requires a multi-faceted modernization strategy that goes beyond merely padding the frontlines with additional troops and assets. To effectively contain Russia in the twenty-first century, the transatlantic alliance urgently needs looking to modernize its maritime forces, as well as improve non-frontline capabilities such as cyber, information warfare, and missile defense.

Russian Expansionism is a Consequence of Geography was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine has received $8.7 billion in low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2015, the government continues to lose $4.8 billion a year from corruption.

In total, Ukraine has lost over $14.4 billion to corrupt officials.

While a simple number does not provide a definitive understanding of corruption, it does reveal the degree to which corruption has become endemic to Ukraine.

Corruption is not uncommon in former Soviet states, where customs officials are commonly bribed by smugglers and traffickers.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption policies have been lackluster in the past.

Ukraine has initiated several measures to address the problem of corruption within the government. The government overhauled the State Fiscal Service and has launched the “Ukraine Without Smuggling” campaign.

However, Ukraine requires more than a public relations campaign to solve its corruption problems. As a result of Ukraine’s geopolitically precarious position between the West and Russia, a solution is required sooner rather than later.

Ukraine has been relying on IMF and World Bank funds to stabilize the national currency (the hryvnia), reduce the budget deficit and bolster international currency reserves.

Without such funds, Ukraine is more likely to make a strategic tilt towards Russia. The loss of funds for Ukrainian oligarchs, in particular, that would result from a loss of international funding would present the Kremlin with the opportunity to re-exert its influence in Kiev.

A substantially decreased cashflow into Ukraine would require replacement funds. Russia would be more than willing to use the situation to pull Ukraine away from the West.

The World Bank seems to be making progress in stabilizing Ukraine’s economy.

The World Bank reported it is preparing a $650 million guarantee for Ukraine to fund its entry into global-debt markets, which would allow the country to raise around $800 billion. However, the Ukrainian government must implement IMF economic reforms to receive the guarantee.

Ukraine has already achieved a number of the reforms, such as the successful enactment of stronger banking and credit laws, which were passed in July 2018.

In September, an IMF mission will be visiting Ukraine to report on the state of Ukraine’s economic reforms.

While it is not definite that Ukraine has wholly fulfilled its IMF obligations, the possibility of receiving substantial funding from the West should be a great enough incentive to induce lasting economic reform.

The question remains, however, as to whether or not Ukraine can overcome the prevalence of public sector corruption?

Corruption threatens Ukraine’s sovereignty.

While corruption is widespread, it’s entirely possible that Ukraine will choose to implement substantial economic reforms in addition to significantly reducing corruption within the country.

Not only does IMF and World Bank financial assistance come at an opportune time for Ukrainian investors, it serves to further solidify Ukraine’s position as a Western democracy.

With Western financing, Ukraine can take further steps on a path towards European integration and fight back against Russian aggression.

Ukraine is already acting out against Russian provocations, by increasing its naval presence in the Sea of Azov.

In doing so, the country shows Russia that monetary persuasion is much more convincing than the history that it shares with Russia itself.

However, it may also be that corruption proves too difficult to unseat, as the World Bank and IMF funds are tied to Ukraine’s implementation of major economic reforms.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index rates Ukraine at 130/180, which is on the lower end of the scale.

However, in 2015, Ukraine established the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and three years later established an anticorruption court.

Signs may indicate a move towards meaningful reform, but only time will tell whether it will be successful.

Lack of Economic Transparency & Corruption Threaten Ukraine’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Millennials are not into the ‘We are the greatest country’ idea.

Millennials, the generation born between 1981 and 1996, see America’s role in the 21st century world in ways that, as a recently released study shows, are an intriguing mix of continuity and change compared to prior generations.

For over 40 years the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which conducted the study, has asked the American public whether the United States should “take an active part” or “stay out” of world affairs.

This year, an average of all respondents – people born between 1928 and 1996 – showed that 64 percent believe the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs, but interesting differences could be seen when the numbers are broken down by generation.

The silent generation, born between 1928 and 1945 whose formative years were during World War II and the early Cold War, showed the strongest support at 78 percent. Support fell from there through each age group. It bottomed out with millennials, of whom only 51 percent felt the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs. That’s still more internationalist than not, but less enthusiastically than other age groups.

There is some anti-Trump effect visible here: Millennials in the polling sample do identify as less Republican – 22 percent – and less conservative than the older age groups. But they also were the least supportive of the “take an active part” view during the Obama administration as well.

Four sets of additional polling numbers help us dig deeper.

• Military power: Only 44 percent of millennials believe maintaining superior military power is a very important goal, much less than the other generations. They also are less supportive of increasing defense spending. And when asked whether they support the use of force, millennials are generally disinclined, especially so on policies like conducting airstrikes against Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, using troops if North Korea invades South Korea, and conducting airstrikes against violent Islamic extremist groups.
• American ‘exceptionalism’: Millennials also were much less inclined to embrace the idea that America is “the greatest country in the world.” Only half of millennials felt that way, compared to much higher percentages of the other three generations. In a related response, only one-quarter of millenials saw the need for the U.S. to be “the dominant world leader.” These findings track with the 2014 American National Election Study, which found that while 78 percent of silent, 70 percent of boomer and 60 percent of Gen X respondents consider their American identity as extremely important, only 45 percent of millennials do.
• Alliances and international agreements: Millennials are especially supportive of NATO, at 72 percent. In this measure, they are close to the other generations’ levels of NATO support. Their 68 percent support for the Paris climate agreement is higher than two of the other three age groups. And their 63 percent support for the Iran nuclear nonproliferation agreement is even with boomers and higher than Gen X.
• Globalization and key trade issues: Millennials’ 70 percent agreement with the statement that “globalization is mostly good for the United States” is higher than all the other age groups. Similarly, 62 percent believe that NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) is good for the U.S. economy – well above the others surveyed. The margin is also positive although narrower on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

These and other polls show millennials to have a world view that, while well short of isolationist, is also not as assertively and broadly internationalist as previous generations.

Millennials’ worldview and its implications

Why do millennials see the world the way they do? And with millennials now the largest generation and emerging into leadership positions, what does it mean for American foreign policy?

In my view, the “why” flows from three formative experiences of millennials.

First, the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and Iraq for close to half the lives of the oldest millennials, who were born in 1981, and most of the lives of the youngest, born in 1996. Despite America’s vast military power, neither war has been won.

So, from the millenials’ point of view, why make military superiority a priority? Why spend more on defense? Why not be skeptical about other uses of force?

Second, as a generation which is generally “defined by diversity,” as Brookings demographer William H. Frey describes them, millennials take a less extreme view of Islam. A 2015 Pew Research Center poll showed only 32 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds agreed that Islam was more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its followers. Compare that to 47 percent of 30- to 49-year-olds and a little more than half of the two older age groups.

Third, globalization infuses the lives of millennials in many ways.

“For younger Americans,” the Chicago Council study authors write, “the Internet, the steady flow of iPhones, computers and other products from abroad, and the expansion of global travel may have all contributed to a rising comfort level with the rest of the world generally, and to the acceptance that international trade is simply part of the fabric of the modern world.”

What are the implications and impact on foreign policy politics of millennials’ views?

In my opinion, even more significant than issue-specific positions is millennials’ disinclination to buy into American exceptionalism. These younger Americans show a greater willingness to get beyond the “We are the greatest country” paeans. Such exceptionalism, subscribed to more avidly by older generations, takes a rose-colored view of American foreign policy’s history and ignores the profound changes shaping the 21st century world.

In this respect in particular, we’d do well to learn from millennials’ more measured views.

Millennials Are Over U.S. Domination of World Affairs was originally published on Global Security Review.

In July 2015, a new Prevent statutory duty was introduced, which compelled specified authorities to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

Introduction

This duty was introduced by Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and it seeks to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism by leveraging on the notion of “non-violent extremism.” The section represents a significant change to the Prevent strand of the overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, because it placed specific legal responsibility on a number of public bodies to tackle radicalization and extremism.

Over the years, Prevent attracted broad criticism for lacking empirical evidence in support of its main corollaries and for being based on the study, “Extremism Risk Guidance” (ERG22+), which however was never validated by the normal process of independent peer review and scientific scrutiny. As a result, in September 2016, over 140 experts and academics criticised Prevent in an open letter to the Government, in which they wrote:

“We are concerned with the implementation of “radicalization ” policies within the UK Prevent strategy, internationally referred to as countering violence extremism. Tools that purport to have a psychology evidence base are being developed and placed under statutory duty while their “science” has not been subjected to proper scientific scrutiny or public critique.”

Prevent originates from the assumption that radicalization is a linear process towards terrorism, which some people are vulnerable to. It also assumes that it is possible to identify someone on a trajectory towards acts of terror, and that, consequently, this trajectory can be interrupted through a process of de-radicalization.

While a large volume of research has been conducted on this topic, statistics keep showing that Prevent is not fit for purpose; instead, it rests on a largely discriminatory interpretation of “radicalization” and “extremism.” Even the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) admitted that 80% of referrals to Channel are redundant, pointing out that there was, in fact, no risk of radicalization.

Further statistics from the Home Office, covering April 2015 to March 2016, show that in 2015/16, a total of 7,631 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, with most referrals (2,539 – accounting for 33%) coming from the education sector. Of the 7,631 individuals referred in 2015/16, 2,766 (36%) left the process requiring no further action, 3,793 (50%) were signposted to alternative services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to be discussed at a Channel panel. In 2015/16, 381 people received Channel support following a Channel panel. Of these, 365 (96%) have subsequently left the process.

Prevent casts a wide net seemingly disregarding the profound consequences that the process has on individuals who are mistakenly identified as subjects at risk. This trend was strongly amplified by the introduction of the statutory Prevent duty.

Towards a police state

The introduction of the statutory Prevent duty compelled the government to find models to train public sector workers to identify and prevent radicalization and extremism. However, the mandatory training is based on the assumptions underpinning the Government’s counter-extremism strategies and, as such, it is marred by the same flawed methodology at the base of the Prevent study. This research identifies four major problems with the legislation.

The first issue is that the Prevent strategy moves from a position of suspicion, that is, everyone is a potential suspect, and everyone can be deterred from committing acts of violent extremism. While the effort to prevent such acts is commendable, the making of the statutory Prevent duty co-opts public sector workers (teachers, nurses, counsellors etc.) into an intelligence tactical role that turns public bodies into sites of securitisation and would require a level of training far superior to that currently provided by the Prevent training course.

In short, not only does the Prevent duty create a climate of suspicion and mistrust between public workers and society, but also puts an enormous responsibility on people who do not necessarily have the background, skills, training, and overall in-depth understanding of radicalization, terrorism, insurgency and related issues. Individuals who have never been involved in the field of counter-extremism are suddenly expected, and in fact compelled, to refer people who they think might be on the path to violent extremism.

The second issue concerns the fact that the Prevent training is shaped upon the faulty assumptions underpinning the Government’s counter-extremism strategies, as well as its understanding of radicalization and extremism. According to the 2011 revised Prevent strategy, the Government has defined extremism as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” This definition, however, poses a number of issues:

1. British values remains a nebulous concept when used to identify individuals at risk of radicalization. Indeed, democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs are arguably universal and human values and do not necessarily reflect the ‘level of Britishness’ of an individual. When such values as transposed into a purely British context, one could then wonder if, for example, criticism of the UK government or of the monarchy could be seen as a sign of un-Britishness and consequently of extremism.
2. The rhetoric of Britishness and British values provides a fertile environment for the festering of far-right ideas and the myth of ‘non-integration’ by Muslim communities. The nearly two decades of constant negative depictions of Islam has resulted in a widespread demonization of British Muslims for their diversities and complexities, which are perceived and portrayed as characterizing various degrees of ‘un-Britishness.’ Such perception can have a profound impact on the way Prevent referrals are made.
3. British values are often defined in opposition to others. For example, David Cameron’s 2011 speech in which he declared “we are a Christian country. And we should not be afraid to say so”, suggests that non-Christians inherently do not belong in Britain. This contributes to creating a climate in which diversity – or more specifically non-Christianity – might be perceived as an indicator of un-Britishness and therefore extremism.
4. Finally, public sector workers such as teachers are required to promote British values as a crucial step to undertake in an effort to prevent radical ideologies. This can result in increasing censorship of dissenting voices, even when these are fully legitimate. It can also result in a profound sense of alienation for all individuals who legitimately disagree with canonical rules or with what is subjectively (and the confusion over British values inherently requires a certain degree of subjective interpretation) perceived as being ‘British values’.

In short, tackling extremism on the basis of an ambiguous definition of ‘British values’ is as dangerous as it is counterproductive. Such a paradigm inevitably frames race relations in light of the Government’s security agenda, while having a profound impact on freedom of expression, diversity, legitimate dissent, and overall multiculturalism.

The third problem is that the Prevent training is based on the presumption that there are clear, identifiable signs that an individual is drifting towards violent extremism.  This conveyor-belt theory, however, is based upon a number of studies conducted on individuals who had in fact committed acts of terror. For instance, the authors of “Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K” identified six signs of radicalization 1] by analyzing the behavior of “terrorists known to have participated in an attack or an attempted attack.” However, there was no control-study of those who were not terrorists to compare/contrast these signs with, which means that all the identifiers led to terrorism not because there is a linear pattern but because of the selected case studies.

Likewise, the government-funded ERG22+ research conducted by Dean and Lloyd suffers from the same limitations caused by the omission of control-studies. Even the MI5 confirmed in its report “Behavioural Science Unit Operation Briefing Note: Understanding radicalization and violent extremism in the UK,” that the several hundred terrorists it analyzed “had taken strikingly different journeys to violent extremist activity.”

There are two consequent problems with this. First, a public worker is not necessarily equipped to understand the nuances of religiosity, theology, political activism, and to differentiate between them and a potentially real ongoing radicalization process. Indeed, as pointed out by Paul Thomas, Professor of Youth and Policy at the University of Huddersfield, questions should be asked as to whether a one-hour-long course can equip a public worker (for example, a teacher) to discern between extremism and conservativism, particularly when this distinction applies to individuals belonging to communities already considered ‘at risk’, such as the Muslim one. A second issue concerns the fact that Prevent identifies a number of extremely loose and generic behaviors that might indicate radicalization. These include:

1. Isolating themselves from family and friend
2. Talking as if from a scripted speech, unwillingness or inability to discuss their views
3. A sudden disrespectful attitude towards others
4. increased levels of anger
5. Increased secretiveness, especially around internet use.

These identifiers are however extremely ambiguous, especially for a teacher dealing with teenagers in the midst of adolescence. As such, it can be contended that a teacher, or any other public worker for that matter, might be inclined to look for other factors to fulfill his/her Prevent duty, such as the level of an individual’s religiosity.

Finally, it is unclear what the duty seeks to tackle, and more specifically, at what point of the presumed radicalization process is Prevent attempting to intervene. If the public worker is expected to intervene to forestall a violent act of extremism, then s/he is effectively pre-empting a terrorist attack – an enormous responsibility to put on the shoulders of a non-expert with merely a one-hour-long training. If the public worker is expected to intervene to forestall acts of non-violent extremism – thus “ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology” –then s/he is challenging and stopping ideas from being expressed. This has potentially disastrous consequences for freedom of speech, particularly within the Education Sector, where debate is key for the advancement and development of pupils and students.

Neoliberalism and Muslim Identity

The statutory Prevent duty has created a profound fracture among Muslim communities and between the Muslim and non-Muslim community because it adds a bottom-up level to the traditional top-down securitization process. This, in turn, adds to the jurisprudential transition towards – and effectively establishment of – a legal system based on pre-crime, in which individuals are not prosecuted for committing a crime, but for fear that they might.

As such, while Britain’s pre-crime-based legal system has created a nation of potential suspects, the introduction of the statutory Prevent duty has also created a nation of potential police officers, effectively crystallizing societal divisions based on suspicion. In turn, difficulties in defining radicalization, terrorism, extremism and ‘British values,’ creates a climate of profound legal, social, and political uncertainty, in which other, and certainly more subjective, factors come into play.

An individual’s level of religiosity appears to be a predominant factor in the determination of subjects considered at risk of radicalization. An increasing number of studies is pointing at an inherent, and seemingly irreconcilable, distinction between British and Muslim identities, with the former being built primarily in opposition to the latter – a trend further evidenced by the Brexit vote.

According to M. S. Elshimi, a Research Analyst at the Royal United Services Institute specialising in Countering Violent Extremism, the fracture is not caused by an alleged inability of Muslims to subscribe to the set of British values encompassed in the government’s Prevent definition (democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs) – which are in fact largely shared by British Muslims. Instead, it is provoked by the construction of a British identity according to the model of neoliberal nation-states, and which appears incompatible with some of the more prominent traits of Islam.

Materialism, secularism, modernity, and individualism – just some of the most defining characteristics of a neoliberal state –are inherently at odds with Islam, but their rejection, or a lesser degree of acceptance of them, cannot and should not be seen as a sign of radicalization. The age of globalism, however, has led to a question of reconciliation of multitude identities beyond normative universal values. As such, normality is ascribed to consumerism, secularism, individualism and a general de-politicisation, which constitute an acceptable level of conduct in a neoliberal state. Too much religiosity, consequently, is abnormal and challenged as a sign of radicalization.

In short, it is the Muslim identity that is being problematized and challenged in the current counter-extremism legislation, not terrorism. The difficulty in defining British values makes it impossible to define what a threat to British values is, and in turn, this leads to a more subjective and arguably over-conjectural categorization of individuals at risk.

Conclusion

The introduction of the statutory Prevent duty has severely altered the fabric of British society by extending the scope of the current pre-crime system to dangerous new levels. As noted above, while a preventative legal system turns everyone into potential suspects, the bottom-up securitization introduced by the statutory Prevent duty turns non-experts into overly zealous officers.

The problems outlined above revolve around the major issue of not knowing what terrorism and radicalization mean, and consequently of being unable to address it satisfactorily. Furthermore, the government’s attempt to frame extremism in opposition to British values has created ulterior confusion due to the difficulty of defining what ‘British values’ actually means. The issue of British identity – or lack thereof – coupled with nearly two decades of anti-Islam rhetoric, has led to an inevitable clash between neoliberal and Islamic values, with the former being formulated in opposition to the latter.

Religiosity, and even more so religious conservativism, seemingly remains a problem in British society. On the one hand, the secularism and modernity embedded in neoliberal states make religion a suspicious presence in the country; while on the other, the rejection of diversity (perfectly illustrated by the Brexit vote) has led to a societal embracement of cultural isolationism.

Muslims are disproportionally impacted by the framework within which Prevent operates. Statistics presented by the Government’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) show that a Muslim is almost 80 times more likely to be referred by Prevent for Channel de-radicalization since 2012. Of the 7,361 individuals referred to Prevent in 2015/16, 4,997 were referred for “Islamist extremism”, but only 5% went on to receiving Channel support. This shows that, while Muslims are the prime suspects, there is still very little understanding of what ‘Islamist extremism’ actually means, and what the identifiers of radicalization are.

The widespread belief among Muslims that the Government’s strategies are aimed at enforcing a political, religious and moral revisionism, contributes to the polarization of communities and in reducing the chances of bridging the gap between them. With the statutory Prevent duty co-opting public workers into the process of securitization, this fracture is amplified on every level of society. This also contributes to perpetuating the Huntingtonian paradigm that there is an “us” and a “them” and that the two are very distinct and irreconcilable. The ambiguities resulting from this model cause widespread misunderstandings, which often result in nothing short of a witch-hunt against Muslims. Marginalisation, stigmatization, and resentment thus become embedded in the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The Prevent duty casts a long shadow of fear and suspicion while demanding idealistic results from public workers with no experience in the field of radicalization and counter-extremism. As argued by Professor Richard English, an authority in the field of terrorism, what really matters is not that we deal with violent extremism but how we do so. Encroaching civil liberties in the name of security legitimizes terrorism because it leads to a dramatic overturn of our societal values and its defining features, while simultaneously eradicating the very ethics we are attempting to protect.

[1] The signs identified in the study are: 1) The Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam; 2) Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities; 3) Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West; 4) Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance; 5) Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others; 6) Political Radicalization.

U.K. Statutory Prevent Duty: The Creation and Consequences of a Police-State was originally published on Global Security Review.

The sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and their allies were targeted against a host of Russian individuals, officials, banks, corporations, and organizations. Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy, defense, and financial firms, limiting their access to western markets while prohibiting the sale and export of certain oil exploration and production technologies to Russia.

U.S. and E.U. sanctions remain in effect, with the E.U. announcing that it will extend them until January 31, 2019. However, sanctions have failed to produce the results that were anticipated when they were implemented.

Sanctions have not only failed to change the course of Russia’s foreign policy towards the West; they’ve neither deterred Russian aggression nor created any incentives for Moscow to alter its behavior. On the contrary, sanctions have contributed to a widening divide within the European Union, and within the transatlantic alliance with growing calls for the elimination of sanctions.

What is the point of sanctions?

Sanctions are limitations that are introduced by one country or a group of countries against another in retaliation, in an attempt to change the behavior of the country with regards to its domestic or foreign policy, or sometimes even attempts at regime change i.e. by increasing the cost of international isolation.

In general, the idea behind imposing sanctions is to preserve the state of legality or to establish the state of peace and security. Considering the coercive and non-coercive impact of sanctions on the economy, businesses, diplomatic channels, and reputation of the targeted country, the aim of sanctions is to prevent, deter, or limit opportunities for possible undesirable behavior.

The idea is that if the targeted country does not change its course of action, then the cost of sanctions would either enforce compliance or create incentives for the country to comply with international rules.

How effective are the sanctions on Russia?

Although sanctions have had a detrimental impact on the Russian economy, the costs imposed by sanctions are outweighed by the Kremlin’s desire to regain and sustain geopolitical influence within what it considers to be its traditional sphere of influence (i.e. the former Soviet Union).

The downturn in Russia’s economy that began in 2014 was not the result of economic sanctions alone, rather, it was the result of a combination of factors made exponentially worse by the Russian government’s inability to reduce the economy’s dependency on energy exports, in addition to a steep decline in oil prices.

The government managed to stabilize the economy by tapping into its sovereign wealth fund, which provided badly-needed time to implement anti-crisis monetary policies in addition to reducing the economy’s vulnerabilities to external events.

Western sanctions do not target a significant segment of the Russian economy. The E.U. and the U.S. sanctions target specific Russian elites and companies, in order to limit the severity of their effect on the Russian population.

If sanctions were too harsh, the Kremlin could see them significant or even existential threat. Nation-states often react when they pushed beyond the threshold of what they perceive as acceptable; extreme sanctions would likely result in Russia retaliating in a manner that would endanger the security of eastern European countries.

According to former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin, sanctions managed to shave off a mere 0.5 percent of GDP each year. Sanctioned firms that have lost access to western markets have been bailed out by the Kremlin with public funds, the National Welfare Fund is one example.

Tit-for-tat measures employed by Russia imposed a ban on American and European food imports, enabling local agriculture businesses to grow their businesses by selling domestically-manufactured products to domestic consumers.

Lastly, tightening restrictions on Russian oligarchs and their investments has done little to change the Kremlin’s behavior. In fact, as many have argued it has played into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin, enabling him to effectively  “nationalize” the elite.

Are sanctions helping Putin politically?

The domestic narrative provided by the sanctions and trumpeted by the Kremlin has given a political boost to Putin. Russian state media portrays Putin as a president fighting to protect Russian interests against NATO aggression.

Sanctions also offer Putin with an easy scapegoat for lackluster economic performance,  allowing him to shift the blame for low economic growth to western economic sanctions, providing increased time to address major structural issues with the Russian economy, and reduce its over-dependence on energy exports.

In other words, the sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea have done little to alter Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine, nor have they impacted the Russian economy in a way that would induce any change in Russian policy. Furthermore, if oil prices continue to rise, the detrimental impact of sanctions on Russia will be further reduced.

This raises an important question over whether or not European states would consider the long-term continuation of sanctions necessary.  Sanctions have been one area where European Union member states have shown solidarity in standing against Russian aggression. This solidarity, however, is increasingly frayed.  Hungary and Bulgaria have both stated their opposition to continuing sanctions on Russia.

In a January 2017 interview, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó stated that “the Hungarian economy has sustained a loss of some $6.5 billion due to the sanctions implemented against Russia.”

Many Central and Eastern European countries like Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy depend significantly on Russian oil and gas exports. Many believe that it is futile to continue imposing economic sanctions without achieving any meaningful results while incurring substantial economic costs.

Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, and Interior Minister made headlines during his trip to Russia in July 2018 when he stated that he would like to see the E.U. drop sanctions against Russia by the end of the year. Salvini also issued a statement of support for Russia to rejoin the Group of 7 (G7), once more making it the “G8.”

A similar tone was adopted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, during his visit to Russia during the World Cup, where he denounced E.U. sanctions against Russia during his meeting with President Putin.

The growing voices of dissent within the European Union are largely those who are most critical of the E.U. as an institution. It may be the case that Italy and Hungary are using sanctions as leverage in migrant and refugee resettlement negotiations, or as a way to resist the economic heavy-handedness exerted by Germany in dictating European fiscal policy.

Regardless, disagreements over sanctions threaten to create further divisions within the E.U. After all, the bloc operates on consensus, and all it would take for that consensus to break is the objection of a single E.U. member state.

The Impact of U.S.-Imposed Sanctions on the Transatlantic Relationship

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the November 2016 U.S. presidential elections and subsequent inauguration, the Trump administration has moved aggressively against long-term U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.

While a substantial amount of the rhetoric emanating from the White House has focused on efforts intended to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, the administration has also threatened E.U. allies that continue to do business with Russia.

The Nord Stream II pipeline has become a point of contention on both sides of the Atlantic. Republican Senators John Barrasso and Cory Gardner have introduced a bill that would mandate the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions on European companies building the Nord Stream II pipeline.

While the bill is intended to increase U.S. energy exports to Europe, it threatens western firms like France’s ENGIE, Austria’s OMV, the German firms Uniper and Wintershall, as well as British-Dutch multinational Royal Dutch Shell, all of which are contributing to the pipeline’s development.

Threatening European firms engaged in the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline with sanctions at a point when tension among transatlantic partners is high puts the transatlantic alliance in a precarious position.

The threat of sanctions levied by an ally widens divisions between the U.S. and Europe. Maintaining a united front is essential, not only against Russian aggression, but on a host of economic, security, and political issues that persist on both sides of the Atlantic.

It Might Be Time to Rethink Western Sanctions on Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

That is not to say that foreign threats are not severe and ongoing. On July 19, Putin warned NATO “against cultivating closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia,” claiming it would have negative consequences for member states if they continued on that journey.

This may not be an idle threat from Kremlin, as it seems to have had an impact on the foreign policies of other countries, particularly that of the United States.

The following day, the United States announced that it would provide over $200 million in aid to Ukraine, to support training programs, operational capabilities, and increased security needs. With this latest string of funding, the U.S. will have provided over $1 billion to Ukraine since 2014.

Why the sudden movement of funds? Ukraine recently adopted a Law on National Security, allowing its armed forces improved interoperability with NATO. On July 23, ships of NATO’s Maritime Group 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 also entered the port of Odessa as part of the Partnership for Peace program.

The most significant security threats to Ukraine are of a domestic nature.

While the foreign threats facing Ukraine are significant, addressing daily security concerns such as access to fresh water and safety in everyday life is essential. Access to clean water may be at risk in the coming month, making this an issue of critical importance.

Dniproazot, a chemical plant owned by Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennady Bogolyubov, ceased operations in July due to increased gas prices. Dniproazot creates liquid chlorine, which is used by more than 170 water treatment and supply plants in Ukraine to clean water.

Without adequate supplies of liquid chlorine, Ukraine’s water filtration systems will be forced to employ alternative methods of filtration. Experts say that in some cities like Kropyvnytsky and Vinnytsia, these systems can only use stored chlorine and filter water for residents for 7 to 10 days.

Ukraine’s Association of Water Enterprises is negotiating with Dniproazot. Thus far, they have not reached an agreement. Building a new factory would cost money and time that many Ukrainian cities don’t have, and importing liquid chlorine from abroad would face its own logistical and cost challenges.

Other cities like Kiev are claiming that they have enough chlorine but face their other issues that threaten to erode internal stability. Approximately one-third of the city’s residents have not had access to hot water due to disagreements between Ukrainian state-owned companies and oligarchs.

Hate crimes are on the rise throughout Ukraine.

Beyond access to clean water, Ukraine is also facing a rise in hate crimes particularly towards their Roma population. Over the last two months, at least four attacks on Roma have been documented.

S14, the youth arm of right-wing party Svoboda, often takes part in violent acts towards the Roma. Often, these involve throwing stones and starting fires in their camps. Despite these acts, there have been no arrests.

Some such as Interior Minister Arsen Avakov claim that attacks on the Roma come from Russia. However, much of the internal disorder comes from right-wing Ukrainians. Hate crimes and trouble with access to clean water are two domestic concerns that Ukrainians must take time to address.

Although international attention towards Ukraine is more often paid towards the encroaching Russian threat, internal matters that have to do with infrastructure, public health, and security require increased attention.

Foreign Threats to Ukraine’s National Security Distract from Internal Disorder was originally published on Global Security Review.

The tone of the summit was set well in advance following President Trump’s criticism of NATO members failing to spend 2% of the GDP on defense expenditure. The United States, in this regard, has been contributing the bulk to what the U.S. President sees as a collective defense organization, in which member states need to contribute equally for their security and thus not be seen as free riders. Notwithstanding the real challenges that the E.U. faces in the form of growing terrorist attacks on European capitals, social tensions, and Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy to influence western governments, the discourse of the summit centered around Trump’s persistence over increased defence spending and his criticism for the German government which has only grown ever since he took over the U.S. presidency.

The narrative that drives President Trump’s criticism towards western allies is based on the changing perception of the United States towards transatlantic alliance as a whole. To understand this changing perception, it is important to shed light on the reasons that led the U.S. to support European integration and security in the first place.

The United States supported European integration for myriad reasons. First, European integration served as a way of containing Germany and tying it tightly to western institutions, namely the E.U. and NATO. Second, supporting and strengthening European allies served as a viable way of containing Soviet expansion in Europe. Third, a strong European alliance meant reduced American burden for economic and military security of Europe in the long run. Fourth, European integration was a valuable mean of ensuring that no European power develops hegemonic tendencies and that a unified bloc would serve as a balance against the Soviet Union, thereby limiting Soviet threat to the European theatre. In other words, the idea was that an integrated Europe would serve U.S. long-term security and economic interest.

In particular, NATO was formulated as a military alliance with a singular purpose of protecting western Europe against the Soviet threat. The alliance was formed with the idea that, U.S. security guarantee would enable western European countries, to develop and strengthen their economies and military capabilities to counter Soviet expansion.

The threat of common enemy worked in favor of both the United States and western European countries. The European countries had the geographical risk of bearing the cost of a war in mind, while for the Americans, the Soviet threat enabled it to be a key player in European geopolitics. The common threat served as a binding factor, which kept the alliance together during the Cold War.

Not much changed following the end of Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union did not exist anymore, the idea of European integration expanded as central and eastern European countries that were previously under Soviet influence, wanted to be part of the western bloc. Even NATO which no longer had Soviet threat to counter expanded as more and more post-communist countries kept applying for NATO membership. The trend continues to date.

The rationale behind the expansion was to bring post-Soviet countries into the framework of common western defense and economic system, which would solidify their transition into the western democratic system thereby making the continent peaceful. For post-communist countries, entry into E.U. and NATO meant economic prosperity and national security from Russian aggression. For the United States, E.U. and NATO enlargement meant the expansion of western influence.

Since more and more countries were becoming part of the alliance and since the bloc functioned on consensus, the U.S. would always have a say as far as its interest in Europe were concerned. Increased European integration would thus enable the United States to focus its attention towards Asia- Pacific, where a rising China is seen as a challenge to global U.S. dominance.

However, things started to change following the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 and its subsequent effect on European economies. European integration which was thought to reduce conflict and encourage consensus behavior resulted in producing divergence on many issues related to economic management and border security. Most European countries have become skeptical of Germany’s behavior within the E.U. Some even debate, Germany as the economic hegemon of Europe. This is true to some extent. Germany is in many ways the economic powerhouse of Europe, with a healthy economy, high wage rate, and low unemployment.

However, that growth is primarily because E.U. member states and the United States absorb Germany’s surplus products. Germany produces more than it consumes and to sell the surplus it needs markets. The free trade agreement with E.U. and a healthy trade relationship with the United States provides Berlin with the advantage of selling its surplus. In fact, it was the United States, which absorbed German exports following the global financial slowdown of 2008-09 which in many ways cocooned the German economy from economic instability.

The problem with Germany’s growth is that it is seen as one-sided. The criticism that follows Berlin is that it is too concerned about its economic well being than taking into account the broader security concerns of its NATO allies. For the United States, the German government is seen as a free rider when it comes to economic and security policy. At present, Berlin enjoys a trade surplus of over 50 billion euros with the United States. German contribution to the NATO budget, however, stands at just 1.2% of the GDP which is the lowest when compared to some of the other powerful economies in Europe.

Germany does have a plan to increase its defense spending to the agreed-upon target of 2% by 2024, but the current low contribution figure does not go down well with Eastern European countries and the United States, who see Berlin’s unwillingness to counter Russian aggression and the need to spend more on defense as a problem.

Furthermore, Germany’s tight grip on deciding fiscal rules for the bloc and forcing member states to agree on its refugee policy is seen as the imposition of German preferences on matters that concern German interest. For the United States and Eastern European countries, Germany’s relationship with Russia is at best seen as dubious. A case in point, the Nord Stream II pipeline which President Trump called out during the recent NATO summit. Nord Stream II is a joint project between German and Austrian companies and Russia’s Gazprom. On completion the pipeline will enable Russia to deliver gas directly to Germany, bypassing existing pipelines that run through Ukraine.

In other words, Nord Stream II will enable Russia to deliver gas to European customers without having to pay transit fees to Ukraine. The pipeline project has been heavily criticized by the European Commission, the United States and countries like Poland and Ukraine for making Europe more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The United States and Eastern European countries consider the pipeline project as detrimental to European security. Germany, however, does not and it continues to go ahead with the project. For Berlin, the pipeline is a viable mean of securing energy needs at affordable prices and at the same time, maintain its economic engagement with Russia.

Therefore, what emerges now is a divergence of interest at many levels. For the current U.S. administration, the behavior of certain European allies, Germany, in particular, is seen as problematic considering that it was the U.S. security guarantee that enabled Europe to grow economically. Trump, who sees maintaining a military alliance and burden sharing on the same scale, getting away with everyday assurances is not going to be easy.

President Trump has already threatened that the U.S. could go its own way if allies don’t contribute. Such a threat is not assuring to the unity of transatlantic alliance as a whole, given the already extensive areas of divergences from climate change to Iran nuclear deal to protectionist trade policies and Russian aggression in Europe. However, it is not to say that the geopolitical reality of having a strong E.U. and NATO is not paramount to U.S. interest or that the European allies can function without the U.S. role in European security. But given the differing perception of allies on a whole number of issues, it is hard to imagine how long can transatlantic partners work together.

Increasing Divergences Amongst Transatlantic Partners was originally published on Global Security Review.

The legitimacy and authority of governments and institutions across the globe will the called into question. All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign.

In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and improve the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the international order and the global balance of power.

Why are global tensions rising?

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are being shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by events overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens a rules-based international order. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order. Less of a U.S. presence on the world stage creates gaps that can be exploited by authoritarian, revisionist powers like China and Russia.

Multipolarity may also heighten the risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Israel, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

The world order is increasingly multipolar.

Questions were raised about the long-term viability of a rules-based international order in the wake of the 2016 Brexit vote and election of Donald Trump. The era of U.S.-led globalization seemed to be at an end.

While globalization has dramatically increased the degree of economic interdependence among the world’s major powers, it is not, in-and-of-itself, a guarantor of stability. Countries like Russia and Iran are perpetually searching for ways to decrease their dependence on adversarial powers, reducing their vulnerability to economic pressures like sanctions while allowing them to pursue their national interests more aggressively.

As international relations trend from a unipolar to a multipolar order, the threat of terrorism remains ever-present but will be eclipsed by increased competition between adversarial great powers.  This trend, combined with rapidly developing technologies, disinformation (“fake news” propaganda), employment shortages, and demographic trends mean greater disorder on a global scale. Thus, fundamental questions will need to be resolved regarding laws, institutions, and the balance of power in the international order.

Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics.

Liberal democracies—like Canada, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and South Korea—will face considerable challenges throughout the next several years. Growing populism and nativist nationalism will need to be tempered by governments, as stagnant living standards, rising wealth inequality, and demographic problems persist. This concentration on domestic issues could mean less bandwidth for engagement overseas.

Overseas events increasingly determine domestic realities. However, rising populist and nationalist sentiments are leading citizens to demand national solutions to global problems. Western governments will need to educate their voters on the importance of foreign policy effectively, and the role it plays in supporting domestic tranquility, rather than giving into xenophobic rhetoric and nativist policies to appease voters.

Liberal democracy is under threat.

Liberal Western powers like Germany and France lack the resources—and in the former’s case, political unity—to fill the void created by the isolationist and unilateral rhetoric and behavior emanating from the United States. In Europe, infighting between E.U. member states is obstructing badly-needed reform.

Newton’s third law—“for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”—applies to international relations just as much as it pertains to physics. Abrupt and sudden departure from the established policy by one actor will result in numerous responses by that actor’s allies, rivals, dependents, and institutions that will impede or exacerbate the impact of that action.

The Early Stages of a Multipolar World Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

The battle for influence in Africa is one of the greatest power-plays left to upset the traditional balance of power in the international community. Africa’s relatively young labor force, untapped business opportunities, thirst for technological injection, strategic location and role as a resource bridge between east and west is attractive to many.

But China’s dedication to penetrating Africa and winning influence is second to none, intricately weaving its intentions across all of its trade and foreign policies.

Critical infrastructure has been at the heart of foreign aid and development policies of Africa’s largest investors (the U.S., E.U., and China). But while the U.S. attempts to navigate a new “America First” policy under President Trump and the EU continues to negotiate the terms of Brexit and its own growing right-wing movements, China has been focused.

Following on his systematic “one belt, one road” campaign, President Xi Jinping has worked at embedding China at the heart of African infrastructure to protect and cement its regional interests for decades to come.

On track with its Belt & Road Initiative

President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an incredibly ambitious strategy to broaden Chinese access to international and domestic markets by securing and leveraging land and maritime trade routes, resulting in new patterns of trade, capital flow, resource access and business expansion.

It has the potential to facilitate regional collaboration on the most extensive global scale ever seen, reaching as much as a third of the world’s GDP, 65 percent of the world’s population and tapping into a quarter of the movement of goods and services globally.

Africa serves as a linchpin for the BRI, but many of the continent’s countries lack the requisite infrastructure to accommodate such a vision. Making inroads in Africa will require reliable power systems, roads and transport systems, broadband coverage, and compliant bureaucracies – and that is precisely what China is targeting.

Aggressive investment in critical infrastructure and the industries supporting these functions has been China’s number one mode of entry. In fact, China has established itself as one of the largest investors in critical infrastructure in nations across Africa.

Investment Means Influence

Through the Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation (FOCAC), China committed $60 billion in funding in 2015 alone, tripling its 2012 commitment of $20 billion.

Recent reports estimate Chinese banks, contractors and the government combined have extended $94.4 billion between 2000 and 2015. Success in the development of pilot programmes engaging local infrastructure industry in development and skills exchange, including construction of large industrial parks, has proved profitable for all parties.

Critical infrastructure such as water, power, broadband, transport, and logistics through these programmes means that Africa can provide the foundation for China’s BRI vision, but also remains indebted and dependent on China to maintain and pay for these new structures. Consequently, the facilitation of such developments ensures Chinese influence and political favor from partner countries.

Large-scale programs and investments support Xi’s goals to ensure the reach of China is felt everywhere not just a financially, but also a physically – and in particular wherever America may also have a presence. This sentiment was reflected by U.S. Marine Corps Commander Gen. Robert Neller speaking before a U.S. House Appropriations Committee meeting in March, “The Chinese are playing the long game … Everywhere I go, they’re there.”

Neller outlined the current Chinese strategy as to “win without fighting,” leveraging soft power capabilities and infiltrating national infrastructures to support their foreign policy ambitions.

China has pursued this strategy across the continent providing targeted investment and turnkey technological and logistical solutions, positioning themselves at the heart of these nations and leaving them vulnerable to both political and financial influence.

Additionally, these government efforts are being amplified by an increase in ordinary Chinese businesses heading to Africa, even without state-backing.

The Trappings of Dependence

While traditional foreign aid and investment have promised external funding or lower-interest loans in return for favorable trade relations and local commitments, China’s investments are tied with high-interest loans with impossible terms.

With billions of dollars already invested in the campaign, developing countries are becoming increasingly saddled with crippling debt and growing dependence on China.

In a March report, the Center for Global Development flagged eight countries at heightened risk of significant debt distress due to China’s One Belt One Road initiative.

Asia author and analyst Gordon Chang highlighted this “new form of colonialism” at a March House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on China’s role in Africa, testifying that once such dependence develops, “Beijing gets their support for geopolitical goals, and one of these goals is undermining democracy.”

Djibouti is one country which has been marked at heightened risk of debt distress, having received $14 billion in Chinese investment. This has won China critical local political support for Chinese interests and goodwill with the population. More importantly, local political support has led to the establishment of China’s first permanent overseas military base in Djibouti.

With unbound strategic importance, guarding the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Djibouti also offers an excellent vantage point from where it may observe the U.S. military base, again reflecting Gen. Neller’s earlier sentiments. This isn’t the first sign of China ruffling security feathers on the continent. French news source Le Monde reported earlier in the year on alleged daily cyber breaches of the A.U. headquarters’ IT framework.

The infiltration was traced back to Shanghai, although it was vehemently denied by Chinese officials and minimized by representatives from the African Union. Further investigations were said to have revealed hidden microphones in desks and walls throughout the Chinese-built building in Ethiopia.

China’s drive to gain greater global influence is clear

China’s method of partnering with those excluded from the Western-led world order does not isolate African governments but continues to prove strategic in protecting and promoting its national interests. China’s lack of reservations in striking deals with authoritarian leaders or governments with poor human rights records remains its advantage over western nations.

As the strategic environment in Africa becomes more crowded and competitive, U.S. General Waldhauser warns that “We will never outspend the Chinese on the continent,” and instead must be smarter about policies and actions connected to the region.

This is true for any country looking to win influence or maintain good relations with the continent. Ultimately, China stands as the lone power with both the sufficient economic might and political unification to succeed in this new scramble for influence in Africa.

China Positions Itself at the Heart of African Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the South Caucuses, the Republic of Georgia is caught in the middle of a geopolitical tug-of-war between Russia and the West. Nestled on the Russian border between the Caspian and Black Seas, Georgia finds itself in a position of strategic significance. Georgia, a former Soviet republic, has embarked on a path towards liberal democracy and is actively pursuing membership within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

International organizations such as the United Nations Development Program and numerous European research centers have been embraced by the Georgian government as it works to increase the rule of law, political transparency, human rights, civil liberties, and economic security in Georgia.

Simultaneously, Georgia is caught in a territorial dispute, claiming that the two northern territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are under illegal Russian occupation. The Russian government, however, refutes this claim. 

Though the 2008 five-day war between Georgia and Russia resulted in a ceasefire, it left Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Russian protection while legally remaining within Georgian territory. After the war, Georgia withdrew its position as a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose re-grouping of former Soviet Union member states, including Russia.

Georgia is strengthening political and security ties with the West.

One of the most significant developments of late are remarks made May 2018 by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during a joint press conference with Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili. In his remarks, Secretary Pompeo issued a call for Russian troop withdrawal from the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in accordance with the 2008 ceasefire agreement. 

Secretary Pompeo’s condemnation of the occupation as a “violation of international peace and security” and contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act is a firm position against Russian regional aggression. 

Furthermore, Secretary Pompeo’s charge against Russia’s involvement in Georgia is essentially an ultimatum that Russia has violated international law. Given the degree to which Russian leadership has employed concepts of international law in its endeavors, this ultimatum has significant implications for the legitimacy of Russia’s foreign policy.

In addition to the continued strengthening of U.S.-Georgian security and economic ties, Secretary Pompeo highlighted Georgia as a “steadfast partner” with the United States and NATO in safeguarding “common security interests,” emphasizing U.S. support for Georgia’s acceptance as a NATO member. 

The European Parliament has since called upon Russia to renounce its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent from Georgia. Syria, in the meantime, has joined Russia in its support of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. The Georgian government has severed diplomatic ties with Syria in response. Moscow has dismissed such claims as politicized and biased, and that Russian involvement in Georgia has been one of peacekeeping.

Tensions are growing over Russia’s troop presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In late June, representatives from Russia, the United States, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia engaged in somewhat fervent consultations that were co-chaired by the U.N, the E.U., and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The United States reiterated the call for a Russian withdrawal of forces and its support for maintaining the integrity of Georgia’s territorial sovereignty.

The Russian representatives emphasized the threat to regional security presented by the growing presence of NATO forces, and that any chance at increased productivity is dependent upon Georgia’s willingness “to engage in a direct and respectful dialogue with the representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to abandon any confrontational rhetoric and behavior.” 

Ultimately, the consultations increased frustrations between Russia as the defender of Abkhazian and South Ossetian sovereignty and the United States as the proponent of Georgian territorial integrity. With the increase in geopolitical tensions between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia exhibited by these developments, the United States and Russia face decisions of profound significance toward regional stability as crucial allies of opposing blocs. 

The upcoming summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump may very well shed light on what the future holds for the South Caucuses. Nevertheless, one would do well to keep a weather eye on Georgia.

Georgia Realizes Strategic Significance Amidst Tense Russia-NATO Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past few weeks, turmoil has engulfed the two countries of Greece and Macedonia – all over a simple name change. The debate over Macedonia’s name is a point of contention between both countries and has been for many years.

However, on June 20, 2018, Macedonia’s parliament ratified an agreement with Greece to change its formal name from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Although the opposition party boycotted the vote and there is much public opposition against it, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev believes this compromise on the name is a step in the right direction for his country. If ratified, the deal will end 27 years of dispute between both countries.

The question of Macedonia’s name has to do with a Greek province.

Greece argues that the usage of the name Macedonia is at odds with a northern Greek province with the same name.

Specifically, Greece is concerned that by allowing their northern province as Macedonia as a whole to have the same name, they are opening themselves to potential future issues of territorial claims.

This dispute arose in 1991 when Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Even Macedonia’s admittance to the United Nations was done under a provisional name.

Greece has boycotted Macedonia’s attempts to join the European Union and NATO for years.

Due to the dispute, Greece has continually vetoed Macedonia’s acceptance into both the European Union and NATO. However, with this agreement in sight, European Union foreign ministers have agreed to open accession talks for both Albania and Macedonia in June 2019.

Before negotiations can take place, both countries will have to show significant progress regarding their human rights and democratic reforms. Regardless, the door is now open for both countries to enter the E.U.

At the July 11-12 NATO summit, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also indicated that he hopes members will agree to start accession talks with Macedonia. Greece has been the primary objector to Macedonia joining NATO.

This change in attitude by Greece might mean a shift in these organizations. Macedonia may be a small country, but a new Eastern member to NATO and the E.U. is always of concern to Russia. Consider that the last time an Eastern non-E.U. state showed interest in joining, part of that state’s territory was annexed by Russia. Naturally, Macedonia is not nearly as strategically important to Russia as Ukraine was. Regardless, any expansionist policy by NATO or the E.U. is watched with suspicion by Russia.

There’s still a long way to go for Macedonia.

Although it is notable that both country’s foreign ministers signed off on this historic deal, there are many hurdles to come. On June 26, 2018, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov refused to sign the agreement, calling it a “criminal act.” However, his refusal to sign it may have no impact.

If the parliament convenes again and approves the change with a two-thirds majority – then he cannot block the name change. Moreover, widespread support for the name change in both countries is at an all-time low.

After provisional approval in the Macedonian parliament, the deal will then be voted on by the Greek parliament. Even that is up in the air, although, Greek Foreign Minister, Nikos Kotzias, claims there is no reason for concern. However, the political volatility of both countries may mean that the necessary majorities in both countries may not exist by the time of the deal.

As far as security ramifications go, the change of Macedonia’s name might not seem noteworthy. The slow process of diplomacy means that the realist urges of each country may soon halt any speedy changes. Ignoring this change, nevertheless, would be a mistake. Any shift in the unpredictable Balkan region is one to be watched with care.

With such small countries, any political turmoil is relevant. Particularly with Erdogan’s recent reelection, the upcoming NATO summit and the subsequent summit between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin – small shifts remain relevant. Will the name change be used as fodder? Or will it operate as a new expansionist shift in NATO and E.U. rhetoric? And how will Russia respond? Only time will tell.

Macedonia Changes Its Name—Or Does It? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Should policies be localized or enforced at a European level? What should the rules be on migration and business deals with other countries? European leaders have often been stymied by these kinds of questions.

In the past few months, however, with the recent surge of right-wing parties, feuding has become more prominent within Europe. With the current anger towards American President Donald Trump, Russia sees an opportunity to rebuild its relations with Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin now has more leeway to strategically foster chaos and discord within Europe, particularly with the added bonus of increased feuding amongst E.U. member states.

Internal German feuding on migration may lead to unilateral action or no action at all.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, is embroiled in a  disagreement between herself and German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer on migration.

Seehofer claims that Bavaria ought to be allowed to refuse asylum-seekers who are trying to enter Germany if they are already registered with another European state or have previously been denied asylum in Germany. Merkel, instead, approaches the issue of migration from a European level. Rather than unilateral action, she opts for following European regulation.

Against Merkel’s European approach is Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. He is advocating for a plan that would strengthen borders and work against illegal immigration coming to Europe. Kurz has called for an “axis of the willing” with Germany, Austria, and Italy.

Germany is set to publish a ‘migration masterplan’ soon. However, there is no certainty as to what the consensus will be if there is one at all.

Italy’s rejection of a rescue ship sends a signal to European leaders.

In mid-June, Italy refused to accept a rescue ship filled with migrants. Although Spain took up the burden and allowed the 629 passengers to come to Valencia, the wound to European solidarity is still fresh.

Italy’s new government campaigned on anti-migrant policies and is now showing its willingness to act on those promises. When asked, Italy’s Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, claimed: “This was a first important signal that Italy cannot go on alone supporting this huge weight.” He also threatened to turn away other rescue boats that arrive with migrants in the future.

So, where does Russia fit in?

With more confusion and chaos within Europe itself, Putin has an opportunity to jump back onto the world stage. This would have seemed impossible only a few years ago. Russia was alienated from Europe because of its annexation of Crimea and its military interventions throughout Syria and eastern Ukraine.

Now, however, Russian-backed populist leaders are in power in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Austria. Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum have caused further fury within Europe. It’s the perfect moment to reassert Russia’s power as an economic and trading partner as opposed to the United States.

While Putin may claim that “it is not our aim to divide anything or anybody in Europe,” actions speak louder than words. It is to Russia’s advantage to have a fragmented Europe that can neither impose sanctions nor act unilaterally against deals like the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

Already, there are signs of this. Austrian leader Kurz refused to expel Russian diplomats after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Both Italy and Greece are calling to end sanctions against Russia.

It makes sense for Russia to encourage this departure from former European solidarity against their country. It may make more sense to pay attention to Russia’s actions towards Europe such as the support for right-wing parts such as France’s Front Nationale and German’s AfD rather than the political rhetoric. Discord is where Russia can make its move, and as it has often done it past, it may do again.

Russia Sees Opportunities as E.U. Member States Feud was originally published on Global Security Review.

The twelve-mile-long bridge (19 kilometers) connects Russia and Crimea by both road and rail. The road portion officially opened on May 15, with the rail portion slated for completion in 2019.

The bridge was constructed at the cost of $3.7 billion, and can reportedly sustain 13 million passengers and 14 million tons of freight per year, and is designed to accommodate around 40,000 vehicles per day.

Planning for the Kerch Strait Bridge began in 2014, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine’s Response

On May 22, Ukraine filed a claim with the International Tribunal stating that the bridge’s construction was illegal under international law and was a threat to Ukraine’s sovereign interests.

Two days later, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko levied sanctions on Russian state-run media outlets RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) and Rossiya Segodnya (Россия Сегодня), citing national security concerns as the primary reason for the sanctions.

Both outlets are banned from operating or broadcasting within Ukraine for a minimum of three years.

Over a week before Poroshenko sanctioned the two media outlets, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on May 15 that it had detained RIA Novosti reporter Kiril Vyshnysky in Kiev on charges of  “high treason for allegedly participating in hybrid information warfare.”

The SBU announced that it had uncovered a “network of media structures controlled by the Russian Federation” and had launched an investigation into the activities of RIA Novosti-Ukraine.

A spokesperson for the SBU stated that “law enforcers have determined that they [RIA Novosti] were used by the aggressor country in the context of a hybrid information war against Ukraine and investigative actions are now being carried out.”

The Decline of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Over the past few years, Ukrainian-Russian relations have soured. In a generous reading of the situation, the bridge could be seen solely as a means to connect Crimea with Russia.

Such schemes, however, are rarely so innocent. The very act of connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula infers the permanence of the Crimean annexation.

The bridge will be a perpetual reminder to Ukrainians that Russian troops have a direct, overland (read: bridge) route into Crimea, diminishing any plausible hope of Ukraine retaking the peninsula.

Meanwhile, clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have escalated. During the week of May 21, there were 7,700 ceasefire violations. The escalations in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian response to the opening of the Crimean bridge indicate that relations between Ukraine and Russia will continue to deteriorate.

As Ukraine continues to turn westward, Russia may seek to respond in more drastic ways to underscore its significance and importance to both Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Russian-Crimean Bridge Completion Escalates Ukraine-Russia Tensions was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is often said, perhaps with some hyperbole, that Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers was the best hope for conflict resolution in the Middle East. Its architect John Kerry argues instead that the 2015 deal’s limited parameter of closing Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon is sufficient on the merits. The Trump administration is taking a different view, focusing on Iran’s escalating threats to U.S. allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Those threats, which have included missile, drone, and cyberattacks on Saudi oil facilities, are looming large over the global economy because they are squarely influencing the volatility of the price of oil. One could argue that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Iranian deal, referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has injected an even higher degree of risk into oil markets, where traders now feel that the chances of Mideast conflict resolution are lower.

But, the Trump administration could argue otherwise. From its perspective, the United States extended to Iran $6 billion in frozen funds, opened the door for a flood of spare parts to be shipped into Iran’s suffering oil and petrochemical sector, and looked the other way while European companies rushed in for commercial deals. In exchange, it’s true, Iran began to implement the terms of JCPOA, but as Secretary of State Pompeo laid out in a major speech on the subject, the nuclear deal has failed to turn down the heat on the wide range of conflicts plaguing the Mideast region.

Rather, Secretary Pompeo explained, Iran’s proxies have raised the stakes for U.S. allies, and regional conflicts have been dangerously escalating. U.S.-Iranian exchanges in Syria are also on the rise. The deal could still move forward, according to Secretary Pompeo, but not until Tehran addresses a laundry list of U.S. demands. Washington expects its action and rhetoric to spur more productive negotiations that would allow the United States to link restoring the nuclear deal with political negotiations to de-escalate conflicts. Since re-imposition of renewed oil sanctions doesn’t take hold for several months, wiggle room still exists for such diplomacy. But markets reflect doubt about those chances, reflecting the view of many respected commentators. Oil prices hit $80 a barrel and even the five-year forward oil price rose above $60 for the first time since the end of 2015. Speculators are still holding substantial long positions and industry has been slower to hedge, lest oil prices go higher still.

In the world of oil, it’s hard to compartmentalize complex geopolitical conflicts. In condemning the Trump administration’s move, Iran’s hardliners actually accused the United States of withdrawing from the JCPOA to raise the price of oil and called on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise its production to resist the United States. In a tweet from the Iranian Oil ministry via @VezaratNaft on May 11, Iranian oil minister Bijan Namdar Zangemeh is quoted as saying “President Trump playing double game in oil market. Some OPEC members playing into U.S. hands. U.S. seeking to boost shale oil production.” Simultaneously, Iranian media promulgated a spurious rumor that Saudi leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had been assassinated. The context for both was dialogue between the United States and its regional Arab allies (kicked off by a Trumpian tweet on OPEC) on the need to cool off the overheated oil market with higher oil production to ensure that the re-imposition of sanctions did not destabilize markets further.

In seeking “better terms” for the Iranian nuclear deal, the Trump administration is counting on the fact that the Iranian government faces more internal opposition from its population than it did when the deal was negotiated back in 2015. That popular discontent is palpable and explains why the Iranian rhetorical response to the U.S. withdrawal announcement has been relatively mild compared to historical precedents. But this is no cakewalk, since Iran is counting on Europe and other major trading partners to resist U.S. sanction efforts.

In recent years, China has established its own networks of financial channels and institutions that could be used to allow Chinese companies to pay Iran in its currency, the yuan, in a manner that avoids the Brussels-based SWIFT financial messaging system, which can be subject to U.S. tracking and intervention. China has already tested using the yuan to pay for imports from Russia and Iran via China National Petroleum Corporation’s Bank of Kunlun. The Tehran-based business daily The Financial Tribune suggested that other countries, including Europe, could tap “alternative Chinese financial networks.” But the practicalities of China taking the lead on behalf of Tehran when other U.S.-China bilateral trade issues loom large is more complicated now than it was back in 2012. In 2012, China agreed to meet the Obama administration’s request that it cut its Iranian imports by the minimum 20 percent. As robust a response as the United States may now say it wants from Beijing on Iran, Washington similarly has to consider other priorities on the table with China right now, including negotiations regarding North Korea.

Iran has been exporting roughly two million barrels a day (b/d) of crude oil. Europe purchases over a quarter of that volume and is—if push comes to shove—likely to go along with U.S. policy if no diplomatic progress can be made. For now, European leaders are trying diplomacy to keep the nuclear deal alive separately from the United States and to press Iran to address some of the common concerns on Secretary Pompeo’s list. Back in 2012, Europe cut virtually all of its oil imports from Iran. Japan had already conservatively lowered its purchases from Iran in March and even India’s oil giant IOC is now saying publicly that it is looking for alternative barrels to replace its 140,000 b/d of purchases from Iran, suggesting the oil will be made available to India from Saudi Arabia. South Korea is also expected to wind down its purchases from Iran given the imperative to display common ground with the United States; Seoul has already reduced purchases from 360,000 b/d last year to 300,000 b/d more recently. In sum, although Iran can conduct oil for goods barters with Russia and Turkey, it could potentially lose one million b/d of sales or more, if it the current geopolitical stalemate stands.

But more is at stake for Iran than short run oil sales since Tehran has learned it can get those back eventually if the political will towards sanctions wears off over time. The curtailment again of international investment in its natural gas industry is a bigger setback for Tehran, which needs natural gas not only to inject into its oil fields to drive production but also for residential and commercial use. If the United States manages to drive French firm Total back out of the important South Pars natural gas venture, the chances of Iran reestablishing itself as a major liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter dissipates once again, possibly this time for decades given potential U.S. exports and other market conditions. China, which is also an investor in South Pars, does not have experience developing LNG exporting projects. Unfortunately, the global natural gas stakes could make it harder to draw Russia along with any U.S.-led conflict resolution effort. Even if Tehran was willing to cooperate in Syria or Yemen, Russia—a major natural gas exporter to Europe and Asia—benefits from U.S. sanctions that block competition from Iranian exports. Motivating the Kremlin into any diplomatic deal that restores U.S.-Iranian cooperation could be a heavy lift.

Russia is expected to begin supplying natural gas by pipeline to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline by late 2019 but Russia’s Gazprom has had difficulty locking down sales to China from additional pipeline routes. Successful negotiations on the Korean peninsula could help in that regard, since one potential fix to North Korea’s energy needs could be a Russian gas peace pipe. But the availability of direct natural gas exports to China and South Korea from the United States muddies the waters further.

Beyond holding Iran out of the long run natural gas market, Russia could similarly be unwilling to agree to conflict resolution in Yemen and Syria because of the benefit it enjoys from keeping Saudi Arabia under financial and political pressure. Riyadh’s economic pressures, driven in part from its high military spending in Yemen, have made Saudi Arabia all the more willing to collaborate with Moscow on managing oil markets—a geopolitical reality that has strengthened Russia’s global standing significantly. It’s hard to see what would motivate the Kremlin to let Saudi Arabia off the hook given that a resumption of a tight alliance with Washington and Qatar is a material danger to Russia’s geopolitical and economic well-being, as demonstrated when the three countries collaborated in the early 2010s to weaken Moscow’s grip on European energy markets.

Russia’s posture is not the only barrier, however, to conditions that would allow progress on U.S.-Iranian conflict resolution. Even if the economic penalty of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions were sufficient to motivate Iran back to the negotiating table, it remains unclear to what extent Tehran can influence its own proxies who have independent goals that could not align fully with any conflict resolution deal Iran could strike with the United States and its allies. Moreover, it is similarly unclear whether the United States could draw Saudi Arabia into a workable political settlement for Yemen. Thus, while the United States could have a strategy in mind that could improve upon the status quo in the Middle East, a deeper dive into the energy realpolitik of the matter shows the complexities that stand in the way of progress. With so much at stake, an incredibly disciplined and patient hand will be necessary to work through the wide host of internecine, interconnected issues.

The Complicated Geopolitics of U.S. Oil Sanctions on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most people presume that the great transition took place in the 1960s, and specifically at the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) when the Church officially signaled its openness to secular statehood, religious freedom, and human rights. This is a mistake. Historians are reluctant to issue laws of history, but here’s one that seems reasonable: massive institutions do not fundamentally transform themselves in moments of relative placidity. The process requires too much energy and too much buy-in from cautious elites. They transform in moments of crisis, destruction, and fear. The early 1960s were not such a moment for the Church. The 1930s, however, were.

The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 signaled a new era in European politics. Across Europe, the liberal center fell apart with a whimper, as voters flocked towards extremes of fascism and communism. Catholics were horrified. Liberals had threatened Catholic schools, or at worst to wrest control over the appointment of bishops. Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler represented something new, and something even more alarming. From the Catholic perspective, they were ‘totalitarian.’ They were claiming total allegiance over their subjects, body, and soul. Both were critical of the Churches, which after all represented alternative principles of law and morality in states that were aggressively trying to turn a variegated population into a unified whole.

In the face of totalitarianism, Catholics confronted the very real possibility that their ability to receive the sacraments, let alone attend Catholic schools, might soon be abridged. As Europe hung in the balance between Hitler and Stalin, the notion that some kind of Catholic political revival was in the offing seemed preposterous, and dangerous to even consider (Hitler had sensitive antennae for such things). This led Catholics, from the papacy to the parish, to reimagine the nature of their Church. For, as all good Christians know, death and rebirth are a hair’s breadth apart.

Their goal was no longer to offer an alternative to modernity, nor to even imagine that the Church would be at the center of some future society. The goal, instead, was to use modern language to make claims on secular states so that Catholics could protect the Church, and see at least some Catholic principles codified into law. It was in these years, and for these reasons, that Catholics accepted human rights, religious freedom, and secular modernity.

Catholics in the 1930s were faced with an agonizing set of choices. If the holistic Catholic renewal they had long dreamed of was off the table, what should take its place? Where should the Church stake its claim? Most Catholic leaders and thinkers opted to retrench around the family. For the first time, Catholics placed sexual and reproductive ethics at the very center of their social and political mission. They did so for two reasons. First, Catholics reasoned that control over the family, as a site of moral education and instruction, would ensure institutional survival in a world that seemed to be falling apart. Secondly, Catholics reasoned (with some justice) that Catholic family ethics would be acceptable to secular politicians, whether it be Hitler or Franklin Roosevelt. These figures, after all, had their own reasons to oppose contraception, divorce, and homosexuality.

The choices that Catholics made in the 1930s have ricocheted to the present. Catholics have organized with immense success around same-sex marriage, abortion, and other reproductive issues, pressuring secular states to encode Catholic teachings into law. This has never been the only way to theorize a Catholic modernity, however. Ever since the 1930s, a dissident faction has observed that this focus on the family has been counterproductive, leading the Church into alliances with forces that in other ways have been antagonistic to Catholic values. They have not rejected Catholic teaching on these matters, but they have disputed the overwhelming emphasis on them, and they have sought to recover other elements of the long Catholic tradition that are more concerned with economic, racial or ecological injustice.

It is no secret that these two wings of the Church coexist today. Pope Francis has expressly questioned the over-emphasis on sexual matters, seeking to recover a broader notion of what a Catholic modernity might entail. His many critics complain that he is giving away too much, and abandoning the family as the citadel of virtue in a world gone mad. This dispute is, however, misconstrued if we date it to the 1960s. The Church did not transform in a lame attempt to seem ‘up-to-date’ in a world where John Lennon could claim, with some justification, to be bigger than Jesus. And the faultlines of the present do not represent, fundamentally, two different attitudes to the mass consumption and sexual revolution of the late 1960s. They represent two different responses to the fundamental problem of how the Church should interact with modern political projects: a question that was first faced, in all its drama, in the era of fascism.

Might the Church, then, be on the dawn of another fundamental reimagination of its nature, and of its relationship to the world? It is too early to tell, though, for all of the fire and fury surrounding Pope Francis, the modern Church is not putty in the hands of the papacy. In the 20th century, the Church transformed only when bishops, clergy and powerful lay voices came to believe that the institution was in dire danger. There are no threats of the totalitarian magnitude on the horizon, although it is certainly imaginable that they might emerge one day.

The very success of the 20th-century Church might be weighing down its 21st-century successor. Whatever the fate of their eternal souls might be, living Catholics are like the rest of us: eternally fighting the last war. The struggle against totalitarianism has concluded. Catholics won, and the contemporary Church was shaped to the core by that battle. Can that Church be repurposed for a new world – a post-totalitarian, but still extremely dangerous, one? This is one of the crucial questions of our times, and while history suggests that it might not, there is no way to be sure. The Church has surprised us before.

This Idea was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust to Aeon. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust.

Funders to Aeon Magazine are not involved in editorial decision-making, including commissioning or content-approval.

How the Catholic Church Evolved to Outlast the Nazis was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent announcement by the United States of Javelin anti-tank missile system shipments to Ukraine has been met with a litany of gratitude from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and condemnation from Moscow. In March, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of 210 Javelin Missiles and 37 Javelin Command Launch Units to Ukraine, worth $47 million.

However, it is not only American lethal aid that is being provided to Ukraine. Since 2015, Bulgaria has been exporting weapons to Ukraine, including DRTG-73 anti-tank grades. These have been used in combat operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as recently as November 2017.

The proliferation of Lethal Weapons

Bulgarian arms shipments aren’t just going to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, however. They are also going to Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. In December 2016, Bulgarian defense manufacturer VMZ’s RPG-22 weapon was discovered to be in use by separatist forces by Ukrainian Security Services. There is no question that Bulgarian lethal weapons have been widely proliferated throughout the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In 2015, Bulgaria exported over €16 million of armaments to Ukraine in 2016.

It isn’t surprising that these weapons are being proliferated on both sides of the Ukrainian conflict—it exemplifies a trend of foreign arms manufacturers exacerbating the conflict through increased arms shipments. As early as 2015, Lithuania was also in the business of sending lethal weapons to Ukraine.

In 2017, Lithuania announced that they intended to deliver weapons worth €1.93 million to Ukraine this year. Included, reportedly, are “more than 7,000 Kalashnikov rifles, two million cartridges, more than 80 machine guns, several mortars, anti-tank weapons and other military equipment.”

Escalation and the Javelin missiles

With the confirmation of delivery of U.S. Javelin missiles, the war in Ukraine enters a new phase. Western support of Ukraine creates the impression that this conflict is merely another proxy war between Russia and the United States. Although lethal weapons have been sent before from Bulgaria and Lithuania to Ukrainian forces, the higher caliber of Javelin missiles introduces a new level of escalation. The proliferation of these weapons is less likely—however, the danger lies in what now Russian-backed separatists will do.

In recent weeks, there has been an uptick in fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Despite the Minsk II Accords, the four-year-old conflict continues to simmer.

This new variable begs the question of what will happen next? Generally, when a country party to a conflict receives stronger weapons, the opposing side will attempt to match it in an arms-race-like scenario. Russian-backed separatists may be supplied with heavier-caliber armaments, and it’s possible Russia’s involvement in Ukraine will become more overt in the near future.

For now, the increased proliferation of weapons in Ukraine may increase Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s gratitude to the United States, but it remains to be seen how this will affect the conflict’s strategic landscape.

American and Bulgarian Weapons Shipments Enter Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years after drone operations were suspended in August 2016, the OSCE has elected to again introduce long-range unmanned drones (i.e., aerial vehicles – UAVs) to Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The OSCE will be using long-range Camcopter S-100 UAVs, which will both operate at night and during the day in areas where ground patrols of the OSCE are not permitted.

Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug stated that “Given that the Minsk agreements envisage the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other technology by the OSCE SMM, we expect the sides, as signatories to these agreements, to not interfere, by jamming, shooting or otherwise, with the operation of these UAVs.”

Part of the reason this monitoring system was initially canceled was that several of the OSCE’s drones were shot down using surface-to-air missiles and rifle fire, and were subjected to interference from jamming equipment.

Due to a lack of access to the crash sites, no blame was assigned to the downing of the drones. However, there was suspicion that the fire came from Russian-backed separatists.

Both Ukrainian fighters and Russian-backed separatists have attempted to shoot down drones in the past. After the cancellation of the long-range drones, short- and medium-range drones continued to function.

Lack of Enforcement of the Minsk Agreements

Perhaps one of the most concerning detriments in the Minsk Agreements was the lack of options on how to enforce it. Although the OSCE can act as a reasonably neutral actor in observing both sides of the conflict, there are many parts of the region where OSCE monitors are not allowed.

Naturally, these are the more common regions where violations are more likely to occur such as artillery attacks, weapons positioning, and prohibited weapons systems.

Why is the OSCE Reinstating the Program Now?

So, what has made it a necessity to restart this program? The main reasoning comes from a video sourced at Ukrainian NGO Come Back Alive, which shows a new electronic warfare system. Come Back Alive claims that this new system comes from Russia. However, Russia has disputed these statements.

The situation in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk’s regions has become somewhat of a hybrid conflict, where actual progress from either side does not occur often, but actual fighting and violations of the negotiated Minsk Accords continue to take place.

The real question is whether reintroducing the drone program will offer any new way of maintaining peace. While some state that monitoring systems decrease violence and increase incentives to follow the rules, what would stop separatists from shooting down these multi-million costing drones to merely be shot down again?

The reason why the OSCE is choosing to reinstate the drone program may have to do with the new electronic warfare system, with some stating it is an escalation of electronic warfare. The maintenance of such a program is, however, questionable.

OSCE Drones Reintroduced into Ukraine’s Donbass and Donetsk Warzones was originally published on Global Security Review.

Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Individual freedoms are secondary to the interests of the state, and there is an absence of constitutional authority or supremacy over the government in an authoritarian regime.

Authoritarianism has been the norm in countries like Russia and China. However, there is a growing trend towards authoritarianism among democratically-elected governments in countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland.  Here are recently published stories that relate to this trend.

Explore all Stories Relating to Authoritarianism

China’s Role in Ousting Mugabe During the Zimbabwe “Coup”

The ouster of Robert Mugabe dominated global coverage of Africa at the end of 2017.

In Western coverage of the first week after the coup in Zimbabwe, there was speculation about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.

Continue reading…

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 

Millions of people around the world voted in elections this year. The French elected Emmanuel Macron president, while South Koreans elected Moon Jae-in president. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani won reelection with a much wider margin of support than his first time around. Turkey voted to expand President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s constitutional authority. Britain’s Theresa May gambled and lost her parliamentary majority, whereas Japan’s Shinzo Abe gambled and came away with a big victory. German Chancellor Angela Merkel led her party to a first-place finish but is struggling to form a coalition government. A disputed independence referendum in Catalonia triggered a constitutional crisis in Spain, and a similarly controversial independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan raised political tensions in Iraq. Next year will see equally important and consequential elections. Here are ten to watch.

Continue reading…

Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East

The impact of the Arab Spring, the retraction of the U.S. military, and diminishing economic influence on the Arab world—as displayed during the Obama Administration—are facts. The first visit of a Saudi king to Russia shows the growing power of Russia in the Middle East. It also shows that not only Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also Egypt and Libya, are more likely to consider Moscow as a strategic ally.

Continue reading…

Explore all Stories Relating to Authoritarianism

Geopolitical Trend: Authoritarianism Spreads Around the Globe was originally published on Global Security Review.

On one level this is a story about changes in relative costs. The costs of solar and wind have plunged while nuclear has become almost astoundingly expensive. But this raises the question of why this came about. As I argue in my new book, Low Carbon Politics, it helps to dip into cultural theory.

Culture wars

The seminal text in this field, Risk and Culture (1982), by the British anthropologist Mary Douglas and American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, argues the behavior of individuals and institutions can be explained by four different biases:

1. Individualists: people biased towards outcomes that result from competitive arrangements;
2. Hierarchists: those who prefer ordered decisions being made by leaders and followed by others;
3. Egalitarians: people who favor equality and grassroots decision-making and pursue a common cause;
4. Fatalists: those who see decision-making as capricious and feel unable to influence outcomes.

The first three categories help explain different actors in the electricity industry. For governments and centralized monopolies often owned by the state, read hierarchists. For green campaigning organizations, read egalitarians, while free-market-minded private companies fit the individualist bias.

The priorities of these groups have not greatly changed in recent years. Hierarchists tend to favor nuclear power, since big power stations make for more straightforward grid planning, and nuclear power complements nuclear weapons capabilities considered important for national security.

Egalitarians like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth usually oppose new nuclear power plant and favor renewables. Traditionally they have worried about radioactive environmental damage and nuclear proliferation. Individualists, meanwhile, favor whichever technologies reduce costs.

These cultural realities lie behind the problems experienced by nuclear power. To compound green opposition, many of nuclear power’s strongest supporters are conservative hierarchists who are either skeptical about the need to reduce carbon emissions or treat it as a low priority. Hence they are often unable or unwilling to mobilize climate change arguments to support nuclear, which has made it harder to persuade egalitarians to get on board.

This has had several consequences. Green groups won subsidies for renewable technologies by persuading more liberal hierarchists that they had to address climate change – witness the big push by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth for the feed-in tariffs that drove solar uptake in the late 2000s, for example. In turn, both wind and solar have been optimized, and their costs have come down.

Nuclear largely missed out on these carbon-reducing subsidies. Worse, greens groups persuaded governments as far back as the 1970s that safety standards around nuclear power stations needed to improve. This more than anything drove up costs.

As for the individualists, they used to be generally unconvinced by renewable energy and skeptical of environmental opposition to nuclear. But as relative costs have changed, they have increasingly switched positions.

The hierarchists are still able to use monopoly electricity organizations to support nuclear power, but individualists are increasingly pressuring them to make these markets more competitive so that they can invest in renewables more easily. In effect, we are now seeing an egalitarian-individualist alliance against the conservative hierarchists.

Both sides of the pond

Donald Trump’s administration in the US, for example, has sought subsidies to keep existing coal and nuclear power stations running. This is both out of concern for national security and to support traditional centralized industrial corporations – classic hierarchist thinking.

Yet this has played out badly with individualist corporations pushing renewables. Trump’s plans have even been rejected by some of his own appointments on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

In similarly hierarchist fashion, electricity supply monopolies in Georgia and South Carolina started building new nuclear power stations after regulatory agencies allowed them to collect mandatory payments from electricity consumers to cover costs at the same time.

Yet even hierarchists cannot ignore economic reality entirely. The South Carolina project has been abandoned, and the Georgia project only survives through a very large federal loan bailout.

Contrast this with casino complexes in Nevada like MGM Resorts not only installing their own solar photovoltaic arrays but paying many millions of dollars to opt out from the local monopoly electricity supplier. They have campaigned successfully to win a state referendum supporting electricity liberalization.

The UK, meanwhile, is an example of how different biases can compete. Policy has traditionally been formed in hierarchical style, with big companies producing policy proposals which go out to wider consultation. It’s a cultural bias that favors nuclear power, but this conflicts with a key priority dating back to Thatcher that technological winners are chosen by the market.

This has led policymakers in Whitehall to favor both renewables and nuclear, but the private electricity companies have mostly refused to invest in nuclear, seeing it as too risky and expensive. The only companies prepared to plug the gap have been more hierarchists – EDF, which is majority-owned by France, and Chinese state nuclear corporations.

Even then, getting Hinkley C in south-west England underway – the first new nuclear plant since the 1990s – required an extensive commitment by the UK Treasury to underwrite bank loans. There is also an embarrassingly high price to be paid for the electricity over a very long 35-year period. Such has been the bad publicity that it’s hard to imagine a politician agreeing to more plant on such terms.

Where does this reality leave hierarchists? Increasingly having to explain prohibitive nuclear costs to their electorates – at least in democracies. The alternative, as renewable energy becomes the new orthodoxy, is to embrace it.

In Australia, for example, a big utility company called AGL is trying to seduce homeowners to agree to link their solar panels to the company’s systems to centralize power dispatch in a so-called a “virtual power plant.”

When the facts change, to misquote John Maynard Keynes, you can always change your mind.

The Unholy Alliance That Explains Why Renewable Energy is Trouncing Nuclear was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.  Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled will be increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to build standards can be elusive as Russia, China, along with other actors such as ISIL seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor.  Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate. Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, such as when to apply concepts like the Responsibility to Protect—that might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations polled by Pew state climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as a la carte internationalism persists.  As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

Global Shifts in Geopolitical Trends was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response to the poisoning of a former Russian spy on British soil, President Donald J. Trump has ordered the expulsion of dozens of Russian diplomats and the closing of the Russian consulate in Seattle.

The United States joins more than twenty other governments taking similar steps against Moscow.

In a written interview, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Stephen Sestanovich says the unity of action, particularly in Europe, is a “real warning sign to Putin.” Meanwhile, U.S. policy toward Russia is likely to become “more hostile” with Trump’s newly configured national security team, he says.

How significant are these moves by the Trump administration?

Traditionally, expulsions like these have been confined to what one government sees as objectionable behavior on its own territory by the intelligence personnel of a rival state.

There’s usually a round or two of retaliation, and then things go back to normal. We’ve obviously seen a change in one part of this pattern already, with concurrent actions taken by the United States and numerous allies. But we want to watch for other changes as well.

Remember, there have been many calls, especially in Britain, for a tightening up of policies related to money laundering and the ability of Russians to move their wealth in and out of western countries.

Less than two weeks ago, the United States imposed new sanctions related to meddling in its elections. American officials have also complained about a growing Russian cyber threat to civilian infrastructure, especially the electrical grid.

What we’re hearing is a far broader set of grievances toward Russia. The diplomatic message is: Russia has ceased to be a member of European polite society. It acts like an outlier and will be treated as such. If that’s a message European governments are getting more comfortable with, relations won’t get back to normal for a while.

How does this reflect the administration’s internal deliberations on Russia policy?

If you’d asked experts and insiders about the administration’s internal deliberations on Russia policy last week, most answers would have portrayed a confused and divided team.

Remember the president’s call to Vladimir Putin despite his staff’s advice not to congratulate the Russian leader after his recent reelection. Some people have even suggested that it was Trump’s anger at this leak that led him to push National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster out more quickly.

But if Putin took any encouragement from that call—and from its aftermath—he’ll have to reconsider now.

The new lineup of senior national security staff is surely both more hostile to Russia than it was before—and more likely to bring the president along with them.

You’ll have a national security advisor in John Bolton and a secretary of state in Mike Pompeo who are more likely to get Trump to follow their advice the next time he gets Putin on the phone.

Some EU countries have expelled Russian diplomats while some haven’t. How divided is the bloc on Russia?

The EU has never been of one mind about how to handle Russia, but nobody has made any money in the past four years betting that the Europeans would lift sanctions.

To the contrary, again and again, EU policy has remained united even though many members have disagreed with it. They were willing to put aside their differences, to follow the lead of the Germans, and to listen to the United States.

If anything, what we’re seeing now is a deepening of that unity. After all, this week’s expulsions are a show of solidarity with a country that is leaving the EU. And the Poles, who have lately been somewhat estranged from Europe, apparently took a leading role.

And after a year in which Europeans wondered where the United States was headed, we’ve seen a strong show of support from Washington to stand together against Moscow. Quite apart from the expulsions themselves, all this is a real warning sign to Putin that his policies are not working.

Where do you see Russia’s relations with the West headed?

It’s wrong to think that this is a breach that can’t be healed. Many European leaders want to keep relations with Moscow from becoming too hostile. There’s always a détente wing among the Social Democrats in Germany. A new Italian government will want to patch things up, even ease sanctions.

Southern Europe, in general, is more sympathetic to Russia than the north. And, as long as Trump remains president, American policy will be unpredictable.

All the same, there is a new suspicion of Putin among most Western governments and a greater conviction that he’s more of a problem than a solution.

What more should NATO and EU governments be doing to alter Russia’s behavior? These diplomatic gestures seem to have little practical effect on Putin.

People often underestimate how much NATO and the EU have already adjusted their policies toward Russia. In the past four years—that is, since the Ukraine crisis—a consensus has taken shape around the need for more defense spending and for forward deployments to defend new allies. Energy policies have made it harder for Russia to use gas supplies as a weapon.

There’s been less progress in limiting other Russian tools, from money to hacking to disinformation to—as we’ve just discovered—nerve agents. But the direction in almost every case is the same: toward a clearer understanding of the problem and a discussion of ways to push back.

Putin is far more isolated and under far more pressure than just a few years ago.

What Lies Ahead for Russia’s Relations With the West? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As global trade has flourished in recent decades, so have trade disputes. Trading nations have created various forums to adjudicate conflicts, but they are increasingly the subject of controversy. U.S. President Donald J. Trump has long criticized trade dispute resolution panels as unfair and ineffective, particularly those the United States is party to via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). While some critics say dispute panels undermine national sovereignty, proponents argue they offer much-needed protections that boost confidence in global investment and prevent trade wars.

Why did dispute panels emerge?

As cross-border trade and investment increased rapidly through the 1990s, individual states as well as public and private investors sought ways to adjudicate conflicts or alleged violations of trade agreements. Over time, the international trading system has developed a number of mechanisms to do this, depending on the type of dispute and the parties involved.

The authority of these supranational bodies is established by agreements such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs), or by membership in an international organization such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Parties agree to accept rulings, though enforcement authority and appeals processes vary.

What types of disputes do they handle?

These bodies broadly deal with two types of disputes: state-state, in which governments challenge the trade policies of other governments; and investor-state, in which individual investors file complaints against governments.

State-State. Most state-state disputes are handled by the WTO system, the primary body governing international trade. Each of its 164 members have agreed to rules about trade policy, such as limiting tariffs and restricting subsidies. A member can appeal to the WTO if it believes another member is violating those rules. The United States, for instance, has repeatedly brought WTO cases against China over its support for various export industries, including one in early 2017 alleging that Beijing unfairly subsidizes aluminum producers. That case has not been decided yet, though the Trump administration has already retaliated by unilaterally imposing tariffs on some Chinese aluminum producers.

Investor-State. Known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, these disputes typically involve foreign businesses claiming that a host government abused them by expropriating their assets, discriminating against them, or otherwise treating them unfairly. For example, a Canadian gold mining company claimed that Venezuela’s nationalization of the gold industry in 2011 violated an investment treaty between the two countries. A tribunal found that while Venezuela had the legal right to nationalize private sector industries, it failed to properly compensate the company for the expropriated assets.

How does the WTO adjudicate cases?

The WTO’s forum for arbitration is called the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). The DSM is run by a rotating staff of judges, as well as a permanent staff of lawyers and administrators. The WTO appoints a panel to hear a case if the opposing parties are unable to resolve the issue through negotiations. A panel’s rulings, if not overturned on appeal, are binding on the respondent country. If guilty, it has the choice to cease the offending practice or provide compensation. If the country fails to respond, the plaintiff country can take targeted measures to offset any harm caused, such as blocking imports or raising tariffs.

Member states have filed more than five hundred disputes since the WTO’s creation in 1995, but most of these cases have been settled prior to litigation.

A number of multilateral institutions adjudicate investor-state disputes, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands, or the London Court of International Arbitration, but one of the most important is the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Created in 1965 as part of the World Bank, the ICSID has 162 member states, all of whom have agreed to recognize the legitimacy of its arbitration system.

Unlike the WTO, the ICSID has no permanent tribunals and does not directly rule on cases. Rather, it administers the process by which disputants choose an independent, ad hoc panel of arbitrators to hear their case. The arbitrators are generally legal experts, including professors, practicing lawyers, and former judges. The specifics on the sorts of conflicts that can be referred to an ICSID panel are set out in individual trade or investment agreements.

There are some 2,500 treaties with investment dispute provisions in force around the world, and the ISCID has administered more than six hundred disputes in its half-century existence. The number of cases accelerated through the 1990s and 2000s with the proliferation of investment agreements, reaching a peak of fifty-two in 2015. About a third of the cases are settled or withdrawn before concluding; a third are dismissed in favor of the defendant; and a third favor the investor in full or in part. An investor’s award generally holds the full force of domestic law in the country being sued.

What are the criticisms of the WTO’s system?

Most trade experts see the WTO’s arbitration forum as one of its most successful efforts, helping to institutionalize rules and reduce the threat of trade wars. However, critics, including the Trump administration, have criticized the WTO system on several grounds. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer has argued the WTO has an anti-U.S. bias because 134 complaints have been brought against the United States, more than any other country, and it has lost most of those cases.

Most trade experts see the WTO’s arbitration forum as one of its most successful efforts.

But many economists argue this is misguided, noting that complainant countries, including the United States, usually win cases they bring to the WTO because they tend to bring only the strongest cases. As former USTR Michael Froman points out, the United States under President Barack Obama brought more cases to the WTO than any other country during that time, including sixteen against China. It won all that have been decided.

Trump and Lighthizer have also said the WTO is incapable of policing China. The USTR’s 2018 report on China asserted for the first time that Beijing’s state-led economic policy is so inimical to global free trade rules that it renders the WTO effectively irrelevant. “No amount of enforcement activities by other WTO members would be sufficient to remedy this type of behavior,” it states.

Other analysts argue that the WTO has been increasingly undermined by its most powerful members, including the United States. For instance, the Obama administration ignored a series of unfavorable rulings and blocked the appointment of a WTO judge for the first time.

What is the debate over investor-state dispute tribunals?

Investor-state dispute tribunals have become a flash point in the debates over multilateral trade deals such as NAFTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the proposed U.S.-Europe Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Opponents say that these tribunals erode national sovereignty by allowing foreign corporations to bypass domestic legal systems. In 2017, a group of more than two hundred lawyers and economists warned that such provisions [PDF] give corporations “alarming power” to override domestic legislation, based on the secret deliberations of unaccountable tribunals that have no appeals process. Before the U.S.-Europe trade negotiations were put on hold in 2016, this worry was especially acute among the European public, which feared that ISDS would allow U.S. companies to challenge EU rules on labor and environmental protections, food safety guidelines, and other public interest legislation.

The Trump administration, too, is skeptical of the provision, which Lighthizer has called “offensive” for giving non-Americans a veto over U.S. law. The administration has proposed changing NAFTA’s ISDS provision to be “opt-in” rather than automatic, which Canada and Mexico have strenuously opposed.

Supporters say these concerns are overblown, pointing out that the United States has never lost an ISDS case to a foreign investor, and that investors tend to lose more cases than they win. Furthermore, they argue that ISDS protects foreign investments made by U.S. businesses, and generally boosts cross-border investment.

What are the options for reforming these systems?

At the WTO, reform discussions have focused on process, as the number of disputes and appeals, as well as the complexity of cases, have increased in recent decades. Reform proposals include expanding the pool of experts on panels, digitizing paperwork, and other tactics to streamline operations. Some have suggested the WTO’s dispute body take decisions based on majority vote rather than consensus, as it does now, though such a move would likely be opposed by the United States and others. Currently, a single member can delay proceedings.

Meanwhile, the public controversy over ISDS has led governments around the world to experiment with other approaches to investor protection. One option is to remove ISDS from some agreements altogether, as countries such as Australia have done, pushing businesses to first pursue challenges through the domestic legal system and then, if unsuccessful, allowing for state-state dispute settlement.

In another alternative, the European Union is developing an investment court that will operate more like the WTO tribunal system, with a permanent roster of judges, strict conflict-of-interest rules, public proceedings, and an appeals process. The European Union and Canada included a version of this in their 2016 trade agreement.

Are there other mechanisms to resolve disputes?

Individual trade deals have also created separate state-state arbitration mechanisms. This was the case with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), the precursor to NAFTA. CUSTA’s Chapter 19, which was continued in NAFTA, allows for one government to challenge the trade policies of another via an independent, bi-national panel, which bypasses domestic court systems.

NAFTA’s Chapter 19 has proven controversial. Canada insisted on its inclusion in CUSTA because of what it saw as a long history of unfair U.S. trade policies. Ottawa has brought dozens of cases before these panels, many relating to U.S. duties on Canadian lumber. The Trump administration has called for the removal of Chapter 19 from NAFTA as part of the renegotiations that opened in 2017.

Some trade experts argue that Chapter 19 reduced trade disputes between NAFTA members because it made it likely that any trade barriers would be overturned by the panels. Removing it, some say, could lead to an increase in duties, especially by a U.S. administration that has seemed eager to apply them. This, in turn, could lead to retaliatory trade measures from Canada and Mexico.

How Are International Trade Disputes Resolved? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Earlier in the negotiation process, Radio Free Europe reported that Hungary additionally wanted to include helicopter spare parts to the exemption list along with biathlon rifles and small caliber sports guns. However, this was later taken off the table. With these two exceptions, both Hungary along with Slovakia see the potential for the small arms market in Belarus. Sports hunting is popular in the post-Soviet country; both small caliber guns and biathlon rifles are popularly used.

Why the embargo?

The arms embargo was initially announced in 2011 after Belarusian officials initiated a violent crackdown on protestors in the 2010 presidential election. This election brought Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko another term in office, an office he held which he’s held since 1993. Four Belarusian companies had their assets frozen and access to EU visas restricted. Also, 174 individuals, including President Lukashenko, were sanctioned.

EU-Belarusian relations were somewhat tarred with the feathers of human rights violations, and the rule of law violations and a lack of press freedom. That all began to change in 2015 when Belarus released the country’s final remaining six political prisoners. Why bother? As a dictator, what could motivate Lukashenko to don a mantle of European civility?

The answer is Russian leverage. Lukashenko was under pressure to allow a Russian airbase to be constructed in Belarus. In the background of this Russian move towards a more concrete show of their power was the fear of NATO beginning to reach eastward. Rather than agree with Russia, however, Lukashenko believed that the construction of such a base would exacerbate tensions. So, when Belarus began to court the European Union, the reasoning was not so difficult to understand.

Two years ago, in February of 2016, the EU removed four companies and 170 individuals from the sanctions list, leaving four individuals remaining. The rationale given was that the human rights situation in Belarus had improved. However, the four individuals remain on the sanctions list. The EU claims that these four individuals played roles in the unresolved political disappearances of four Belarusians in 1999-2000. They consisted of opposition politicians Yuri Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar, businessman Anatol Krasouski and journalist Dzmitry Zavadski.

So, who is still sanctioned?

• Former Interior Minister Uladzimir Naumau
• Former Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Sheiman
• Former Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakou
• And Former Commander of the Special Forces Brigade of the Interior Ministry Dzmitry Paulichenka

It’s an interesting list—particularly given that Uladzimir Naumau, Dzmitry Paulichenka, and Yury Sheiman are also included on the list of sanctions in the United States. Though given their role in the earlier repressive steps taken by the Belarusian government, it’s not surprising. Their continued lack of ability to travel to Europe and the United States as well as their overseas assets being frozen is business as usual.

The arms embargo today is more a symbolic statement, a sign that the European Union is promoting democracy and human rights, even in countries with which they share a border. But if the tendency to add more and more exceptions continues to grow—it won’t be surprising if all that remains is the four individuals associated with political disappearances. After all, more often than not, economic gains rates higher on the scale of political choice than the idealistic urges of human rights advocates.

European Union Extends Arms Embargo Against Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most of the focus in recent weeks has been on Russia’s newfound confidence in its nuclear arsenal after President Vladimir Putin boasted about four new delivery systems designed to make U.S. defenses “useless.”

Of equal concern to U.S. and European officials, however, is Russia’s remade conventional military might, which has been displayed and tested in places like Ukraine and Syria.

“Russia’s increasingly modernized military is operating at levels not seen since the Cold War,” the commander of U.S. forces in Europe, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, told lawmakers in Washington, Thursday, warning the U.S. has no choice but to keep pace.

“Given their [Russia’s] modernization and the pace that it’s on, and what we are aware of they’re doing, we have to maintain our modernization so we can remain dominant in the areas that we are dominant today,” he said.

Dominance possible by 2025 or sooner

Scaparrotti, who also serves as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, further underscored that any failure by Washington to continue to modernize its forces could enable Russia to challenge the U.S. “in almost every domain, in a military perspective, by 2025.”

In some areas, like the Arctic, Russian dominance could come even sooner, Scaparrotti said, estimating Moscow could exert control over northern routes there in as little as two to three years.

The U.S. and NATO are not alone in their concern.

A new report by the Rand Corporation concludes Eastern Europe is especially vulnerable, warning NATO ground forces there would be “badly outnumbered and outgunned” if Moscow were to launch a conventional attack.

“Russia would have a substantial time-distance advantage in the initial days and weeks of its ground campaign because of its strong starting position,” the report states.

It also determined Russia forces would benefit from a strategy “that emphasizes mobility and repower and trains to conduct larger-scale operations, strengthening Russia’s ability to engage in conflicts between mechanized forces close to its border.”

More tanks, troops

According to the report, while Russia has about 78,000 troops along Europe’s eastern flank, NATO has 32,000. Russian tanks also outnumber NATO tanks 757 to 129.

Questioned by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday, Scaparrotti pushed back against some of those concerns, noting any potential conflict would not be fought with ground forces and tanks alone.

There also are some doubts about the likelihood Russia would try to engage in such a conflict.

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service asserts in a report earlier this year the threat of a direct Russian military attack in 2018 “is low.”

Still, the Estonian report cautioned that Russian forces along Europe’s eastern flank and the Baltics “have consistently strengthened their presence in the region with the most modern weapon systems as well as the establishment of new units and commands.”

Equally concerning to U.S. and European military and intelligence officials is Russia’s ongoing influence campaign — part of what Scaparrotti describes as Moscow’s “whole of society approach” that can soften up potential targets well in advance of any use of force.

“It can really undermine a nation because all they have to do is sow some confusion,” he said. “It’s subtle but it’s constant.”

Every aspect of Europe

The commander of U.S. forces in Europe also expressed concern that Washington may not be doing enough to counter Russia, questioning whether there is “an effective unification across the interagency, with the energy and the focus that we could attain,” despite reinforcing the military’s cyber operations across Europe.

“They’re involved in just about every aspect of Europe in one way or the other,” Scaparrotti said, pointing to the Balkans, and Serbia, in southeastern Europe, as a particular area of concern.

“Russia’s at work in the Balkans, and I think we’ve kind of taken our eye off of the area,” he warned. “I’ve seen an increase in the year and a half I’ve been on the job.”

Russia Poised to Challenge U.S. & NATO Allies for Military Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

International orders have a tendency be based on two pillars: the equilibrium power and prestige among the main members and some level of shared values. Both of those pillars look shaky today.

For several years, U.S. Grand Strategy was based on the concept that a unitary, U.S.-led order revealed universal values, was simple to join and exercised a gravitational force on others nations.

Those assumptions don’t keep as strongly as they formerly did. If Washington expects to maintain an international system which might help avoid conflict, increase wealth, and promote liberal values, it’s going to have to adopt a more diverse order, one that operates in various ways for various states and regions and on various issues.

Connected Forecasts:

• The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers
• Russia: Ongoing Tensions with the West Throughout 2018
• Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies
• A Changing Role for the United States
• The European Union: A Chance to Lead?

The U.S. will be lured to withstand such a change and also to double down on the present liberal order following the book of the Cold War: rallying democracies and penalizing norm-breakers.

But, such an order will create more embittered outcasts and imperil the most basic objective of a global order: to maintain peace between the great powers. Dividing the world into defenders and opponents of a shared sequence is also very likely to be less feasible than in the past. China’s role in the worldwide economics and its standing as a regional power mean that it can’t be isolated in the manner the Soviet Union was.

A Multi-Lateral Order

A lot of today’s rising powers, furthermore, have personal preferences which are too diverse to collect into a U.S.-led system or a bloc opposed to it. If China or even Russia adopt a considerably more aggressive stance, the U.S. might find it necessary to focus mostly on containing it and hunker down into a narrow, U.S.-led liberal purchase.

However, doing so should be the last resort. Throughout the Cold War, the central challenge of world politics was to contain, and finally transform, just one power opposed to the most important world order. Today the aim is extremely different: to prevent war and promote collaboration among a group of nations.

Building a more inclusive order

An order that’s inclusive and shared will face this challenge better than one that’s narrow, competitive, and dominated by Washington. The US would, therefore, be better off attempting to develop many distinct yet overlapping forms of sequence: universal and significant power global-centric and regional, political and economic, liberal and realist. To an extent, Washington already does this.

However, the trend in U.S. strategy, particularly since the conclusion of the Cold War, was to pursue a more homogeneous liberal order that all states must join in about the same manner and which pushes its liberal values on each front. The United States would have greater grip if it knowingly embraced a sequence and accepted a few of the hard compromises that came with it.

Connected Forecasts:

• The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers
• Russia: Ongoing Tensions with the West Throughout 2018
• Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies
• A Changing Role for the United States
• The European Union: A Chance to Lead?

U.S. Grand Strategy & the Future of the International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

As Germany and Russia begin construction phases for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline underneath the Baltic Sea, Polish lawmakers echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson continue to oppose its construction. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki asked the United States to consider extending sanctions that would hamper its development. Secretary Tillerson has stated that he sees the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a threat to European energy security.

What do gas pipelines and security have to do with one another? The United States and Poland both consider the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to be a potential political tool for Russia. Both countries have raised the frightening possibility that Russia could use the flow of gas as geopolitical leverage in Europe. In other words, if political tensions escalated significantly to Russia’s detriment, the Kremlin could just turn off the tap.

What is Nord Stream 2?

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will link Germany and Russia, bypassing several Eastern European states. Once constructed, it will be one of the world’s longest offshore pipelines measuring at over 745 miles (1,200 kilometers). Once it makes landfall, natural gas from Russia will flow through to access European energy markets.

Permits were granted to begin construction on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the landfall area in Lubmin, near Greifswald, Germany on January 31, 218. The Stralsund Mining Authority issued the permits. Other countries that will need to also provide licenses to Nord Stream 2 are Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. The scheduled completion of the pipelines is marked for the end of 2019.

Europe will face a deficit of 120 billion cubic meters of gas over the next two years. Nord Stream 2 and LNG aim to mitigate that gap. In response to claims that Nord Stream 2 is will place Europe under Russian influence, the gas company claims that Russian gas makes up approximately thirty percent share of EU energy consumption. Even with the construction of Nord Stream 2, Russian gas exports to Europe are not expected to increase or decrease drastically.

Energy diversification as a tool of political power.

Energy diversification has long been the desired policy of European states. However, with the expansion of Russian natural gas pipelines across Europe and Eurasia – that possibility grows smaller. Smaller countries like Poland are naturally worried about the intentions that a monopoly on gas could cost Europe. Poland has started imported liquid natural gas (LNG) from the United States, but overall – the majority of energy comes directly from Russia.

One of the more significant questions is whether or not this is a situation that requires a negotiation mandate from the European Commission. Does Germany need permission from the EU for this project? Countries like Poland would say yes. However, Germany doesn’t believe there is a need for it. With that comes a degree of regulatory uncertainty. Furthermore, the question of how seriously Bulgaria will take energy diversification when it takes up the EU Council presidency remains unanswered.

Another issue that arises is that Ukraine makes around 1 billion USD annually from transport costs of Russia using their territory to access Europe. With the Nord Stream 2 in place, that will no longer be the case. Bulgaria, like Ukraine, is also highly dependent on Russian gas. On the security front, how will Nordic countries handle construction preparation with a more aggressive Russia on their literal sea borders?

Taking all of this into account, however, Nord Stream 2 will translate more gas and in turn more competitive pricing for European consumers. As a political tool, though, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a potentially useful way for Russia to increase its influence in the European Union, which has restricted Russia’s economic activities through sanctions that were levied in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It remains to be seen, at present, whether or not the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a vehicle for Russian foreign policy and political influence.

The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Threatens European Energy Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

The year 2017 was marked by conflict, instability, and humanitarian crises. But there were bright spots as well. Here are ten areas where progress has been reported around the world.

1. The World Health Organization reports in October that global measles deaths have decreased by more than 80 percent since 2000 to an estimated ninety thousand last year. The drop is part of a broader decline in child mortality, which has been more than halved since 1990.

2. Colombia’s largest Marxist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), completes its disarmament process in June, six months after it reached a peace agreement with the government, bringing to a close Latin America’s oldest and bloodiest civil conflict. The second-largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), agrees to a temporary cease-fire in September.

3. The hole in the earth’s ozone layer is the smallest it has been since 1988, NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports in October. Warmer weather conditions over the last two years prevented ozone-depleting chemicals from eating away at the protective layer, scientists say. They also attribute the improvement to decades of global efforts to reduce emissions of such chemicals.

4. Women’s rights advance in several Arab countries with the passage of legal reforms: Tunisia criminalizes violence against women, Lebanon and Jordan repeal laws that had permitted rapists to escape punishment if they wed their victims, and Jordan amends its penal code to do away with reduced penalties for so-called honor killings.

5. Eight countries adopted legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation, bringing the total to eighty-five, according to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association.

6. The number of people living in extreme poverty, making $1.90 or less per day, continues its steady drop, falling from roughly 35 percent of the world’s population in 1990 to 8.4 percent in late 2017, according to the Vienna-based World Data Lab.

7. Gambia’s longtime authoritarian president, Yahya Jammeh, steps down on January 20, 2017, weeks after losing his reelection bid to Adama Barrow and a day after troops from the regional bloc ECOWAS cross into the country. Barrow’s government releases hundreds of political prisoners, holds legislative elections deemed free and fair, and announces plans for a truth and reconciliation commission.

8. Maritime piracy declines in the first nine months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016, dropping 14 percent to 121 incidents, according to the International Chamber of Commerce. The organization attributes the improvement to more stringent naval patrols in some areas such as Indonesia. This follows a 25 percent decrease a year earlier.

9. After resolving Argentina’s billion-dollar dispute with bondholders in 2016, President Mauricio Macri continues promarket reforms that have lifted the Group of Twenty economy. October 2017 midterm elections reinforce Macri’s reform mandate, and the International Monetary Fund hails Argentina’s “systemic transformation of its economy” and progress in “restoring integrity” to the government.

10. The eurozone economy grows 2.5 percent more in the third quarter of 2017 than in the same period a year prior. The increase puts the zone’s economy on track to see its highest annual growth since before the 2008 global financial crisis. Unemployment in the single-currency area drops to 9.1 percent, its lowest level since early 2009.

10 Geopolitical Silver Linings in 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 Brexit vote and rising the popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin, in no small degree—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe seems to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continues to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions. For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

The E.U. Will Attempt to Implement Reforms in 2018

Europe is in dire need of reform, both politically and economically. The bloc faces significant internal divisions. Demographics, economic stagnation, and ideological arguments threaten the European Union’s ability to act as a global power.

Over the next two years, the E.U. will need to decide whether or not it is in search of an ever-closer union, mainly as it manages Brexit negotiations. The bloc’s leadership badly needs to prove the legitimacy and value of the Union, and consolidating power as the UK leaves may be the way forward.

While Brexit initially seemed to undermine the E.U.’s standing overseas, it may have had the opposite effect. Member states on the continent have primarily reaffirmed their commitment to the bloc, particularly following the election of pro-EU President Emmanuel Macron of France.

In fact, the loss of the UK may facilitate more easy implementation of EU-wide fiscal and monetary policies, as the UK has famously retained its currency—the pound—and with it, monetary sovereignty.

Security concerns may play a decisive role in further E.U. integration. Concerns about U.S. credibility following the election of Donald Trump could lead to higher military integration by E.U. members. Germany, which has maintained a more pacifist stance since the end of the Cold War, is integrating parts of its’ armed forces with the militaries of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania.

Increased numbers of NATO and European troops have been deployed along Europe’s frontiers with Russia and Belarus.  Additionally, there has been more and more talk of greater security integration and E.U.-wide policy towards defense and security.

What’s the future of the European Union?

Economically, Europe is still at risk. Eurozone banks continue to distribute capital unevenly due to irregular E.U. banking regulations. Migration within the E.U. will persist, as will migration to Europe from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Separatist movements will continue, encouraged by the Brexit movement.

Demographically, Europe’s population is changing. Aging population will consume government revenues as health care will be an even more significant concern. Youth unemployment in countries like Spain and Italy will continue to be a security risk, as this is a group at risk for violent radicalization. Growth will be dependent on Europe’s abilities to reform E.U. institutions, provide employment, and manage public anxiety about issues like immigration, terrorism, and national identity.

Of immediate concern is the aftermath of the recent Catalonian independence crisis in Spain. The handling of the issue by the central government in Madrid, the imprisonment of Catalonian political leaders, and the steadfast refusal of Catalonia’s leaders to find a compromise could destabilize the internal politics of the bloc, and encourage other separatist regions in E.U.-states like Belgium to pursue secession referendums of their own. The dispute could be prolonged in the aftermath of snap elections called in the wake of Madrid seizing administrative power over Catalonia.

The European Union Faces Challenges to Its Legitimacy in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This comes alongside news that the Polish military will create a 50,000-strong volunteer militia as fears grow of a resurgent Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Poland shares a border with Russia. Since Moscow has annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported the insurgency in the east of the nation, Russia’s neighbors have warily observed its military expansion.

Polish President Andrzej Duda signed off a statement which will increase defense spending and increase the strength of the military by 50,000 troops from the current 100,000 troops. The bill will also include provisions for a volunteer militia force, numbering around 50,000, according to reports from state broadcaster Polskie Radio.

Increased Defense Spending is Policy Everyone Can Agree On

The bill—a rare piece of cross-partisan legislation—envisions defense spending increasing to up to 2.5 percent of Poland’s gross domestic product by 2030. Most NATO members have yet to meet their pledges to increase defense spending to, at least, 2 percent of their respective GDPs.

Of the 28 NATO members, only the U.S., the U.K., Greece, Poland, and Estonia currently meet the 2 percent threshold that all members have pledged to meet. “The Polish army will, within ten years, gain the capability of stopping every opponent,” said the Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz.

Poland is one of just five NATO allies that share a border with Russia, along with all 3 Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. NATO’s ongoing reinforcements in Eastern Europe has leaned towards alleviating the anxieties of Poland and the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), where multinational NATO battalions are based.

Deterrence or Expansion?

Russia has consistently argued that NATO expansion in the former Soviet sphere of influence is part of a strategic encirclement of Russian territory, rather than providing protection for European states that would be otherwise vulnerable to Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has vowed that his nation would never strike a NATO ally and risk a conflict.

Nevertheless, confidence in Russian foreign policy among Western governments is at a post-Cold War low. The Kremlin has made a string of spurious claims about the character of its campaign in Syria, in which it’s denied all reports of infringing and bombing civilians. Russia’s official policy is to refuse any military backing for insurgents in east Ukraine. However, the insurgents themselves have claimed to have thousands of Russian troops in their ranks.

Poland Will Increase the Size of Its Military by Over 50% was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. nuclear forces, operated by the Air Force and Navy, have entered a years-long period that will see the modernization of warheads, bombs, and delivery systems. Many of these land-, air-, and sea-based systems, which constitute the so-called nuclear triad, entered service during the Cold War and will reach the end of their life cycles in the coming decades.

The ballistic missiles, submarines, bombers, fighters, and air-launched cruise missiles in operation today will be gradually phased out for newer systems. The United States will also develop new nuclear warheads and upgrade facilities that produce and maintain nuclear weapons. However, while some modernization efforts are already underway, debate persists in Washington over their direction and extent, especially given the massive investments they will require. The Congressional Budget Office estimates [PDF] that maintaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces will cost $400 billion between 2017 and 2026.

How did the nuclear triad emerge?

The triad emerged and evolved, more by accident than design, over the four decades of the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union responded to each other’s advances. “No one set out to create the triad,” says Stephen Schwartz, editor and co-author of Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. “It arose out of interservice rivalry, pork barrel congressional politics, competition between defense contractors, fear of the Soviet Union, and highly redundant nuclear targeting.”

What are the legs of the U.S. nuclear triad?

Ground. The ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, managed by the U.S. Air Force, is the largest of the three regarding the number of delivery platforms. It comprises four hundred Minuteman III intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were first deployed in 1970. ICBMs are missiles capable of striking targets more than 5,500 kilometers away. Each Minuteman III can deliver one warhead, though the missile originally designed to carry three to multiple targets. The United States keeps ICBMs on nearly constant alert. They are in underground silos spread out across thousands of acres of farmland in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming.

Sea. The sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, by far the largest in terms of total deployed warheads, comprises more than two hundred Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can be launched from fourteen Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) based in Washington State, on the west coast, and Georgia, on the east coast. Twelve of the fourteen SSBNs are at sea at all times, with five each in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans always on “hard alert” in designated patrol areas, ready to launch their missiles within minutes of receiving an order from the president. Each Trident II SLBM can deliver four to five independently targetable nuclear warheads, although the missile is capable of carrying up to eight warheads.

Air. The air-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad comprises two types of heavy bombers, which are based in Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota: forty-four B-52H Stratofortresses and sixteen stealth B-2A Spirits. The B-52H, which has been modified extensively over its fifty years of service, carries nuclear-tipped, air-launched cruise missiles. The B-2A, which became operational in 1997, can be armed with three different nuclear bombs. The Air Force used another aircraft, the B-1B Lancer, for nuclear missions until 1997, but has since modified it to carry only conventional weapons.

What other nuclear weapons does the U.S. have?

The United States also has approximately five hundred nuclear bombs adapted for tactical use with various fighter aircraft. About 150 of these are located at bases in five NATO ally states, but modernization plans may include reducing the total number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Though they have no fixed definition [PDF], tactical nuclear weapons are generally distinguished from strategic ones by their shorter delivery ranges, and they are designed for battlefield scenarios in which conventional weapons might otherwise be used. (Tactical nuclear weapons have never been used in battle.)

What modernization is planned for each leg of the triad?

Ground. The planned replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM, known for now as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), is still in the design phase. In the meantime, the Air Force is continuing to upgrade the Minuteman III.

Sea. First deployed in 1981, Ohio-class submarines will be replaced beginning in the early 2030s with Columbia-class submarines, which are expected to operate through the 2080s. Assuming current requirements and cost projections hold, the Navy will likely operate between ten and twelve Columbia-class SSBNs, which will feature sixteen missile launch tubes, four fewer than the Ohio-class SSBNs have. The submarine-launched Trident II is undergoing improvements to extend its service life through the early 2040s. The Navy will likely reduce the number of deployed SLBM warheads as well.

Air. The U.S. Air Force is developing a new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, which will be capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads. Meanwhile, the Air Force is expected to upgrade and keep the B-2A Spirit in service through 2058[PDF] and the nuclear-capable B-52H through 2040.

The Air Force has put out contracts to develop a new weapons system, known as the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, which may be capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads and be interoperable across the U.S. nuclear bomber force. It is not expected to be operational until 2030.

What arms control agreements cap the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

Russia is the only other nuclear weapon state with an arsenal comparable to that of the United States. The New START Treaty [PDF] entered into force in February 2011 and limits U.S.- and Russian-deployed warheads to 1,550 and deployed delivery vehicles—individual ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—to 700. The United States and Russia report their strategic warhead and delivery vehicle counts to each other on a biannual basis.

Why is nuclear modernization debated?

Shortly into his tenure, President Obama declared “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Despite this, most of the ongoing triad modernization began under his administration, and fewer U.S. nuclear weapons were eliminated under him than under any other post–Cold War president. President Donald J. Trump declared shortly after his election in 2017 that he would seek to “greatly strengthen and expand [U.S.] nuclear capability,” and he ordered the Department of Defense to conduct a review of the U.S. nuclear posture, which is expected to be completed by early 2018.

Some aspects of nuclear modernization face political opposition, with critics noting that the triad itself is an artifact of Cold War-era strategic thinking. In 2017, a group of Democratic senators sought to slow development of the LRSO, citing strategic concerns and high costs. Others, including former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, have recommended abolishing the ICBM force, arguing that the other two legs of the triad would be sufficient for deterrence.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization was originally published on Global Security Review.

Summary

• Madrid takes immediate control of its institutions and sets early regional elections for December 21.
• If the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.
• If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid.
• In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship.

A couple of weeks following the election, which took place October 1, Madrid responded to Catalonia’s subsequent declaration of independence by dissolving the Catalan government, taking immediate control of its institutions and calling early regional elections for December 21. But Catalan society is broken, and also the political and emotional distance between the Catalan nationalists and the Spanish trade unionists so high, that the vote alone won’t end the region’s issues. The gap that separates the nationalists out of unionists raises questions regarding Spain’s future.

The nation which managed to construct a democracy following the conclusion of a dictatorship in the late 1970s seems disoriented as it endures its most significant crisis in four decades. Opposing Views of the Identical Event. Catalans were divided between nationalists and unionists long before last month’s referendum. The events of October 1 only created more controversy.

The nationalists argue that the vote, which occurred against all the odds, confirmed Catalonia’s desire. They also see the police crackdown on voters as evidence of Spain’s hostility towards Catalonia. The Spanish government and unionist voters, and on the other hand, assert that the referendum is illegal, that it lacked a proper electoral roll along with a valid electoral commission.

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From their viewpoint, the vote confirmed only that regional leaders are willing to violate the law to achieve their political goals. Although the interpretations of what happened differ broadly, there is no denying the fluctuations the vote produced. Before October 1 the proud and provocative–though internally fragmented—separatist government headed Catalonia.

The pro-freedom flag known as the estelada hung from balconies throughout the region, while the Spanish flag flew in only a couple of public buildings. Only the expert independence organizations seemed capable of phoning millions of Catalans to the streets to maintain the most significant demonstrations Europe has experienced in quite a long time.

Catalonia’s secession movement is part of a growing trend of nationalism in Europe

Nationalists controlled the streets, the story of the events, and they had been the only ones with a transparent strategy to sell their origin to the rest of the planet. By early November things had changed drastically. The Spanish administration ignored the Catalan government, and several former Catalan officials have been in prison or take shelter in Belgium.

Spanish flags competed with the esteladas on balconies and terraces, particularly in Barcelona. Unity groups had organized two massive demonstrations, demonstrating that they, too, can mobilize large crowds. It seemed as if Catalonia’s quiet majority, as politicians and commentators called them, had finally woken up that the region was facing the abyss.

Outside Catalonia, a form of nationalism has begun to take on as well. Merchants have happily announced that sales of Spanish flags had skyrocketed lately as a result. However, the growing nationalism also had a darker side. Conservative groups called for a boycott of products, and small far-right groups chanted fascist slogans at unity demonstrations.

Catalan nationalism has existed for hundreds of years, and the region has rebelled against Madrid many times. Economic troubles and corruption cases involving members of Spain party strengthened separatist sentiments in recent decades.

Catalan leaders are accountable for the situation, having encouraged independence to divert voters attention from unpopular spending cuts and their very own corruption scandals. Catalan conservatives decision to abandon their traditional quest for autonomy and concentrate instead of independence helped the secessionist parties to gain ground from the center-left and left, to the point that they now command the independence movement.

The 3 Core Ideas of Catalan Secessionism

The secessionist storyline is based on three core ideas: The Spanish state is hostile to Catalonia, it threatens Catalonia’s identity, and it takes advantage of Catalonia’s wealth. The fiscal issues are subject to endless debate because though Catalonia is a contributor to the Spanish state, other regions are, too. A debate in which Spain is hostile to Catalonia and the Catalan identity is contentious. Catalan is widely spoken in the region’s public administration. Also, schools instruct Catalan history and civilization, a radical difference in the life under Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, which banned regional languages. Hardcore Spanish nationalists, in actuality, lament Madrid’s decision to give Catalonia control of its education system, which they see as a secessionist factory.

To be specific, a few Spanish government representatives have spoken with contempt of Catalonia in latest months, and the pictures of cops using force to prevent individuals from voting October 1 did not help. However, these episodes aren’t elements of a plot against the region. A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has made a more substantial effort to create secessionists than Spain’s prime minister. Catalonia’s freedom movement is active, but it’s heterogeneous. The individuals who’ve voted for secessionist parties lately fall into three principal groups. The first includes individuals who want freedom as quickly as possible, at any cost.

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They feel no cultural or emotional connection to Spain, a country they consider as alien, remote and antagonistic. They consider Catalonian institutions more legitimate than their Spanish counterparts, plus they believe that Spain’s judicial system is corrupt and subject to Madrid’s political sway. They also tend to have negative opinions of southern Spanish regions, which in their view receive too much money from the state. This category is firm in the Catalan hinterland, where only Catalan is spoken and where migrants from elsewhere in Spain well.

The second group consists of those who consider independence as ideal, they’re angry at the Spanish government for its reluctance to negotiate with a legal referendum, plus they attribute Madrid’s intransigence to the crisis. This group has some relations with the 3rd one, made up of those who don’t need independence, but who vote for separatist parties in protest against the Spanish authorities. For them, the problem isn’t necessarily Spain, but the Spanish state and, particularly, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s authorities. Both of these voting blocs eventually could go back to a more moderate position, if Spanish authorities listened to them.

A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has done more for the secessionist cause than Rajoy. Catalonia’s communications infrastructure is a well-oiled broadcasting and propaganda machine. Everything, from radio and TV to WhatsApp classes and events, is utilized to disperse pro-independence views. Catalan nationalists also have a knack for promoting their origin abroad. For the last five years, pro-independence organizers have designed demonstrations to be unusual events which will draw the attention of Television broadcasters and captivate social network users around the world. Even Barcelona’s football team plays a part in the marketing campaign: Its games are a stage for expert independence messages.

In each game, for instance, people start to sing in favor of independence when the clock reaches 17:14. Catalan officials are almost always keen to speak to international media to market their platform, and the area has started unofficial embassies in dozens of nations. By comparison, Catalonia’s unionists lacked a collective voice, then later, in a lot of cases, would decide to remain quiet on the topic of secession to prevent a confrontation with the pro-independence camp. The Spanish authorities, meanwhile, have done little to win back the minds and hearts of ordinary Catalans who’ve turned into independence only as a protest against a government that appears uninterested in them.

The Spanish Government’s strategy (or lack thereof) for managing the Catalan secession issue only increases secessionist legitimacy.

Madrid’s strategy to deal with the secessionist movement concentrates on the fact that independence is illegal. The central government has made no visible attempt to present a story to counter that of the separatists. The strategy seems to work everywhere in actuality, The ruling party, the Popular Party, is still the most famous political force in the nation. Taking into consideration the region’s political situation, however, employing the same strategy in Catalonia is insecure.

What the separatists need can be illegal under the current constitution, but that does not make their emotions any less real. Six weeks after the independence referendum, the psychological and political space between a society and the rest of Spain is as vast as ever. Madrid cannot afford to ignore the millions of Catalans who no longer feel at home in Spain. In the same time, the Catalan leadership is trapped in its own story, the snowball it’s generated is getting ever more significant as it rolls out of control.

Whichever side wins the December 21 regional elections, the Catalan conflict won’t end there. If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid. And if the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.

In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship. Spain’s transition to democracy gave policymakers chance to explore the sort of country they desired for the future. Thus far, however, no signals have emerged that any form of debate will take place between Madrid and Catalonia.

Spain-Catalonia Secession Crisis Won’t End After December Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a saying in Catalonia:  “once they send in the tanks, they may have missed the battle.” Spanish authorities didn’t send the Spanish military to intervene against the independence referendum. However, they did ship in the police, which, in turn, lead to clashes that reportedly left over eight-hundred individuals injured.

The events of the referendum haven’t only exacerbated Spain’s worst political crisis since democracy was re-established four decades ago, they’ve given the independence movement serious momentum, which Madrid will fight to stop.

Madrid Paid a High Price for a Nominal Victory

At the weeks leading up to the vote, the Spanish administration’s strategy was to delegitimize the referendum by interrupting its organization. It was a partial success. Polling centers were closed, and the ballot boxes were confiscated, forcing individuals to vote under abnormal circumstances, without a legal electoral list and without any control to prevent them from voting several times. Consequently, the referendum results, by which 90 percent of voters favored liberty, with a participation rate of roughly 40%, per the Catalan authorities, can’t be considered reliable.

If the Spanish state has even obtained a partial legal victory, it arrived at a high price. Though a judge allowed the police crackdown on voters, it was met with shock by Catalans and international public opinion. The resulting peaceful disobedience of thousands of Catalans gave the liberty process an appearance of validity it didn’t have before.

Therefore, even though a lot of the Catalan government’s arguments for liberty are dubious, Madrid’s actions have given the additional pretext for Barcelona to declare independence unilaterally. From the start, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s approach to coping with the Catalan situation was controversial.

Spain’s mountainous geography has led to the emergence of strong regional identities which are distrustful of the central government.

For the past five hundreds of years, successive governments have chosen for a carrot-or-stick approach to ensure the integrity of Spain. The twentieth century offers clear samples of both: While Francisco Franco’s dictatorship from 1939-1975 attempted to suppress Spain’s regional identities by denying them cultural and political rights, the constitution of 1978 generated probably the most decentralized political systems in Europe, providing Spanish regions high levels of autonomy. This was intended to curb Spain’s natural tendency towards fragmentation. However, it did not eliminate it, and Spain today remains divided.

The present conservative government in Madrid is not likely to authorize a referendum in Catalonia, as it’d open the door for other regions, most notably the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, to need the same. Even a progressive administration will be skeptical of any decision which can lead to the dissolution of the nation.

Then there’s the dilemma the emotional connection between Catalonia and Spain, that has deteriorated over the last decade. An economic crisis, increasing anti-establishment sentiments, recurrent corruption scandals and controversial political events, like the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision to block portions autonomy status of Catalonia in 2010, have all ruined the image of the Spanish state in the opinion of many Catalans.

The Catalan government has made a conscious effort to deepen nationalist and anti-Spanish sentiments in the region. A strong narrative has taken root in the area, presenting the Spanish state as something alien, remote and hostile to Catalonia. Consequently, support for Catalonia’s freedom climbed from approximately 20% to about 50% between 2007 and 2017.

Opinion polls before October 1 indicated that a substantial part of Catalan society would welcome institutional reforms to give Catalonia greater control over its taxes while maintaining the region within Spain. Catalonia represents approximately 20% of the Spanish gross domestic product and Madrid will be hesitant to give up substantial quantities of cash it uses to conduct the state and also to invest in other regions.

The Catalan issue will persist for some time.

But these reforms might prevent the nation from breaking, even though they aren’t on the desk. That is since Madrid and Barcelona have presented their dispute as a zero-sum game where one of the two parties has to be defeated.

The events during and after the referendum only made things worse. The Catalan government is one step closer to declaring independence, which might induce Madrid to react by suspending the autonomy of Catalonia or calling for early regional elections. While either of those options would remove the present Catalan leadership, which Madrid does not consider legal, from the equation, they’d only lead to further social unrest and potentially new episodes of violence.

Furthermore, suspending autonomy or holding ancient regional elections without first introducing real institutional reforms at the national level would do little to solve the crisis. Pro-independence sentiments are not likely to go away anytime soon. In this context, the minority government of Rajoy would become fragile domestically as well as internationally. To date, two of the three opposition parties in Spain have affirmed Madrid’s decision to obstruct the Catalan referendum.

However, the pictures of the police cracking down on voters are making it hard for unionist parties to side with the government of Rajoy. The same holds for the European Union, which affirmed Rajoy before the referendum but chose to remain quiet as events unfolded on October. In the event social unrest in Catalonia rise, the bloc will likely change its perspective of the catastrophe as an internal issue and pressure Madrid to negotiate a compromise.

In the end, Brussels and a lot of the bloc’s authorities are not likely to tolerate prolonged instability at the 4th largest economy in the eurozone. In fact, on October 2, the EU Commission urged all relevant actors at the referendum to move very quickly from confrontation to dialogue. Things in Catalonia are likely to get worse before it gets better. And when the Spanish government manages to keep the nation together, the catastrophe will leave long-lasting scars, that will form politics for many years to come.

Catalonian Secession: Madrid Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place was originally published on Global Security Review.

On Oct. 4, the region’s pro-independence parties, Junts pel Sí, along with the Popular Unity Candidates, declared that the Catalonian parliament would hold a session on Oct. 5th to proceed with its move towards independence. A Spanish Court ruling has since suspended the Catalan Parliament.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

While the official purpose of the session would be to explore the results of the referendum that took place on October 1, secession forces within Catalan’s regional government initially planned to use the meeting to announce independence. Based on a Sept. 7 law passed by the Catalan parliament, the regional legislature must declare independence if people vote in favor of secession.

However, the Catalan President has decided hold off on a formal declaration, pending negotiations and discussions with Madrid. However, he stated that the catalonian people have a right to a vote to independance, and this issue is not one that will die quickly.

The current situation in Catalonia

On Oct. 1, 90 percent of poll respondents supported independence from the Spanish state. Presently, all communication channels between the Spanish and the Catalan governments seem to be broken. Madrid insists that the referendum was prohibited and refuses to negotiate with the government which has broken the law.

Furthermore, on Oct. 3 Spanish King Felipe VI accused the Catalans authorities of violating the Spanish Constitution. The Catalan government, in turn, insists that it’ll only negotiate with Madrid if a legally binding referendum is on the table, something which  Spanish authorities vehemently oppose.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

Could Madrid seize control and suspend Catalan autonomy?

Not only could this decision be controversial in Catalonia and the rest of Spain, but it could also be challenging to enforce. This step would lead to significant street protests and potential acts of vandalism against Spanish institutions throughout the region. Support from security forces will be required.

However, Madrid expresses worry over the fact that Catalonia’s regional police, known as the Mossos d’Esquadra, did not obey a Spanish judge’s order to close down polling centers on referendum day to prevent individuals from voting. Courts in Catalonia have already begun investigations against Mossos for an offense of disobedience. Since the beginning of the independence process, expert secession forces have organized many massive demonstrations.

Their main aim was to show Madrid as well as the international community that countless thousands of Catalans support independence. However, they’re also a broader demonstration of strength along with a reminder that any action contrary to Catalonia, especially one as drastic as suspending the region’s autonomy, will lead to massive protests.

Analysis: Outside mediation may be necessary if tensions escalate and violence increases.

In a situation of widespread regional revolt, Madrid will face the dilemma of having to choose between using force in Catalonia or entering into negotiations with the regional government. The former could come to the price of deepening one already considerable catastrophe and possibly triggering an intervention from the European Union.

Thus far, the bloc and most of its authorities have sided with Madrid, calling the Catalan referendum prohibited and pledging to honor the unity of Spain. However, E.U. leaders have also cautioned that a continued forceful response by the central government in Madrid would result in an escalation of violence, and have advised Spanish and Catalan authorities to reestablish dialogue to reach an agreed-upon solution.

However, if tensions between Madrid and Barcelona carry on or escalate, an outside mediator may be required to ensure stability and security both in Spain and in the European Union.

Catalonia Moves Toward Independence—Will Madrid Seize Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The drill exercised combat scenarios recently used in Ukraine and tested the compatibility of the Belarusian army with Russian forces.

Politicians from Poland, Ukraine and Baltic states viewed the exercise as aggressive as they mistrust the Kremlin and fear possible security threats in the region. They used the drill to justify the ongoing “social militarisation” of their respective countries.

This is primarily a rise of state support or enthusiasm for voluntary defence organisations which are sometimes armed, committed to “national causes” and often have roots in right-wing political groups.

Is the “Russian threat” the sole reason why right-wing politicians in the region want to militarise their societies?

Training for war

With the post-1989 transition to liberal democracy and NATO accession, Central Europe began a gradual process of social demilitarisation towards a Western model of civilian states. Slowly but steadily armies were reduced in size and professionalised.

In recent years, however, this model of statehood and citizenship has been seriously challenged in Central Europe.

The region has experienced a significant rise in the number and visibility of grassroots paramilitary actors ranging from anti-refugee vigilantes in Bulgaria and Hungary through pro-Kremlin militias in Slovakia and the Czech Republic to a civilian component cooperating with the armed forces in the Baltics and Poland. By 2019, Poland expects to have trained 53,000 people for its Territorial Defence Forces, a new volunteer segment of the army built entirely of local citizens – many of them members of already existing paramilitary groups.

Military picnics

Normalisation of the paramilitary sector goes hand in hand with a diffusion of military values and practices to everyday life. For example, in Poland, the teaching of history is increasingly centred around military events. WW2-themed clothing and accessories are growing popular too, and families can be seen attending military-themed picnics featuring shooting ranges and weapons displays. The visibility of military uniforms in the public sphere has become too. In Estonia, meanwhile, people are signing up for weekend training sessions with volunteer paramilitary groups.

This ideological shift became evident when the Polish minister of defence Antoni Macierewicz made an appearance on a morning television programme for children. Sitting among a group of youngsters over bowls of army-style pea stew, he talked to the children about the importance of fighting for sovereignty.

Children are also being courted by the Hungarian governing party FIDESZ. Its officials are currently implementing a broad patriotic and national defence programme beginning in kindergarten. They are contemplating including shooting classes and military training in schools. Following the path of his Estonian and Polish counterparts, the Hungarian minister of defence, István Simicskó, has praised volunteer territorial defence forces. He is also endorsing the idea to build state-owned shooting ranges in each county to popularise military skills.

Towards militarised governance

Central European leaders claim their societies need to be prepared to face challenges brought about by the refugee, terrorist and Ukrainian crises. Wide-scale societal militarisation has stirred concern among both military officials and civil society.

Many see it as part of the illiberal political transformation which is underway in the region and aims to popularise an alternative model of governance which combines democratic procedures such as multi-party system and general elections with a disregard for human rights and constitutional limits to power.

In Poland and Hungary, civil society activists are portrayed as enemies and national traitors. There are also extraordinary measures against perceived threats, such as activists and journalists increasingly face financial penalties and even direct violence.

‘Remasculinisation’

Right-wing ideologues also wish to regenerate the society that they consider broken and morally corrupt. In their narrative, the journey towards liberal democracy and global governance is told as a story of emasculation of men and loss of their agency over their lives and their countries.

As argued by panellists of the National Congress of Families held in Warsaw in 2017, militarisation is the solution to a crisis of masculinity in Poland.

In the words of former MP of the ruling Law and Justice party Marian Piłka – the militarised “New Man” has character traits which are needed to advance the country’s international standing as well as forge a “new form of Polishness” capable of overcoming “post-communist mediocrity”.

Members of Territorial Defence Forces are to receive €125 monthly along with additional financial rewards for completing all training. They also enjoy the special protection of labour contracts preventing employers from firing them while in service.

Families benefiting from such programmes could contribute to the emergence of a substantial new patriotic middle class.

Can the civilian state be saved?

In 2012, hopes were raised of a future without military violence when the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for the “advancement of peace and reconciliation” on the continent. Today in Central Europe, the civilian state is trembling.

Objective security challenges such as the terrorist threat or the Kremlin’s superpower ambitions certainly play a role in boosting nationalist militarism. But the public attractiveness of the militarised model of governance and citizenship has as much to do with severe social costs and unfulfilled promises of the post-1989 transition.

Therefore, to save European civilian states, advocates will need to take the underlying causes seriously fuelling militaristic sentiments. One of them is the unfulfilled need of individuals for security, well-being and upward mobility. Another is a sense of being left out and deprived of control over their economic future. If these genuine issues are not addressed progressively, nationalist militarism will continue to seem like a legitimate answer.

“In Central Europe, militarised societies are on the march” was originally published on The Conversation. 

In Central Europe, Militarized Societies are on the March was originally published on Global Security Review.