With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. Dr. Christopher Yeaw, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around 2,000 warheads and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear powered Poseidon torpedo, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.

Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a major nuclear actor, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next four to five years and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, which was roughly 200 at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s CFR-600 reactors, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.

The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the P5 forum where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under an obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.

In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess 80 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.

The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.

In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.

Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Introduction

Russia’s recent deployment of a conventionally armed, diesel-powered submarine to Indonesia should not be dismissed as routine naval activity. It is a calculated strategic signal. One that highlights a growing challenge for Australia and calls into question the resilience of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. While such deployments fall below the nuclear threshold, they reveal an emerging approach to strategic competition. The use of advanced conventional capabilities can undermine the systems that enable nuclear deterrence.

At the center of this challenge is the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt, are integral to this architecture. They support early warning, signals intelligence, and communications with nuclear forces. As such, they are not only strategic assets but also potential targets. Modern diesel-electric submarines—quiet, survivable, and increasingly capable—can operate in Australia’s northern approaches and threaten these critical nodes with precision strike options or intelligence-gathering missions that enable future disruption.

The Gray Zone Effect

This development reflects a broader shift in adversary strategy. Rather than relying on overt nuclear coercion, states such as Russia are exploring how to achieve strategic effects through conventional means. By targeting NC3 infrastructure using submarines, cyber operations, or long-range precision strike, adversaries can degrade the credibility of nuclear deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. This approach exploits the grey zone between peace and war, complicates escalation dynamics, and introduces ambiguity into alliance responses. It is not escalation dominance in the traditional sense, but escalation manipulation, and shaping the environment so that nuclear deterrence becomes less certain, less credible, and therefore less effective.

Recent Chinese naval activity reinforces this concern. The PLA Navy’s circumnavigation of Australia should not be viewed as routine presence or symbolic signaling alone. Rather, it demonstrates an emerging capacity to operate persistently along Australia’s littoral approaches and key maritime choke points—areas proximate to critical infrastructure that underpins U.S. and allied NC3. Such operations enable the mapping of undersea terrain, surveillance of communication pathways, and potential identification of vulnerabilities in systems such as subsea cables and relay nodes. In a crisis, these capabilities could be leveraged to conduct limited, deniable disruption of NC3 functions that degrade communication, delay decision-making, and complicate alliance coordination without crossing the threshold of armed attacks. In this sense, China’s activity mirrors and reinforces the broader trend: the use of conventional means to hold at risk the foundations of nuclear deterrence.

For Australia, the implications are significant. The traditional model of U.S. extended deterrence, anchored in the threat of nuclear retaliation, assumes that nuclear forces remain survivable, communicable, and politically usable. However, if NC3 systems are degraded or disrupted, that assumption weakens. Deterrence begins to erode not because nuclear weapons are absent, but because their employment becomes uncertain or delayed. In such a scenario, adversaries may calculate that they can act with greater freedom at the conventional level, confident that escalation can be managed or avoided. 

Policy Recommendations

This evolving threat environment demands a recalibration of Australia’s defense and deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. It must be reinforced by a comprehensive strategy that integrates conventional resilience, grey-zone competition, and a more explicit recognition of the role nuclear forces play in underpinning deterrence across all domains.

First, Australia should prioritize the hardening and resilience of NC3-related infrastructure on its territory. This includes enhancing physical protection, investing in redundancy and dispersal, and strengthening cyber defenses. Facilities such as Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt must be able to operate under contested conditions, ensuring continuity of communication and decision-making even in the face of sustained disruption. This may also require the development of alternative communication pathways, including space-based and mobile systems. Resilience is not merely a defensive measure; it is a core component of deterrence, signaling to adversaries that attempts at degradation will not succeed.

Second, Australia must significantly expand its undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ability to detect, track, and, if necessary, neutralize hostile submarines in Australia’s maritime approaches is critical to protecting strategic infrastructure. Investments should focus on integrated undersea sensor networks, maritime patrol aircraft, autonomous systems, and closer operational integration with allies. A persistent and credible ASW posture will complicate adversary planning, increase operational risk, and reduce the feasibility of covert operations targeting NC3 nodes.

Third, Canberra should deepen strategic dialogue with Washington on the role of Australia within U.S. nuclear deterrence architecture. This dialogue must move beyond general assurances and address specific contingencies, including how attacks on NC3 infrastructure in Australia would be interpreted. Greater clarity around escalation thresholds, attribution challenges, and response options will reduce the risk of miscalculation and strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. This should include regularized nuclear consultation mechanisms and scenario-based planning.

Fourth, Australia should take the lead in advocating for the development of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. Such a framework that brings together the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia, would formalize shared deterrence responsibilities and strengthen collective resolve. While politically sensitive, this arrangement could include elements of nuclear consultation, planning, and burden-sharing, similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. By distributing deterrence functions and signaling unity, such an alliance would complicate adversary calculations and reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence across the region.

Fifth, Australia must engage India more directly on the implications of Russian strategic behavior. As a key regional power with longstanding ties to Moscow, India occupies a unique diplomatic position. Canberra should clearly communicate its concerns regarding Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including the risks posed to critical infrastructure and regional stability. In parallel, India should be encouraged to consider the broader consequences of a hypothetical Russian attack on Australia, not only for bilateral relations, but for its strategic partnerships with both the United States and Australia. This dialogue would not seek to force alignment, but to underscore the interconnected nature of regional security and the potential costs of strategic ambiguity.

Sixth, Australia should explore options to visibly anchor U.S. nuclear deterrence in the region. This necessitates a proactive approach to alliance integration. Mechanisms such as enhanced consultation, increased transparency around nuclear policy, and potential participation in nuclear planning arrangements could reinforce deterrence by demonstrating resolve and cohesion. Initiatives under AUKUS provide a foundation for this deeper integration and should be expanded to include broader deterrence considerations.

Seventh, Australian defense policy must explicitly recognize the interdependence of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Investments in long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare are essential, but they must be understood as part of a broader deterrence framework. These capabilities contribute to resilience and denial, but they are ultimately underpinned by the threat of escalation. Ensuring that this relationship is clearly articulated in strategy and doctrine will strengthen deterrence coherence and improve signaling to adversaries.

Finally, Australia must broaden its strategic focus to account for multiple nuclear-capable adversaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. While China remains the primary focus of defense planning, Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia underscores the need for a comprehensive approach. Strategic competition is no longer confined to a single actor or domain. It is multi-faceted, simultaneous, and increasingly coordinated. Australia’s deterrence posture must reflect this complexity.

Conclusion

The central lesson is clear. Deterrence in the 21st century cannot be treated as a layered system in which nuclear weapons sit passively at the top. Instead, nuclear deterrence must actively underpin and reinforce every level of conflict, including the conventional and grey-zone domains. Adversaries are increasingly seeking to exploit gaps between these layers, using conventional means to achieve strategic effects without triggering nuclear retaliation.

To respond to this challenge, Australia must take seriously the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on which it relies. This means investing in the resilience of critical systems, strengthening conventional capabilities, and engaging more deeply with allies and partners on the role of nuclear alliances and forces in regional security.

In an era defined by ambiguity and threshold management, the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on integration, clarity, and resolve. By advancing new nuclear alliance structures, deepening strategic dialogue, which includes India, and reinforcing both conventional and nuclear pillars of deterrence, Australia can ensure that sophisticated conventional threats do not undermine the stability of the broader strategic order.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Silent Signals: Russian and Chinese Conventional Threats to NC3 and U.S. Extended Deterrence in Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. New START, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this bilateral architecture. Its limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, combined with an intrusive verification regime, helped sustain stability even as geopolitical relations deteriorated.

However, Russia’s suspension of participation in 2023 and the treaty’s expiration in 2026 mark a significant turning point. The breakdown of the broader arms control framework—evident in the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020—suggests a structural shift in the valuation of negotiated restraint. Assessing the prospects for post–New START arms control, it is important to consider these developments within both the historical context of bilateral relations and the shifting dynamics of current great power competition.

Academic debates on arms control offer a helpful context for understanding the current impasse. Traditional arms‑control theory, rooted in rationalist models, views treaty agreements as tools for reducing uncertainty, preventing arms races, and stabilizing deterrence. From this perspective, verification mechanisms and numerical limits mitigate the security dilemma by reducing incentives for worst‑case planning. While other scholars emphasize the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and leadership perceptions. Arms control agreements often reflect internal political coalitions, institutional preferences, and the ideological orientation of decision makers. The current U.S.-Russian environment, which is characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalist rhetoric complicates the formation of pro-arms control coalitions. Moreover, constructivist analyses highlight the normative dimension of arms control, arguing that treaties shape expectations, legitimize restraint, and embed cooperative practices. The erosion of these norms over the past decade has contributed to a broader delegitimization of negotiated limits.

These theoretical perspectives underscore that the challenges facing post–New START arms control are not merely technical but deeply embedded in political and normative contexts. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s framing of the conflict as a confrontation with the West, combined with U.S. and allied NATO support for Ukraine, has created a political environment in which formal negotiations are viewed as strategically risky or politically unacceptable.

The U.S. seeks to address Russia’s large arsenal of non‑strategic nuclear weapons and its development of novel systems such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia, in turn, prioritizes constraints on U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional strike capabilities. These asymmetries complicate the search for mutually acceptable trade-offs. Furthermore, verification has long been a cornerstone of bilateral arms control. Russia’s suspension of inspections and data exchanges under New START has undermined transparency and raised questions about the feasibility of future verification regimes. Designing agreements that satisfy both sides’ security concerns will be a central challenge.

The U.S. increasingly argues that future arms control must account for China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Russia rejects trilateral frameworks, viewing them as attempts to dilute U.S.–Russian parity. Thus far, China shows little interest in formal arms control negotiations. This triangular dynamic introduces new complexities absent from earlier bilateral negotiations.

Despite the hostile political environment, arms control still matters. The strategic reasons for arms control include specific factors that deserve attention from states. Agreements reduce incentives for preemption and miscalculation, which can increase crisis stability. Data exchanges and inspections improve transparency by reducing uncertainty and reliance on worst-case assumptions. Arms races can impose significant economic burdens, even for the U.S.’ trillion-dollar defense budget and Russia’s constrained economy. Finally, U.S.–Russian cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime. These lasting incentives suggest that both states have structural reasons to pursue at least minimal engagement.

So, what are the pathways for Post–New START arms control? Political commitments to maintain New START limits, even without a formal treaty, could involve both sides making parallel political statements to uphold New START’s numerical limits. While these have no legal force, such commitments could help prevent rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and maintain stability and predictability.

Other paths could include more Issue‑Specific or Modular Agreements. Rather than pursuing a new comprehensive treaty, negotiators could focus on discrete issues, such as notifications of major strategic exercises, transparency measures for new strategic systems, and agreements to avoid dangerous military incidents. These modular arrangements could serve as building blocks for more ambitious frameworks. Next, revitalizing crisis‑management mechanisms by reestablishing military-to-military communication channels could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Such mechanisms do not require treaty-level negotiations and can function even amid broader political tensions. Finally, promote multilateral and norm-building initiatives such as broader dialogues involving China, NATO allies, and other nuclear-armed states to help shape norms around transparency and risk reduction. Multilateral workshops, data exchange initiatives, or voluntary reporting mechanisms may be more practical than formal treaties.

The expiration of New START marks a critical turning point in the history of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control. The structural, political, and technological challenges facing a successor agreement are formidable, and a new comprehensive treaty is unlikely in the near term. Yet the logic of arms control, rooted in the need to manage existential risks, remains important. Incremental, issue-specific, and politically binding measures offer a pragmatic path forward, preserving essential elements of strategic stability until conditions allow for more ambitious negotiations. The future of arms control will depend not only on geopolitical developments but also on policymakers’ ability to adapt traditional frameworks to a more complex, multipolar nuclear landscape. Without some form of negotiated restraint, the world risks entering an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time in over half a century.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2022, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, it did not domestically produce any Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drones. They initially purchased a small quantity (up to around 6000) from Iran and quickly set their sights on building manufacturing plants. By 2023 they had the Alabuga drone factory where they were able to produce around 200 Geran-2 drones per month. In 2024, they saw a major increase in production and by December of that year it was reported that they were able to produce up to 2000 Geran-2 drones per month. By May of last year, Russia’s production capacity was up to around 2700 Geran-2 drones and another 2500 ‘simulator’ drones used to overwhelm air defenses in a single month (according to Ukrainian intelligence), and production is likely to increase further.

Mass production of these drones has changed what it means to be ‘war ready.’ A massive reduction in Iran’s arsenal of missiles, air capabilities, and ground capabilities would weaken the regime but Trump’s pronouncement should not convince anyone they are no longer a threat. If Iran follows Russia’s blueprint, even heavy losses today are unlikely to prevent them from sustaining a long campaign of drone attacks tomorrow.

Besides, Iran’s strategy is to delay. They retain the ability to threaten American bases in the Gulf, as well as Gulf allies, with their current stockpile of drones and missiles. From almost anywhere in Southern or Central Iran they can launch a Shahed which could reach the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that even if missile and naval drone production slows, they will continue to threaten global trade flows, should the status quo continue.

Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine should have shown to the United States what modern war looks like, and how a state can remain a threat at a low cost. Iran is more than capable of continuing this conflict, and their recent statements reaffirming their lack of interest in diplomacy a makes that clear.

Iran’s current stockpile of Shahed-136 drones has not been made public. Before the war started, estimates indicated it could be up to around 80,000 drones. Considering Russia’s demonstrated ability to create and grow a drone industry whilst at war, there is no reason Iran’s drone industry will not grow similarly. Between 2023 and 2025 Russia’s Geran-2 drone production grew by 1250%. Iran will not require this level of growth and is in a better placed position to start having produced a significant quantity of these drones.

The significance of this threat lies in the unique importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy. A sizable portion (around 25%) of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, so even limited disruptions can have huge consequences for energy prices. Crucially, Iran does not need to secure a complete shutdown of the Strait to achieve its aims, as even the threat of attacking merchant ships drives insurance premiums and forces ships to reroute. By demonstrating that the Strait can be reached, Iran has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and can maintain this very atmosphere without their arsenal of long-range missiles by building Shahed-136 drones. In this instance, drones are not strictly a military asset, but a way of exerting economic pressure on adversaries.

Securing the Strait of Hormuz to a point of trade continuation will prove to be almost impossible without either a negotiated settlement or a complete capitulation from the Iranian regime. If during this conflict Iran retains even a small portion of their current Shahed-136 stockpile, or the ability to manufacture them, then ships passing through the Strait cannot be guaranteed safe travel.

In short, claims that the Iranian threat has been significantly reduced are short sighted and ignore many of their existing capabilities. Their existing missile stockpile, combined with their production capacity, means that even heavy strikes will not eliminate their ability to project their power across the region. Just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, modern warfare requires cheap and easily mass-produced systems and Iran is very well positioned to meet these requirements. Until a diplomatic solution is reached, or the Iranian regime is somehow forced to end their war efforts, the threat to world trade and to the world energy market will persist.

Raphael Chiswick writes on Diplomacy, International Security, and the Defense Industry. He is based in the United Kingdom. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Shaheds to Strait Control: Why Iran Can Still Influence Global Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Published: April 2, 2026

On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.

Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard testified in 2020, “We do not seek parity.”

That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.

The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.

Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.

Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.

Deterrence needs a similar framework. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. Dynamic Parity offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.

Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.

Skeptics argue that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.

Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.

Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.

Here is what that would look like in practice:

• Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.
• Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
• Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.

This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.

Execution is the signal. Russia’s 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.

Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.

Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.

Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whenever the United States resorts to military force, the same question echoes through Washington and beyond: Did President Trump act within the law? Recent controversies surrounding the War Powers Resolution—especially the requirement to notify Congress—have only intensified that debate. This article steps aside from that familiar battleground. Instead, it asks a more fundamental constitutional question: would an air campaign against Iran be lawful under the United States Constitution? A careful reading suggests that the answer may well be yes.

There are two sections in Article I of the Constitution that address the authority to declare war. Clause 11 of Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning capture on land and water. It is not the only provision that discusses war-making authority.

Clause 3 of Section 10, which is rarely mentioned in war powers discussions, deprives the states of the authority to maintain a standing army or navy, or to engage in war. It is the federal government’s responsibility to provide for the nation’s common defense, with two exceptions. First, Congress may permit states to possess these powers. Second, states may go to war if they are “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

War Powers Act of 1973

Using general legislative authority, as well as power granted to it from Article I, Section 8, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973. The Act came after frustration over the Korean War and the bombing campaign over Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

The Act creates several limitations on the President’s abilities to make war and requires: 1) a declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

“In every possible instance,” the President is required to consult with Congress prior to beginning hostilities and do so within 48 hours. Congressional approval is needed if hostilities are to continue beyond 60 days.

From a prescriptivist perspective, there are compelling arguments that certain provisions of the Act may be unconstitutional. While some argue that Congress cannot delegate its authority to make war, others argue that the Act infringes on the President’s duties as Commander in Chief. Article I, Section 10, creates exceptional circumstances for the exercise of war-making powers. Moreover, there is a strong textual argument that those powers expressly granted to the states inherently apply to the President.

Principles of Presidential War Powers

Using the two clauses of the Constitution referenced above, we can extract two principles regarding war-making authority: Consent of Congress and Imminent Danger.

1. Consent of Congress

Congress can consent in three ways. It can issue a formal declaration of war. It can also pass legislation to create conditions for the use of force. And it can give the Commander in Chief limited flexibility, as they did with the War Powers Act.

Alternatively, Congress can signal passive approval by not responding to the Presidential action at all. This last approach is controversial, but common sense and Supreme Court precedent suggest it is lawful. Moreover, Congress is the only body that can legally correct an unauthorized or undesired war. They can pass laws to restrict war-making authority, end a war, or use their impeachment power. When Congress chooses not to use these options, it is effectively granting passive consent.

2. Imminent Danger Exception

As stated in the preamble to the Constitution, the purpose of creating a constitution is to provide for the common defense of the people, among other goals. While Congress has the Article I power to declare war or legislate how the President can wage war, responsibilities are commingled. The President is the Commander in Chief per Article II, Section 2. One of the implied duties of heading the armed forces is directing them in a defensive attack or addressing imminent danger, which refers to an immediate threat that poses a risk of harm without prompt intervention. This is not a tangential power of the President, but a core constitutional power as well.

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the initial response to the War of 1812 was unauthorized because Congress could not meet to deliberate on a declaration. While it is clearly the primary duty of the federal government to repel invasion, it is also in the purview of the states to act when “actually invaded” or placed in “imminent danger.” The Founding Fathers clearly recognized the need for flexibility in responding to threats, especially in an era when communication delays were the norm. If the states are given such power in exceptional circumstances, certainly the Commander in Chief would have these powers.

What is peculiar is that the flexibility afforded to states is not restricted to times of invasion. An invasion is already an imminent danger. Neither is the exception in Section 10, Clause 3 restricted to actions on the sea for events such as intercepting a flotilla attempting to invade. It is easy to believe the Founders contemplated threats from their immediate borders with France, Britain, and Spain.

If a state had a border along a river, and an enemy nation started concentrating forces on the other bank of the river, one could argue the existence of imminent danger, especially in historic times where standing armies were statements in and of themselves.

How This Applies to Iran

There is clearly some lawful justification for offensive use of force when Congress does not provide express consent. Just War Theory and the preemption doctrine can be discussed all day long until we are blue in the face, without concluding whether the current use of force is theoretically justified. The answer is truly a matter of prudence and congressional will.

Using threats of imminent danger as justification seems to be a stretch in this scenario, particularly because many in positions of authority have hinted the imminence originates with Israel’s decision to carry out strikes and the retaliation that would bring upon American forces within the region.

One can argue that the intent of the imminent danger exception in the Constitution is limited to public defense. The War Powers Act considers imminent danger to military forces. Say that the military came across evidence of a nation trying to repeat a USS Cole-style bombing. Retaliating against that nation or striking first to reduce their capability would be the prudent thing to do, and it would be a lawful use of force under the Constitution alone, regardless of what acts of Congress say.

It is also important to consider the specific moment used to assess whether the actions are lawful. At the start of a conflict, one might not actually be in immediate danger or have given consent. Nevertheless, arguing imminent danger becomes easier in the chaos of war, especially after the first shot is fired.

It is unknown what the actual intelligence is behind the scenes, nor is it known the veracity of public comments by members of the Administration and Congress. Some say it is about nuclear weapon production, preempting retaliation that would stem from Israel’s strikes against Iran, retaliation for the alleged killings of thousands of Iranian civilians, or regime change. Others who are just as authoritative contradict these claims.

While there may be classified intelligence to the contrary, this is a rare instance in which the justification for the strikes has not been communicated to the public. Normally, the public is aware of escalating tensions and seeing the President or other officials give warnings or make demands before we see strikes. On the evening of March 3, 2026, many members of Congress took to social media to discuss their briefing on the conflict. Representatives Seth Magaziner and Stephen Lynch, Senator Richard Blumenthal, among others, indicated that the administration failed to articulate any justification, while most republicans stated support for the strikes.

Just as there is a fog of war, there is a fog of politics. Commentary is often on partisan lines; it is an election year, and members often vote against public statements, and to the chagrin of public opinion. It is also common for members to offer support privately and behind the scenes while publicly posturing against matters. What matters is what Congress does as a body. Congress has not yet revoked the President’s war-making ability. Until they do so, they are at least providing passive consent for the President to use force against Iran. While some may find the prudence of this conflict distasteful, until Congress votes otherwise, the war and that the President’s actions are lawful per the Constitution itself.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Is The Air Campaign Against Iran an Illegal Use of Force? was originally published on Global Security Review.

(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.) 

After successful US regime-change operations in Venezuela, Washington is aiming for similar endeavor again, this time in Middle East against Iran. Mass mobilization of US military assets—most notably the deployment of naval armada in the Arabia Sea, the forward deployment of Patriot air-defense system and THAAD missile defense systems, and the sudden evacuation of non-essential personnel from regional military bases, were among advanced preparatory measures by Washington for kinetic action against Iran. Amid heightening tension, few incidents preceded US military actions. Iran seized two foreign oil-tankers allegedly smuggling oil and had attempted to approach US flagged tankers. And a US Navy F-35C shot down a Shahed-139 MALE UAV in the Arabian Sea.

Amid growing tensions, hurried to leave the Persian Gulf. The US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration issued guidelines to US flagged commercial ships to keep distance from Iran’s territorial waters and reject Iranian forces permission to board ship.

It is apparent that Trump Administration does not want a prolonged war, rather a quick precise and decisive operation to facilitate regime change. The US Navy was expected to take the lead using carrier-based airpower and cruise-missile strikes from guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and nuclear guided missile attack submarines (SSGNs), followed by bombardment by US Air Force bombers flying from US mainland or from Diego Garcia.

But unlike the Venezuela operation, which was conducted in American backyard, Washington has limited territorial room available for military action against Tehran given limited territorial support by Gulf nations. Therefore, it is likely kinetic operations will be highly dependent on naval forces.

This makes complete sense. At sea, the US enjoys overwhelming technological superiority. The US Navy has an estimated nine warships in the region. Three Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) stationed in the Persian Gulf but of limited value as these vessels have little  offensive capability.

The Most prominent formation is the Carrier Battle Group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), with embarked Carrier Air-Wing Nine (CVW-9). CVW-9 boasts F-35C Lightening-II stealth fighters, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets attack aircraft, E/A-18G “Growler” electronic warfare jets, E-2D “Hawkeye” Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and MH-60R Sea Hawk Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopters. The Lincoln is accompanied by three Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke class DDGs – each armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for offensive missions and an arsenal of air-defense missiles for multi-layer defense.

Two additional Arleigh Burke class DDGs are deployed in Strait of Hormuz. Besides surface combatants, an unknown number of Ohio class SSGNs –equipped with a formidable payload of 154 land attack Tomahawk cruise missiles – are also patrolling in the area.

In theory, this naval armada is an instrument of coercion at sea, capable of projecting power against Iran and establishing local sea-control in the Arabian Sea. The employment of force through the maritime domain against various types of targets including: military targets like air-defense systems, nuclear enrichment facilities, and missile sites; high visibility targets like economic infrastructure; and high value targets like Iran’s political leadership itself, complicate Iran’s defensive measures as US Navy can launch from multiple vectors and over vast oceanic distances.

Any Iranian retaliation will mirror this logic. In a low-level response, Tehran has in the past attempted assertive signaling in the maritime domain, i.e., harassing merchant shipping and conducting naval exercises with Russian and Chinese partners.

A mid-level escalation includes counterstrikes on military assets of US and its allies in the Gulf. Facing an existential threat Iran is attempting maritime escalation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move represents a strategic gamble with global consequences and risks overwhelming US retaliation.

Iran, for its part, understands this asymmetry well. Iranian Navy, with obsolete surface and sub-surface fleet, stands no chance against US Navy in a traditional conflict. However, Iran has structured its naval strategy on sea denial rather than sea control. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) operates hundreds of fast-attack crafts (FACs) equipped with missiles and rockets for saturated strikes against surface vessels. In addition, hundreds of coastal missiles and suicide drones have been dispersed and concealed along the Iranian coast.

Additionally, Iran has commissioned rudimentary specialized vessels, like Shahid Bagheri, Shahid Roudaki and Shahid Mahdavi, which have the capability to launch swarms of drones and containerized missiles at floating targets. Together, these assets manifest Iran’s asymmetrical warfare strategy in the maritime domain through which it seeks to overcome US defenses through overwhelming numbers.

Geography facilitates Iran’s strategy. The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s most potent political leverage. At its narrowest point between the Omani Musandam Peninsula and Iran, merely 33 kms wide with the shipping lane just 3 kms wide in either direction. Iran’s ability to block this channel using coastal missile batteries, FACs, naval mines, midget submarines, and unmanned systems provide its greatest capability to counter any major aggression.

The US understands this very well. Therefore, instead of venturing in close waters, the US Navy is likely to operate mostly outside the Persian Gulf while relying on Over-The-Horizon (OTH) precision strikes using distance as a buffer.

A blockade of Strait of Hormuz, by Iran will have immediate ramifications at the global scale. Oil tankers carry more than 17 million barrels of oil each day through this strait which accounts for approximately 20% of global net oil consumption.  Saudi Arabia and UAE have alterative pipelines operational which can transit about 2.6 million barrels per day. However, compared to the net volume passing through Start of Hormuz, these pipelines can carry 15.29% at maximum capacity and cannot overcome the economic spillover of any disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

Yet, for Iran this leverage of Strait of Hormuz is fragile and unsustainable in longer run. Israel’s comprehensive air-campaign against Iranian high value assets and subsequent Operations Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer have already exposed major capability voids in Iranian air-defense capability. The Iranian Air Force is obsolete, and its air-defense systems – including domestic as well as Russian and Chinese systems – are mediocre at best.

Against a well-coordinated multi-domain offense, Iran lacks a credible and workable retaliatory option at its disposal. Yes, a large stockpile of short-range ballistic missiles and drones pose a threat, but again, Israel’s precise targeting of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers during Iran-Israel conflict indicates that US can also undertake a similar campaign at a much greater scale employing far more robust options.

But the central question remains: what is Washington’s endgame with Iran? Can limited air strikes realistically cripple the Iranian political regime or permanently degrade its nuclear ambitions, or are they more likely to reinforce the regime’s ideological narrative and deepen Tehran’s perceived necessity for a nuclear deterrent? There are no clear answers.

Mr. Ahmad Ibrahim is research associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. His areas of research include Modern Warfare, Military Technology, Conflict Studies, and Nuclear Strategy. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

CARRIER, CHOKEPOINT, AND COERCION: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-US CONFLICT was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is entering a far more dangerous strategic era. Military modernization, grey-zone coercion, and rapid nuclear expansion are reshaping the regional balance of power. Most notably, China is undertaking a historic expansion of its nuclear arsenal, investing in silo fields, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and dual-capable systems. Simultaneously, Russia’s willingness to use nuclear threats in Europe demonstrates that nuclear coercion is once again central to great-power competition.

In Washington, proposals such as Ely Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact reflect recognition that the current security architecture is insufficient. A more formalized collective defense structure in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.

However, this is not sufficient. A conventional Pacific Defense Pact does not fully address the most dangerous level of escalation to large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack. What the region now requires is a narrowly defined Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

A Narrow, Explicit Purpose

This would not be a sweeping defense pact covering every maritime incident, border clash, cyber intrusion, or grey-zone coercive act. It would have a clear and carefully delimited purpose. That is to deter large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack against member states.

Its clarity would be its strength. That clarity performs a second vital function. It minimizes the risk of entrapment by ensuring member states are not dragged into escalation over actions below the threshold of war. By explicitly excluding grey-zone coercion and limited crises from its nuclear remit, the alliance would reassure leaders that only truly existential threats trigger its highest-level commitments.

Participation becomes politically sustainable and strategically credible because it avoids automatic escalation over incremental provocations. The alliance would draw a line at catastrophic strategic aggression.

The Historical Record: Why Nuclear Deterrence Matters

The case for a nuclear alliance is not theoretical. It is grounded in historical experience. During the Cold War, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented direct large-scale war and nuclear attack in Europe. Despite ideological confrontation and proxy conflicts, neither side attempted a conventional war or nuclear attack on the other’s core territories. Nuclear weapons imposed restraint. They deterred not just nuclear use, but overwhelming conventional assault.

Similarly, within NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear guarantees has prevented full-scale Russian conventional attack on Alliance territory. Moscow has tested boundaries through

hybrid tactics and coercive signaling, but it has not launched a large-scale attack on NATO soil. Nuclear deterrence at the alliance level raised the costs to an unacceptable threshold.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict further illustrates how nuclear capability constrains escalation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear superiority allowed it to signal credible threats, while China’s emerging nuclear capability and mobilization signaled resolve. Mutual fear of escalation compelled negotiation, including intervention through U.S. triangular diplomacy. Nuclear weapons shaped behaviors without being used.

The India–Pakistan experience is equally instructive. Prior to overt nuclearization, the two states fought multiple full-scale wars. Since their nuclear tests in 1998, crises have erupted, but they have remained limited. Missile strikes, cross-border skirmishes, and periods of great tension have not escalated into all-out conventional war or nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence imposed a ceiling on the conflicts.

Contrast this with the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s and now confronts a nuclear-armed Russia without possessing its own nuclear deterrent. The result has been a prolonged and costly conventional war of attrition. The absence of mutual nuclear deterrence has made sustained large-scale conventional war possible. By comparison, Russia has not launched a direct assault on NATO territory precisely because nuclear deterrence underwrites NATO’s collective defense.

The pattern is clear. Where credible nuclear deterrence exists between adversaries, large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack is sharply constrained or avoided. Where it does not, prolonged and devastating large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack becomes more likely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategic Gap

The Indo-Pacific currently relies on a patchwork of bilateral extended deterrence arrangements centered primarily on Washington. These remain essential, but they are increasingly strained or at risk of being fractured by China.

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal complicates escalation management. A larger and more survivable force reduces the credibility of assumptions that escalation will remain controlled or asymmetrical. Meanwhile, the region contains multiple flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the India–China border where conventional conflict could rapidly climb the escalation ladder.

Frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad strengthen capabilities and coordination, while the proposed Pacific Defense Pact aims to guarantee that the U.S. and its allies can act in concert during crises or conflicts. But they are not structured as nuclear deterrence mechanisms. They do not institutionalize shared nuclear declaratory policy, crisis consultation at the strategic level, or joint planning for high-end escalation management. A nuclear alliance would fill that gap.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact

A Pacific Defense Pact, as envisioned in conventional terms, strengthens interoperability and signals unity. But without an explicit nuclear dimension, it leaves ambiguity at the highest rung of escalation. That ambiguity can invite miscalculation.

A nuclear alliance would not broaden commitments; it would sharpen them. It would: (1) establish shared declaratory policy on deterrence of large-scale war and nuclear attack, (2) institutionalize strategic consultation mechanisms during crises, (3) coordinate planning to ensure credible escalation management, and (4) reinforce extended deterrence while discouraging independent nuclear proliferation.

Importantly, such an alliance need not require additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Like NATO, it could rely on extended deterrence commitments and nuclear-sharing with structured burden-sharing and planning arrangements. Nuclear forces may remain nationally controlled, but alliance cohesion amplifies deterrent credibility. 

Clarity as Stability

The objective is not confrontation. It is clarity. By defining a narrow and explicit threshold—large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack—the alliance reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. It signals to potential aggressors that existential aggression will trigger unified strategic consequences.

Simultaneously, it reassures members that lower-level competition will not automatically escalate to nuclear commitments. This dual clarity strengthens deterrence at the top end and stabilizes politics at the lower end.

A Necessary Evolution

The Indo-Pacific is now the central arena of 21st-century strategic competition. Nuclear modernization is accelerating. Multi-nuclear dynamics are emerging. Escalation timelines are compressing.

History shows that nuclear weapons, and when embedded within credible alliance structures, deter catastrophic war. They prevent large-scale conventional war and nuclear attacks not because they are desirable tools of war, but because they impose unacceptable costs on those who contemplate it.

A Pacific Defense Pact is a step forward, but in the current strategic environment, it is not enough. To deter large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack in the Indo-Pacific, the region must move beyond a Pacific Defense Pact. It must build a nuclear alliance.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact: Why the Indo-Pacific Requires a Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed – in paraphrased terms- that the atom bomb be given to those who can “strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.” Commonly referred to as the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech, Eisenhower’s words launched an International Atomic Energy Agency and a generation of research into nuclear energy. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s relationship with nuclear power has attracted less attention, but the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution is forcing the United States to take a “new look” at its power grid.

Throughout 2025, senators, think tanks, and federal commissions likened the pursuit of better AI to the Manhattan Project that built the bomb. The vast sums of energy required to fuel such a task, however, may need its own project. Although President Donald Trump issued an executive order to reinvigorate the nuclear industrial base last May, these energy demands have been overshadowed by mounting fascination with the need to win a technology race with China. Considering U.S. public opinion toward atomic energy reached a near record high last year, there is no better time to expand the atom’s role in support of a coherent AI strategy.

The Dawn of a Nuclear Renaissance

During the early Cold War, nuclear technology drove a revolution in energy generation, powering everything from American cities to aircraft carriers. The skyrocketing number of AI data facilities in the United States, on the other hand, represents a potential crisis in energy consumption. When asked if the country can support the growing demands of its data centers, former President of Energy at Microsoft Brian Janous responded: “No. Utilities have not experienced a period of load growth in almost two decades and are not prepared for—or even capable of matching—the speed at which AI technology is developing.” The White House is exploring nuclear options to meet this challenge, yet its AI strategy released last July only mentions nuclear power briefly on page sixteen. This point deserves more attention.

America’s 94 reactors currently supply twenty percent of its energy with 97 gigawatts (GW), and the largest of them—located in Georgia—has a generating capacity of 4.5 GW. A recent Goldman Sachs report projected that the United States needs 47 GW of additional energy to power its AI centers through 2030—the equivalent of half the country’s nuclear capacity. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has taken notice. In January, he secured a series of nuclear energy deals to power his 6.6 GW AI compound under development in Ohio. Companies that did not exist twenty years ago, such as Meta and OpenAI, could soon demand more than ten percent of the nation’s power grid, and the needs are only increasing.

Professor Joohyun Moon of Dankook University suggested recently that small modular reactors (SMRs)—automobile-sized nuclear batteries—could offer energy solutions for national security purposes in forward areas, such as the Indo-Pacific. Although the United States approved its first SMR design in 2022, it will not be operational until 2029, and only three SMRs are currently active in Japan, China, and Russia. Some studies cast doubt on the affordability of SMRs and question whether they would increase the risk of proliferation given the enriched uranium they need to operate. Moreover, these reactors only generate up to 300 megawatts, so while they could be useful in certain military contingencies, their output pales in comparison to the forecasted energy demands of AI.

Microsoft alone plans to build at least six data centers in Texas, each of which might consume enough energy to power more than 100,000 homes. Once Meta completes its Ohio facilities, it will have at its disposal energy reserves capable of powering roughly five million homes. Data centers in the United States could therefore devour nearly one quarter of the energy used by all American households before 2030. Without tighter integration between a national AI strategy and America’s nuclear sector, these numbers appear unsustainable.

Reversing the Ship

Going all in on nuclear energy also requires sustainable solutions to disposing of spent nuclear fuel and investing in high-capacity pressurized water reactors, but such solutions have not been forthcoming. President Barack Obama’s administration slashed funding for Nevada’s Yucca Mountain disposal facility in 2009 and suspended development of a nuclear waste repository there. Despite the first Trump administration’s requests to fund the disposal program between 2018 and 2020, Congress has yet to approve a plan. Any rapid increase in nuclear energy must be accompanied by a commensurate spike in disposal capacity.

In addition to these concerns, the United States closed thirteen reactors between 2013 and 2022, which has encouraged the current administration to reverse course. Last year, the Department of Energy pledged to quadruple America’s nuclear output from 100 GW to 400 GW by 2050. President Trump also issued an executive order to unburden AI companies of federal regulations and requested that they shoulder the burden of energy costs. The next step is to fuse these developments with a theory of success that explains what “winning” the AI race looks like and then align that vision with the energy requirements needed to support it—much of which will be nuclear.

The Long Shadow of 1945

In her historical account of U.S. citizenship during the early atomic age, Sarah Robey explains how “American culture has never truly partitioned the difference between ‘atoms for peace’ and ‘atoms for war.’” Over the last eighty years, these blurred lines generated both hyperbolic and apathetic responses to the nation’s relationship with nuclear power. The atom became equal parts provider and destroyer, but these conversations disappeared once public fears of a Cold War going hot subsided. With American optimism toward nuclear energy now sitting at 61 percent, there is no better time to reignite the discussion about the atom’s role in American society.

Despite the Trump administrations’ efforts to break ground on new nuclear plants over the last ten years, AI theory has outpaced the long-term realities of AI application, especially regarding the energy equation. Advancing AI research will force western societies to embrace the atom for the purpose of sustaining life rather than destroying it much as Eisenhower theorized in 1953. Accepting this reality by establishing deeper connections between energy generation and AI strategy is the first step toward finding sustainable solutions to AI’s role in war and peace.

MAJ Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army, is an instructor in the Department of History and War Studies at the United States Military Academy and a Ph.D. student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Specializing in early Cold War history and nuclear strategy, he has published several dozen articles and columns on a wide range of topics. His latest research appeared in the International Journal of Military History and Historiography and Texas National Security Review. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the policies or position of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of War, or the U.S. Government.

Learning to Love the Atom Again: Why the Future of Artificial Intelligence is Nuclear was originally published on Global Security Review.

In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to spy and surveillance satellites—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s concept of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.

Basrur identifies two levels of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.

India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as navigation satellites (NavlC) and communication satellites (GSAT). India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous development of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.

The Mission Shakti ASAT Test is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both the US and Russia as per its strategic needs. This multi-alignment strategy aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.

Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as Chandrayaan, Mangalyaan, and the upcoming Gaganyaan mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India’s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.

Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the Artemis Accords, the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time data that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.

Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly offensive space uses, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.

At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.

In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary strategic rift between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies was originally published on Global Security Review.

The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence does not rest solely on possessing nuclear weapons. It also depends on the assurance that those weapons cannot be neutralized, constrained, or rendered ineffective by an adversary’s ability to maneuver, surveil, or strike first. Geography, therefore, matters. In the emerging strategic environment, Greenland occupies one of the most consequential geographic positions in the world.

Denial as the Foundation of Nuclear Survivability

The survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is the cornerstone of strategic stability. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the most secure retaliatory capability precisely because they operate undetected at sea. But stealth is not automatic. Submarines must transit known maritime corridors to reach patrol areas, and those corridors create opportunities for adversary interference.

For U.S. and allied forces operating in the Atlantic and Arctic, two choke points are decisive: the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Greenland and Svalbard. These routes connect the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic and serve as the primary pathways for submarines moving between bastion areas and open-ocean operating zones.

If Russian or Chinese submarines could transit these gaps freely, they would be able to threaten NATO SSBNs, target transatlantic sea lines of communication, and position themselves for nuclear or conventional strikes against NATO territory and U.S. nuclear forces. Denying that access—rather than reacting after the fact—is what preserves nuclear survivability. Greenland makes such denial far more feasible.

Greenland as a Strategic Gatekeeper

Greenland’s location enables persistent surveillance, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare operations across the Arctic–Atlantic interface. Sensors, airfields, space and radar infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes associated with Greenland enable the United States and NATO to monitor adversary movements and constrain their ability to maneuver undetected.

This is not about tactical confrontation; it is about strategic denial. Greenland’s geography makes it exceedingly difficult for Russian or Chinese forces to move quietly from the Arctic into the Atlantic, increasing the likelihood that such efforts would be detected, tracked, and, if necessary, intercepted. When combined with American technology, Greenland adds uncertainty, constrains their options, complicates operational planning, and reduces incentives for escalation.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy and the Olenya Complex

Russia’s own posture reinforces Greenland’s importance. Moscow has invested heavily in the Arctic, operating 32 bases, expanding air and missile defenses, and increasing submarine activity across the High North. The Kola Peninsula hosts a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear forces, supported by infrastructure such as the Olenya nuclear weapons storage facility, which underpins long-range aviation and missile operations.

Russia’s objective is twofold: to shield its own nuclear forces within a protected Arctic bastion, and to enable submarines and aircraft to push outward into the Atlantic when required. Those outward movements would be designed to threaten NATO’s reinforcement routes, hold allied territory at risk, and directly threaten U.S. strategic forces and American cities.

By enabling the U.S. and NATO to better monitor and deny access through the Arctic gaps, Greenland limits Russia’s ability to mobilize and deploy 40 percent of its submarine force. This denial mission directly strengthens Euro-Atlantic security by reducing the coercive value of Russian nuclear signalling or capacity for destruction.

China, the Arctic, and Global Deterrence

Although China is not an Arctic power by geography, it increasingly behaves like one strategically. Beijing’s naval expansion and interest in Arctic routes reflect its ambition to operate on a global scale. Chinese submarines operating in cooperation with Russia, or benefiting from shared intelligence and surveillance, could complicate the maritime balance in the North Atlantic.

Preventing Chinese submarines from accessing these waters is therefore as important as containing Russian forces. Even a limited Chinese presence would require diverting allied assets and introducing new strategic risks. Greenland helps pre-empt that outcome by reinforcing allied control over Arctic approaches and denying adversaries the ability to open a northern axis of competition.

This denial function links Greenland directly to Indo-Pacific security. The same U.S. nuclear forces that deter conflict in Asia depend on freedom of manoeuvre and survivability in the Atlantic and Arctic. If those forces are threatened in one theatre, credibility erodes in all others.

Air, Missile, and Early Warning Dimensions

The Arctic is also a critical domain for air and missile operations—America’s planned “Golden Dome.” Long-range bombers and ballistic missiles generally follow polar trajectories to maximize range and payload and minimize warning time. Greenland’s position enables early detection, tracking, and integration into broader air and missile defense architectures.

By denying adversaries access to Arctic airspace, Greenland reinforces strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strike calculations over the North Pole. This capability is essential in an era of increasingly compressed decision timelines.

Conclusion

Greenland matters because it enables strategic denial by denying Russian and Chinese submarines, aircraft, and missiles access through the Arctic and North Atlantic gaps that connect global theatres. That denial preserves the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, protects allied homelands, and sustains the credibility of extended deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

In an age defined by competition over access and geography, Greenland is not peripheral but essential to maintaining the balance of power and preventing great-power conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Greenland, Strategic Denial, and the Survivability of U.S. Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

AI has improved intelligence operations in developing nations, but it has also created a new intelligence gap due to disjointed technological implementation, political exploitation of surveillance, reliance on foreign suppliers, and insufficient integration between HUMINT and AI-driven systems. Pakistan and India have large human resources and developing technological ecosystems, but institutional fragmentation and political agendas prevent the development of integrated, modern intelligence frameworks.

The problems that South Asian intelligence services are having are part of a larger global transformation. AI is now a segment of intelligence operation in the US, China, Israel, and some European countries. This includes automated translation, pattern-of-life analysis, algorithmic triage of intercepted data, commercial satellite imagery analytics, and cyber-enabled anomaly detection. China’s surveillance state uses AI-powered facial recognition, behavior prediction, and nationwide data fusion to show what a fully integrated intelligence model looks like. The U.S. is pushing for automated signals intelligence (SIGINT) processing and predictive analysis in all its intelligence agencies in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). As shown in studies of its military AI systems, Israel uses AI in real-time targeting and ISR fusion.

Developing countries are just as vulnerable to cyber-attacks, terrorism, and false information, but they do not have the institutional frameworks that let AI grow. This global gap is what makes the changes in intelligence in Pakistan and India so important for strategy. Pakistan and India have both spent resources on AI-enabled surveillance systems like ID databases, CCTV networks, predictive policing tools, interception systems, and cyber technologies that come from other countries. The NADRA database and Safe City projects in Pakistan give a lot of biometric and real-time data. India has made the Central Monitoring System (CMS) and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) to connect databases between state agencies. The ministry, military, police, and intelligence systems are separate. Legacy bureaucracies promote compartmentalization over integration. AI needs centralized databases, clean data, agency cooperation, and agreed analysis criteria. These requirements are missing; hence, AI systems exhibit limited and inconsistent intelligence. Agencies are collecting more data than ever but lack the framework to analyze it.

Pakistan and India still value HUMINT for intelligence. It is crucial for counterterrorism, political spying, and regional operations. HUMINT alone can’t compete with hybrid enemies who use AI-driven processing. Strategically, China’s integrated military and civilian AI ecosystem is advantageous. Developing states are stuck between two sources of intelligence: First is a legacy HUMINT system with deep networks and second is an AI ecosystem that is fragmented and not fully developed, so it cannot support strategic analysis. In cross-border threat assessments, cyber invasions, and emerging non-traditional security issues like information warfare, this mismatch causes delays, blind spots, and analytical distortions.

In both Pakistan and India, AI-enabled surveillance has been used more for political purposes than for improving strategic intelligence. Amnesty International reported that India’s use of Pegasus spyware targeted journalists, activists, and political opponents. Pakistan has been criticized for using automated social media monitoring and political profiling, which often focuses on threats from within the country rather than threats from other countries. When surveillance tools are used to control political competition within a party, two things happen. First, institutional resources prioritize domestic control over strategic analysis. Second, technology investments strengthen policing instead of updating intelligence. This challenges national security by making it harder for the intelligence system to predict cyberattacks, regional crises, and threats from outside the country.

South Asia has a lot of foreign AI and cyber infrastructure. Pakistan employs Chinese surveillance equipment (Hikvision, Huawei), while India uses Israeli, US, and European and American forensics platforms. This increases structural risks, including data exfiltration and espionage due to entrenched vulnerabilities, strategic reliance on foreign updates, and weakened sovereignty over vital intelligence activities.

Two traditional rivals, nuclear-weapon states, are weakened by this reliance. AI-powered surveillance systems increase digital access points for assault. Big national data repositories attract attackers. Pakistan has had multiple government system hacks, and India has had large breaches that compromised critical infrastructure and government information.  Failures in the past were largely caused by human error, but in the AI era, bias in algorithms, data manipulation, hostile and automated cyberattacks, and misclassification can lead to erroneous operational decisions. These dangers make the strategy unstable.

Increasing intelligence gaps between Pakistan and India jeopardize national and regional security. More likely to misjudge opponents: In fast-moving crises, agencies may miss signals, misjudge threats, or misread trends without AI–HUMINT fusion. Cross-border escalation risks rise; poor intelligence integration in nuclearized environments may aggravate misperceptions during crises like the 2019 Pulwama–Balakot incident or the May 2025 standoff. Cyber attacks expose national secrets. Easy-to-get digital network intelligence can have fatal repercussions. China-asymmetric strategic competition: China is decades ahead in intelligence upgrading, and Pakistan and India may fall further. Domestic AI reduces institutional capacity: political survival trumps strategic intelligence.

In summary, countries that do not update their intelligence risk being caught off guard, making mistakes, and becoming more vulnerable. The myths of shadows, secrecy, and huge people networks that fueled emerging country intelligence organizations are gone. AI has highlighted bureaucratic opacity’s long-hidden structural flaws: dysfunctional systems, politicized surveillance, reliance on foreign technology, and a lack of HUMINT-AI integration. Thus, Pakistan and India’s new intelligence divide is not about data or resources. It is about institutions’ failure to transition from analogue intelligence to AI-connected ecosystems. State and non-state adversaries that accelerate this transformation will benefit.

In nuclearized, crisis-prone South Asia, small misunderstandings could lead to massive wars. Pakistan and India need more than AI tools to stay competitive strategically. They need data architectures that work together, technical specialists, protocols to prevent politicians from abusing their authority, and strategic AI–HUMINT fusion.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Intelligence Illusion: How AI is Exposing Strategic Vulnerabilities in the Developing World was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the technological details are simplified in the movie, its strategic intuition is right on point. A ballistic missile —possibly a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) attributable to North Korea—creates a uniquely destabilizing crisis. The alert time is compressed, attribution gets ambiguous, and U.S. homeland missile defense becomes both the first and last line of defense. However, such a situation should not be a U.S. only issue especially in a West Pacific launch scenario, originating from the Sea of Japan or an adjacent maritime area. Both Japan and South Korean alliances present capabilities already in place or being actively pursued which could change the outcome.

Why SLBMs Create a Distinct Crisis?

SLBMs raise more profound challenges for interception than a land-based missile launched deep inside North Korean territory. The launch location is uncertain, early warning alerts could be delayed, while a credible trajectory may only be acquired after the boost phase. This compresses the U.S. leader’s decision-making cycle and complicates attribution at precisely the moment when clarity matters most.

Japan’s Role: Forward Maritime-Based Defense

Japan already fields many of the relevant capabilities to address . The Japanese Maritime SDF operates Aegis destroyers that are armed with SM-3 interceptors, including the SM-3 Block IIA variant that is co-developed with the United States. Under controlled experimental conditions, this interceptor has verified its ability to intercept ICBM-class targets, indicating that its strategic relevance goes beyond regional missile defense.

More importantly, Japan is moving towards a maritime-oriented ballistic missile defense posture. The planned Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs)—built around the SPY-7 radar—are designed to provide continuous BMD coverage without diverting multi-mission destroyers. Expected to be deployed in the late 2020s, these vessels would function as constant BMD platforms.

In an SLBM launch scenario in the Sea of Japan, such vessels could be ideally poised to detect, track, and intercept an SLBM that is transiting the Northern Hemisphere. Such forward deployment expands the interception theater, creating an opportunity for an early engagement before activating the missile defense situated in the continental United States. Therefore, Japan’s contribution is geometrical, not symbolic, shortening the initial time of engagement. 

South Korea’s Emerging Contribution

Similarly, South Korea is preparing to add the second crucial defense layer. Seoul is proceeding with the procurement of SM-3 missiles, reflecting the understanding that missile defense can no longer be restricted to terminal-phase defense on the Korean Peninsula. While South Korea’s existing air and missile defense system is centered on short- and medium-range threats, SM-3 introduces a new mission: sea-based midcourse interception.

South Korea’s Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3s can operate in partnership with the Japanese defense forces in a complementary manner, creating azimuth diversity in intercept geometry. Multiple engagement opportunities from different angles to complicate an opponent’s countermeasures and lower the dependency on a single interception attempt. This is not mere redundancy, but resilience under uncertainty.

Another important element is South Korea’s push for a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN). Although an SSN does not intercept a missile, it influences the very unstable factor in this scenario: The North Korean submarine itself. While diesel-electric submarines rely on limited endurance and predictable operational patterns, SSNs can loiter, sprint, and conduct continuous operations across vast maritime areas. This makes it extremely difficult for North Korean submarines to reach actual launch areas undetected. In that sense, South Korea’s SSN ambition represents a denial strategy that could prevent the crisis from emerging, rather than serving as mere prestige or a symbol of a blue-water navy.

A Trilateral Layered Response

Pre-crisis posture is decisive. Japan’s ASEVs or Aegis destroyers should maintain BMD patrol points somewhere in the Sea of Japan, while South Korean Aegis destroyers could be operated near Korean waters in complementary sectors. Real-time information sharing through trilateral missile alert mechanisms should be a standing arrangement rather than an ad hoc measure.

At launch, forward sensors and shipborne radars could track earlier than what is portrayed in the movie—and if geometric conditions are met, Japanese naval vessels could attempt the first interception through SM-3 during early midcourse. Sequentially, South Korean destroyers could conduct a second round of engagement from different azimuths. To be sure, these attempts do not guarantee interception. Nevertheless, they reshape the problem from a terminal-phase gamble into a layered contest.

Only when these attempts fail would the engagement fall back to U.S. homeland defense; in this case, GBIs serve as the last line of defense rather than the sole response. At that juncture—when the U.S. must launch its GBIs—decision-makers would have more information, higher attribution credibility, and greater room for diplomacy to manage further escalation. The objective is not interception certainty, but the expansion of decision space under extreme uncertainty.

Policy Implications

If The House of Dynamite is a warning, the response should be concrete. Japan should recognize ASEVs as the backbone of regional BMD rather than as a peripheral capability. Meanwhile, South Korea should invest in the training, doctrine, and readiness required for sustained SM-3 operations. To be sure, together with the U.S., the three countries should institutionalize exercises that explicitly rehearse ICBM-class scenarios.

Although The House of Dynamite is a compelling drama, it is not destiny. The decisive factor is not technology itself, but alliance design, specifically whether Tokyo and Seoul are already in the fight when the crisis begins.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a President at the Security Management Institute, in the South Korean National Assembly. He holds a doctoral degree in international relations from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, a master’s degree in conflict management from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a degree in public policy from Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA). The views of the author are his own.

Fixing the House of Dynamite – An SLBM Crisis in East Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most the world’s approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately 5,500 and the US holding approximately 5,177, declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated 600 operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.

These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.

Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.

Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel’s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.

Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a “crucial year” for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.

Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.

In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own.

The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Policy planning reflected that belief. Governments prepared for escalation management, energy disruption, and post-conflict instability not for sustained deterrence or a prolonged, high intensity war. This failure was neither accidental nor confined to a single capital or political party. It was the result of long-standing policy choices, alliance design decisions, and a shared belief that restraint could substitute for credible deterrence.

A Long Arc of Under-Resourcing

The NATO alliance arrived at this moment after more than a decade of deliberate under-investment. Under Presidents Barack Obama and later Joe Biden, U.S. defense policy emphasized escalation avoidance, fiscal restraint, and risk management over capacity, readiness, and industrial depth. Deterrence became a matter of signaling rather than a consistent force structure.

This trajectory did not change meaningfully during President Donald Trump’s first term. Budgetary turbulence, government shutdowns, continuing resolutions, and inherited top lines constrained structural change. Europe took its cues from Washington as strategic restraint aligned with European politics. Risk aversion, energy accommodation with Russia, and the belief that diplomacy could compensate for declining hard power. This was publicly validated when Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, not for altering U.S. strategy, but largely for reaffirming a posture Europe favored. The signal was unmistakable: restraint would be rewarded, not penalized.

Alliance Design and the Shock of 2022

NATO functioned exactly as designed. After the Cold War, the United States explicitly asserted its leadership and structured the alliance accordingly. Command arrangements, rank hierarchies, and decision-making processes ensured that Washington always held the most senior voices in the room—and an effective pocket veto.

The shock in 2022 was not that Europe took the lead, but that President Biden was so timid as to reinforce Russian risk assessments. Escalation anxiety, combined with under-resourced deterrence, produced caution when decisiveness was needed. Europe, constrained by years of deferred defense investment and structural energy dependence, lacked both the capacity and the political will to move faster than Washington. The result was paralysis by design: American restraint set the ceiling, European limitations set the floor, and the Western alliance’s action was trapped in between.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders deserve credit for attempting to break the paralysis when the scale of Russian aggression became unmistakable. Boris Johnson effectively accelerated the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by signing bilateral security guarantees that would have placed NATO forces on the ground and triggered Article 5 through cascading alliance obligations. It was a brilliant realist move, anchoring deterrence in forward commitment rather than process. Overcoming a Europe constrained by alliance structure, capacity, and the limits of American political cover.

Energy Sovereignty as a Deterrence Variable

A critical and under-appreciated failure was Europe’s abandonment of energy sovereignty. Years of policy choices have left European economies structurally dependent on Russian hydrocarbons at precisely the moment when deterrence required resilience. In 2024, the EU bloc purchased approximately €21.9 billion ($23.5 billion) worth of fossil fuels from Russia—exceeding the €18.7 billion ($20 billion) it reported allocating to Ukraine in financial aid over the same period. Climate change was elevated as the dominant strategic threat, displacing hard-power competitors such as Russia and China in threat prioritization and in efforts to defend Ukraine from Russian invasion. That disordering of risk mattered.

Europe compounded its vulnerability by dismantling reliable nuclear capacity before a dependable replacement baseload was in place. Rather than sequencing decarbonization alongside firm alternatives, several states removed nuclear generation while relying on Russian gas to bridge the gap. This was not a technical error but a strategic one.

Deterrence is weakened by dependence and strengthened when leverage is denied. The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines did not create Europe’s vulnerability; it exposed and accelerated its resolution. It removed Russia’s most potent instrument of coercive leverage over Europe. The act dismantled a dependency that had distorted European decision-making and narrowed the range of credible responses.

The Burden-Sharing Reality

The deeper problem exposed by the war is not under-spending, but misaligned responsibility. Europe accounts for nearly 44 percent of NATO’s combined GDP yet contributes 32 percent of alliance defense spending and a smaller share of high-end industrial capacity. That disparity was sustainable only so long as American support was unconditional and inexhaustible. It is not.

Fixating on President Trump’s demand for fairness obscures this structural reality. Trump did not create alliance stress; he exposed it. The core issue is that NATO has evolved into a system in which the United States bears disproportionate escalation risk while Europe enjoys disproportionate security benefits. In any conflict in which U.S. and European equities are asymmetric, that imbalance creates credibility problems—and adversaries can see them clearly.

Europe has begun to wake up. Defense budgets are rising, industrial capacity is being rebuilt, and strategic rhetoric has hardened. However, it took Vladimir Putin’s war—his willingness to use force at scale on Europe’s borders—to force a reckoning that European leaders had long postponed.

Interests, Narratives, and Credibility

Deterrence rests on perception of strength and credibility. When responsibility, risk, and capability are asymmetric, resolve is questioned. Credibility erodes quietly, long before it collapses publicly.

The uncomfortable truth is that U.S. and European interests are not perfectly aligned. Europe increasingly speaks the language of realism. Deterrence, balance, and forward defense, while framing policy through a liberal narrative of norms, process, and institutional legitimacy. That mismatch is not illegitimate, but it becomes dangerous when it masks unequal contributions and obscures who bears the true costs of failure.

Necessary Correction

The solution is neither retrenchment nor recrimination. It is a shift toward genuine Regional Shared Deterrence: a model in which European states meet NATO obligations proportionate to their economic weight, rebuild industrial capacity at scale, restore energy sovereignty, and assume visible responsibility for regional defense outcomes. That, in turn, would allow the United States to lead decisively without carrying the alliance alone—restoring credibility through aligned incentives and shared risk.

Ukraine did more than halt a Russian invasion. By refusing to collapse, it shattered Western assumptions and disrupted plans built around convenience rather than genuine deterrence. That disruption has exposed a simple truth: deterrence that is under-resourced by design and shared only in rhetoric will fail when tested. Whether this moment produces a strategic correction—or merely another cycle of improvisation—will determine the next crisis long before it arrives.

Kirk Fansher is a retired Colonel, Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Editor at Global Security Review. A Yale graduate and U.S. Naval War College alum, he has published extensively on nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and burden sharing. The views expressed are his own.

Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of interest these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.

While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist Dr. William Van Cleave, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “Team B.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.

Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.

The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who advocated for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.

Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. Designed by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists arguing the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.

Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be vastly reduced using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.

The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of a crackdown, clashes with the security forces, and rising casualties among protestors indicate that Iran’s rulers are facing a serious threat to regime survival—the second such event since the 12 days of war with Israel in June 2025. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei branded the protesters “rioters” and “mercenaries,” who were instigated by the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump is openly backing the protests and has made it clear that if the Iranian authorities kill protestors, the United States will intervene militarily to protect them from Tehran’s reprisals, with the latest reports saying that the U.S. President has even been presented with possible strike options.

At the same time, Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Iran’s last shah, and his backers are trying to hijack the protests and brand them as a popular demand for his return to the country and restoration of an absolute monarchy. However, Reza Pahlavi has a very poor reputation among Iran’s non-Persian ethnic minorities, who make up at least 50 percent of the population of the country. Having faced discrimination for over a century from the former Pahlavi and the current Islamic Republic regimes, Iran’s Azerbaijanis are mainly sticking to their national slogans such as “Freedom, Justice and National Government.”

Iran’s Azerbaijanis Reject Both Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic

There are estimated to be 25-30 million Azerbaijani Turks in Iran, making them the second largest ethnic and linguistic group after the Persians. Historically, Azerbaijani Turks have played a significant role in Iran’s politics, not only providing the successive Turkic dynasties that ruled what is today Iran for centuries, but also shaping political thought and spearheading political changes, such as the 1906-1911 Constitutionalist Revolution. Azerbaijanis are primarily concentrated in the northwestern regions of Iran, where they constitute the world’s largest Azerbaijani community—bigger than the one in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

As part of the Pahlavi regime’s forced homogenization policies to create a Persian-centric Iranian supra-national identity, Azerbaijanis suffered systematic erasure of their identity, such as a ban on the Azerbaijani Turkic language in print media, education and theatres. Reza Shah’s policies of forced assimilation and the promotion of the Persian language, accompanied by the suppression of non-Persian languages, became a defining state initiative. This was part of the Pahlavi monarchy’s promotion of centralism, modernism, and secularism to create an Aryan European nation-state.

Reza Shah’s centralization policies resulted in the decline of Azerbaijan’s significance within Iran, the reallocation of state resources, and changes in economic development trends. In his book Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, Rasmus Christian Elling asserts that the diminishing status of Azerbaijan was accompanied by restrictions on Turkic elements of Azerbaijani culture and initiatives aimed at promoting Persian as the only language of Iran. New provinces were established to fragment Azerbaijani strongholds, important locations were renamed in Persian, and Persian names were promoted for Azerbaijani children.

The short-lived 1945-1946 Autonomous Azerbaijan People’s Government, which demanded self-determination within Iran and recognition of Azerbaijani rights, was violently suppressed in December 1946 by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s army. More than 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed. Even the Iranian army’s records, which downplayed the numbers, reported that 2,500 individuals were executed, 8,000 were imprisoned, and 36,000 were expelled from the Azerbaijan province.

State-level discrimination against Azerbaijanis continues to this day, as the provision for education in their mother tongue for Iran’s minorities, set out in Article 15 of the Constitution, remains on paper only. Azerbaijani rights activists are subjected to arbitrary arrests and punishments for trying to raise awareness of their identity and language and for protesting against the environmental disaster of Lake Urmia, which has completely dried up because of the Islamic Republic’s mismanagement. The Islamic Republic’s ethnic discrimination is still visible in cases of parents being denied the right to give their children Azerbaijani Turkic names. The Islamic Republic’s use of Shia Islam to override ethnic differences and forge a homogenous Persian-centric Iranian identity is a continuation of the Pahlavi-era policies.

Security Threats for the Azerbaijan Republic

As the protests grow and U.S. military intervention looms, the Azerbaijan Republic needs to be prepared for possible security risks from the chaotic political environment in Iran. The Iranian regime has been an existential threat to Azerbaijan’s security over the years with its support for the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan, export of Khomeinist political Islam and instigation of radical Shia elements against the secular Azerbaijani state, killing of Azerbaijani citizens, creation of a terrorist proxy called the Huseyniyyun brigade under Soleimani’s supervision, and pouring of narcotics into Azerbaijan on an almost daily basis.

In a scenario of regime collapse, Azerbaijan needs to formulate a proactive policy by engaging with Israel, the U.S., and Turkey to be ready to prevent any bloodshed against Iran’s Azerbaijanis, considering that the PKK-linked Kurdish PJAK militants, who are armed and have territorial claims on Iran’s Azerbaijani cities such as Urmia. A second threat might emerge if the regime or an alternative central authority engages in a bloody crackdown against the Azerbaijani minority, which also needs to be prevented. Overall, in a chaotic environment, the primary target should be the prevention of armed attacks by the PJAK militants or a violent crackdown on Azerbaijanis.

A change in Iran from theocracy to secularism is also in Azerbaijan’s national interests and might help to mend the ties between the countries. A strong Azerbaijani role in Iran’s future as equals is essential to curb pan-Iranist inclinations towards imperialism and denying Azerbaijani identity. Further exasperating this is Russian imperialism, which has re-emerged following the Soviet Union’s collapse and has become deadly under Putin. A democratic and decentralized Iran is in the interests of the world.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Iranian Collapse Poses Security Risks for the Azerbaijan Republic was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s January 2026 use of a hypersonic Oreshnik missile was not primarily about destroying a target. It was a strategic message delivered through speed and proximity rather than words. Western reporting confirms the strike occurred near Ukraine’s western border during a broader missile and drone attack and was widely interpreted as a deliberate signal toward NATO rather than a battlefield necessity.

This is how the conversation begins. Russia speaks first, not with a declaration, but with a capability demonstration. Hypersonic systems like Oreshnik reportedly exceed Mach 10, compressing detection and decision timelines and complicating interception by existing missile defense architectures. The message is implicit. If this can reach here, it can reach farther. Geography does the rest of the work.

From a battlefield perspective, the strike changed little. Ukraine has endured far heavier damage from conventional missile campaigns. Infrastructure effects were limited relative to scale. That is precisely why the strike matters. Hypersonic weapons derive much of their value not from explosive yield but from psychological and strategic effects that shape decision-making under uncertainty.

Hypersonic systems sit in an uneasy space between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Their speed and maneuverability reduce warning time, while their dual-use potential introduces ambiguity about intent and escalation thresholds. This ambiguity is destabilizing by design. It forces worst-case assumptions and heightens coercive leverage without crossing overt nuclear red lines.

The timing of the strike matters. It occurred amid active European debates about long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. Russia has consistently opposed deeper Western involvement, and analysts note that demonstrations of advanced strike capabilities often coincide with diplomatic inflection points to influence allied decision-making. Poland was not targeted, yet proximity alone conveyed risk. That was sufficient.

This brings the conversation directly to deterrence and national strategy. The most recent United States National Defense Strategy identifies Russia as an acute threat and emphasizes integrated deterrence across domains, allies, and instruments of national power. The document explicitly recognizes the challenge posed by advanced missile threats and highlights the need for resilient command and control, integrated air and missile defense, and close coordination with allies.

However, the Oreshnik strike exposes a gap between strategic acknowledgment and operational specificity. The National Defense Strategy speaks clearly about the importance of integrated deterrence, yet it remains largely high-level in addressing how compressed decision timelines created by hypersonic weapons affect escalation management in Europe. While the strategy calls for investments in missile defense and sensing, it does not fully grapple with the psychological and political effects of hypersonic ambiguity on alliance cohesion crises.

Deterrence by denial becomes harder to sustain when allies know that some threats may penetrate defenses regardless of investment. Hypersonic systems challenge assumptions that reassurance can rest on interception alone. NATO and U.S. strategies increasingly emphasize deterrence by punishment and resilience, yet the National Defense Strategy stops short of articulating how allies should respond politically and militarily when warning time collapses, and attribution is immediate, but intent remains unclear.

This does not mean the strategy is wrong. It means it is incomplete. Integrated deterrence remains the correct framework, but hypersonic weapons demand greater emphasis on crisis decision-making, distributed command structures, and alliance-level exercises that assume ambiguity rather than clarity. Analysts have long warned that hypersonic systems stress deterrence not by making war more likely, but by increasing the risk of miscalculation during moments of political tension.

Russia’s hypersonic signal near NATO’s border, therefore, becomes a practical test of whether strategic documents translate into a credible posture. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges the problem. The question is whether implementation moves fast enough to match the physics involved. Deterrence must function even when seconds replace minutes, and ambiguity replaces certainty.

The Oreshnik launch did not redraw Europe’s security map overnight. It changed the tone of the room. It reminded policymakers that deterrence is not static, and that technology can erode comfortable assumptions faster than doctrine adapts. Hypersonic weapons are not the end of deterrence. They are a stress test of whether national strategies and alliances can remain credible when clarity disappears.

When the screens go dark in that briefing room, the real discussion begins. Not about panic or retaliation, but about adaptation. Deterrence endures not because threats are fast, but because responses remain coherent under pressure. Russia spoke in velocity. The enduring question is whether strategy, alliance resolve, and execution can keep pace.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Conversation Europe Never Wanted: Hypersonic Tensions and U.S. Defense Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nearly a century later, Russian planners still view Deep Battle as a foundational concept. Yet the war in Ukraine has exposed the performance gap between theory and practice.

Deep Battle in Russian Military Thought

Deep Battle was designed as a holistic operational approach: massed firepower, rapid penetration, and exploitation by mobile formations. It required tight coordination, robust logistics, and the ability to sustain momentum across multiple echelons. Soviet forces demonstrated aspects of this during World War II, and the concept remained embedded in Russian doctrine long after.

Modern Russian operations—at least on paper—still aspire to this model. Analysts note that Russian commanders have attempted to regain maneuver by applying Deep Battle principles, seeking rapid breakthroughs and deep strikes to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. However, the conditions required for successful Deep Battle are far more demanding than the theory suggests.

Why Deep Battle Has Struggled in Ukraine

Several factors have undermined Russia’s ability to execute Deep Battle effectively. Logistical fragility has plagued Russian operations, as sustaining supply to fast-moving units proved difficult; forces entering Ukraine in 2022 quickly outran their logistics, leading to stalled advances and exposed columns. Scholars argue that this logistical weakness fundamentally compromised Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo. Additionally, Ukrainian resilience and adaptability have presented unexpected challenges. Ukrainian forces have been far more agile and technologically integrated than Russian planners anticipated, employing precision fires, dispersed command structures, and Western intelligence support to blunt Russian attempts at operational shock and interrupting supply lines and replacement equipment. Their use of drone and counter-drone technology exemplifies adaptive learning that has already been noted and copied by other state militaries.

Russia’s attempts at Deep Battle are further hindered by insufficient force quality and added maneuver complexity, as the doctrine relies on well-trained, coordinated echelons. Russia’s reliance on mobilized troops, fragmented command structures, and heavy attrition has made synchronized deep operations difficult to sustain. The loss of air superiority has limited Russia’s ability to shape the battlefield making the battlefield more complex. As intended by doctrine, Soviet Deep Battle assumes overwhelming air support to suppress enemy depth, but contested airspace in Ukraine has prevented this crucial element.

Where Russia Has Adapted

Despite these challenges, Russia has applied Deep Battle concepts in modified ways. In adapting the principles of Deep Battle to modern conflict, Russia has focused on targeting Ukrainian infrastructure with long-range strikes. This campaign has prioritized attacks on energy systems and logistics nodes, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian depth and sustain pressure even without accompanying maneuver. By striking critical assets far from the front lines, Russia attempts to weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist and maintain its war effort.

Rather than achieving rapid breakthroughs as originally envisioned by Deep Battle doctrine, Russia has shifted to a strategy of incremental, attritional “deepening.” This approach relies on massed artillery and slow, grinding advances to steadily erode Ukrainian defenses. The result is a war of attrition where progress is measured in small territorial gains instead of dramatic operational shifts, demonstrating an adaptation of Deep Battle’s objectives without its characteristic momentum.

In addition to these methods, Russian military planners and observers continue to pursue efforts to reconstitute maneuver forces. Despite ongoing challenges, such as limited operational success, attempts are being made to rebuild the capacity for operational-level breakthroughs. These efforts underscore a persistent desire within Russian strategy to reclaim the maneuver warfare and deep operational reach that are central to Deep Battle theory, even as practical limitations remain.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deep Battle

Vladimir Putin has repeatedly issued veiled or explicit warnings regarding the potential for Russian nuclear first use concerning the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to perceived unacceptable threats. This stance is further reflected in Russian military exercises, which have frequently included simulated launches with tactical nuclear weapons systems. However, it is important to note that some Soviet assessments during the Cold War adopted a realistically pessimistic outlook on the conduct of military operations in a nuclear environment, recognizing the immense challenges such conditions would impose.

Taken together, these perspectives highlight the duality in Russian strategic thinking: while nuclear signaling and preparation remain integral to Russia’s military posture, there is also an awareness—rooted in historical experience—of the profound difficulties associated with waging war in a nuclear-affected battlespace.

Implications for the Future of the War

Understanding Russia’s attachment to Deep Battle helps explain both its ambitions and its limitations. Russia will continue seeking opportunities for operational breakthroughs, even if conditions rarely allow them. The concept remains deeply embedded in Russian military culture. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategy of disrupting Russian logistics and command nodes directly targets the prerequisites of Deep Battle, making it harder for Russia to generate momentum. If Russia can rebuild its logistics, improve training, and integrate drones and electronic warfare more effectively, it may regain the ability to conduct deeper operations—but this remains uncertain. The war is likely to remain attritional because neither side currently possesses the combination of mass, mobility, and air dominance required for true Deep Battle.

Conclusion

Deep Battle remains a conceptual framework and historical marker for understanding Russian military behavior. But the war in Ukraine has shown that doctrine alone cannot compensate for structural weaknesses, resilient opposition, and the realities of modern precision warfare. Russia’s struggle to translate Deep Battle theory into battlefield success underscores the widening gap between its strategic aspirations and its operational capabilities.

NOTE: The author provides a grateful acknowledgment that is made to David Glantz and the late Dr. Jacob Kipp for the author’s appreciation of this topic. None bear any responsibility for arguments herein.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy.  He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025).

The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether knowingly or not, these headlines promote a false narrative that China wants the world to believe. As an example of complex psychological warfare, the narrative aims to weaken the will of the Japanese public and the international community at large to defend Taiwan against a future Chinese attack. To prevent the weakening of deterrence, it is necessary to set the record straight regarding Japan’s policy towards Taiwan.

The 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué

The previously cited news reports mischaracterize a comment made by Prime Minister Takaichi, who told lawmakers, “The Japanese government’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, and there has been no change to this position.” Specifically, she is referring to paragraph 3 of the 1972 communiqué: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

Importantly, the communiqué does not say that Japan “affirms,” “recognizes,” “endorses,” or “agrees with” the viewpoint of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the communist regime that governs the country today. The communiqué states only that Japan “understands and respects” the PRC’s position.

When the United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC, it used similar language. Paragraph 7 of the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué states, “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” In this context, the word “acknowledges” performs the same function as the phrase “understands and respects” does in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.

A key legal distinction lies in whether a government uses the word “recognize,” which then constitutes formal acceptance of a claim’s legal validity. Japan and the U.S. both stated that they “recognize” the PRC as the “sole legal government of China.” By recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China, Japan and the U.S. were adopting a “One China” policy.

A crucial aspect of the “one China” policy adopted by both Japan and the U.S. is that neither recognizes the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China; they merely take note of the PRC’s position. Where the American and Japanese policies differ is Japan’s insistence that it “firmly maintains” its stance under Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Unpacking the meaning of Japan’s reaffirmation of Potsdam requires a review of multiple related declarations and treaties.

Shimonoseki to Cairo to Potsdam

Several treaties and declarations over the last century have shaped how the international community manages the Taiwan situation. Following the First Sino-Japanese War, China’s Qing government ceded, “to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty,” the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, as stated within the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Fast forward to before the end of World War II, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Kai-shek issued the 1943 Cairo Declaration, promising the return of territories like Taiwan and Manchuria to China.

At the time, the PRC did not exist. The ROC government replaced China’s Qing government in 1912 and continued to govern China until it was forced out by the Communists in 1949, at which point it took refuge in Taiwan, Penghu, and various other minor islands along the Chinese coast.

Days before the end of the war, the major allies of the U.S., the UK, and the Soviet Union held the Potsdam Conference and issued the Potsdam Declaration, preparing the terms of Japan’s surrender. Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement states, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

Following the devastation from the atomic bombings, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender at the end of World War II, agreeing to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith” and “take whatever action may be required…for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.”  Japan transferred administrative control of Taiwan and Penghu to the ROC in 1945. Only a few years after the end of World War II, civil war broke out between the ROC and the PRC on mainland China, leaving Japan no opportunity to formally cede the islands to either rival government. Although the ROC continues to govern those islands to the present day, it never acquired legal sovereignty over them. This is why Taiwan’s status is still often described as “undetermined.”

An International Matter

The Cairo Declaration cannot be implemented as originally intended because the ROC no longer governs China, and even if it did, Japan no longer has the legal capacity to transfer sovereignty. In short, Japan has never recognized Taiwan as part of China. Since 1972, it has acknowledged the PRC’s position without endorsing it, while reaffirming its postwar obligation to comply with the terms of Potsdam and Cairo.

As part of re-establishing relationships with the allies, Japan renounced “all right, title, and claim” to Taiwan and Penghu without designating a recipient through the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Neither the ROC nor the PRC governments were invited to participate, nor were they even mentioned within the treaty.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the latest legal document to leave Taiwan’s status unresolved, transforming it into an international problem rather than a settled matter of China’s domestic sovereignty. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent remarks reaffirmed Japan’s longstanding position, which is essentially a position of neutrality. Claims to the contrary misread the Japanese Prime Minister’s words and the legal history behind them.

Lindell Lucy is based in Honolulu, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Harvard Extension School.

Not Part of China: An Explanation of Japan’s Taiwan Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The return of great power competition is especially concerning in the Indo-Pacific, with the expansion of Chinese military capabilities eroding the status quo of a regional rules-based order. An evolution in Chinese strategic objectives has created a shift among American defense planners and strategists, who now see China as the primary adversary of the United States. As written within the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, “The [People’s Republic of China] PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades… this conclusion [is based] on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences, alongside a keen awareness of the PRC’s clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernization and expansion of its military.”

In the Cold War, Western strategists and planners spent most of their intellectual capital examining the challenges posed by the Soviet Union, in particular, the deterrence challenges posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Policymakers subsequently developed defensive strategies and associated concepts including extended deterrence and force posturing in Europe and the role that the American industrial, economic, and military could play. Not least among these considerations was the role of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to its allies in NATO, particularly those allies on the front lines of the Cold War stand-off in Europe.

Put simply, extended deterrence refers to the stated policy to defend a foreign ally, including the use of nuclear weapons in said defense, as part of a mutual defense treaty. Many policies supported the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe, to include public statements by American presidents, the presence of American military personnel abroad, and U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe. Extended nuclear deterrence, along with the forward deployment of vast amounts of conventional power, was a central element of America’s defense of its European allies. One of the factors that strengthened the conventional defensive posture of Europe is that Europe enjoys a certain amount of strategic depth.

Strategic depth is defined as the space available within a territory to halt an adversary attack, execute a counterattack, and end the conflict on terms acceptable to the counterattacking party. During the Cold War, NATO enjoyed a regional depth which allowed not only for NATO forces to fall back to more defendable geographic features in the face of a conventional attack, such as the Rhine, the Rhone, or even the Pyrenees, but strategic depth within Europe allowed either side to carry out strikes on European soil without escalating or expanding the conflict to a nuclear war on each other’s homelands.

While this geography served U.S. and allied interests in the Cold War, the United States lacks a similar level of strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific as it confronts the prospects of a large-scale conflict with China. Much of the geography in a U.S.-China conflict would take place over the open ocean and skies of the Western Pacific. As such, there are few defendable terrain features such as rivers or mountain ranges behind which an actor can rest, reset, and prepare for a counterattack.

Just as importantly, a battlefield in the Western Pacific means that there are fewer options for the distribution of basing. American and allied bases would therefore have to generate combat operations from a limited number of high priority bases in a conflict. The lack of defensible features and small number of high-value bases is in many ways the opposite condition of what the United States and its NATO allies experienced in the Cold War.

In contrast, China has enormous strategic depth due to its ability to generate combat power from any number of bases, launch sites, or ports along its enormous Pacific coast and its deep hinterland. In the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners are dispersed and in some cases thousands of miles away from each other, with neutral and non-aligned states dotted in between. As a result of the United States’ limited number of bases, owing to the scarcity of permanent land features in the Western Pacific, China can focus on a small number of critical targets to diminish American and allied combat effectiveness.

Further, the limited number of in theater bases increases the demands and stress on an aerial fleet and the logistics involved in keeping U.S. forces adequately supplied. It also makes for significantly longer ship and submarine transit times to and from more distant resupply points. Already in 2015 there was the issue of the rate at which missiles can be launched.

To counter China, the number and availability of sensor resources that can be devoted to integrated air and missile defense systems versus other missions must increase given the vertical proliferation of such systems. Also, the capacity of combat logistics forces needed to cycle ammunition ships between rear bases and forward reloading areas, maintain long-range, high-capacity carrier-based aerial refueling, and to sustain different operational concepts over prolonged periods of conflict must be expanded.

The United States, Japan, and Australia should consider pre-positioning substantial amounts of military capabilities directly relevant to deterrence operations, such as missile defense capabilities, fuel, and conventional munitions, in each other’s territories to create targeting dilemmas for China. Doing so would not only enhance knowledge of deterrence methods and challenges between allies in theater that are vastly different from Western Europe during the Cold War but also create existential misery for PRC defense planners.

Regardless of personal preference, complex issues related to nuclear strategy are now central in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. and its allies must deliberately evaluate the profound responsibilities that come with being members of a nuclear alliance.

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Prior to joining Heritage, Peters served as the lead strategist at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, where he oversaw the office that developed the Agency’s five-year strategy, conducted the Agency’s research and tabletop exercise program, and executed Agency-level program evaluations. Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Views expressed by the author’s are their own.

Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth was originally published on Global Security Review.

Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to Reuters, the first point calls for “Ukraine’s sovereignty to be reconfirmed.” It does this by partitioning a sovereign state victimized by unprovoked aggression. Equally odd is the fact that the agreement would be signed by a regime in Moscow that does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state.

The second point suggests, “There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe.” However, such agreements were in force in 2014 when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his first invasion of Ukraine.

In 1994, Russia pledged to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” In 1997, Russia signed a treaty with Ukraine pledging “mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, [and] the non-use of force or threat of force.” Russia violated all of these pledges.

The third point suggests “There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbors, and NATO will not expand further.” In addition to the 1994 and 1997 agreements, the United Nations Charter and Helsinki Final Act include the “expectation” that Russia does not invade its neighbors. Russia currently occupies parts of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) embraces an open-door policy. Any external limitation on this policy impinges upon NATO’s independence, encroaches on the sovereignty of 32 member-states, sentences NATO aspirants to Russian vassalage, and serves as a green light to further Russian aggression.

Putin and his defenders believe Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 because Ukraine wanted to join NATO, but they have it precisely backwards; Ukraine wanted to join NATO because Putin invaded in 2014. Sovereign nations seek NATO membership because they distrust Moscow and view NATO as the surest route to security in Europe.

The fourth point stipulates, “A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment.” The US is a founding member of NATO—not a disinterested third party. To suggest the US could be a moderator between NATO’s chief adversary and NATO’s members is to undermine NATO’s unity.

The fifth point states, “Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.” The guarantees are not robust by any reasonable definition of the term. They are limited and conditional.

To make matters worse, point six stipulates that, “The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.” This undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty. Given Russia’s size, capabilities, actions, and aims, agreeing to this would jeopardize Ukraine’s future security.

The seventh point requires that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.” Not only did Putin make these demands before his 2022 assault on Ukraine, but it is now known that this 28-point plan is based on Russian proposals.

The eighth point guarantees that “NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.” This obliterates the notion of robust security guarantees and would leave Ukraine exposed to further Russian aggression. NATO members, if not NATO itself, will need to play a role in postwar Ukraine’s security.

The ninth point states that “European fighter-jets will be stationed in Poland.”
The use of “European” here, rather than “NATO,” raises further questions about the transatlantic bond, which has ensured deterrence in Europe since NATO’s founding. Are we to infer that US fighter-jets will not be stationed in Poland? They are there now on a rotational basis.

The tenth point states that American security guarantees are forfeit “if Ukraine invades Russia” or “fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg.” This is gratuitous. Ukraine did not invade Russia in 2014 or 2022. Ukraine’s incursions and missile-strikes in Russia are a response to Russian aggression.

The thirteenth point states that Russia will be “re-integrated into the global economy” and “invited back into the G8.” Russia was expelled from the G8 because it invaded Ukraine in 2014. It is important to remember that the G7 was founded as a club of wealthy, industrialized, free-market democracies. Yeltsin’s Russia was none of those when it was invited into the G7 in 1998. Putin’s Russia is none of those today.

The fifteenth point says, “A joint US-Russian security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.” Elevating Russia to the status of American security partner ignores the fact that Russia is the main threat to the security of Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Sidelining NATO from any role in postwar security shows a disregard for the transatlantic community, for NATO’s capabilities in peacekeeping operations, and for NATO’s postwar planning.

The drafters of the 28-point plan are oblivious of the fact that NATO has an entire command focused on security assistance and training for Ukraine and that the British army developed plans to lead a multinational force in Ukraine. Are they opposed to NATO playing those roles?

The seventeenth point stipulates that “The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty. This is fine in theory, but Russia is in violation of numerous arms-control treaties that served as the foundation of post-Cold War stability and security in Europe.

The eighteenth point is particularly troublesome for Ukraine. It requires, “Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state.” In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its entire nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russia’s commitment to respect Ukraine’s “sovereignty” and “existing borders.” The free world’s failure to back up those words after Putin’s 2014 invasion not only set the stage for 2022, it crippled the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Russia’s war on Ukraine serves as an object lesson of the deterrent power of nuclear weapons—and the danger of not having them. Ukraine, South Korea, Poland, and others are pondering that lesson.

The twentieth point calls on Ukraine and Russia to “commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promote the understanding and tolerance of different cultures” and for “all Nazi ideology…renounced and forbidden.” Of course, Putin has pushed the lie that Ukraine is “not a real country,” that Ukraine was “entirely created by Russia,” and that Ukraine is governed by “a gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis.” The irony about “Nazi ideology” is that by concocting phantom enemies, rewriting history, trying to rebuild a dead empire, and waging aggressive war, Putin is the one who is imitating the Nazis.

The twenty-first point recognizes Russian control over the territories it currently occupies; requires Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their own territory, which “they currently control;” and calls for that territory to be turned into a “demilitarized buffer zone.”

The twenty-second point calls on Russia and Ukraine “not to change these arrangements by force.” Force is the only language Putin understands. He has employed military force in Ukraine and Georgia and is probing NATO with drone attacks and sabotage operations.

The twenty-third point stipulates that “Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River.” This underscores the perverse nature of this document. Russia should have no role, no say, and no ability to obstruct Ukraine’s use of the hundreds of miles of the Dnieper River that run through the heart of Ukraine.

The twenty-fourth point establishes “a humanitarian committee” to deal with issues related to prisoners, hostages, and “family reunification.” Such initiatives are only necessary because Russia abducted Ukrainian children; imprisoned Ukrainian civilians in “filtration camps;” and forcibly transferred thousands of Ukrainians to Russia.

Point twenty-five demands that Ukraine hold elections within 100 days. This echoes Putin’s talking points. The only way Ukraine and its NATO partners should agree to this is if Russia also holds OSCE-monitored elections within 100 days.

The twenty-sixth point declares that “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions.” This is another bonus for bad behavior. There would be no need for amnesty were it not for Putin’s war crimes.

The first of these crimes is the very way the war started; the 2014 assault on Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitute a war of aggression. However, that was only the beginning of Putin’s war crimes, which include targeting hospitals, population centers, and energy, food, and water supplies; destroying schools and places of worship; torturing and massacring civilians; and conducting a campaign of sexual violence.

Point twenty-seven declares the agreement will be “monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, chaired by President Donald J. Trump.” The president of the United States has plenty of responsibilities to occupy his attention. Proconsul of postwar Ukraine should not be added to that list.

Finally, point twenty-eight calls for a ceasefire once the parties agree to the plan. The good news is that the plan presented by Washington is a dead letter. The better news is that European leaders used it as a starting point for a peace initiative that focuses on Ukraine’s sovereignty, Europe’s security, and NATO’s unity. Let’s hope a US-Europe compromise plan will emerge that brings Ukraine a step closer to an endpoint all people of goodwill can agree on, a sovereign and secure Ukraine in a stable and peaceful Europe.

Alan Dowd is director of the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.  Views expressed are his own. 

Points, Counterpoints, and Starting Points was originally published on Global Security Review.

Featuring insights from Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the discussion examines the myths perpetuated by Hollywood, the historical context of deterrence policy, and why accurate understanding matters for national security.

Participants gain a deeper appreciation of: * The evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy since the Cold War * Misconceptions in movies like Oppenheimer and Dynamite * The critical role deterrence plays in preventing large-scale conflict This event is part of NIDS’ ongoing mission to advance peace and stability through education, research, and dialogue on strategic deterrence.

Hollywood vs. Reality: Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite and Oppenheimer-Huessy Seminar was originally published on Global Security Review.

A protégée of former PM Shinzo Abe, this Kansaï (West Japan) Iron Lady admires former British PM Margret Thatcher. Her cabinet picks of Shinjiro Koizumi for Defense, Toshimitsu Motegi for Foreign Affairs, and Kimi Onoda for Economic Security will revitalize the administration.

Onoda is further designated “minister in charge of a society of well-ordered and harmonious coexistence with foreign nationals.” This means the government will begin cracking down on fraudulent immigration.
The market hailed PM Takaichi’s upcoming stimulus package and her appointment of senior lawmaker Katayama as finance minister ahead of Tokyo welcoming President Donald Trump to discuss economic cooperation and major defense policy changes. President Trump was gifted Shinzo Abe’s golf putter.

Takaichi also announced that she was going to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, observing that “the nature of warfare has changed significantly.” She also intends to fast-track the revision of three key security frameworks: National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. The prime minister outlined a defense budget totaling 43 trillion yen ($284 billion) through fiscal year 2027, which means that defense spending should exceed 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) shortly and reach 3.5 percent later.

Threats and Challenges

Security concerns in relation with China top the agenda. PM Takaichi stated she would “continue to engage in frank dialogue” by acting neither confrontational nor spineless. With upcoming Japan-US and Japan-South Korea diplomatic summits, she demonstrated willingness to acknowledge regional sensitivities over historical grievances, refraining from visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine that Asia brands as worshiping convicted war criminals.

The Takaichi administration will face several challenges as it implements these changes and must navigate coalition instability while dealing with inflationary pressures such as the price of rice exploding. Further, the administration must contend with public opinion that is both wary of the increasing threats caused by Russia, China, and North Korea but reluctant to accept tax increases to fund the country’s ambitious defense program.

Revising the Constitution

Japan’s question of a potential revision of its constitution, Article 9, has again reemerged. It is useful to reexamine the original text born from the ashes of 1945. The Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Article 9, says, Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The reality is that “will never be maintained” is not how things turned out. Japan has, for decades, steadily built up an arsenal under the umbrella of its Self-Defense Force, which covers all domains, including cyber and space. It fields the Indo-Pacific’s most powerful military forces outside China.

Japan did so while avoiding revision of Article 9, instead sticking to a mere reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution. That self-defense alone is a means of justifying massive re-armament has worked well in the past and could still work for decades to come, as long as it is supported by the Diet and the public.

However, Japan has made sure to never commit boots on the ground to engage in active conflict, other than by providing logistical support, such as during the US campaign in Afghanistan. There are still major ambiguities for engagement in collective defense, such as Japan shooting down an enemy missile on its way to American bases in the Western Pacific or the American homeland.

Most critical is what happens if Japanese forces, in seas surrounding the archipelago, are directly threatened, or the Japanese homeland falls under missile attack during enemy operations over Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the Sea of Japan, or the Northern Territories seized by Russia at the end of World War II.

That makes the constitutional “right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” both obsolete and counter-productive, as it prevents Japan from clearly establishing formal deterrence and from actively defending itself, including by preemptive attacks against enemy capabilities. Additionally, with US-Japan military cooperation and ubiquitous joint-basing, Japan has a giant bullseye on the country.

Japan’s Problematic Three Non-Nuclear Principles

Japan has more than sufficient plutonium reserves to arm itself if desires to do so. While PM Takaichi stated that she upholds the principles of “not possessing” and “not manufacturing” nuclear weapons, she is opposed to the third principle of “no nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan,” as it stifles extended deterrence—the American nuclear umbrella.

Her previous attempts to remove these principles from Japan’s national security strategy were rejected. Perhaps the PM will have her say this time around. Positioning American weapons in Japan would ensure Japanese nonproliferation and postpone weaponizing its plutonium stockpile.

PM Takaichi is a long overdue leader who can rebuild a more robust economic and security capability. Normalizing Japan’s national security policy means a realist shift in defense and military space posture. In these transformative times when obsolete arrangements collapse and new fit-for-purpose relevance has yet to form, a more strategically autonomous and sovereign Japan might emerge, engaging the Indo-Pacific and globally.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Japan’s New Prime Minister Galvanizes Defense and Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current approach, developed during a period of adherence to global norms, reached its limits amid intensifying great power competition, the expansion of authoritarian nuclear arsenals, the growth of regional nuclear warfighting doctrines, and disruptive technological shifts. Effective deterrence demands that adversaries fear the consequences of violating the status quo.

Preventing aggression by one or more nuclear-armed adversaries requires an American nuclear strategy supported by a strong, credible force structure that can inflict devastating costs—not merely deliver minimal retaliation. To achieve this, the Trump administration and the Department of War need to embrace a culture of deterrence that values, rather than downplays, America’s nuclear edge.

The 2023 report by the Strategic Posture Commission, America’s Strategic Posture, underscores the urgency of such a shift. It calls for a revised strategy capable of protecting vital interests and maintaining stability with China and Russia, warning that critical decisions cannot be deferred any longer. The report’s recommendations, particularly its insistence that the United States be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat China and Russia simultaneously, requires a strategy for implementation, not passive admiration.

Peace Through Strength: Renewing America’s Nuclear Deterrent, a Proposed Nuclear Posture Review for 2026, by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, provides a decisive model of maximum deterrence. It promotes tailored, full-spectrum strategies and rejects outdated minimum-deterrence concepts that no longer reflect geopolitical reality. This framework strengthens general and immediate deterrence, addresses the nuclear threats from rivals, improves American escalation management, increases the resilience and survivability of the nuclear force, and strengthens extended deterrence through forward-based regional capabilities.

This deterrence framework is founded on six core pillars. First, it offers a national deterrence strategy that reflects the Department of War’s mission, “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation’s security,” and supports a peace-through-strength doctrine that prioritizes American security, prosperity, and independence. Second, it advocates survivability enhancements that ensure a credible second-strike capability—beyond reliance on the submarine leg of the triad. Third, it seeks urgent nuclear modernization and expansion consistent with the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendations. Fourth, it advocates deployment of hedge capabilities from the nuclear stockpile. Fifth, it proposes strengthening forward-deployed regional nuclear deterrent assets. It requires deployment of robust non-strategic nuclear forces, empowering allied burden-sharing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Sixth, it advocates clear and credible declaratory policies as a means of deterring asymmetric non-nuclear attacks on the homeland, space assets, and critical cyber infrastructure.

Nuclear weapons provide the highest strategic leverage at the lowest expense. The Department of War is projected to spend about $8.5 trillion on conventional military capabilities over the next decade, while dedicating only $946 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent. This focus on conventional military spending long supported failed interventionism and a fragile status quo. At six to seven percent of the annual defense budget, the cost of deterrence remains relatively cheap, even if nuclear deterrence spending rises significantly.

Nuclear deterrence, like home insurance, is affordable but only seems a wise decision after a disaster strikes. A house can be rebuilt, but a devastated nation cannot. Hence, the “premium” for maximum nuclear readiness is not just affordable, it is indispensable. The cost of not having a strong nuclear deterrent might exceed $10 trillion if an undeterred China tries to forcefully unify Taiwan. Pursuing the nuclear posture offered here will cost less than one tenth the cost of losing Taiwan and may prevent such a conflict from ever happening.

This proposed Nuclear Posture Review strengthens America’s deterrence by replacing outdated strategies with an approach tailored to modern nuclear competition. It emphasizes credible capabilities, improved burden-sharing, and bold new designs to deter adversaries who are rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals.

Their build-ups serve one purpose, coercing American foreign policy. Tolerating such destabilizing actions only encourages more. A well-prepared American nuclear deterrent is crucial to restraining autocratic ambitions. Strategies that were once focused on risk reduction and arms control are now unintentionally fostering instability. In today’s volatile environment, maximum deterrence is essential to maintaining peace.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. James Petrosky, PhD is the President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Arming for Deterrence: A Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Trump’s insistence on deferring to Putin and hoping that Putin—after one more round of diplomacy, one more summit, one more phone call, one more tweet, one more attempt to rationalize unjust aggression—will become reasonable, is a fruitless exercise. After 10 months of placing his hopes in Putin, and allowing Putin to sway America’s Ukraine policy, it is time for the president to stop giving the Russian dictator the benefit of the doubt and start giving the Ukrainians what they need to ensure their independence and security.

Trump’s Ukraine policy includes a withholding of critical aid to Ukraine, a failed summit with the Russian strongman, an inspiring counter-summit with Ukraine’s European backers, and a return by Trump to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) consensus on Ukraine. Indeed, by mid-summer, President Trump was offering American airpower to a European-led peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine and signaling his support for a security guarantee for Ukraine. Trump said, “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” before adding, “We’re going to help them…. [W]e’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

By the end of September, Trump was declaring that Ukraine could win back all of its territory. In October, he slapped sanctions on Russian oil producers and expressed a willingness to supply Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles, which would allow Ukraine to launch precision strikes deep inside Russian territory and hamstring Putin’s war machine. But then, after another phone call with Putin, Trump, during a meeting with Zelensky late last month, took the Tomahawks off the table, urged Ukraine to consider territorial concessions, and spoke of security guarantees for Kyiv and Moscow.

Trump also recently addressed Israel’s Knesset and noted parenthetically, “We have to get Russia done.” That begins with recognizing he cannot keep putting hope in Putin and expect a different outcome. Instead, Trump must understand that ending the war in Ukraine requires being consistent, focusing on realities, and speaking the only language the Russian dictator understands—force.

Indeed, America’s security (and Ukraine’s future) would be better served if the president took the clear-eyed, hard-headed approach that has borne fruit in the Middle East; this includes steady material support for a democracy under assault, rejection of moral equivalence, recognition that the aggressor and its cause are not reasonable, and a commitment to tilting the battlefield and the postwar environment in favor of the democracy that was attacked rather than the aggressor that started the war.

There can be no end to the unjust war in Ukraine until the aggressor realizes that the costs are simply too high. Putin will not stop this war until he is stopped and understands he cannot achieve his aims. If the president continues to vacillate and maintain a hope-based perspective on Putin, Russia’s war on Ukraine will continue.

Putin has escalated his war on Ukraine (and NATO) in the months since Trump’s return to the White House. There are more terror bombings against civilian targets and infrastructure, more waves of murderous drones, more civilian deaths, more hybrid attacks elsewhere in Europe, and more testing of NATO’s unity.

The Atlantic Council’s Daniel Fried, former US Ambassador to Poland, compares Trump’s approach to Putin with President Franklin Roosevelt’s approach to another Kremlin dictator, Joseph Stalin, during World War II. Roosevelt said, “I think if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing in return,” with sincere hopes for the best, “he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.” History proved otherwise.

Roosevelt was naïve and Trump seems to be taking that same path.

With its recent history of multiple violations of international treaties and agreements, such as the Minsk Agreements, Budapest Memorandum, Chemical Weapons Convention, European Convention, Helsinki Final Act, and United Nations Charter, Putin’s Russia has shown itself to be a serial aggressor. That pattern has not been deterred by the words of those treaties or by diplomatic communiques or angry tweets.

The only thing that prevented Putin from taking all of Ukraine is a Ukraine armed with Western weapons, willing to fight for its independence. And the only thing that prevented Putin from expanding his war beyond Ukraine is a rearmed and revived NATO alliance. If Trump thinks Putin is difficult and unreasonable today, with the NATO alliance intact, wait until NATO fractures and falls.

What is needed is a just application of coercive force, embodied by a sustained flow of arms to Ukraine, a firm commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, and a renewed recognition of the shared interests and values that bond America and Europe. This will lay the groundwork for peace.

In practical terms, European nations must get serious about implementing a plan for Ukraine’s support with $300 billion in frozen Russian assets. They must stay the course in rebuilding their defenses and must commit to firmer restrictions on the purchase of Russian oil and gas. The sanctions Trump placed on Russian energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil underscore his willingness to apply economic force against Putin’s war machine; he should commit America’s arsenal of democracy to that same goal.

Does the president simply want to mediate a “deal” that kicks the can and the problem down the road, or does he want to save lives, secure a durable peace, and end the injustice of Putin’s war? If his aim is the latter, there is only one course of action, and that is to make the costs unbearable for the Russian dictator.

The president needs to stop putting hope in Vladimir Putin and start focusing on realities, actions, and results in Ukraine. Only then will this war come to an end. Only then will Putin “become reasonable.”

Alan Dowd is a Senior Fellow of the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. J. Daryl Charles is a Senior Fellow of the Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy.

Time to End a Hopeless Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

During his first term, Trump engaged in other symbolic actions that upended the status quo, such as when he moved the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, declaring, “We finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital.” He also became the first sitting US president to meet with a North Korean leader, smashing decades of diplomatic norms.

Given Trump’s willingness to talk to anyone, to call it like he sees it, and to use symbolism to project American strength, it should come as no surprise that he is unafraid of reconsidering policies related to China and Taiwan. He has already done so.

By almost every measure, Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country. Thus, upgrading the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto embassy, to an official US embassy is worthy of consideration, even if it would mean a fundamental change to American Taiwan policy.

Such a move would undoubtedly cause a Chinese backlash, but it would likely make it harder for China to claim that Taiwan is a rebellious province—a position unsupported by history. Taiwan is Taiwanese. Eliminating names like Chinese Taipei at the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics is a good idea and recognizes Taiwan for what it is—an independent country.

If shaking hands with a North Korean dictator is okay, then shaking hands with a Taiwanese president should also be acceptable. Kowtowing to China is the wrong answer. The truth is, the US is preparing to militarily defend Taiwan. Restoring the formal alliance with Taiwan is a natural step. Sacrificing Taiwan for cheap Chinese goods and a more powerful China is a bad idea.

Trump once famously claimed, “I alone can fix it,” referring to America’s broken system of governance. In the special case of US-Taiwan relations, he may be correct.

As part of his quest to “make America great again,” Trump could begin reversing the damage done by former President Jimmy Carter, who abrogated the alliance with Taiwan in 1979. That was a mistake that deserves correcting.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) recently argued that Trump would deserve a Nobel Peace Prize if he could convince Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan. This would presumably entail the repeal of China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, if not China’s formal recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.

To have any chance of success, Trump would need to give Xi a compelling reason for choosing peace. He would need to give Taiwan a credible way to deter an invasion, at least until China proved trustworthy.

Nuclear weapons are currently the only weapons terrifying enough to accomplish these objectives. This is a fact underscored by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who last year told a European Council summit, “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons and that will be our protection or we should have some sort of alliance [such as NATO].”

One thing that Trump and Xi have in common is that they both wish to go down in history as the greatest leaders of their respective countries. Until now, Xi has aimed to achieve greatness by conquering Taiwan—something no previous Chinese communist leader did.

Invading Taiwan would be a costly gamble, risking trillions of dollars and millions of lives, with an uncertain chance of success. On the other hand, committing to peace is simple and costs nothing. Finding a way for China to preserve “face” is the critical hurdle for the US.

President Lai did not mention it, but if the Nobel Peace Prize were awarded to Trump, then Xi would be a co-recipient. That may be a point worth considering.

Imagine two versions of the future, one in which Xi orders the invasion of Taiwan and one in which he wins the Nobel Peace Prize for recognizing Taiwan’s independence. It is the latter scenario that would ensure both Xi and Trump go down in history as great leaders.

That is a conversation worth having in future meetings between Trump and Xi. China is fundamentally an aggressive nation, but that aggression can be checked while still ensuring that the Chinese Communist Party maintains international respect.

Lindell Lucy lives in Honolulu. He has a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Harvard Extension School. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

How Taiwan Could Earn Trump a Nobel Peace Prize was originally published on Global Security Review.

This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

So sure was Israel in its southern security that intelligence reports were downplayed; the military even redeployed troops from Gaza prior to the October 7. The brutality of the attack and horror at the hostage crisis left Israel so shocked that it delayed a ground invasion for 20 days.

Despite the delay, calls for ceasefire and accusations of genocide existed before Israel’s offensive began. All the same, every first-semester international relations student knew what would happen next: with Hamas no longer deterred, Israel’s only recourse was compellence.

Compellence theory is simply acting on the threat that keeps your adversary deterred. Israel needed to compel Hamas to surrender the hostages, disarm, and realize that attacking Israel is a bad idea—restoring deterrence. For nearly two years since, Israel has tested compellence theory; at best, with mixed results, not only with Hamas, but across the region.

The Lebanese terror group Hezbollah launched its own attack on October 8, 2023, which by the end saw the launch of approximately 10,000–15,000 rockets and 2,500 drone attacks that displaced at least 70,000 Israelis and killed 75 soldiers and 45 civilians. Israel’s effort to restore deterrence devastated Hezbollah, killing 2,500–3,000 fighters, eliminating the majority of its leadership, through an exploding beeper attack in advance of a ground invasion. Seeing their losses, the group agreed to partially disarm and stay out of further hostilities, being effectively compelled.

In Yemen, the Houthis likewise joined the attack on Israel with rocket and drone attacks, as well as targeting ships off its coast, causing significant supply-chain disruptions. The attacks prompted the United States (US) to designate them a terrorist group and launch an aerial campaign alongside the United Kingdom—on top of Israel’s responses.

The Houthis endured severe damage to its offensive infrastructure and lost hundreds of fighters but still managed to occasionally launch limited attacks. The Houthis are more weakened than compelled.

Iran, the financier of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, for the first time acted against Israel directly. Retaliating against Israeli strikes, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone salvos against Israel in April and October of 2024. The tit-for-tat came to a head over 12 days in June 2025, as the two exchanged strikes while Israel tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Though the damage Iran’s nuclear capability took is debated, what is known is Israel’s air superiority destroyed nearly all of Iran’s defense framework and eliminated several senior military staff.

Israel endured significant damage as Iran managed to breach its defenses on a few occasions, and the two have since agreed to a ceasefire, while simultaneously pledging readiness to attack in the future. So perhaps, they are mutually deterred for now.

Syria recently entered a new phase of its civil war following the downfall of Assad, an Israeli push to expand its buffer region, and the emergence of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction. HTS is led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, an Islamic State affiliate who recently began targeting members of Syria’s minority populations, largely the Druze.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze, striking HTS sites until Julani quickly agreed to withdraw his troops from the Druze-populated areas. Prior to that intervention, there were rumors of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. While compellence worked to protect the Druze in the short term, it may have derailed a long-term peace deal.

Hamas remains the outlier. Ceasefire talks are again looking to collapse. The message is that despite the devastation, loss of leadership, approximately 17,000 lost fighters, and thousands of civilians killed in the crossfire, it can endure more. Israel’s attempt at compellence was so intense, that it sparked worldwide protests and allegations of genocide. Yet, rather than agree to Israel’s terms, Hamas continues to hold out, giving a statement that they will continue to fight until a Palestinian state is established.

The US attempted to broker multiple ceasefires, with some success in November 2023 and January 2025, but a deal to end the conflict remains elusive. If the US wants real results, compellence should target Hamas’ hosts and financiers, Turkey and Qatar.

While publicly on good terms with the US, the argument that Turkey and Qatar are state sponsors of terrorism would not be difficult to make given the support and protection they have offered Hamas. President Trump could threaten to add Turkey and Qatar to the list of state sponsors of terror unless Hamas agrees to Israel’s terms of ending the war.

There are indications that this could work. At least publicly, the two countries recently joined with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a call on Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This is a good first step, but the call has no “or else”–type clause that would actually pressure Hamas.

With that support gone, Hamas’ political leadership’s only choice would be deportation from its hosts which would likely jeopardize their finances and potentially put them within Mossad’s reach or accede to Israel’s conditions. Ever self-interested, the hope is they would be compelled to the latter. This type of diplomatic pressure directed at Hamas’ sponsors could trickle down to Hamas’ leadership and potentially be the last best hope for Gazan civilians as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signals plans for a renewed military offensive in the enclave.

Whether deterrence is restored by Israel is yet to be determined. For the sake of civilians on both sides, let us hope it is restored and soon.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza was originally published on Global Security Review.

The talk challenges conventional thinking and calls for renewed strategic clarity in deterring nuclear proliferation threats.

Huessy Seminar: After Iran, What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? with Henry Sokolski was originally published on Global Security Review.

One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Wargaming-A Strategic Tool for Defence with Darren Huxley and John McGarry was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the Korean Peninsula has experienced violent ideological strife, culminating in a war that claimed the lives of 10 percent of its people. The following decades were marked by authoritarian governments in the South and a cult-like regime in the North—cloaked in the guise of communism.

During authoritarian rule in South Korea, which was often characterized as a dictatorship, martial law was declared on several occasions to maintain law and order. It also served as a crucial mechanism in preparing for potential invasions by North Korea.

Martial law in South Korea refers to a legal framework under which the administrative and judicial powers of the state are transferred to a military commander. This extraordinary measure is stipulated under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. It grants the president authority to declare martial law in circumstances of war, armed conflict, or other national emergencies of similar gravity. Its objective is to address military requirements or ensure public safety and order when normal governance is deemed inadequate.

Martial law is divided into two types: emergency martial law and security martial law. Emergency martial law grants the government sweeping powers, including the suspension of the warrant system, restrictions on freedom of the press, curbs on publication rights, limitations on assembly and association, and the overriding of civilian courts and government agencies.

These measures are intended to ensure swift and decisive action in times of crisis. When martial law is declared, the president must notify the National Assembly immediately. If the Assembly demands its termination through a majority vote, the president is legally obligated to comply. While the National Assembly retains legislative authority, there are exceptional cases where a military regime may temporarily assume control, particularly during a coup or other events that disrupt the constitutional order.

On December 3 at 10 p.m., President Yoon Suk-Yeol declared martial law. This marked the first time in 45 years that martial law was invoked in South Korea. President Yoon justified the decision by citing actions of the National Assembly and opposition party, which he claimed were paralyzing the judicial and administrative systems. Specifically, their pursuit of numerous impeachment motions against officials and ministers, coupled with a unilateral decision to reduce key public welfare and defense budgets for the coming year. Yoon specifically cited these actions as undermining the essential functions of the state.

President Yoon framed them as attempts to disrupt constitutional order and overthrow the liberal democratic system. He went so far as to label the National Assembly a “den of criminals,” warning that the nation was in a “dire and precarious state.” To safeguard the liberal democratic system and protect citizens from North Korean communist forces and anti-state elements, he declared martial law, taking a step that would significantly escalate political tensions.

What followed was both alarming and puzzling. The Martial Law Commander was announced almost immediately, accompanied by a proclamation that limited civil liberties.

Troops were deployed to the National Assembly building, ostensibly to secure control, but the details of their mission remained unclear. Notably, the government refrained from taking control of broadcasting networks, implementing a curfew, or restricting internet access—measures that have traditionally been associated with martial law. This restraint raised questions about the intent and preparedness behind the declaration.

Within just two hours, 190 of the 300 National Assembly members gathered in an extraordinary session. Demonstrating remarkable decisiveness, they unanimously voted to overturn the martial law decision. The swift and unified response underscored the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions, even under extraordinary pressure. The critical question that followed was whether President Yoon would adhere to this decision, given the volatile circumstances.

As of this writing, the democratic mechanisms appear to have prevailed. President Yoon complied with the Assembly’s decision, and the troops, whatever their initial directives may have been, refrained from any extreme actions. The system of checks and balances worked, averting what could be a prolonged and destabilizing crisis. This resolution highlights the resilience of South Korea’s democracy, even when tested under such dramatic circumstances.

The entire ordeal lasted only six hours, yet its implications are profound. It was bizarre, embarrassing, and politically damaging for the Yoon administration. The short-lived declaration of martial law raises significant questions about the president’s judgment, the advice he received, and the decision-making process within the government.

The absence of traditional martial law measures, such as media control or curfews, suggests either a miscalculation or an intent to avoid inflaming public outrage. Regardless, the political fallout will be severe and long-lasting.

This six-hour ordeal, while alarming, ultimately reaffirmed the strength of South Korea’s democratic systems. The National Assembly acted swiftly and decisively, and the president adhered to constitutional norms, ensuring the crisis did not escalate further.

However, the incident leaves lingering doubts about the future of the nation’s political climate and the ability of its leadership to navigate complex challenges. It will serve as a sobering case study in the delicate balance of power, the risks of executive overreach, and the resilience required to uphold democratic principles.

The “silver lining” of this affair is undeniable; the democratic system worked. Yet the political and reputational costs will shape South Korea’s discourse for months, if not years, to come. It is a stark reminder that democracy, though tested, must remain vigilant and steadfast in protecting its core values against both external and internal threats.

LTG (Ret.) Chun In-Bum was the commander of the Republic of Korea’s Special Forces Command. He is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. 

Six Hours of Crisis: Martial Law, Democracy, and Leadership in South Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

These states are modernizing their naval deterrence capabilities, thus weaponizing the waters of the IOR. The growing competition between US-led alliances, China and India, as well as India and Pakistan intensified, particularly with US support for India to counter China’s influence in the IOR.

Pakistan views these developments as a security threat, as they challenge its maritime mobility and increase the risk of entanglement between Indian and Pakistani forces at sea. The escalating tensions between India and Pakistan underscore the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid conflict. What are the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan in the IOR and how can maritime CBMs be realized and institutionalized to prevent prospects for any dangers?

Maritime Entanglement in the IOR

Maritime entanglement refers to the complex and potentially dangerous situations where naval forces from different states, often adversaries, come into proximity or engage in activities that can lead to unintended confrontations, miscalculations, or escalations. The IOR is a center point for states’ contestation where forces of India and Pakistan can interface anytime.

India is modernizing its naval capabilities to assert its regional dominance through advanced technologies such as Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers, uncrewed systems, and sensors, thereby expanding its naval presence.

India has also approved the purchase of MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance drones, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of its armed forces in the IOR.

India is also inclined to procure high endurance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to further enhance its ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine-counter measures (MCM). India is using China’s looming threat as leverage to procure 26 Rafale-M fighters to serve as the new carrier, Vikrant’s, air wing, and three additional Kalvari-class submarines.

Pakistan, in turn, is also improving its deterrence survivability. Pakistan’s capability is mainly based on conventional platforms with heavy reliance on cruise missiles. Its sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, deployed on Agosta-class submarines or on-surface ships.

India’s acquisition of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) adds new complexities to Indian Ocean security. These stealthy, autonomous systems enhance India’s naval capabilities in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare and increase the risk of unintended encounters with other countries’ forces, especially Pakistan, as the autonomous nature of AUVs makes them less predictable and harder to monitor.

Furthermore, a cyberattack on surveillance or intelligence systems can create monitoring “blind spots,” leading to potential misinterpretations of naval activities. If one country’s radar is disabled, it might incorrectly assess the other’s movements, prompting a more aggressive stance. This risk escalates if command and control communications are also affected, as either side could misinterpret a blackout as a threat, potentially deploying additional naval assets and leading to unintended confrontations.

The presence of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine near another state’s naval assets might be perceived as a prelude to an act of aggression, especially during times of heightened tensions. A stark example of this occurred during the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis between India and Pakistan. In the milieu of the Pulwama crisis, the Indian Navy declared that its carrier battle group, including the Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was on a deterrence patrol, which was “swiftly shifted from exercise to operational disposition” amid the crisis.

After the crisis, Pakistan reportedly detected an Indian submarine, suspected of being armed with nuclear weapons, within its maritime zone. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine movements makes it difficult for states to distinguish between routine operations and potential threats, increasing the risk of miscalculation.

This is particularly noteworthy in the IOR where numerous states assert their interests in strategically significant areas as well as crucial chokepoints for trade routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Thus, misinterpretation of naval maneuvers, especially involving nuclear-armed submarines, heightens the risk of maritime entanglement between India and Pakistan, which will create challenges for all the players involved and disrupt the SLOCs and transportation. These developments demand the opening of effective CBMs between India and Pakistan to prevent any risks in the maritime domain. 

Proposed Confidence-Building Measures

In the context of India and Pakistan, several CBMs are applicable. First, establishing a mutual notification and data-sharing mechanism on cybersecurity threats between India and Pakistan is essential, given the growing reliance on digital systems for naval and maritime operations. This mechanism would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent the misattribution of cyber incidents to state actors.

Second, an agreement on prior notifications of naval activities such as naval exercises or critical movements of submarines is needed. This will enhance transparency and trust by ensuring that routine movements, such as those involving nuclear submarines, are not misinterpreted as hostile actions.

Third, an agreement on managing incidents at sea can also be formalized by setting up clear protocols for their behavior during unintended or unexpected encounters at sea. This would help both countries to turn dangerous eventualities into normal situations. The two states can create standardized rules of engagement for naval forces operating nearby and develop crisis-management protocols to handle maritime incidents.

Fourth, another risk-reduction initiative could be a submarine rescue agreement, enabling cooperation in case of climate-prone or any natural crisis-led accidents involving rescuing crew and sunk submarines, and sheltering the survivors on board.

Fifth, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deployment notification and safety protocol CBM proposes that India notify Pakistan, via a neutral third party or direct hotline, about routine SSBN deployments near Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arabian Sea. It includes communication protocols to prevent accidental encounters from escalating, with India providing limited, non-sensitive information on SSBN timing and location near shared maritime boundaries.

Sixth, an agreement on the non-deployment of AUVs between India and Pakistan is essential to mitigate risks associated with autonomous systems in sensitive maritime areas. Establishing no-deployment zones, particularly near nuclear sites, disputed areas, and key naval bases, would reduce the chances of misinterpretation and accidental confrontations, offering a safety buffer in shared waters.

Seventh, India and Pakistan could establish a code of conduct (CoC) for the Arabian Sea to manage maritime interactions, reduce confrontation risks, and promote peaceful sea use amid regional tensions. Modeled after the South China Sea CoC. This CBM would provide a framework of rules for behavior in contested areas, particularly near disputed zones like Sir Creek and along shared maritime boundaries.

Eighth, direct bilateral maritime cooperation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would ideally be the most effective approach. Given the current state of relations between the two countries, this option remains politically challenging.

Therefore, a more feasible path to promote bilateral trust would come through multilateral forums. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association can be a valuable avenue to which both nations are already members. This forum provides a platform for indirect cooperation on shared maritime issues such as security, trade, and disaster-related risk management.

Expanding their collaboration within this multilateral forum, particularly on non-sensitive issues like anti-piracy efforts and environmental protection, could help build trust between them. As multilateral engagement deepens, it could serve as a steppingstone toward more focused and issue-specific dialogues between India and Pakistan at a bilateral level.

Implementation of the above agreements would provide a structured approach to promote a more secure and stable maritime environment in the IOR preventing miscommunication or misunderstandings and ensuring safety during maritime operations, contributing to greater stability in the IOR.

Rizwana Abbasi is an associate professor of security studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University of Austria. 

Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer and Associate Editor at CISS and an M. Phil Scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.

Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the webinar, Lowther briefly touched on the alternative and numerically weaker concept of sizing America’s nuclear triad based upon “strategic sufficiency.” This approach would mean deploying just enough nuclear warheads to launch a counterforce first strike on the deployed nuclear delivery platforms of America’s adversaries. For example, it may be possible to strike eight nuclear-capable bombers, which carry 12 nuclear weapons each, with one intercontinental ballistic missile. Thus, the ratio, in this case, would be one American nuclear weapon for 96 (8×12) adversary nuclear weapons. One is strategically sufficient for 96.

Unfortunately, there are a number of challenges with strategic sufficiency as a concept. Let me explain.

It should first be noted that nuclear weapons do not exercise effective deterrence simply by their existence in the American inventory, nor merely by matching friendly weapons to enemy weapons on paper. American planners need to go much further.

The US needs to base its nuclear deterrent arsenal size, and its nuclear deterrent strategy and posture, on a realistic evaluation of possible scenarios. Adversaries will certainly perform such risk analysis. If America’s nuclear readiness falls short, in their minds, adversaries may seek openings to attack.

The American nuclear deterrent needs to include survivable, damage-limiting, and damage-equalizing second-strike capabilities, against both numerous enemy armed forces and extensive enemy countervailing (political control) assets. The US should also have the ability to restore intra-war deterrence and to have leverage during post-war armistice talks, a significant further number of warheads and delivery platforms deployed or in secure stockpiles.

Strategic Sufficiency

In the webinar, Lowther offers as an illustrative case where China’s new missile field deploys three hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), each with eight warheads. In this case, strategic sufficiency may require fifty ICBMs to hold the three hundred Chinese missiles at risk. Dynamic parity, in contrast, would dictate the US should field an arsenal closer in size to China’s, which in this limited example would be 300 missiles with a similar number of warheads.

Admittedly, strategic sufficiency is attractive for a country with a smaller arsenal, but it is also attractive to an adversary with a larger arsenal. The adversary may see strategic sufficiency as a strategy of weakness and built on a lack of will. The approach has a number of flawed assumptions.

First, strategic sufficiency assumes that all American nuclear weapons will succeed in striking their targets and destroying them. While American delivery systems are reliable, they have no experience under the harsh conditions of a nuclear conflict. Some weapons may malfunction, others will be destroyed in a first strike, weapons may not hit their target, and some will be destroyed by enemy defensive systems.

This is why targeteers often allocate two or more warheads to one enemy silo, for example, which is generally considered necessary for a successful counterforce strike. On this count alone, strategic sufficiency underestimates sizing requirements.

Second, a more serious flaw is the assumption that the United States can always launch a counterforce first strike. An adversary’s remaining weapons will still be in their silos, or in their hangars, when American warheads arrive. This is a foolish assumption. The US is unlikely to initiate a first strike, which means it must be able to absorb a strike and respond. Strategic sufficiency does not allow that.

Making the situation much worse is that China, North Korea, and Russia possess nuclear delivery platforms that are mobile, making them far harder to strike. Ballistic missile submarines at sea are, for now, hard to strike. Mobile ICBM launchers move positions constantly, and might also be camouflaged, for example, while inside shipping containers or railroad freight cars. Strategic bombers can maintain airborne alert. Other ICBM launchers can be hidden inside caves or tunnels until the moment they are ready to fire.

Third, the US is highly unlikely, as said above, to employ nuclear weapons in a first strike. A number of wargames played by the military and senior government leaders only underscores the cultural aversion to nuclear weapons use. This means the homeland is likely to face a nuclear attack before the president responds with whatever nuclear weapons remain. If the American arsenal is already smaller than the arsenals of adversaries, the US becomes an inviting target for a second strike or a strike from a different adversary.

Fourth, strategic sufficiency gives allies the impression that the United States has too few weapons to defend North America and both Europe and Asia. This belief may lead allies to seek their own arsenals.

As McGiffin and Lowther argue, dynamic parity is designed to address these specific challenges. China, North Korea, and Russia are very clearly looking to topple the American-led international system. Should the United States seek to build an arsenal that is too small to effectively deter the Authoritarian triad discussed here, not only will Americans suffer, but so will the free world. Moving from 5 percent of the defense budget to modernize the current arsenal to 8 to 10 percent of the defense budget to build the arsenal needed is not in the “too hard to do” category. It is time to recognize that strategic sufficiency is not sufficient.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Strategic Sufficiency Is Not Enough was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports

The Only Nuclear Deterrence Strategy America Needs.
Dynamic Parity by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther
https://thinkdeterrence.com/dynamic-parity/

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Weekend Gouge – November 8, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The book is fast-paced and covers Nitze’s career in and around government in just 268 pages. James Graham Wilson, an historian at the US State Department, draws on voluminous archived notes of White House meetings and State Department documents to build his description of Nitze’s influence. This allowed the author to clearly and confidently identify what and how Nitze’s ideas were injected into treaties and American policy. Wilson also does not shy away from criticizing Nitze’s policy or personal shortcomings where warranted. This makes for a complete yet consumable treatment of Paul Nitze’s work.

Whether working in the Department of State or Defense, where Nitze served, aspiring national security professionals should be reading this book. Following Paul Nitze’s career path might be impossible today, but tracing it offers many useful insights.

Nitze made a personal fortune investing during the volatile years of the market crash and depression. He married into political connections and with his comfort secured, could have lived a life of leisure, but chose a life “in the arena” instead. Nitze first applied his exceptional analytical skills to a pressing national security issue—assessing the value of strategic bombing in World War II. It was here, with the US Strategic Bombing Survey, that the Nitze way came to prominence. As Wilson tells it, this “way” is to find the facts, use them to craft executable plans for securing American “predominance,” and then fight aggressively but patiently to get that plan implemented.

The Bombing Survey demonstrated that strategic bombing did not achieve the goals its advocates claimed, earning Nitze no friends in the Pentagon. His analytical accuracy, candor in presentation, and independence of thought earned him the respect of President Truman, Eisenhower, and most presidents that followed.

Paul Nitze has a particular policy related to nuclear weapons. His influence did not depend on his holding a position in government but transcended political partisanship. He saw himself as a “man of action” who fused his mathematical mind with the social sciences and balanced theory with his practical experiences to provide realistic policy. Wilson’s Nitze changed his views rarely and did not shy away from bullying when the tactic appeared useful.

Nitze’s laser focus on America first policies put the country on the path for peace through strength well before those were popular slogans. His loyalty to national interest over personal gain was showcased in a scathing op-ed he helped write that attempted to scuttle the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, once he came to see it as counter-productive to defense.

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68) was Paul Nitze’s first, and perhaps most important policy document. Wilson dedicates a chapter to this product, but it permeates the entire book. Wilson shows how this document was so much more than simply a plan to deal with Soviet nuclear weapons. It was close in impact to Kennan’s Long Telegram. While sensitive to the value of public debate on defense policy, Wilson demonstrates that Paul Nitze was self-conscious about publishing. However, Wilson credits Nitze with an impressive writing feat in NSC-68, functionally creating the first national security strategy. This document certainly echoes across the decades from its initial presentation to Truman in 1950 well past the Cold War.

Later in his career, Nitze led President Ronald Reagan’s negotiation team for the anti-ballistic missile and intermediate nuclear forces treaties. Nitze consistently pushed for a strong US nuclear posture to enable effective negotiations. This is reflected in deterrence theory today in books like Matt Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters.

Advocacy for high defense budgets did not restrict Nitze from calling for complete nuclear disarmament later in life. He believed that the 1991 Gulf War showed that this could be achieved because of the strategic effects of precision-guided weapons and what the Biden administration calls integrated deterrence.

Some of today’s up and coming defense policy and strategy practitioners may have a hard time relating to Paul Nitze’s privileged upbringing or his self-made independent wealth. Wilson’s assertion that it is unlikely that anyone today could move back and forth across the political aisle like Nitze did is probably true. But there are many useful nuggets of Nitze wisdom and experience in this book that are useful for new and well-practiced policymakers. Wilson’s Nitze is a persistent yet practical advisor at the nexus of defense and diplomacy whose work covered most of the last century but whose impact will likely reach into the next. Paul Nitze’s professional life is worth your time and this book is a great introduction to his work.

James McCue is a retired USAF aviator and nuclear security professional. He is an expert on nuclear strategy and national defense policy. He is a fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Associate Editor for Global Security Review. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

These ominous developments did not happen overnight but are made worse by bad American security policy decisions just as China and Russia were simultaneously deciding to confront the United States leadership role in the world. Critical to a growing China and Russia threat is bad American nuclear policy choices.

Key to this decline were ten bad American policy decisions. These policies began in the wake of the Soviet Union’s decline and continue to the present. Let me explain.

First, America began by buying Francis Fukuyama’s flawed “end of history” thesis and believed that the “liberal international order” of the early post–Cold War period would remain in perpetuity, with authoritarian regimes collapsing as democracy and capitalism triumphed. This, as we know, proved untrue.

Second, the United States unilaterally eliminated almost its entire theater nuclear weapons arsenal, the very type of nuclear forces where there is now a serious and growing imbalance between the United States and China and Russia.

Third, after terrorism took the place of the Soviet Union as America’s top threat, the United States identified the solution to terrorism as democratization through force. The attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), US embassies in Africa (1998), and USS Cole (DDG-67) were the kindling that served, in part, to justify the later invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, despite the extraordinary take down of Saddam’s Iraqi forces in Gulf War I (1991), the deterrent value of liberating Kuwait disappeared by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were then followed by two more decades of futile efforts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fifth, the United States long assumed a cooperative arrangement with China and Russia would prevent nuclear proliferation. American leaders failed to recognize that both nations played an important role in enabling North Korea’s successful nuclear program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with a 1982 decision by Deng Xiaoping and Yuri Andropov to transfer nuclear technology to client states.

Sixth, for three decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US took a holiday from modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Now, as the US attempts to reverse course, the entire nuclear establishment requires refurbishment to make modernization possible.

Seventh, the US ignored Russian incursions into Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine during 2008–2014. Then, just prior to the 2022 invasion, the US compounded these mistakes by both declaring that the US response would depend upon how much Ukraine territory was taken or, later during the war, Ukraine could negotiate an end to the war by ceding additional territory to Russia—a country responsible for the deaths of many millions of Ukrainians during the Soviet Union’s existence. This only encourages Russian aggression.

Eighth, the US abandoned Afghanistan and left significant military equipment behind for the Taliban to use. A billion-dollar embassy and $14 billion worth of military equipment was quickly incorporated into the new Taliban-led government’s arsenal or sold to terrorist organizations around the world. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a humiliating action that undermined respect for the United States.

Ninth, the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Iranian regime allowed Tehran to continue its ballistic missile and nuclear program with increased funding from a return of assets previously seized by the United States. The Trump administration brought Iran under some semblance of control by cutting its foreign exchange reserves by over $100 billion. The killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ General Qasem Soleimani was a clear signal that then-President Donald Trump would not tolerate Iranian-backed terrorism.

The Biden administration backtracked on efforts to deter Iran. Since October 2023, Iran has conducted 170 attacks, primarily against US and assets in the region. Iran combined forces with Houthi rebels to largely shut down commercial freight and crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran also rebuilt its foreign exchange reserves, while becoming more closely allied with Russia and China. This all took place as Iran moved closer to a nuclear weapon.

Tenth, the United States long dismissed warnings about the rise of Chinese military power and the threat it posed to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s massive investment in cyber, space, conventional, and nuclear weaponry will soon make China a peer of the United States. Asian allies of the United States are increasingly worried by China’s actions.

The United States must act to alter its course before it is too late. A return to a strong military, capable of fighting two peer competitors is necessary. It may also be time for a second Manhattan Project to implement the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s  recommendations. With nuclear modernization facing regular delays, there may be no other option. Whatever the solutions are, the time to act is now.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

America’s Downward Slide was originally published on Global Security Review.

Several months ago, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an article by Zak Kallenborn in which he defended nuclear weapons and their utility. Rebuttal articles published made two fundamental arguments. First, realism predicts the unavoidability of war, which requires the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is unreliable because previous close calls predict future failure.

The authors believe that reducing nuclear weapons to [near] zero limits the danger in inevitable future wars because future cheating or proliferation would only take place in small numbers, thereby limiting the damage of nuclear use. History and game theory prove this argument dangerously flawed.

For two millennia, major power wars occurred several times per century. Oxford’s Max Roser charts this bloody cost over the past 600 years. In that time 5–10 people per 100,000 population died in these wars, most of them civilians. In the past century deaths topped 100–200 deaths per 100,000 population.

Then after World War II something happened. Over the past seven decades this death rate has plummeted 99 percent to near zero (0.1/100,000 population). This is in spite of small spikes, which are attributable primarily to ethnic genocide in the (non-nuclear) global South. The world did not magically become more pacific. It built nuclear weapons.

The same abolitionists who criticize Kallenborn are horrified by the scale of the slaughter in Gaza and Ukraine. Over 315,000 Russian and 31,000 Ukraine troops are dead in Ukraine and 12,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza. Nuclear abolitionists fail to grasp, this is a mere drop in the bucket compared to great power war.

For example, during World War I, there were 480,000 casualties in 7 days at the Battle of the Marne. There were 848,614 casualties at Passendaele and another 946,000 at Verdun. During World War II, more than 61,000 British civilians died in the Battle of Britain. Over 83,000 British and American airmen died over Germany

European deaths during World War II are estimated at 28.7 million people. Great-power war gave rise to Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler, who exterminated over 30 million people between them. Stalin’s genocide of  3.5 to 7 million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 is the historical context for Ukrainian resistance today.

When it comes to killing civilians, the Japanese beat Stalin and Hitler combined. They killed over 300,000 Chinese during the “Rape of Nanjing.” China suffered over 35 million casualties during the Japanese occupation. When atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese army was still killing an estimated 250,000 Chinese every month.

During World War II, conventional bombing raids killed more civilians in a single night than both atomic bombs. In the Dresden firestorm, caused by allied conventional bombing, 135,000 Germans were incinerated. The ability of today’s conventional weapons is even greater.

The only answer to the horror of war is to keep the peace through effective deterrence.  To do this, those who would wage war must know the reward does not justify the risk. Deterrence does this at every level of conflict.

Arms control treaty regimes, the source of stability for nuclear disarmament advocates, are largely a failure. Despite the existence of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa all sought or obtained the bomb. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also failed to stop nuclear testing, with the violations of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States have either not signed or ratified the treaty.

Russia breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during the Obama administration and then suspended participation in New START in 2023. As a result, for the first time in five decades, there is no nuclear arms limitation treaty between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union. Russia already maintained a policy of escalate to de-escalate during New START negotiations and, in fact, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military doctrines all contemplate nuclear warfighting across the spectrum of conflict.

Deterrence is working every day and is not reserved for discussions of nuclear war. As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia coalesce in an authoritarian coalition, deterrence remains the last best hope for averting war. It works along the entire continuum of conflict, reducing the likelihood of war. In short, nuclear weapons save lives.

Colonel Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Nuclear Weapons Abolition Will Kill Millions (Again) was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is not a proxy war from the Cold War or the Global War on Terror. The West is in a hot war with Iran, and the United States must act accordingly. American focus on containing the conflict in Israel and Gaza is undermining Israeli deterrence. An anemic campaign of limited attacks against the Houthis is failing to deter Iran in the Red Sea, damaging American credibility and promoting Iranian and Houthi prestige.

By contrast Israel understands it is in an existential fight and has an appropriate strategy.  They are systemically destroying enemy forces and can hold Iran’s high-value targets at risk.  Iran should not doubt that October 7, 2023, put its nuclear program and critical infrastructure on the target list. Israel will deal with the Iranian threat with or without American support.

For Israel, American involvement is always a two-edged sword. American politics, Western pressure, and arbitrary red lines are often liabilities that disadvantage Israeli deterrence.  In fact, Israel began a no-holds barred information campaign, targeting media and anti-Jewish forces in the US and Europe. Some Israeli voices attacked the “River to the Sea” narrative characterizing the “two-state solution” as a de facto Iranian occupation of the Jewish homeland.

Deterrence is a coercive spectrum from positive to punitive. Carrots are not working, which leaves only sticks. Curtis McGiffin argues that provocations by Iran, including more than 160 attacks on American forces since October 7, 2023, combined with anemic policies of appeasement and the bribery of Iran, irreparably damaged deterrence in the region.

McGiffin points to statements by IRGC General Hossein Salami that Iran is not afraid of war with the United States. Why should they? Iran’s conduct of grey zone war for decades, with few repercussions, only encourages further aggression. Finally, McGiffin argues that America must formally declare war if we are going to cross the Rubicon and attack targets inside Iran.

That position is debatable. After the Cold War, conventional military superiority empowered the US to act whenever there was sufficient will, constrained only by the imperative to avoid escalation with another nuclear-armed power.

Game theory can be instructive in this case. It teaches risk aversion (Prospect Theory) is a powerful incentive and a key predictor of behavior. Decision-makers will irrationally forego probable gains to avoid improbable losses. It also shows that in an iterative game, players learn from previous opponent actions. The Mullahs learned from American behavior that the US is irrationally risk-averse when it comes to conflict with Iran.

Diplomacy is insufficient without a credible threat to back it up. The United States is standing in a forest fire asking everyone to put away the matches when it needs the deterrence equivalent of backburning. This requires the President to take a significant step up the escalation ladder to re-establish deterrence. Israel is doing this while the US dithers.

Iran is a cancer that has metastasized to threaten the region and the world. America’s ineffective tit-for-tat strategy only emboldens Iran. However, since the hostage crisis (1979) and the Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw fiasco, there was/is little American appetite to deal effectively with Iran. As a result, Tehran has capitalized on American weakness at every turn.

Presidents Ronald Regan and George W. Bush deterred the nation’s enemies by inflicting unacceptable losses, backed by overwhelming military and economic capacity. Operation El Dorado Canyon missed killing Muammar Gaddafi by minutes. The US Air Force enforced no fly zones over Iraq for a decade to punish and contain Saddam Hussein. After the American removal of Saddam, Gaddafi opted out of the extended axis of evil, voluntarily eliminating his weapons of mass destruction programs and long-range ballistic missiles. Even President Bill Clinton “went downtown” bombing Serbian power plants and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s cronies. Instead, Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden bribed Iran and put the United States only twelve days away from an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Iranian instigated attacks in the region can no longer be met with impotence and half measures. Swift decisive American action directly against Iran is now essential. Drone attacks on American forces call for the prompt destruction of Iranian drone production facilities and IRGC command and control nodes inside Iran. Harassment of international shipping and attacks on US naval vessels require the destruction of Iranian naval forces and oil-exporting infrastructure.

Chamberlain was wrong in 1939 and his disciples are wrong today. Iran is an implacable foe, and it must be de-fanged. America must make rational choices based on reality. The Mullahs began their war against the US on November 4, 1979. After 45 years, the only rational strategy is to eliminate Iran as an existential threat.

The immediate elimination of the Iranian nuclear program is a necessity. Anything less is delaying an inevitable conflict with a nuclear-armed enemy determined to kill Americans and incinerate Israel.

Colonel (Ret.) Kirk Fansher (USAF) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

The US Is Undermining Deterrence with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

Download the full compendium here:

Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.

One of the most valuable qualities of American nuclear credibility is its incorporation of responsible authority to ensure nuclear command and control (NC2), which is the exercise of authority and direction over nuclear weapons by the president as the chief executive and head of state. According to the Congressional Research Service’s Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces:

The US President has sole authority to authorize the use of US nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President can seek counsel from appropriate military advisors; those advisors are then required to transmit and implement the orders authorizing nuclear use. The President does not need the concurrence of the US Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons, and neither the military nor Congress can overrule these orders.

The US Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 provide a framework for the order of succession in the event of presidential incapacity or demise. If a president cannot fulfill the duties of the office, including those of NC2, another designated government leader will take over in a specific order. The secretary of Defense is sixth in line for the presidency, following the vice president, speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, secretary of State, and secretary of the Treasury. Any cabinet member or elected official in an office identified in the line of succession, but is not a natural-born citizen, cannot become president.

In addition to being one of the president’s key advisors during a nuclear decision event, the secretary of Defense is a key “designated survivor” option for presidential succession planning. During the Eisenhower administration, officials introduced “continuity of government” to prepare for a possible Soviet nuclear attack. Maintaining constitutional legitimacy during the Cold War was important if the president or his successor were killed. Because of the awesome responsibility, those in presidential succession receive appropriate training. Knowing where each of those government officials identified in the presidential line of succession, like the secretary of Defense, remains paramount to national survival.

Two congressmen, Jimmy Panetta and Ted Lieu, requested President Biden “consider modifying the decision-making process the United States uses in its command and control of nuclear forces.” The congressional authors noted, “You alone possess the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, which assures that nuclear weapons remain under civilian control.” They also advocated that the secretary of Defense be required to certify that the “launch order is valid,” presumably even in a second-strike nuclear retaliation. However, adding this caveat to the president’s already compressed nuclear decision timeline could lead to negative impacts, especially in light of Austin’s incapacitation.

By the 1950s it was well known that the president’s office is vulnerable to a decapitation strike, especially a nuclear one. According to a 1975 Institute for Defense Analysis Study, “The unique role of the President as the Commander in Chief, as well as Chief Executive, and his particular statutory powers with regard to nuclear weapons, made the survival of the presidency—the office if not the man, indispensable for legitimate nuclear action.” A 1969 blue ribbon defense panel convened by President Nixon concluded:

It is stated US policy to retaliate only in the event of unmistakable attack, only by decision of the President or his constitutional successor, and with discrimination according to the source, magnitude, and type of attack to perform as desired [in an] environment of nuclear war would be extremely difficult at best. Yet, the possibility of a disruption of command which would either immobilize retaliatory forces, subject them to piecemeal destruction, or bring about a weak or uncoordinated response which an enemy might feel he could cope with, might offer an aggressor too tempting an objective and thereby dangerously weaken deterrence.

In order for nuclear deterrence to be effective, potential aggressors must view the United States’ nuclear capabilities, architecture, and process as credible. This means that the president must have his key advisors (secretary of Defense and US Strategic Command commander) available to assist in decision-making, and succession must be reliable and contribute to shaping the adversary’s decision calculus.

On the worst of days, good advice and presidential continuity is crucial in ensuring that a decision to retaliate can be made. To achieve this, the secretary of Defense or his clear designee must be available to the president. The ability to maintain credible nuclear command and control is essential to America’s deterrence threat.

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service serving America’s nuclear enterprise. Both authors co-host the popular weekly podcast: “The NIDS View” found on https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Why SECDEF Austin’s Secret Hospitalization Really Mattered was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is straightforward to see that beyond the deterrent or “last defense” aspect of possessing a nuclear arsenal these weapons are one tool among other strategic options. It is the duty of a military planner to plan for outcomes with the instruments that adversaries possess, however distasteful those weapons (nuclear weapons). It does not require reams of classified intelligence nor deep policy experience to recognize the appeal of a nuclear weapon to achieve winning outcomes. Even the technical specifications of specific weapons, their delivery method, and the effects achieved by their use can take a second seat to the appealing utility of their use in the mind of a foe.

A brief look at two kinds of adversary is instructive. First, there is the ideologically driven actor who seeks to remake the international state system and its associated norms, behaviors, and morals. Second, there is a leader or state-party that seeks to climb politically, economically, and cultural-informationally within the extant Western-built international system.

For the antagonist motivated by an ideology whose primary ambition is the destruction of contemporary norms or who desires to trigger a millenarian kind of resorting, whether secular or religious, a nuclear weapon heralds to fellow adherents the breaking of the status quo by the offer of a new, radicalized future. To achieve such an outcome a nuclear weapon targeted at a populated area, especially a political capital or major religious center, would offer the radical damage and chaos sought.

The size of the nuclear device need not be large. The purpose is to tear down a targeted society by inflicting as many casualties as possible and to wreck the symbols and sinews that symbolized the victims’ way of life and station in the international order. There is no doubt many terrorist organizations that would leap at the chance to exploit a nuclear weapon in this fashion. And there are state challengers who no doubt see the same appeal. The only risk to such leaders is the repercussions they may face. But to the radicalized actor, the repercussions are just another aspect of martyrdom—religious or ideological. One imagines that such a scenario has not occurred more due to lack of opportunity than to a lack of desire.

A nuclear weapon fired by a state’s armed forces is even more likely to occur if for no other reason than governments possess the world’s nuclear arms. State arsenals and their delivery systems continue to proliferate in both number and capability, thus expanding the scenarios for weapons use. The danger of the “mutually assured destruction” problem that occupied many deterrence thinkers during the Cold War is still a threat, but the logic of employment success points towards battlefield use.

A nuclear weapon that struck a key military target could decisively alter the course of a battle and a campaign by inflicting damage at a scale that conventional weapons can only achieve over much longer periods of time. The historical record informs us that winning quickly is a tremendous advantage for an adversary.

The one sure way to suffer a military defeat by the US and any American-led coalition is to wait for American joint and combined forces to deploy, assemble, and wage a maneuver campaign. If the Normandy landings of World War II are too distant, then the overwhelming success of the United States in the Gulf War (1991) is a more recent reminder of the fate of any adversary that simply waits for the United States to come to them. The war in Ukraine is an ongoing example of the grinding, almost interminable, result of fighting when early wins do not occur. Despite the many technological advances that modern armed forces possess, speed in multi-domain operations is still decisive, and elusive.

America’s adversaries are certainly aware that speed matters. Alongside the imperatives of increasing range and the convergence of lethal effects, the rapid way a nuclear weapon can alter battlefield geometries and the correlation of forces gives so called “battlefield nukes” tremendous appeal. There are many creative ways to benefit from a nuclear weapon, not just on land, but also in the maritime and air domains. Sealing an area off from maneuver; denying communications, targeting, and surveillance systems; destroying logistical nodes and stockpiles; damaging vehicles and equipment; and inflicting casualties on the adversary are all additional ways nuclear weapons are useful. This is not to mention the escalatory advantage of skipping rungs on the escalation ladder, thereby intimidating America’s partners and neutral states—foreclosing incremental steps from American policymakers.

Simply put, nuclear weapons present an urgent operational challenge to the joint force of the United States and its military partners. Whether the scenario is in Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or globally, the United States must imagine that adversaries are thinking about, and at least gaming if not planning, nuclear weapons use to achieve their objectives.

Americans must admit that there is a problem and stop hiding behind sincere wishes that nuclear weapons are never used again. The logic of their employment demands that the nation act on the facts as they are. Nuclear weapons are present. They are plentiful. It is also almost certainly only a matter of time before an adversary exploits American reticence to prepare for their use. It is time to prepare for that day.

Major General (Ret.) Bradley T. Gericke, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Operational Logic of Nuclear Weapons Use by an Adversary was originally published on Global Security Review.

The belief that the United States is being dragged into a forever war is ill informed. In fact, giving Ukraine what it needs to win might very well drag Russia, not the US and its allies, into a forever war that Russia eventually loses. Much as Soviet support for North Vietnam allowed Hanoi to perpetuate the war in South Vietnam against the United States while it reaped the benefits of a relatively modest investment, American support, combined with large-scale European support for Ukraine, will strengthen Kyiv’s capabilities and morale and allow it to outperform Russia in regard to adaptation and innovation in this war as it has consistently done.

Maintaining a consistent supply of weaponry and economic support also reinforces Western unity and drives European and American efforts. Despite some stumbles, Ukraine is fighting the West’s war and Ukraine is merely the most kinetic front in Russia’s long-running global war against the West. Providing Ukraine the necessary support reestablishes a deterrent capability that the United States is in danger of losing.

Investment in international security is essential to its maintenance. Although Putin is putting out feelers for a settlement where he can retain his ill-gotten gains from aggression, such a settlement would not constitute peace. A peace of this kind would demoralize Ukraine and strengthen Putin at home. Putin will spin such a Russian victory as ample evidence of the decadence and lack of fortitude of the West and accelerate the cascade of global crises now confronting the United States.

Russia will undoubtedly continue and upgrade its multi-dimensional probes and pressures against an equally demoralized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Chinese pressure tactics against Southeast Asian states and Taiwan will also intensify. And one can certainly say the same for Iran’s threats to Israel and international shipping, as well as further undermining the nonproliferation goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed all these attacks on the West, including Venezuela’s threats to Guyana, are probably connected to the perception of Western drift and also possible covert support from Russia.

Therefore, supporting Ukraine and Israel allows them to continue fighting on behalf of Western and American interests and reinvigorate the deterrence that is under attack globally. Concurrently, for a fraction of the American defense budget, Ukraine has already destroyed over half of Russia’s conventional forces and is killing 40 percent of Russian recruits per month–more Russians than Moscow can replace.

Western support has a proven record of success. The Biden administration has openly stated that Ukraine should win by expelling Russian forces from Ukraine—and restore the integrity, sovereignty, and right to choose alliances. Strong and continuing support can bring about those conditions of victory. A victorious Ukraine will then have a strong claim to NATO membership that will deter Russia. The US and NATO can then further strengthen the respect adversaries have for Article V of the Washington Treaty and allow Western governments to reorient much of current spending on Ukraine to its economic reconstruction.

In other words, continuing support for Ukraine, coupled with rising Western pressure on Russia’s military, economy, and morale, can lead to victory. That outcome rules out a forever war for the United States but imposes that choice on Russia, thereby adding to the considerable strains already discernible. Indeed, in Russian history, every protracted war has imposed enormous strain upon the economy and the state. Defeat led to major reforms, if not the toppling of the regime. It is unlikely Putin can escape this history because it has repeatedly manifested itself over the past five hundred years.

Putin’s aggression gives the West a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decisively advance European and international security. The global reverberation of a Russian defeat strengthens the cause of democracy, deterrence, and the rules of an international law-based order. On the other hand, a Western defeat originating in the refusal to support Ukraine or similarly threatened states will encourage more wars around the world, greater costs than we bare now and certainly more loss of life. For these reasons, the United States must rise to its responsibilities and protect its interests. This means imposing the prospects of “forever war” on Russia, and thus seizing the opportunity to end Russia’s aggression and re-establish deterrence.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Why Congress Should Support Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

After getting many high-level threat briefings from across the intelligence community and hearing from American allies, the commission found the US is running out of time to remedy a sharply deteriorating strategic nuclear environment. The speed of the threat is accelerating, leading the commission to recommend dozens of new initiatives, some to be initiated immediately, with the remainder fully implemented in a phased manner over the next fourteen years.

Notably, the commission recommended an even stronger bolstering of the delivery options and capacity of the modernized nuclear triad by deploying multiple warheads on the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), building a road-mobile version, adding more strategic Columbia-class submarines, and acquiring more B21 strategic bombers. Additionally, the commission recommended the deployment of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system for the protection of the continental United States against threats from China and Russia, including, if technologically feasible, space-based components.

Such missile and air defenses are critically important to deal with coercive nuclear threats from Russia and China, especially in the context of enemy “escalate to win” strategies. The commission concluded that China and Russia will both continue their aggressive policies seeking to replace the United States as the leading power in the world. And Russia and China will continue their modernization and expansion of their conventional, space, cyber, and nuclear capabilities.

The commission warned that regional conflicts with China and Russia are the most likely future conflicts and could escalate to direct confrontation. Expanding on this point, commission co-chairs Creedon and Kyl underscored, in Senate testimony, that “coercive or bullying strikes” with cruise and hypersonic missiles could be used to make the US “buckle” under Chinese or Russian threat.

Neo-isolationism was rejected. Instead, the commission implored the US to work with allies and cooperate with partners while improving American security policy. The whole-of-government approach was also noted as key to better deterrence policy, including diplomatic and financial measures.

One of the commission’s more interesting points was the emphasis on the urgency of these recommendations. This position was underscored by their assertion that even if many of their recommendations were adopted immediately the United States will lag until modernization programs are complete.

Nonetheless, commission proposals would be adopted in a phased manner as the United States moves from legacy forces to modernized elements of the nuclear enterprise. The period 2023–2027 is the first phase and beyond 2035 is the last phase, including building additional Columbia-class strategic submarines after the current 2042 planned program sunset.

The commission also highlighted the fact that the current nuclear program of record is based on an old assessment of the threat. For example, the program of record limits nuclear warheads to 1,550, a number that is insufficient for the current threat. Thus, an additional margin of deployed capability, including hundreds of new nuclear warheads, is desired.

It was also noted that, as compared to the strategic environment of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), it is important to acknowledge the dramatic changes of the past decade. For example, explained one commission member, at the time of the 2010 NPR, the US assumed China and Russia would engage with the US to help deal with that time period’s top nuclear priority, preventing nuclear proliferation to terrorists. This is no longer the primary concern.

The commission did encourage lessening American dependence on nuclear weapons, which lines up well with the current administration’s goals. However, the report indicated that strategy would require deep investments with the acquisition of not 100 but 200 or even 300 new stealth bombers along with the requisite number of new refueling aircraft to make such a recommendation possible.

Also of import was the commission’s recommendation that the US field the “hedge,” contained in all nuclear arms deals—adding to deployed nuclear warheads. Such an expansion of deployed warheads would be a reversal of American policy since the adoption of the START I reductions in 1991.

Nevertheless, the commission recommended the US maintain its targeting policy that avoids infrastructure and population centers while still holding at risk what America’s adversaries value most: their leadership, the security apparatus that maintains their power, and their exquisite weapons. The commission was open to future arms control agreements, but as Creedon explained, “[t]he prospects for arms control remain bleak.”

Finally, perhaps the most surprising statement came when the commission called for deployment of a national missile defense system. Not simply to defend against the growing North Korean “rogue” missile threat but to expand American missile and air defenses to the point of being able to credibly defeat “coercive nuclear threats” from China and Russia.

This change in US policy would jettison the notion that US missile defenses have to be “limited” in scope and defend only against rogue state threats. Such thinking assumed that a robust American missile defense would create an unstable strategic situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

In late 2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the American withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty would have no deleterious impact on Russia’s security. Nevertheless, the United States has not deployed more than a relatively limited number of interceptors and currently has no plans for a space-based system, which is necessary for an effective national missile defense capability, a point the commission underscored.

To implement the recommendations found in the report, the commission estimated it would require 6 percent of the defense budget. Such an expenditure is certainly affordable. As former Secretary of Defense General James Mattis once said, “America can afford survival.”

Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, terrorism, and climate change are often trotted out as examples of threats nuclear weapons cannot deter. This straw man argument fails to acknowledge that nuclear weapons were never meant to be a cure all for every strategic ill.

After establishing this false premise, arms control advocates suggest that the only use for nuclear weapons is deterring an adversary’s use of nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear abolition often go further and assert that nuclear weapons may, in fact, be completely useless. They argue a nuclear attack on the United States can be effectively deterred with American conventional weapons.

As an interim measure on the way to total nuclear disarmament, these advocates suggest that the United States only needs a small nuclear arsenal, seventy percent less than the current arsenal, to achieve a “minimum deterrent.”

There are three key flaws with such a policy. First, minimum deterrence undermines the credibility of the United States’ nuclear umbrella by reducing the size of the arsenal to a point that allies no long find extended deterrence credible—setting the stage for nuclear proliferation.

Second, minimum deterrence undermines the role of nuclear arms in deterring and limiting conventional conflict. Nuclear weapons do far more than simply deter the use of other nuclear weapons.

Third, minimum deterrence ignores the critical requirement for strategic stability, especially during a crisis between nuclear-armed adversaries. Too little capability can encourage an adversary to act aggressively.

In short, when it comes to strategic nuclear deterrence, size matters and numbers count. Each point deserves further examination.

Extended Deterrence

The United States extends the protection of its nuclear umbrella to over 30 allied non-nuclear nations. This includes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states and helps guarantee allies are not threatened by nuclear-armed adversaries. Critical to the success of such a policy is the credibility of the American commitment to allies’ security. That requires the American deterrent to remain capable and credible.

Extended deterrence helped ensure that the Soviet Union did not threaten NATO allies with nuclear use or aggression during the Cold War. The success of extended deterrence gave American allies in NATO and Asia the confidence to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Absent a credible American nuclear arsenal, this was unlikely to occur.

Russia’s penchant for bullying non-nuclear states and territorial expansion makes extended deterrence all the more important. Arms control and nonproliferation become far more difficult when the United States lacks the capability to assure its allies. Even now, South Korea and Japan are wondering if the United States will actually come to their aid in a nuclear fight with North Korea or China.

Consequently, policy pronouncements that the United States should limit its nuclear deterrent to stopping a nuclear attack on the homeland may very well heighten President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to recklessly threaten allies and friends in Eastern Europe. And it may heighten similar threats to Japan from China given the latter’s growing nuclear arsenal and desire for a nuclear strategy similar to that of Russia and the United States.

Thus, far from reducing the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy, Russia is already expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy, with more to follow in the years ahead. Such an altered strategic environment is very bad for extended deterrence.

Minimum deterrence divorces the United States’ nuclear deterrent from its longtime role in preventing or limiting conventional conflict. This may give a green light—however inadvertently—to those seeking to use conventional force against America’s friends and allies. In short, adversaries may believe they do not need to fear a nuclear response if the sovereignty of an ally is threatened by conventional force.

NATO member-states must naturally wonder if their membership in the alliance is sufficient to prevent Russian aggression. The corollary to this concern regards American credibility. Are American promises credible in the face of a Russian theater nuclear arsenal that is ten to thirty times larger, and far more diverse, than NATO’s nuclear arsenal. Will the Americans trade Tallin for New York?

Minimum deterrence advocates accept that Russia’s war on Ukraine is reckless aggression. They then suggest that NATO conventional capabilities can defeat future Russian aggression, even nuclear aggression, and that our nuclear weapons need not play any role. This belief may prove untrue—leaving NATO’s east flank to pay a costly price.

There may be at least four additional factors worth considering when determining whether a minimum deterrence posture will or will not work. This is particularly important when considering NATO’s conventional capabilities, which require nuclear weapons to supplement limited conventional forces.

First, NATO’s conventional force capability in Eastern Europe is insufficient to the task of deterring Russian aggression in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. While these are non-NATO nations, they either border NATO member-states or were in talks with NATO concerning membership. Furthermore, some senior Norwegian defense officials warned that Russia maintains conventional superiority in the Arctic.

Although the likely outcome of the Ukraine war is unclear, the question of “what comes next” should be high on the agenda for NATO. If Moscow ends up thinking it has a green light to dismember Ukraine, even a small part, it may also think it can do the same to the Baltic states.

Second, NATO action in the war in Ukraine is not deterring further Russian aggression. It appears Russia is seeking to simply wear out Ukrainian forces and NATO resolve. Possible Russian efforts to employ such a strategy against the Baltic states, for example, should raise concerns in European capitals.

It may simply be the case that Moscow does not believe Washington is serious about stopping or reversing Russian aggression in Ukraine, irrespective of American nuclear or conventional capability. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the United States and NATO called for Russian aggression to stop. Failing to ensure their objectives come to fruition sends a message to Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping that the United States is unserious.

Third, American conventional capability is proving ineffective at deterring Russian aggression. US Strategic Command’s former commander, Admiral (Ret) Charles Richard, previously testified before Congress that American conventional plans for prevailing against an aggressor in Europe come undone if nuclear weapons are used in the conflict. Richard said, “Every operational plan in the Department of Defense, and every other capability we have, rests on an assumption that strategic deterrence will hold. And if strategic deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, doesn’t hold, none of our other plans, and no other capability that we have is going to work as designed.”

Moscow may have indeed concluded just that. This leaves the United States with little more than a strategy of hope built on optimism.

Fourth, while current American nuclear and conventional forces are not stopping Russian serial aggression in Eastern Europe, future capabilities are even less likely to deter Russia or, more importantly, China. The proof of this view may come when Russia broadens its aggression to include the Baltic’s or other border areas. For China, the long-awaited invasion of Taiwan is the proof no American wants to see.

The final weakness of minimum deterrence is its impact on strategic stability. Idealist claims that today’s dangers do not match the severity of the Cold War. Allowing for more risk with a smaller arsenal is a clear misreading of the current and future strategic environment. The future is anything but predictable, which means taking less, not more, risk is the wiser course of action.

Admittedly, deterrence is not an exact science. However, the Director of National Intelligence’s public statements suggest that the threats to the United States are graver than at any point in the 45 years the intelligence community has collected threat data. By way of example, Vladimir Putin is repeatedly threatening the United States and NATO with nuclear attack, something the Soviets did not do.

Franklin Miller, a former senior Pentagon and White House nuclear policy official warned,

The triad and our targeting policy need to continue to give us confidence that we are not approaching the edge of disaster from miscalculation. For virtually every armed conflict involving US military forces since WWI, a major cause was allowing a potential adversary to miscalculate our response and our ability to respond and particularly our mistake in not being well prepared. Minimum deterrence strategies would so reduce US nuclear deterrent forces as to dramatically heighten the incentive of the world’s bad actors to pre-emptive attack the United States and take us out of the nuclear deterrent business.

Conclusion

In the end the question is whether the United States should deliberately lessen the credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent by the adoption of a minimum deterrence strategy as part of a hoped-for road to nuclear abolition. The logical answer is clearly no.

Winston Churchill said it best when, prior to World War II, members of parliament were advocating for restraint in British shipbuilding, he quipped, “Building slow destroyers? You might as well breed slow racehorses.” Unfortunately, the United States seems determined to follow the course of the pre-war British parliament by building a nuclear arsenal that is the equivalent of Churchill’s slow racehorse. This is a mistake.

The Danger of Minimum Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s growing influence in the Americas is neither in the U.S. nor the region’s interests.

The growth of Chinese influence around the globe has become one of the top priorities for the United States, with President Biden going so far as to state, “We are in a competition with China to win the 21^st century.” With China’s presence in the Latin American and Caribbean region increasing, there has been abundant consternation within U.S. foreign policy circles.

Despite the rise in U.S. attention to Chinese influence in the Americas, concerns remain over the United States not paying enough attention or being strategic enough in responding to this threat. However, framing the Chinese influence as a threat may undermine the very efforts aimed at countering China’s presence in the region. While concerns over China’s influence are warranted, addressing the challenge of extra-hemispheric involvement is complicated, and important lessons can be drawn from historical U.S. attempts at preventing the rise of external influence.

In 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt implemented the Good Neighbor Policy (GNP) and embarked on what is widely considered to be the “Golden Age” of U.S.-Latin American relations. Despite this rosy perception, two major U.S. concerns provided the foundation of this policy: the recovery of the U.S. economy post-Great Depression and countering foreign influence in the region. Economically, the United States extended an olive branch to Latin America by unilaterally lowering tariffs, boosting trade, and creating the Export-Import Bank.

Apart from economic cooperation, there were particular concerns over German influence in the Southern Hemisphere – specifically, the Nazi Party’s growing relationship with Brazil. However, rather than counter Nazi influence by framing the Brazil-Germany relationship as a threat to the United States, the GNP utilized cultural diplomacy to foster a sense of Pan-Americanism. The overarching narrative of these policies was not to spread American ideals or even to compete with American adversaries but instead to foster an Inter-American identity. Following Pearl Harbor, nearly every country within Latin America declared war on the Axis powers. Brazil even sent troops to fight in the European theater.

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During the Cold War, the United States was once again concerned about growing extra-hemispheric influence in the region– this time from the Soviet Union. However, rather than framing policies through a cooperative and Pan-American lens, the United States took an interventionist strategy to stop the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere.

Instead of seeking to build upon shared values and addressing common challenges, U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War regularly focused on supporting anti-Communist dictatorships and overthrowing leaders viewed as Communist or too close to the Soviet Union. The strategy could not have been less effective for building a positive relationship with the region’s people. However, it was clear that this U.S policy was not intended to strengthen Hemispheric ties but used Latin America as a pawn in their competition with the Soviet Union. This narrative, coupled with support for undemocratic actors in the region, left a lasting stain on U.S.-Latin American relations.

Despite all the differences, the GNP and Cold War-era foreign policy toward Latin America shared a goal– countering foreign influence in the region. However, framing Latin America as a battleground during the Cold War often undermined U.S. objectives to limit Soviet influence in the region. Conversely, the Good Neighbor Policy created a sense of unity within the region while still warding off German influence, a position that had positive results.

Countering the rise of Chinese influence in the Americas should be a priority for the United States. However, as previous attempts to counter extra-hemispheric influence show, how the issue is framed is critical. Pushing to improve relations with the region will be difficult, however, as the Trump administration framed much of U.S.-Latin American relations as a battle to push China out of the region and went as far as to resurrect the Monroe Doctrine, a policy associated with U.S. interventionism in the region. Administration officials even scolded Latin American nations for taking aid from China. This heavy-handed approach helps explain the decrease in Latin American perceptions of the United States during the last administration.

The United States will make more friends in the region with carrots than sticks. Rather than pushing Latin American countries on the issue of China, the United States should take steps to show that it is a better partner and do so without making the issue about China. Doing so can limit Chinese influence in the region by providing a reasonable alternative to China. For instance, studies show that Chinese influence (in the form of aid) has been most notable in places where the United States has been disengaged from the region. In other words, increasing aid will likely result in a decline in states seeking support from China.

Framing Latin America as a battleground for influence vis-à-vis other great powers undermines the ability to forge meaningful relations with the region. One area where this should be particularly clear is in boosting COVID-19 vaccine access. While some have called on the United States to more actively compete with China in the “Vaccine Diplomacy” game, providing vaccines through the prism of great power competition limits the ability to combat foreign influence and improve relations with the region.

One need only look at China’s attempts to pressure Paraguay on the issue of Taiwan to see how this can backfire. Rather than seeing Paraguay switch recognition towards Beijing, it has become clear that the Chinese government’s support to the region is predicated on political objectives rather than supporting the region. This provides a learning opportunity for the United States. By framing Pandemic aid as contingent on bolstering political influence, a country can undermine its own interests.

Fortunately, Juan Gonzalez, the Biden Administration’s Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere, recently noted that the United States should provide vaccines to the region without strings attached and as a means of combatting the pandemic as a common threat. Although there will be those that identify the increase in U.S. attention to the region as being due to Chinese influence in the region regardless of what the administration says, the Biden administration should avoid framing aid as about China and work with partners in the region irrespective of their stance on China.

China’s growing influence in the Americas is not in the U.S. nor the region’s interests. However, suppose the United States frames relations and support for the region through the prism of the Chinese threat rather than as supporting Latin America. In that case, the region will not see the United States as an ally and may continue to turn to China rather than work with the United States. Instead, the Biden administration should look to history and frame the relationship as a mutually beneficial partnership rather than as an effort to counter China.

The First Rule of Countering Influence: Don’t Talk About Countering Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Voting for him seemed like the only chance for Iranians to end the corruption and mass murder of the post-revolution years. But, sadly, the more Khatami grew in his presidential role, the more distant he became from the people and the more obedient to the Supreme Leader. Although he later denied it, before the end of his presidency, he said: “the president is no more than a middleman in Iran.”

By now, the United States seems to be realizing that too, albeit very late. Khatami left in 2005, with a legacy of student arrest and murder and the raid on Tehran University in 1998. His successors Ahmadinejad and Rouhani and their record of repression are much the same.

The Iranian people carry the trauma of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. However, it is clear that they do not want another war, and the low voter turnout of the recent election sends a clear message that they do not support the regime, either. Starting with the people inside Iran, promoted by the Iranian diaspora abroad, the virtual campaign of #NO2IRI paid off and should be a wake-up call for Iranian authorities.

Resentment against the regime is high, and its reasons are abundant. The Iranian people are suffocating from shooting citizens on the streets in November 2020 to shooting down Ukrainian flight PF752 with missiles. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suppressing human rights for over 40 years. First, the mass cleansing of the opposition inside Iran in the 80s, enforcing anti-women and anti-freedom regulations and then targeting dissidents abroad in the 90s. Today, complete control of state media and social media filtering put freedom at risk more than ever. One must either express support for the regime or say nothing at all.

So if Iranians want neither this regime nor war, what do they want?

Iranians may have taken part in the 1979 revolution, but the outcome blindsided them. Today, they blame President Carter for his lack of support to back the Shah. Thirty years later, in 2009, they blamed President Obama for not standing firm on the Green Movement protests. President Obama regrets the same in his book, “A Promised Land.” Rightfully, Iranians are terrified that President Biden will sacrifice them to make a weak deal with a rogue regime. In his first presidential interview, new President Raisi said, “He will not meet with the U.S. President.”

The United States should not be afraid of the regime. The Iranian people showed their courage by staying home and not participating in a predetermined election. The U.S. should do the same by standing high on the foundation of America: democracy and freedom for all.

President Biden and his national security team have the chance, for the first time since the revolution, to make it right with the people of Iran:

1. The U.S. can and should add all human rights demands to the negotiating table in Vienna and stand by them. Such demands should go beyond merely asking to free American hostages in Iran. They must include higher international law standards, such as prevention of torture and access to free and fair trials, equal rights for women, minorities, and LGBTQs. Iran will not like it and claim domestic sovereignty, but it too signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945. Human rights for all is what President Biden has promised. With his leadership, the Europeans will follow.
2. The White House should support the Iranian people in every way short of the use of force. Iranians want the President to condemn regime atrocities strongly. Since January 2021, the State Department Farsi section has lost followers on social media. Human rights content is far more critical than scattered messages on Jazz or birthday wishes. The State Department should transform its Farsi page and tailor it to the target audience of Iranians. Information on fundamental human rights and needs, privacy protection, and accessible VPNs should be the contents of USABEHFARSI. It is wrong to think the U.S. will blame the people by supporting them. The Iranian regime always blames the U.S; the U.S. should always stand by what is right and what the regime despises.
3. The word on the ground among the Iranian diaspora is that Iran lobby groups such as NIAC (National Iranian American Council) did not establish themselves independently and that the CIA played a role in setting them up as a concession to the regime. The U.S. government should set the record straight, denounce these regime lobby groups, and stay as far from them as it can. These groups have only worked against U.S. interests and the regime in the last decade.
4. The U.S. Justice Department’s actions against Iranian malign activities should go beyond shutting down IRGC websites. Instead, it should focus on those individuals who create division and hate among Americans, claiming the U.S. is at fault for everything wrong in Iran. A specific Task Force is now needed to target those individuals, their travel, and finances.
5. Meeting with Iranian groups from all perspectives must be a top priority within the State Department. In the last decade, the regime lobby groups have gotten close enough to the U.S. government and bought time for the regime. This should change, and the U.S. should hear out everybody.

The path ahead for the United States to deal with the Iranian government is neither war nor fruitless diplomacy, rather fierce advocacy for human rights and the freedom of the Iranian people. The regime has the money and the tools of repression, but it doesn’t have the people’s support.

The United States now has the chance to do the right thing for the people of Iran. The regime needs to know the world is watching. The Iranian people will surprise themselves and the world with their courage to change and a better future.

The JCPOA is Dead—Renewal Not Required was originally published on Global Security Review.

Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which recently passed the House and Senate, authorizes $7.1 billion (over $2 billion more than requested) for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a subset of the Department of Defense budget for targeted investments in the Indo-Pacific region. Other geographic areas across the globe were mentioned in GPR briefings and the NDAA, but almost as an afterthought when compared to the emphasis placed on the Indo-Pacific.

To face current and future threats, the United States’ national security strategy needs to evolve at the speed of relevance. The current geopolitical and economic environment demands more forward-looking and predictive thinking from civilian and military leaders, rather than reactive views based on recent history and antiquated doctrine. Casting an eye beyond the regionally-focused and traditional planes of national security is essential to competing and succeeding in the era of great power competition.

This latest shift to the Pacific comes over ten years after the Obama Administration announced a “pivot” or “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region in 2011. Yet the Obama-era pivot never really came to be and only served as a catalyst for PRC military modernization, the PRC militarization of the South China Sea, and the launch and execution of a series of aggressive trade endeavors, including the Belt and Road Initiative. All this was done with impunity as the United States remained focused on the Middle East.

The shift to the Indo-Pacific announced by the GPR and backed by the NDAA has come too slowly and too late. Focusing on a single geographic region for the past twenty years has allowed problems to fester in areas and ways outside of the strategic focus of the United States. Technology and competitors have outpaced the speed of U.S. national security strategy.

The United States seems poised to take its eye off the ball again. Before the NSS and NDS have even been publicly released, over 100,000 Russian troops have amassed on the border of Ukraine and seem poised for invasion. More surreptitiously and less immediate, the United States strategy needs to acknowledge an emerging center of gravity in Africa. In December 2021, the Wall Street Journal reported that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is executing plans to establish a naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast in Equatorial Guinea to the alarm of U.S. government officials.

The juxtaposition of the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific against the PRC’s plans to establish a base in West Africa highlights three truths the United States must confront regarding its national security strategy: (1) great power competition is not defined by U.S. military doctrine; (2) great power competition is not defined by geography; and (3) great power competition will not be won by the U.S. military alone.

1. Great Power Competition Is Not Defined By U.S. Military Doctrine

As hard as U.S. military strategists may try to shoehorn it in, great power competition does not fit neatly into the boxes historically prescribed by U.S. military doctrine. United States national security policy towards China over the past decade assumes a clean division between peace and war. But this approach quickly loses efficacy in the face of PRC strategy.

As one example, China has spent at least the past decade aggressively influencing international technical standards. Such standards are agreed upon among regional and global bodies with the shared goal of ensuring functionality, interoperability, and safety among products, services, and processes. While seemingly mundane and highly technical, such international technical standards have a profound influence on how the world adopts and uses new technologies.

Initially, China’s standards strategy was mostly limited to protectionist domestic policies, designed to keep foreign products out of China. In more recent years, however, China has increased its profile on international standards-setting bodies, where participants endeavor to develop consensus-based rules deemed in the best interest of industry and consumers.

In numerous cases, governments, businesses, and others have attested that China uses a variety of tactics to skew the outcomes of standard-setting deliberations, including by abusing leadership positions and pressuring Chinese representatives to vote for PRC proposals regardless of their merits. These practices not only cut against long-standing rules and norms, but they also reduce the technical quality and long-term relevance of international standards.

In addition to influencing international standards bodies, the PRC sets de facto standards by creating dependencies on Chinese technology products and services through its Belt and Road Initiative.   In essence, the PRC exports technology at a subsidized cost, and signs agreements with governments across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean that formalize and solidify standards favorable to China. Such arrangements make it legally difficult or cost-prohibitive to switch to alternative products, thereby forcing consumers into using PRC technology.

More insidiously, the PRC is influencing standards as part of a military-civil fusion strategy to exploit networks and critical communications infrastructure. Most notably, Huawei, China’s most successful telecommunications company, is believed to be backed and controlled by the PRC military. Since Huawei was founded in 1987, the company has faced allegations across the globe ranging from corporate theft to trade agreements and sanctions violations to purposefully installing backdoor vulnerabilities on its products.

The United States government has taken note of this behavior as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designated Chinese tech companies, including Huawei, ZTE, and others, as “threats to national security.” And in November 2021, President Biden signed a bill into law barring the FCC from authorizing products made by companies considered a threat to national security. But these measures are largely defensive and only apply domestically.

To compete with China, U.S. strategy must counter PRC strategy on the global stage, not just in the Indo-Pacific. In terms of international standards, few bodies are more important than the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The ITU is a treaty-based United Nations organization with representation from almost every nation in the world. The ITU governs the global use of the electromagnetic spectrum, assigns satellite orbits, and plays a significant role in setting global telecommunications and internet standards. 

In 2022, the ITU is scheduled to convene in Bucharest, Romania to elect its next Secretary-General. Responsible, forward-looking, and transparent leadership of the ITU is vital to global industry as well as international security. Currently, there are two leading candidates. One is Rashid Ismailov, former deputy chief of the Russian communications ministry and, as it happens, a former executive at Huawei. The second is Doreen Bogdan-Martin, from the United States. Bogdan-Martin is currently the Director of ITU’s Telecommunication Development Bureau, where she is working to transform the global digital landscape to improve connectivity, close gaps in infrastructure, and make the digital future more inclusive and sustainable. If elected, Ms. Bogdan-Martin would be the first woman to lead the ITU.

Although Bogdan-Martin has the support and endorsement of the U.S. government, this will not be enough to win the election. The winner of the election must obtain the majority of the votes from representatives across the 193 participating nations.

Notably, the largest and, therefore most critical, block of voters for the ITU election reside not in the most powerful countries in the world, but in Africa. And Africa deserves the attention of national security professionals for other reasons as well.

 2. Great Power Competition Is Not Confined By Geography

While the U.S. remains regionally focused and competing within traditional planes of national security, the world is in the midst of an era not defined by geography, but by networks and new technologies. The greatest untapped potential is in Africa, and the PRC realized this some time ago.

Despite the pervasiveness of the internet in all aspects of life in advanced economies, much of the developing world still lack access to affordable and reliable connectivity. Nearly 3.7 billion people (or roughly half of the global population) do not have internet access. Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites are projected to increase global satellite internet capacity by tenfold by the end of 2021 and by thirtyfold by 2030. Because of their proximity to Earth, LEO satellite constellations can circle the globe many times a day, providing continuous and high-quality connectivity for any given area.

The goal of bringing the internet to underdeveloped nations is not a novel aspiration. But previous efforts were hampered by a lack of access to electricity in the poorest countries. While there is still more work to be done, due to a concerted effort by the World Health Organization, a $5 billion investment by the World Bank, and advances in off-grid technologies, the global electrification rate has increased dramatically over the last decade; as of 2020, over 90 percent of the world’s population has access to electricity.

The potential to bring reliable internet to remote and underserved populations across the globe could have profound impacts on the availability of information and how it is received, consumed, and transmitted, as well as on national security, the economy, and the international world order. Because of market demand, the potential for economic growth, and population demographics, no region of the world will be more affected by the increased availability of the internet than Africa.

Thus far, fifty African countries have signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative. Huawei is engaged in 25 projects throughout the continent and has already secured seventy percent of Africa’s 4G network. Further, PRC companies have built over 100 commercial ports in Africa over the past twenty years and fund other major infrastructure projects throughout the continent.

The PRC’s efforts to develop a base on the western coast of Africa in Equatorial Guinea should come as no surprise. In the spring of 2021, U.S. Africa Command Commander General Stephen Townsend testified that China was seeking to establish “a port where they can rearm with munitions and repair naval vessels.” General Townsend further stated: “The Chinese are outmaneuvering the U.S. in select countries in Africa. Port projects, economic endeavors, infrastructure and their agreements and contracts will lead to greater access in the future. They are hedging their bets and making big bets on Africa.”

Although the United States has made efforts to blunt China’s influence in Africa, unilateral efforts have not achieved desired effects. In October, President Biden’s Principal Deputy National Security Adviser, Jon Finer, met with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea to seek favor, but this comes on the heels of a series of U.S. diplomatic and legal actions over the past decade targeting Equatorial Guinean government corruption and kleptocracy. Prospects of curbing Equatorial Guinea’s blossoming partnership with China appear dim.

To effectively counter great powers – especially in Africa – the United States cannot do it alone.

3. Military Power Is Not the Sole Path To Success In Great Power Competition

Just two months ago, Australia canceled a long-standing $88 billion diesel submarine contract with France, opting instead to procure nuclear submarines through a trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom. Seemingly surprised by this development, President Macron immediately recalled French ambassadors in the United States and Australia and canceled a symbolic security cooperation event in Washington commemorating the 240th anniversary of the Battle of the Capes. According to France Foreign Affairs Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian: “It was a stab in the back. We had established a relationship of trust with Australia. This trust has been betrayed.”

While the United States government has not articulated the rationale behind the decision, Australia has indicated dissatisfaction with French contract performance and the urgent need for a stronger submarine force to challenge the PRC in the South China Sea. Analysts have observed that even if this particular crisis passes quickly, the United States’ alliance with France will remain damaged, suggesting that the strategic value of the pivot to the Pacific outweighed the potential harm to relationships with France.

Australian submarines in the Pacific likely will be inconsequential to the outcome of great power competition. Frayed partnerships and a lack of meaningful presence in other parts of the globe will not. The consequences of the diplomatic fallout between the U.S. and France, however, may go well beyond the South China Sea, the United States, and France. Instead, it will hurt shared efforts everywhere, including in Africa.

Although Françafrique has waned in recent years, France still maintains considerable influence in Africa founded on deep personal relationships and “family-like” networks as well as a common language in many instances. Additionally, France retains the largest military presence in Africa of any foreign power. Throughout the last two decades of counterterrorism operations, France has provided U.S. special forces with otherwise unattainable placement and access. The value of French partnerships in Africa cannot be overstated.

France would also benefit from U.S. partnership. In some African countries, France is still viewed negatively as a neo-colonial power. The United States, on the other hand, is a preferred partner in many nations on the continent. According to General Townsend: “We were never a colonizing power in Africa, and we are regarded as an honest broker by many nations.” As one recent example, in April 2021, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari asked Secretary of State Antony Blinken to move the U.S. Africa Command headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa. This is significant as the Nigeran government was the most vocal opponent of establishing a U.S. Africa Command presence on the African continent when the command was first created in 2007.

To effectively deter the PRC in Africa and anywhere else, the United States, France, and other like-minded nations are stronger and more effective together. As demonstrated by the submarine deal gone awry, however, we are not on the right track. As recently as early December 2021, France declined to join the United States in boycotting the Beijing Olympics, signifying a huge setback for U.S. diplomacy and the continuation of a widening rift between the strategic alignment of democratic nations. Similarly, Singapore and other key U.S. partners expressed frustration by not being among the 100 nations invited to President Biden’s virtual Summit on Democracy in favor of blatantly authoritarian governments. China and Russia are undoubtedly reveling in these developments.

Conclusion

The threats emanating from China and the Indo-Pacific region remain significant, but such a strong focus on one specific geographic area overlooks how great power competition is understood and employed by our competitors. We are in the midst of an era that will be defined not by geography, but by new technologies and networks. Technology and our competitors have outpaced the speed of U.S. national security strategy.

The United States needs to take heed and recognize that the modern battlefield for great power competition is happening everywhere, all the time, and in the shadows of legal agreements and commercial partnerships. And at the moment, an important center of gravity is emerging in Africa.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official views of Freedom Technologies, Inc., or any other entity.

It’s Time to Stop Pivoting: Great Power Competition is Everywhere was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States provides substantial diplomatic and economic support to Pakistan. Unfortunately, this policy inadvertently enables Pakistan’s economic, political, and military support for the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups. The U.S. should move from its dubious relationship with Pakistan to a more compatible alliance: India should become America’s premier South Asian ally.

Pakistan is an unreliable and untrustworthy ally. From the Taliban’s inception in the 1990s, The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has supported them with money, training, and supplying weapons. It continues to be a significant source of financial and logistical support. In addition, the Taliban own real estate in Pakistan and receive large donations from private Pakistani citizens. The Taliban also teach their brand of Islam in numerous madrassas (Islamic Schools) all over Pakistan, a valuable tool to influence and recruit new members.

Since 2009, the U.S. government has committed over $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion in emergency humanitarian response. U.S. assistance includes projects supporting economic growth and bilateral trade; refugees and refugee-housing communities; law enforcement; civil society; and countering infectious diseases. In addition, the U.S. is Pakistan’s largest export destination country and has been one of Pakistan’s top investors. Examples of U.S. investments include consumer goods, energy, chemicals, agriculture, transportation, and communications. Yet, despite all the resources the U.S. has invested in helping Pakistan, Pakistan still harbors and supports the Taliban.

The U.S. should shift attention and priority to India as the premier South Asian U.S. ally. This new policy would keep economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan but lessen them over time as the U.S. builds closer ties to India. It makes more sense for the U.S. to focus on India as the essential South Asian relationship. Both countries share a commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights, and the rule of law.

India also shares a commitment to counterterrorism. India actively opposes the Taliban. Unlike Pakistan, India is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups.

Lastly, adopting this new policy instead of a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan would prevent a more powerful Taliban. Economic sanctions on Pakistani military and government officials with ties to the Taliban would likely be counterproductive and cause a backlash. Pakistan might even increase monetary and arms support for the Taliban. However, a growing and ever-closer U.S. relationship with India would send Pakistani officials a powerful message.

Critics argue that the U.S. neglect of Pakistan in favor of India will increase tensions in South Asia. However, tensions are already growing because of a Taliban-leaning Pakistani government. India’s relations with Pakistan are always tense. The difference is that a more robust U.S.- India relationship can bring more regional stability than keeping things status quo or pushing towards a more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. India is a more reliable partner.

Current U.S. -Pakistan policy has enabled Pakistan to support and assist the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups for the past two decades. Pakistani intelligence officials deliberately lie to CIA officials regarding Taliban whereabouts, yet still claim they are committed to fighting the War on Terror alongside the U.S. Continuing down this path with Pakistan is a dead end. It is time to chart a new course with India. A U.S. alliance with India would protect U.S. strategic interests and contribute to regional stability and peace.

India Should Become The United States Premier South Asian ally was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under Maduro’s regime, Venezuela has become a humanitarian disaster. The country’s economy has shrunk by a staggering 80 percent since 2013, with inflation peaking at over 1.8 million percent and triggering an exodus of over 5.6 million Venezuelans – a mass migration similar in size to the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian Civil War, but one that has attracted far less international support. A report from the Organization of American States (OAS) warned that the number of refugees fleeing Venezuela could reach as high as seven million in 2021 alone because of continued economic strife exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. More of the refugees have come to Colombia than any other country, and the Colombian government recently took the step of offering 1.7 million refugees the opportunity to apply for legal status and to remain in Colombia for up to 10 years.

But Venezuela’s domestic crises don’t end with the mass exodus or economic implosion. Armed gangs control large parts of the capital, and the environmental situation in Venezuela is so bad that experts have coined the term “ecocide” to describe it. In addition to its ongoing conflict with the United States, Venezuela has also been openly antagonistic towards Colombia, one of Washington’s key allies in the region, and bellicose toward Guyana, another neighbor aligned with Washington. During Chávez’s rule, his government allegedly went so far as to offer weapons, training, and funding to terrorists in Colombia.

Recent events highlight Venezuela’s continued threat to the region, and why the United States cannot afford to ignore it. In early June, an Iranian frigate and a transport ship left Iran and sailed around the Cape of Good Hope to become the first Iranian navy vessels in the Atlantic. While the Iranian government didn’t announce their destination, most analysts believed that it was Venezuela or Cuba. Based on satellite photos taken before its departure, the modified Iranian tanker was believed to be carrying seven fast attack craft capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and machine guns, as well as other arms and a large amount of fuel. The ships did not end up in the Caribbean, and instead sailed to the Baltic, likely a result of behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure. But the delivery of Iranian weapons and illegal fuel to Venezuela would have only increased Venezuela’s threat to regional stability.

Venezuela and Iran have long and deepening ties in what one expert called the “axis of the sanctioned,” and this is not the first time the two regimes have supported one another against international deterrents. Earlier this year, Iran sent tankers with gasoline to Venezuela in defiance of US sanctions to help relieve a crippling fuel shortage, despite the fact that Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves of any country in the world. Importing fuel via military vessels is one way to evade US sanctions which have foiled efforts to ship fuel from Iran to Venezuela in the past. President Maduro has also spoken about the prospect of buying Iranian arms as a way to shore up the poor state of the country’s navy and bully neighbors like Guyana and Colombia while poking a finger in the eye of the United States.

The Venezuelan disaster has also been an opportunity for terrorist groups and violence has increased along Venezuela’s borders. On June 15, terrorists used a car bomb to attack a Colombian army base in Cucuta, injuring 36 people, including two US soldiers who were part of an advising mission. Cucutá is on the border between Colombia and Venezuela, and Bogotá has long accused Caracas of harboring rebels who carry out attacks in Colombia. The Colombian government has named the 33rd Front of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, better known as the FARC, as responsible for both attacks and asserted that they were planned in Venezuela. While most of the FARC demobilized in 2016 after signing a controversial peace deal with the Colombian government, the 33rd Front is a splinter group. Attacks like the car bombing in Cucutá are possible because terrorist groups like the 33rd Front can operate from Venezuela and strike in Colombia.

In addition to the car bombing, in late June a helicopter carrying Colombian President Ivan Duque and several of his ministers were attacked by fringe groups as it overflew an area near the border with Venezuela. This brazen attempted assassination is further evidence of the insecurity spilling outwards from Venezuela where groups like the FARC benefit from safe havens, enjoy constant revenue streams from the illicit cocaine trade, and leverage the combination of tacit Venezuelan support and lack of state presence, especially along the borders.

Venezuela’s maritime border with Trinidad and Tobago has fared no better. Coastal criminals have taken to the seas to threaten fishermen, merchants, and boaters in a modern-day Pirates of the Caribbean. Research by Stable Seas found that incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Caribbean increased 200 percent between 2014 and 2019 “largely due to increases in armed robberies at anchorages in Venezuela” where more than half of the incidents occurred. While some of the most brazen attacks received press coverage, such as the murder of the captain of the San Ramon, attacks and kidnapping of fishermen from Trinidad and Tobago are rarely mentioned in US news outlets.

Between the car bombing and attempted assassination in Colombia, the spike in piracy off the coast of Venezuela, and the potential delivery of Iranian arms to Caracas, there is a clear warning: the slow collapse of the Maduro regime has turned Venezuela into a cancer rotting away the security of the Eastern Caribbean. As the Biden Administration charts future US foreign policy in Latin America, it cannot afford to ignore the Venezuela crisis. The continued decaying of the regime’s security apparatus and Venezuelan sovereignty is an inviting opportunity for hostile actors that would further degrade regional security in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Building on Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Bogotá, the United States should maintain close ties with Colombia and continue to work with other countries in the region impacted by the trafficking and migration coming out of Venezuela. The US could also increase coronavirus vaccine donations to countries that have taken on large numbers of Venezuelan refugees and strengthen security cooperation with countries that share land and maritime borders with Venezuela.

Despite Venezuela’s implosion, there is no clear indication that the Maduro regime will fall from power any time soon. While the US should continue to back the Venezuelan opposition forces and push for dialogue, it needs to focus its efforts on limiting outside influence from countries like China, Iran, Cuba, and Russia and shoring up regional partners and allies most affected by Venezuela’s collapse. The apparent Iranian decision to send their vessels to Russia instead of Venezuela or Cuba is evidence that behind-the-scenes pressure can persuade these enablers to step away from Maduro. Other options to push for change in Venezuela, such as bellicose rhetoric, freedom of navigation exercises, and more onerous sanctions, are unlikely to improve security in the region. Instead, the United States should do more to support partners in the region that are most affected by instability in Venezuela in order to mitigate what is already a disaster of hemispheric proportions and which has no end in sight.

A Two-Pronged Approach for Dealing with Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the looming humanitarian threats should be the first order of business for U.S. policy there, another kind of ever-present crisis threatens to make the situation markedly worse in the longer term. If the Biden administration is serious about preventing Afghanistan from becoming an even bigger security threat, they must construct a strategy that better addresses the effects of climate change—not only there but across other flashpoints like Syria and Yemen where intractable conflicts have been exacerbated by environmental stress.

80% of conflicts in Afghanistan are linked to natural resources, and with 60% of Afghans deriving their income from agriculture, the unpredictable and infertile conditions will continue to multiply internal strife and result in greater security threats. Northern regions of Afghanistan, like Kabul, now see snow and glaciers melt earlier and more quickly, flooding fields and irrigation systems, and yielding snowmelt-related droughts in the winter. Northern, central, and southern areas of Afghanistan also experience the impacts of floods, caused by the heavy spring rainfall. Areas where agriculture and pastoralism determine livelihoods have seen precipitation events increase by 10 to 25% since 1990. Both extremes yield poor harvests and spike wheat prices.

For years, the Taliban has taken advantage of this agricultural stress.  The increasingly poor farming conditions and economic pressure had pushed farmers into difficult situations. Thousands relocated to urban areas and left families behind, who became more vulnerable to Taliban influence. The Taliban also recruited farmers as fighters and paid them $5-$10 a day, more than they could earn from farming.

Other intractable conflicts in the Middle East have also been fueled, or even caused, by climate change.

The dual crises in Syria and Yemen show how water insecurity instigates and exacerbates regional instability and humanitarian crises. Between 2006 and 2010, Syria suffered its worst drought in over 900 years. 800,000 Syrians lost their source of income, 1.5 million moved into cities to find work, and the price of bread nearly doubled. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad subsequently reduced fuel and water subsidies, which aggravated ethnic tensions, increased the prices of water and food, and ultimately created the conditions for a devastating civil war.

The conflict had national security implications for the United States, creating the conditions in which ISIS thrived and ultimately resulted in American military intervention in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. More than a decade has passed since the devastating drought and onset of the Syrian Civil War and, today, 60% of the population faces food insecurity, over 600,000 people have been killed, and more than 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country.

As the war dragged on in Syria, the crisis in Yemen simultaneously gained international attention. Before the conflict erupted in 2014, much of the country’s violence was rooted in disputes over resources, especially water. Seven years after its onset, approximately 20.5 million Yemeni people urgently need water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance. As one of the world’s most water-stressed countries, scarce resources have severely compounded the political, economic, and social conflict in Yemen. In conjunction with intensified climate conditions, state and non-state actors continued weaponization of water in Yemen will further inflame the ongoing crisis.

There is no perfect solution to any of these intractable conflicts, but it is clear that climate change has only exacerbated them—and it will continue to do so. The future U.S. strategy to address these conflicts needs to consider the role that climate change has and continues to play. Mitigation of environmental stressors should be considered a security imperative.  At the same time, America’s climate change policies themselves must also recognize and address its impact on these conflicts.

The United States should learn from these humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria and seek to prevent similar security and humanitarian crises in Afghanistan. First, the United States must facilitate a global response to the growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan that addresses across the country. However, over the longer term, US programs must invest in climate mitigation practices across Afghanistan and the Middle East to prepare for the intensified and frequent consequences of climate change – namely conflict and humanitarian disaster. In addition to providing urgent humanitarian aid to protect citizens’ most basic needs, USAID should work with local stakeholders, including farmers, to build more resilient infrastructures that can support citizens in the face of climate change.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates President Biden’s mission to redefine U.S. security policy and pursue new strategic opportunities. However, increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters will fuel intractable conflicts, and the U.S. cannot simply turn away from the instability nor disengage from the region.

The United States needs an approach in the Middle East and Afghanistan that elevates and addresses the implications of climate change through a security lens. This is necessary to both mitigate future conflict and prevent humanitarian crises.

When it Comes to Security in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Climate Change is a Looming Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

Worryingly, not all seem to realize this. On April 15, Ljubljana-based outlet Necenzurirano published a written proposal for wide-ranging border changes in the Western Balkans that had been delivered to Charles Michel, the President of the European Council. While no country has claimed authorship of this unofficial diplomatic document, or ‘non-paper’ in Brussels-speak, many suspect that it came from Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša or a high-level official in his government. The non-paper suggests that the European Union throw its support behind a variety of measures designed to create ethnically homogeneous states in the region, including the unification of Albania and Kosovo as well as the cession of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s primarily Serb and Croat areas to Serbia and Croatia proper.

This is far from the first proposal to redraw Western Balkan borders along ethnic lines.

While the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia during the 1990s sprang from ethnonationalist impulses, the geopolitical patchwork that emerged in its wake does not correspond entirely with the distribution of the region’s various ethnic groups. Western Balkan politicians have therefore periodically advocated for further territorial changes in attempts to realize misguided dreams of ethnically pure nation-states.

The European Union’s persistent opposition to border changes and leveraging of the carrot of EU membership have been key to preventing them thus far. In 2011, for instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that Serbia give up its claims to northern Kosovo if it wished to join the bloc. This ultimately led to an EU-brokered deal in 2013, whereby Belgrade agreed to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty over the territory in exchange for the opening of accession negotiations. So long as countries in the region believe that their eventual path to the European Union hinges on respect for the territorial status quo, Brussels maintains the final say on this crucial issue.

Unfortunately, however, it is unclear how committed the European Union remains to this former red line. After the non-paper first surfaced, Michel’s office failed to immediately condemn its contents. In fact, there was no official EU response to the proposals until the Commission finally came out in opposition more than ten days later. This delay, as well as the proposal’s likely origin from a member state government, suggests significant internal EU disagreement about how to approach Western Balkan territorial issues.

It is not just the European Council that has demonstrated the Union’s softening stance on border changes. When the idea of a Serbia-Kosovo land swap resurfaced again in early 2020, top EU diplomat Josep Borrell refused to publicly state his opposition. Overall, Brussels seems increasingly hesitant to reject the toxic goal of ethnically homogeneous states in the Western Balkans. This trend likely stems from frustration with a perceived lack of progress in the region’s reform agenda in recent years, which has prompted a greater willingness to consider bold, alternative ‘solutions’ (as the non-paper states).

Yet opposition to this ideology should be a no-brainer for a bloc that ostensibly champions liberal values such as diversity and respect for minorities. Indeed, the foundational logic of the European Union as a political project rests on a repudiation of ethnic nationalism and its associated perils. Allowing territorial changes motivated by this outlook in future member states, therefore, represents a betrayal of the European Union’s very raison d’être. Furthermore, changes such as those proposed in the non-paper would lead to a host of dangerous consequences, including the legitimation of Russia’s claims to various territories in its near abroad as well as increased risks for the hundreds of thousands of people who would end up on the “wrong” side of these new ethnically determined borders.

A much more productive course of action would be for the European Union to get serious about promoting reform in the Western Balkan states. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the already precarious condition of democracy and rule of law across the region, casting serious doubt on its countries’ ability to fulfill the political criteria for EU accession in the foreseeable future. Despite its clear geopolitical interest in integrating the Western Balkans as soon as possible, EU engagement in the region has been lacking.

To support societal resilience, Brussels should provide aid to selected independent media outlets and civil society organizations in Western Balkan countries. It should also enthusiastically support the extension of the existing ‘mini-Shengen’ area between Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, to include Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well – this would provide an ideal avenue for enhanced regional cooperation and trust. Finally, the European Union should offer single market access to any country in the region that desires it, providing an achievable interim goal that will encourage Western Balkan governments to continue making the necessary reforms for full EU membership down the line.

Ultimately, the Western Balkans must move beyond the ethnonationalist tensions that have brought the region so much pain in recent decades. While changing borders may seem like an easy fix, it legitimizes the existence of a pernicious ideology while failing to address the root of the problem. A better way forward is to do the hard work of building better societal relations within the region’s states as currently constructed. This is true not only for the Western Balkan countries themselves but for the European Union as well – indeed, if it ever wishes to welcome the region into the fold without losing itself in the process, there is no other option.

Western Balkan Border Changes Must Remain an EU Red Line was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Geopolitically-Fraught Northern Sea Route

In March, the Kremlin published an Arctic decree, paving policy plans for the next fifteen years that focus on the industrialization of the region and its’ military defense. Perhaps the most topical geopolitical approach in the decree is the importance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR decreases the sailing time from China to Europe by 40% compared to traveling through the Suez Canal—making it a popular route for trade. With melting polar ice caps and increasing climate change, the NSR is also becoming more passable than ever.

While Russia views the NSR as an internal waterway, most of the international community does not. This makes the decree’s allotment of responsibility to Rosatom to limit traffic in the NSR from foreign warships without a 45-day notification a clear indication of Russia’s claim in the region. Other states, such as the United States, do not agree with Russia’s claim of sovereignty. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in 2019, “In the Northern Sea Route, Moscow already illegally demands that other nations request permission to pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard foreign ships, and threatens to use military force to sink any that fail to comply.”

Beyond the usage of the NSR waterway, Russia’s military posture in the Arctic demonstrates a clear and present focus on the region for the foreseeable future. With the reopening of 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts, Russia currently emphasizes early warning and defense as its military doctrine. To fulfill this doctrine, Russia has recently tested new capabilities, including hypersonic cruise missiles and nuclear-powered undersea drones. These new capabilities are supported by Russia’s nuclear and non-nuclear icebreaker 40 ship fleet, which is the largest in the world.

Russia’s interests are more than geopolitical—they’re also economic.

Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil company, is currently developing the Zapadno-Irkinsky field and building 2000 km of new long-distance pipelines and 7000 km in local-branch pipelines. They are also building 50 new ice-class tankers, three new airports, and 10 helipads. Their goal is to produce 115 million tons of oil per year by 2030.

Rosneft is also building the Sever terminal and engaging in drilling in the Kara Sea, both of which will be instrumental in NSR shipments. Tourism is also on the rise in the Arctic, with the Russian government incentivizing tourism initiatives in the region.

The Arctic’s importance for Russia cannot be underestimated

With the intersection of economic and geopolitical interests in the region, it is important to not discount the Arctic’s importance within Russia’s grand strategy. In the same way that Russia sees former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia as part of its sphere of influence, the Arctic is to Russia part of its historic geography. For policymakers, this means being cognizant of Arctic policies.

However, the melting Arctic ice leaves Russia stuck between eventual necessary cooperation and growing regional militarization. It is true that the Arctic is critical to Russian policy, but the impacts of climate change will become an issue that Russia cannot solve alone. In other words, climate change will eventually necessitate cooperation amongst states in the region. In all likelihood, however, this cooperation will not take place for some time. For now, the growing militarization of the region will continue for the foreseeable future. Russia’s interest in the region is not going away anytime soon and will actually probably increase over time, leading to increasing claims of economic interest and military defense.

Russian Ambitions in the Arctic: What to Expect was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a chance that Bashar Al Assad is going to depart from his position of power in the near-term. The regime, however, will continue to hold power—the U.S. prefers to maintain the current regime, which has been a long-term American policy. For the United States, the maintenance of the current regime is the only viable solution, which can aid its interests in the future. This dilemma of whether or not to replace the current Syrian regime has been ongoing since the Obama era, where an alternative regime could not be found to replace the existing one. Thus, the Obama administration initiated a covert CIA program to fund the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions in southern and northern-western Syria that the administration deemed to be moderate. The reason for this program was to create a stalemate between the regime and the rebels due to Obama’s stated goal of reducing the presence of U.S. troops in the region as a result of the Bush Administration’s debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. In short, the Obama administration wanted to maintain the regime while preventing it from prevailing over the country.

There is also another reason for upholding the Syrian regime, which benefits both the U.S. and Israel. Over the years, both Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar have utilized a rhetoric of invoking the Golan height lost due to the 1967 war as bolstering the regime’s popularity and the regime’s survival. Thus, it is arguably in the interests of both the U.S. and Israel to preserve a weakened Syrian regime. And Turkey and Russia have been aiding the U.S. plan in Syria for some time now.

When Donald Trump assumed the U.S. presidency, he disputed the efficacy of Obama’s strategy as well as the presence of American troops in Syria. Thus, Trump disregarded the notion of backing rebel groups in Syria, arguing that it would fuel further Islamic extremism. Besides the tensions between the U.S. and Russia, which is standard between adversarial great powers, there has also been much cooperation between the two. Russia has maintained a presence in Syria since Obama’s time to support the Syrian regime and in fighting ISIS. After Obama, President Trump has also coordinated with Russia over the past few years in accelerating the defeat of ISIS through forming a temporary partnership based around counterterrorism—something which Obama could not fully accomplish.

The Trump Administration’s objectives have been based on withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria as much as possible while leaving Russia to back the Assad regime through military force.  Where America has continued to utilize Russia in supporting Assad from the air and simultaneously in defeating ISIS. In reality, however, Russia is not content with being in the region since Syria is not a geopolitical imperative for Russia unlike, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltics; therefore, Russia has remained trapped in Syria.

Russia also hoped that cooperation with the U.S. by getting involved in the Syrian crisis could somehow aid in removing the U.S. and EU sanctions due to its Crimean annexation of 2014. Mike Pence suggested that the administration’s decision on sanctions would depend on whether “we see the kind of changes in posture by Russia and the opportunity perhaps to work on common interests,” including making common cause against the Islamic State. As for the E.U sanctions, they can be removed by the U.S. pressuring the Europeans through applying sanctions on Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which Europe depends on. Although Russia has learned to work around the sanctions, they have continued to pose a considerable amount of pressure on its economic health. Perhaps more importantly, Russia intervened in Syria to convey its material heft to the world, which makes more sense psychologically than strategically. Putin’s ultimate goal has been to show off Russia’s military capabilities and preserve its commercial interests. When Russia sustained an air campaign in Syria for an approximate period of two months, the world was amazed by its military capabilities. Putin is most concerned with the appearance of Russia’s strength.

Thus, Russia cannot withdraw from Syria without achieving some sort of military victory on paper. Otherwise, the whole Syrian intervention would be useless—a scenario that Putin wants to avoid at all costs. By creating a quagmire, America has restrained Russia in Syria to create further complications for Moscow since being in Syria would distract Russia from its primary geopolitical imperatives. This is why the Trump administration did not reject Russia’s presence in Syria after Obama’s departure as it did in comparison to the U.S. funding of rebels and the presence of American troops in Syria.

The justification for both the Trump and Obama administrations to coordinate with Russia is twofold: it enables the U.S. to focus its military power elsewhere, also trapping Russia in Syria, further economically straining the Kremlin. Russia will always remain a foe in America’s eyes and vice versa. Clinton, Bush, Obama all have tried to carve out Russia over the years since America’s policy revolves around Eurasia, and Trump is not so different. The installation of missiles in Poland in 2007, the Withdrawal from the Anti-missile ballistic treaty (ABM) in 2002, which was criticized by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, and NATO. Are are all indicators of the U.S-Russian rivalry, which goes back to 1917, and America has continuously tried to apply a different approach to prevent a rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia. The overall policy remains the same, but the styles and means of carrying out that will continue to change—successive presidents will employ different strategies in executing the same policy.

Russia’s role in Syria really demonstrates the United States’ paramount power: it wields a significant amount of influence in the Middle East despite the fact that U.S. relative power is diminishing. Putin thought that Syria would be a simple mission, which would help to restore Russia’s great power image, but reality begs to differ. So far, Russia has revolved around American policies within Syria, which is quite embarrassing for a self-described great power. This is because the Middle East remains within America’s sphere of influence, not Russia’s.

Turkey’s role strictly orbits around America’s policy towards Syria. Just days after the U.S. envoy for Syria arrived at Ankara in December 2018, Turkish President Erdoğan announced a Turkish incursion within northern Syrian. However, this was a massive blow to the Kurdish fighters in Syria- American allies. During the same month, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Robertson stated that any unilateral action within northeast Syria was “unacceptable”. This statement was released since the Turkish intervention would affect the U.S. relationship with its Kurdish partners, which Turkey planned on targeting. Following the Pentagon’s statement, Turkey paused its new military operation in northeast Syria as it found itself trapped between two conflicting views emerging in Washington. After the dispute was settled in Washington, a few days later, the Turkish president then announced the continuation of the military operation in northeast Syria. Erdoğan and Trump spoke by phone and agreed to ensure “more effective coordination” between their countries’ military operations in Syria. These events indicate that Turkey is broadly abiding by American policies.

When Trump decided for the second time in 2019 to withdraw more U.S. troops from Syria, it left Kurdish fighters in Syria even more exposed to Turkish military assaults. Why would the U.S. betray its allies in such a manner? The reason for the withdrawal was to help the Assad-regime regain its grip on the country, where it left the Kurds with no other alternative except to surrender and return to Assad, and once again come under his regime’s control. There was no other rational option that the Kurds could have pursued to maintain their survival. Thus, the withdrawal of U.S. troops has brought the U.S. plan one step closer to fruition, which is preserving the Syrian regime in a weakened state. James Jeffrey stated, “we want to have cooperation with Turkey across the board on all Syrian issues. He further pointed out that the Kurds were always a tactical maneuver in Syria.

Turkey has aided the U.S. plan for Syria by fighting ISIS and forcing Kurdish fighters to align themselves with the Assad regime. In early March of 2020, the Turkish shelling of the Russian-backed Assad regime forces left the regime vulnerable—having failed to protect their frontline against repeated Turkish and rebel assaults. However, Russia was unwilling to respond to Turkey’s actions. A week later, Russia and Turkey reached a cease-fire in Idlib province, which was subsequently violated by the Assad regime within 15 minutes of implementation. Moreover, Erdoğan warned a month later that Damascus would suffer “heavy losses” if it continued to violate the cease-fire, where the Syrian regime was using the novel coronavirus as a pretext to yet-again renege on the agreement.

Both Russia and Turkey have played a role in supporting U.S. policy in Syria, which is to preserve—in a weakened state—the Assad regime. Thus, Russia has allowed the Syrian regime’s hatred for the Turkish to manifest into military action, which would result in Turkey retaliating through its military assaults on the regime’s land forces, which would result in weakening the regime even further than it already is. As Russia helped the regime regain back most of the territory in Syria, it had simultaneously allowed occasional Turkish assaults on Syrian forces. This illustrates that both powers—Turkey and Russia—are working (wittingly or unwittingly) to achieve the U.S. plan in Syria- even though both sides have displayed animosity towards each other, but has not got in the way of supporting the U.S. America is able to achieve all this since the international system is based upon U.S. hegemony.

The American Plan for Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

This tough stance may seem puzzling. For one thing, Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), having a Taiwan-centered orientation, has historically been far less keen than the Kuomintang (KMT) to press on issues of ROC territorial claims outside of Taiwan proper, as these are widely seen as a holdover from the era of Republican China. For this same reason, Tsai has been perceived as being more amenable to developing deeper Taiwan-Japan ties, especially in such areas as security cooperation and trade relations—this latter would help both countries avoid keeping too many eggs in the China basket.

Likewise, from the Japanese perspective, there has been an embrace of—and high hopes for—the Tsai administration, as it promised an end to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-friendly policies.

In short: Taiwan and Japan make natural allies in a region and an era marked by an increasingly aggressive China. Why, then, Taiwan’s tough talk on the Senkakus, an issue which few Taiwanese people care about?

Earlier this month, the Executive Yuan—the executive branch of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—promulgated the island’s first-ever marine policy white paper on June 4, 2020. This move came at a time when the maritime security environment in the East and South China seas is becoming increasingly volatile as a result of China aggressively pressing its territorial claims in these bodies of water. The document has as its primary goal to provide consistent guidelines to government departments for implementing the sustainable development of ocean-related policies. According to the head of the ROC Ocean Affairs Council, the idea behind the white paper is to transform Taiwan into a “marine country,” and one that is “ecological, safe, and prosperous.”

The white paper is the result of the framework for the country’s ocean management, as approved by the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s Congress) in November 2019. The “basic act for ocean affairs,” as it is called, is another attempt to integrate all government agencies that are stakeholders in marine and maritime issues.

The efforts of the administration of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen to implement more coherent and coordinated ocean policies could not be timelier. Taiwan is an island, and it is surrounded by waters that are especially turbulent, from a geopolitical perspective. Moreover, for too long, the ROC government has paid short shrift to its littoral holdings, being reticent to conceive of itself as a maritime power. But an island nation it is, and it is about time that the DPP administration acknowledges this with its actions.

The paper U.S. Strategic Mobility in Deployment to Ensure Regional Security, written by Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a senior researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, affirmed Taiwan’s status as a nation with a stake in the events that transpire in the East and South China seas. Su pointed out that the PRC has been effective in leveraging the COVID-19 global pandemic to beef up Chinese power-projection capabilities, in the South China Sea and surrounding maritime areas, due in part to the reduced presence of the U.S. Navy. He also asserted that the instability has had a deleterious effect on key navigation channels such as the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, as well as the East China Sea.

What Su did not take into account was domestic inertia and party rivalry: That the task of coordinating and integrating the many national and local marine agencies in Taiwan, and overcoming the inter-party conflicts over maritime ideologies, may be more daunting than facing the geopolitical maritime perils that await them offshore. These two elements have long been roadblocks preventing Taiwan from being able to respond adequately to its urgent marine and maritime challenges.

In terms of coordination, the ocean-related matters in Taiwan involve at least 15 different agencies—some of whose jurisdictions overlap—ranging from technical departments to a general ministry, and from agencies that are directly involved with maritime issues to those for which ocean-related matters are only peripheral.

The main consequence of the difference in scope, focus, and structure of these government agencies—as well as the destructive yet inevitable inter-agency rivalries that tend to emerge in bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities—has been an inability to coordinate actions effectively. This makes it difficult to build up the momentum for the kind of change that is needed in order to remedy the above problems, making the proper administration of maritime affairs a difficult task.

Until now, nothing related to the marine or maritime policies in Taiwan has been integrated. Instead, there has been a patchwork of policies promulgated by a plethora of departments, each with its own marine-related area of oversight. Fishery issues are dealt with by the fishery agency, for example, and shipping issues, with the shipping agencies, and so on, until the proverbial right-hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.

Part of the reason for the different governing paradigms in Taiwan is that some sectors within the Pan-Blue camp (to wit: the KMT) still possess an outdated terrestrial or land-oriented mentality, inherited from the Chinese tradition from which this party evolved. This terrestrial mentality, however, also tends to make the KMT more assertive in terms of territory, as they see it essentially from the sovereignty perspective. It was under KMT leadership that the ROC laid the foundation for the modern Chinese maritime claims (adopted almost entirely by the PRC, interestingly). Thus, the PRC’s adherence to the U-shaped nine-dash line, originally published by the ROC in December of 1947. In this view, defense of the territorial claims in the area encompassed by this line is a natural position, and anything otherwise would be politically impracticable and ideologically contradictory.

On the other hand, the Pan-Green Camp, led by the DPP, tends to take the opposite tack. First, it prefers to focus on environmental questions, as this fits well with the DPP’s idea of being a friendly stakeholder in the disputes, given that the environmental protection discourse tends to have few opponents among the other claimants due to its nature as an issue of collective interests.

Finally, in diverting from the territorial-sovereignty discourse, the DPP intends to bring Western powers onside, by positioning its claims under the UNCLOS umbrella. Moreover, it will try to keep its distance from any mention of the U-shaped line map for two reasons: First, this presupposes a Chinese territorial centered view of the disputes, adoption of which would make the DPP undistinguishable from the KMT (and the PRC, for that matter). Second, the nine-dashed line map defense is not feasible under the UNCLOS perspective and would be perceived as extremely aggressive by the international community. These do not contribute to the way the DPP must position itself.

Therefore, the challenge of integrating ROC government departments and coordinating a coherent maritime policy is not a simple one. Whatever the effectiveness of the white paper presented by the Executive Yuan this year might bring in terms of day-to-day maritime and marine operations, a modus vivendi must be found between the Blues and the Greens. From this perspective, the Tsai administration’s tough talk on the Japanese redesignation of the Senkaku Islands may be interpreted as an olive branch to the Pan-Blue coalition—both politically, and to the many civil servants serving in the relevant ministries and departments who are known to have blue-leaning sympathies—in order to secure buy-in for this project.

If Tsai fails to find such common ground, then any of the eventual gains accrued from the current administration will be thrown away, just as both parties have done to each other every other time that a transition of power has taken place. The stakes are too high for the Taiwanese people to accept this outcome.

Confronting Japan to Defend Against China: Senkaku as a Case Study in Taiwan’s Politics was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Core Assumptions of Liberalism

At its base level, liberalism emphasizes inalienable rights and individuality. From this baseline, thinkers have developed theories and ideas about how these rights should be manifested. The conclusion is at the crux of whether liberalism acts as an expansionist ideology or not. Although one could trace liberalism quite far back in historical political thought, John Locke acts as a cornerstone of the philosophy. Importantly, Locke lays the groundwork in Two Treaties of Government that all men are in “a state of perfect freedom,” that is to say, that humans have natural or inalienable rights.¹

Although different thinkers have come to different conclusions of the type of liberalism that is dominant. In the American case, which will be the primary subject for the remainder of this piece, progressive liberalism and its emphasis on positive rights is the only dominant strand. According to John Mearsheimer in The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, this is true for three reasons: The Industrial Revolution, nationalism, and modern peacetime militaries.² Since the United States is the sole world superpower and also subscribes to modern liberalism, the next section will explore how those two characteristics make liberalism incredibly expansionist in its aims.

Liberalism is Inherently Expansionist

To first explain why liberalism is inherently expansionist, one must understand how important the concept of inalienable rights is too liberal thinkers. It is through this understanding that the other layers form. If one believes, as liberals do, in inalienable rights, it means that everyone in the world has the same inherent set of rights. This is so important to internalize as a concept because of what this belief drives a country to do. For instance, if the fundamental principle is that each human has the same rights, then there is inevitably a duty to ensure that these rights are protected.  It is from this duty that humans feel a calling, and eventually, a nation-state can be provoked to meddle.

The American view of liberalism and its focus on positive rights results in social engineering. Social engineering manifests itself through policies aimed at leveling the playing field. On the domestic side, an example of this would be affirmative action. This policy manipulates the playing field in order to give a group who is historically disadvantaged a fairer opportunity. This is done at the expense of negative rights. Since people within a nation have more in common with each other than they do with people of other nations, it is possible to agree on foundational rights within the confines of one’s borders. For example, in the United States, the Bill of Rights is mostly noncontroversial. However, since each nation-state has its own identity, agreeing on foundational rights between states, or worse, globally is all but impossible. However, many liberals feel confident that they can project positive rights aboard. It is from this confidence that nation-states begin to feel obligated to intervene in places that rights are threatened.

Even though a desire to meddle and optimism of success is in the DNA of liberal internationalists, they frequently lack the number one characteristic needed for liberal hegemonic pursuit, unipolarity. For most of the modern world, the globe existed with multiple superpowers. In a world with more than one superpower, countries’ foreign policies were preoccupied with survival. Since there is not a global state, the nation-state is the highest level of authority. In a multipolar world, nation-states are required to operate using a realist strategy. This strategy forces countries to balance, position, and align themselves in a rational way. However, in 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself without a rival. This unipolar world gave the liberal United States the rare opportunity to pursue any foreign policy strategy they wanted without fear of attack or significant pushback.

Thus far, it has been established that liberal internationalists believe in global inalienable rights and that these rights are positive in nature thus requiring social engineering. Further, they have profound confidence in their own ability to execute global social engineering. Now, as the lone global power, the United States is unencumbered in its choice of foreign policy strategy. With all of this in place, according to liberal logic, one has the duty to protect and enforce the rights of others. From this duty, the next question is how is this accomplished? Despite the liberal internationalist fascination with international organizations, it is interesting that the policies of those institutions mirror that of the dominant state. With the United States being that state, the United Nations and NATO have taken their lead in liberal projection and have acted as a puppet organization.

By the logic presented, it is unreasonable not to promote rights abroad if able. Now that the United States is able, that is exactly what they have done. Also, as established above, international organizations are part of the bedrock of liberal internationalism. It is through the ruse of these organizations that the United States can act under the veil of legitimacy. With these two pillars, the United States the state, and the United States the United Nations, numerous interventions have been waged, and there is no logical conclusion, with the exception of the emergence of another superpower. As the unipolar power, the United States not only has tried to liberalize several countries as the dominant front but has also led non-U.S. participant resolutions in the U.N. which started violent interventions. An example of this is the AMISOM run intervention in Somalia. While the United States is not a direct participant, they fronted and legitimized this effort using the international community.³

It’s illogical for liberalism as a foreign policy to be non-expansionist and has proven itself to be very expansionist. If inalienable rights are real, then how can a liberal internationalist not protect those rights abroad, even if it is through violence. It is from this paradox that one should understand that despite the peaceful façade, liberalism as a foreign policy is not only inherently expansionist but innately violent.

Arguments Against Liberalism Being Expansionist

Logic supports the understanding that liberalism as foreign policy is expansionist and violent, but some clearly don’t believe this. The proponents of liberal internationalism do so for three main reasons: democratic peace theory, economic interdependence theory, and liberal institutionalism. If these theories are true, then liberal internationalism is not only the peaceful approach to foreign policy but ultimately non-expansionist, at least in the militaristic sense.⁴

Democratic peace theory is the idea that democracies do not go to war with each other. Therefore, it stands to reason the more democracies in the world would lead to less conflict. While not 100-percent true, this theory is mostly true. It is also assumed through this theory that as liberal democracies spread, it will be contagious, and more countries will join up. Further, despite liberal democracies not often fighting each other, they frequently wage wars against both non-democracies and illiberal democracies. Even if the theory was factually and theoretically true, the act of spreading democracy in the first place requires intervention. Autocrats typically don’t yield their authority from stern warnings or even sanctions. In addition to the expansionist beginnings of the democratic peace theory, there is reason to believe that even with military defeat, nation-states are not hardwired to desire liberal democracy. For reasons beyond the scope of this piece nationalism and rational choice trump democracy in most cases.

Economic interdependence theory’s core assumption is that when two countries are economically tied, they do not fight. This theory is being played out in the modern world through the correlation of globalization and the decline of interstate wars. This theory is based on logic and observations but again misses one of the core tenants of the global landscape and that is security always trumps economics. From this, it stands to reason that security concerns, for instance, a rising China, combined with nationalism and political autonomy make economic interdependence theory a level of protection against interventions but not a shield from it. Further, in the liberal’s playbook, rights are at the center. These inalienable rights would always be protected above economic cohesion.

The final idea promoted by liberals to support their peaceful internationalist pedigree is the idea of liberal institutionalism. This argument rests on the idea that states that join international institutions more often cooperate with one another. Again, on the surface this makes sense, and likely often does work. For instance, nation-states who have a platform to discuss issues would likely be less inclined to choose violence. Unfortunately, despite liberalism’s reliance on tolerance, they remain intolerant of non-liberals. For example, Rawls in Law of Peoples makes the claim that countries that are not tolerant of liberal nations are subject to violent intervention.⁵ This furthers the above theme that even though liberal nations in organizations may fight less, it is still on the liberal state to intervene and violently force the illiberal state to conform.

So what?

Even if all the liberal theories are correct, and a world full of liberal democracies would be the one Francis Fukuyama in The End of History suggests, expansionist efforts would be needed to achieve those goals.⁶ So long as inalienable rights are at the core of the liberal project, and the world is made up of nation-states, it is inevitable that liberal internationalism will be interventionist and expansionist in nature.  Further, so long as nationalism and realism are present in the world, host countries will fight to avoid this aggressive pursuit of international social engineering.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not reflect the views and policies of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or the U.S. Air Force.

¹ Locke, John. Two Treaties of Government : In the Former, the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and His Followers Are Detected and Overthrown, the Latter Is an Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government. Making of the Modern Economy Digital Collection. London: Printed for Awnsham and John Churchill …, 1698.

² Mearsheimer, John J. Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. S.l.: Yale University Press, 2019.

³ Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition- Building,” International Security 43.4 (2019).

⁴ These reasons and arguments are based heavily on those found in Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities

⁵ Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples ; With, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, Summer 1989.

Liberal Internationalism, an Ideology of Violence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The spread of the virus caught the U.S flatfooted and disoriented as Washington found itself with no capacity to contain the virus effectively nor willingness to lead a unified front of the leading nations to blunt the crisis.  The lack of U.S leadership to call countries to act, to set the agenda and to chart a path beyond the point of crisis, raised doubts about its role in the world and opened the way for China and Russia to cast themselves as the new leaders filling the shoes of the United States.

The public health crisis laid bare the limits of international organizations and global institutional frameworks as they seem to be watching from the sidelines. By downplaying the severity of the novel coronavirus and delaying the declaration of a worldwide health emergency for two months, not to mention Beijing’s growing influence on its decision making, the WHO failed its core mission to alert the international community about the COVD-19 and its possible ramifications, contributed to the ongoing crisis. In parallel, the inaction of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to organize a response to the global pandemic further undermined the legitimacy of the world’s highest deliberative body.

Furthermore, the crisis has exposed the structural deficiencies of the European Union. As healthcare (in addition to national security, terrorism, and fiscal policies) remains the responsibility of national governments, so Brussels no capacity nor authority to lead an organized response, conceding to the member states to take the lead on the issue. Moreover, the combination of the pandemic, the economic implications of the crisis and the continued failures of member states to agree on recovery programs, could also conspire to reverse the gains that the European project has made in the last few decades and radically shift the European political landscape.

Meanwhile, in the face of global institutional paralysis, the nation-state reasserted itself. This has been particularly evident in the EU, where the virus accentuated the existing distrust between the EU members and revealed deep-seated structural weaknesses of the Post-Westphalian frameworks. As the member states, closed down borders, refused to aid one another and focused on distinct crisis management methods, they revealed their deep-seated Hobbesian selfishness, undermined intra-European solidarity and increased the sense of coming apart while reinforcing the sense of the indispensability of the nation-state for expertise, control, and assurance.

The absence of the U.S. leadership and the disorganization and preoccupation of its European allies with their domestic health crises has disabled NATO’s ability to function effectively and act decisively against the pandemic. NATO’s inexperience to deal with such a challenge, led some members even to signal that the virus was not something they needed to act upon. However, the fast spread of the coronavirus made a crippling impact on the U.S. naval activities and NATO military exercises. The spread of COVD19 on the USS Theodore Roosevelt paralyzed, albeit not operating under the auspice of NATO, an American aircraft carrier, the first time since World War Two. NATO was forced to scrap its largest military exercise, DEFENDER-Europe20. Furthermore, several other exercises linked to DEFENDER-Europe20, including and not limited to the Dynamic Front, the Joint Warfighting Assessment, and the Saber Strike and SwiftResponse have been postponed as well, underscoring the fragility of NATO’s military operations and deterrence posture in Europe while questioning its credibility and purpose again.

The global pandemic intensified and accelerated the global great power rivalry as Beijing and Moscow have moved quickly and effectively to take advantage of the openings created by the U.S. retrenchment and inward-looking policies to fill the void of  Washington’s global leadership. Although both China and Russia are revisionist powers by nature, and both are trying to weaken the U.S., their objectives and visions of the world order differ markedly. While Russia intends to undermine the current international order, China is seeking global leadership within the order.

China intends to cast itself as a global savior. It wants to tout its authoritarianism as the key and decisive factor in defeating the pandemic while chipping away at the U.S. dominant status. With massive lockdowns, the imposition of electronic surveillance measures, and the arrests of those who may have exposed its deficiencies, Beijing managed to put this fast-spreading virus under control, striving to create a strong case for authoritarian rule. As Beijing dispatched the bulk of masks, ventilators, respirators, protective suits, test kits, and medical workers to Europe, China tried to boost its role and international status as well as advertise the efficiency, effectiveness, and indispensability of its authoritarian model. In parallel, Beijing organized and led international forums, videoconferences, and panel discussions to highlight, publicize and politicize its policy decisions while attempting to displace the U.S. as the world’s first responder, the global crisis manager, and the world role model.

Russia did not let a good crisis to go waste either as it unleashed a barrage of disinformation campaigns aiming at on the one hand to sow distrust and discord in the West, and on the other to burnish its tainted image, portraying itself as a good neighbor willing to assist all countries in dire need of support. Pro-Kremlin media outlets accused a Harvard professor of creating the COVID19 and blamed the U.S. army for disseminating it. In the same vein, the Kremlin sent medical equipment, health responders and other forms of medical aid to European countries not to assist the virus stricken states, but to aggravate public health calamity, undermining public trust in the healthcare systems, the local governments, and democratic institutions. Moreover, Russia shipped medical gear to New York to undermine the U.S. role as a leading health care provider and to showcase Russia’s clout.

The U.S. Can’t Afford to Lose its Leadership Role

The United States could have galvanized allies, partners, and even competitors into action against the pandemic and avoided the global authoritarian pushback as the U.S. has extensive experience in mobilizing broad coalitions to address challenges to similar nature. The U.S. led all-out efforts to contain the spread of infectious outbreaks in the early 2000s. Both President Bush and Obama successfully employed the G-20 to contain the spread of HIV and Ebola outbreaks. In 2003, George W. Bush mobilized around $90 billion, the largest amount of money ever committed by any nation to a single disease, for his emergency program to ensure HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention, and research, saving over 17 million lives. While rallying the UN Security Council (UNSC) behind his plan and assembling thousands of medical workers, Barak Obama deployed the 2,800 troops in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to detect, contain, and eliminate Ebola.

An international order strained by the virus had already faced challenges more significant than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian states such as China and Russia have been threatening to undermine the Liberal World Order that has subdued great power conflicts and kept global peace in the last few decades. In Asia, Africa, and a vast swath of Europe, China has been expanding its clout and trying to control a considerable share of global commerce flows. While invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and attacked Eastern Ukraine, Russia carved out a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space and created the first major crack in the international security architecture. With supporting Bashar al Assad in Syria, backing Iran and alienating Egypt and Turkey from the United States, Moscow increased its influence in the Middle East and challenged the U.S.  unipolar moment in the region. Moreover, Russia’s hybrid attacks on the West that includes and not limited to disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks threaten the cohesion and legitimacy of the Western political establishments while making Russian narratives effective factors in shaping attitudes, public opinions, and false perceptions in Western societies.

Considering visible authoritarian pushback, the United States can’t afford to give up its global role as its disengagement would far outweigh its costs. It would weaken NATO, undermine the EU and deepen Moscow/Beijing tandem’s bilateral ties with individual nation-states in Europe while helping mushroom authoritarian regimes across the old continent. In parallel, the re-assertiveness of the nation-state coupled with the increasing nationalism, growing inequality, and economic recession could also play into the hands of the revisionist powers and lead to the unprecedented social and geopolitical ruptures in Europe. Consequently, the growing political divergence, division or fragmentation of the EU in any sort, could shatter the European project, the cornerstone of the U.S. international security architecture and precipitate the final collapse of the world America made.

Given the growing dangers of the great power rivalry and ongoing power shift to the East, both sides of the Atlantic need to be reminded of what is at stake here, as the survival of the Liberal World Order as we know it lies in the strength and unity of the transatlantic community. Thus, U.S. engagement and leadership can make an enormous difference over how the world could look like the 2020s and 2030s. Washington’s passive role will be dangerous. U.S. isolation and retrenchment in the 1930s created a breeding ground for Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and imperialist Japan, inviting the most destructive conflict in history.

The U.S. engagement and commitment to its allies after World War Two, spearheaded by the Marshal Plan, laid the groundwork for strong NATO, the prosperous European Community, and final victory over the Soviet Empire. The newly emerged the Liberal World Order, after the collapse of the communist bloc in the1990s, led by the United States, benefited billions of people around the world. It helped Europe thrive, raised the standard of living, lifted billions out of poverty, brought unprecedented economic prosperity, opened political systems, and kept the world a peaceful place.

Thus, none of this would have been possible without the U.S. strong global leadership and willingness to work closely with allies and partners through NATO, the EU, and other global and regional international frameworks. The pandemic has shown how interdependent and integrated the world has become in the last three decades. Considering the global trends such as the revolutions in the communication and information technology as well as dramatic changes in population, resources, economics, governance, and security, not to mention “the rise of the rest,”  any radical shift towards isolation or autarchy would have devastating effects on social, cultural, political, economic and military aspects of the West.  To meet and overcome these challenges, the United States needs to call into action not only allies and partners, but leaders in business and civil societies to coordinate their actions. Notably, the U.S. needs to think more comprehensively about NATO-EU strategic partnership and invest more in their approximation efforts as the cooperation between the two will be vital in determining the winners and losers as well as shape and characteristics of the Post-COVID world.

Will the United States Lead the Post-COVID World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The year 2014 can be singled out for its significance due to the timing of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. However, this momentous event is itself simply a response to an earlier, though unwavering, Russian foreign policy. That is to say that Moscow’s desire to maintain close ties and heavy economic integration with Kyiv is due to two fundamental objectives of the Kremlin. The first is the establishment of a viable Eurasian Economic Union and the second is the implementation of a multipolar world order. While these two goals are to a great extent inseparable, it is vital to first acknowledge that each is rooted in several years of consistent policy.

The Eurasian Economic Union, a supranational organization that serves as a common market for several former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, emerged out of the consequences of the 2008 economic crash. In 2007, Russia’s GDP grew by an astounding 8.5% yet in 2009 it contracted by 7.8%. The establishment of an economic union would serve Russian interests by preserving existing markets and making it more immune from foreign encroachment. While the idea had been around since 2008, concrete policy proposals began taking form as early as 2012 following then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he would be campaigning in the next Russian presidential election. When viewed through a historical lens, it becomes clear this idea did not merely incidentally come about shortly before 2014 but rather has a deep running history. The historian Serhii Plokhy, for example, points to the fact that not only did Boris Yeltsin’s foreign minister and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov hold similar aspirations for the Commonwealth of Independent States in the 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union but that the Eurasianist sentiments were held as early as the 1920s by Russian emigreés only for them to be revived in the post-Soviet era by neo-Eurasianists such as Aleksandr Dugin.

The Eurasian Economic Union also serves Russian foreign policy as a counterweight to the augmenting influence of the European Union in former Soviet republics. In order to understand Russia’s exertion of its will in 2014, it is imperative to note that in 2013 the European Union was increasingly forcing some of Russia’s neighboring states to essentially choose between Moscow and Brussels. However, even some of this dates back even earlier. For example, in 2009, the European Union had proposed “Eastern Partnership” to six former Soviet republics while Putin, copying Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a “Common European Home,” had counterproposed with a “Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” The radical shift in 2014 in Russia’s relationship with Ukraine can be partially attributed to the European Union’s rejection of Russia’s earlier efforts of preserving its involvement in future EU-Ukraine negotiations as well as having Ukraine be associated with both Unions with Putin later noting ‘They just slammed the door in our face telling us to mind our own business.”

Notions of transnational bonds, though manifested most clearly in Crimea, is by absolutely no means unique. What changed, rather, was the ability to implement policies to such an effect. In September 2013, Putin famously declared that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” claiming this “because we have the same Kyivan baptismal font in the Dnieper; we certainly have common historical roots and common fates; we have a common religion, a common faith; we have a very similar culture, languages, traditions, and mentality.” Though this can be interpreted as an opportunistically timed statement, it does reflect long-held attitudes among the Russian populace. While in 2015 only a mere 18% of Russian citizens supported the revision of the nation’s borders and the absorption of contiguous territories, which can be primarily attributed to the high cost both in lives and finances of the war in the Donbas, in 1998 this figure stood at 75%.

As such, when analyzing pre-2014, Crimean annexation, and post-2014 attitudes, there is a consistent ideological underpinning to Russian foreign policy that is altered by practical circumstances, whether it be the economic decline of the 1990s or war-weariness. The year 2014, in a sense, represents a culmination of capacity building, which explains why by the end of March 2014 (after Crimean annexation), Putin’s approval ratings increased by 19 points and reached 80%, the single largest jump for him ever. This growing capability, which was largely non-existent during Putin’s first two terms as president, can be ascribed to a changing economic landscape in the aftermath of 2008. According to professor of economics Steven Rosefielde, this is largely due to the growing dependency on the state by big business following the economic collapse. As such, military procurement strategy pursued over the course of several years became applicable abroad in 2014 and 2015.

Russian foreign policy post-2014 needs to be placed in a context of relative power disparity between Moscow and the West. This can be subdivided into two spheres: Europe and the rest of the world. NATO’s eastward expansion and gradual encroachment during the 1990s and throughout the 2000s was carried out largely unimpeded but without Russian support. To some degree, this growing hostility due to NATO’s policy of incorporating former Warsaw Pact members into its military alliance was anticipated. George F. Kennan, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, even lamented it in an interview with a New York Times columnist as early as 1998 when he said that “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.”

Domestic sentiments that Russia was being treated as a second-rate power can also be credited to a series of western unilateral actions that took place over several years long before 2014. Among these include the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 as well as the United States’ cancellation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Putin’s February 2007 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy can be seen as an early indicator of the Russian rejection of an American unipolar world when he pronounced that “Millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling together under the slogan ‘you’re either with us or against us.’” Similarly, Putin penned a New York Times op-ed in 2012, which warned that a US military strike against Syria would “unleash a new wave of terrorism” and “could throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance.”

Developments outside of Europe did also play a role in forming Russian foreign policy and can aid in analyzing why a particular path was chosen. One example is the Kremlin’s policy towards Libya, which might suggest an inconsistent approach but illuminates the larger arc that describes the state’s worldview. Then-President Dmitri Medvedev’s decision in March 2011 to abstain from the United Nations Security Council’s vote on Resolution 1973, which authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, itself represents an aberration and deviation from Russia’s general position of opposing western involvement in a country’s internal affair. However, when we viewed together with Prime Minister Putin’s public rebuke of Medvedev and comparing the intervention to “a medieval summons to a crusade when someone would call someone to go to a particular place and liberate something” suggests that a Putin-led foreign policy has generally been consistent on the role of western military involvement long before 2014. Additionally, the lessons of Libya from 2011, i.e. the effects of regime change in the Arab world, is like to have played a role in informing the Kremlin’s attitude towards its policy in Syria.

Though it might be alluring to view Russian foreign policy through a single framework with a preset formula with the benefit of hindsight, which would make analyzing it easier, neither policymakers nor historians ought to overlook the role of short-term tactical moves. Paul J. Saunders, then-executive director of the Washington Post, put the blame of the August 2008 war on Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili and that Russia was simply reacting to escalating violence following Saakashivili’s provocations. Similar political-realist arguments were made following Crimea, such as John Mearsheimer’s Foreign Affairs essay “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” These claims are also subject to criticism, however, with Gerard Toal crucially highlighting “Why fear of NATO encroachment in 2008 or EU encroachment in 2014 triggered wars, but did not result in wars in 2004—when NATO expansion incorporated the former Soviet Baltic Republics—needs explanation.” However, when coupled with ongoing capacity building, one can more clearly see why there was an apparent shift in 2014 while the same attitudes and policy goals were held both before and after.

Short-termism in Russian foreign policy is particularly visible in cases where sustained positions are augmented by new tactics. A striking example is that of Syria. The year 2015, or even the years leading up to it, saw no discernable difference in the Kremlin’s desire to maintain the territorial integrity and structural security of the Syrian state. However, that year saw a noticeable change in methodology, namely through direct military intervention in the war in Syria. At its root, it was a response to the rebel advances in the first half of 2015, such as rebels capturing Idlib on 28 March 2015, Iraqi Shia militiamen leaving the country in 2014, Turkish-Saudi rapprochement, the fall of Palmyra to ISIS in May 2015, as well as the creation of Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) with seven armed groups including al-Nusra.

Though the decision was largely unexpected, the underlying motives were by no means new and is reflected in wider Russian foreign and domestic policy that has been active throughout the Putin era. One of the earliest challenges that faces Putin upon becoming president was the danger of jihadi movements in the Caucasus, which had become increasingly internationalized. Fears of Islamic radicalization in Russia in case of a jihadi victory in Syria, with 14% of the population of Russia being Muslim, and the fact that Russian speaking foreign fighters were among the most effective jihadis in Syria illustrates that from a wider historical viewpoint, the seemingly new action fit coherently within a longer policy development cycle.

The hybrid nature of Russian foreign policy thinking, consisting of both long term attitudes alongside with short term reactions, can be seen in the case of alleged electoral interference abroad. This can be seen particularly clearly when zooming in on Russo-American relations on this issue. The KGB’s Department for Active Measures was set in 1958 with it being at its most active internationally during the time when Putin was working for them. To a certain extent, Putin was a product of the Andropov KGB. Additionally, for a historian to analyze foreign policy effectively, it is necessary to contextualize this in a bilateral setting, which includes American involvement in the form of advisors in the Russian presidential election of 1996 in which President Boris Yeltsin was reelected.

The years immediately leading up to 2014 suggest a change in method but not necessarily of policy. Traditionally, the Kremlin had focused its efforts on traditional media, such as television and newspaper, but the Medvedev presidency was arguably the first to take a major interest in the internet. This included visits by him to Silicon Valley, where he met Steve Jobs and Eric Schmidt among others, as well as created his own official Facebook page. The use of the internet as a tool for foreign policy, like other actions, was to some degree a mirroring and retaliatory step. As early as May 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton started a “21st-century diplomacy” initiative at the State Department, which was intended to assist civil society groups who were trying to change politics through the internet. This manifested itself in a practical sense in different ways, such as when in April 2009 the State Department requested that Twitter delay its maintenance work in order to enable protestors in Iran to continue using the service while subsequently increasing grant funding groups in the Middle East and North Africa region. Putin’s belief that anti-government demonstrations in December 2011 were instigated by Secretary Clinton suggests that there was a clear and direct line in terms of his thinking for years between his second premiership and the American presidential election of 2016.

One way to understand Russian foreign policy since 2014 is to analyze intensity and scale as opposed to policy objectives themselves. That is to say that in many areas recent years have borne witness to greater efforts while not fundamentally changing the policies themselves. Russo-Saudi relations, for example, emerges as a clear case of this. While the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia did not have formal diplomatic ties, the 2000s saw early efforts at establishing better relations. In 2007, Putin became the first Russian leader to visit the kingdom, which did result in the signing of several commercial agreements. To a considerable degree, what might be perceived as improving Russian-Saudi ties following the Arab Spring of 2011 is a by-product of worsening US-Saudi ties. Disappointment in President Barack Obama abandoning Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and allowing for the Muslim Brotherhood (viewed as a terrorist organization by Saudis) to take the presidency, perceived American weakness in trying to oust President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, along with growing suspicions over negotiations between Washington and Tehran over nuclear deal all contributed to an environment in which Russian-Saudi relations could improve.

One manner to analyze developments would be to take a chronological approach, which understands changes as being informed by a chain reaction even if not directly related to its cause in the first place. Growing isolation in the West following the annexation of Crimea produced a cascading effect in which Russian foreign policy became increasingly defined by its efforts to become more engaged elsewhere. This could explain improving Sino-Russian ties, which stand in contrast to the notably cold ties relations during the Cold War. Following the implementation of western sanctions, Russia has become increasingly supportive of Chinese conduct in the South China Sea, which has been reciprocated by Chinese approval of Russian involvement in the war in Syria. This latter policy has been reinforced by Chinese fears of the participation of Chinese nationals, particular Uyghurs, among Islamist ranks. As such, it is necessary to also incorporate driving factors in the foreign policy decisions of other nations, to which Russia is often seizing the opportunity rather than defining.

Viewing foreign policy as an extension, if not a by-product, of domestic politics is one manner in which to understand the Kremlin’s international behavior. Similar to the sudden growth in support for Putin after annexing Crimea, other actions have likewise seen the integration of the domestic and the international. At times, this can be identified in certain demographics or sectors of society. While the war in Syria has largely been centered on the notion of preserving the Syrian state as well as combatting jihadism, it has increasingly drawn in the Russian Orthodox Church. Not only has Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called Putin “the sole defender of Christian civilization one can rely on” but it has been reinforced within Russia by senior clergymen who have described the conflict as a “holy war.” The attempt to use external matters as a distraction for domestic issues has limitations, however. The announcement of raising the retirement age during the 2018 FIFA World Cup was not only unpopular but also widely viewed as a cynical bid to use Russia’s international spotlight as an obscurant. The limited effectiveness of such a strategy, reflected in declining trust in Putin as well as the government as a whole, ought to caution one from using this as a comprehensive explanation, especially the further away one moves away from 2014 as a perceived turning point.

Russian domestic economic policies are intricately interwoven with international developments. As such, some of the post-2014 changes in Russian foreign policy ought to be analyzed in context of wider trends to which the Kremlin is simply responding to. Declining oil prices on the international market are the guiding factor behind Russia’s increasing willingness to negotiate with Saudi Arabia as well as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a whole. The fact that the fall in prices came roughly at the same as the imposition of western sanctions and the declining value of the ruble illustrate that the December 2016 decision by OPEC and non-OPEC countries, including Russia, to limit oil production in order to raise prices was the by-product of external pressures and not an inevitable and predetermined path for Russian engagement with the global oil market.

Like all historical developments, finding a clean dividing point in a chronology is a difficult and oftentimes unhelpful endeavor. Rather than analyzing Russian foreign policy as consisting of pre- and post-2014 strands, it is more beneficial for us to take a more holistic approach whereby a longer period of time is examined. By doing so, it becomes increasingly clear that all-encompassing themes and explanations for changes are absent and that foreign policy consists of continuous and non-continuous threads caused by both strategic and tactical decision-making processes while still being responsive to external events. Additionally, taking a regional approach could aid us. By acknowledging that objectives and motives vary greatly from region to region, one avoids the risk of being lured by grand narratives while simultaneously being able to elicit unique attributes that may lack parallels elsewhere.

Was 2014 a Turning Point in Russian Foreign Policy? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Kissinger’s approach to statecraft and foreign policy is especially useful when applied to national security in the digital age. The rapid shift to an information-based economy has changed politics, society, and economics in practically every capacity, and these changes have disrupted almost everything technology has touched. Primarily, AI is already having a profound influence on the global economy, and AI will become an essential element of military power, such as warfare platforms, cybersecurity, target recognition, and threat monitoring. With the constant oscillations from new technologies, students, scholars, and practitioners need to maintain a proper framework of analysis if the US will achieve its strategic objectives and defend the national interest. Kissinger shows that these changes should not impact the fundamental goals of a country’s foreign policy.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Scholar Amy Zegart and former Acting Director of the CIA Michael Morell argue that the U.S. intelligence community is behind the curve when approaching these rapid technological changes, and the failure to identify and respond to Russia’s interference in the U.S. presidential election in 2016 shows that policymakers need an overarching vision.

Great powers have started pursuing AI strategies in competition against each other that will upset the balance of power. President Trump has signed the executive order to establish the “American AI Initiative;” China has its “New Generation Plan” to be the world leader in AI by 2030; Russia’s Vladimir Putin even stated that AI would determine the future “rule of the world.” China has especially put efforts towards AI in an attempt to move academic, military, and commercial research towards its goal of domination. The U.S. is also willing to push for an increase in AI research as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency will spend $2 billion, and the U.S. Army will spend $72 million to research AI, both over the next five years. Such financial and political commitments signal a quickly shifting defense landscape that foreign policy leaders need to comprehend and then prepare for such a future.

At the Bush Center’s Forum on Leadership 2019, Kissinger summarized his view of statesmanship. He stated, “The task of a leader is to bring his society from where it is to where it has never been. And in order to do that, you need vision and courage. You need to be able to imagine what doesn’t yet exist, a better future for your people. And then you have to have the courage to withstand the attacks from those that have to alter their attitudes.” Considering the rapid technological changes that have taken place in the previous decade, and the significant changes that are likely in the next decade due to AI research, political leaders need to focus on the objectives that Kissinger describes in his early works to create such a future.

Kissinger’s first two books—A World Restored and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (both published in 1957)—are quintessential to understand his political philosophy and the lessons for those who work in foreign policy. A World Restored, Kissinger’s first book based on his dissertation, explored the consequences of the Napoleonic wars and how diplomats—especially Austria’s Metternich and Britain’s Castlereagh—created a legitimate and stable international order. As biographer Walter Isaacson observed, even in the 1950’s Kissinger’s dissertation topic exploring early 19^th century court diplomacy was suspect (Kissinger also admits this in the opening sentence of A World Restored). Yet the text on the diplomacy of Europe in the 1800s would form a framework of analysis for Kissinger in confronting the Soviet Union.

The U.S. was at the beginning of the Cold War, and thermonuclear war was the most pressing issue for most scholars and politicians. However, Kissinger focused on how legitimate international orders are created and how such an order can contain a revolutionary state. Revolutionary states create chaos and significantly more injustices than any order (examples include the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Russian Revolution, Cultural Revolution, Arab Spring, and many others in the previous two centuries alone. Although the text is a historical analysis, this work, in many ways, is an analogy of World War II and Hitler’s revolutionary state that upended the international order.

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy took up the same theme of containing revolutionary states. Still, with this work, Kissinger incorporated how nuclear weapons impacted the United States’ “strategic doctrine” (translating power into policy) and maintaining the international order. A strategic doctrine is requisite because circumstances and technology will continuously shift and evolve. The U.S. will need to contain revolutionary states and/or rival powers that could upend the established order through advances in AI. Without a doctrine, the U.S. would have to act haphazardly and defensively, which will be a waste of energy, resources, and ineffective. For example, China’s current pursuit of AI in maritime operations will be a serious challenge to U.S. primacy in the Pacific. “Extra Large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles” (XLUUVs) researched by the Chinese Academy of Sciences could be used for anti-carrier operations through electronic and mine warfare. In the meantime, China is further modernizing its naval forces, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy already has more vessels than the U.S. Navy. If the U.S. falls behind in such areas without a strategic doctrine, then the ability to project power or coerce revolutionary states will be significantly diminished.

Therefore, the themes for Kissinger’s early works can be summarized as:

• Stability through the balance of power and a legitimate (generally accepted) international order should be the primary goal of statesmen.
• The greatest threat to this stability is revisionist or revolutionary states that a coalition in support of the legitimate order must contain.
• Changing global circumstances and advances in technology do not alter these objectives.
• Statesmanship requires the country’s leaders to accept the changing world/technology and craft the appropriate response with the objectives in mind.

Writing in The Atlantic, Kissinger delineated the concerns of AI to statesmen, starting with a story about the game Go and machine learning. Machine learning, an AI method, does not require programmers to write rules for the system to follow. Instead, the machine will learn the rules by analyzing the data. Because of machine learning, AI is now utilized for disparate functions, from self-driving cars to diagnosing cancer. Kissinger wrote that at a conference on transatlantic issues, he attended a session on artificial intelligence and how AlphaGo (the AI program) was able to “decisively defeat” expert Go players after refining its algorithms through machine learning. Kissinger raises more questions than he answers and points to the inherent uncertainty of machines that can go beyond human intelligence or experience, such as mastering a game better than the experts. However, as he writes, “these algorithms, being mathematical interpretations of observed data, do not explain the underlying reality that produces them.” This will be the role of statesmen, explaining the underlying reality and forming a strategic doctrine based on it.

The power of such AI programs will radically alter the way wars are fought, and the global economy operates. For the military, modernization in areas such as autonomous systems will significantly increase the lethality of conflict in conventional wars. Iran is already moving its military industries towards robotics and autonomous systems. Even if they are currently behind, they and other adversaries are highly likely to catch up to the US, China, and Russia. Concerning the impacts to markets, AI will add between $13 trillion and $15 trillion to the global economy by 2030. Although there will be significant contributions to the global economy due to increased productivity, there will be negative impacts on the labor market as fewer people become needed for jobs.

It is without a doubt that artificial intelligence and the digital age have transformed conflict and economics, but this will only alter the balance of power rather than the objectives of countries.  Kissinger’s prioritization of the stability and legitimacy of the international system requires leaders to grapple with the global impacts of AI that range from automated production systems that increase unemployment to wide-ranging recognition software that raises a plethora of legal and ethical issues over lethality when related to the execution of warfare.

In 1957, Kissinger wrote, “[N]uclear technology makes it possible, for the first time in history, to shift the balance of power solely through developments within the territory of another sovereign state.” Now, the world’s nation-states are entering a new era in which the balance of power—economic and military—can radically alter within a sovereign state through developments in artificial intelligence. Even though there will be a multiplicity of technological changes in disparate areas of politics, the role of the statesmen is static while the circumstances change. This does not alter the goals of foreign policy; it alters how foreign policy is conducted. The reason: rapid technological evolution creates new problems when it changes the distribution of power in the international system.

To maintain its position, the U.S. must win on AI and fully move into a post-industrial economic model that re-trains the newly unemployed in emerging industries. To mitigate wars that cost lives and displace multitudes of people, the U.S. must win on AI military developments and keep U.S. military superiority–a superiority that is being challenged like never before due to technology. To ensure the lasting political openness of the world’s oldest democracy, the U.S. must push for AI developments in line with its values and norms.

As Kissinger wrote in his article on AI, “The digital world’s emphasis on speed inhibits reflection; its incentive empowers the radical over the thoughtful; its values are shaped by subgroup consensus, not by introspection.” This is the time for foreign policy practitioners to be reflective, thoughtful, and introspective, and Kissinger’s framework of analysis on a legitimate international order will help guide statesmen in the digital age.

Kissinger Was Right: Statesmanship in the Digital Age was originally published on Global Security Review.

Liberal internationalism was pursued without restraint by U.S policymakers seeking to fundamentally change the system of international relations. The U.S. tried to conform states to models of peace, freedom, cooperation, and prosperity. Today, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the possibility of multiple spheres of influence, while accelerating the trend of great power competition.

The theory of liberal internationalism consists of three primary components: Commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, and regulatory liberalism. In practice, commercial liberalism became the most dominant component of the project, which produced a globalized economic order creating incentives for nations all across the world. Free trade was seen as a means to unite and conform states to liberal principles by disconnecting their political interests from the nation-state philosophy. However, today the circumstances have drastically changed.

Numerous factors have played supporting roles in changing the tide against the United States’ favor, one of them being the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then, major actors like the EU, China, and Russia began to re-evaluate U.S. economic hegemony. Many of these powers over the years have desired to break free of the U.S denominated dollar system; however, this is easier said than done. It also exhibited that globalization made the international economic order more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Moreover, it illustrated that commercial liberalism was not an adequate solution to maintain a degree of global unity, and that mere free trade incentives are not sufficient to transcend the nation-state philosophy.

In recent years, states have grown dissatisfied with trade rules and regulations that have restrained their pursuit of independent macroeconomic policies. Since the U.S. dollar denominates the worldwide currency, the U.S. government can effectively freeze any international payment which flows through SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).  The U.S. Dollar provides Washington with the ability to enact crippling unilateral sanctions. Combined with America’s technological and internet control, the dollar has provided the U.S. with unprecedented power to utilize global surveillance to control and strangle all asset flows that are denominated in dollars.

On the multilateral front, instead of liberalizing, U.S.-dominated institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have brought more control and restrictions on foreign economies—particularly in poorer states.  In reality, the application of international economic liberalism has failed to benefit everyone; instead, it has created global inequality between countries and the people within those states.
Why did the liberal internationalist project fail? First, the U.S only emphasized commercial liberalism to lure countries and conform them to the models of the liberal world order- through its international economy. It turns out that more than money is required to conform a state to liberal principles. China was lured in only for the benefit of its own trade interests, not by the principles of the liberal world order.  Thus, over the years, China’s persistent illiberal, authoritarian behavior has continued to frustrate America.

Second, free trade didn’t exist for most of human history. States typically always maintained protectionist economies to protect their infant industries. Germany and the United States practiced protectionism when Britain and France were the chief upholders of free trade during the nineteenth century. For most of the 1930s and the Cold War, many states—including those in Europe—implemented policies of economic nationalism to develop their industrial strength and capacity. Only after the fall of the Soviet Union did the United States hold sufficient power and legitimacy to maintain a global free trade economic order. However, due to the power shifts from the West to the East, it is no longer feasible for the U.S to sustain global free trade, nor does the Trump administration plan on doing so.

Today the security dilemma has started to reappear once more, where China has finished “hiding and abiding”, and is catching up with the United States. Now Beijing is further revealing and revitalizing its military strength to pursue its future regional ambitions- even though it still has not been able to match the U.S military power yet. Moreover, China has become the number one trading partner of all countries within the Asian pacific- including U.S allies. Furthermore, China is trying to establish 5G and AI supremacy to narrow the gap between China and America on the battlefield. In reality, the U.S.-China trade war is a battle for 5G supremacy, and the winner will likely hold a significant advantage over the other.

The current dynamic between the United States and China resembles that of nineteenth-century Britain and Germany. While Britain was practicing free trade, a rising Germany was utilizing protectionism to enhance its economic, technological, and military power. During the 1870s, the wealth ratio between Britain and Germany was 3:1—by the early 1900s, the ratio between the two powers reached 1:1.

In recent years Russia has also increased its military strength. While modern Russia possesses nowhere near the military power of the Soviet Union, it has come a long way. After the corruption of the Yeltsin-era, the economic catastrophe of the 1990s, and decades of NATO expansion, Putin has managed to carve out a sphere of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe. He has been able to revitalize Russia’s military power to a point where it has become once again a worthy rival of the United States. That being said, Russian economic strength has faltered, primarily due to a lack of diversification from oil and gas revenues, but also due to U.S. and EU sanctions.

Furthermore, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea challenged the U.S.-led liberal order, exposing its reluctance to impose more costs beyond economic sanctions. Russia’s military modernization and application of asymmetric tactics have made it more difficult (although not impossible) for the United States to counter Russia through conventional means. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have proven that Russia is capable of capturing and holding territory in Europe. Moreover, Russia’s standing within its traditional sphere of influence has increased—primarily in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Crimea. A recent survey found that the majority of Crimeans are “happy” to live under Russian rule. Thus, an increase in the relative power of China and Russia—while still not matching that of the U.S—has caused Washington to be more cautious in calculating risks and re-evaluating its relative strengths and weaknesses.

Today, the rapid spread of COVID-19 has further accelerated global dissatisfaction with globalization, leading to a lack of cooperation and compromise. Consequently, the novel coronavirus has also accelerated the imposition of nationalist economic policies. In the heady days of globalization, many would argue that borders were no longer relevant. However, the current reality begs to differ.

Visions of a globalized economy led by the United States have evaporated. Many states are searching for alternative solutions that align with their interests. Unfortunately for them, the COVID-19 pandemic has further cemented U.S. dominance over the international financial system due to the U.S. dollar’s role as a global reserve currency. As the global economy grows more volatile, the demand for dollars increases as investors seek to safeguard their assets through purchases of U.S. treasury bonds. Regardless of the increasing strength of China and Russia, the United States will remain a formidable power for many years to come. Even as the economic balance has tilted in China’s favor, being the world’s biggest exporter and second-largest importer, the U.S. remains an anchor of the global economy. Forty percent of all global transactions are carried out in dollars, while just two percent of transactions are conducted in Chinese RMB.

Furthermore, U.S.-led international economic institutions are still a driving force in global trade. In contrast, Chinese and European institutions have not been successful in presenting a viable alternative to existing U.S.-led institutions and the dollar. Furthermore, the U.S still possesses an unparalleled naval presence, which provides it with the power to regulate, maintain, and choke any of the global sea-supply chains.

While the U.S. will maintain several advantages over its rivals, despite its diminishing relative power, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the faults of a globalized system. The world will likely return to an order defined by great power spheres of influence, as great power competition returns in earnest. With an acceleration of de-globalization and growing discontent with U.S. hegemony, the U.S. should show restraint in its foreign policy, rather than doubling down on the failed strategies of the past.

COVID-19 Will Accelerate Consolidation of Great Power Spheres of Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The U.S.-Iran relationship continues to change for the worse. Because of its history with foreign meddling, Iran’s government is fearful of regime change. Surrounded by unfriendly forces and isolated from the global financial market, Iran’s leaders are focused on regime survival. The U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran Nuclear Deal) has also diminished confidence in whether the U.S. will honor its commitments.

This new approach cannot be zero-sum. It must provide tangible progress for both sides. The U.S. needs assurances that Iran will not seek nuclear weapons, cease supporting violent proxy forces, and stop threats against Israel.  Iran needs assurances that the U.S. will not renege on commitments or threaten regime change.

A step-by-step approach requires incremental trust-building.  It must begin by disaggregating the current web of sanctions and breaking down the U.S. list of 12 requirements for a new agreement. Each measurable action requires a reciprocal response.  For example, the two sides could start with point five on the U.S. list, an exchange of prisoners. The U.S. should link relief of economic sanctions with compliance with international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards.

Since 1979, over 30 different U.S. Presidential Executive Orders, Statutes, Regulations, United Nations and European Union sanctions have tried to coerce Iran to comply with different demands. The sanctions hurt the ability of Iran’s government to provide for its national defense, its citizens, and to support militant groups abroad. A rational leader would be expected to choose the first two; instead, Iran’s leaders have made the conscious decision to shortchange their citizens by spending funds on the third option while shifting the blame on outside threats. Iran’s refusal to alter its behavior may be fueled by pride, spite, or insecurities. Nevertheless, it’s clear that the regime places a higher value on resistance than submission.

History has shown we can successfully work with Iran on issues of mutual interest. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. hit Taliban targets in Afghanistan with the assistance of the Iranian government. Before the U.S. withdrawal, Iran complied with the terms of the Nuclear Deal for two years. It was successful in reducing Iran’s progress toward obtaining a nuclear weapon and in allowing extensive inspections of Iran’s facilities.

Some believe that a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran is working. Yes, its impacts are evident; it has deterred most foreign investment and raised the average cost of milk over 400 percent since 2010. However, Iran has had 40 years to refine how it insulates the elites from sanctions. The regime keeps networks of smugglers, money launderers, and document forgers in business. Since sanctions disproportionally harm the average citizen rather than the elites, they have failed to change the regime’s behavior.

Those critical of U.S.-Iran negotiations say that partial concessions undermine U.S. national security. Yet partial progress would also provide benefits. A normalized Iran would reduce violence in Iraq and Syria. Renewed U.S.-Iranian relations would also hinder Russian clout in the Middle East. A de-escalation of tensions in the Middle East would directly increase U.S. capacity to deter great power competitors China and Russia.

There remains an opportunity to prevent another 40 years of U.S.-Iranian hostility. The U.S. still has diplomats experienced in successfully negotiating with Iran. They will be essential in formulating the long-term path of gradual sanctions reduction. Leading the world in a productive dialogue with Iran will restore global trust and confidence in the U.S.  A series of small steps can lead to great opportunities to create a safer world for the next generation of Americans.

What’s Next for the United States’ Iran Strategy? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and NATO forces observed mutual truce for three days over the Eid ul-Fitr holiday in June. In an earnest statement, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that his government was ready for “comprehensive peace and talks” and that he would be willing to discuss all Taliban concerns, including “the future role of international forces” in the country. President Ghani’s historic speech aimed to build on the extraordinary success of the truce’s first day Friday, in which pictures of thousands of Taliban members, government troops, and civilians celebrating the Eid holiday together across the country flooded social media.

A remarkable shift in U.S. policy on peace negotiations with the Taliban also formed new momentum after Washington came to the predictable conclusion that it must give up on a military solution and embrace negotiations with the Taliban. Having decided to accelerate peace talks, and speak directly with the Taliban during a new round of peace negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appointed veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018 aimed at eventually winding down America’s longest war. The United States and the Taliban have since held several rounds of negotiations in Doha. Khalilzad’s stated position at the commencement of the talks was that there were four topics to discuss and that these topics were tied into a package. The principle was reflected in the phrase “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

The four topics were:

• Withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Afghanistan
• Anti-terrorism guarantees by the Taliban
• Inclusion of the Afghan government in the negotiations, and
• Permanent, Afghanistan-wide ceasefire

The Taliban declined to talk directly to the Afghan government until an agreement on U.S. forces withdrawal is secured, although Taliban leaders met with Afghan warlords and ex-government officials in nonofficial talks to marginalize the Afghan government. The U.S. negotiating team, led by Khalilzad and the Taliban team have reportedly made significant progress in nine rounds of negotiations. U.S. peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that Washington and the Taliban had reached an “agreement in principle” with regards to the withdrawal of American troops from the war in Afghanistan. In exchange, the Taliban would accept to enter immediate peace negotiations with the Afghan government and stop ISIS, al-Qaida, or any other terrorist organizations from operating out of their territory. But just days prior to the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks which led to America’s protracted war in Afghanistan, President Trump disclosed in a series of tweets that he had canceled a secret Sunday summit with Taliban and President Ghani at Camp David and he also stated that the peace negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban were “dead” after Taliban militants claimed responsibility for a car bombing that killed 12 people including an American soldier in Kabul. The reason, he claimed, was that the Taliban insurgents had confessed to killing an American soldier in order “to build false leverage” in its peace talks with the U.S. In a statement to Al Jazeera, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said Washington would regret canceling negotiations led by high-level officials from both sides. “We had two approaches to put an end to the occupation in Afghanistan, one was jihad and fighting, the other was negotiations,” Mujahid said. “If Trump wants to stop negotiations, we will take the first approach, and they will soon regret it, ” he said.

Trump’s abrupt announcement left in doubt the future of the deal agreed in principle by Zalmay Khalilzad, for the withdrawal of thousands of American troops over the coming months.

The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee subpoenaed Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump’s top negotiator for Afghanistan, demanding him testify before lawmakers about his talks with the insurgents. Congressman, Eliot Engel, accused the Trump administration of keeping Congress and the American people “in the dark” about the talks. President Ghani formerly had spoken of the risks of moving too quickly to reach an agreement with the Taliban and warned Trump’s administration not to marginalize his government in the negotiations. But National Security Adviser to President Ghani Hamdullah Mohibbroadside went a step further, accusing Khalilzad of selling out Afghanistan, betraying the trust of a strategic ally, and questioning the intentions of Trump’s Afghan-born emissary.

Resumption of Talks

Following a three-month-long impasse of the US-Taliban negotiations, President Trump paid a surprise Thanksgiving visit to Afghanistan to meet with both U.S. troops and President Ghani on November 28, 2019. He told reporters that he had resumed peace talks with the Taliban and claimed they are eager to ink a deal, less than three months after he abruptly called off official talks. “The Taliban wants to make a deal, and we’re meeting with them, and we’re saying it has to be a cease-fire, and they didn’t want to do a cease-fire, and now they want to do a cease-fire, ” President Trump said during a meeting with Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. “We’re going to stay until such time as we have a deal, or we have total victory, and they want to make a deal very badly, “Mr. Trump added. The statement came on an unexpected journey as the president sought to highlight a record of achievement while he campaigns for re-election. Reacting to Trump’s statement, the Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, welcomed Trump’s announcement and he said, “We are ready to recommence negotiations from the stage that had been stopped. However, it will take some time to formally commence the peace talks with the U.S.”

[bs-quote quote=”Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

Zalmay Khalilzad launched a new chapter of the Afghan peace process in October 2019 by meeting with Pakistani leadership, the Chinese, Russians, European, and NATO, and Mullah Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group’s top political leader in Qatar, and Khalilzad resurrected peace negotiations with the Taliban on December 7, 2019, in Doha. The talks were held behind closed doors since both sides had agreed on confidentiality.

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a landmark agreement in Doha that could result in the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan within 14 months. The U.S.-Taliban comprehensive accord predetermined a series of commitments from both sides relating to withdrawal mechanisms for U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan, counterterrorism, intra-Afghan negotiations, and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Afghanistan. The Taliban also agreed not to assault American and coalition forces provided they were withdrawing their troops from the country, while in return as 5,000 prisoners would be released from Afghanistan’s prisons. But the militant group has kept attacking Afghan forces. While claiming they will only conduct operations on rural bases. It is correct that this landmark accord offered a golden opportunity to end one of the longest-running conflicts in the world if the intra-Afghan negotiations were to commence. But finalizing the end of an almost two-decade war is not like finishing the production of a television-show season.

The wider consequences of the agreement between the U.S.-Taliban remain ambiguous. Plenty of Afghans believe that bringing the world’s superpower to the humbling point of withdrawal has been a great triumph for the Taliban, giving that there are no clear pledges in the agreement to secure the achievements made since 2001, including the constitutions, women’s rights, human rights, civil and political rights for all citizens, and the culture of tolerance.

Khalilzad became a biased party to the conflict with vivid interests and intentions. More precisely, he played the role of viceroy whereby he took over command from his superiors of the procedural homework and reframing the issues. It appeared that the U.S. envoy neglected western sacrifices and betrayed Afghans by dropping the “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” principle and have delegated two of the four original topics of the negotiations to any future “intra-Afghan negotiations” including the all-comprehensive cease-fire. Khalilzad also suggested the Taliban that the “intra-Afghan negotiations should not be conducted by a team of the Afghan government alone but by an “inclusive and efficient national team. This team would encompass government, warlords, civil society, and women’s emissaries. The shift in Khalilzad’s approach further marginalized and undermined the position of the internationally recognized Afghan government.

Engaging in bilateral talks was perhaps the only diplomatic approach to get around the Taliban obstruction on direct negations with the Afghan government. But as a means to encourage the Taliban to hold actual peace talks, it seems, for now, to have faced a deadlock. In lieu of taking more time and inducing for engagement on the full four-point package agreement, addressing the root causes of terrorism, and putting pressure on sponsors of the Taliban, especially Pakistan, which is a major sponsor of terrorism in the region and utilizes proxy war as a foreign policy tool. Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.

Does the U.S.-Taliban Deal Devalue American Sacrifices and Betray the Afghan People? was originally published on Global Security Review.

People the world over are in quarantine or isolation as the international order demands American leadership. However, the United States finds itself overstretched, having too many interests to defend with no allocation of priorities. At the same time, the population grumbles about climate change and economic inequality, with many calling for socialism and aggressive government intervention.

This article argues not for isolation but for prioritization: identifying critical areas in need of attention. The United States cannot be everywhere and solve everyone’s problems. What if the United States pulls back from the international system? Can the United States pursue self-sufficiency and maintain existing standards of living for citizens? These are essential questions that this short essay cannot answer. This article intends to identify core areas of American interest.

Let us first define the term interests. Interests are anything that makes a state more secure. If the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, then it is in the interest of the United States to get them out. If the United States is dependent on other states for oil, then it would be in its interests to manage supply chains as well as the oil price. Thus, if any state is planning on attacking the United States, or inflicting economic damage upon it, then it is in the interest of the United States to act to neutralize the source of that vulnerability.

The United States is currently balancing against Russia, China, and Iran, providing counter-terrorism support to African, Middle Eastern and Latin American states, funding NATO while most members free-ride, providing aid to developing states (U.S. Build Act), all the while trying to improve the lives of over 325 million citizens. The United States also contributes to the bulk of the funding for major international institutions like the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the International Monetary Fund.

Why did the United States take on this much responsibility when it was founded on principles of non-intervention? This can be boiled down to a straightforward argument: the wealthier the state, the more it needs to expand outward to secure its wealth. Like any business, a state must expand to survive. Unlike a business, a state cannot reach out to a governmental authority if it is attacked or a partner refuses to honor its end of the deal. This is called anarchy. Hence, throughout its process of economic expansion, the United States had to increase its presence overseas, thereby creating international interests. These interests need defending to sustain development and prosperity at home.

The point of no return with regards to isolationism came in 1945 with the end of World War II. From the American perspective, the Soviet Union and its expansionary ambition had to be stopped. This author is of the view that the United States was threatened by the power of the Soviet Union, not by its economic system. Power is the ability of one state to make other states behave in a way that benefits the interests of the former. The United States (and the Soviet Union) wanted to avoid being dominated. Regardless, the Cold War was over in 1991.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States began doing business with China, a socialist state without the power of the Soviet Union (at the time). Neoliberals believed that the wealthier and more market-oriented China became, the less authoritarian the state would be as the rising middle class would demand increased representation. This didn’t happen. Instead, much like the United States: the wealthier the state, the more it needs to expand to secure its growing wealth. Today, China is most definitely not a democratic state, and thus the logic of neoliberalism failed.

The United States, primarily due to its trade with China, underwrote China’s transformation into the economic powerhouse it is now. Today, China has genuinely global interests, and its presence can be felt around the world: in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is creating a system of economic dependency with China at the very center. As a result, the United States risks being sidelined. This leads us to today. Writing in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, this author isn’t interested in writing about the pandemic’s origins; but rather its effects.

The Chinese Communist Party was never transparent about the spread of the COVID-19. COVID-19 would not have spread the way it did if the CCP had acted responsibly. Instead, it silenced and punished those like Dr. Li Wenliang, who tried to sound the alarm. However, because China is a global power with deep economic relations the world over, the disease rapidly spread.

The irony of ironies is that the economic policies of the United States enabled China—a totalitarian and self-described socialist state—to become the economic giant it is today. China is today is just as belligerent as the Soviet Union, but even more powerful. The COVID-19 pandemic brought the global power and influence of China to light. Can the United States withdraw from the system under these conditions? At this point, no. However, there needs to be some prioritization.

[bs-quote quote=”The people of China are not to blame. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

To borrow from Cato the Elder, for the good of China and the good of the world, the CCP must be destroyed. The CCP gets its legitimacy partly from positive economic performance. Thus, the first priority for U.S. policymakers should be both economic and political; The U.S. government must designate specific national security priorities in these two areas, as it’s irrefutably clear that China does not have the best interests of the United States in mind. The United States must accelerate its efforts to decouple its critical supply chains from China and encourage domestic manufacturing of essential goods for the national interest (steel, pharmaceuticals, and other materials vital to state survival.

The second task is to address critical geopolitical questions: can Europe effectively defend itself? Should Japan remilitarize? Can other states become less dependent on the U.S. for their security? Finally, the United States must avoid becoming entangled in foreign conflicts where no core U.S. interests are at stake.

The people of China are not to blame. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is. It is those suffering as a result of the CCP’s hold on power who hurt the most: Uyghurs interned in concentration camps, pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, victims of organ harvesting and trafficking (particularly members of religious groups like Falun Gong), victims of the corruption of the party elite, and the citizens of Taiwan who are denied recognition in the international arena as a result of CCP influence operations. The party claims to act in the interests of the Chinese people, but in reality, it exists only to further its power—often at the expense of those subjected to its rule. The CCP must face a global reckoning.

U.S. Isolationism in an Era of CCP Dependency was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s Pivot: The Great Recession

The Great Recession of 2008 was America’s worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Millions of Americans lost their jobs and homes, and trillions of dollars evaporated from U.S. stock markets. By several metrics, the U.S. has yet to recover some 12 years later.

What is frequently overlooked is how well China weathered the financial crisis. At its worst, China’s economic growth slowed from a high of 14% in 2007 to a low of 9.4% in 2009. Meanwhile, the American economy’s meager 1.8% growth in 2007 eventually bottomed out with a 2.5% contraction two years later.

The Great Recession became a pivotal moment for leaders and analysts in China. Many took note of the discrepancy between the performance of the two economies, attributing the difference to how each government responded to the crisis in their respective countries. The change that the PRC’s success induced was psychological. It marked the moment that many in China began to give more support to two interrelated propositions. The first being that China is on the rise. The second is that the U.S. is on the decline. Many people in China did not hide or mask this conclusion. For example, in 2017, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei wrote that 2008 was possibly the “watershed year” that ushered in the end of the era of American hegemony, Pax Americana.

Given this assessment, the PRC likely saw the Great Recession as a strategic opportunity. Its government proceeded to shepherd through challenging and profound changes to its foreign policy approach. The most notable of these changes involve the gradual but continued shift from a restrained policy to a more assertive one. In the decade since China has shown its ambitions to reshape the international order more to its favor, press forward with unilateral claims in the South China Sea, assert itself more forcefully in diplomatic encounters and countenance the prospect of maintaining unstable relations with the U.S. to achieve other strategic interests.

China reaped enormous gains as a result of the distraction and momentary weakness of America and its allies. Chinese-led multilateral institutions are increasing in number. The PRC continues to maintain militarily uncontested control over its illegal maritime territories. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s landmark grand strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, has been pursued with vigor, mainly to the benefit of China’s economic, political, and security interests. Furthermore, China has yet to buckle under pressure from the U.S. to resolve the trade war.

Coronavirus: A Second Opportunity?

China reported an outbreak of a new contagion to the World Health Organization (WHO) in December 2019. This virus subsequently came to be known as COVID-19. After initially bungling its response, the PRC snapped into action and took drastic measures, enacting the most widespread and comprehensive lockdown of its population in the country’s history. Months later, the final weeks of March have demonstrated the effectiveness of its approach. China regularly reports that homegrown cases are down to zero. Life in Wuhan will soon return to normal. And China is dispatching medical supplies and hundreds of doctors to Italy to help the country’s beleaguered hospitals.

[bs-quote quote=”If the United States’ response fails to adequately address the crisis, the damage to the economy, people’s livelihoods, government credibility, and even international reputation could be tremendous.” style=”default” align=”left”][/bs-quote]

Meanwhile, almost 90 days after China’s first report to WHO, the U.S. has continued to struggle on nearly all fronts. The United States took virtually no action in the lead-up to its own outbreak and has had a disjointed and spastic response since. The process of manufacturing and procuring ventilators from the private sector has been marred by vacillations within the Trump administration. Efforts to obtain test kits and put them to use have faced complications due to uncertainties about financing and eligibility. Congress spent weeks haggling over much-needed bailout provisions. As of March 26, the U.S. has the highest number of confirmed coronavirus cases of any country in the world. Meanwhile, Americans are left confused by the tangled web of preventive measures that can differ from state to state, county to county, or even city to city.

If the United States’ response fails to adequately address the crisis, the damage to the economy, people’s livelihoods, government credibility, and even international reputation could be tremendous. This, of course, is all in addition to the tragic loss of human life that would result.

In contrast, China has recently gone on a propaganda blitz. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang has stressed that the coronavirus will be a “major impetus” for friendship and cooperation. In phone calls with world leaders, Chairman Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party has preached his country’s desire to offer assistance and cooperation. And Jack Ma, the founder of the Chinese internet juggernaut Alibaba, has pledged to send 500,000 test kits and one million masks to the U.S. China, in effect, is trying to frame itself as a global leader, a capable partner, and a steadfast friend in the fight to contain the coronavirus.

Apart from some criticism by Western officials such as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and EU High Representative Josep Borrell, China has faced little resistance in promoting its narrative as the world’s savior. One reason is that China’s help is genuinely needed in many countries struggling to battle the epidemic. But another reason is that China effortlessly stepped into a gaping leadership vacuum left by the U.S., Europe, and their allies. This may only be the first (and most innocuous) step in an intensified effort by the PRC to pursue greater strategic objectives.

Implications

It is still too early to say how this epidemic will play out in the United States. A lot may depend on what the U.S. government does—and does not do—in the coming weeks. However, it is not too early to speculate about how a perceived success by the PRC coupled with the perception of a U.S. failure could impact the former’s calculus. Similar to the Great Recession, the COVID-19 pandemic could yet again provide evidence to China’s leaders and analysts that their country is rising while the U.S. is falling. And just like the developments that followed in the wake of the Great Recession, this could once again energize China to take advantage of a relatively weakened and distracted West by doubling down on its commitment to proactive foreign policy pursuits.

[bs-quote quote=”China’s own rapid recovery is far from guaranteed, and the U.S. still has time to respond.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

At the same time, other factors could further facilitate Beijing’s ambitions. Reputationally, China may score additional gains among countries that recognize China’s response and recovery as more effective. Economically, U.S. businesses may be hit twice. First, American companies will suffer the direct effects of an economic slowdown at home. Second, U.S. businesses operating in a prolonged recession may be at a disadvantage to Chinese businesses enjoying the benefits of an earlier economic recovery, resulting in the potential loss of billions in missed business opportunities.

However, China’s own rapid recovery is far from guaranteed, and the U.S. still has time to respond. As Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said in a televised CNBC interview on March 10, COVID-19 is “a test of preparedness on all fronts […] The United States has got enormous resources at its disposal […] I would never count the Americans out.”

COVID-19: Crisis or Strategic Opportunity for China? was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, that presumably quiet and intense series of talks was matched by more than 1,000 demonstrators in Minsk who rallied against integration with Russia. Many of these demonstrators expressed concern that “politicians are playing with Belarusian sovereignty,” and that they didn’t want their independence on the bargaining table.

Both during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Belarus have shared a close fraternal relationship. Recent negotiations suggest that Russia is invested in an even closer integration of the two countries while Belarus remains wary.

Belarus and Russia Have a Tangled History

In 1997, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement that anticipated close political, economic and military ties. However, this agreement has not come to pass as cleanly as its writers perhaps believed. Regardless, ties between the two countries have always remained close. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, the two countries share a free travel area similar to Europe’s Schengen Zone.

Historically, Belarus has relied upon Russia for cheap gas, low-cost loans, and energy. Currently, Russia provides Belarus with around $5 billion worth of subsidies for its Soviet-era economy. This support has allowed Lukashenko to stay in power, where he has stayed for the last quarter of a century.

Negotiations: Why Now?

Ostentatiously, negotiations restarted ahead of the 20^th anniversary of Russia and Belarus’s initial agreement. However, in recent years, Russia also claimed that they can no longer subsidize lower energy and gas prices to Belarus. As a solution, Russian officials have suggested that should Belarus agree to closer economic integration, lower energy prices would follow. In response, Belarus insisted that any further integration must be preconditioned on handling bilateral economic issues.

Belarus objects to paying higher prices for Russian gas and energy than Russian households and businesses. Some documents have leaked suggesting that Belarus and Russia are negotiating a deal that would result in an economic confederation. However, details and confirmation still remain to be seen.

In the days before the most recent set of negotiations, Lukashenko also spoke to parliament. He assured parliamentarians that there was no plan to join Russia, but rather remain as fraternal nations.

What Next?

Despite concern internationally about the union between Belarus and Russia, most of this likely comes from uncertainty. The talks are shrouded in uncertainty with no one leak explaining exactly what the two leaders are discussing. Moreover, Russia and Belarus’s history suggests that many agreements, while present on paper, are not actually fulfilled. In short, many issues that would need to be included in an economic confederation, such as unifying tax codes, would take many years of work rather than a simple agreement by two leaders.

The overarching gap between the two leaders is that while Lukashenko has been only open to integration on the basis of equal treatment, Putin has not been willing to accept that in the past or now. One speculation about the heightened pressure on Belarus and the changing nature of these negotiations, however, is connected to Putin’s presidential term, which expires in 2024. Some claim that full integration with Belarus would provide Putin with a way to stay in power as the head of the proposed new union state. Putin and Lukashenko will meet again on December 20^th in Saint Petersburg.

Belarus and Russia: Fraternal Nations But Not a Union State was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, the Trump administration’s 2018 “Africa Strategy” specifically targets Russia as a key geopolitical rival, presenting the United States’ potential African partner countries with an apparent choice between Cold War-style enemies. Again in March, the U.S. pointed to Russia as a threat in Africa, when Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan warned Angola of Russia’s interests in Africa. The U.S. media environment has also fostered an ascendant vision of Russia in Africa, quoting “alarmed” U.S. officials who speak of Russia being “highly active” in the region.

This growing narrative pushes an inflated interpretation of Russia’s real capabilities while ignoring or footnoting the broader context. The relative size, scope, and trajectory of Russia’s gradual increasing economic involvement in Africa indicate an approach fitting with the behavior of other similarly sized economies. Russia’s military footprint and economic connections remain comparably marginal in Africa, while the French, Chinese, and U.S. hold entrenched positions. Meanwhile, Russian military adventurism on the scale of with its involvement in the Syrian Civil War is unlikely in Africa, owing to a Russian population increasingly vocal over domestic issues and opposed to foreign entanglements. 

Russian global military posture skips Africa

The Kremlin’s military priorities are planted firmly in Russia’s elongated peripheral regions of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. Insofar as Russia leaves these spaces, it is usually to counter the United States and allies (who are actively involved in Russia’s neighborhood themselves) with low-level incursions designed for disruption. 

In terms of intentions, the Russians, unlike the Americans, do not fight a Global War on Terror across the Sahara/Sahel, requiring a lily pad strategy of U.S. drone bases for thousands of miles. There is not an internal security dimension to Russian involvement in Africa, precluding similarly scaled military deployment. 

In terms of capabilities, Russia lacks a significant military or political command in Africa. Many African countries do not have a Russian embassy or even a small diplomatic mission, and Russia’s military footprint—outside of small contingencies of mercenaries—remains marginal, with no bases to bivouac within, and no host governments agreeing to allow them space.  Meanwhile, the United States has 5-6,000 soldiers across Africa and around 34 bases. 

While the United States and ally France fulfill air-land-sea campaigns across multi-country theaters, Russia fills niche support roles with countries the United States does not have significant military relationships with—such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan. 

It is worth noting that the two most high-profile instances of Russian influence in Africa in recent years were borne out of economic enterprises for Russian businessmen. In 2017, mercenaries—not Russian soldiers—from the Wagner Group outfit began advising Central African Republic (CAR) on how to defend against militias in the country’s seven-year-long civil war.  In 2018, it was reported that Russian individuals arrived as consultants in several African countries to influence their elections, such as South Africa and Madagascar. As with the Wagner Group, it was possibly money that drew in the operatives, rather than clear strategic objectives from Moscow. 

Russo-African Economic Normalization is…Normal

In addition to a smaller military presence, Russia is also a minor economic player in the region. Russia retreated from Africa after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested in a sharp increase over the past 20 years. The increases are notable not for their scope but rather their steep return from much lower levels. 

Russian trade with Africa makes up less than 1% of global trade with Africa, which is comparable to economies of its own size, though far behind the United States, China, and especially Europe. 

Foreign wars are increasingly unpopular in Russia, reducing the risk of major interventions beyond Russia’s periphery

Russia will continue attempts to drum up economic integration with Africa to bring life to its weak economy, but military interventions involving long-term ground deployments to active conflicts, especially at the levels seen by the United States and France, are unlikely—owing to the growing unpopularity of foreign wars among Russians. Refocusing inward, Russia is less likely to afford attention to far-reaching foreign entanglement in the future, moving Africa further to the bottom of the Kremlin’s limited agenda. 

Moving forward, and with this context in mind, the Cold War-esque U.S. government and media perspective may incur negative policy implications and misconstruing the United States’ geopolitical rivals’ roles risks miscommunication with current or potential African allies. The United States has the benefit of strong favorability in many Africa states. The U.S. should market itself as a productive partner irrespective of other outsiders, and remind African countries of their agency, rather than force a choice between supposed zero-sum competitors.

Don’t Buy the Hype on Russia in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ever since the commencement of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, India has struggled to play an influential role in Afghanistan. Despite being one of Afghanistan’s most valuable strategic partners, India remains a mute spectator of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks as well as intra-Afghan negotiations. As India finds itself increasingly ignored in Afghan affairs, the time has come for Delhi to make its presence felt in the landlocked country and ensure that it’s not excluded from negotiations going forward.

India in Afghanistan: a Proactive Economic Partner

India has played a critical role in supplying economic aid to Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2002, India has provided humanitarian aid and invested in major infrastructure projects as well as smaller developmental initiatives which have provided Afghanistan with a much-needed lifeline amidst ongoing war, sectarian divisions, and terrorism.

Major projects that have benefited from Indian investment include the construction of the Parliament Building in the country’s capital, Kabul, where India committed $178 million (USD), spending approximately $28 million thus far, the $150 million Zaranj Delaram highway project connecting western Afghanistan with the strategic Chabahar port in Iran, and the $42 million Salma Dam Project on the Hari Rud river in the province of Herat province—which includes the construction of a power transmission line connecting the city of Pul-e-Khumri with Kabul. India has also signed a trilateral preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and Iran.

Inspired by India’s history of successful community engagement programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal, hundreds of social development programs were launched in Afghanistan in conjunction with 250,000 tons of wheat to be provided to primary schools as food assistance. Furthermore, India provides technical advisers to Afghan public institutions, offers training for Afghan civil servants and policemen, and contributes funds to an Afghan Red Crescent Society program which provides free medicine and healthcare consultations in its medical missions in five Afghan cities.

India’s Role in the Afghan Taliban Peace Talks

Historically, India has been staunchly anti-Taliban. When the Afghanistan government led by President Mohammed Najibullah collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah’s subsequent assassination in 1996, Delhi grew increasingly alarmed by the Taliban’s rise to power. On the other hand, the Taliban has historically maintained a neutral position when it comes to India, even expressing a willingness to engage with India—provided that India abstained from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Today, India has adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the Taliban. Delhi understands the potential consequences of a resurgent Taliban, but it must face the geopolitical reality that the Taliban controls over half of the territory of Afghanistan. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 229 districts were controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan government as of January 31, 2018—approximately 56.3 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. On the other hand, 59 districts—approximately 14.5 percent—were controlled by the Taliban.

India is concerned that a return to power by the Taliban will undermine the fragile government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—which is struggling to provide basic necessities and security to the Afghan people as it continues to battle the Taliban for its very existence. In a sign of its changing position towards the Taliban, the Modi government dispatched two former highly-decorated diplomats in November 2018 on a “non-official visit” to Russia to participate in negotiations with the Taliban that were being held there.

Former diplomat and secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Vivek Katju—  known for his hardline stance against the Taliban—has adopted somewhat different take on the Taliban issue. Writing in an editorial for The Indian Express, Katju argued that it is in India’s strategic interests to engage with the Taliban to not only maintain its influence in Afghanistan but to better understand the power dynamics of the broader South Asian region.

India must increase and sustain engagement in Afghanistan, particularly after not being invited to participate in quadrilateral talks between the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China after talks between U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar. China subsequently issued a statement saying that India was not intentionally excluded from the quadrilateral talks and that India would be included in future regional discussions involving the Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan.

While India has put forth clearly defined red-lines concerning its dealings with the Taliban, its willingness to engage in discussions with the battle-hardened militants is evidence that Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic stance.

India’s Expectations for the Taliban

India’s first expectation is that “all initiatives and processes must include all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” Historically, the Afghan government has often been sidelined by international interlocutors in their engagements with the Taliban. Furthermore, this expectation indicates a degree of acceptability in Delhi over negotiating with the Taliban, as the group represents a “section of the Afghan society.”

Delhi’s second expectation is that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate,” meaning that democratic processes and human rights—including women’s rights—should be respected.

Thirdly, India expects that any process “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” This expectation is crucial for India, as it highlights the threat posed by terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State. Furthermore, this expectation implies that Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be permitted to expand their operations into Afghanistan.

India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of the peace process in Afghanistan. The country is an important partner and is of great strategic value for India—especially with India’s control over the Iranian port of Chabahar, which has been granted a sanctions waiver by the U.S. government. India must up the ante in Afghanistan by initiating track II diplomacy, engaging with tribal elders, and convincing the Taliban to adopt and maintain a favorable stance towards India while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for foreign terrorist groups. Furthermore, should the Taliban return to power with backing from Pakistan, India will be in a challenging position concerning the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in South Asia.

Is India’s Influence in Afghanistan Declining? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Decades of interventionist policies have contributed to the view that the United States is the greatest threat to global peace, according to research by Gallup, with the decades-long “War on Drugs” contributing to the migration crisis and perceived insecurity along the U.S. southern border.

Wilsonianism—the interventionist doctrine espoused by the 28th President of the United States—aimed to advance the role of capitalism and democracy throughout the world. Following the First World War, this doctrine took a back seat in favor of increased isolationism and a withdrawal from the world stage. President Franklin D. Roosevelt reversed this trend, returning Wilsonianism to the heart of U.S. foreign policy, thrusting the country into the heart of global geopolitics.

However, U.S. foreign policy—particularly from the 1970s-onwards—has only served to diminish the United States’ role in the Western hemisphere, with aggressive policies pushing its adversaries closer together while influencing them to turn to the USSR for support. The forging of ties between Cuba and Venezuela may have begun long before the ideological assimilation of the Castro-Chavez years, but, more than a decade after the cigar-wielding Cuban left office, aggressive U.S. policy has strengthened the region’s anti-American bloc and diminished American influence.

As the humanitarian, political, and economic crisis in Venezuela escalated—brought to a head by President Nicolás Maduro’s fraudulent electoral victory, following years of deteriorating economic conditions—the Trump administration adopted a policy of regime change, throwing its weight behind Juan Guaidó and alluding to the possibility of military intervention. Backed by a chorus of Western governments, the Trump administration appeared to be making progress in ousting the unpopular socialist leader.

Maduro’s continued grip on power can be attributed in large part to Cuba’s commitment to propping up the socialist dictator. Numerous outlets have reported that Venezuela is teeming with Cuban intelligence officials rooting out opposition. Forged through mutual ideological understanding and staunch opposition to American interventionism, the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship is unlikely to be broken by the re-imposition of sanctions, which has been the Trump administration’s approach thus far.

Last month, I stood watching the final U.S.-flagged cruise ship leaving Havana harbor, before the reinstatement of sanctions (previously relaxed by Obama) that prohibits U.S.-flagged vessels from docking in Cuba, and prohibits foreign ships from docking in Cuba and the U.S. within six months of each other. This foreign policy is a clear indication that Trump is returning to the hardline interventionist policies of his predecessors, moving away from Obama’s reconciliation and diplomatic approach.

The Obama administration relaxed many of the sanctions placed on Cuba throughout the preceding decades; with the relaxation of the controversial wet-foot, dry-foot policy, as well as a host of new opportunities for Americans to travel to the island. These policies resulted in significant moves by the Cubans towards a more outward and capitalist economy, with private property and limited trading being permitted in recent years.

The re-imposition of sanctions is a mistake and will only serve to jeopardize U.S. national security interests in the long-term. As the recently published The Ordinary Presidency of Donald J. Trump points out, such an approach to foreign policy is likely only to deepen the resolve of the United States’ adversaries—strengthening the bond between Cuba and Venezuela, thereby reducing American influence in Central and South America. Stricter policy towards Cuba will only heighten the common security concerns of Cuba and Venezuela, encouraging the Cubans to continue supporting the Maduro regime.

Hans Morgenthau’s theory of realism has been the guiding philosophy in American foreign policy throughout much of the post-World War 2 era. Morganthau’s philosophy centered around security and power concerns on the international stage, suggesting that these were the driving forces in international relations. Ironically, America has failed to account for how security is the driving force behind the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship, with greater aggression only driving the joint security policy of the two states towards greater cooperation.

This approach will not only weaken the United States’ ability to direct policy in the region but could further destabilize volatile environments, encouraging far greater national security threats than currently exist. The use of force to remove Maduro and replace him with a more friendly ruler has been floated by U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton (a driving force behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq). Given Cuban influence, however, such a move is likely to destabilize the region and produce new national security dangers akin to those in the wake of the U.S. nation-building project in the Middle East.

Instead, the U.S. should focus on reinvigorating the diplomatic approach championed by Barack Obama, employing American soft power and influence among the Cuban populace to decouple the relationship between Havana and Caracas, allowing for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

The crux of the United States’ argument in favor of intervention in Venezuela comes from the Wilsonian tradition of championing democracy, as Venezuela has consistently reneged on democratic principles. Maduro’s faux victory in the latest election threatens this tradition, encouraging the U.S. to push for intervention, but diminishing the achievability of its foreign policy aims.

Although some suspect that John Bolton and Mike Pompeo’s interventionism is underlined by a muscle-flexing attempt to use the military, rather than effectively achieve national security objectives. If the U.S. is to champion Wilsonian principles of democracy and capitalism, diplomacy and the exercise of soft power is the way forward. Cuba is primed for more considerable U.S. influence, with one of the most striking features in Havana being the shiny new U.S. embassy, a perfect symbol of American potential to reconcile with Cuba.

The Cuban people seem ready for a more significant American presence. Speaking to a taxi driver in Havana, it was clear that there was real hope of American reconciliation and the influx of American goods during the thawing of tension during Obama’s administration. The same taxi driver spoke of the damage the Trump administration’s policies are doing to the potential reconciliation between Cuba and its behemoth neighbor, with such aggression only diminishing America’s potential to decouple Cuba and Venezuela.

America clearly could exert significant influence through diplomatic means. Cuban infrastructure remains almost entirely the product of a now-defunct state, with Soviet-era power plants and motor vehicles dominating the Caribbean island. This provides the opportunity for quick growth to be facilitated by the United States, by the opening up of relations with Cuba and offering developmental aid, instead of pressuring them into submission—a wholly unsuccessful policy. Cuban people have a hunger for modern American goods and allowing them access to such products will only grow the potential for Cuba to be an American security asset, rather than a potential strategic threat.

Amongst the Cuban people, adherence to socialism is seemingly borne out of two realities, respect for Castro and the revolution, and the inability to pursue a different course of political economy. Cuba would likely be decoupled from Venezuela should their national security no longer rely on creating a regional buffer to the U.S., with the Cuban economy being almost entirely strangled except for limited regional trade.

Recent reforms indicate the willingness of the Cuban government to open up and reform away from their state-controlled economy; the 2019 constitutional referendum affirmed this by recognizing private property, recognition of foreign investment and introduction of habeas corpus, somewhat reflecting America’s declaration of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—a clear indication of a willingness to align more closely with the United States.

Given this willingness, the Trump administration’s policy is counterproductive in achieving all of the United States’ regional objectives. Cuban shifts towards increased openness will provide a significant opportunity for America to drive policy in the region, using diplomatic means to maneuver Cuba away from their socialist dogma and weaken a key pillar supporting the Maduro government.

If the United States is genuine about its adherence to Wilsonianism and wish to achieve democratic governance and economic upturn in Venezuela, its policy of sanctioning Cuba to pressure Maduro will only weaken its efforts to effect change.

Instead, the U.S. should pursue reconciliation and take advantage of the waning ideological alignment of the Cuban regime, allowing for the capitalization of markets and free trade, that can make Cuba a critical regional partner. Using its considerable economic might rather than military force, the U.S. should pursue the Wilsonian tradition of tackling injustices abroad, while ensuring its national security.

Engagement with Cuba is the Key to Greater U.S. Influence in Latin America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proxy wars and great power politics have returned to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is once again at the center stage of regional and global rivalries over influence for a variety of geostrategic interests and the quest for resources. This time unlike the past, there are many players including nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, the most prominent being Pakistan, Iran, China, and India.

Afghanistan, as observed by Lord George N. Curzon, was an empty space on the map which was neither Persian nor Russian nor British. It was purely a geographical space which emerged and was used as a buffer zone during an era of great power politics between the former British Empire and Russian Tsar. Some scholars and historians describe Afghanistan as an accidental nation.

The nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled ethnic groups living in this rugged but vitally strategic land were used as tools to extend the influence and interests of one Empire against the other. The monarchies and militia groups trained and funded by these two empires emerged as a result of these great rivalries used to take turns in preparing the ground for government collapse and capturing Kabul centric power through assassinating monarchs, waging coups, and rebellions to further the interests of their imperial paymasters.

In recent times, the Afghan government and its allies are complaining about enemy sanctuaries and safe-havens across the border in Pakistan and Iran for the growing insurgency in the country, but this phenomenon is nothing new. Afghan monarchies and the Afghan communist regime were toppled by rebel leaders, dethroned Kings, and disgruntled tribal and religious leaders who enjoyed financial and military support in the courts of British Raj, the Persian Empire, and the Russian Tsar. In recent times, the Pakistani military and intelligence services have provided safe havens and training grounds for militant groups like the Taliban.

This time around the stakes are higher, and the game is much more complicated. Various countries are furthering their interests within the country through their proxy—oftentimes with ethnic, racial, and sectarian ties to their sponsors.

Understanding the depth of this problem, the incumbent President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, has been consistently warned Afghanistan’s neighbors in various forums including the recent SAARC leaders summit in Nepal, Heart of Asia conference in Beijing, and other multilateral and bilateral meetings that he will not tolerate proxy wars in his country and will not allow Afghan territory to be used against its neighbors from any party involved in the country. However, the reality of the situation is different, as the Afghan state’s influence is limited beyond major urban centers. This makes it difficult to ensure and deliver on Dr. Ghani’s promises.

Today, Pakistan claims that India is using Afghan territory to support Baloch separatists and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whereas India has been over the years warning and complaining to the international community over Pakistan’s duplicity and complicity in various terrorist attacks within and outside India. The recent bombings of Indian Embassy and consulate in Afghanistan are in no doubt the handiwork of the various extremist groups supported and trained by the powerful Pakistani military intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for influence to promote or protect the Shiite and Sunni domination within the power structure in Afghanistan. Russia and China, respectively, are concerned about Chechens and Uyghurs in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan that is infested with proxy groups presents a great threat to Central Asian states, the security of the Russian Federation, as well as China’s commercial and economic interests in Central Asia.

It seems that history is repeating itself once again in Afghanistan. With the development of technology and advancements in land, sea, and, air transport it seemed that countries such as Afghanistan which were pivotal geo-strategic land bridges lost some of their strategic importance. Conversely, however, these new developments have not done much to diminish the geopolitical importance of the Afghanistan. Geography is still a significant factor in deciding the political and economic fate of a state.

The Rise and Fall of Regimes in Afghanistan: Proxy Wars and Regime Collapse in Afghanistan

By several estimates, the average lifespan of republican regimes in Afghanistan is 3.5 years with significant statistical outliers in Afghan monarchies. These are normally regimes which normally lasted over a decade. The reasons for such rapid regimes changes, coup d’états and state collapse in Afghanistan are many chief among them exclusive politics and rebellions supported by outside actors. 

One of the effective instruments for toppling various Afghan regimes has been proxy warfare exploiting ethnic and/or religious sensitivities. Historically and with few exceptions, nearly every rebellion in Afghanistan was organized, trained and funded by outside actors and regional players. The British Raj gave refuge and sanctuary to various toppled Afghan kings and statesmen and eventually paved the way for their return whereas the same tactic was used by the Russian Tsar.

The Russian Tsar hosted Afghan emirs like Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir Shir Ali Khan, along with several other Afghan monarchs in the former “Bukhara” and later on assisted them in their return to power. The last Afghan King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, by several accounts is born in British India and completed his education in France and occupied the throne after his father who also came to power with considerable British support and was later assassinated in a school shooting also enjoyed significant regional support by remaining neutral in regional rivalries.

Furthermore, the Afghan communists, Mujahiddins, and more recently, the Afghan Taliban, were all groups which were actively supported, trained and assisted in their rise to power by regional powers. Therefore, external powers always play a pivotal role in the rise and fall of various regimes in Afghanistan.

Old Game, New Players: Proxy Wars and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been at the epicenter of the “Great Game” and later on the cold war rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States in the lead. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was abandoned to Pakistan and the proxies of other countries—chief among them Iran, India, Russia, and Central Asian states—each of whom supported a particular ethnic faction. It led to a bloody civil war which lasted for almost a decade resulting in the hundreds of thousands of death of civilians.

Today, this old game is returning with new players. These new proxy wars are more localized with regional players (i.e., Pakistan and India playing the lead role, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard their interests). This time, the stakes are higher—as are the costs of inaction for Afghanistan.

Absence of Indigenous Economy: Financial and Economic Dependence

The absence of an indigenous economy and source of financial revenue has made the political sovereignty and military independence of Afghanistan vulnerable to various regional players. For years, Afghan political elites and parties have been dependent on regional funding and support to pursue its political goals inside Afghanistan. The Afghan communist party factions—PDA Khalq (People) and Parcham (Flag)— were heavily reliant on Moscow while various Mujahiddin factions benefitted from Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Western support. The current Afghan government is heavily dependent upon Western military and financial support.

During his tenure as former President Hamid Karzai acknowledged that his office is receiving millions of dollars from western and regional intelligence agencies for various payments. This implies that, just like the British Raj and Russian Tsar buying loyalty in the Afghan royal court, the same financial manipulation in exchange for loyalty is happening in the corridors of Afghan presidential palace today.

This dependence has made Afghanistan and its multiethnic mosaic social structure vulnerable to political manipulation and the biggest threat to its national security and long term stability. Almost all of the ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan are in various ways politically and economically supported by regional countries.

For Afghanistan to preserve its political sovereignty in the true sense of the word, it has to find a sustainable source of financial revenue and a comparative advantage. Political sovereignty without financial independence have no meaning. So long as Afghanistan remains a financially dependent state, it will remain unstable and vulnerable to regional proxy wars.

The Vicious Cycle of Traps: The Crisis of Governance and Statesmanship

Afghanistan since its establishments as an independent state has been consistently tangled in four traps of poverty, poor governance, geographical limitation and internal conflicts. Each of these traps have been reinforcing each other.

Throughout history, Afghan statesmen have either completely monopolized power or wealth or been struggling for the control of the country through quelling internal rebellions under various banners and causes. This has given the little time to think strategically about their country and its vision and future.

The first Afghan statesmen who rose to fame due to his 5 year plans and presenting the first vision of governance, economic development in addition to addressing internal conflicts and the geographic limitations of the country was Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, who fell out with his communist allies and was brutally murdered inside the presidential palace in Kabul. Most other governments have either been too preoccupied with preserving their power or fighting for control of the rest of the country.

In essence, the country has been in some sort of war since its establishment as an independent state. It has suffered from a crisis of governance and leadership and the traps have only been pushing Afghanistan deeper and deeper into a state of crisis.

From Vicious Cycle to Virtuous Cycle: Hard Decisions to Make for Afghanistan

In order to reverse this historical trend and address the four traps of poverty, bad governance, geographical limitation, and internal conflicts, Afghan statesmen and policymakers will have to make some very hard choices and bring Afghanistan out of this vicious cycle and put into a virtuous cycle of stability and peace. Some of these hard decision require statesmanship, courage combined with a vision and farsight for the country.

To address these four traps, Afghan statesmen and policy makers will have to take the following three vital steps:

1. Forge a national agenda and broad based consensus across all political parties and ethnic groups on key national interests, priorities and threats of the country. Afghanistan should start a national movement of internal rejuvenation and national awakening. Afghanistan will only prosper at a time when its leadership and commoners understand that the only way to stability is through the hardwork and unity of Afghans and its neighbors. Nobody else can hand in peace and stability to Afghanistan but the Afghans themselves with their neighbors.
2. Afghanistan will have to reach a fundamental agreement with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran. In return for safeguarding their legitimate interests in Afghanistan, they will stop engaging in interference and proxy warfare in the country. This can be done through a long process of honest and direct diplomatic and bilateral negotiations.
3. Finally, without a sustainable indigenous economy and financial self-reliance, Afghanistan cannot become a truly sovereign state. Financial dependence and economic vulnerabilities will continue to make Afghanistan and various Afghan ethnic groups prone to political manipulation and military sabotage by regional players and criminal networks.

A Framework for Managing Regional and Global Interests

When it comes to the management of regional interests in Afghanistan, there are three schools of thought which, in some cases, pursue complementary as well as contradictory views.

The proponents of the first view opine that Afghanistan like many other countries with a vital geostrategic location, should take advantage of these rivalries to build itself. This means that through wise leadership and smart diplomacy just like Pakistan, Afghanistan can exploit the geopolitical vulnerabilities of its allies and neighbors and in return get the required economic and military assistance to build its economy and military capabilities. This is very hard under the current circumstances

The proponents of the second view are supporting that Afghanistan should remain a neutral state and give vital guarantees to its neighbors and other major powers that its soil will not be used against one or several of its neighbors. This policy has been pursued time and again by Afghan statesmen and policy makers, but it has not paid much dividend except it kept the country weakened and divided.

Lastly, proponents of the third view advocate that Afghanistan should ally itself with one of the major global powers (the United States, China, or Russia). Therefore, by obtaining the required security and economic guarantees, Afghanistan can serve as the frontline state in ensuring its interests through the pursuit of the interests of the allied power.

All of the above options require a broadly-based, strong government in Kabul with a long-term view of its interests. Afghanistan will sooner or later have to make some tough decisions when it comes to its survival and long term interests or get dumped as it often does into the dark pages of history.

Throughout history, Afghan political leaders and monarchs have fallen prey to great power politics and regional proxy wars due to their failure to manage the geopolitical and strategic interests of various regional and global powers in its soil. But this time the stakes are higher and involves the survival of the Afghan state. A combination of smart leadership, active diplomacy and strong governance will enable Afghanistan to swim the tides.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Return of Proxy Wars in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Iranian government’s recent announcement that it would surpass previously-agreed-upon uranium enrichment limits should come as no surprise. In fact, the regime’s scattered mining efforts in the Persian Gulf, as well as the recent downing of a U.S. military RQ-4A Global Hawk drone were long forthcoming. A clash with the United States is the Islamic Republic’s prolonged, yet deferred dream, despite pretenses to the contrary.

On October 26, 1964, the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gave his very first anti-American speech in response to a law he described as the “capitulation” law, which in reality was a status-of-forces agreement. Under the law, U.S. military personnel were granted diplomatic immunity and any crimes committed would be tried in U.S. military courts. Khomeini claimed the law would make Iranians slaves to the West and described the U.S. president as a “disgrace.”

Khomeini claimed that his primary goal was to protect Islam & Muslims around the world. He would later order the assassination of then-Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour, who was involved in drafting the agreement, setting off. That set the very first fanatic terrorism in Iran, Shah refused to put Khomeini on trial or to kill him. Therefore, this led to Khomeini’s exile to Turkey. He continued to employ anti-American, anti-Western, and pro-Shia Islam rhetoric until his return to Iran in 1979.

While the reasons behind Khomeini’s hatred towards the U.S. is unclear, it is evident that his revolutionary followers carried on his legacy, injecting it into every aspect of Iranian foreign policy and statecraft post-revolution. At its core, this legacy prioritizes Islam over Iran, looks outward to create problems instead of looking inward to resolve domestic issues, and infringes on the civil and political rights of Iranian citizens in Iran.

The current Iranian regime claims it does not want war, but the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says he won’t engage in negotiations, either. Khamenei explicitly stated that before meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in June 2019. Abe hoped his diplomatic effort might reduce tensions between the U.S. and Iran, which would benefit Japan as a mitigator in the international community. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister wasted a trip by assuming dialogue would alter the obsolete thought process of the elderly ayatollah. However, Abe’s efforts provided U.S. President Donald Trump with additional leverage, showing the American public he was open to negotiations without preconditions.

In the U.S., President Trump’s political opponents who drafted and signed the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) likely see this tension as avoidable and unnecessary. They see the President of the United States as the centerpiece of this escalatory dynamic. However, they seem to be forgetting that the initial reason Iran agreed to enter into negotiations in the first place was the disclosure of the Islamic Republic’s secret ambition to obtain nuclear weapons. The Iranian government came to the negotiation table only when all means for circumventing severe sanctions was no longer feasible.

In reality, the Iranian government wasn’t happy about the limits imposed by the JCPOA and never intended to abide by it in the long-term. The JCPOA empowered the Iranian government to continue interfering in regional affairs, arbitrarily detaining dual citizens and foreign individuals, and suppressing internal grievances and dissent by all means necessary.

Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Islamic Republic has been advised by lobby groups in the U.S. to wait out President Trump, in the hope that he would be impeached following the release of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report. This miscalculation is ongoing, as the Iranian government uses the same lobby groups to depict President Trump in D.C. as being responsible for rising tensions in the Middle East. The Iranian government assumed that by playing the victim card, the JCPOA’s European signatories would support Iran. It would seem, however, that Tehran forgot that threatening and impeding stability in the Middle East would preclude any meaningful support from the Europeans.

The Iranian government is at its weakest as a result of the U.S. government’s “maximum pressure” strategy; it’s distraught by domestic public outrage as a result of socio-economic conditions. The Iranian government will continue to unjustly detain and execute young activists such as Alireza Shir Mohammadali. Over the next few months, in the runup to the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, Iran will continue to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz and continue to engage in malign activities in the broader region with the hope of pulling the United States into a direct military confrontation.

Trump’s staunch opposition to the Iraq War may have contributed to his victory in the 2016 elections. As his 2020 campaign gears up, it would behoove him to maintain a consistent message. Deploying military assets and troops in a defensive posture is the right signal to send Iran. However, Trump should show restraint if the consequences of Iranian actions are largely insignificant, and should escalate only as a last resort.

Thus far, six countries have offered to mitigate between Iran and the U.S. If additional countries come forward, Trump shouldn’t stand in their way. If Trump can continue to buy time until the 2020 election, Iranian opposition groups such as Iran Revival (Farashgard) will be better positioned to mobilize the Iranian public, and will deprive the regime in Tehran of the opportunity to ensnare the U.S. in a costly and unnecessary war, one which would detrimentally impact Trump’s reelection bid.

The U.S. Should Avoid a Direct Military Confrontation with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The first inquired after what was morally right, whereas the second focused on what was pragmatic and expedient. The Greek city-states, long regarded as the enlightened architects of diplomatic customs and traditions, bequeathed upon the Western world the lofty ideas, aspirations, and vocabulary of the political ethos and practice of such commonplace concepts as democracy, commercial accords, truces, alliances, and conventions. The preferred methods of achieving these entailed persuasions, inducements, threats, and intimidation, with an occasional resort to arms. Subsequent travails of Imperial Rome, Constantinople and the Florentine courts of the Renaissance showed that the reigning canon of all diplomatic endeavors rested on enlightened self-interest aimed at the preservation and aggrandizement of empire.

While conquest and territorial expansion lay at the heart of continental Europe, the promise of the New World offered a form of republicanism absolved of foreign entanglements, wherein the words of John Adams, the “business of America with Europe is commerce, not politics or war.” “Why by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,” George Washington in his Farewell Address asked, “entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humor or Caprice?” This post-revolutionary idealism carried over to the Wilsonianism of open covenants and self-determination of peoples, only to be tested and eventually buried by the tragic reality of World War Two and the consequent chill emanating from the Cold War.

It is at this moment in history that Stephen M. Walt’s The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy begins. Walt starts his reflections on the American foreign policy establishment with a skeletal reliance on the thoughts of the U.S. forefathers or the long and rich history of a diplomatic esprit de corps, choosing instead to focus on the late twentieth and early twenty-first century’s moral compulsions and ideological convictions that led to the nation’s many political victories as well as fiascoes. His is a character study of three U.S. administrations and the vast network of think tanks and policy wonks that have influenced the trajectory of America’s foreign policy.

At the centre of Walt’s argument is the critical assertion that the United States is a benevolent power with noble intentions, an “indispensable nation” intent on pursuing an ambitious grand strategy of liberal hegemony based on liberal principles of individual freedom, democratic governance, and a market-based economy, which in the past 25 years has tragically misfired. Rather than making the United States “safer, stronger, more prosperous, or more popular […] and the rest of the world more tranquil and secure,” Walt contends that “America’s ambitious attempt to reorder world politics undermined its own position, sowed chaos in several regions, and caused considerable misery in a number of countries” (23). The Cold War victory has been squandered, Walt argues, and the United States has found itself bearing a disproportionate share of global security burdens with a considerable cost to America’s own blood and treasure.

Given America’s abundant advantages, Walt claims, the price of U.S. primacy has been mistakenly perceived by administrations on both ends of the political spectrum to be modest and easily absorbed by the world’s largest economy. Excessively burdensome democracy promotion remained the central foreign policy objective of the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, despite ballooning federal deficits, budget sequesters, cuts in defense spending and world financial crises. In the meantime, the Washington D.C. policy establishment eagerly embraced a singular solution to the world’s crises irrespective of the peculiarity of the problem at hand – that, in order to keep the liberal order alive, the U.S. must remain “deeply engaged” and take the lead in “solving every global issue” (132).

To execute foreign policy and convince the American public of the benefits of global activism, policy experts engaged in meticulous rationalisations ranging from threat inflation and exploitation of uncertainty, to the exaggeration of benefits guaranteeing the country’s security and prosperity, finally to the concealment of the real costs, effectively masking the loss of human lives and risks associated with potential blowback resulting from military interventions abroad (147-80). According to Walt, liberal hegemony, pursued by “an out-of-touch community of foreign policy VIPs” (181), has failed not only in Iraq but also heavily miscalculated:

Fallout from the NATO expansion, the consequences of regime change in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere, the open-ended “war on terror,” the mismanagement of the Middle East peace process, the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the anti-democratic backlash that has occurred since the 2008 financial crisis (259).

But why should an otherwise benevolent empire intent on acting on humanitarian impulses in the face of human tragedy be excoriated for its use of power in the pursuit of ennobling ends? For Walt, diplomacy – as a tool of statecraft, rather than an ideology devoid of tangible deliverables – ought to be a primary means to an end. To win on the diplomatic front, however, America’s diplomatic ranks, the author argues, are in need of reform in order to absolve “inexperienced amateurs” (273) of the responsibility and unmerited prestige of holding key diplomatic positions. Professionalising the ranks also means ridding the foreign policy establishment of excessive secrecy, self-protective inbreeding, and immunity from accountability which encourages members of the group to pursue precarious foreign policy goals at no personal or professional expense. Walt further indicts diplomatic corps’ penchant for marginalizing dissent, silencing criticism of policy or policy “insiders” and eschewing strict accountability in order not to jeopardize friendships while routinely embracing elements of expansionism and power projection towards which the lay American taxpayer feels increasing tedium and aversion (215). These include overreliance on military force when confronted with political crises, elites’ lack of interest in diplomacy and a tendency toward unilateralism executed under the prestigious mantle of “global leadership” (288).

The Hell of Good Intentions offers an exacting autopsy of America’s successive foreign policy pursuits since the end of the Cold War in the name of liberal hegemony. While finding the outcome inadequate to the enormous soft power appeal of the U.S. and the overwhelming military might at the country’s disposal, Walt offers an alternative approach – offshore balancing – which instead of attempting “to make the world in America’s image, focuses on preventing other states from projecting power in ways that might threaten the United States, while engaging its resources only when there are direct threats to vital U.S. interests” (261).

This strategy, Walt argues, would permit the United States to focus on four primary geographical regions where its vital interests are at stake: that is, in the Western Hemisphere itself, as well in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. As industrial and military centers of power, America’s primary role would be in maintaining an “offshore” presence or, in certain circumstances, providing for small military contingents or intelligence-gathering facilities. Rather than launching into “costly and counterproductive crusades” (263), the regional security challenges would be repelled by regional stakeholders themselves, leaving the United States in the position to enter conflicts only when another major power or peer competitor should patently threaten to obstruct its pursuit of strategic aims and upset the regional balance of power. By monitoring and ensuring that the regions of vital interest to the United States do not fall under the control of other powers, Walt projects, this will buffer the country from harmful foreign policy blowbacks fostered by nationalist resentment, terrorism and anti-American extremism (264).

While the sensible American public would welcome reduced military expenditures on foreign campaigns and significant reductions to the $750 billion Pentagon defense budget, Walt does not tell his readers how much buy-in “offshore balancing” has among the Washington D.C. foreign policy establishment or how the strategy would fare when confronted with new regular and irregular trials and perturbations outside of the purview of the country’s traditional geographical spheres of influence and expertise. Putting a high premium on “patient diplomacy” and “moral suasion” (289), as Walt indeed does, while also promoting liberal values abroad, is a theoretically attractive proposition until, of course, realpolitik and the prerogatives of hegemonic exceptionalism launch the country into its longstanding default crisis response of retaliatory invasive warfare and excessively protracted conflict with a staggering human cost.

Since the book is largely retrospective and reactive in approach, Walt’s analysis would also benefit from a closer look at America’s prospective foreign policy challenges, particularly how “offshore balancing” might address the shift in the economic balance of power towards Asia; the escalation in Russian belligerence and its fine-tuning of propaganda and misinformation campaigns; North Korean and Iranian malign influence; the great power scramble for the Arctic; technological innovation in artificial intelligence and the cyber-dimension of (hybrid) warfare fought by bit and bot as well as the rise in irregular armies and the inevitable weaponisation of outer space.

Anyone who wants to understand historical trends and contemporary developments in America’s foreign policy and the emerging shifts in the country’s political landscape will nonetheless find Walt’s book a rewarding reading and an apt and timely companion to John Mearsheimer’s The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018).

This article was first published in the London School of Economics Review of Books. It represents the views of the author, and not the position of Global Security Review, the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the London School of Economics.

Book Review: The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is hardly surprising to many—Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn has been espousing an anti-European and pro-Russian campaign for some time now. While Hungary has not outright rejected all of Europe’s values, he is firmly against immigration and increasingly receptive towards the overtures of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia agrees to supply Hungary with natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline—bypassing Ukraine.

The European Union imports the majority of its natural gas from Russia. For some time, this relationship has relied on the free flow of gas through Ukraine. In recent years, the trading relationship between the E.U. and Russia has been under increasing strain due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and rising prices.

For Eastern European member-states, this has meant a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to energy acquisition. Therefore, it will be critical to monitor a recently signed agreement under which Russia will supply natural gas to Hungary beginning in 2020, “regardless of agreements on gas transit between Moscow and Kiev.”

The gas transit arrangement between Russia and Ukraine will expire at the end of 2019. Given that Ukraine and Russia remain in a de facto state of war, it is unlikely that a new transit agreement will be implemented. What does this mean for Hungarian natural gas imports? According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian gas exports to Hungary will transit via the TurkStream pipeline.

Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is growing.

Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is an increasingly contentious issue in the realm of international relations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline—a project led by Gazprom—will directly connect Germany with Russia, bypassing Ukraine.

Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 has been repeatedly criticized by the United States. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both strongly opposed the pipeline because Nord Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependency on Russian energy while simultaneously harming Ukraine’s economic and national security.

It’s not likely that Russia would move to cut off European gas supplies if the E.U. failed to support specific policies, but the possibility is nevertheless a matter of concern for both European and American policymakers. Furthermore—beyond the energy sector—further amelioration in an already warm Hungary-Russia relationship is a matter of concern for the E.U. as many worry Hungary could serve as a Trojan horse in an increasingly fragmented European Union.

Why does the Hungarian-Russian relationship matter?

The European Union is based on the principle that democratic states are stronger and more peaceful when they act together rather than alone. Unfortunately, for the past few years, neither the E.U. nor Hungary has seen eye-to-eye.

Under Prime Minister Orbàn, Hungary has been accused of breaching democratic norms. Orbàn’s government has severely weakened the plurality of the country’s media while cracking down on civil society as well as educational freedom. Orbàn has touted Hungary as Europe’s first “illiberal democracy,” going so far as to object to E.U. sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, in June 2018, Hungary was the only E.U. member to vote against providing increased aid to Ukraine.

The destabilization of the European Union and other Western institutions is a crucial objective for the Kremlin, and one that has been successful with regards to Hungary. Natural gas deals that thumb the nose at the European Union coupled with Orbàn’s anti-European rhetoric all act in Putin’s favor. Even more concerning is the International Investment Bank (IIB)’s imminent move to Hungary.

The IIB is a Moscow-based development bank that is seen by many European officials as a cover through which Russia can subvert European institutions. Orbàn has already granted the IIB immunity from any regulatory or prosecutorial authority and has accorded IIB officials with diplomatic status in Hungary. For European and American policymakers, the Hungarian-Russian relationship is one that merits increased scrutiny for the foreseeable future.

Hungary’s Relationship with Russia Poses a Risk for Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Crimean Peninsula may have strategic significance for the Russian military, but Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer play the Crimea card at home for political gain. Even though the 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in a sharp increase in the Russian president’s approval ratings, five years on the matter has been overshadowed by widespread economic hardship.

Crimea is heavily subsidized by Moscow, with no hope of becoming economically self-sufficient in the current political climate. Russia has invested billions of rubles into the peninsula but has yet to resolve the most critical issue: water supply. Crimea, especially its northern region, is heavily dependent on Ukraine when it comes to water and power supply.

Following the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Ukraine imposed an economic embargo of the peninsula, cutting off its supply of water and power. The embargo resulted in severe economic and ecological problems for northern Crimea. More recently, Russia has established two power stations to strengthen the peninsula’s energy security. However, Moscow has been unable to ensure a sustainable water supply.

Had Russia seized the whole of southeastern Ukraine—and not just Crimea as some Russian hardliners suggested at the time—the water-supply problem may have been avoided. Since such actions weren’t taken, however, Crimea was without an overland connection to the Russian mainland until 2018, when Russia completed construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait that connected the mainland to the peninsula. 

The Kerch Strait, however, is a strategic vulnerability for Russia. In the event of a conflict, the bridge would be an easy target for sabotage. To hedge against this vulnerability, the Russian military deployed the S-400 integrated air defense system along with additional warships to Crimea in the aftermath of the November 2018 clash between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Kerch Strait.

The Kremlin must also contend with growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Crimea was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Today, Crimean Tatars—a Turkic ethnic group—retain strong cultural and religious ties to Turkey. Given that Turkey has been pursuing a more active foreign policy in recent years, it’s likely Ankara will pursue a more proactive role in Crimean affairs in the long-term. In the short-term, however, Turkey is expected to maintain its behind-the-scenes role.

The current geopolitical climate means that Moscow will have to manage Crimea like a suitcase without a handle for the foreseeable future. The Kremlin has invested heavily in integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation, but Western sanctions enacted in response to Russia’s behavior have helped to isolate the peninsula, raising prices and inhibiting economic development.

Despite these difficulties, approximately seventy-two percent of Crimean respondents said that their lives have improved since Crimea’s annexation, according to polling conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM).  However, in the long-run, the economic situation in Crimea and throughout Russia will only deteriorate due to the effects of Western sanctions.

Russia Faces Rising Costs 5 Years After Crimea’s Annexation was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

As part of a renewed pushback against Chinese influence, India announced in February that it would allocate $361 million for aid to the Maldives, a fourfold increase from 2018-19.

Key Insights

• Beijing and New Delhi are competing for influence throughout the Indian Ocean, an area which has traditionally been a part of India’s sphere of influence but has recently seen a surge of Chinese economic and military activity.
• Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives owe a substantial debt to China; New Delhi worries that debt-trap diplomacy could lead to Chinese military bases in the region.
• India will bolster its economic and military efforts in its near abroad while continuing to call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese influence in the region.

The Maldives: Trouble in Paradise an Opportunity for India

Dispensing foreign aid is hardly the primary concern of Indian policymakers. Faced with debilitating poverty levels, the South Asian nation still receives aid from a number of countries such as the UK and the US. Yet the announcement of a new foreign aid component for the 2019-2020 budget has triggered the interest of Indian foreign policy pundits because of one notable outlier. Compared to 2018-2019, aid to the Maldives has seen a 460% increase, with $361 million being allocated to the island nation. The budget boost follows New Delhi’s declaration in December 2018 that it would provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to Malé, after a meeting between Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recent political upheaval in the Maldives provides the backdrop for these decisions. The newly elected Solih defeated pro-China authoritarian leader Abdulla Yameen in a surprise election result in October 2018. Solih’s victory was clearly a welcome relief for politicians in New Delhi who described the victory as a ‘triumph of democratic forces’.

During Yameen’s five-year rule, the Maldives strengthened ties with China, solidifying a free trade deal and welcoming considerable investment while sidelining Indian concerns over the relationship. Yet the spending spree was no free lunch. The Maldives accumulated between $1.5 billion and $3 billion in debt to Chinese lenders due to an infrastructure construction boom. Solih is now actively trying to reduce this debt. India’s financial assistance will go a long way towards alleviating Malé’s financial distress. It also represents New Delhi’s intention to forge closer ties with neighboring countries and signals a broader pivot back to the Indian Ocean.

The Red Dragon in the Indian Ocean

Rather than being India’s canary in the coal mine, the Maldives represents just one aspect of China’s increasing presence across the Indian Ocean. Through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which India vehemently opposes – Beijing has sought to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with Indian Ocean nations. China sees this as a ‘win-win’ opportunity for all parties involved to enhance development and connectivity and denies any form of nefarious motive behind the sprawling scheme. Yet India doesn’t see the BRI as wholeheartedly benign. Instead, New Delhi believes that Beijing is putting some countries in significant debt stress to gain leverage for the ultimate purpose of pursuing its own strategic aims, a concept known as  ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.

Perhaps the best-known example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is in Sri Lanka. Colombo built Hambantota port on the southern coast using Chinese loans that it ultimately couldn’t repay, resulting in a debt-equity swap that left the port under the control of state-owned enterprise China Merchants Group on a 99-year lease. The fear for Indian policymakers is that this port will eventually be used as a military facility for Chinese naval vessels, as part of a scheme to ultimately establish a ‘String of Pearls’ – a series of Chinese military bases across the Indian Ocean – that would threaten India’s lines of communication and ability to project force in the event of a military crisis.

China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, its operation of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and its increased naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean to protect sea lines of communication and enhance anti-piracy efforts are perceived by India to be a threatening combination. Coupled with reports that the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are all facing high BRI-related debt distress, India is extremely concerned that these countries could become beholden to China’s will in the future.

Battles for Influence, Calls for Allies

Perceptions of China have soured in the Maldives since Solih came to power. The cheap loan binge by former president Yameen has come to an end and the hangover is starting to set in. Solih has already pledged to pull out of the free trade deal with China, claiming that deal was ‘very one-sided’.

The competition for influence is unlikely to be confined to the Maldives, with Sri Lanka on the radar for both nations. Rival bailout bids have been tabled for the debt-stressed country: the Reserve Bank of India agreed to a $400 million currency swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 2019, while the Bank of China allegedly offered a $300 million loan. In this respect, Sri Lanka presumably welcomes competition from the bigger powers if it results in a better outcome for debt reduction, and will more than likely hedge between the two nations rather than simply picking sides.

India will increasingly call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The French naval destroyer FNS Cassardrecently docked into a military port in Mumbai after India and France solidified a Joint Strategic Vision deal to increase co-operation between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne also reminded audiences at the Raisina Dialogue – a multilateral geopolitical conference held in New Delhi – that Australia remained committed to securing the Indian Ocean through close collaboration with joint naval exercises and support for regional institutions.

Expect this kind of diplomatic signaling to continue and strengthen in the future, with the possibility of a revival in more military exercises within the ‘Quad’ group, a security cooperation arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Extra funding may also be dedicated to promoting and implementing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a sea corridor promoting development across the Indian Ocean and into Africa that India has developed with Japan to rival BRI.

On the flip side, China will double down somewhere that India can’t compete: Pakistan. The $62 billion China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), with the Gwadar port as the flagship project, has come under increased scrutiny due to concerns among the new Pakistani leadership about the country’s debt levels. As other countries across the Indian Ocean begin to doubt the viability of some BRI projects, China can’t afford for its close strategic relationship with Pakistan to sour. Expect Beijing to continue pouring investments into the country. The addition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in CPEC allows China to diversify its risks whilst also strengthening its relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. More partners could join that align with China’s strategic goals, with Iran pointing out that it too had ambitions to take part.

India’s renewed influence in the Maldives shows that foreign policymakers in New Delhi are aware that for the country to remain a significant force in the Indian Ocean, they need to focus on a few key objectives. These include maintaining close ties to nearby countries by offering incentives and assistance, calling on powerful allies to support its efforts across the Indian Ocean, and also displaying independent expressions of force projection. The ensuing competition with China over influence in the Indian Ocean will likely only intensify over the coming months and years.

New Delhi’s Foreign Policy in the Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many countries, both regional and global powers, are working in Afghanistan to secure their interests in Southeast Asia. Afghanistan’s strategic location is of substantial value for India; increased and ongoing engagement in the country by India is likely.   India’s foreign policy goals are centered on enhancing India’s economic and political influence in Asia and around the world.  For instance, India’s long-term economic development will be assured if trade corridors are opened to connect India with Central Asian countries, and ultimately Europe through Afghanistan. This economic growth, in turn, will support increased Indian political influence throughout Southeast and Central Asia. Ensuring pro-Indian governments and sustained internal stability in Afghanistan are critical factors in cementing Indian regional hegemony.

India has been aggressively investing in the Middle East and Central Asia, with some of the more prominent initiatives being the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the acquisition and development of the Chabahar port in Iran. Both examples illustrate India’s substantial economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. Ensuring the flow of oil from oil-rich Central Asian states is crucial for India’s continued economic growth. According to the Economic Times, India is the third-largest importer of crude oil in the world. Some Indian officials have categorized India’s dependency on oil imports as an economic crisis. India has been urgently seeking alternative sources of crude oil in the region, in an effort to diversify in light of sanctions imposed by the United States on the Iranian oil industry, and Saudi Arabia’s close alignment with India’s arch-rival Pakistan.

India seeks to expand commerce and trade throughout Central Asia and Eurasia. India’s growing economy requires access to substantial energy resources like those found throughout the Eurasian landmass. Indian companies see tremendous opportunity for growth, as they are well-positioned to provide Central Asian states with technology and services. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Lapis Lazuli transit corridor in the region are competing to India’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that they can marginalize India’s trade in the region. The INSTC connects India to Russia, central Asian countries, Baltic, Nordic and Arctic regions. It is an Indian version of Chinese One belt One Road Initiative.

Should the United States lose a substantial amount of influence in Afghanistan, India’s goals of regional hegemony will be difficult to achieve. The U.S. expects India to play an increasingly major role in the region—particularly in Afghanistan.  India is connected with Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. Given that Iran is presently sanctioned by the U.S., Afghanistan is seen as a more viable option. While there are certainly discouraging factors—such as a lack of security—for heightened engagement in Afghanistan, there are a number of factors which could induce expanded regional cooperation. India is not only a major energy market for Central Asian energy, but it is also a way for smaller states to balance against China. Those countries who supply India with energy through Afghanistan could, theoretically, play a part in ensuring Afghanistan’s stabilization to facilitate efficient energy trade.

Neither Pakistan nor China is in favor of a substantive Indian presence in Afghanistan. Both countries have their own historical issues with India. From a strictly economic perspective, India’s activities in the region are seen by China as a threat to its ambitious BRI. For instance, Iran supports the INSTC as it would facilitate the export of Iranian natural gas and oil to Europe. India has also invested in port infrastructure in Iran in an apparent effort to disconnect Afghanistan from Pakistan. Additionally, India’s efforts to build hydropower dams along rivers in Afghanistan that flow into Pakistan and Iran is evidence of India’s strategic interests in the country, and will be hard-pressed to relinquish influence—even after a U.S. withdrawal.

India must extend assistance and support to the Afghan government in a way that benefits both countries to ensure India’s interests in the region. U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan are in alignment, as are both powers’ respective strategic goals. Therefore, it would be pragmatic for India to take advantage of the opportunities being provided by the U.S. One such opportunity being the exemption to specific Iranian sanctions granted to India by the U.S. State Department. The exemption will allow for the Indian-led development of a port in Iran as part of a transportation corridor designed to boost Afghanistan’s economy. India will have a harder time achieving its goals without support from the U.S and NATO, as Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan, coupled with China’s growing influence in Central Asia are major obstacles to India’s dreams of hegemony.

India’s Strategy for Regional Hegemony Depends on Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan has been plagued with four decades of war and conflict. Afghans are understandably wary of any notion of manufactured peace. It has been understood, to varying degrees, that a cessation of the ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the elected Afghan government can only be brought about by both parties coming to the negotiating table.

In early November in Moscow, Russia came closer to achieving this than any state has previously. The Kremlin hosted representatives from the Taliban and the High Peace Council—the committee formed to oversee such talks on behalf of the Afghan government. Among the representatives in attendance was an observer from the United States embassy, in addition to delegates from Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. Despite that these latest talks resulted in no concluding successes, the fact that both major parties merely came to the negotiating together was a success in-and-of-itself and certainly indicates a more productive dialogue going forward into 2019.

Despite the initial optimism going forward, however, these talks highlight a more disturbing trend, not just for Afghanistan, but for the rules-based global order; revisionism in U.S. foreign policy. Attempts to bring in the less hard-line members of the Taliban was a direct result of President Obama’s Afghan policy in 2011, the strategy was jointly implemented and overseen by the U.S. State Department and General Stanley McCrystal, then-commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has shifted considerably.

The shift in U.S. policy from the policy initiatives of the Bush administration resulted in several near-breakthroughs throughout the campaign, but the Taliban were reluctant to engage with both the U.S. and Afghan governments. The opening of a regional Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar, with US support, was a seen as a positive sign; that the Taliban were receptive to potential discussions.

Before anything more meaningful could take place, however, then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that there would be no talks with the Taliban. The reasoning, according to Karzai, was that the Doha office was flying the Taliban flag with signs on the building’s exterior proclaiming the office to represent the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; a signal not lost on the Afghan government. The perceived representation of Taliban legitimacy, shifting the narrative of the group from terrorists to a potentially legitimate state actor, was an affront to Karzai and the talks stalled shortly thereafter.

Despite the Afghan government’s lack of progress, there have been successful attempts by the U.S. to engage the Taliban through the Taliban’s presence in Doha. These efforts yielded tangible results. The office was instrumental in a 2014 prisoner exchange, when the U.S. transferred five Taliban fighters from Guantánamo Bay to Qatar, in return for captured U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.

Peace talks seemed to resurface over the next few years, culminating in 2018 when U.S. government officials and a Taliban spokesperson acknowledged that bilateral talks had taken place at Doha. This represented a fundamental change in U.S. policy for Afghanistan, which previously adhered to the long-held Afghan government wish that talks, no matter how informal, must include representatives from Kabul.

The Taliban, for their part, have consistently rebuked Kabul’s wishes, maintaining that it fails to acknowledge both the Karzai and subsequent Ghani governments as legitimate. Whilst the Taliban spokesperson described the talks in early 2018 with the US as “very helpful”, Trump has since angered the Quetta Shura by insisting to President Ghani that the Doha office ought to be closed; a move Ghani agrees with in principal, but one in which Qatar is unlikely to relent.

Moscow perceives itself as exploiting receding U.S. influence in the Middle East.

Despite the small but consistent glimmers of hope for a peaceful settlement under President Obama, the balance of power in the peace and reconciliation talks has shifted from Washington to Moscow under President Trump. This shift appears to be the result of two factors: The first is a long-term covert operation conducted by Russia in support of the Taliban, and the second being a withdrawal of U.S. influence and leadership in the region at a time where the U.S. could have been positioned in a way to be the prime actor in any peace talks, enabling Washington to set the conditions for moving forward.

The lack of clear Western leadership on the issue of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan has opened up a window through which Moscow has positioned itself as the key orchestrator of the talks. Paradoxically, the mujahadeen’s former enemy has become its chaperone and patron.

There has been wide speculation in the West that Moscow has been, at worst, supplying arms and cash to the insurgents, or, at best, facilitating their supply through Central Asia into Afghanistan. The Kremlin benefits from these operations as they ensure picking rights at the negotiating table, whilst simultaneously being taking care to avoid a fierce response from the United States. Of course, these allegations have been repeatedly denied by officials at the highest levels of the Kremlin.

At a time when the future of the rules-based global order seems no longer guaranteed, and with the liberal values of the West under threat, the U.S. and its coalition partners were gifted with an opportunity to shape the outcome of peace talks with the Taliban. Instead, Washington has reversed its position and allowed for Moscow to assume the leading role.

As a result of this geopolitical disruption, new questions arise. It remains to be seen how Moscow’s engagement will shape the talks going forward, and how this will this affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the broader region. If Russia is permitted to return to Afghanistan as a key player, facilitating the Taliban’s return to domestic politics, it will only serve to embolden an expansionist and revisionist Russian state in its campaign to degrade the rules-based, liberal world order.

Russia Returns to Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s vast amounts of territory are inhabited by diverse groups of people—each with distinct cultural, political, economic, and religious traditions. Today, the Chinese Communist Party aims to forge a single, homogeneous “Chinese” national identity. Beijing is implementing policies designed to effectuate the forced ethnic and cultural assimilation of minorities like the Tibetans and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.

This lack of a singular national identity was further compounded by a geographical landscape that impeded the establishment of a multipolar regional order like that of Europe. Europe’s plains and uplands are divided by rivers and mountain ranges—a vast swath of territory that enabled the rise of multiple, sovereign nation-states.

Eventually, European imperialist ambitions would extend this competition to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. As competing sovereign entities, European nation-states were actors an evolving political system that would eventually become known as the balance of power. This system upended the universalist status quo following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The term balance of power gained significance in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

China’s topography isn’t conducive to balance of power politics. Where the Europeans had space to expand and develop distinct national identities, China’s various competing groups had competed with one another for supremacy in the absence of a strong central authority. Each ruling dynasty followed a similar path to power, with minor exceptions.

Controlling the Chinese heartland allows for the control over all of China.

Until the tenth century, the Guanzhong Plain was the primary center of political power. Eventually, this concentration of wealth and power shifted to the North China Plain, which took on increased economic and cultural significance. The North China Plain then connected to the fertile Yangtze Plain. The importance of the North China Plain only increased as the Chinese empire expanded further to the north and the east.

The Yangtze Plain, by contrast, generated dynasties that instantly succumbed either to their weaknesses, like the Southern Song in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or to their northerly competitors like the short-lived nationalist government did in the twentieth century.

The North China Plain’s political importance is primarily due to its geography. Unlike areas to the south, the North China Plain expands mostly uninterrupted by mountains and has fewer rivers. This facilitated rapid communication by horseback. This resulted in a mostly homogeneous linguistic makeup, relative to the many different languages and dialects that are found throughout southern China. The ability to communicate rapidly across a significant distance allowed political and economic power to be concentrated along the North China Plain.

While the North China Plain was primarily the political center of China after the tenth century, it was control over Zhongyuan (中原)—the Central Plains—that was central to the survival of any ruling dynasty. Each understood that control over the Central Plains—the Chinese heartland—would enable for the control over all of China. This principle, the “Heartland Theory” was laid out by British economic theorist Halford Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History.

Historically, China’s international relations were based on suzerainty rather than sovereignty.

The area that comprises the Chinese heartland is less than one-third the size of the European plains, albeit with a substantially higher population. These demographic and geographic variables inhibit the development of a system of competing sovereign states. As such, the concept of sovereignty was nonexistent in imperial China.

Whereas the great powers of Europe looked upon rival powers as peers and understood the concept of sovereignty, China held no such outlook. Up until the nineteenth century, China’s international relations were based on the idea of suzerainty. China considered itself to be without equal, seeing itself as the world’s cultural and political center. It managed its international relations through a tributary system.

The Mandarin word for China is Zhongguo (中国), which translates literally as the “Middle Kingdom.” This Sinocentric perception can be primarily be attributed to China’s geographical reality and the fact that it possessed no notion of national sovereignty. Political scientist Suzanne Ogden has discussed Chinese international relations as being fundamentally based on the concept of universal morality, one that is developed, implemented, and imposed on others by a single entity. This belief of “moral persuasion and cultural superiority” as Ogden puts it, is a significant driver of the narrative of Chinese exceptionalism.

The Chinese emperor was identified as the single “supreme authority under heaven.” The area “under heaven” was, therefore, subject to the emperor’s authority. The sole “supreme authority” was the emperor of the Middle Kingdom. During China’s imperial period, no word akin to “Chinese emperor” existed. In relations with other rulers, even those of European states, the Chinese viewed the emperor as a patriarchal figure to which there was no equal.

East Asia expert Alan M. Wachman explains that the Chinese emperor’s sovereignty or rule over the imperial Chinese state was “potential, not actual, control.” As such, the degree to which the emperor’s authority was accepted depended on the period and location in question. This belief guided the nation through generations of unification, expansion, fragmentation, and decline, prescribing an approach for handling each phase in the cycle.

At times of dynastic corrosion and rebellion, for example, defense and military strategy had been the answer for aspiring leaders. Furthermore, major infrastructure development projects like the Grand Canal and military incursions in the broader region helped a dynasty secure the “mandate of heaven”—thereby legitimizing its hold on power.

The bureaucracy was and is essential to central government’s exercise of political power. Auxiliary tiers of bureaucratic authorities within the central government’s control extended from the heartland to the rest of China, and beyond. Utilizing a tributary system of appointed officials and in rare circumstances, military forces, China’s leaders were able to diffuse their power within Central Asia, into the Korean Peninsula, and throughout Southeast Asia, consolidating their control over the heartland, China, and the world as they saw it.

Chinese notions of geopolitics failed to account for the importance of maritime power.

During the seventeenth century, however, the onset of the maritime era would interrupt China’s illusions of being a separate realm. Naval invaders began arriving on the nation’s shore, where the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty, would eventually meet them.

Although the Manchu Qing possessed what Mackinder called the “superior mobility of horsemen and camelmen,” their approach to repelling invasions was no different from that of the previous ethnically Han Ming dynasty. Where the Han Ming dynasty constructed the Great Wall to protect against the Manchu, the Qing erected fortifications along the shoreline to keep foreign invaders at bay.

At that point, China hadn’t developed significant naval assets of its own, and its conceptualization of geopolitics wouldn’t include maritime power for three centuries. Even then, the geostrategic implications of robust naval power would garner little notice within China before Japan used its superior naval power to achieve victory over China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895.

China’s defeat marked the beginning of another era of decline and the demise of the Sinocentric view of international relations. It took the so-called “century of humiliation” for China to comprehend that this worldview was no longer compatible with the rest of the world.

The broader geopolitical strategy which prevailed in the West did not serve the European powers far better. After fighting for control of the Eurasian landmass, what Mackinder dubbed the World Island, they emerged from two world wars and innumerable smaller conflicts only to see that the center of international power had moved across the Atlantic Ocean to the United States.

Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is rooted in the successes and failures of the past.

As maritime and land-based powers (the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively) expanded their spheres of influence across the globe, the combination of territory on the border of the Eurasian landmass and a shoreline seemed to sentence China to be on the margins of the international system.

Nevertheless, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, China overcame its geographical circumstances, and in the process, its reasoning has evolved. The trials and tribulations it suffered through in the second half of the twentieth century, including the wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, a U.S. naval quarantine, and concurrent pressure from the Soviet Union, encouraged China to realize its capabilities. The geography that once seemed a curse to Chinese theorists now brimmed with possibility.

The country’s location, in the end, provides it access to developed economies overseas and overland access to precious energy assets in Central Asia and the Middle East, an edge that economic theorist Nicholas Spykman identified in the early 1940s. China’s geopolitical goal was now to tap into wealth in the east, and technological advancement in the west, as stated by Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu.

China’s ascendancy to great power status in the twenty-first century was primarily enabled by a combination of geographic, political, and economic factors. It’s economic growth allowed in this century an unprecedented concentration on naval development. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has grown substantially over the previous two decades, enabling the overseas projection of Chinese military power.

As it has done throughout history, China is embarking on an expansionary course more out of necessity than out of ambition. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, aims to ease the country’s economic and logistical dependence on its eastern coast while developing its less-developed interior regions.

Similarly, Beijing’s increasingly assertive maritime policy is another attempt to secure its access to overseas markets and preclude a challenger from presenting a threat to its multiplying global interests. There are consequences, however, for China’s increasingly aggressive expansionism.

China will attempt to outmaneuver these consequences wherever possible, as it strives to revise the terms of the international order. Chinese expansionism is a policy that will yield unpredictable results after centuries of a Sinocentrist approach to international relations. However, if the U.S. and its allies fail to provide and sustain a viable alternative to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions, Beijing will find it increasingly easier to rewrite the rules of global trade and security.

How Chinese Exceptionalism Fuels an Expansionist Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

America is not alone in projecting itself as an exceptional power and vital force for good in the world. Russia makes the same claim. That sentiment is built upon centuries of defeating invaders, as I explore in “Russia: The Story of War.” And it plays a crucial role in how Russia sees itself in its increasingly tense relationship with NATO and the West.

The birth of Russian exceptionalism

For Russia, its triumph over Nazi Germany in the Second World War is a pillar of national identity. Outsiders don’t often realize that Russians’ belief in their special role in saving civilization from history’s villains predates the war.

In 1812, Napoleon, a tyrant bent on world domination, invaded Russia only to see his army destroyed. It was a tremendous victory and propelled Russia to lead a coalition of allies to liberate Europe from his grip. That campaign ended in 1814 with their occupation of Paris. While Napoleon’s final defeat came at Waterloo in 1815, Russians insisted that they had inflicted the mortal wound.

After the Napoleonic Wars, a volcano of patriotism erupted across Russian society. At its center was the widely shared belief that Russia had saved Europe. Moreover, no other country on its own had repelled an invasion by Napoleon or crushed his army, which had once seemed invincible. Commonly disparaged by Western Europeans as savages or barbarians, Russians could now turn their reputation on its head. As Denis Davidov, a flamboyant leader of partisans declared: “At last, with head lifted proudly, one can say: ‘I am a Russian.’”

Such pride caused many writers and intellectuals in the 19th century to look deeper into history for more evidence of this exceptionalism.

Roll call of invaders

That search led back to the 13th century when the Mongols invaded Europe. Known as “God’s scourge,” their forces advanced no farther than Eastern Europe, allowing Russians centuries later to claim that they had shed their blood to protect the rest of Europe from this dire threat.

Intellectuals advanced subsequent invasions to bolster the argument of exceptionalism. In the 16th century, the Crimean Tatars rode north, leaving Moscow in ashes. In the 17th, the Poles did the same while also deposing the tsar and murdering the head of the Russian Church. In the 18th, the Swedes invaded only to be defeated by Peter the Great.

With Napoleon’s invasion in the 19th, belief in Russia’s indispensable role was secure, and it enjoyed stable currency across the political spectrum. From Fyodor Dostoevsky, an arch-conservative, to Lenin’s idol, the radical revolutionary Nicholai Chernyshevsky – all awarded their nation pedigree status for serving as a shield to defend civilization.

The military, to no surprise, took this idea as an article of faith. At century’s end the head of Russia’s equivalent of West Point, General Nikolai Sukhotin, embraced it as “the key to understanding the special nature of Russia’s experience of war” – something to which, he also added, no other Western nation could lay claim.

Hitler’s attack in the next century – the most significant threat Russia has faced – has cemented its myth of exceptionalism. Just as no country has done what Russia has done to protect others from aggressors, so runs the belief, no other nation has itself also been such a frequent target of aggression.

What war means today

More than anything else, Russia’s experience of war has profoundly shaped its worldview and self-image. That legacy also feeds a national narrative, one nurtured over centuries, not just of epic proportion but of grand persuasion that can serve multiple purposes.

First, and perhaps foremost, it can be invoked whenever Russia is painted as an aggressor. It ensures a presumption of innocence and just cause, no matter the action taken. It even allows for a defensive gloss to burnish Russia’s campaigns of conquest that, by the end of the 19th century, made it the largest contiguous empire, encompassing one-sixth of the world’s landmass.

Defensive expansionism, for example, can be invoked to explain Russia’s annexation of Crimea – both times. The first instance was at the end of the 18th century in order to eliminate the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars who for centuries had raided Russia in pursuit of its most lucrative resource: Russians themselves bound for the slave markets of the Middle East. The second time, of course, was in 2014 when Russia argued it was protecting Russians on the peninsula from an ostensibly hostile Ukrainian government.

Second, it helps underwrite Russia’s suspicion of others that is often decried as overly paranoid or pathological. Here, too, one can go back to the Mongols. When they invaded, how did Russia’s western neighbors respond? By attacking Russia as well.

Also driving this suspicion of the West, besides the sheer number of invasions, is that the invaders have often been coalitions of nations, as if engaged in a collective conspiracy against Russia. Napoleon’s army included, among others, Poles, Italians and Germans, whereas Hungarians, Romanians and others joined Hitler’s ranks. In this reasoning, this is why NATO – especially after its expansion right up to Russia’s border – can be seen through the lens of deja vu, as if Europe once more is ganging up on Russia. Not for nothing do state-sponsored advertisements replay a joke favored by Tsar Alexander III in the late 19th century – but no longer in jest. He would ask, “How many allies does Russia have?” Two, s the punch line: its Army and its Navy.

Third, calling on this legacy plays into the Kremlin’s drive to centralize power. And in the hyper-patriotic climate it has caused, political opposition can be tagged as treason, and foreign entities on Russian soil easily rebranded as foreign agents.

In fact, the legitimacy of the office of president is inseparable from the aura of war. It is no coincidence that inauguration day is May 7, thus pairing it with May 9, VE Day, and the massive celebrations marking the end of World War II. To add effect, the presidential honor guard wears uniforms recalling the Napoleonic age. What else but the backdrop of Russia’s two greatest triumphs to cement the authority of the state with the sacrifices of the people?

Here we see the true function of this civic religion: showcasing a sense of exceptionalism that unites Russians behind an all-powerful center and unifies their turbulent and bloody thousand-year history along with a single continuum as the perpetual victim of foreign aggression. This mythic narrative is high-octane fuel for the engine of Russian nationalism, and today is pumped through all venues of culture and society. And precisely because of its deep roots extending back centuries, it enjoys widespread domestic support.

Nothing but war teaches Russians better that, while at the center of world-shaking events, they are on the side of the good and always come out on top. Nothing raises the ideological scaffolding higher than seeking to make Russia great again following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

“We are history’s makers,” the popular historian Vladimir Medinsky declared shortly before becoming minister of culture. And in this telling, Russians certainly are.

Why Russia Thinks It’s Exceptional was originally published on Global Security Review.

The E.U. first decided to impose sanctions in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which were expanded a few months later after Russia began a destabilizing hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, and after a Russian-made missile destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukrainian territory controlled by separatist forces backed by the Kremlin.

In 2018, E.U. members states joined the United Kingdom and the United States in expelling a record number of Russian diplomatic and intelligence personnel in response to the reportedly Kremlin-ordered attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, in which the nerve agent Novichuk was used on U.K. soil.

At the turn of the century, Russia saw itself as European. However, as E.U.-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated over the past decade, Russia has turned away from Europe, identifying instead as a Eurasian power. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promoted the idea of E.U. integration for Russia, and upon becoming president in 2000, Vladimir Putin pursued a similar path.

Russian-European Integration

The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, a whitepaper produced by the Kremlin that defines Russia's foreign policy, identified the E.U. as being critically important for Russia as one of Moscow's primary "political and economic partners." While the Kremlin still perceived NATO and the U.S. as Russia's foremost national security threats, in addition to impeding Russia's long-term goal of restoring its status as a "great power," the European Union was viewed favorably.

However, this perception did not last. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the U.S., Putin became increasingly vocal about the necessity for Russia to reestablish itself as a "great power" to adequately defend its interests in the post-Cold War era. Concurrently, the Kremlin, in both rhetoric and action, became increasingly assertive about what it considered its right to dictate the foreign policy of neighboring states, located in what Russia historically regards as its sphere of influence.

In 2004, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia (former Soviet republics) joined the E.U. along with multiple former members of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland. In response, the Kremlin denounced the E.U.'s expansion, accusing the bloc of creating divisions across the European continent.

The expansion of the E.U. into what Russia viewed as its sphere of influence, combined with the wave of "color revolutions" in several former Soviet republics between 2003 and 2005, led the Kremlin to begin regarding the E.U. as a power with expansionist ambitions that threatened Russian sovereignty and strategic foreign policy aims.

European Expansionism

Under Putin, Russia grew convinced that both the E.U. and the U.S. played a part in the "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which either could have—or did—shift the alignment of those states towards Europe, at Russia's expense.

The perception in Moscow of the E.U. as a distinct and separate entity from NATO and the U.S. faded between 2004 and 2008. From Russia's point of view, all three actors were working to impede Russia's foreign policy, and undermine its sovereignty by imposing on Russia an international order that was at odds with Russia's interests.

Less than eight years after desiring greater integration with Europe, Putin regularly accused the U.S. of unipolar hegemony and argued that the post-Cold War order was unfair. In a speech delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin asserted that the U.S. "overstepped its boundaries in all spheres—economic, political, and humanitarian." As a consequence, he stated that Russia would follow an "independent foreign policy."

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept released in 2008 subsequently downgraded the E.U. from a "main political and economic partner" to "one of the main trade-economic and foreign policy partners." In the same year, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied the regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia, situated along Georgia's border with Russia.

In response, the E.U. halted negotiations on what would be a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that would define Moscow-Brussels relations. In 2009 the E.U. launched its Eastern Partnership initiative with six former republics of the Soviet Union.

The following year, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was formed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The ECU was intended as a counterweight to the E.U. and was designed to consolidate Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space to guarantee its national interests better and increase its global standing.

Russia Turns Away from Europe—to Eurasia

In 2012, Moscow was overwhelmed by large-scale protests over the reported rigging of the 2011 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin, again, saw the protests as being part of a Western plot to destabilize Russia's political system and foment regime change. Putin, having returned to the presidency that year, began instituting structural reforms that would impede Western influence within Russia, while simultaneously promoting Russia as the conservative defender of traditional values.

The 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine that toppled the pro-Russian government of President Viktor Yanukovych was seen by Putin as yet another example of Western interference in Russia's historical sphere of influence. Just months after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea from Ukraine and stoked a devastating civil war in eastern Ukraine.

In recent years, Russia has gone on the offensive against the West, interfering in multiple elections and exploiting political divisions in Europe and the United States. From the Russian perspective, this is only logical. The Kremlin maintains that the E.U and the U.S. were engaged in a plot designed to destabilize and weaken Russia, so it attempts to do the same.

Relations between the E.U. and Russia largely reflect the broader relationship between Russia and the West. Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept eliminates any reference to the European Union, instead emphasizing "Eurasian integration," a reference to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the successor to the ECU. Currently, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are members.

The EAEU is intended to facilitate the economic integration of former Soviet republics into a single economic entity. Russia's reorientation towards Eurasia through the EAEU is a signal that it now sees the E.U. as something that, instead of cooperating with, must be confronted.

As Russia Identifies as a Eurasian Power, It Turns Away from Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has been threatened by invasions for centuries. The country’s western borders have always been distinctly vulnerable, with no mountain ranges, bodies of water, or other geographical features to serve as natural defenses.

The European landmass that borders western Russia is a large peninsula that lies between the Baltic and North Seas in the north, the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south.

In contrast to its European neighbors, Russia has few maritime access points. Its few ports are mostly unusable during the winter, and even during warmer months, the Arctic Ocean is far from Russia’s major population centers. Turkish waters to the south, much like Nordic waters to the north, can be easily blocked.

During the Cold War, airbases in the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland gave NATO air superiority which would, in the event of a conflict, enable the alliance to block Russian access to the Atlantic ocean through the strategic GIUK Gap.

The concept of containing Russian expansion wasn’t limited to the Cold War. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, both France and Britain made concerted efforts to contain Russian activities in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia. With limited defensive options available, Russia’s military doctrine has historically been offensive, with the aim of dominating its neighbors to prevent borderlands from being used against it.

Whereas the West views Russia’s fear of invasion as baseless, history has shown otherwise. The view in the Kremlin is that each era brings a fresh existential threat, be it overt or covert, conventional or asymmetric.

Russia’s history and geography have fostered the existence of a highly centralized and autocratic political system, with leaders obsessed with both internal and external security.

After World War II, Moscow saw the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and its western allies as a strategic threat. The incorporation of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, along with the creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, bolstered Russia’s feelings of security at the expense of the West’s.

NATO expands as the Soviet Union disintegrates.

As the Kremlin lost control over territory across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, its sense of security was eliminated entirely. At the end of the twentieth century, Russia’s security buffer had ceased to exist, and its western border was the farthest east it had been since the eighteenth century.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russian objections left few options when it came to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. One option was for a robust expansion of NATO, under the logic that Russia would always attempt to dominate its neighbors if not deterred by the threat of military force.

Alternatively, the NATO expansion could be delayed until Russia reneged on its pledges to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. However, NATO proceeded with its eastward expansion, arguing that it had done so on the premise of avoiding a confrontation with Russia, rather than preparing for a new or expected Russian threat.

After the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in March 1999, the alliance commenced a three-month bombing campaign against Serbia, a state with deep historical and cultural ties to Russia.

The campaign demonstrated the efficacy of NATO’s advanced conventional weaponry at a time when Russia was struggling to rebuild itself. Additionally, the concurrent NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries all but ensured that Russian leaders would once again be able to seize upon the tried-and-true narrative that NATO, led by the United States, was an existential threat to Russia.

Russia’s perpetual fear of invasion has always been a significant driver of its foreign policy.

While military conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have been attributed to aggressive Kremlin efforts to reestablish elements of the Soviet empire, it should be noted that, with the exception of Crimea (which houses the Russian Black Sea Fleet), Russia has not officially annexed any territory belonging to the states in which it has engaged in hybrid conflicts.

The Kremlin’s motives in Ukraine aren’t merely plausible deniability, the annexation of pro-Russian territories would only have the counter-productive effect of encouraging pro-Western forces to escalate their efforts.

Annexation would undermine Russia’s primary goal, which is to prevent countries in what the Kremlin considers to be its sphere of influence from joining NATO, essentially a strategy of reverse-containment.

The alliance typically rejects aspirants with unresolved border disputes, internal territorial conflicts, and insufficient military capabilities to provide for credible national defense. The presence of frozen conflicts in the Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine effectively blocks them from joining NATO.

Recommendations for Policymakers: Contain and Modernize

During the Cold War, the NATO alliance worked because the United States understand the reality of a Russian sphere of influence with which it had to balance to maintain global stability and security.

In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the timing of the Russian interventions coincided with those states’ respective overtures to both NATO and the European Union, entities viewed as inherently hostile to Russia’s interests.

The combined separatist territories, under de-facto Russian control, now form a protective barrier along Russia’s southwestern border. Just as Stalin used the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a security buffer against the perceived threat of western encirclement, Putin has done the same.

NATO members and partner states can better inform their view of Russian strategy by analyzing the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has employed hybrid warfare in both conflicts to great effect, in the form of conventional cross-border assaults accompanied by a combination of unconventional operations, information operations, cyber tactics, economic coercion, and political influence.

NATO requires a multi-faceted modernization strategy that goes beyond merely padding the frontlines with additional troops and assets. To effectively contain Russia in the twenty-first century, the transatlantic alliance urgently needs looking to modernize its maritime forces, as well as improve non-frontline capabilities such as cyber, information warfare, and missile defense.

Russian Expansionism is a Consequence of Geography was originally published on Global Security Review.

Earlier this month, Russian business daily Kommersant reported that the Kremlin proposed to cooperate with the United States to prevent “cyberattacks on critical infrastructure,” and wanted to include language to that effect in a communiqué issued at the end of the Helsinki Summit.

Although the communiqué was never issued, it is at least the third time in two years that Russia has requested some form of cooperation with the United States on cyber issues. Last year at the G20 in Germany, Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of U.S.-Russia cyber working group, which President Trump famously called an “impenetrable Cyber Security unit.” In December, BuzzFeed reported that Russia’s deputy foreign minister had proposed an agreement whereby both countries would agree to not interfere in each others’ domestic politics. U.S. officials rebuffed that offer.

So why has the United States rejected Russia’s offers at collaboration? Three reasons come to mind.

First, U.S. officials are understandably skeptical of the sincerity of Moscow’s overtures while it continues its reckless cyber operations against the United States. In the last twenty-four months, Russia compromised and doxed the Democratic Party, launched a chaotic ransomware attack, tried to infiltrate U.S. electrical utilities with tools similar to those used to cause blackouts in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, owned over 500,000 consumer-grade routers, sustained an active measures campaign on social media, and compromised voter databases in at least two states. From Washington’s perspective, these actions go way beyond traditional peacetime intelligence gathering. Collecting intelligence about political parties’ views on policy issues or the technology a utility uses is generally kosher among spies. Active measures against those parties and trying to find a utility’s off switch is not.

Russia would respond that all of the above could have been avoided if the United States simply agreed to its proposals of non-interference in each others’ internal affairs and cooperated to reduce threats against critical infrastructure. That raises the second reason for Washington’s rejection of the Kremlin’s proposals: Russia and the United States often talk past each other on cyber issues. As I wrote last year, both “fundamentally disagree on the nature of cyber conflict” and hampers their ability to agree to shared norms. A norm to not use cyber means to interfere in each others’ domestic politics is not viable because it would be dependent on factors beyond the U.S. government’s control. If the Kremlin already believes that the Panama Papers was a CIA plot to undermine Russia or that the White House has the ability to fire journalists, it is sure to blame the U.S. government for any future New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, or similar investigation uncovering corruption or malfeasance in Putin’s inner circle.

Third, the Kremlin’s emphasis on getting President Trump’s endorsement of a cyber agreement poses a particular optics problem for the United States. Any cyber agreement that he makes with his Russian counterpart would automatically be greeted with skepticism in light of Russia’s 2016 election interference and the Mueller investigation. The proposed cyber working group in 2017 was quickly discarded after the idea was made public and Trump’s subsequent tweet drew condemnation, ridicule, and derision. Nevertheless, Russia keeps aiming for a leaders’ level agreement, hoping it can bypass an intransigent “deep state” in the United States bent on styming efforts at rapprochement, when quieter talks between working-level diplomats might yield greater success.

The United States and Russia recognize that despite their significant differences, they have to talk to each other to avoid uncontrolled escalation in cyberspace. That’s why even after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States kept meeting with Russian cyber experts despite having cut cooperation elsewhere. And the Kremlin reportedly used a dedicated hotline on cyber issues to raise concerns about malicious cyber activity emanating from the United States against the 2014 Sochi Olympics.

The most promising opportunity for U.S.-Russia cyber cooperation will come this fall at the United Nations. Russia will propose a resolution seeking the General Assembly’s endorsement of a code of conduct for state activity in cyberspace. The text of the resolution has not been made public, but it is likely to be a combination of existing cyber norms the GGE agreed to in 2013 and 2015 and previous iterations of another code of conduct members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) proposed in 2011 and 2015. The inclusion of the SCO language will make the United States and like-minded countries balk given its negative human rights implications. Nevertheless, the proposed Russian resolution could probably be salvaged through negotiation that strips it of the SCO code’s worst elements, keeps the consensus GGE language, and mandates the creation of a new GGE to pick up where the last one fell apart.

That outcome is far from an ideal scenario for either country. Russia and China have been drivers of the SCO’s cyber work, and will want to see some form of UN endorsement of its efforts. The United States is unlikely to be enthused at the prospect of another GGE process when it would rather spend its time enforcing existing cyber norms instead of talking about creating new ones. Despite these misgivings, it is one of the few options that keeps Moscow and Washington at the bargaining table.

Russia Wants a Deal with the United States on Cyber Issues. Why Does Washington Keep Saying No? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Millennials are not into the ‘We are the greatest country’ idea.

Millennials, the generation born between 1981 and 1996, see America’s role in the 21st century world in ways that, as a recently released study shows, are an intriguing mix of continuity and change compared to prior generations.

For over 40 years the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which conducted the study, has asked the American public whether the United States should “take an active part” or “stay out” of world affairs.

This year, an average of all respondents – people born between 1928 and 1996 – showed that 64 percent believe the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs, but interesting differences could be seen when the numbers are broken down by generation.

The silent generation, born between 1928 and 1945 whose formative years were during World War II and the early Cold War, showed the strongest support at 78 percent. Support fell from there through each age group. It bottomed out with millennials, of whom only 51 percent felt the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs. That’s still more internationalist than not, but less enthusiastically than other age groups.

There is some anti-Trump effect visible here: Millennials in the polling sample do identify as less Republican – 22 percent – and less conservative than the older age groups. But they also were the least supportive of the “take an active part” view during the Obama administration as well.

Four sets of additional polling numbers help us dig deeper.

• Military power: Only 44 percent of millennials believe maintaining superior military power is a very important goal, much less than the other generations. They also are less supportive of increasing defense spending. And when asked whether they support the use of force, millennials are generally disinclined, especially so on policies like conducting airstrikes against Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, using troops if North Korea invades South Korea, and conducting airstrikes against violent Islamic extremist groups.
• American ‘exceptionalism’: Millennials also were much less inclined to embrace the idea that America is “the greatest country in the world.” Only half of millennials felt that way, compared to much higher percentages of the other three generations. In a related response, only one-quarter of millenials saw the need for the U.S. to be “the dominant world leader.” These findings track with the 2014 American National Election Study, which found that while 78 percent of silent, 70 percent of boomer and 60 percent of Gen X respondents consider their American identity as extremely important, only 45 percent of millennials do.
• Alliances and international agreements: Millennials are especially supportive of NATO, at 72 percent. In this measure, they are close to the other generations’ levels of NATO support. Their 68 percent support for the Paris climate agreement is higher than two of the other three age groups. And their 63 percent support for the Iran nuclear nonproliferation agreement is even with boomers and higher than Gen X.
• Globalization and key trade issues: Millennials’ 70 percent agreement with the statement that “globalization is mostly good for the United States” is higher than all the other age groups. Similarly, 62 percent believe that NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) is good for the U.S. economy – well above the others surveyed. The margin is also positive although narrower on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

These and other polls show millennials to have a world view that, while well short of isolationist, is also not as assertively and broadly internationalist as previous generations.

Millennials’ worldview and its implications

Why do millennials see the world the way they do? And with millennials now the largest generation and emerging into leadership positions, what does it mean for American foreign policy?

In my view, the “why” flows from three formative experiences of millennials.

First, the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and Iraq for close to half the lives of the oldest millennials, who were born in 1981, and most of the lives of the youngest, born in 1996. Despite America’s vast military power, neither war has been won.

So, from the millenials’ point of view, why make military superiority a priority? Why spend more on defense? Why not be skeptical about other uses of force?

Second, as a generation which is generally “defined by diversity,” as Brookings demographer William H. Frey describes them, millennials take a less extreme view of Islam. A 2015 Pew Research Center poll showed only 32 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds agreed that Islam was more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its followers. Compare that to 47 percent of 30- to 49-year-olds and a little more than half of the two older age groups.

Third, globalization infuses the lives of millennials in many ways.

“For younger Americans,” the Chicago Council study authors write, “the Internet, the steady flow of iPhones, computers and other products from abroad, and the expansion of global travel may have all contributed to a rising comfort level with the rest of the world generally, and to the acceptance that international trade is simply part of the fabric of the modern world.”

What are the implications and impact on foreign policy politics of millennials’ views?

In my opinion, even more significant than issue-specific positions is millennials’ disinclination to buy into American exceptionalism. These younger Americans show a greater willingness to get beyond the “We are the greatest country” paeans. Such exceptionalism, subscribed to more avidly by older generations, takes a rose-colored view of American foreign policy’s history and ignores the profound changes shaping the 21st century world.

In this respect in particular, we’d do well to learn from millennials’ more measured views.

Millennials Are Over U.S. Domination of World Affairs was originally published on Global Security Review.

The sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and their allies were targeted against a host of Russian individuals, officials, banks, corporations, and organizations. Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy, defense, and financial firms, limiting their access to western markets while prohibiting the sale and export of certain oil exploration and production technologies to Russia.

U.S. and E.U. sanctions remain in effect, with the E.U. announcing that it will extend them until January 31, 2019. However, sanctions have failed to produce the results that were anticipated when they were implemented.

Sanctions have not only failed to change the course of Russia’s foreign policy towards the West; they’ve neither deterred Russian aggression nor created any incentives for Moscow to alter its behavior. On the contrary, sanctions have contributed to a widening divide within the European Union, and within the transatlantic alliance with growing calls for the elimination of sanctions.

What is the point of sanctions?

Sanctions are limitations that are introduced by one country or a group of countries against another in retaliation, in an attempt to change the behavior of the country with regards to its domestic or foreign policy, or sometimes even attempts at regime change i.e. by increasing the cost of international isolation.

In general, the idea behind imposing sanctions is to preserve the state of legality or to establish the state of peace and security. Considering the coercive and non-coercive impact of sanctions on the economy, businesses, diplomatic channels, and reputation of the targeted country, the aim of sanctions is to prevent, deter, or limit opportunities for possible undesirable behavior.

The idea is that if the targeted country does not change its course of action, then the cost of sanctions would either enforce compliance or create incentives for the country to comply with international rules.

How effective are the sanctions on Russia?

Although sanctions have had a detrimental impact on the Russian economy, the costs imposed by sanctions are outweighed by the Kremlin’s desire to regain and sustain geopolitical influence within what it considers to be its traditional sphere of influence (i.e. the former Soviet Union).

The downturn in Russia’s economy that began in 2014 was not the result of economic sanctions alone, rather, it was the result of a combination of factors made exponentially worse by the Russian government’s inability to reduce the economy’s dependency on energy exports, in addition to a steep decline in oil prices.

The government managed to stabilize the economy by tapping into its sovereign wealth fund, which provided badly-needed time to implement anti-crisis monetary policies in addition to reducing the economy’s vulnerabilities to external events.

Western sanctions do not target a significant segment of the Russian economy. The E.U. and the U.S. sanctions target specific Russian elites and companies, in order to limit the severity of their effect on the Russian population.

If sanctions were too harsh, the Kremlin could see them significant or even existential threat. Nation-states often react when they pushed beyond the threshold of what they perceive as acceptable; extreme sanctions would likely result in Russia retaliating in a manner that would endanger the security of eastern European countries.

According to former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin, sanctions managed to shave off a mere 0.5 percent of GDP each year. Sanctioned firms that have lost access to western markets have been bailed out by the Kremlin with public funds, the National Welfare Fund is one example.

Tit-for-tat measures employed by Russia imposed a ban on American and European food imports, enabling local agriculture businesses to grow their businesses by selling domestically-manufactured products to domestic consumers.

Lastly, tightening restrictions on Russian oligarchs and their investments has done little to change the Kremlin’s behavior. In fact, as many have argued it has played into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin, enabling him to effectively  “nationalize” the elite.

Are sanctions helping Putin politically?

The domestic narrative provided by the sanctions and trumpeted by the Kremlin has given a political boost to Putin. Russian state media portrays Putin as a president fighting to protect Russian interests against NATO aggression.

Sanctions also offer Putin with an easy scapegoat for lackluster economic performance,  allowing him to shift the blame for low economic growth to western economic sanctions, providing increased time to address major structural issues with the Russian economy, and reduce its over-dependence on energy exports.

In other words, the sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea have done little to alter Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine, nor have they impacted the Russian economy in a way that would induce any change in Russian policy. Furthermore, if oil prices continue to rise, the detrimental impact of sanctions on Russia will be further reduced.

This raises an important question over whether or not European states would consider the long-term continuation of sanctions necessary.  Sanctions have been one area where European Union member states have shown solidarity in standing against Russian aggression. This solidarity, however, is increasingly frayed.  Hungary and Bulgaria have both stated their opposition to continuing sanctions on Russia.

In a January 2017 interview, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó stated that “the Hungarian economy has sustained a loss of some $6.5 billion due to the sanctions implemented against Russia.”

Many Central and Eastern European countries like Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy depend significantly on Russian oil and gas exports. Many believe that it is futile to continue imposing economic sanctions without achieving any meaningful results while incurring substantial economic costs.

Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, and Interior Minister made headlines during his trip to Russia in July 2018 when he stated that he would like to see the E.U. drop sanctions against Russia by the end of the year. Salvini also issued a statement of support for Russia to rejoin the Group of 7 (G7), once more making it the “G8.”

A similar tone was adopted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, during his visit to Russia during the World Cup, where he denounced E.U. sanctions against Russia during his meeting with President Putin.

The growing voices of dissent within the European Union are largely those who are most critical of the E.U. as an institution. It may be the case that Italy and Hungary are using sanctions as leverage in migrant and refugee resettlement negotiations, or as a way to resist the economic heavy-handedness exerted by Germany in dictating European fiscal policy.

Regardless, disagreements over sanctions threaten to create further divisions within the E.U. After all, the bloc operates on consensus, and all it would take for that consensus to break is the objection of a single E.U. member state.

The Impact of U.S.-Imposed Sanctions on the Transatlantic Relationship

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the November 2016 U.S. presidential elections and subsequent inauguration, the Trump administration has moved aggressively against long-term U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.

While a substantial amount of the rhetoric emanating from the White House has focused on efforts intended to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, the administration has also threatened E.U. allies that continue to do business with Russia.

The Nord Stream II pipeline has become a point of contention on both sides of the Atlantic. Republican Senators John Barrasso and Cory Gardner have introduced a bill that would mandate the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions on European companies building the Nord Stream II pipeline.

While the bill is intended to increase U.S. energy exports to Europe, it threatens western firms like France’s ENGIE, Austria’s OMV, the German firms Uniper and Wintershall, as well as British-Dutch multinational Royal Dutch Shell, all of which are contributing to the pipeline’s development.

Threatening European firms engaged in the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline with sanctions at a point when tension among transatlantic partners is high puts the transatlantic alliance in a precarious position.

The threat of sanctions levied by an ally widens divisions between the U.S. and Europe. Maintaining a united front is essential, not only against Russian aggression, but on a host of economic, security, and political issues that persist on both sides of the Atlantic.

It Might Be Time to Rethink Western Sanctions on Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The tone of the summit was set well in advance following President Trump’s criticism of NATO members failing to spend 2% of the GDP on defense expenditure. The United States, in this regard, has been contributing the bulk to what the U.S. President sees as a collective defense organization, in which member states need to contribute equally for their security and thus not be seen as free riders. Notwithstanding the real challenges that the E.U. faces in the form of growing terrorist attacks on European capitals, social tensions, and Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy to influence western governments, the discourse of the summit centered around Trump’s persistence over increased defence spending and his criticism for the German government which has only grown ever since he took over the U.S. presidency.

The narrative that drives President Trump’s criticism towards western allies is based on the changing perception of the United States towards transatlantic alliance as a whole. To understand this changing perception, it is important to shed light on the reasons that led the U.S. to support European integration and security in the first place.

The United States supported European integration for myriad reasons. First, European integration served as a way of containing Germany and tying it tightly to western institutions, namely the E.U. and NATO. Second, supporting and strengthening European allies served as a viable way of containing Soviet expansion in Europe. Third, a strong European alliance meant reduced American burden for economic and military security of Europe in the long run. Fourth, European integration was a valuable mean of ensuring that no European power develops hegemonic tendencies and that a unified bloc would serve as a balance against the Soviet Union, thereby limiting Soviet threat to the European theatre. In other words, the idea was that an integrated Europe would serve U.S. long-term security and economic interest.

In particular, NATO was formulated as a military alliance with a singular purpose of protecting western Europe against the Soviet threat. The alliance was formed with the idea that, U.S. security guarantee would enable western European countries, to develop and strengthen their economies and military capabilities to counter Soviet expansion.

The threat of common enemy worked in favor of both the United States and western European countries. The European countries had the geographical risk of bearing the cost of a war in mind, while for the Americans, the Soviet threat enabled it to be a key player in European geopolitics. The common threat served as a binding factor, which kept the alliance together during the Cold War.

Not much changed following the end of Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union did not exist anymore, the idea of European integration expanded as central and eastern European countries that were previously under Soviet influence, wanted to be part of the western bloc. Even NATO which no longer had Soviet threat to counter expanded as more and more post-communist countries kept applying for NATO membership. The trend continues to date.

The rationale behind the expansion was to bring post-Soviet countries into the framework of common western defense and economic system, which would solidify their transition into the western democratic system thereby making the continent peaceful. For post-communist countries, entry into E.U. and NATO meant economic prosperity and national security from Russian aggression. For the United States, E.U. and NATO enlargement meant the expansion of western influence.

Since more and more countries were becoming part of the alliance and since the bloc functioned on consensus, the U.S. would always have a say as far as its interest in Europe were concerned. Increased European integration would thus enable the United States to focus its attention towards Asia- Pacific, where a rising China is seen as a challenge to global U.S. dominance.

However, things started to change following the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 and its subsequent effect on European economies. European integration which was thought to reduce conflict and encourage consensus behavior resulted in producing divergence on many issues related to economic management and border security. Most European countries have become skeptical of Germany’s behavior within the E.U. Some even debate, Germany as the economic hegemon of Europe. This is true to some extent. Germany is in many ways the economic powerhouse of Europe, with a healthy economy, high wage rate, and low unemployment.

However, that growth is primarily because E.U. member states and the United States absorb Germany’s surplus products. Germany produces more than it consumes and to sell the surplus it needs markets. The free trade agreement with E.U. and a healthy trade relationship with the United States provides Berlin with the advantage of selling its surplus. In fact, it was the United States, which absorbed German exports following the global financial slowdown of 2008-09 which in many ways cocooned the German economy from economic instability.

The problem with Germany’s growth is that it is seen as one-sided. The criticism that follows Berlin is that it is too concerned about its economic well being than taking into account the broader security concerns of its NATO allies. For the United States, the German government is seen as a free rider when it comes to economic and security policy. At present, Berlin enjoys a trade surplus of over 50 billion euros with the United States. German contribution to the NATO budget, however, stands at just 1.2% of the GDP which is the lowest when compared to some of the other powerful economies in Europe.

Germany does have a plan to increase its defense spending to the agreed-upon target of 2% by 2024, but the current low contribution figure does not go down well with Eastern European countries and the United States, who see Berlin’s unwillingness to counter Russian aggression and the need to spend more on defense as a problem.

Furthermore, Germany’s tight grip on deciding fiscal rules for the bloc and forcing member states to agree on its refugee policy is seen as the imposition of German preferences on matters that concern German interest. For the United States and Eastern European countries, Germany’s relationship with Russia is at best seen as dubious. A case in point, the Nord Stream II pipeline which President Trump called out during the recent NATO summit. Nord Stream II is a joint project between German and Austrian companies and Russia’s Gazprom. On completion the pipeline will enable Russia to deliver gas directly to Germany, bypassing existing pipelines that run through Ukraine.

In other words, Nord Stream II will enable Russia to deliver gas to European customers without having to pay transit fees to Ukraine. The pipeline project has been heavily criticized by the European Commission, the United States and countries like Poland and Ukraine for making Europe more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The United States and Eastern European countries consider the pipeline project as detrimental to European security. Germany, however, does not and it continues to go ahead with the project. For Berlin, the pipeline is a viable mean of securing energy needs at affordable prices and at the same time, maintain its economic engagement with Russia.

Therefore, what emerges now is a divergence of interest at many levels. For the current U.S. administration, the behavior of certain European allies, Germany, in particular, is seen as problematic considering that it was the U.S. security guarantee that enabled Europe to grow economically. Trump, who sees maintaining a military alliance and burden sharing on the same scale, getting away with everyday assurances is not going to be easy.

President Trump has already threatened that the U.S. could go its own way if allies don’t contribute. Such a threat is not assuring to the unity of transatlantic alliance as a whole, given the already extensive areas of divergences from climate change to Iran nuclear deal to protectionist trade policies and Russian aggression in Europe. However, it is not to say that the geopolitical reality of having a strong E.U. and NATO is not paramount to U.S. interest or that the European allies can function without the U.S. role in European security. But given the differing perception of allies on a whole number of issues, it is hard to imagine how long can transatlantic partners work together.

Increasing Divergences Amongst Transatlantic Partners was originally published on Global Security Review.

The legitimacy and authority of governments and institutions across the globe will the called into question. All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign.

In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and improve the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the international order and the global balance of power.

Why are global tensions rising?

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are being shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by events overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens a rules-based international order. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order. Less of a U.S. presence on the world stage creates gaps that can be exploited by authoritarian, revisionist powers like China and Russia.

Multipolarity may also heighten the risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Israel, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

The world order is increasingly multipolar.

Questions were raised about the long-term viability of a rules-based international order in the wake of the 2016 Brexit vote and election of Donald Trump. The era of U.S.-led globalization seemed to be at an end.

While globalization has dramatically increased the degree of economic interdependence among the world’s major powers, it is not, in-and-of-itself, a guarantor of stability. Countries like Russia and Iran are perpetually searching for ways to decrease their dependence on adversarial powers, reducing their vulnerability to economic pressures like sanctions while allowing them to pursue their national interests more aggressively.

As international relations trend from a unipolar to a multipolar order, the threat of terrorism remains ever-present but will be eclipsed by increased competition between adversarial great powers.  This trend, combined with rapidly developing technologies, disinformation (“fake news” propaganda), employment shortages, and demographic trends mean greater disorder on a global scale. Thus, fundamental questions will need to be resolved regarding laws, institutions, and the balance of power in the international order.

Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics.

Liberal democracies—like Canada, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and South Korea—will face considerable challenges throughout the next several years. Growing populism and nativist nationalism will need to be tempered by governments, as stagnant living standards, rising wealth inequality, and demographic problems persist. This concentration on domestic issues could mean less bandwidth for engagement overseas.

Overseas events increasingly determine domestic realities. However, rising populist and nationalist sentiments are leading citizens to demand national solutions to global problems. Western governments will need to educate their voters on the importance of foreign policy effectively, and the role it plays in supporting domestic tranquility, rather than giving into xenophobic rhetoric and nativist policies to appease voters.

Liberal democracy is under threat.

Liberal Western powers like Germany and France lack the resources—and in the former’s case, political unity—to fill the void created by the isolationist and unilateral rhetoric and behavior emanating from the United States. In Europe, infighting between E.U. member states is obstructing badly-needed reform.

Newton’s third law—“for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”—applies to international relations just as much as it pertains to physics. Abrupt and sudden departure from the established policy by one actor will result in numerous responses by that actor’s allies, rivals, dependents, and institutions that will impede or exacerbate the impact of that action.

The Early Stages of a Multipolar World Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

The battle for influence in Africa is one of the greatest power-plays left to upset the traditional balance of power in the international community. Africa’s relatively young labor force, untapped business opportunities, thirst for technological injection, strategic location and role as a resource bridge between east and west is attractive to many.

But China’s dedication to penetrating Africa and winning influence is second to none, intricately weaving its intentions across all of its trade and foreign policies.

Critical infrastructure has been at the heart of foreign aid and development policies of Africa’s largest investors (the U.S., E.U., and China). But while the U.S. attempts to navigate a new “America First” policy under President Trump and the EU continues to negotiate the terms of Brexit and its own growing right-wing movements, China has been focused.

Following on his systematic “one belt, one road” campaign, President Xi Jinping has worked at embedding China at the heart of African infrastructure to protect and cement its regional interests for decades to come.

On track with its Belt & Road Initiative

President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an incredibly ambitious strategy to broaden Chinese access to international and domestic markets by securing and leveraging land and maritime trade routes, resulting in new patterns of trade, capital flow, resource access and business expansion.

It has the potential to facilitate regional collaboration on the most extensive global scale ever seen, reaching as much as a third of the world’s GDP, 65 percent of the world’s population and tapping into a quarter of the movement of goods and services globally.

Africa serves as a linchpin for the BRI, but many of the continent’s countries lack the requisite infrastructure to accommodate such a vision. Making inroads in Africa will require reliable power systems, roads and transport systems, broadband coverage, and compliant bureaucracies – and that is precisely what China is targeting.

Aggressive investment in critical infrastructure and the industries supporting these functions has been China’s number one mode of entry. In fact, China has established itself as one of the largest investors in critical infrastructure in nations across Africa.

Investment Means Influence

Through the Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation (FOCAC), China committed $60 billion in funding in 2015 alone, tripling its 2012 commitment of $20 billion.

Recent reports estimate Chinese banks, contractors and the government combined have extended $94.4 billion between 2000 and 2015. Success in the development of pilot programmes engaging local infrastructure industry in development and skills exchange, including construction of large industrial parks, has proved profitable for all parties.

Critical infrastructure such as water, power, broadband, transport, and logistics through these programmes means that Africa can provide the foundation for China’s BRI vision, but also remains indebted and dependent on China to maintain and pay for these new structures. Consequently, the facilitation of such developments ensures Chinese influence and political favor from partner countries.

Large-scale programs and investments support Xi’s goals to ensure the reach of China is felt everywhere not just a financially, but also a physically – and in particular wherever America may also have a presence. This sentiment was reflected by U.S. Marine Corps Commander Gen. Robert Neller speaking before a U.S. House Appropriations Committee meeting in March, “The Chinese are playing the long game … Everywhere I go, they’re there.”

Neller outlined the current Chinese strategy as to “win without fighting,” leveraging soft power capabilities and infiltrating national infrastructures to support their foreign policy ambitions.

China has pursued this strategy across the continent providing targeted investment and turnkey technological and logistical solutions, positioning themselves at the heart of these nations and leaving them vulnerable to both political and financial influence.

Additionally, these government efforts are being amplified by an increase in ordinary Chinese businesses heading to Africa, even without state-backing.

The Trappings of Dependence

While traditional foreign aid and investment have promised external funding or lower-interest loans in return for favorable trade relations and local commitments, China’s investments are tied with high-interest loans with impossible terms.

With billions of dollars already invested in the campaign, developing countries are becoming increasingly saddled with crippling debt and growing dependence on China.

In a March report, the Center for Global Development flagged eight countries at heightened risk of significant debt distress due to China’s One Belt One Road initiative.

Asia author and analyst Gordon Chang highlighted this “new form of colonialism” at a March House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on China’s role in Africa, testifying that once such dependence develops, “Beijing gets their support for geopolitical goals, and one of these goals is undermining democracy.”

Djibouti is one country which has been marked at heightened risk of debt distress, having received $14 billion in Chinese investment. This has won China critical local political support for Chinese interests and goodwill with the population. More importantly, local political support has led to the establishment of China’s first permanent overseas military base in Djibouti.

With unbound strategic importance, guarding the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Djibouti also offers an excellent vantage point from where it may observe the U.S. military base, again reflecting Gen. Neller’s earlier sentiments. This isn’t the first sign of China ruffling security feathers on the continent. French news source Le Monde reported earlier in the year on alleged daily cyber breaches of the A.U. headquarters’ IT framework.

The infiltration was traced back to Shanghai, although it was vehemently denied by Chinese officials and minimized by representatives from the African Union. Further investigations were said to have revealed hidden microphones in desks and walls throughout the Chinese-built building in Ethiopia.

China’s drive to gain greater global influence is clear

China’s method of partnering with those excluded from the Western-led world order does not isolate African governments but continues to prove strategic in protecting and promoting its national interests. China’s lack of reservations in striking deals with authoritarian leaders or governments with poor human rights records remains its advantage over western nations.

As the strategic environment in Africa becomes more crowded and competitive, U.S. General Waldhauser warns that “We will never outspend the Chinese on the continent,” and instead must be smarter about policies and actions connected to the region.

This is true for any country looking to win influence or maintain good relations with the continent. Ultimately, China stands as the lone power with both the sufficient economic might and political unification to succeed in this new scramble for influence in Africa.

China Positions Itself at the Heart of African Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past few weeks, turmoil has engulfed the two countries of Greece and Macedonia – all over a simple name change. The debate over Macedonia’s name is a point of contention between both countries and has been for many years.

However, on June 20, 2018, Macedonia’s parliament ratified an agreement with Greece to change its formal name from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Although the opposition party boycotted the vote and there is much public opposition against it, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev believes this compromise on the name is a step in the right direction for his country. If ratified, the deal will end 27 years of dispute between both countries.

The question of Macedonia’s name has to do with a Greek province.

Greece argues that the usage of the name Macedonia is at odds with a northern Greek province with the same name.

Specifically, Greece is concerned that by allowing their northern province as Macedonia as a whole to have the same name, they are opening themselves to potential future issues of territorial claims.

This dispute arose in 1991 when Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Even Macedonia’s admittance to the United Nations was done under a provisional name.

Greece has boycotted Macedonia’s attempts to join the European Union and NATO for years.

Due to the dispute, Greece has continually vetoed Macedonia’s acceptance into both the European Union and NATO. However, with this agreement in sight, European Union foreign ministers have agreed to open accession talks for both Albania and Macedonia in June 2019.

Before negotiations can take place, both countries will have to show significant progress regarding their human rights and democratic reforms. Regardless, the door is now open for both countries to enter the E.U.

At the July 11-12 NATO summit, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also indicated that he hopes members will agree to start accession talks with Macedonia. Greece has been the primary objector to Macedonia joining NATO.

This change in attitude by Greece might mean a shift in these organizations. Macedonia may be a small country, but a new Eastern member to NATO and the E.U. is always of concern to Russia. Consider that the last time an Eastern non-E.U. state showed interest in joining, part of that state’s territory was annexed by Russia. Naturally, Macedonia is not nearly as strategically important to Russia as Ukraine was. Regardless, any expansionist policy by NATO or the E.U. is watched with suspicion by Russia.

There’s still a long way to go for Macedonia.

Although it is notable that both country’s foreign ministers signed off on this historic deal, there are many hurdles to come. On June 26, 2018, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov refused to sign the agreement, calling it a “criminal act.” However, his refusal to sign it may have no impact.

If the parliament convenes again and approves the change with a two-thirds majority – then he cannot block the name change. Moreover, widespread support for the name change in both countries is at an all-time low.

After provisional approval in the Macedonian parliament, the deal will then be voted on by the Greek parliament. Even that is up in the air, although, Greek Foreign Minister, Nikos Kotzias, claims there is no reason for concern. However, the political volatility of both countries may mean that the necessary majorities in both countries may not exist by the time of the deal.

As far as security ramifications go, the change of Macedonia’s name might not seem noteworthy. The slow process of diplomacy means that the realist urges of each country may soon halt any speedy changes. Ignoring this change, nevertheless, would be a mistake. Any shift in the unpredictable Balkan region is one to be watched with care.

With such small countries, any political turmoil is relevant. Particularly with Erdogan’s recent reelection, the upcoming NATO summit and the subsequent summit between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin – small shifts remain relevant. Will the name change be used as fodder? Or will it operate as a new expansionist shift in NATO and E.U. rhetoric? And how will Russia respond? Only time will tell.

Macedonia Changes Its Name—Or Does It? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Should policies be localized or enforced at a European level? What should the rules be on migration and business deals with other countries? European leaders have often been stymied by these kinds of questions.

In the past few months, however, with the recent surge of right-wing parties, feuding has become more prominent within Europe. With the current anger towards American President Donald Trump, Russia sees an opportunity to rebuild its relations with Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin now has more leeway to strategically foster chaos and discord within Europe, particularly with the added bonus of increased feuding amongst E.U. member states.

Internal German feuding on migration may lead to unilateral action or no action at all.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, is embroiled in a  disagreement between herself and German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer on migration.

Seehofer claims that Bavaria ought to be allowed to refuse asylum-seekers who are trying to enter Germany if they are already registered with another European state or have previously been denied asylum in Germany. Merkel, instead, approaches the issue of migration from a European level. Rather than unilateral action, she opts for following European regulation.

Against Merkel’s European approach is Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. He is advocating for a plan that would strengthen borders and work against illegal immigration coming to Europe. Kurz has called for an “axis of the willing” with Germany, Austria, and Italy.

Germany is set to publish a ‘migration masterplan’ soon. However, there is no certainty as to what the consensus will be if there is one at all.

Italy’s rejection of a rescue ship sends a signal to European leaders.

In mid-June, Italy refused to accept a rescue ship filled with migrants. Although Spain took up the burden and allowed the 629 passengers to come to Valencia, the wound to European solidarity is still fresh.

Italy’s new government campaigned on anti-migrant policies and is now showing its willingness to act on those promises. When asked, Italy’s Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, claimed: “This was a first important signal that Italy cannot go on alone supporting this huge weight.” He also threatened to turn away other rescue boats that arrive with migrants in the future.

So, where does Russia fit in?

With more confusion and chaos within Europe itself, Putin has an opportunity to jump back onto the world stage. This would have seemed impossible only a few years ago. Russia was alienated from Europe because of its annexation of Crimea and its military interventions throughout Syria and eastern Ukraine.

Now, however, Russian-backed populist leaders are in power in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Austria. Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum have caused further fury within Europe. It’s the perfect moment to reassert Russia’s power as an economic and trading partner as opposed to the United States.

While Putin may claim that “it is not our aim to divide anything or anybody in Europe,” actions speak louder than words. It is to Russia’s advantage to have a fragmented Europe that can neither impose sanctions nor act unilaterally against deals like the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

Already, there are signs of this. Austrian leader Kurz refused to expel Russian diplomats after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Both Italy and Greece are calling to end sanctions against Russia.

It makes sense for Russia to encourage this departure from former European solidarity against their country. It may make more sense to pay attention to Russia’s actions towards Europe such as the support for right-wing parts such as France’s Front Nationale and German’s AfD rather than the political rhetoric. Discord is where Russia can make its move, and as it has often done it past, it may do again.

Russia Sees Opportunities as E.U. Member States Feud was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Donald J. Trump administration has adopted the term Indo-Pacific to describe its larger strategic area of interest across the pan-Asian region. Fully realizing this strategy’s potential will require reconciling differences over the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific and what can and should be done across this enormous geography.

The term’s descriptive value matters strategically. As Australian national-security strategist Rory Medcalf wrote in 2013, the term Indo-Pacific recognizes deepened connections between the Indian Ocean region and the Western Pacific. China’s increasingly active presence in the Indian Ocean (e.g., a military base in Djibouti and intensified ties with countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives) illustrates a new reality in this maritime space.

As important, the Indo-Pacific framework inherently places India at the heart, rather than as an appendage to a concept of Asia focused on East Asia. Indeed, as Carnegie India’s C. Raja Mohan has written, the concept of Indian centrality revives a colonial-era framework that situated India in the middle of a larger maritime strategic space. This larger maritime area, described as the “confluence of the two seas” by Japanese Prime Minister Abe during a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament, has important implications.

It’s hard not to see India’s inherent relevance in this broader region—a country on the brink of becoming the world’s most populous; a stable democracy with the world’s sixth-largest economy, third-largest military by personnel strength, and fifth-largest defense budget; and a commitment to rule of law and the liberal international order.

Oceans Apart?

The Trump administration has elevated the Indo-Pacific to a top-level regional priority, as suggested by its placement in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) [PDF]. The strategy describes the Indo-Pacific as a region in which “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place” and where “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”

While the NSS calls for working in concert with U.S. allies and partners, including boosting “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India,” otherwise known as the Quad, the newly formulated strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a “leading global power” and emphasizes expanded defense ties with New Delhi. Notably, the framework appears focused on pulling India more intensively into regional activities to its east but does not necessarily take into account India’s own interests in the Indian Ocean.

The NSS defines the Indo-Pacific region [PDF] as stretching from “the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States” (page 46). This section has no reference to Indian Ocean maritime space, including the area off the east coast of Africa, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. In this light, the Indo-Pacific described by the Trump administration has a lot more Pacific than it does Indo. Meanwhile, India’s sense of the region includes the larger maritime space to its west. The members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), a minilateral organization India co-created with South Africa to better institutionalize consultation across this poorly linked area, includes countries spanning this geography.

In Search of an Agenda

If the NSS hinted at the challenges across this amorphous region, the Trump administration’s statements to date have not clarified its plan. Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy speech, delivered during his November 2017 visit to Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s CEO summit, provided the highest-level vision of what the strategy intends to cover. He called for fair and reciprocal trade and infrastructure investment from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and he affirmed the importance of rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation. Still, the speech relayed no specific indication of how the administration would support these priorities in any manner that differs from the past, and it did not specify a U.S. approach to a more comprehensive Indo-Pacific geography.

Last October’s foreign policy speech delivered by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ahead of a visit to India—one of the few policy speeches during his brief tenure—placed heavy emphasis on working closely with India on defense and security across the Indo-Pacific, as well as providing alternatives to the “predatory economics” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, no specific initiatives have since emerged.

This issue of “seams,” or arbitrary bureaucratic separations, bedevils Washington’s ability to cover the Indo-Pacific adequately. This is certainly true within the State Department, where the bureaus of East Asia and the Pacific, South and Central Asia, Near Eastern Affairs, and African Affairs would all be required to cover countries in the larger region. Or take the divisions within the Defense Department’s combatant commands. U.S. Pacific Command covers the Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. But it does not cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are part of U.S. Central Command, nor does it encompass the islands in the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Africa, which are contained within the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility.

For its part, India seeks further coordination with the United States not only on the eastern portion of the region—Southeast and Northeast Asia—but also to its west, spanning Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf, the islands of the Indian Ocean, and the eastern coast of Africa. Finding a way to better integrate India into the larger pan-Asian region to the east, as well as better cooperating on issues that are of significant concern to India, such as counterterrorism and maritime security to the west, could go a long way toward creating an Indo-Pacific strategy that aligns with both U.S. and Indian interests.

How to Realize a Fully Indo-Pacific Strategy

First, a compelling Indo-Pacific strategy needs to incorporate an economic through-line that offers an alternative to China’s expansive regional economic framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) eliminated Washington’s proactive model for trade. Both China and India advocate an alternative trade grouping, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—an agreement of more limited ambition but whose presence, without the prospect of U.S. leadership, underscores how the United States has withered its ability to shape regional trade rules of the road. The Trump administration should reconsider joining the TPP, especially given the leadership gains it would engender from reengaging with partner countries. A TPP-rooted economic strategy for the broader region could ultimately incentivize India to join the trade pact.

Second, and closely related, Washington should champion Indian membership in APEC as a show of good faith on Indian priorities. India, with a more than $2 trillion economy, has been denied entry for more than twenty years, and its exclusion makes little strategic sense. Keeping India on the outside of a multilateral organization vital to economic activity across Asia undermines the strategic goal of expanding the Asia-Pacific framework to a larger Indo-Pacific region. An APEC with India included would expand the organization’s geography to more accurately reflect the centers of economic activity at scale, and it would be a concrete step toward realizing an Indo-Pacific region.

Third, the Trump administration should develop clear infrastructure investment initiatives with India, Japan, Australia, and others to provide transparent financing alternatives to China’s BRI, as Tillerson proposed. This is an excellent idea, but it lacks an implementation strategy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin initially rejected capital base expansion for the World Bank but thankfully changed his position, which should permit the United States to partner with other countries on infrastructure finance within a multilateral framework.

Existing U.S.-India-Japan consultations include a working group on infrastructure, which could identify opportunities. Tokyo and New Delhi have been working closely on this front through the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor partnership, whose vision for cross-regional connectivity [PDF] is designed to link the larger Indian Ocean region via infrastructure development, skills training, people-to-people exchange, and cooperative projects in areas including agriculture, health, and disaster management.

Fourth, Washington should take seriously the priorities and suggestions emerging from the IORA platform. The United States became an IORA dialogue partner in 2012, and it could more actively rely on the body as a forum for ideas and new Indo-Pacific-wide initiatives. Australia, India, and Indonesia are active members; the group also includes Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania; and U.S. allies France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners. The IORA has a wide range of focus areas, from maritime security and disaster management to the blue economy, which comprises economic activity centered on the oceans, and women’s empowerment, so it should not be difficult to develop test projects amenable to all.

Fifth, diplomatic coordination should be increased not only among the Quad countries but also throughout the larger region. It could encompass regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts or relate to specific political or humanitarian crises, such as those in the Maldives and along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Such a framework will require, within the U.S. system, reaching across bureaucratic boundaries. (The announcement that an Indian defense attaché will be posted at the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain indicates a move in this direction.)

Successive U.S. administrations have strengthened ties with India and developed strategic frameworks for a broad U.S.-India partnership. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific emphasis could be its most consequential strategic initiative, building on the work done by the Obama administration’s U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. But it will need—very soon—to identify and implement some specific projects for the grand strategy to become reality.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

The twelve-mile-long bridge (19 kilometers) connects Russia and Crimea by both road and rail. The road portion officially opened on May 15, with the rail portion slated for completion in 2019.

The bridge was constructed at the cost of $3.7 billion, and can reportedly sustain 13 million passengers and 14 million tons of freight per year, and is designed to accommodate around 40,000 vehicles per day.

Planning for the Kerch Strait Bridge began in 2014, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine’s Response

On May 22, Ukraine filed a claim with the International Tribunal stating that the bridge’s construction was illegal under international law and was a threat to Ukraine’s sovereign interests.

Two days later, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko levied sanctions on Russian state-run media outlets RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) and Rossiya Segodnya (Россия Сегодня), citing national security concerns as the primary reason for the sanctions.

Both outlets are banned from operating or broadcasting within Ukraine for a minimum of three years.

Over a week before Poroshenko sanctioned the two media outlets, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on May 15 that it had detained RIA Novosti reporter Kiril Vyshnysky in Kiev on charges of  “high treason for allegedly participating in hybrid information warfare.”

The SBU announced that it had uncovered a “network of media structures controlled by the Russian Federation” and had launched an investigation into the activities of RIA Novosti-Ukraine.

A spokesperson for the SBU stated that “law enforcers have determined that they [RIA Novosti] were used by the aggressor country in the context of a hybrid information war against Ukraine and investigative actions are now being carried out.”

The Decline of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Over the past few years, Ukrainian-Russian relations have soured. In a generous reading of the situation, the bridge could be seen solely as a means to connect Crimea with Russia.

Such schemes, however, are rarely so innocent. The very act of connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula infers the permanence of the Crimean annexation.

The bridge will be a perpetual reminder to Ukrainians that Russian troops have a direct, overland (read: bridge) route into Crimea, diminishing any plausible hope of Ukraine retaking the peninsula.

Meanwhile, clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have escalated. During the week of May 21, there were 7,700 ceasefire violations. The escalations in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian response to the opening of the Crimean bridge indicate that relations between Ukraine and Russia will continue to deteriorate.

As Ukraine continues to turn westward, Russia may seek to respond in more drastic ways to underscore its significance and importance to both Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Russian-Crimean Bridge Completion Escalates Ukraine-Russia Tensions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most people presume that the great transition took place in the 1960s, and specifically at the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) when the Church officially signaled its openness to secular statehood, religious freedom, and human rights. This is a mistake. Historians are reluctant to issue laws of history, but here’s one that seems reasonable: massive institutions do not fundamentally transform themselves in moments of relative placidity. The process requires too much energy and too much buy-in from cautious elites. They transform in moments of crisis, destruction, and fear. The early 1960s were not such a moment for the Church. The 1930s, however, were.

The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 signaled a new era in European politics. Across Europe, the liberal center fell apart with a whimper, as voters flocked towards extremes of fascism and communism. Catholics were horrified. Liberals had threatened Catholic schools, or at worst to wrest control over the appointment of bishops. Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler represented something new, and something even more alarming. From the Catholic perspective, they were ‘totalitarian.’ They were claiming total allegiance over their subjects, body, and soul. Both were critical of the Churches, which after all represented alternative principles of law and morality in states that were aggressively trying to turn a variegated population into a unified whole.

In the face of totalitarianism, Catholics confronted the very real possibility that their ability to receive the sacraments, let alone attend Catholic schools, might soon be abridged. As Europe hung in the balance between Hitler and Stalin, the notion that some kind of Catholic political revival was in the offing seemed preposterous, and dangerous to even consider (Hitler had sensitive antennae for such things). This led Catholics, from the papacy to the parish, to reimagine the nature of their Church. For, as all good Christians know, death and rebirth are a hair’s breadth apart.

Their goal was no longer to offer an alternative to modernity, nor to even imagine that the Church would be at the center of some future society. The goal, instead, was to use modern language to make claims on secular states so that Catholics could protect the Church, and see at least some Catholic principles codified into law. It was in these years, and for these reasons, that Catholics accepted human rights, religious freedom, and secular modernity.

Catholics in the 1930s were faced with an agonizing set of choices. If the holistic Catholic renewal they had long dreamed of was off the table, what should take its place? Where should the Church stake its claim? Most Catholic leaders and thinkers opted to retrench around the family. For the first time, Catholics placed sexual and reproductive ethics at the very center of their social and political mission. They did so for two reasons. First, Catholics reasoned that control over the family, as a site of moral education and instruction, would ensure institutional survival in a world that seemed to be falling apart. Secondly, Catholics reasoned (with some justice) that Catholic family ethics would be acceptable to secular politicians, whether it be Hitler or Franklin Roosevelt. These figures, after all, had their own reasons to oppose contraception, divorce, and homosexuality.

The choices that Catholics made in the 1930s have ricocheted to the present. Catholics have organized with immense success around same-sex marriage, abortion, and other reproductive issues, pressuring secular states to encode Catholic teachings into law. This has never been the only way to theorize a Catholic modernity, however. Ever since the 1930s, a dissident faction has observed that this focus on the family has been counterproductive, leading the Church into alliances with forces that in other ways have been antagonistic to Catholic values. They have not rejected Catholic teaching on these matters, but they have disputed the overwhelming emphasis on them, and they have sought to recover other elements of the long Catholic tradition that are more concerned with economic, racial or ecological injustice.

It is no secret that these two wings of the Church coexist today. Pope Francis has expressly questioned the over-emphasis on sexual matters, seeking to recover a broader notion of what a Catholic modernity might entail. His many critics complain that he is giving away too much, and abandoning the family as the citadel of virtue in a world gone mad. This dispute is, however, misconstrued if we date it to the 1960s. The Church did not transform in a lame attempt to seem ‘up-to-date’ in a world where John Lennon could claim, with some justification, to be bigger than Jesus. And the faultlines of the present do not represent, fundamentally, two different attitudes to the mass consumption and sexual revolution of the late 1960s. They represent two different responses to the fundamental problem of how the Church should interact with modern political projects: a question that was first faced, in all its drama, in the era of fascism.

Might the Church, then, be on the dawn of another fundamental reimagination of its nature, and of its relationship to the world? It is too early to tell, though, for all of the fire and fury surrounding Pope Francis, the modern Church is not putty in the hands of the papacy. In the 20th century, the Church transformed only when bishops, clergy and powerful lay voices came to believe that the institution was in dire danger. There are no threats of the totalitarian magnitude on the horizon, although it is certainly imaginable that they might emerge one day.

The very success of the 20th-century Church might be weighing down its 21st-century successor. Whatever the fate of their eternal souls might be, living Catholics are like the rest of us: eternally fighting the last war. The struggle against totalitarianism has concluded. Catholics won, and the contemporary Church was shaped to the core by that battle. Can that Church be repurposed for a new world – a post-totalitarian, but still extremely dangerous, one? This is one of the crucial questions of our times, and while history suggests that it might not, there is no way to be sure. The Church has surprised us before.

This Idea was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust to Aeon. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust.

Funders to Aeon Magazine are not involved in editorial decision-making, including commissioning or content-approval.

How the Catholic Church Evolved to Outlast the Nazis was originally published on Global Security Review.

Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reportedly informed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he must support the Israeli-Palestinian peace deal put forth by the Trump administration or resign.

According to Israeli media broadcasts, Abbas was given the ultimatum after he was summoned to Riyadh in October 2017 for a meeting with Bin Salman days after Senior U.S. Presidential Advisor Jared Kushner made an unannounced visit to the Saudi capital to meet the young crown prince.

Riyadh had offered to normalize relations with Israel in 2002 on the condition that it agreed to the two-state formula, which more and more Israeli’s, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have rejected.

While the details of any peace deal remain unclear, there is growing concern among Palestinians about Bin Salman’s readiness to support a U.S. president described as the most overtly pro-Israel president in years.

The Trump administration, at the time, was reportedly drafting a deal allegedly arranged by Jared Kushner, himself a staunch advocate of Israel. Kushner has given money to Israeli settlement charities, and his family is reportedly friendly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli media reports also stated that Abbas was directed to prevent increased rapprochement with Hamas—an ultimatum that could jeopardize the reconciliation process between the two rival Palestinian factions.

On the surface, the warning given by Bin Salman seems to be identical to the one made by Netanyahu who is strongly opposed to the Palestinian unity government.

While Abbas has disputed the claims made on Israeli news Channel 10, details of the meeting seem to be in line with the Saudi, UAE, Israeli and U.S. vision for the region agreed before Trump’s inauguration.

Since the Trump administration has taken power, the U.S. has backed the unpredictable Crown Prince and seems to be endorsing a regional plan that will see full U.S. support for the Gulf monarchies, revisions to the Iran nuclear deal, and a new Israel-Palestine peace plan.

The Saudis appear to be entirely behind this agreement whose blueprint is being drawn up by senior members of the Trump administration.

Since his election, Trump has gone on to describe Saudi Arabia as a “magnificent country” while taking the unprecedented step of visiting the Gulf state in his first official visit, having condemned the rulers during his election campaign. Trump also struck a multibillion-dollar deal with the Saudi royals in May.

Trump’s fondness for the Saudi’s saw him backing the anti-Qatar media campaign directed by the Saudi and Emirati governments and the November announcement that he was decertifying the Iran nuclear accord.

When Saudi Arabia arrested scores of princes and businessmen in an “anti-corruption” purge, Trump tweeted his support for the move.

Saudi Arabia Pressured Palestinian Authority to Accept Saudi-backed Israel-Palestine Peace Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul
• The Ukrainian government could likely escalate the conflict within the next year.
• Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots
• Russian foreign policy has fed domestic nationalism and pride has become a source of power for the Kremlin.

Russia attempts to make inroads to the east as tensions persist with the West.

As relations with the West remain tense for the foreseeable future, Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul, playing them off each other, and off Beijing, to its benefit.

Despite talks between Russia and Japan in November 2017, the two countries are still at odds over a contested set of islands, and China remains Moscow’s most important partner in the region.

Russia’s proposal to send U.N. Peacekeeping forces to Donbas will gain traction, despite discussions between Russia and Ukraine, together with its Western supporters, over the installation’s parameters.

Expect Continued Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine

The plan likely will not come to fruition by the end of the year. However, there is a small chance it may reduce the violence in eastern Ukraine in the short-term.

In the medium- to long-term,  recent developments in Ukraine may mean an escalation of hostilities in the country’s east, as the Ukrainian military takes command over operations in the region.

A recently passed bill by the Ukrainian parliament outright labels Russia as a foreign aggressor. The law gives the President increased over Ukraine’s armed forces and eliminated the requirement for parliamentary support before ordering military action. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict in eastern Ukraine joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence, like the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict within the next year.

Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots

Two other post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan), and the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, will remain prone to internal instability and vulnerable to political, cyber, military, or other hybrid interference from Russia.

The long-term standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially flare up again. The joint border shared by Moldova and Ukraine will potentially result in an increased Russian security presence in the region, either by conduction more frequent military exercises or shipping more weapons to separatist groups.

While it is unlikely that either of these territories will result in a regional conflict, it remains to be seen whether Russia will seek to exploit ongoing political and social divisions in the West to advance its interests in either region.

Both lie within what the Kremlin considers its traditional “sphere of influence,” and maintaining this sphere is an essential component of its national security strategy

Russia: the aspiring—but declining–great power?

Russia aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber-rattling, and foreign engagements overseas. Russian foreign policy is centered on regaining and retaining the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, at home, it faces increasing constraints from a poorly-diversified economy and crippling U.S. and E.U. sanctions, levied in the aftermath of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin (and above all, Putin) prizes internal stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and political expression.

Moscow’s ability, through its foreign policy, to regain what it views as its traditional role on the world stage—even through aggressive expansionism and disruption abroad—has fed domestic nationalism and pride which has further legitimized the Kremlin and has become a source of regime power.

Russian nationalism features strongly in the Kremlin’s national narrative, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism.

Putin is personally popular, but recent protests driven by economic and administrative mismanagement reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power by government officials and those close to them.

However, Putin’s recent re-election has been used by the Kremlin as a referendum to buttress his continued rule. Domestically, authoritarianism and decreased rule-of-law are likely to be expected.

Foreign policy will be dictated by heightening tensions with the west due to the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and foreign interference operations will dictate Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Russian Foreign Policy: Expansionism Feeds Domestic Nationalism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.