The United States needs a nuclear posture that supports its commitment to deterrence and averts costly wars. America’s traditional nuclear deterrence strategy is ill-suited for today’s accelerating threat environment and future challenges.
The current approach, developed during a period of adherence to global norms, reached its limits amid intensifying great power competition, the expansion of authoritarian nuclear arsenals, the growth of regional nuclear warfighting doctrines, and disruptive technological shifts. Effective deterrence demands that adversaries fear the consequences of violating the status quo.
Preventing aggression by one or more nuclear-armed adversaries requires an American nuclear strategy supported by a strong, credible force structure that can inflict devastating costs—not merely deliver minimal retaliation. To achieve this, the Trump administration and the Department of War need to embrace a culture of deterrence that values, rather than downplays, America’s nuclear edge.
The 2023 report by the Strategic Posture Commission, America’s Strategic Posture, underscores the urgency of such a shift. It calls for a revised strategy capable of protecting vital interests and maintaining stability with China and Russia, warning that critical decisions cannot be deferred any longer. The report’s recommendations, particularly its insistence that the United States be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat China and Russia simultaneously, requires a strategy for implementation, not passive admiration.
Peace Through Strength: Renewing America’s Nuclear Deterrent, a Proposed Nuclear Posture Review for 2026, by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, provides a decisive model of maximum deterrence. It promotes tailored, full-spectrum strategies and rejects outdated minimum-deterrence concepts that no longer reflect geopolitical reality. This framework strengthens general and immediate deterrence, addresses the nuclear threats from rivals, improves American escalation management, increases the resilience and survivability of the nuclear force, and strengthens extended deterrence through forward-based regional capabilities.
This deterrence framework is founded on six core pillars. First, it offers a national deterrence strategy that reflects the Department of War’s mission, “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation’s security,” and supports a peace-through-strength doctrine that prioritizes American security, prosperity, and independence. Second, it advocates survivability enhancements that ensure a credible second-strike capability—beyond reliance on the submarine leg of the triad. Third, it seeks urgent nuclear modernization and expansion consistent with the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendations. Fourth, it advocates deployment of hedge capabilities from the nuclear stockpile. Fifth, it proposes strengthening forward-deployed regional nuclear deterrent assets. It requires deployment of robust non-strategic nuclear forces, empowering allied burden-sharing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Sixth, it advocates clear and credible declaratory policies as a means of deterring asymmetric non-nuclear attacks on the homeland, space assets, and critical cyber infrastructure.
Nuclear weapons provide the highest strategic leverage at the lowest expense. The Department of War is projected to spend about $8.5 trillion on conventional military capabilities over the next decade, while dedicating only $946 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent. This focus on conventional military spending long supported failed interventionism and a fragile status quo. At six to seven percent of the annual defense budget, the cost of deterrence remains relatively cheap, even if nuclear deterrence spending rises significantly.
Nuclear deterrence, like home insurance, is affordable but only seems a wise decision after a disaster strikes. A house can be rebuilt, but a devastated nation cannot. Hence, the “premium” for maximum nuclear readiness is not just affordable, it is indispensable. The cost of not having a strong nuclear deterrent might exceed $10 trillion if an undeterred China tries to forcefully unify Taiwan. Pursuing the nuclear posture offered here will cost less than one tenth the cost of losing Taiwan and may prevent such a conflict from ever happening.
This proposed Nuclear Posture Review strengthens America’s deterrence by replacing outdated strategies with an approach tailored to modern nuclear competition. It emphasizes credible capabilities, improved burden-sharing, and bold new designs to deter adversaries who are rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals.
Their build-ups serve one purpose, coercing American foreign policy. Tolerating such destabilizing actions only encourages more. A well-prepared American nuclear deterrent is crucial to restraining autocratic ambitions. Strategies that were once focused on risk reduction and arms control are now unintentionally fostering instability. In today’s volatile environment, maximum deterrence is essential to maintaining peace.
Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. James Petrosky, PhD is the President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.
About the Author
Kirk Fansher
Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.
Curtis McGiffin
Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.
Read the full bio here.
James Petrosky
Dr. James C. Petrosky is the President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). He holds a Ph.D. and M.S. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Engineering Physics where he developed experimental techniques for the prediction of damage to electronic devices and materials. He has a substantial technical expertise in pulsed radiation effects and nuclear weapon survivability, with an emphasis on radiation effects on electronics and electromagnetic pulse.
As President of NIDS, Dr. Petrosky is responsible for the overall operation, mission, and vision of the organization. His primary focus is on developing and achieving strategic objectives aligned with the NIDS mission and sponsors, and assessing and managing the manpower needs.
An important aspect of this proposed Nuclear Posture Review is that it also provides actionable insights for allies, by advocating for a U.S. policy of strengthening regional deterrence. This responsible commitment is further meant to avoid risky proliferation among Indo-Pacific and NATO allies.
The value proposition: This concept treats nuclear deterrence as what it is: a fight over adversary belief. Deterrence lives or dies in their mind, fear of catastrophic consequence, not in our mirror-imaged assumptions about “rational restraint.” That’s why the authors reject minimum deterrence: it advertises hesitation and creates narrative seams autocracies can pry open with deception.
In a multipolar nuclear age with expanding rival arsenals and fading treaties, influenced attacks will aim first at confidence, our thresholds, our second-strike survivability, and especially allied faith in extended deterrence. When allies doubt, proliferation pressure rises and deterrence erodes, and that is exactly the leverage opponents want.
The authors aren’t just offering their view of posture guidance, they are giving America its own playbook for strategic stability. It shows how to keep perception aligned with reality so autocracies can’t manufacture miscalculation at nuclear speed.