In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.

The Economic Inversion of Warfare

Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth millions. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.

Ukrainian Technology Transfer

A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment announced on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.

Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region

The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.

Conclusion

The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.

Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.

A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and strategic autonomy. Within this context, Turkey’s declared goal to develop long-range ballistic capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.

We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.

Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either restrict access to advanced weapons capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with arms embargoes, sanctions, and restrictions imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey’s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.

Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.

Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its National Technology Initiative, is part of a larger investment in civilian space and satellite launch initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in Somalia, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.

Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by Turkish officials criticizing the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM capable of carrying a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.

The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and develop its own nuclear capabilities—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its new doctrine of “forward deterrence,” which advocates for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both Poland and Germany have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.

At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.

Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.

Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relationship between the federal government and American universities is tense and often misunderstood. The gap between the purposes and priorities of government, on one side, and the missions and functions of universities, on the other, is alarming.

Historically, the United States has relied on its colleges and universities for several things critical to national defense. First, higher education produces a more educated work force for a globally competitive marketplace. Second, advanced learning fills federal, state, and local government positions that citizens rely on for necessary services. Third, the military and civilian defense establishments require leaders who understand the science and engineering behind modern weapons. Future defense and national security leaders must also understand the American military experience and the relationship between the armed forces and society.

The current and prospective international system is one that poses a wide variety of threats to world peace and international order. U.S. armed forces will be tasked for deterrence and war fighting missions across the entire spectrum of conflict,  from nuclear weapons spread and the possibility of war in space, to the nuances of urban terrorism and counterinsurgency. Officers who rise to senior command will need the perspective of innovators and adaptors, sometimes improvising in combat when exigent conditions override old rules of engagement.

As technology advances and the geostrategic environment grows more complicated, the United States will need a stronger educational establishment to compete with China and other rising powers. Nowhere in Europe or among major Asian military powers is national education under such crossfire as it is in the United States today. How did we get here, and what is to be done?

A primary cause of the war against American education is the perception among politicians, activists, and journalists that higher education has been colonized by radicals who hate America, misrepresent its history, and aim to produce dissidents who attack traditional culture and values, including patriotism and military service. This narrative has spread through misleading political campaigns, indifferent media coverage, and, unfortunately, some missteps by educators themselves.

At the center of this narrative is conflict between the Trump administration and Ivy League universities where demonstrations included violence and charges of antisemitism. Coverage of episodes at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia has emphasized the behavior of a small percentage of students, sometimes supported by nonstudents and outside money, and overlooked the far larger share of students and faculty who avoid political violence and intimidation.

Admittedly, some leaders in higher education were slow to confront agitators who crossed the line between permissible speech and harassment. On July 24, 2025, Columbia University announced a settlement with the Trump administration: $220 million in fines in exchange for an end to attacks on Columbia’s federally funded research program. Some commentators and observers saw a dangerous precedent; others preferred Harvard’s decision to litigate. Acting Columbia President Claire Shipman argued the agreement was needed to prevent further disruption, and possible destruction, of the broader research enterprise. Whatever the outcome, we are far from the day President John F. Kennedy, at Yale’s 1962 commencement, joked that he enjoyed the best of both worlds: a Harvard education and a Yale degree.

Attacks on higher education also suggest that students, faculty, and administrators are elitists out of touch with Middle America. In fact, most students that attend public institutions come from middle class families, and do not learn their basic values from professors. Values are learned years before college through family and other primary groups. Professors rarely convert diehard conservatives into liberals, or vice versa. Radicals who break the law and violate campus codes are seldom motivated by instructors and more often they are encouraged and funded by activists who move from campus to campus. For example, antisemitism at some universities has been fueled by provocateurs exploiting student concern for non-terrorist Palestinians in Gaza while mischaracterizing Israel’s response to the October 7, 2023, attacks.

Administrators can also be faulted for negligence in defending First Amendment rights and for suppressing speech on spurious grounds. Unlike high school students, most college students are legal adults. They have the right to use confrontational rhetoric and provocative discourse protected by the First Amendment, however infuriating it may be. Too many universities have come to see themselves as providers of reassurance and guarantors of good feeling, backing that impulse with coercive training and sanctions against so-called offensive remarks inside and outside the classroom. The result is an atmosphere in which conversation is reduced to clichés and the celebration of the obvious instead of the clash of ideas from which great minds are molded.

It is an irony that more cut-and-thrust classroom testing of ideas can be found in some U.S. military war colleges and service academies than in many civilian institutions. Even there, however, trends toward government micro-management of curricula and textbook selection are troubling. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia since the February 2022 invasion is lesson to be learned in this debate: Ukraine turned a failed coup de main into a war of attrition through determination, drones, better intelligence, and a faster OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) than Russia.

Going forward, educators, politicians, warriors and voters will have to decide: do we want rigorous and results-oriented learning experiences for our future generations of leaders, or, instead, do we prefer ritualized feelgood rites of passage that will produce generations of intellectual bobbleheads majoring in conspicuous consumption?

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The Halls of Ivy and National Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iranian ship seized by US Marines has China links was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2022, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, it did not domestically produce any Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drones. They initially purchased a small quantity (up to around 6000) from Iran and quickly set their sights on building manufacturing plants. By 2023 they had the Alabuga drone factory where they were able to produce around 200 Geran-2 drones per month. In 2024, they saw a major increase in production and by December of that year it was reported that they were able to produce up to 2000 Geran-2 drones per month. By May of last year, Russia’s production capacity was up to around 2700 Geran-2 drones and another 2500 ‘simulator’ drones used to overwhelm air defenses in a single month (according to Ukrainian intelligence), and production is likely to increase further.

Mass production of these drones has changed what it means to be ‘war ready.’ A massive reduction in Iran’s arsenal of missiles, air capabilities, and ground capabilities would weaken the regime but Trump’s pronouncement should not convince anyone they are no longer a threat. If Iran follows Russia’s blueprint, even heavy losses today are unlikely to prevent them from sustaining a long campaign of drone attacks tomorrow.

Besides, Iran’s strategy is to delay. They retain the ability to threaten American bases in the Gulf, as well as Gulf allies, with their current stockpile of drones and missiles. From almost anywhere in Southern or Central Iran they can launch a Shahed which could reach the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that even if missile and naval drone production slows, they will continue to threaten global trade flows, should the status quo continue.

Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine should have shown to the United States what modern war looks like, and how a state can remain a threat at a low cost. Iran is more than capable of continuing this conflict, and their recent statements reaffirming their lack of interest in diplomacy a makes that clear.

Iran’s current stockpile of Shahed-136 drones has not been made public. Before the war started, estimates indicated it could be up to around 80,000 drones. Considering Russia’s demonstrated ability to create and grow a drone industry whilst at war, there is no reason Iran’s drone industry will not grow similarly. Between 2023 and 2025 Russia’s Geran-2 drone production grew by 1250%. Iran will not require this level of growth and is in a better placed position to start having produced a significant quantity of these drones.

The significance of this threat lies in the unique importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy. A sizable portion (around 25%) of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, so even limited disruptions can have huge consequences for energy prices. Crucially, Iran does not need to secure a complete shutdown of the Strait to achieve its aims, as even the threat of attacking merchant ships drives insurance premiums and forces ships to reroute. By demonstrating that the Strait can be reached, Iran has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and can maintain this very atmosphere without their arsenal of long-range missiles by building Shahed-136 drones. In this instance, drones are not strictly a military asset, but a way of exerting economic pressure on adversaries.

Securing the Strait of Hormuz to a point of trade continuation will prove to be almost impossible without either a negotiated settlement or a complete capitulation from the Iranian regime. If during this conflict Iran retains even a small portion of their current Shahed-136 stockpile, or the ability to manufacture them, then ships passing through the Strait cannot be guaranteed safe travel.

In short, claims that the Iranian threat has been significantly reduced are short sighted and ignore many of their existing capabilities. Their existing missile stockpile, combined with their production capacity, means that even heavy strikes will not eliminate their ability to project their power across the region. Just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, modern warfare requires cheap and easily mass-produced systems and Iran is very well positioned to meet these requirements. Until a diplomatic solution is reached, or the Iranian regime is somehow forced to end their war efforts, the threat to world trade and to the world energy market will persist.

Raphael Chiswick writes on Diplomacy, International Security, and the Defense Industry. He is based in the United Kingdom. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Shaheds to Strait Control: Why Iran Can Still Influence Global Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

The digital public square has transformed how Americans encounter information, debate ideas, and form political identities. Social media platforms promise open dialogue, but their algorithms often reward emotionally charged content, amplifying voices that confirm what users already believe. In this environment, misinformation spreads quickly, and communities increasingly cluster around shared narratives rather than shared facts. Foreign actors have recognized the strategic value of this fragmented information ecosystem. Among them, Russian influence operations—often described as “Kremlinbot” networks—have drawn particular attention for their efforts to inflame existing social and political tensions within the United States.

Kremlinbots, Russian state-sponsored bots and trolls, manipulate public opinion through fake accounts to skew social media comments and manufacture a false sense of consensus. While inauthentic, bombarding the comments section of social media threads is an effective tactic to manipulate public opinion. This tactic can lead to two outcomes: supporters of the narrative are more likely to follow aligned pages, creating an echo chamber; while dissenters are often intimidated or discouraged from posting, fearing online conflict. Even if users recognize the commenters as bots, false consensus bias discourages them from joining public debates.

False Consensus Bias

False consensus bias and manufactured consensus bias are similar but differ in how they develop and their purpose. False consensus bias happens when people favor information that seems supported by the majority. This information can be true, false, or misleading. Regardless, if it looks widely accepted, it is considered accurate. Simply put, people believe something because it appears that everyone else does. This is like in-group thinking. On the other hand, manufactured consensus bias involves intentionally manipulating social media to create the illusion of broad agreement. When Kremlinbots succeed in manufacturing consensus, they also generate a false consensus bias, making people think their views are in line with the mainstream.

The Battleground

Manufactured consensus often forms in the comments sections of major news outlets, government officials, institutions, celebrities, universities, world leaders, CEOs, and athletes on social media. Whenever any of these entities, organizations, or high-profile individuals post an article, statement, or video, the comments thread beneath the post becomes the battleground for Russian state-sponsored bots and trolls to create biased perceptions.

Additionally, Kremlinbot-manufactured consensus bias is often seen on threads where the entire article post is fake. False information from a single fake account or multiple fake accounts pretending to be real people or organizations has become quite common. For example, a Russian state-sponsored troll farm based in St. Petersburg, Russia, called the Internet Research Agency (IRA), created the Twitter account EN_GOP named “Tennessee GOP” during its attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election, gaining over one hundred thousand followers.

The IRA was founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former Russian oligarch who led the Wagner Group and was a close ally of Vladimir Putin with direct ties to Russian intelligence. The agency created fake accounts on major social networks to promote Kremlin interests in domestic and foreign policy, especially concerning Ukraine and the Middle East. More than 1,000 employees worked in a single agency building in 2015. The reach and impact of the IRA were enormous. By 2019, the IRA’s troll farm influence operation caused unprecedented divisions and discord within Western democracies. For perspective, if 500 people each manage at least 30 fake profiles in a troll farm, which totals 15,000 state-sponsored troll accounts, all targeting comment threads on various social media pages.

The comments thread is a clear example of manipulation, deceit, and illusion. Russian Kremlin bots and trolls function as illusionists, working overtime to make followers believe they are part of the club if they agree, and outside if they do not accept the false consensus. This constitutes a social media psychological operation, or psyops campaign. Benjamin A. Valentino, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, explains in his analysis co-authored by computer scientist Soroush Vosoughi, “Bias arises not from who is on a platform, but from who among them are active, vocal participants on that platform. This varies based on the topics being discussed. Even if you have everyone on Twitter, they may only participate in topics they find interesting or feel comfortable discussing in public, says Vosoughi. So, when a small group is very vocal about a particular issue, their opinions get over-represented in the data.”

Conclusion

Kremlinbot-manufactured consensus is not the only reason Americans live in two conflicting realities. Still, consensus bias is a key cause of division among Americans, many of whom now only inhabit isolated echo chambers of alternate worlds. Within their echo chambers, cognitive biases are often reinforced, especially on social media platforms that are manipulated to bolster pre-existing beliefs. These tactics turn social media into breeding grounds for hatred and tools for foreign adversaries. Russian security agencies have perfected methods to exploit these divisions, which now pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.

Sean G. McKelvey is a Doctoral Candidate at The Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., conducting research on Russian Foreign Malign Influence Operations. Sean has published an article in the Sentinel Journal, A Journal of Strategic Statecraft and Counterintelligence Volume 1, Issue 1, Winter 2025, an Article titled: “Russia is winning the Disinformation War with Ukraine.” Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

State-Sponsored Trolls as An Emerging Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Narva River separates Narva from the Russian city of Ivangorod, where a historic Swedish castle faces a Russian fortress built by Ivan III in 1492. Walking through the streets of Narva, one might easily believe they were in Russia, were it not for the Estonian street signs breaking the facade. Here, many Russian residents from the Soviet era, known as “grey passport” holders, still live without Estonian citizenship. Efforts to remove Soviet monuments have fueled anger amongst the local population in what remains an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking area.

Many in the Riigikogu (Estonia’s parliamentary body) view efforts to remove monuments across the country as a way of moving on from painful symbols of oppression. Tens of thousands of Estonians were imprisoned or deported to Siberia during the Soviet occupation, many of whom died in captivity. Many community members of Russian descent consider this to be an unnecessary cleansing of history, especially concerning monuments dedicated to Soviet soldiers killed in the “Great Patriotic War” of WWII.

A Soviet T-34 tank that stood in honor of fallen Soviet casualties was controversially removed in August of 2022. The monument, which stood against the banks of the Narva River, was left covered in flowers by residents and eventually relocated to the Estonian War Museum. I was in Narva during the months leading up to the removal of the tank and heard the Russian perspective firsthand from the people I lived with. This, however, was not the first-time parts of Estonia had struggled with identity issues.

Riots swept through the capital city of Tallinn in 2007 over the relocation of a Soviet monument known as the Bronze Soldier. Now known as Bronze Night, the unrest led to over 100 injuries and the deadly stabbing of an ethnic Russian, as well as Russian cyberattacks that brought Estonian government, banking, and news sites offline.

Events like these placed Estonia directly in the Kremlin’s sights, where it has remained ever since. While I was living in Narva in the summer of 2022, Putin remarked that Narva, Estonia’s third-largest city, was historically Russian and “would need to be ‘taken back’.” These comments drew immediate ire from many politicians, but more importantly, they preceded a series of provocations by the Kremlin against Estonian sovereignty that intensified through 2025.

On an early morning in May 2024, nearly half of Russia’s buoys marking the border in the Narva River disappeared after their unexpected removal by Russian border guards. Estonian officials and media interpreted this as a threat against their statehood. This incident led to an increase in accidental border crossings by fishermen in the Narva River, particularly in sections where buoys had been removed. Later, on December 17th, 2025, Russian border guards themselves crossed the border near Narva, perhaps accidentally. Moreover, Russian aircraft breached Estonian airspace for 12 minutes in September 2025, prompting NATO to quickly scramble aircraft in response. This was consistent with the common Russian tactic of testing NATO’s response times and military capabilities while also making a strong statement toward their adversaries. Earlier in the same month, Estonia’s Baltic neighbor, Latvia, reported that a Russian military drone had crash-landed in Latvian territory.

If a pattern of recurrent airspace violations is not enough, Russia has adopted a new tactic of unorthodox warfare by using shipping vessels to cut internet cables in the Baltic Sea. These incidents made headlines around the world and have continued to plague EU and NATO officials to this day. As recently as December 31st, 2025, a vessel was seized by the Finnish Border Guard after dragging its anchor across the Baltic seafloor, cutting a cable between Helsinki and Tallinn.

It is unsurprising that Putin has held a special grudge against Estonia, considering the nation’s unwavering support for Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion. Adjusted for GDP, Estonia has been among the most dedicated providers of military aid to Ukraine. The country has also handled many refugees, some of whom, by my own experience, include military-aged males fleeing the war. These refugees have been somewhat successfully encouraged to assimilate into host communities and learn the Estonian language.

After multiple tumultuous years in a row, Narva highlights the contrast in opinion between ethnic Estonians and many of their fellow ethnic Russian citizens. On the banks of the Narva River, the celebrations of Victory Day on May 9th set the stage for one of the more bizarre scenes of 2025. A Russian holiday celebrating the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 drew crowds on both sides of the river for the third straight year.

Supportive cheers erupted from many in Narva’s crowd during the celebrations in Ivangorod across the river, despite a massive banner protesting Putin hanging in the background on the walls of Narva Castle. Estonia may not support Putin, but feelings of identity in this Russian-speaking city are undeniably complicated. Just months after Narva residents gathered on the riverbank to celebrate with their neighbors across the border, Estonia began work on concrete defensive bunkers near the Russian border in December 2025, as part of the planned Baltic Defense Line to prepare for armed conflict.

Given Estonia’s cultural divide, which benefits Kremlin propaganda, it is vital the EU and Tallinn prevent Russian claims of marginalization from gaining credibility. Policies phasing out Russian-language schools have strained relations in Narva, but Estonia’s efforts to protect its heritage are legitimate. To enhance social cohesion and ensure security and human rights, Estonia should invest in inclusive initiatives that value Russian communities, recognizing that descendants of Soviet-era immigrants are not responsible for Estonia’s colonization.

After the American Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant took steps to address past wrongs but recognized that former Confederate states must rejoin American democracy for lasting peace. Estonia has made significant efforts to redress past injustices by gaining independence. The new generation of Russians must assimilate, but more initiatives are needed. The Kremlin has used the situation to foster a narrative of marginalization, resonating with frustrated Russian Estonians. The government must reconcile with young Russian speakers to ensure peace, sovereignty, and stability for Estonia.

Chris Sproesser is a student at the University of South Carolina’s McCausland College of Arts and Sciences, focusing on economics and Russian studies. He has previously been published by The Yale Review of International Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Identity Crisis in Europe’s Russian Frontier was originally published on Global Security Review.

Policy planning reflected that belief. Governments prepared for escalation management, energy disruption, and post-conflict instability not for sustained deterrence or a prolonged, high intensity war. This failure was neither accidental nor confined to a single capital or political party. It was the result of long-standing policy choices, alliance design decisions, and a shared belief that restraint could substitute for credible deterrence.

A Long Arc of Under-Resourcing

The NATO alliance arrived at this moment after more than a decade of deliberate under-investment. Under Presidents Barack Obama and later Joe Biden, U.S. defense policy emphasized escalation avoidance, fiscal restraint, and risk management over capacity, readiness, and industrial depth. Deterrence became a matter of signaling rather than a consistent force structure.

This trajectory did not change meaningfully during President Donald Trump’s first term. Budgetary turbulence, government shutdowns, continuing resolutions, and inherited top lines constrained structural change. Europe took its cues from Washington as strategic restraint aligned with European politics. Risk aversion, energy accommodation with Russia, and the belief that diplomacy could compensate for declining hard power. This was publicly validated when Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, not for altering U.S. strategy, but largely for reaffirming a posture Europe favored. The signal was unmistakable: restraint would be rewarded, not penalized.

Alliance Design and the Shock of 2022

NATO functioned exactly as designed. After the Cold War, the United States explicitly asserted its leadership and structured the alliance accordingly. Command arrangements, rank hierarchies, and decision-making processes ensured that Washington always held the most senior voices in the room—and an effective pocket veto.

The shock in 2022 was not that Europe took the lead, but that President Biden was so timid as to reinforce Russian risk assessments. Escalation anxiety, combined with under-resourced deterrence, produced caution when decisiveness was needed. Europe, constrained by years of deferred defense investment and structural energy dependence, lacked both the capacity and the political will to move faster than Washington. The result was paralysis by design: American restraint set the ceiling, European limitations set the floor, and the Western alliance’s action was trapped in between.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders deserve credit for attempting to break the paralysis when the scale of Russian aggression became unmistakable. Boris Johnson effectively accelerated the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by signing bilateral security guarantees that would have placed NATO forces on the ground and triggered Article 5 through cascading alliance obligations. It was a brilliant realist move, anchoring deterrence in forward commitment rather than process. Overcoming a Europe constrained by alliance structure, capacity, and the limits of American political cover.

Energy Sovereignty as a Deterrence Variable

A critical and under-appreciated failure was Europe’s abandonment of energy sovereignty. Years of policy choices have left European economies structurally dependent on Russian hydrocarbons at precisely the moment when deterrence required resilience. In 2024, the EU bloc purchased approximately €21.9 billion ($23.5 billion) worth of fossil fuels from Russia—exceeding the €18.7 billion ($20 billion) it reported allocating to Ukraine in financial aid over the same period. Climate change was elevated as the dominant strategic threat, displacing hard-power competitors such as Russia and China in threat prioritization and in efforts to defend Ukraine from Russian invasion. That disordering of risk mattered.

Europe compounded its vulnerability by dismantling reliable nuclear capacity before a dependable replacement baseload was in place. Rather than sequencing decarbonization alongside firm alternatives, several states removed nuclear generation while relying on Russian gas to bridge the gap. This was not a technical error but a strategic one.

Deterrence is weakened by dependence and strengthened when leverage is denied. The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines did not create Europe’s vulnerability; it exposed and accelerated its resolution. It removed Russia’s most potent instrument of coercive leverage over Europe. The act dismantled a dependency that had distorted European decision-making and narrowed the range of credible responses.

The Burden-Sharing Reality

The deeper problem exposed by the war is not under-spending, but misaligned responsibility. Europe accounts for nearly 44 percent of NATO’s combined GDP yet contributes 32 percent of alliance defense spending and a smaller share of high-end industrial capacity. That disparity was sustainable only so long as American support was unconditional and inexhaustible. It is not.

Fixating on President Trump’s demand for fairness obscures this structural reality. Trump did not create alliance stress; he exposed it. The core issue is that NATO has evolved into a system in which the United States bears disproportionate escalation risk while Europe enjoys disproportionate security benefits. In any conflict in which U.S. and European equities are asymmetric, that imbalance creates credibility problems—and adversaries can see them clearly.

Europe has begun to wake up. Defense budgets are rising, industrial capacity is being rebuilt, and strategic rhetoric has hardened. However, it took Vladimir Putin’s war—his willingness to use force at scale on Europe’s borders—to force a reckoning that European leaders had long postponed.

Interests, Narratives, and Credibility

Deterrence rests on perception of strength and credibility. When responsibility, risk, and capability are asymmetric, resolve is questioned. Credibility erodes quietly, long before it collapses publicly.

The uncomfortable truth is that U.S. and European interests are not perfectly aligned. Europe increasingly speaks the language of realism. Deterrence, balance, and forward defense, while framing policy through a liberal narrative of norms, process, and institutional legitimacy. That mismatch is not illegitimate, but it becomes dangerous when it masks unequal contributions and obscures who bears the true costs of failure.

Necessary Correction

The solution is neither retrenchment nor recrimination. It is a shift toward genuine Regional Shared Deterrence: a model in which European states meet NATO obligations proportionate to their economic weight, rebuild industrial capacity at scale, restore energy sovereignty, and assume visible responsibility for regional defense outcomes. That, in turn, would allow the United States to lead decisively without carrying the alliance alone—restoring credibility through aligned incentives and shared risk.

Ukraine did more than halt a Russian invasion. By refusing to collapse, it shattered Western assumptions and disrupted plans built around convenience rather than genuine deterrence. That disruption has exposed a simple truth: deterrence that is under-resourced by design and shared only in rhetoric will fail when tested. Whether this moment produces a strategic correction—or merely another cycle of improvisation—will determine the next crisis long before it arrives.

Kirk Fansher is a retired Colonel, Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Editor at Global Security Review. A Yale graduate and U.S. Naval War College alum, he has published extensively on nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and burden sharing. The views expressed are his own.

Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s January 2026 use of a hypersonic Oreshnik missile was not primarily about destroying a target. It was a strategic message delivered through speed and proximity rather than words. Western reporting confirms the strike occurred near Ukraine’s western border during a broader missile and drone attack and was widely interpreted as a deliberate signal toward NATO rather than a battlefield necessity.

This is how the conversation begins. Russia speaks first, not with a declaration, but with a capability demonstration. Hypersonic systems like Oreshnik reportedly exceed Mach 10, compressing detection and decision timelines and complicating interception by existing missile defense architectures. The message is implicit. If this can reach here, it can reach farther. Geography does the rest of the work.

From a battlefield perspective, the strike changed little. Ukraine has endured far heavier damage from conventional missile campaigns. Infrastructure effects were limited relative to scale. That is precisely why the strike matters. Hypersonic weapons derive much of their value not from explosive yield but from psychological and strategic effects that shape decision-making under uncertainty.

Hypersonic systems sit in an uneasy space between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Their speed and maneuverability reduce warning time, while their dual-use potential introduces ambiguity about intent and escalation thresholds. This ambiguity is destabilizing by design. It forces worst-case assumptions and heightens coercive leverage without crossing overt nuclear red lines.

The timing of the strike matters. It occurred amid active European debates about long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. Russia has consistently opposed deeper Western involvement, and analysts note that demonstrations of advanced strike capabilities often coincide with diplomatic inflection points to influence allied decision-making. Poland was not targeted, yet proximity alone conveyed risk. That was sufficient.

This brings the conversation directly to deterrence and national strategy. The most recent United States National Defense Strategy identifies Russia as an acute threat and emphasizes integrated deterrence across domains, allies, and instruments of national power. The document explicitly recognizes the challenge posed by advanced missile threats and highlights the need for resilient command and control, integrated air and missile defense, and close coordination with allies.

However, the Oreshnik strike exposes a gap between strategic acknowledgment and operational specificity. The National Defense Strategy speaks clearly about the importance of integrated deterrence, yet it remains largely high-level in addressing how compressed decision timelines created by hypersonic weapons affect escalation management in Europe. While the strategy calls for investments in missile defense and sensing, it does not fully grapple with the psychological and political effects of hypersonic ambiguity on alliance cohesion crises.

Deterrence by denial becomes harder to sustain when allies know that some threats may penetrate defenses regardless of investment. Hypersonic systems challenge assumptions that reassurance can rest on interception alone. NATO and U.S. strategies increasingly emphasize deterrence by punishment and resilience, yet the National Defense Strategy stops short of articulating how allies should respond politically and militarily when warning time collapses, and attribution is immediate, but intent remains unclear.

This does not mean the strategy is wrong. It means it is incomplete. Integrated deterrence remains the correct framework, but hypersonic weapons demand greater emphasis on crisis decision-making, distributed command structures, and alliance-level exercises that assume ambiguity rather than clarity. Analysts have long warned that hypersonic systems stress deterrence not by making war more likely, but by increasing the risk of miscalculation during moments of political tension.

Russia’s hypersonic signal near NATO’s border, therefore, becomes a practical test of whether strategic documents translate into a credible posture. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges the problem. The question is whether implementation moves fast enough to match the physics involved. Deterrence must function even when seconds replace minutes, and ambiguity replaces certainty.

The Oreshnik launch did not redraw Europe’s security map overnight. It changed the tone of the room. It reminded policymakers that deterrence is not static, and that technology can erode comfortable assumptions faster than doctrine adapts. Hypersonic weapons are not the end of deterrence. They are a stress test of whether national strategies and alliances can remain credible when clarity disappears.

When the screens go dark in that briefing room, the real discussion begins. Not about panic or retaliation, but about adaptation. Deterrence endures not because threats are fast, but because responses remain coherent under pressure. Russia spoke in velocity. The enduring question is whether strategy, alliance resolve, and execution can keep pace.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Conversation Europe Never Wanted: Hypersonic Tensions and U.S. Defense Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia continued its bombardment of Ukraine with drone and missile strikes, and the US weighed the possibility of additional economic sanctions on Russia, including secondary sanctions against states trading with Russia. Debates among the Washington cognoscenti about possible peace settlements focused on two “baskets” of topics: what kind of “land swap” might be agreeable to Ukraine and Russia and what sort of security guarantees would be necessary for a postwar Ukraine. Amid all of this, one elephant in the room received little attention: the status of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in future relationships between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and NATO.

President Donald Trump posted on social media in late July 2025, that Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s former president, was a “failed former President of Russia” who had better “watch his words.” Trump was responding to earlier remarks by Medvedev, after Trump threatened economic sanctions against Russia unless Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a temporary ceasefire and expedited peace talks with Ukraine.

In the earlier exchange, Medvedev called Trump’s ultimatum about peace talks a threat and a step toward war. Most recently, Medvedev again warned against nuclear danger by referring to the American television series The Walking Dead and reminded Trump that Russia retains the Soviet “Dead Hand” system for automatic nuclear launch even under the most extreme postattack conditions.

In response, President Trump posted on social media that he ordered two nuclear submarines to be repositioned in response to Medvedev’s threats. Trump said he ordered the submarines “to be positioned in the appropriate regions, just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” In addition, the President noted that “[w]ords are very important and can often lead to unintended consequences. I hope this will not be one of those instances.”

Nuclear submarine movements are among the most highly classified information pertinent to military operations. If the reference was to American nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), this public announcement was unprecedented.

At one level, these interchanges between Medvedev and Trump are as much performative as they are substantive. During the early stages of Russia’s war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022, Putin issued frequent warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that might be unacceptable to Russia. These warnings were dismissed by many Western political leaders and military experts as bluff to conceal Russia’s frustration at the prolonged military deadlock it faced in Ukraine, as well as distractions from looking too closely at Russia’s disappointing battlefield performances.

As Russia’s military operations on the ground seemed to improve in 2024 and 2025, nuclear threats became less frequent and less explicit. At present, Russia seems confident of maximizing its forward progress in military reach and operational control over the Donbass and other districts in the east and south of Ukraine.

Even a “small” nuclear war fought with tactical nuclear weapons would be a self-defeating endeavor for Russia. Fighting a conventional war under the shadow of possible nuclear escalation is sufficiently risky. If Russia were to cross the bridge into nuclear first use there would be a strong likelihood of a NATO nuclear response.

Russians need to interrogate their own military literature from the Cold War with respect to the challenge of conducting military operations in a nuclear environment. Troops seeking an operational breakthrough against enemy defenses would be fighting against the prompt and delayed effects of nuclear detonations that slow operational movement, inflict significant numbers of casualties, and corrupt the coordination and cohesion of combined arms. The Soviet Union could draw upon its ideological indoctrination and favorable memories of its victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) to maintain morale and avoid mass desertion, Russia cannot.

Nor would the economy of Europe, including Russia, survive anything beyond the very restrictive use of a few ultra-low-yield or low-yield in the sub-five kiloton range. In today’s world of social media and globally transmitted visual images, the meltdown of major financial and other institutions in Europe would trigger a global crash of markets, disrupt supply chains, let loose armed formations of criminals, and drive many leading politicians to abdication. Some in NATO might hope that Putin’s mistaken decision for nuclear first use would finally convince Russia’s military and security forces to overthrow their president and sue for peace, but Putin is not Lenin, and he is as likely to double down on escalation as he is to acquiesce to a nuclear ceasefire.

And therein lies the second danger, escalation to strategic nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Putin might calculate that he could hive off the nuclear deterrents of the British and French from their American allies and bully the former into submission while frightening the American government and public with separate threats of mass destruction. This would be a dangerous miscalculation because the nuclear forces of the United States are politically and operationally coupled to those of their European allies.

American nuclear weapons and American personnel deployed in Europe are effectively tied to the continent under Article V of the NATO charter. The idea that selective use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by Russia could be sealed off from wider and more deadly destruction, is beyond optimism.

In addition to misplaced optimism about escalation control during a major European war, there is also a lack of appreciation for the challenge of skillful crisis management that might avoid war altogether. Experience teaches that the requirements for nuclear and other crisis management include shared understandings and expectations about the risks of war and a willingness to consider the danger of misperceptions held by leaders in stressful situations. They may misjudge other national leaders as irrevocably committed to acts of conquest or aggression, when in fact those other heads of state may be undecided about their final judgments for or against war.

Communication between and among leaders may be incomplete and intelligence assessments can be blinkered by insufficient information or political bias. Examples of these and other maladies in crisis are provided by the July crisis of 1914 leading to the outbreak of World War I, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and by numerous other crises.

Russians playing with the rhetoric of Armageddon are legitimizing nuclear coercion in a time of troubles. The arrangement of a prompt ceasefire and peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia is of the highest significance for many reasons. These include putting an end to the loss of life and the destruction of national infrastructure. This objective should be pursued with aggressive diplomacy and without the distraction of references to the possibility of a war that would have no precedent in its capacity to do irreparable harm to civilization.

Steve Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Danger Remains in Ukraine Peace Settlement was originally published on Global Security Review.

The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider his transformation since February’s Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump and Vice President JD Vance chastised Zelensky for being “disrespectful,” admonished Zelensky’s efforts to rally international support as “propaganda,” suggested it was Zelensky’s responsibility “to end the destruction of your country,” and described Zelensky as “buried.” Six months later, Trump is praising Ukraine’s “unbreakable spirit,” supports its “future as an independent nation,” and appears to realize that Zelensky is not to blame for Vladimir Putin’s war. It is clear that Putin is not entranced by “the art of the deal,” and that America must play a role in securing any postwar peace. The outlines of that peace are starting to come into focus.

Lurching

In early 2025, French military commanders floated the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members expressed support for the idea. By summer, 10 European nations offered to contribute troops to a 30,000-man “reassurance force” in postwar Ukraine. However, the Europeans emphasized they would need the US to provide “backstop” capabilities.

That was a nonstarter for Trump—at least until the hastily-arranged summit that brought the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU to the White House on August 18. Whether they came out of panic over the unsettling Trump-Putin Alaska meeting or in solidarity with Zelensky, or both, the result of the White House summit was positive.

For example, while Trump emphasized that he would not deploy American ground forces and explained that “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” he added, “We’re going to help them…we’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

Toward that end, he ordered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to work with allied militaries on the specifics of a European-led peacekeeping force. Perhaps with the US shouldering command-and-control responsibilities; offering American airpower and other enabling capabilities; and signaling support for a security guarantee for postwar Ukraine, peace may prevail. Predictably, administration officials then hedged on Trump’s promise to support the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine—prompting a NATO diplomat to conclude, “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

What Trump’s transatlantic counterparts and those of us who are critical of Trump’s policies need to keep in mind is that this lurching, two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach to Ukraine’s security is better than what Ukraine endured between January and July. There was the Oval Office meeting, the suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing, the mineral deal, the moral relativism, outright moral inversion, and the inexplicable deference to Putin. Trump now appears to be moving in the right direction.

Lessons

Zelensky made clear that Ukraine cannot sign a peace deal without concrete security guarantees—given Putin’s brazen violation of the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 and 2022. Eleven years of occupation and war have taught Ukrainians that words are not enough to ensure their security. A genuine security guarantee, bolstered by multinational peacekeepers and sustained military aid, is what Ukraine needs going forward—not to roll back Putin’s army to pre-2014 borders, but to deter it from another landgrab. The rest of Europe needs this too. A strong, stable, secure Ukraine will only enhance NATO’s ability to deter Moscow.

Such a guarantee will not be embodied by Ukraine’s accession to NATO—at least not anytime soon—but instead will be a thatch of bilateral commitments from individual NATO members and partners. “A group of now 30 countries, including Japan and Australia, are working on this concept of security guarantees,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently revealed.

To be sure, an American contingent on the ground in postwar Ukraine—working alongside partners that collaborated in other warzones under acronyms such as MFO, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF—would be preferable to what Trump is offering.

After all, American boots on the ground send an unmistakable message to aggressor nations. However, given where Trump was in February, it is important to look at the bright side; rather than taking an ambivalent or even antagonistic position towards Ukraine, Trump appears willing to support America’s closest allies as they secure a postwar peace. The Ukrainian people can then harden their territory against another Russian invasion. There are also two important historical realities.

First, American airpower has a proven track record of making a positive impact on the ground—whether in humanitarian, peacekeeping, deterrent, or combat-support missions. Consider the Berlin Airlift, which sustained a besieged city for 15 months and dealt Stalin a humbling blow. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, which protected Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein’s vengeance for 12 years and allowed Iraq’s Kurds to build an all-but-sovereign state is another. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, which, in coordination with partners on the ground, brought Serb paramilitaries to heel in Bosnia, pushed Serb regulars out of Kosovo, and hastened the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal rule. The toppling of the Taliban after 9/11, which saw the US use airpower as a force-multiplier for indigenous fighters on the ground is but one more example. Finally, Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged airpower to assist ground units in rolling back ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, no one wants American warplanes directly engaging the Russian military. But it pays to recall that it is already happening on a routine basis—near Alaskan airspace, over the Baltic Sea, across Pacific Ocean, and in the Middle East. Moreover, given recent encounters between American and Russian forces—and American and Russian hardware—it seems unlikely Putin’s high command will want to challenge American airpower along or above a future Ukraine-Russia DMZ.

That brings to light a second set of historical lessons. Neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security guarantees to allies and partners in the crosshairs. Consider post–World War II Germany. After a period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was rearmed and invited into NATO as a full member, despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin and despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border.

In fact, the US did not formally recognize the post–World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany or across Europe until 1975. The people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for German reunification. Those hopes were not realized until 1990.

Next, consider post–World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands. Despite this territorial dispute, the United States guaranteed Japan’s security in 1951 and entered into a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Last, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements; despite the absence of a peace treaty; and despite, or perhaps because of, the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the US provided open-ended security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people of South Korea still look forward to unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Predator

In none of these examples did the US or its allies agree to the permanent ceding of territory. Rather, they recognized the difficulty of liberating occupied territory and they envisioned the future prospect of the return of that territory. That is how Ukraine and its partners should view the imperfect peace that will emerge in the coming months—a peace that will leave some of Ukraine’s territory under Putin’s control.

It is also worth emphasizing that a European-led, US-supported peacekeeping force in Ukraine is necessary given Putin’s policies and plans: Moscow occupies swaths of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; threatens Poland; is conducting a campaign of sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint; has moved nuclear weapons into Belarus; is firing off intermediate-range missiles; and is diverting 35 percent of government spending into its war machine. As French President Emmanuel Macron concluded, Putin is “a predator…at our doorstep.” Putin will not stop until he is stopped. Securing Ukraine—while continuing the build-up of deterrent forces on NATO’s eastern flank—is key to stopping Putin.

Alan W. Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

Trump’s Path to an Imperfect Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.

Recent analyses suggest that such drone operations contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.

Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions

For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a reconsideration of long-held assumptions.

The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.

Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might

The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.

These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now recalibrate their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.

Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary

During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.

American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.

Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation

One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.

Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.

Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence

Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how military operations are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.

With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.

Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age

Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a deterrence model solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this new operational environment.

Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence

“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in modern deterrence. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.

The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The containers were then placed far inside Russia before launching the drones. One hundred seventeen drones were able to strike targets up to 2,500 miles away from Ukrainian territory. The hurdle of communicating with the drones and powering them was accomplished with local SIM cards and solar panels.

While the results are disputed, many Russian aircraft were damaged at a significant cost, especially since production lines for many of Russia’s bombers shut down decades ago. There is also the cost of embarrassment and the concern that Russia cannot protect its forces from drone threats. Understandably, there may be a concern that a similar follow-on attack is likely.

Those fears were proven correct, but in another country—Iran. Israel was able to strike numerous military and nuclear installations, as well as target specific individuals in air strikes throughout Iran, with minimal resistance and no known losses.

Despite Israel being only hours into a purported weeklong operation, they revealed they had a network within Iran that used drones to incapacitate anti-air defenses.

Incorporating covert use of drones into suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) doctrine is a critical development in air warfare. While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used in SEAD was theorized, this is the first time it was employed for that purpose. Unlike Ukraine, Israel used personnel within Iran to operate the drones. While increasing risk to their operatives, it most likely allowed more precise control of pre-placement and planning and minimized communications that could be intercepted or disrupted.

In the future, it is likely that covert pre-placement and distant operation will be used to “shape the environment” for more conventional strikes and attacks. The hurdles to overcome are power supply, detection, and communication. There is also the need to overcome any particular anti-drone technology that may exist.

Regardless, use of drones as a preliminary and surprise strike weapon works. It is a threat that will work particularly well against soft targets as well as military targets. While the US needs to develop its own capabilities, and fast, it absolutely needs to prioritize defeating drones and defending infrastructure from them. Whether they are pre-programmed or operated by fiber optics, radio, or lasers, the US must develop affordable ways to stop them.

The days of relying on a handful of military police to guard installations at home should have ended on September 11, 2001. In some cases, it did, but in others it did not. In the civil sector, not much has changed despite the increasing threat environment.

There are additional challenges that make attacks like Ukraine’s asymmetric attack more likely. The United States has seen tens of millions of illegal aliens enter the country, many from nations hostile to the United States. Many that do come legally come from every background imaginable and hold various ideologies, faiths, and allegiances that are not friendly to the United States. China’s extensive use of Chinese students and work visa holders to commit industrial espionage is another example of what can be turned into a fifth column.

Additionally, with only 6 percent of cargo entering American ports facing inspection, ports are also an easy target for exploitation. And as if this were not enough, Americans also allow hostile nations to purchase land next to military installations.

It is only a matter of time until such an attack happens on American soil. A terror attack, perhaps in retaliation for the recent air strikes in Iran or by Mexican drug cartels is possible. More likely and troublesome is the use of drones in conjunction with other strikes on infrastructure and installations, all to cripple the military in advance of conflict in the Pacific. The US Air Force and Navy are particularly at risk, as air frames and ships are expensive and take time to replace. The Navy, for example, struggles to build ships and submarines.

Today, the nation’s only defense against this threat is relying on signals intelligence to intercept communications, praying for defectors, and dumb luck. This is certainly no way to plan for asymmetric threats that are predictable. The time to find solutions is now, not after the attack.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Ukraine’s Drone Attack: What It Means was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since January 20, Trump administration officials have announced an end to US participation in NATO military exercises; floated plans to relinquish NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander post (held by an American since NATO’s founding); proposed withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe; threatened the sovereignty of NATO ally Canada; raised the prospect of using force to seize Greenland (a territory of NATO ally Denmark); derided “freeloading” Europeans; said of Vladimir Putin that America “should take him at his word”; torpedoed NATO’s unanimous declaration to “never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea”; and suggested America’s NATO allies would not “come and protect us” in a time of crisis. This follows Trump’s 2024 invitation to Putin’s henchmen to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies failing to meet NATO’s defense-spending requirements; 2018 threat to withdraw from NATO; and a 2016 declaration that he would defend NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us.” Add it all up, and Trump’s view of NATO diverges dramatically from that of what was once known as the “Grand Old Party.”

For instance, as he took the reins as NATO’s first military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower—a future Republican president—called NATO “the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.” President Richard Nixon viewed NATO as “a moral force.” President Gerald Ford believed NATO “protected the free world from the threat of aggression.”

President George H. W. Bush called NATO “an insurance policy.” Indeed, for America, NATO insures against the worst scenario: another European conflict triggering another global war. For the rest of NATO, the alliance is a security guarantee backed by the United States. Without that guarantee, there is no security in Europe, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in, from Cold War Hungary to post–Cold War Ukraine.

President George W. Bush called NATO “the essential foundation of transatlantic security.” This essay did not forget President Ronald Reagan. However, many of those who claim Reagan’s mantle forget that he was an unwavering NATO advocate—during and after the Cold War. Rather than dismissing NATO as “obsolete,” Reagan called NATO “the core of America’s foreign policy and of America’s own security.” Rather than alarming NATO allies, Reagan reassured them by echoing the words of the North Atlantic Treaty: “If you are threatened, we’re threatened…. An attack on you is an attack on us.”

Rather than distorting NATO into a transactional protection racket, Reagan championed NATO as a “community of democratic states” and “a bond which has served us so well.”

Reagan never questioned NATO’s relevance, never browbeat NATO laggards, never threatened withdrawing from NATO, and never raised doubts about America’s commitment to NATO. Instead, Reagan championed NATO as “an antidote to chaos,” “a living commitment of the nations of the West to the defense of democracy and individual liberty.”

Importantly, Reagan did not think NATO’s mission was over when the Berlin Wall fell. In fact, he endorsed NATO’s continued growth. “Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” he declared after the Cold War thawed. And even after Moscow began walking the path of reform, Reagan cautioned, “We cannot afford to forget that we are dealing with a political system, a political culture and a political history going back many decades, even centuries…. We must stick with the strategy of strength.” In short, Reagan shrewdly saw NATO as a hedge against a Russia that might revert to revanchism—which is exactly what has happened.

Putin’s Russia violated nuclear treaties, conventional-weapons treaties, and its own pledge to “respect the independence…sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine”; warned NATO member Poland that its western territories were “a gift from Stalin”; dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine; countenanced and/or conducted cyberattacks against American energy infrastructure; interfered in elections throughout NATO’s membership roster; conducted sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint (including American targets); threatened use of nuclear weapons; aided and funded attacks against American forces; provided targeting data to support Houthi attacks against allied ships; and made “massive investments in its defense sector” (according to Trump’s own intelligence officials). In light of all of that—and the Kremlin’s long history of deceit—Reagan would never “take Putin at his word.”

GOP presidents, and their democrat counterparts, supported NATO because they recognized that NATO serves America’s interests. For 40 years, NATO helped deter Moscow and prevent the Cold War from turning hot. But that is just a fraction of how NATO has served America’s interests.

Thirteen current NATO allies deployed troops to assist America in defending South Korea. NATO militaries, infrastructure, and decades of interoperability served as the nucleus for the coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait, with NATO allies deploying thousands of troops to assist America.

The only time NATO’s all-for-one collective-defense clause was invoked was after September 11, 2001, when NATO allies rushed aircraft and personnel to this side of the Atlantic to guard America’s skies. NATO then bled with America in the Sisyphean campaign that followed, with 455 Brits, 158 Canadians, 86 French, 54 Germans, 48 Italians, 43 Danes, and 40 Poles dying in Afghanistan. When America withdrew from Afghanistan—20 years after the attacks on America’s capital, America’s military headquarters, America’s largest city—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not Americans. The vast majority were NATO allies. Trump is apparently unaware of this history.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 16 NATO allies sent troops when America asked for help. Hundreds of NATO troops—Brits, Italians, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Danes, Dutch, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs—died in Iraq, as did 18 soldiers from Ukraine, a country that is not a NATO ally but certainly acts like one.

In the post Iraqi freedom years, seven NATO members conducted airstrikes against the ISIS caliphate. Again, NATO was there.

Far from “freeloading,” NATO allies Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are supporting operations in the Red Sea. Likewise, British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Canadian assets are promoting freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

European nations sent more aid to Ukraine than the US. Britain and France are organizing a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine.

NATO has eight battlegroups defending its most at-risk members along the eastern flank. Only one is American-led.

Britain leads the battlegroup in Estonia, supported by Denmark, France, and Iceland. Britain is committing resources to defend NATO’s northern flank. And the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales just commenced a globe-spanning mission—the largest deployment of British naval airpower in a quarter-century.

Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, backed by Belgium, Czechia, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Germany is building permanent bases in Lithuania for 4,800 German troops. Germany is spearheading a continentwide missile shield. And Germany’s parliament recently approved a massive defense-infrastructure fund.

Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, supported by 10 other NATO allies. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania. Pouring almost 5 percent of GDP into defense, Poland fields NATO’s third-largest military. Sweden is quadrupling production of anti-tank weapons.

What NATO is doing and deterring underscores something General James Mattis observed almost a decade ago, “If we did not have NATO today, we would need to create it.”

This begs the questions: what if we did not have NATO? What if these first hundred days mark the last days of history’s greatest alliance for peace?

NATO is designed not to wage war, but to deter war. If there is any doubt about NATO’s collective-defense guarantee—and these first hundred days have created enormous doubts—Putin could be tempted to do in the Baltics what he has done in Ukraine. That would force NATO to blink or fire back. And that would lead to terrible outcomes. The former means the collapse of NATO—and with it, the entire US-led alliance system. The latter means great power war.

The best way to prevent such dire outcomes is through deterrent military strength, clarity of intent, and certainty of cause and effect. Trump’s words and actions have undermined all of these.

What the transactional Trump administration fails to recognize is that by undermining NATO, it is undermining America’s security. If a cyberattack or EMP blast or bioweapon paralyzes America; if ISIS or al Qaeda or some other terror group unleashes something worse than 9/11 or 10/7; if Moscow blinds America’s constellation of satellites; if Beijing moves against Taiwan; or if Pyongyang restarts the long-paused Korean War, America will call for help.

A post-NATO Europe may be unable or unwilling to answer.

Alan Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

FYI to the GOP on NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Given these doubts, European political leaders have expressed a determination to increase their defense budgets and upgrade their armed forces and defense industrial bases. For example, European Community leaders met in early March to discuss the urgency of rearmament and the possible shift in American commitment to the defense of Ukraine and/or Europe altogether. The president of the European Commission noted that Europe faces a “clear and present danger” from the possibility of an asymmetrical peace agreement favorable to Russia followed by a more ambiguous American commitment to the defense of Europe.

European concerns are understandable, but the possibility that free Europe can establish a self-sufficient deterrent against further Russian political coercion or military aggression, apart from US security guarantees, is remote. An effort to bisect American national security from that of Europe would be politically unwise, weaken deterrence, and open the door to piecemeal disintegration of the transatlantic partnership that served leaders during the Cold War and thereafter. Four aspects of this issue merit specific consideration.

First, NATO is the strategic and military embodiment of shared security commitment and risk among member-states. NATO’s totality of conventional and nuclear military strength, supported by its political unity, is the linchpin for credible deterrence against Russian revanchism. Collectively, NATO members have the resources, including conventional forces for modern combined arms battle and the defense industrial base for protracted conflict, to deter any repetition of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine or any Russian attack on the alliance. American commitment to European defense ensures that its strategic nuclear forces support deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including possible Russian nuclear political coercion or first use.

Second, President Trump, on his best and worst days, tends to see international relations as entirely transactional. This may work when dealing with trade or tariff matters but not matters of war and peace. American entanglement with the security of Europe is not only transactional; it is also existential. European and American defense and deterrence requirements are joined at the hip, notwithstanding occasional spats and acrimony over the details of military planning and defense economic priorities. American politicians complain that the United States should try to avoid getting stuck in another “forever war” in Ukraine but Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan.

A victory for Putin in Ukraine opens the door to European vulnerability that Russia will later exploit at a higher cost in blood and treasure for the United States and its European partners.

Therefore, it follows that the US decision in early March to suddenly suspend American military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine was ill advised and poorly timed. Although holding back equipment deliveries might take some months to impact events at the front, failure to share timely intelligence could impact immediately on Ukraine’s ability to strike key Russian targets, including logistics hubs, command centers, and troop concentrations. Thus, the suspension sent the wrong message to Ukraine and to Russia about allied steadfastness as preliminary ceasefire and peace negotiations were taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Third, messaging of American commitment to peace and security in Europe also involves the decisions about modernization of the American nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. This has a number of components. First, the US is replacing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad. The Trump administration also wants to deploy the sea-launched cruise missile, to replace some existing nuclear warheads with upgrades, and to provide additional limited nuclear options for contingencies short of general nuclear war.

Fourth, American defense planning for each potential theater of war will continue to emphasize a spectrum of options including both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US must maintain credible deterrence against the combined forces of China and Russi, not only with respect to the possible outbreak of conventional war in Asia or Europe, but also with regard to the threat of nuclear first use or first strike against American allies or the American homeland.

In this respect, another challenge to deterrence lies in the increasing capability of conventional weapons for use against targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons, and, conversely, the attractiveness for some parties of low-yield nuclear weapons for use against targets previously assigned only to conventional weapons.

The challenges in meeting the preceding standards for deterrence in Europe and beyond are enormous. First, they include the evolving international security environment in which an emerging multipolar realignment places a coalition of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at cross-purposes with US and allied visions for world order in Europe and Asia. Second, the challenges involve the significance of emerging technologies for long-range precision strike, missile and air defenses, cyber deterrence and war, space conflict, and continuing developments in autonomous warfare. Third, the costs for maintaining deterrence in Asia and Europe are enormous and Europe cannot expect the United States to foot the bill.

Some American allies in Asia and Europe expressed a willingness to increase their defense budgets and their degrees of readiness for local or regional conflict. More demanding times are ahead. In short, there is no “Eurodeterrent” without the United States and vice versa.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a distinguished professor at Penn State-Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Euro-deterrence and the Quest for Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

A new version, the Shahed-136B, is available for use in conflict. With an extended range of 4,000 kilometers, the increasing capability of Iran’s long-range drone raises important strategic questions as this weapon’s potential uses beyond Ukraine are considered. Consider Iran’s potential response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, should the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Shahed-136 in the Russia-Ukraine War

Iran is supplying the Shahed-136 to Russia as supply of the drone is available. Russia often uses the drone to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and military positions. The design of this Shahed-136 allows it to bypass traditional air defense systems due to its low radar cross-section and ability to deploy in swarms—ensuring the drone will always get through, at least some portion.

Military officials in Ukraine and the West identified the Shahed-136 as a persistent and cost-effective threat capable of overwhelming advanced air defense systems. In the case of the Shahad-136, quantity has a quality all its own. Russia’s use of this drone is giving Iran valuable battlefield data that allows designers to refine and improve the capabilities of the Shahed-136B, which is proving an even more lethal weapon.

Strategic Implications in a US-Iran Conflict

If tensions between the US and Iran escalate—particularly if the US conducts strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites—the Shahed-136B could become a key component of Iran’s retaliation strategy. With a 4,000-kilometer range, the Shahad-136B has the potential to strike American strategic assets across the region. With a large American presence spread across the Middle East, there are a large number of Americans and military targets that would make inviting targets. Although the Shahed-136B does not have the legs to strike targets beyond Southern Europe and the Middle East, the number of American bases and assets within the drone’s striking radius are significant.

Iran may also try to launch attacks from unfriendly nations in the Western hemisphere like Cuba or Venezuela or even work with Mexican drug cartels. This proximity, should such an approach work, could allow for attacks on critical targets in the United States. Iran believes the United States is seeking regime change, which will lead the regime to see any fight as a fight for survival.

While military analysts can debate the effectiveness and impact of such a response, the psychological effect achieved is significant. Israelis, for example, live in constant fear of attack from the air. An American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or other assets would surely elicit an Iranian attack from Iran’s most advanced capabilities.

Iran has a sophisticated network of asymmetric capabilities that extend across the Middle East and Europe. This means any direct confrontation with Tehran could lead to severe and unpredictable consequences for American security. Ensuring Iran does not field a nuclear weapon may be worth the risk of an Iranian response, but it is certainly unknown just how Iran may respond and how effectively the United States and its allies can limit the effect of any response.

Rather than pushing the region toward war, President Donald Trump, who presents himself as a pragmatic negotiator, should consider engaging Iran in constructive dialogue. Despite the difficulties in recent efforts by President Trump to work with the Iranian regime, a return to diplomacy could prevent a devastating conflict that neither side can afford.

Keep in mind, the regime in Tehran feels the United States is attempting to end the regime. The desire for nuclear weapons was spurred by American forces in Iraq, Iran’s western neighbor, and Afghanistan, Iran’s northern neighbor. Ratcheting down tensions will require an American effort to create a sense of security within the Iranian leadership.

While the Shahed-136B is not the only tool in Iran’s toolkit, it is an example of the growing capability fielded by Iran. It is also a strategic consideration for the United States. Iran is unlikely to let any attack go unanswered.

Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash is an independent defense analyst in Tehran.

Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Christine and Natalie engage with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, a nuclear historian, to discuss her book ‘Inheriting the Bomb’ and the complexities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. They explore the historical context of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, the narratives surrounding its disarmament, and the implications of security assurances from major powers. Mariana shares her personal reflections on the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenges faced by nuclear facilities under occupation, and the lessons learned for international security and cooperation.

Podcast: The Complexities of Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, Ukraine cannot rely entirely on aid packages from Europe and especially not the US who, under Trump, is taking a much more careful role in European conflict. So far, support for Ukraine from the international community is limited, costly, and dependent on repayment either in natural resources or as the United Kingdom said, “the extraordinary profits on immobilized Russian sovereign assets.”

There are certain things which, due to their higher cost, Ukraine must receive from aid deals with foreign governments, such as missile systems and larger manned vehicles. These more expensive items must be produced by larger defense contractors as they have greater access to raw materials and a larger production budget. UAVs, however, can be produced as effectively by smaller companies which are able and willing to provide the Ukrainian government a better deal financially. Over the past few years, a German AI company, Helsing, has filled an important role in providing affordable drone systems to the Ukrainian military. Four thousand reconnaissance drones, designed and manufactured by Helsing, are already operational in Ukraine, and a recent deal was struck to provide 6,000 of their new HX-2 attack drones.

The HX-2 attack drones are similar in design to the Russian Lancet drone, produced by Russian aerospace giant ZALA, but come with a few key advantages and innovations. The HX-2 is technologically advanced and able to avoid signal disruption, a feature which can transform drone capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield. The engagement range is also far higher, at 100 kilometers (km) compared to the Lancet’s 40–60 km. Helsing is the developer of an AI software which allows the drones to travel on missions in a swarm, where many are piloted by one individual, allowing for incredibly destructive capabilities.

The key advantage of a company like Helsing, over a larger aerospace company with a wider range of products, such as ZALA, is the significantly lower production cost, which Helsing offers. Helsing has plans to increase output, building “resilience factories” across Europe, which allow for countries to carry out domestic production.

The Ukrainian government clearly spotted some of the advantages in giving smaller defense companies the opportunity to develop new and innovative products. Brave1 is an initiative run by the Ukrainian government, where investors, engineers, defense companies, and military experts are able to meet to address some of the gaps and issues that Ukraine faces on the battlefield. The idea is to fix issues and fill gaps as fast as possible, and so far, it has been successful. The Ukrainian government incentivizes both smaller and larger technology companies to innovate by offering them a shot at a lucrative government contract.

Another similar program aimed at kickstarting innovation in the European defense industry is the Darkstar Coalition. Listed as one of the partners of Brave1, Darkstar is a team of European tech start-up owners and investors who joined forces to boost European defense. Darkstar hosted two boot camps, where small tech start-ups demonstrate their creations and compete for the winning prize: cash to expand their operations. A third boot camp will take place in Spring of 2025, with a total of €1.5 million awarded to the two most successful companies. Even companies which do not win the funding will benefit from attending, as they are given the opportunity to carry out field testing, network with other companies, gain technical advice, and potentially receive funding externally from other interested attendees. The success of the boot camps demonstrates the previously underutilized talent and innovative ability in Europe in sectors such as engineering, robotics, AI, and cybersecurity. When incentivized and supported, these smaller start-ups can have a real impact on the war in Ukraine and European security more broadly.

It is not just defense manufacturing companies that are stepping up to meet the changing requirements of the Ukrainian government, but also AI programming companies such as Swarmer are also innovating. Swarmer is a company that creates drone swarm programs with huge capabilities in modern warfare. It is also a company which is consistently present at Brave1 tech summits, meeting with investors and Ukrainian military officials.

As the war enters a new phase, with reduced support from the US and the prospect of limited support from Europe, stretching the Ukrainian defense budget as far is it will go will become even more of a priority. This is where these smaller defense and tech start-ups will thrive. Whilst giants such as Lockheed Martin, BAE, or Airbus typically fill a majority of the orders during long-term conflicts, Ukraine recognized the power in allowing smaller, newer, more nimble defense technology companies to innovate.

Raphael Chiswick is an independent author. Views expressed are his own.  

AI Defense Start-ups was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vance addressed the continents’ hostile stance on freedom of opinion. He suggested Europe is becoming the enemy they opposed during the Cold War, and with elections coming, challenged Europeans to step up and take charge of their own defense. Vance also argued that the most urgent issue shared by all nations at the conference was mass migration.

Europe is Not Unified

 Incidentally, in late 2024, Global Security Review (GSR) published an updated independent assessment of European political uncertainties. It shows that JD Vance’s statements made in February 2025 were factual and fully grounded, even if inconvenient.

The governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are fractured and dysfunctional. Another late 2024 GSR independent assessment of an endgame in Ukraine suggested an uncomfortable realpolitik-driven negotiated settlement, even before the Trump administration offered its plan after the Munich Security Conference.

That suggests two observations. First, the complete terms will never be made public but are already known to powerbrokers. Present neutrality of Russian forces in Transnistria and a lack of attacks on Ukrainian leadership suggests some form of agreed limitation of the conflict. Recently both Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio remarked on Zelensky’s duplicitousness. Apparently, he would agree to terms in meetings and then lie to the media about them. The ostentatious way Zelensky ended up confronting both President Donald Trump and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office, despite the rather realistic and transactional path to settlement, only reinforces this assessment.

The indignation and moral outrage over the conflict is mostly performative for the media and the public. It gives governments cover to prolong the conflict by providing aid, winning elections, and increasing the size of their bureaucratic apparatus, along with the corrupt mechanisms endemic to Ukraine. What online outrage does not do is enable a negotiated settlement of hostilities.

After the White House debacle, President Macron arranged an emergency meeting. While President Macron again pushed for “strategic autonomy” for Europe, the emergency meeting again showed that other European countries are not getting on the France bandwagon just yet. Together with the UK, France is the most likely to send troops to Ukraine, an idea that both Germany and Poland loathe. Italy is attempting a pragmatic balancing act between Europe and the US. Regrettably, the Baltic and Nordic countries, who are the frontline against Russia and invest the most in their defense, were not represented in a meaningful way.

Second, the claims of America “abandoning” Kyiv are hyperbolic, counterfactual, and premature. This is an ongoing negotiation. The facts are clear. The US provided 0.6 percent of its 2021 GDP to Ukraine and more than $160,000,000,000 in financial assistance and munitions, just about half of all assistance Ukraine has received. This aid, unlike European aid, has no strings attached and no expectation of repayment. The US also secured billions in loans from various banks for the benefit of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the US is strategically overextended and incapable of matching the more immediate threat (China). The Trump administration understands this. Many Americans know this, too, which is why 72 percent of registered voters want a negotiated settlement. That does not mean President Trump is surrendering to Putin or “abandoning” Europe. Nor does it make him a tool of Putin.

The West is in a bad strategic and operational position. Even after three years of supporting the Ukrainian war effort, weapons production across all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states cannot meet demand, let alone stockpile in case of war in the Pacific. While many speculate that Russia is in bad shape and is showing indicators of economic decline, they are stronger than Ukraine and its immediate neighbors.

For the West there are only two alternatives to a brokered peace: a dramatic escalation led by American conventional forces and resources or continuing to feed the war of attrition. Neither is a good scenario for the Ukrainian people who are dying by the thousands. President Trump understands this fact.

The Future of NATO

How Europe responds to the US remains to be seen. There are deeper fractures within and between the UK, France, and Germany than mainstream observers realize. The only ones significantly expanding their militaries and cooperating with the US are Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries.

As for the United States’ participation in NATO, it should be scaled back over time and be contingent on shared values with partner nations, especially when it comes to freedom of conscience and speech. Countries like Denmark, who believe Russia will invade Europe in 5 years, should expand their militaries and demonstrate not only commitment to liberal values but self-defense. The United States cannot fund its welfare state and those of Europe. Americans are not that wealthy.

American involvement in NATO should be primarily limited to (1) logistics (air and sea transport to Europe); (2) support in the form of weaponry, materiel, and war support materiel; (3) maintaining freedom of the seas; and 4) developing missile defense systems that can serve American and, when purchased, NATO. The United States also has unmatched space capabilities.

There should be no expectation of American boots on the ground simply because Europe neglected its security obligations for nearly 30 years. While there is still immense value in joint training and cooperation, the US should be seen as a rear guard and a last resort force. American taxpayers should not be the primary funder and provider of military forces and capability for Europe.

It is difficult to expect any long-term peace to be possible so long as NATO serves primarily as an anti-Russia platform funded by the United States. Europeans need to solve their own problems without vilifying the United States for solving American problems first. This means Eastern Europe needs to secure the buy-in of countries like Italy and Spain, who do not feel the Russian threat. As Vice President Vance suggested in Munich, Europeans must reflect on what they are defending and not just what they are against.

Europe is their continent and their home. It is their responsibility and duty to be the primary protectors of their individual nations and European society. Unfortunately, Europe does not appear to be ready to make a unified effort. Nonetheless, the proposal by the newly elected German chancellor, which calls for France and the United Kingdom to share their nuclear deterrent, might be a first concrete step in the right direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the authors’ own.

The US and Europe: A Reality Check was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies

Key Takeaways

• Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.
• U.S. Defense Leadership Changes: Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.
• Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments: Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.
• Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran’s growing missile capability.
• Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission: NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance’s credibility.
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates: Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.

International Developments

Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion

• Russia’s military spending will increase to 13.5 trillion rubles, estimated at 7-8% of GDP, its highest post-Soviet military budget.
• Significant investments in modernized nuclear and conventional forces to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.
• Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.

Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements

• Intelligence sources indicate Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China, raising alarms among Western security analysts.
• Iran continues uranium enrichment, prompting warnings from the UN about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.

China & Russia’s Nuclear Expansion

• Reports predict that by 2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
• Concerns grow over China’s accelerated nuclear development and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.

Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon

Escalation Risks in Space Warfare

• A RAND Corporation study warns that Russia may escalate conflicts in space early due to its heightened fears of a U.S. first strike.
• The study underscores Moscow’s increasing risk tolerance and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.

Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.
• U.S. extended deterrence remains under scrutiny, with debates over whether the Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization

• The U.S. Air Force confirms that the Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.
• Discussions continue over potential mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft to ensure nuclear survivability.

‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System

• President Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.
• Critics call it overly ambitious, but proponents argue that it is essential to counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Key Events

Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)

• Speakers: Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) & Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).
• Topic: Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)

• A 4-star USAF officer will serve as the featured speaker.
• Expected discussions on extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy.

Conclusion

The ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025, highlights key developments in U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues. With Russia’s increasing military budget, Iran’s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion, the U.S. faces a growing multipolar nuclear environment. Discussions on extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events will provide further insights into these critical security matters.

ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The presence of non-state actors on the battlefield is a common occurrence in warfare. Private military companies, such as the Wagner Group, make the news regularly for their violent involvement in multiple conflicts across numerous continents. In addition to mercenaries, foreigners can involve themselves in the current conflict in Ukraine legally by joining the International Legion for the Defense of Ukraine, also known as the Foreign Legion, a group included in the broader Ukrainian military.

However, a feature of recent wars, which rarely attracts much attention, is the presence of individuals or small groups who arrive without state-backing or membership in a larger private fighting force. These individuals or small groups are present during wars on a voluntary basis. They are often in complete control of their mission plans and ambitions, and do not appear to report to any higher authority in the military.

They also tend to work alongside more official or established militaries or private military companies. Whilst some may technically be members of groups, such as the Foreign Legion, or semi-autonomous groups, such as the AZOV Brigade or the Georgian Legion, many seem to operate mostly independently and without needing the official approval of these groups to act and carry out their plans.

In order to demonstrate this unique aspect of war, it is worth drawing attention to the YouTube channel Civ Div, which is run by a former American marine, ex-member of the Kurdish YPG, Iraqi YBS, and currently a volunteer operating in Ukraine. The channel gained widespread traction since the start of the war due to the unique coverage and insider perspective it gives to viewers.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Civ Div has played numerous roles. He began by training Ukrainian troops on how to use Western weapons. He then taught them how to carry out drone reconnaissance missions on the front line. Now he is designing and building explosive FPV drones alongside his team and training Ukrainian soldiers on how to use them in the Chasiv Yar region. It is safe to say he has had incredibly varied experiences. These ventures are captured on a GoPro which seems to be permanently running, providing a gritty and fascinating view of day-to-day life in an active war zone.

Currently, Civ Div seems to be operating out of an abandoned house in the Chasiv Yar region, along with a team of Americans and Ukrainians. He recently left his drone reconnaissance role and is therefore no longer required to live in underground bunkers, as was the case before.

Despite some of the team having a military background or experience in combat zones, one American has a background in tech and simply decided his skills could make a difference on the front lines, helping to arm Ukrainian soldiers. Due to limited access to mission specifics and details on the YouTube channel, for obvious reasons, it is very unclear as to who oversees this operation.

One might expect them to be members of the Foreign Legion acting legally, but this is hard to establish and even if it were true, they seem to be autonomous, incredibly.

Interestingly, the FPV drone project, along with some other missions carried out by his friends, which are posted to the channel, are funded by the viewers who can donate by Patreon and GoFundMe. When one joins the channel’s Patreon, their name is written on a munition which is then given to a Ukrainian soldier and eventually used on the front line, a rather dark rewards system. Previously, Civ Div advertised his friend’s Go Fund Me, which was aiming to raise money for his unit to buy a truck for military operations.

This presents a unique situation where individuals are engaging in something along the lines of a “DIY war.” The members of the team in which Civ Div works are self-funded, in control of their own mission, do not need to report progress to anyone, and yet are proving themselves able to make a real difference in turning the tide of the war.

Civ Div himself describes the FPV drone project as “grassroots,” highlighting the extent to which they only answer to themselves. The group has also been given drones by another charity, known as Doves of Freedom, which is also entirely crowdfunded. The significance of the YouTube channel is evidenced by his fear that he has become a “high-value target” to the Russians.

Overall, the success of Civ Div and his team shows the extent to which war may be beginning to change, moving away from conflicts between groups which are purely state-funded and controlled towards this DIY warfare. Remarkably, it may be that teams such as his, operating in Chasiv Yar, could make all the difference, especially when considering the low operating costs and the fact that all they have achieved is on the back of accumulated small donations from viewers.

Raffy Chiswick is a freelance writer. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The New Era of DIY Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.

The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.

This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with Russia and China, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.

Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in Ukraine serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.

The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.

The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.

The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.

Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.

First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.

Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.

Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.

Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.

Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.

Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.

Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

This single-missile attack was launched from the Sary Shagan missile test complex near Astrakhan, almost 700 kilometers from the target. In remarks later that day, Vladimir Putin identified the delivery vehicle as an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Oreshnik. The missile has been linked, variously, by the Pentagon to a terminated project, likely an intermediate-range multiple-warhead missile project known as Rubezh, and by the Ukrainian intelligence service to a future replacement for the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM known as Kedr (translated as Cedar) that is just entering engineering development.

Further, at least one component identified in the debris from the missile had markings associated with the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). These missiles (Rubezh, Kedr, and Bulava) are designed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, as is likely the case with Oreshnik. Rubezh and a version of the SS-27 Mod 2 were tested with a new warhead deployment concept in which each warhead is called an “independent dispersal unit” (Russian acronym BIR) with its own deployment motor rather than being deployed from a single warhead bus in a more traditional multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration. This feature, along with flight in a more fuel-consuming depressed trajectory, may make the warheads more difficult to intercept.

To date, no official damage assessments for the Pivdenmash facility are published. Putin compared the effect of a conventional Oreshnik strike to that of a nuclear weapon. However, reporting in the UK Daily Mail five days after the attack indicated that the damage was not as extensive as advertised. Ukrainian press reporting was similarly dismissive. The Kyiv Post reported that satellite imagery did not show the expected damage and recounted Russian war blogger expressions of disappointment or disbelief of the Russian official claims. American and NATO experts are said to be investigating the site, but no statements have been released yet.

Putin indicated that Oreshnik was not a weapon of mass destruction, in that it was not nuclear-armed. Examination of debris at the site indicated that the submunitions did not appear to carry high explosives; their effect was purely kinetic. At the reported impact velocity of Mach 11 (3,740 meters/second at sea level), the kinetic energy of an incoming projectile is about 7 mega-joules per kilogram (MJ/kg), which is almost 70 percent higher than the chemical energy content of TNT at 4.2 MJ/kg.

The choice of using 36 relatively large mass submunitions dispersed from the independent warheads may not have been the optimal choice for such an attack. A more effective approach may be more like systems researched and tested by the US that have been described as a “big shotgun shell.” Through the controlled use of conventional explosives to scatter fragments, one can place a desired fragment pattern on a target by selecting a height of burst appropriate to the incoming speed of the warhead and the expected fragment sizes.

Two examples are instructive. First, consider metal fragments of 50 grams each, roughly equivalent to a .50 caliber bullet; at Mach 11, each fragment has roughly ten times greater kinetic energy. The number of such fragments expected from an 800-kilogram payload (not counting structure and controls) would be 16,000.

First, if the height of burst is set to disperse 1 fragment per square meter, then the radius of the “shotgun” pattern is about 70 meters. Consequently, a fully fragmented warhead could theoretically cover about 4 acres in one shot, which would probably have produced far more devasting surface effects on the Pivdenmash complex, which is assumed to be a relatively soft target.

Second, for an increased fragment mass of 100 grams, the mass of a 25-millimeter (mm) cannon armor-piercing round, then the kinetic energy for an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) -delivered, Mach 11 100-gram fragment is about 7 times higher than a cannon-fired round. Such energies raise the likely prospect of even penetrating ceilings and floors to vulnerable basement spaces. The parameters can be varied to maximize effectiveness, but at 1 fragment per square meter, the affected area will be reduced to about 1 acre.

Because of the hypersonic velocities of ballistic missile–delivered fragmenting munitions, fragment energies delivered by an IRBM will, in virtually every case, deposit significantly more energy than similarly sized munitions fired from rifles and cannons.

Conventionally armed Oreshnik allows Putin the option of shifting away from a strategy of repeated nuclear threats and reducing the need to violate the so-called nuclear taboo, for which the consequences are unknown following the first breach. It provides Russia an additional high-speed delivery option on the conventional side of the conventional-nuclear integration space. Nevertheless, given that a Russian IRBM can also be designed to carry a nuclear payload, and deliver it at transcontinental range, it also provides an additional high-speed nuclear option.

Col. (Ret.) David Rehbein is a former US Army FA52 and consultant for the National Strategic Research Institute. John Swegle, PhD, spent his career at Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Lab, and Savannah River National Lab. He is also a consultant for the National Strategic Research Institute and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are their own.

Russian Use of IRBMs in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These objectives, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, dismissed peace talks with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.

Russia’s Domestic Situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.

Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.

Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.

Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

President Zelensky dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China’s 12-point peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.

However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Geneva talks regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.

Hungary’s attempts to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.

Is Peace Possible?

The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.

Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Real Space Strategy: Starlink, Key Tool in the Battle for Freedom? was originally published on Global Security Review.

These early civil defense measures were eventually neglected and then forgotten after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the Soviet Union ended in 1991. Such measures were mirrored in the USSR under General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, but by no means neglected afterward.

Civil defense is, by nature, a community-wide activity. The more people participate and help, the better the results for the entire citizenry. This includes improved morale and will to resist, fewer combat casualties, and prolonged lifespans in case of conventional or nuclear war.

The organization of processes, the laying down and buildout of infrastructure, the first-responder rehearsals, and pervasive homefront readiness drills all require group dedication in the face of natural popular skepticism, even active resistance by a vocal few.

Although there is ample room for volunteerism, and for more formalized national service (especially for those well above military draft age), governments at different levels do need to take overall charge. This ensures efficient coordination, direction of available funding into the most pressing needs, and arranging for efficient communication and reasonable compliance.

With Vladimir Putin’s many nuclear threats, it is once again time to ensure the nation has effective civil defenses against nuclear employment. It may not be the 1950s and 1960s, but civil defense matters.

This is perhaps a prime case where today’s financial-industrial and high-tech oligarchs (billionaires) can work with and/or under contract to the federal government, or even on their own initiative, to assure that, for example, America is hardened against electromagnetic pulse attack, cyber assaults, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction attacks. These may not be traditional civil defense measures, but they are civil defense for the modern era.

This collaboration is already happening in the space domain where President Putin’s “Sputnuke” threatens to totally disrupt space operations, and where President Xi Jinping’s growing space-dominance capabilities threaten to disrupt current civil society.

Effective civil defense measures are as central to effective nuclear deterrence and ally assurance as is nuclear modernization. Effective civil defense also includes ensuring the societal supporting infrastructure, such as housing, hospitals, and food stocks, are secure and survivable under even the most highly stressed circumstances.

In fact, an essential component of a truly superb American deterrence strategy must be a comprehensive program of being able to absorb an attack and nevertheless survive. Only in this way can the United States make it clear to adversaries, as President Richard Nixon said, “Not today, Comrades. Not ever.”

Church and synagogue groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders, and fraternal organizations, such as the Shriners or the Boy Scouts can also play a significant role in providing the ultimate in community civil defense. Examples of such efforts abound from the current conflict in Ukraine and Israel.

Exactly how much civil defense is the right amount? Nuclear strategists Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn were never able to agree. Such agreement is even less likely today.

The right answer to civil defense is likely a programmatic solution that is affordable and optimizes the strengths of local communities. The right amount of civil defense should be a discussion between the federal, state, and local governments. The challenge for any civil defense effort is that more than two-thirds of all federal spending and about half of all state spending are dedicated to mandatory social programs. This leaves very little room for civil defense programs, which must compete with all other government functions for an ever-dwindling percentage of federal and state budgets.

For most Americans, the threat of nuclear strikes on the homeland is an abstract threat. Thus, they would rather have immediate government services than look to an event that may never happen. This leaves the prospects for improving civil defenses low. Much as in the Cold War, it may be up to Americans to look to their survival in the event of the unthinkable.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Modernizing Civil Defense Is Wise was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.

It might be tempting to dismiss these statements as yet another instance of grandstanding by an aggressor portraying itself as an innocent victim. However, it might be worth putting Putin’s comments into context for some decoding of the next steps required not only for the Ukraine conflict but for the entire European deterrence picture.

The deployment of American intermediate-range missile systems on German territory is scheduled for 2026. When declaring Russia unbound by any unilateral moratorium on deploying medium- and short-range strike capabilities, Putin blamed the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) for Russia’s necessary actions.

Russia plans to produce weapons similar to those prohibited by the INF Treaty, increasing the nuclear component of Russia’s military budget. Overall, Putin presented the US deployment of missiles in Europe as a strategic threat to Russia and a potential justification for Russia’s own nuclear response. Russian invasion of Ukraine and nuclear threats against NATO had nothing to do with it.

During his speech at the Naval Day Parade, Putin raised concerns about Western tolerance for nuclear weapon use and the deployment of missiles in Germany. There was also an aspect of pleasing the crowd at home and impressing on them the irrefutable logic of his leadership. Reminding Putin’s audience of Russia’s military power and strategic importance, particularly regarding the Baltic Sea, was paramount.

Putin often refers to what he characterizes as the period of great tension between the tragically defunct Soviet Union and the West—the Cold War. The Russian narrative once again views the West as an enemy. It is helpful to listen to Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. He advocated for an offensive stance towards the West and revigorated the Russian complex of obsidionalism (under siege mentality), which views the West as a long-term adversary.

When in 2008 Putin invaded Georgia, French president Nicolas Sarkozy barely managed to understand what the invasion meant. The naivete of the West convinced Putin that Crimea was up for grabs. Indeed, not one shot was fired by the West when Putin grabbed Crimea in 2014.

Putin is also well aware of the fact that the current NATO defense math simply does not add up. For example, France used to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—at the end of the Cold War. France stopped just short of completely gutting its military after 1991 and kept its nuclear weapons in working order. Three decades later, France struggles to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, though it has now substantially increased defense spending as of late. Most of Europe, except for the voluntarist Baltic and Nordic countries, is in this situation or even worse.

On the one hand, Russia may be trying to extend the Ukraine conflict as a way to justify increased defense spending. On the other hand, extending the Ukraine conflict also postpones Russia’s rearming for a much larger and deeper fight against NATO.

When Putin publicly threatens the use of nuclear weapons, it plays to domestic audience reassurance. Russian naval struggles in the Black Sea are real. The enlargement of NATO to Sweden and Finland only makes matters worse as the Baltic Sea now sees Putin with NATO able to cut off access to the Atlantic and Kaliningrad. After all, the expansion of NATO leaves Russia with NATO forces much closer on land and able to completely cut off Russia by sea in the West. It should come as no surprise then that Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has decided a structural investment in nuclear forces is his best option.

In his protracted conflict with Ukraine, the Ukrainians are provided enough military support to avoid defeat, but not enough to unambiguously prevail over Russia. Finnish President Sauli Väinämö Niinistö made an ouverture to Russia to suggest peace negotiations. Considering economic and military recruitment challenges and struggles on the ground and in the Black Sea, Russia may eventually seek negotiations. However, Putin and Russian leaders may be reluctant to negotiate as it could be perceived as a sign of weakness.

Western diplomacy should look deeper at the strategic and deterrence picture. It is rather challenging to create a consensus within Russia’s political circles regarding Putin’s foreign policies, particularly towards the West. Even the rapprochement and convergence of interests that led to the China-Iran-North Korea-Russia nexus, the “Axis of Upheaval” according to British prime minister Keir Starmer, is not something straightforward. Russia’s concern for China’s ambitions should never be underestimated.

Ukraine, however, is the immediate concern and deterring further NATO intervention is most important. Thus, Putin will continue to threaten in an effort to coerce NATO restraint and the further deterioration of Russia’s position in Europe.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Putin’s Nuclear Swagger was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The lessons from this experience are numerous. First, American and coalition air defenses performed marvelously in the political act of coordinating multiple nations in the defense of Israel. This required working out the logistical issues prior to taking a defensive posture ahead of time.

Second, the response proved the maturity of ballistic missile defenses. Israel’s Iron Dome (and other defenses), American SM-3s, and coalition systems were excellent. It was a practical demonstration of the technical improvements in air and missile defenses.

Third, the response was a demonstration of successful intelligence integration. Coordinating intelligence among coalition partners is never easy, but as the coalition response proved, it is possible.

Fourth, coalition members took full advantage of the geography and time provided by Iranian air strike. With the coalition expecting a response, they had the time needed to prepare for an attack. Moreover, due to the distances the cruise missiles and drones had to traverse, coalition defenders could best posture themselves at the optimal locations to intercept inbound weapons.

However, there are also negative lessons to learn from the coalition’s response to Iran’s attack. First, the response was expensive. At least $1 billion was spent to defend Israel from Iranian and Houthi attacks. Israel spent half a billion dollars to defend against this single attack.  Such expenditures are unsustainable. While this captures the immediate costs, more time is needed to determine the long-term/opportunity costs.

Second, the United States is continuing to deplete limited stocks of expensive and exquisite missile systems against relatively cheaper Iranian weapons. The US and coalition must reverse this exhaustion strategy.

The variation in responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s attack on Israel certainly create difficult political questions. Taiwan, for example, may look at its own situation and see this varied response as politically problematic for itself. Fears of escalation against a nuclear power are logical, but to defeat any of these nations equates to extinction. Defending these democratic nations’ right to exist is in the United States’ and NATO’s interest.

The United States does not, however, have the luxury of time in preparing for future Russian or Chinese attacks on Ukraine or Taiwan. Any attack will also see far more sophisticated weaponry than that employed by Iran. Thus, defending Ukraine and Taiwan requires persistent forces ready to defend these nations.

If the United States, NATO, and other American allies are committed to defending democracies like Ukraine and Taiwan, there are three moves the United States should make. First, it must take proactive and deliberate actions. It could include establishing defensive zones around critical infrastructure and civilian population centers. This includes combined land- and sea-based defenses for shooting down air attacks. The goal is to protect civilians and critical infrastructure against indiscriminate attacks.

Second, the United States should accelerate investments in inexpensive weapon systems.  Providing more inexpensive air defenses allows for sustained defense. Focusing on capabilities that disrupt adversary surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting systems along with electronic warfare effort should serve as a central focus. The US and NATO must counter the exhaustion strategy employed by Russia, China, and Iran.

Third, the United States and its allies should enhance their partnership by further exchanging lessons learned, innovative ideas, and best practices for defending against evolving attacks. Reducing bureaucratic obstacles that limit ally and partner access to critical air defenses is part of that effort.

The reasons for doing this are simple and best summarized in four points. First, it is important to improve American credibility. Nothing will aid American deterrence efforts more. There is ample reason to argue that Ukraine and Taiwan should receive the same support as Israel. All are fighting for their nations as enemies vow to destroy them. Thus, the US and NATO must do more to protect democratic nations.

Second, for the sake of deterrence, demonstrating to adversaries that the United States will not allow air strikes on democratic nations is important. Establishing protective cover with American and NATO forces can act as a deterrent that drives tensions down. The “responsibility to protect” concept is useful in deterring Russia, China, and/or Iran from attacking the infrastructure and citizenry of democratic states. There is always a risk of escalation by intervening, however. The risk of defeat and the elimination of democratic states by authoritarian regimes would, however, do irreparable harm to the United States’ standing in the world.

Third, there is value in creating and enforcing international norms. Even though Russia and China would veto any UN Security Council resolution supporting the defense of Ukraine or Taiwan, establishing such norms is worth the effort.

Fourth, the United States must defend democracy and freedom. Many nations are looking at both Western democracies and Eastern authoritarians to determine which path to follow. It is in the United States’ interest for them to take the democratic path.

It is time for the West to take a stand. While Americans may not seek war, authoritarian adversaries often believe that war is their best option for reshaping the world in their own image. The United States and some NATO member states demonstrated the means and will to defend Israel against Iranian air attack. Providing a similar defense to Ukraine and Taiwan certainly deserves further consideration if the United States aspires to continue leading the free world. Abrogating that position would be a mistake. It is now time for the US and NATO to take more risks in supporting friends in their hour of need.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Opinions expressed are the author’s own and not those of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. 

Allied Air Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the military supplement package is undoubtedly beneficial, it falls short of grappling with the deeper strategic complexities of the conflict. The war in Ukraine is not merely a matter of tactical engagements. It is a multifaceted struggle that demands a comprehensive approach.

The cyclical nature of military aid inadvertently creates vulnerabilities. As obstacles arise—whether due to domestic political debates, bureaucracy, or logistic challenges—a new gap in Ukraine’s defense could emerge. With each step forward, Russian forces entrench themselves deeper into Ukrainian territory, making subsequent efforts to reclaim lost ground more resource-intensive and costly in terms of human lives. Russia has already switched to an exhaustion strategy that is too costly for Ukraine.

While the current rate of military aid may bolster Ukraine’s defense, it is unlikely to afford Ukrainian forces the opportunity for a counteroffensive or strategic initiative that can secure victory. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Washington looms, the prevailing stance in the US and Europe is to persist in providing life support for Ukraine, yet refrain from confronting Russia, the root cause of Ukraine’s tragedy. This approach affords the Kremlin increased confidence and time to adapt its war economy.

By choosing political passivity and refraining from adopting a counter-offensive stance against Russia, Western democracies are gradually ceding their global influence. The strategic choice—or, more accurately, the strategic indecisiveness—to remain in a passive-defensive mode against Russia extends beyond the relationship between Western democracies and Russia. The war in Ukraine is but a single theater in a much larger conflict—a third world war, to be blunt—where the free world is pitted against authoritarian regimes. China, Iran, and North Korea already emerged as major supporting actors on Russia’s side, fully cognizant that their fight is not against Ukraine, but an indirect war with Western democracies.

For China, the war in Ukraine holds paramount importance. By supplying military components and dual-use technologies to Russia, and purchasing Russian oil and gas, China can gauge not only the effectiveness of economic sanctions on a large authoritarian state, but also the seriousness of the US and European countries in implementing full-scale isolation of the aggressor. This could be a pivotal factor in the future, particularly when assessing the impact of potential economic isolation from Western democracies towards China, for instance, in a scenario involving an assault on or blockade of Taiwan.

As one report indicates, China is already the largest single exporter of key military goods to Russia. This clearly reveals Beijing’s strategic posture on the war. Chinese communist leaders aim to defeat Western powers in Ukraine by exposing democracies as unable to compete with the authoritarian axis in terms of political will, efficient strategic decisions, and even by depleting the military reserves of NATO countries and the readiness of democratic societies to fight for democratic values.

Despite these challenges, the Biden administration persists in seeking dialogue with China, even with the knowledge that China attempts to “influence and arguably interfere” with the upcoming election in the United States. However, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China demonstrated that Beijing does not seem inclined towards meaningful conversations with Washington. It appears that Chinese leaders already assessed the Ukraine-Russia war in terms of Western resolve to fight back. These conclusions bolster Beijing’s confidence that the US and NATO allies are too timid, too slow, and too preoccupied with domestic political issues to assert themselves against Russia.

The war in Ukraine is likely the initial phase of a much longer and more complex war between the US and China, as leaders of diametrically opposed blocs in the current global landscape. This initial phase could culminate in a victory for China if Western democracies fail to adopt a robust stance and enter a counter-offensive mode against Russia.

NATO must dissuade Russia that it fears the dubious escalation risk, a narrative heavily promoted by the Kremlin’s propaganda, to prevent genuine NATO membership accession talks with Ukraine. This would send an unequivocal signal that Russia is incapable of conquering Ukraine, regardless of the duration of their attempts. And Ukrainians, armed with military supplies from NATO, will do everything in their power to liberate the occupied territories from Russian control. This is the path forward for Western democracies to re-assert their global role and uphold democratic values.

Tomas Janeliūnas is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, and a professor of international relations at Vilnius University, Lithuania. At X: @TomasJaneliunas The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Strategic Contest in Ukraine: A Pivotal War Foreshadowing a Major US-China Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

Previously known as the Turkic Council, the OTS was founded in 2009. Since then, it has grown into a fully-fledged international organization, to include several institutions—the General Secretariat in Istanbul, the Turkic Academy in Astana, the Turkic Cultural Foundation in Baku, as well as several other entities such as an OTS representative office in Budapest.

Engagement with the Central Asian Turkic states is strategically significant in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. First and foremost, the ongoing geopolitical turmoil in the neighborhood leaves Azerbaijan as a vital link on a geographical route for Central Asian states, bypassing both Russia and China in their engagement with the external world. The issue of economic diversification, particularly in the form of the diversification of energy routes, makes Azerbaijan a strategic route for Kazakhstan to export its oil to Western and world markets without using the existing traditional route through Russia.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s state oil companies, KazMunaiGas and SOCAR, signed an agreement in March 2024 on a gradual increase in the transit of Kazakh oil via Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan expressed willingness to increase receipt of Kazakh oil to 2.2 million tons annually. The usage of Azerbaijani energy pipelines, in particular the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, is a strategic necessity for Kazakhstan to export its oil to world markets. Oil shipment via Azerbaijan will gradually grow to 16.5 million barrels a year, double the 2023 figure.

Azerbaijan’s recent participation in Central Asian summits as well as the joint summits and meetings of Central Asian states and the Gulf countries (GCC) is also a new trend in its foreign policy and highlights the strategic importance of Baku for Turkic states. The areas of cooperation are huge and cover strategically important topics such as logistics, trade, energy routes, and economic and security aspects. Considering that the US, Germany, and United Kingdom (UK) increased their engagement with the Central Asian Turkic states since the Russia-Ukraine war, and that the US and Germany institutionalized their engagements in the format of 5+1, Azerbaijan’s strategic role for these countries is also growing.

With the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty President Aliyev made integration with the Turkic states a national priority. Amidst the Russia-Ukraine war and the confrontations between the West and Russia and the US and China, Azerbaijan seeks to stay out of this global struggle and reduce its negative impacts in a region where security is already being affected.

The OTS has traditionally focused on culture, transportation, and logistics. President Aliyev proposed expanding OTS cooperation to include military, defense, and defense-industry matters, which reflects a proactive approach in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in the midst of the increasing global and regional security issues.

Richard Outzen identifies five regional security dynamics that accelerate military integration and cooperation between the Turkic states. They are the economic and technological development in the Turkish defense industry, which is enabling Turkey to become one of the leading nations in the production and export of drones. Turkey’s military capacity, with a professional military that can provide training, education, doctrine, and military equipment to the countries that are seeking to diversify from Russia’s traditional dominance also matters. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, which is seen in its support for Armenian irredentism against Azerbaijan, its war in Georgia (2008), and ongoing war against Ukraine, turned many away from Russia. Generational change in Turkic states, American withdrawal from Afghanistan (2021), and disagreements among the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states are all factors shaping the view that no external power or military alliance can be a reliable security guarantor and that the Turkic states will have to step up joint security efforts to face security challenges.

According to Cavid Veliyev, following the liberation of Azerbaijani land from Armenian occupation, Azerbaijan became a target country for Western organizations, mainly driven by an orientalist and selective approach to the principle of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. As a result, Western institutions lost credibility in the eyes of Azerbaijani society. The OTS, however, emerged as a crucial ally of Azerbaijan. Its support for the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over the occupied lands has not gone unnoticed by the Azerbaijani public.

President Aliyev’s proposal to bolster defense and military cooperation among the member states builds on the Astana Declaration, approved by the heads of state at the 10th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States on November 3, 2023, which commits to joint efforts in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and separatism.

The Turkic states face many of the same security threats. Russia is an aggressive and unpredictable neighbor. The rise of an assertive Chinese foreign policy is worrisome. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan is problematic. American attempts to project its confrontation with China onto economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative in the region is also an issue of concern. Terrorism, particularly the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in neighboring Tajikistan worries Azerbaijan greatly. Finally, there is the issue of separatism.

The Turkic countries share a vision of joining efforts to face these collective security risks. They are represented in two different security organizations, with Turkey as a NATO member and Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic as members of the Russia-led CSTO. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are not members of either military bloc. Although Azerbaijan is a neutral country as a non-aligned movement member, it has strong relations with NATO and participates in NATO programs. It took part in the peacekeeping contingent in NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Baku also has close security ties with CSTO members such as Kazakhstan.

Additionally, Azerbaijan has a military alliance with Turkey, enhanced by the 2021 Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey. The declaration highlights mutual security commitments, such as strengthening defense capability and military security, conducting joint Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises and training, increasing the interaction and interoperability of the armed forces, increasing joint weapons production, and holding joint meetings of the security councils on national security issues.

If the territorial integrity and sovereignty of either state is violated, the parties will hold joint consultations and coordinate their political, diplomatic, and military efforts to eliminate the threat. With the recent change in the landscape in the South Caucasus region, the Shusha Declaration is the embodiment of the emerging Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation as the decisive military-economic factor shaping regional developments and the security architecture.

The OTS covers a vast geography with substantial natural and human resources. It has close to 170 million inhabitants with the potential for this number to increase to 250 million by 2050, and the potential to produce $2 trillion in gross domestic product. The significance of the Turkic states increased following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Europe’s trade routes with China passing via Russian territory become insecure geopolitically.

Its concrete projects include the establishment of an investment fund, integration and ease of customs procedures, and the promotion of the Middle Corridor between Europe and China via the South Caucasus and Central Asia, also known as the Trans Caspian trade route. There are increasing investments that ensure intra-regional connectivity with well-developed infrastructure projects among the member states.

In short, Azerbaijan, which is often overlooked by Western states, is a country actively working to place itself as a key partner to the West, while recognizing that it sits between Russia and China—an unenviable position. Supporting Azerbaijani efforts to improve its economic success and security efforts will only make the country a more reliable partner for NATO and the United States.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. 

Analyzing the Turkic Vector of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In both cases, the situation is dire for Ukraine and one that will require considerable external assistance. Such assistance is crucial to maintain the credibility of the West, yet the fear is that once the war ends, so, too, will Western interest—leaving Ukraine with an aging population and a destroyed economy that may not recover for decades. If that happens, the demographic decline of the state will only accelerate as it will provide few opportunities for its younger population who will leave. The West needs, therefore, to come up with a long-term plan to reverse both these interrelated trends.

Demographic Decline

Ukraine’s population is declining and has for some time. The country went from a population of 51.7 million, at the time of independence in 1991, to 43.5 million in 2020. A weak economy with few jobs led to an exodus of young people to other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe. Declining birth rates also contributed to a shrinking of the population with it reaching a fertility rate of 1.23 children per couple by 2019. Ukraine is one of the European countries that was already in serious demographic decline and the war has only exacerbated this trend. By 2023 the population shrank to 34.8 million.

The war led to 4–6 million citizens living in an area occupied by Russia, another 4 million are refugees in the European Union (EU), and another 1 million are spread over the rest of the world. Worse, about 20 percent of Ukraine’s children are now refugees in the EU and there is a big question mark over how many of these children and their parents will return to the war-torn and impoverished nation. Thus, a Ukrainian population that was meant to reach 35 million by 2050 is now expected to further shrink by that year to 30.9 million. As the Census Bureau’s data shows the bulk of this population will be in the age group 55–75, hardly a cohort that can drive economic activity in the country, foster innovation, or attract outside investment.

The Cost of Economic Reconstruction

The economic damage to Ukraine, especially the destruction of its infrastructure, continues to grow, leading the World Bank, in 2023, to estimate that the country would require $411 billion for rebuilding from the war’s devastation. This estimate now tops $486 billion, although the final figure is unclear—given recent attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. By the time the war is over the cost of reconstruction is likely to exceed $500 billion, a staggering amount for any group of countries to provide in assistance. To put this in perspective, the EU is committing $54 billion over a four-year period to Ukraine—a sum of $13.5 billion a year. Funding at that level is too little to significantly change the fortunes of Ukraine, especially since after the war is over the EU and US may have other priorities. This means upping aid to the level where it has a meaningful effect on Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and that leads to the other problem.

The EU and US would have to sink roughly $20 billion a year for 25 years into the country. Asking for such a long-term commitment is difficult. Western nations would likely balk at the sums involved and the length of the financial commitment to Kyiv. Further, western public opinion, while overwhelmingly supportive of Ukraine, is likely to lose interest in the minutiae of post-war reconstruction. Supplying arms, after all, is far more compelling and appealing than seeking to rebuild power grids and schools.

One solution is to take the $300 billion of confiscated Russian assets and either transfer them to Ukraine or loan them to Kyiv. The problem with this approach is that it reduces confidence in western financial institutions as secure and safe repositories of foreign assets.  Taking such an action might see foreign investors pull their holdings in the West. Funding Ukrainian reconstruction may, therefore, be costly for the West. But both for demographic reasons and for showing the strength of Western commitment, it is necessary to consider a sizeable and long-term economic package for Ukraine.

Demographically, a Ukraine that shows the prospect of being rapidly rebuilt is far more likely to attract back the millions of refugees who have crossed into other countries. It will also stem the outflow of future populations from the country as jobs and opportunities become freely available. Beginning with the Ukrainian arms industry, particularly its missile and aircraft industries, may be a good starting place. At one point, Ukraine-based Antonov was one of two producers of heavy-lift aircraft for the Soviet Union. Antonov manufactured the world’s largest transport aircraft—the An-225 Mriya. The sole operational Mriya was destroyed in the early days of the attack on Kyiv, but the manufacturing rights and technical data were sold to China in 2016. Rebuilding what Ukraine has a proven talent and capacity for would be the first right step in the path to reconstruction.

A long-term commitment would also show the rest of the world that the West is willing to bear the burden of a decades-long aid process. In doing so, it would signal that the Western alliance does not cut and run when its short-term objectives are achieved. After Afghanistan, for example, trust in the West as a reliable long-term ally reached a low given the manner of the pull-out from Kabul. A sustained commitment to Kyiv would show that the sacrifices made by the Ukrainian people were not in vain.

While the war may continue for a while, it is necessary to develop a solid long-term plan for the economic reconstruction of Ukraine and to line up donors who will fund it over a long period of time. Otherwise, Ukraine’s demographic disaster will only escalate, and the West will be seen as an alliance that does not honor its commitments.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the NIDS. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Ukraine’s Long-Term Catastrophes: Demographic Decline and Economic Devastation was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bad actors, for example, would likely cheat on such a ban. Russia, for example, has a long track record of cheating on international agreements. As with all law, it is only the honest who follow the rules. The dishonest are incentivized to cheat in order to employ nuclear coercion, or even nuclear attack, in a time of crisis.

Scenario analysis of possible results from denuclearization suggest there is significant risk to such a move. Removing the constraints on conventional war, which mutual nuclear deterrence has provided since 1945, could serve as the catalyst for expanded conventional conflict. Disarmament would not eliminate nuclear arms design knowledge. Instead, the world would rely on a shaky monitoring regime to ensure no misuse of such knowledge.

Without the impediment of a nuclear-armed adversary, great-power war would return with gusto. Some simple actuarial calculations are revealing. First, about 80 million soldiers and civilians were killed in World War II. An equivalent war today, accounting for population growth, gives an approximate death toll of 325 million. This estimate could be too low, given modern military capabilities.

There is a myth that modern war produces less collateral damage and fewer civilian casualties due to precision-guided munitions, prevailing humanitarian restraint, and improved medicine. Actual conditions in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine illustrate that this is a myth. Modern conventional warfare tends to equal the destructive capacity of that in the twentieth century.

Similarly, the idea that ethnic cleansing (genocide) is a thing of the past is also false. The Balkans, Ukraine, and Xinjiang are all examples.

Other likely side effects of conventional great-power war deserve consideration. War creates refugees, expanding troop requirements, violence, stress, deprivation, and overtaxed medical systems.

If Americans thought the loss of life during the COVID-19 pandemic was terrible, and the global death toll was about seven million, how many more will the next world war kill? Lest we forget, the American medical system was overtaxed by a flu virus that left only a small percentage of the population needing medical care. If the next world war brings the fight to the United States and the American people, the medical crisis will prove far greater.

Furthermore, during the next world war, the current focus on manufacturing consumer goods will shift to a focus on producing war materials as nations exhaust their financial resources to wage war. Environmental regulations, child labor laws, and the other luxuries of peace will certainly be cast aside as victory becomes the primary concern.

Nuclear disarmament also has another consequence that should enter the equation. The nation(s) losing the war or those fearful of being pulled into war may very well turn to the covert development of nuclear weapons to either win or prevent attack. In short, the genie will likely escape the bottle once again, but without the benefit of providing pre-war deterrence. The scientific knowledge and engineering know-how to build nuclear weapons will never go away. Neither will ample supplies of special nuclear material.

A race among combatants to be the first to build new nuclear weapons would likely result. With trust at zero, an incentive to go nuclear is certain. As a conventional World War III wore on, anger, panic, grief, and revenge would likely feed the collapse of restraint. A rebirth of the most powerful nuclear weapons possible is likely. International law would prove meaningless as the fear of defeat loomed. Events far more terrible than Hiroshima and Nagasaki may follow.

Advocates of nuclear abolition argue that without global denuclearization, the accidental launch of a nuclear weapon or use by miscalculation is very likely, even if deterrence never fails. The disarmament community wants it both ways, while ignoring basic human nature.

Focusing on solid risk-mitigation decisions is a better option than the risky course of nuclear abolition. Assertions that general nuclear war is inevitable and will kill millions before bringing about nuclear winter is bad science and worse strategy. It attributes high probabilities where none exist.

Effective nuclear deterrence can sustain peace as it has for seven decades. Efforts to abolish nuclear weapons are based on emotion rather than a well-founded understanding of human nature. It is time we fully consider the consequences of a world without nuclear weapons. They are certainly not attractive. We know what that world looks like because we have seen it before.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

The Consequences of Nuclear Disarmament was originally published on Global Security Review.

By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

Wild Blue Yonder, By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

With the movie Oppenheimer bringing the Bomb back into our casual conversations, it is a good time to rethink how you feel about the Bomb. Its abstract but existential implications are especially present today as a driver of both conversation and human behavior in an unprecedented way. Will the unleashing of nuclear weapons be the sadly predictable end of mankind that our worst nightmares portend, or will the Bomb fulfill our greatest hopes and be a deterrent backstop that prevents a third World War and enables a global reconciliation that leads to total disarmament? Should we hate or love the Bomb, or somewhere in between?

Read more about the paradoxes, the hatelove of the bomb, and some unsolicited advice from a cat in the article on Wild Blue Yonder.

We Are the Cat: How Schrödinger Can Teach Us to Hatelove the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts to conventionally deter Iran failed with Iran-inspired fighting spreading from Gaza to the Red Sea, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Recently, three American soldiers were killed and 34 wounded in a drone attack by Iran-backed militants in northeastern Jordan, according to US Central Command. The Pentagon has reported more than 160 attacks by Iranian-linked militia groups on American bases and forces in the Middle East since Israel was attacked on October 7, 2023. These actions place immense pressure upon President Joe Biden to strike the sovereign territory of Iran, which Iranian leaders may view as an act of war.

Moreover, recent political decisions render the threatened use of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program impotent. In February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded President Trump’s United Nations (UN) sanctions restoration. This was followed by President Biden’s decision to release $6 billion “in exchange for the release of five Americans detained in Iran” and another $10 billion in a sanctions waiver that grants Iran access to money from Iraq in exchange for electricity purchases.

Recently, Maj Gen Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, said the country is not seeking war with America, but is not afraid of it either. Iran’s aggressive behavior certainly lends credence to the statement. Iran is emboldened by its allies and empowered by its proxies. This, of course, is backstopped by an eerie sense of confidence that Iran may soon become a nuclear power. In May of 2022, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that “Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb,” with a uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent that had grown four times in just 90 days.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and founder of the US Institute for Science and International Security, said that if Iran continues producing enriched uranium at the same rate, the regime will have enough weapons grade material to make 12 nuclear bombs within five months. Meanwhile, Iran successfully launched three satellites into space using a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket. This achievement undoubtedly accelerates Iran’s ability to perfect and field a future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), likely the regime’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery system.

The United States is now experiencing coordinated aggression. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”

Furthermore, the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board recently warned in their Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity that the United States must be concerned that adversary states could engage in opportunistic acts if or when the United States is engaged in other conflicts.

The bipartisan America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also advised that the possibility of opportunistic or simultaneous multi-state aggression should no longer be construed as improbable. According to the report, “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Opportunistic aggression can translate to other hostile states like Iran and North Korea in league with Russia and China if they perceive American limitations in capability, capacity, or the will to fight with enough ferocity as to induce the fear to attack in the first place.

It appears that Iran is taking advantage of an already beleaguered United States that continues to support Israel in its war with Iranian-backed Hamas; exports arms, munitions, and intelligence to Ukraine; deters a hostile North Korea; and must endeavor to discourage Iran’s top oil importer (China) from invading Taiwan. All of these “fronts” are collectively testing American diplomacy, burdening the American taxpayer, challenging the American defense industrial base, negatively impacting military readiness, and now producing American casualties.

Killing Americans is a clear escalation and yet another indication that Iran remains undeterred by the current threat of American power. These acts are timed to take advantage of an overburdened America and are designed to frustrate American efforts within the region and ultimately convince the United States to abandon its Middle East interests and allies. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s untimely proclamation on September 29, 2023, that “[t]he Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades” was a complete misreading of the region.

Successful deterrence requires the consistent application of power. Deterrence messaging must not be muddled or muted. It must be clear, powerful, and credible. How is this done?

First, the Biden administration must immediately end sanctions relief of Iran. The United States can never fund its adversaries.

Second, the United States must take a systematic approach to eliminate the weapons, command and control, and supplies of Iranian proxies. They must not be allowed to threaten American and allied forces across the region.

Third, the United States must credibly communicate through strength by moving nuclear assets closer to the region. The United States seems content to use ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) to deter North Korea. An SSBN in the Arabian Sea would communicate a similar deterrence message.

Fourth, America must heed the warnings of opportunistic multi-state aggression and prepare a robust capability to address this very real and demonstrated threat. To do otherwise risks abandoning regional allies in conflict.

Fifth, America must not attack Iranian targets within sovereign Iranian territory unless President Biden and Congress are ready to declare war. What may be a regional conflict for the United States is a fight for survival for the Mullahs in Tehran.

Iran and its proxies are not deterred from attacking American forces, whether motivated by opportunistic aggression or existential circumstances. It is time to create a real sense of fear within the Iranian leadership. They must dread economic isolation, the destruction of proxies, and potential attack on what Iran holds most valuable—themselves and their nuclear facilities.

However, unless prepared to declare war, the United States must limit its retaliation to targets outside sovereign Iran. To attack Iranian soil would be a clear indication that deterrence has failed and could potentially lead to an all-out war. Restoring deterrence after such an event would come at a much higher cost.

Deterrence aims to make the adversary afraid to attack by creating a preferable condition of war avoidance. The goal is to convince the adversary that maintaining a peaceful status quo is the best option. Starting a war to prevent another war is a bad strategy, and it does not qualify as deterrence.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterrence Is Failing in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

Download the full compendium here:

Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.

While specific nations to be deterred are not directly named in the DSR, China’s increased involvement in strategic competition in the region is clearly documented. The DSR also highlights the critical importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States to its security. It recognizes that the alliance will play an increasingly important role in the coming decades given increased rotations of American forces to Australia and ongoing cooperation on science and technology under agreements like Pillar II of AUKUS.

While much of the formal implementation plan to improve ADF capabilities associated with the DSR will be released in 2024 as part of the inaugural National Defence Strategy and its associated Integrated Investment Program, a few priorities for immediate action were identified including preparing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines; increased long-range strike capabilities, including the manufacture of munitions locally; and upgrades to Australia’s northern bases. The review also recognizes the role of resilience in Australia’s deterrence strategy, calling upon the nation to harness all element of national power to make Australia less susceptible to coercion by hostile nations.

Australia’s strategic environment is extremely challenging when considering deterrence of China’s large, capable, and increasingly expeditionary, conventional military forces. However, China also possesses a significant nuclear force structure which is modernizing and expanding at a dramatic pace. Assuming the current growth in forces leads to a stockpile of 1,500 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2035. In considering methods for the ADF to deter China, Australia must find ways to address threats of nuclear escalation and develop methods to deescalate any potential limited nuclear use. It is interesting to note that the word nuclear appears in the DSR report 41 times in total, yet 36 of those instances refer to nuclear-power submarines planned for delivery under AUKUS. The critically important topic of nuclear escalation and the role of American extended deterrence is barely mentioned, being covered in two sentences of a 116-page document.

Effective deterrence of a major nuclear power like China, even assuming the presence of the American “nuclear umbrella,” will require both effective engagement between the US and Australia, and detailed thought about ways nuclear threats or limited nuclear use can affect any potential future conflict.

Recent tabletop exercises at the Center and Strategic and International Studies highlighted a lack of imaginative thinking by “Blue” players in a simulated US-China conflict over Taiwan, labeling the Blue team as “stuck in a Cold War mindset.” “Red” players, at the outbreak of the conflict, used the threat of nuclear use in an attempt to deter Blue forces from entering the war, similar to the way Putin has successfully leveraged nuclear threats to deter NATO’s increased involvement in  Ukraine. In one tabletop exercise, Red players employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam as a response to conventional attacks on Red’s mainland. Understanding and developing methods to limit and manage escalation within the alliance construct, while maintaining deterrence, are especially critical for a non-nuclear weapon state like Australia.

Although increased numbers of American troops rotating through Australian bases may increase deterrence, those bases are attractive targets for long-range ballistic and cruise-missile strikes early in a conflict should conflict erupt between the US and China. Several wargames and expert analyses show that the US could lose hundreds of aircraft on the ground from attacks by Chinese conventional missiles unless new methods of base hardening, base resilience, and agile combat employment are implemented. The US and Australia need to work together to find ways to ensure the maritime and air forces of both nations are able to effectively operate through such attacks.

Missile defenses, rapid base repair capabilities, infrastructure upgrades, and methods of deception and denial form a partial list of options. Proven resilience during peacetime against such attacks on air and maritime bases will help deter those attacks in wartime.

To increase deterrence and the nation’s resilience, Australia’s government must also start an open and frank dialog with the public about the significance of the threats the nation is facing and the ways in which the ADF and other parts of government are posturing to deter those threats. This is needed to help motivate the “renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness” as part of the transition to national defence recommended in the DSR. This discussion must include more than conventional threats. While only the United States possess nuclear weapons, Australia has a role to play in shared extended deterrence. This includes helping the US understand what assurances Australia requires given various routes to escalation in potential future crises. Further examination of these issues and sharing finding with the public, friends, and adversaries should lead to a more stable Indo-Pacific region.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the Growing Importance of Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The belief that the United States is being dragged into a forever war is ill informed. In fact, giving Ukraine what it needs to win might very well drag Russia, not the US and its allies, into a forever war that Russia eventually loses. Much as Soviet support for North Vietnam allowed Hanoi to perpetuate the war in South Vietnam against the United States while it reaped the benefits of a relatively modest investment, American support, combined with large-scale European support for Ukraine, will strengthen Kyiv’s capabilities and morale and allow it to outperform Russia in regard to adaptation and innovation in this war as it has consistently done.

Maintaining a consistent supply of weaponry and economic support also reinforces Western unity and drives European and American efforts. Despite some stumbles, Ukraine is fighting the West’s war and Ukraine is merely the most kinetic front in Russia’s long-running global war against the West. Providing Ukraine the necessary support reestablishes a deterrent capability that the United States is in danger of losing.

Investment in international security is essential to its maintenance. Although Putin is putting out feelers for a settlement where he can retain his ill-gotten gains from aggression, such a settlement would not constitute peace. A peace of this kind would demoralize Ukraine and strengthen Putin at home. Putin will spin such a Russian victory as ample evidence of the decadence and lack of fortitude of the West and accelerate the cascade of global crises now confronting the United States.

Russia will undoubtedly continue and upgrade its multi-dimensional probes and pressures against an equally demoralized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Chinese pressure tactics against Southeast Asian states and Taiwan will also intensify. And one can certainly say the same for Iran’s threats to Israel and international shipping, as well as further undermining the nonproliferation goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed all these attacks on the West, including Venezuela’s threats to Guyana, are probably connected to the perception of Western drift and also possible covert support from Russia.

Therefore, supporting Ukraine and Israel allows them to continue fighting on behalf of Western and American interests and reinvigorate the deterrence that is under attack globally. Concurrently, for a fraction of the American defense budget, Ukraine has already destroyed over half of Russia’s conventional forces and is killing 40 percent of Russian recruits per month–more Russians than Moscow can replace.

Western support has a proven record of success. The Biden administration has openly stated that Ukraine should win by expelling Russian forces from Ukraine—and restore the integrity, sovereignty, and right to choose alliances. Strong and continuing support can bring about those conditions of victory. A victorious Ukraine will then have a strong claim to NATO membership that will deter Russia. The US and NATO can then further strengthen the respect adversaries have for Article V of the Washington Treaty and allow Western governments to reorient much of current spending on Ukraine to its economic reconstruction.

In other words, continuing support for Ukraine, coupled with rising Western pressure on Russia’s military, economy, and morale, can lead to victory. That outcome rules out a forever war for the United States but imposes that choice on Russia, thereby adding to the considerable strains already discernible. Indeed, in Russian history, every protracted war has imposed enormous strain upon the economy and the state. Defeat led to major reforms, if not the toppling of the regime. It is unlikely Putin can escape this history because it has repeatedly manifested itself over the past five hundred years.

Putin’s aggression gives the West a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decisively advance European and international security. The global reverberation of a Russian defeat strengthens the cause of democracy, deterrence, and the rules of an international law-based order. On the other hand, a Western defeat originating in the refusal to support Ukraine or similarly threatened states will encourage more wars around the world, greater costs than we bare now and certainly more loss of life. For these reasons, the United States must rise to its responsibilities and protect its interests. This means imposing the prospects of “forever war” on Russia, and thus seizing the opportunity to end Russia’s aggression and re-establish deterrence.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Why Congress Should Support Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bulgaria identified its Border Police General Directorate as lacking sufficient armored vehicles to safeguard the country’s borders. To address this issue, the Bulgarian army is currently providing transportation equipment. Additionally, the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior’s “wartime tasks” were not adequately taken into account before receiving approval from parliament. 

The Bulgarian president stated that the protection of the Bulgarian border is of utmost importance. While this action should not be seen as a reduction in support for Ukraine by NATO or Bulgaria, the Bulgarian border security forces will be better equipped to secure Bulgaria’s borders if the Ukraine conflict spills over the border. To achieve this, the formally mothballed equipment will be incorporated for domestic use instead of being transferred to Ukraine. 

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg issued a warning yesterday that there is a growing concern of a stalemate with Russia, and the allies may discuss whether to provide more aid to Ukraine. Each NATO member will continue to consider their individual national interests, such as their own border security, while also weighing in on the collective effort to support Ukraine’s fight, which may not result in a victory. Wars are an expensive way to reset the geopolitical situation. It is likely that the Bulgarian president, whose primary responsibility is to ensure Bulgaria’s security, is now assessing the requisite means of pursuing his own national interests. 

NEW-Bulgaria Asserts Own Security Needs Over Ukraine’s was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

I. Introduction

The concept of warfare has evolved significantly over the years, with the traditional notion of state-on-state conflict increasingly giving way to more complex forms of engagement. This essay explores the concept of hybrid and non-linear warfare, a strategy that systematically blurs the lines between war and peace, and its implications for international security. The Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-2023) and the Chinese approach to hybrid warfare, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, serve as case studies to illustrate the practical application of these concepts.

Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, refers to a strategy that disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. These strategies have become increasingly prevalent in the 21st century as state and non-state actors seek to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional warfare¹.

The Russo-Ukrainian War provides a clear example of these tactics in action. The conflict, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, has been marked by a mix of traditional military operations, cyber attacks, and information warfare.² The war has also been characterized by its non-linear nature, with the front lines and the state of war and peace often blurred.

Meanwhile, China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly about Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers another perspective on these strategies. Chinese military theorists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work “Unrestricted Warfare,” have outlined a broad approach to conflict that includes not only military actions but also economic, informational, and other non-military means.³ This approach, evident in China’s actions in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, reflects a strategic shift towards hybrid and non-linear warfare.

This essay aims to explore these issues in depth, examining the nature of hybrid and non-linear warfare, its implications for international security, and how it has been employed in the Russo-Ukrainian War and by China. In doing so, it seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of these complex and evolving forms of warfare.

II. Hybrid and Non-Linear Warfare: An Overview

Hybrid and non-linear warfare represent two of the most significant developments in conflict and warfare in the 21st century. Their complexity and fluidity characterize these forms of warfare and the blurring of traditional lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.⁴

Hybrid warfare is a type of conflict that blends conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. This form of warfare is not limited to a single shape or dimension and can involve a mix of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war.⁵ The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been in use since at least 2005 when it was employed to describe the strategy used by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War.⁶

Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. This form of warfare utilizes a grand strategy approach, where force-on-force conflict is not the primary objective. Instead, the goal is to create a complex and fluid situation that exploits an opponent’s weaknesses.⁷

Several factors, including advances in technology, the increasing interconnectedness of the world, and the evolving nature of threats, have driven the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare. These forms of action allow state and non-state actors to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional war. However, they also pose significant challenges to international security, as they can be difficult to detect and counter and have far-reaching impacts on societies’ political, economic, and social fabric.⁸

In the following sections, we will delve deeper into these concepts and explore their implications through the lens of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s approach to hybrid warfare about Taiwan and the South China Sea.

III. Case Study: The Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2014 and is a prime example of hybrid warfare. The conflict started with disguised Russian troops’ covert invasion of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. This was followed by the seizure of territory in Ukraine’s Donbas region by Russians and local proxy forces, marking the expansion of the conflict.⁹

In the early stages of the war, Russia employed a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics to destabilize Ukraine. This included cyber warfare, propaganda, economic pressure, and the deployment of “little green men” – soldiers without insignia who were later confirmed to be Russian personnel.¹⁰

However, the war took a significant turn on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹ This marked a shift from the hybrid warfare tactics used in annexing Crimea to a more traditional form of warfare. Despite initial gains by Russian forces, Ukrainian defenders repelled attempts to seize Kyiv and other major cities and soon launched counterattacks at Russian positions.¹²

The full-scale invasion was not executed in the same manner as the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The gradual escalation of tensions and the failure of Russia at a strategic level to achieve its objectives became evident. The invasion resulted in a significant loss of life and displacement of people, with millions fleeing Ukraine.¹³

The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates the complexities and challenges of hybrid warfare. While Russia initially succeeded in destabilizing Ukraine through a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics, the shift to a full-scale invasion marked a significant escalation of the conflict. The failure of Russia to achieve its strategic objectives despite this escalation highlights the limitations of hybrid warfare when confronted with a determined and resilient defense.

The Russo-Ukrainian War also underscores the international implications of hybrid warfare. The conflict drew widespread international condemnation and led to significant sanctions against Russia. It also highlighted the role of global alliances and partnerships in countering hybrid warfare tactics.¹⁴

IV. Case Study: China’s Approach to Hybrid Warfare

China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly in the context of Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers a unique perspective on applying non-linear warfare strategies. This section will analyze China’s hybrid warfare tactics, focusing on its maritime gray zone operations, cyber warfare capabilities, and information warfare strategies.

China’s hybrid warfare strategy combines military, economic, diplomatic, and informational means to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to open warfare.¹⁵ This approach is particularly evident in China’s maritime gray zone operations in the South China Sea. China has been using a combination of naval, coast guard, and militia forces to assert its territorial claims in the region.¹⁶ These operations are designed to incrementally alter the status quo in China’s favor without provoking a military response from other regional actors or the United States.¹⁷

China has developed significant capabilities in the cyber domain and has been accused of conducting cyber espionage and cyberattacks against foreign governments and corporations.¹⁸ China’s cyber warfare strategy is driven by its perception of other countries’ changing cyber warfare approaches and practices, especially those of the U.S. and Russia.¹⁹ The Chinese government views cyber warfare as consistent with its military strategy, which is modified according to the national security environment, domestic situation, and activities of foreign militaries.²⁰

China’s information warfare strategies also play a crucial role in its hybrid warfare approach. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been using information warfare to control the narrative within its borders and influence perceptions abroad.²¹ The CCP employs various tactics, including censorship, propaganda, and disinformation campaigns, to shape public opinion and advance its strategic objectives.²²

In the context of Taiwan, China’s hybrid warfare approach is designed to isolate Taiwan internationally, undermine its political system, and gradually erode its will to resist unification with the mainland.²³ This strategy includes diplomatic pressure to reduce the number of countries recognizing Taiwan, economic coercion to make Taiwan more dependent on the continent, and military intimidation to demonstrate China’s resolve to achieve unification.²⁴

China’s approach is multifaceted and adaptive, reflecting its strategic objectives and the evolving security environment. This approach allows China to pursue its interests and assert its influence without resorting to open warfare, thereby minimizing the risk of escalation and international backlash.

V: Causes and Consequences of Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare, as a complex and multifaceted form of conflict, is driven by various causes and has significant national and international security consequences. This section will explore these causes and effects, drawing on various academic sources to provide a comprehensive analysis.

V.1 Causes of Hybrid Warfare

The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the diverse nature of this form of conflict. One key driver is the changing nature of power in the international system. Monaghan notes that the diffusion of power away from states and toward non-state actors has created an environment where hybrid threats can thrive.²⁵ This is particularly true in the digital domain, where non-state actors can wield significant influence.

Another cause of hybrid warfare is the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action, which is often costly and risky. Hybrid warfare allows states to exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war, using military and non-military means to achieve their objectives.²⁶ This is evident in the case studies of Russia and China discussed in the previous sections.

V.2 Consequences of Hybrid Warfare

The consequences of hybrid warfare are significant and wide-ranging. At the national level, hybrid warfare can undermine state sovereignty, security, and the rule of law. This is evident in the case of Ukraine, where Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has resulted in a protracted conflict that has undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.²⁷

At the international level, hybrid warfare can destabilize the global system and challenge the norms and principles that underpin it. This is particularly the case in the South China Sea, where China’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has challenged the principle of freedom of navigation.²⁸

Hybrid warfare also has significant implications for the conduct of warfare. As Baines and Edwards note, hybrid warfare blurs the lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.²⁹ This complicates the conduct of action and poses significant ethical and legal challenges.

VI: Rethinking Warfare: A New Framework

The evolution of warfare, particularly the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare, necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to these threats. This section will explore the need for a new framework, the critical elements of this framework, and how it can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China.

1. The Need for a New Framework
   The traditional understanding of warfare, which primarily focuses on conventional military conflict, is no longer sufficient to address the complexities of the contemporary security environment³⁰. Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare, along with other non-military tools, has become a prevalent strategy for state actors.³¹ This necessitates a new framework that can effectively address the multi-dimensional nature of hybrid warfare.
2. Key Elements of the New Framework: The new framework should incorporate the following key elements:
   1. Comprehensive Understanding of Hybrid Warfare: The framework should provide a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare, including its various dimensions, such as conventional, irregular, cyber, and information warfare.³² It should also consider using non-military economic, diplomatic, and political tools.
   2. Recognition of the Role of Non-State Actors: The framework should recognize the role of non-state actors in hybrid warfare. This includes not only insurgent groups and terrorists but also cybercriminals, hackers, and other actors who state actors can co-opt to achieve their objectives.³³
   3. Incorporation of Technological Developments: The framework should incorporate the impact of technological developments on warfare. This includes using cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies.³⁴
   4. Focus on Resilience and Defense: The framework should emphasize the importance of resilience and defense in responding to hybrid threats. This includes not only military security but also strengthening societal resilience, cyber protection, and other non-military reasons. ³⁵
3. Application to the Case Studies of Russia and China: The new framework can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.
   1. Russia: The new framework can help to understand Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine. It can shed light on Russia’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures³⁶.
   2. China: The new framework can help to understand China’s use of hybrid warfare in its approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea. It can shed light on China’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures.³⁷

The continuous evolution of warfare necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to hybrid threats. This framework should provide a comprehensive experience of hybrid warfare, recognize the role of non-state actors, incorporate technological developments, and focus on resilience and defense. It can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.

VII. The Agile Approach to Hybrid Warfare

The agile approach to hybrid warfare is a strategic response that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making in the face of complex and evolving threats. This approach is particularly relevant in hybrid warfare, where the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare are blurred, and the adversary’s tactics constantly evolve.

The agile approach is not a new concept in military strategy. It is rooted in maneuver warfare principles, which emphasize speed, surprise, and initiative to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process.³⁸ However, applying these principles to hybrid warfare is a relatively recent development.

The NATO Alliance has recognized the need for an agile approach to hybrid threats. In its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders agreed on a strategy to enhance the Alliance’s resilience against hybrid threats, emphasizing the need for rapid decision-making, enhanced situational awareness, and improved strategic communications.³⁹

The U.S. Department of Defense has adopted an agile approach to hybrid threats. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the need for a more agile force that can quickly adapt to new threats and challenges.⁴⁰ This approach has been further developed in the concept of Multi-Domain Operations, which seeks to integrate capabilities across all domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) to create multiple dilemmas for the adversary.⁴¹

The agile approach to hybrid warfare also has implications for defense acquisition and technology development. Rapid technological change and the proliferation of advanced technologies to non-state actors and near-peer competitors have increased the complexity of the threat environment. Defense organizations must rapidly adopt more agile and flexible acquisition processes to field new capabilities.⁴²

However, the agile approach is not without its challenges. It requires high coordination and integration across different domains and agencies, which can be challenging to achieve in large and complex organizations. It also requires a cultural shift towards greater risk tolerance and a willingness to experiment and learn from failure.⁴³

An agile approach to hybrid warfare offers an intriguing framework for responding to the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare. However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.

VIII. Policy Recommendations

The complexity and evolving nature of hybrid warfare necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to policy-making. The following recommendations are proposed to counter hybrid threats effectively:

1. Strengthening International Cooperation: The international community must work together to counter hybrid threats. This includes sharing intelligence, coordinating responses, and developing joint strategies. In this direction, NATO has already taken steps, establishing the Hybrid Analysis Branch and the Hybrid Warfare Fusion Cell to enhance understanding and response to hybrid threats.⁴⁴ However, more can be done to strengthen these efforts, including expanding these initiatives to include non-NATO members and fostering closer cooperation with the private sector and civil society.
2. Building Resilience: Resilience is critical to countering hybrid warfare. This includes societal resilience, such as public awareness and media literacy to counter disinformation campaigns, and institutional resilience, such as robust cyber defenses and crisis management capabilities.⁴⁵
3. Investing in Research and Development: Technological advancements play a significant role in hybrid warfare. Therefore, investing in research and development in artificial intelligence, cyber security, and advanced weaponry can provide a competitive edge.⁴⁶
4. Enhancing Legal and Normative Frameworks: Hybrid warfare often exploits legal and normative gray zones. Therefore, enhancing international legal and normative frameworks to address these challenges is crucial. This includes clarifying the application of international law in the cyber domain and developing norms against the use of disinformation and other hybrid tactics.⁴⁷
5. Adopting a Whole-of-Government Approach: Countering hybrid threats requires a coordinated approach involving all government sectors. This includes the military and intelligence agencies and departments dealing with foreign affairs, domestic security, finance, and infrastructure.⁴⁸
6. Promoting Strategic Communication: Effective communication is crucial in countering hybrid warfare. This includes both internal and external communication within the government with the public and international partners. Strategic communication can help to counter disinformation, build public trust, and promote a unified response to hybrid threats.⁴⁹

Countering hybrid warfare requires a comprehensive and adaptive approach involving all societal sectors. By strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication, we can effectively counter the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare.

IX. Conclusion

Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber action with other non-military tools, has emerged as a significant challenge in the contemporary security environment. This essay has comprehensively analyzed hybrid war, its causes and consequences, and the need for a new framework to understand and respond to these threats.

The case studies of Russia and China illustrate hybrid warfare’s diverse and complex nature. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and China’s approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea demonstrate how state actors can exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war to achieve their objectives.^{50 51} These case studies underscore the need for a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare that includes both military aspects and non-military dimensions, such as economic, diplomatic, and political measures.

The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the changing nature of power in the international system and the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action.⁵² The consequences of hybrid action are significant and wide-ranging, undermining state sovereignty and security, destabilizing the international system, and complicating the conduct of warfare.⁵³

The agile approach to hybrid warfare offers a promising framework for responding to these complex and evolving threats. This approach emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making and incorporates the impact of technological developments on warfare.⁵⁴ However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.

The policy recommendations proposed in This essay provide a roadmap for countering hybrid threats. These include strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication.⁵⁵ However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on the specific circumstances of each country and the nature of the threats they face.

Endnotes

¹ Smith, M. E. (2016). Hybrid warfare and its implications for defense and security policies. European View, 15(2), 223-234.
² Galeotti, M. (2019). The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Case Study in Non-Linear Warfare. In Non-Linear Warfare (pp. 45-64). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
³ Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
⁴ Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 1-72.
⁵ Kaldor, M. (2012). New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. Stanford University Press.
⁶ Van Puyvelde, D. (2015). Hybrid war – does it even exist? NATO Review. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/05/07/hybrid-war-does-it-even-exist/index.html
⁷ Hoffman, F. G. (2009). Hybrid warfare and challenges. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, (52), 34-39.
⁸ Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2015). A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War.” Kennan Cable No. 7. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
⁹ Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power.” Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 2016.
¹⁰ “Documents on Democracy: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Journal of Democracy, 2023.
¹⁵ Fravel, M. Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 292-319.
¹⁶ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson. “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Studies in Chinese Military Science (2019).
¹⁷ Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. “China’s Vision of Victory.” The Diplomat, June 6, 2019.
¹⁸ Segal, Adam. “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1, 2019.
²¹ Brady, Anne-Marie. “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping.” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017.
²³ Chase, Michael S., and Benjamin S. Purser III. “China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications.” RAND Corporation, 2015.
²⁴ Tsang, Steve. “Taiwan’s Impact on China: Why Soft Power Matters More than Economic or Political Inputs.” The China Quarterly 177 (2004): 25-44.
²⁵ Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
²⁶ Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
²⁷ Galeotti, Mark. “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.'” Foreign Policy, 2018.
²⁸ Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
²⁹ Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
³⁰ Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
³¹ Johnson, R. (2018). Hybrid warfare and its countermeasures: A critique of the literature. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(1), 141-163.
³² Thiele, R. D. (2017). Hybrid warfare and the changing character of conflict. Connections, 16(2), 65-72.
³³ Popescu, N. (2015). Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian. EUISS Issue Alert, 4.
³⁴ Kostyuk, N., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2019). Invisible digital front: Can cyber attacks shape battlefield events? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 317-347.
³⁵ Baines, P. R., & Jones, K. (2019). Influence and interference in foreign elections: the real threat to the ‘free and fair’ election process? Intelligence and National Security, 34(5), 685-703.
³⁶ Galeotti, M. (2016). Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(2), 282-301.
³⁷ Cheung, T. M., & Thomas, J. (2018). The impact of China’s military modernization on regional stability. In China’s Evolving Military Strategy (pp. 1-30). Brookings Institution Press.
³⁸ Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
³⁹ “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.” NATO. July 9, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/officialtexts133169.htm.
⁴⁰ “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.” U.S. Department of Defense. March 4, 2014. https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014QuadrennialDefenseReview.pdf.
⁴¹ “Multi-Domain Operations.” U.S. Army. https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2018/12/06/.
⁴² Gansler, Jacques S., and William Lucyshyn. “Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?” University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. October 2014. https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-acquisition-reform-where-do-we-go-here.
⁴³ Blanken, Leo J., and Jason Lepore. “Is the U.S. Military Ready for Agile Acquisition?” War on the Rocks. August 14, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/is-the-u-s-military-ready-for-agile-acquisition/.
⁴⁴ “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.
⁴⁵ “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and Trust as the Antidote,” NATO Review, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.
⁴⁶ Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,'” Prism 8, no. 2 (2019): 104-120, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism8-2/PRISM8-2Monaghan.pdf.
⁵⁰ Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
⁵¹ Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
⁵² Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
⁵³ Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
⁵⁴ Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
⁵⁵ “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.

The Changing Face of Conflict: What is Hybrid Warfare? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Last week, Ukrainian oligarchs Igor Kolomoyskiy and Hennadiy Boholyubov lost their case against the nationalized Ukrainian bank, PrivatBank, in the London Court of Appeals. In an official statement, the Court of Appeals stated that PrivatBank “has a good arguable case to recover the full $1.9 billion—$3 billion including interest—given in the particulars of claim.”

PrivatBank CEO Peter Krumphanzi expressed his satisfaction with the ruling, noting that “this is an important step towards achieving justice for the bank and the people of Ukraine.” The Ukrainian bank was nationalized three years ago in 2016 against the wishes of Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov after accusations arose of fraud.

During a routine check, auditors found $5.5 billion (USD) missing from the bank’s records. Kolomoisky and Boholyubov were subsequently accused of insider trading and fraud. In the court case in London, PrivatBank alleged that the former owners cost the bank billions of dollars. Both oligarchs denied the claims and are pursuing legal action to force the privatization of the bank and their shares. Kolomoyskiy is seeking $2 billion in PrivatBank capital returned to him.

The implications of the PrivatBank case go beyond money

While the ruling is ostensively positive for the Ukrainian state, it has consequences for Ukraine’s renegotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been renegotiating a $3.9 billion agreement that is set to expire in January 2020.

However, these negotiations came under pressure when concerns arose that a Ukrainian court could reprivatize PrivatBank and return ownership of the bank to Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov. Additional concerns arose surrounding Kolomoyskiy’s and Boholyubov’s close business relationships with Zelensky. Zelensky’s old television show not only ran on a TV station owned by Kolomoyskiy, but Zelensky’s current chief of staff used to act as Kolomoyskiy’s lawyer on the PrivatBank case.

While Zelensky claimed that as president he would remain neutral regarding the PrivatBank case, many commentators expressed concerns that this would be impossible for him. This case, in particular, has been watched closely by investors as a measure of Ukraine’s changing business climate.

Ukraine’s corruption challenge

While the court case against Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov is only one aspect of Ukraine’s struggle against corruption, it is an illustrative example of how corruption continues to touch many parts of Ukrainian society and playing a role in determining its future. Without IMF funding, Ukraine would be forced to turn to other monetary sources and benefactors.

It is unlikely that Ukraine would turn to Russia for such aid. However, it would be one potential political avenue to both reduce tensions between the two countries. Therefore, it should be considered as one, however improbable option that geopolitical analysts ought to consider.

For now, it seems as though Ukraine will continue its anti-corruption efforts and work with Western institutions such as the IMF. However, considering Zelensky’s past connections as well as the willpower of Ukraine’s oligarchs—it is important to recognize that tackling corruption in Ukraine could have unintended consequences.

London Court Rules Against Ukrainian Oligarchs in PrivatBank Case was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donetsk and Luhansk has killed more than 13,000 people since its onset in April 2014. While many in Ukraine see this as a surrender to Moscow, Zelensky asserted that “there will be no capitulation.” As part of this new peace deal with Moscow, Zelensky also set up a prisoner exchange with Moscow—swapping 35 prisoners each. While Moscow and other members of the international community expressed their support for this new détente in relations between Moscow and Kyiv—local politicians did not agree.

Response in Ukraine

Within Ukraine, this move was met with anger and betrayal. Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko criticized the agreement, while Andriy Biletsky, leader of the right-wing National Corps, claimed Zelensky “chose shame and now he will get war too.” National Svoboda member Yuriy Syrotyuk also added his voice to the discussion, stating that Zelensky “committed treason.”

Many politicians claim that while Ukraine is now committed to holding an election, Russia has not agreed to give back control of the border—moving the scales heavily in Russia’s favor. This was particularly concerning for Zelensky’s reputation as he came to power promising to end the war rather than prolong it.

Will this mean peace?

While this step might herald a new warmer point in relations between Russia and Ukraine, it does not necessarily immediately foretell immediate peace. Even the four-way talks between Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia have stalled since October 2016. However, both states have already renewed pulling troops and equipment from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions starting October 7. Despite this positive step, the process toward peace will take time. Although the agreement to hold elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk has already provoked much aggression from local politicians, no elections can take place without promises that all armed groups will vacate the area before the election.

The elections are one part of the Steinmeier Formula; a plan put together by former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016. In short, it first proposes free and fair elections in Ukraine’s east under Ukrainian law, verification by the OSCE, and self-governing status in return. It is the only plan that Russia has also agreed to as part of reopening talks.

If elections bring peace, what will the cost be?

Although elections in Donetsk and Luhansk may seem to be beneficial for the peace process, results will likely heavily favor Russia and the current Russia-backed separatist leaders. Most of the population with pro-Ukrainian views left for western Ukraine at the start of the conflict. Therefore, those remaining will likely harbor pro-Russian views, and the election, rather than get a broader range of opinion in the region, will consolidate the already dominant position of Russia-backed leaders currently in place.

It is to Russia’s advantage to have and support a federalized Ukraine as it will allow for more pro-Russian dissent against Ukraine’s current pro-European stance. Moreover, a more heavily divided Ukraine also favors Russia’s wish that it remains in its sphere of influence. Already, many Ukrainians do not support special status for Donetsk and Luhansk and do not think that the Steinmeier formula is appropriate. Elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk might decrease violence right now, but, in the future, they could lead to a Ukraine that is more likely to head into civil conflict in the future.

Elections in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk Regions: Peace, But At What Cost? was originally published on Global Security Review.

After President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was sworn in as Ukraine’s sixth president, his first order of business was to dissolve the current parliament. Zelenskiy announced this move in his inaugural address; a strategic move meant to capitalize upon his present popularity in the hopes of gaining a majority. In this address, he also criticized the current Cabinet of Ministers and called for a change in the office of the General Prosecutor, presently held by Yuriy Lutsenko.

Zelenskiy, however, may face difficulties in moving his agenda forward in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament). While the decree to dissolve the Rada was accepted and snap elections are in preparations for July 21, Zelenskiy also called for this new election to be based on votes for parties rather than people. His argument centers around corruption, where he claims that voting for individuals promotes corruption. In the emergency session of the Rada to vote on this, only 92 lawmakers voted in favor. To place any such proposal on the agenda, a majority of 226 votes is necessary. This proposal was also voted down, along with another plan submitted by Zelenskiy that would change the rules for state purchases during election campaigns.

Does this precede a standoff between Zelenskiy and the Rada?

Due to Zelenskiy’s unique electoral support base and the fact that he ran without a political party, he has little to no formal support within the Parliament itself. This has meant that even though Zelenskiy has called for the government to step down, the Rada did not accept it. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman only received 97 of the 226 votes necessary to accept his resignation. Even more important is the fact that Rada speaker Andriy Parubiy has claimed that Zelenskiy’s decree to dissolve parliaments and to call snap elections in July is illegal. He has stated he will appeal to the Constitutional Court, saying that “it is sad and alarming that the guarantor of the constitution starts his work in the post with a gross violation of the constitution.”

Interestingly, other members of the government are also attempting to call appointments illegal and in violation of lustration legislation. Tetyana Kozachenko, the head of the public council on lustration issues, has claimed that Zelenskiy’s appointment of Andriy Bohdan violates lustration legislation because he held posts under former President Viktor Yanukovych.

Is dissolving the current Rada possible?

According to the Ukrainian Constitution, there are three strategies through which Zelenskiy could dissolve the Ukrainian parliament. The first is if the Rada fails to build a coalition. Second is if there are no plenary meetings within thirty days of the start of the legislative session. Alternatively, the Rada could be dissolved if, after sixty days after the resignation of the Cabinet of Minister, it has not reformed.

According to Volodymyr Fesenko, a political scientist, such a dissolution is not possible right now because there are no norms on how the absence of a coalition set within the Regulations of the Rada. Fesenko also notes that “Before this, the president must hold consultations with the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada and heads of factions on the expediency of dissolution. And all this needs to be done within a few days, since, according to the Constitution, six months before the end of Rada’s powers (no later than May 27), it cannot be dissolved.”

If Fesenko is to be believed, dissolving the Rada would precede a political crisis. How does he know this? Because Yushchenko used this strategy in 2007. However, it was only achieved after compromise with the representatives of every parliamentary faction. According to writer Anastasia Zaremba, the problem is that Zelenskiy does not have any motivation to work with the current parliament. Due to his popularity, he can use his recent election to claim that the Rada is stonewalling him rather than choosing to work with his constructively.

Given Parubiy’s appeal to the Constitutional Court, observers will have to wait and see whether such a dissolution of the Rada is possible. As for Zelenskiy, his choice of advisors will likely prove whether or not this brief standoff will continue to endure for the foreseeable future.

President of Ukraine Moves to Disband Parliament was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is hardly surprising to many—Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn has been espousing an anti-European and pro-Russian campaign for some time now. While Hungary has not outright rejected all of Europe’s values, he is firmly against immigration and increasingly receptive towards the overtures of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia agrees to supply Hungary with natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline—bypassing Ukraine.

The European Union imports the majority of its natural gas from Russia. For some time, this relationship has relied on the free flow of gas through Ukraine. In recent years, the trading relationship between the E.U. and Russia has been under increasing strain due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and rising prices.

For Eastern European member-states, this has meant a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to energy acquisition. Therefore, it will be critical to monitor a recently signed agreement under which Russia will supply natural gas to Hungary beginning in 2020, “regardless of agreements on gas transit between Moscow and Kiev.”

The gas transit arrangement between Russia and Ukraine will expire at the end of 2019. Given that Ukraine and Russia remain in a de facto state of war, it is unlikely that a new transit agreement will be implemented. What does this mean for Hungarian natural gas imports? According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian gas exports to Hungary will transit via the TurkStream pipeline.

Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is growing.

Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is an increasingly contentious issue in the realm of international relations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline—a project led by Gazprom—will directly connect Germany with Russia, bypassing Ukraine.

Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 has been repeatedly criticized by the United States. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both strongly opposed the pipeline because Nord Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependency on Russian energy while simultaneously harming Ukraine’s economic and national security.

It’s not likely that Russia would move to cut off European gas supplies if the E.U. failed to support specific policies, but the possibility is nevertheless a matter of concern for both European and American policymakers. Furthermore—beyond the energy sector—further amelioration in an already warm Hungary-Russia relationship is a matter of concern for the E.U. as many worry Hungary could serve as a Trojan horse in an increasingly fragmented European Union.

Why does the Hungarian-Russian relationship matter?

The European Union is based on the principle that democratic states are stronger and more peaceful when they act together rather than alone. Unfortunately, for the past few years, neither the E.U. nor Hungary has seen eye-to-eye.

Under Prime Minister Orbàn, Hungary has been accused of breaching democratic norms. Orbàn’s government has severely weakened the plurality of the country’s media while cracking down on civil society as well as educational freedom. Orbàn has touted Hungary as Europe’s first “illiberal democracy,” going so far as to object to E.U. sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, in June 2018, Hungary was the only E.U. member to vote against providing increased aid to Ukraine.

The destabilization of the European Union and other Western institutions is a crucial objective for the Kremlin, and one that has been successful with regards to Hungary. Natural gas deals that thumb the nose at the European Union coupled with Orbàn’s anti-European rhetoric all act in Putin’s favor. Even more concerning is the International Investment Bank (IIB)’s imminent move to Hungary.

The IIB is a Moscow-based development bank that is seen by many European officials as a cover through which Russia can subvert European institutions. Orbàn has already granted the IIB immunity from any regulatory or prosecutorial authority and has accorded IIB officials with diplomatic status in Hungary. For European and American policymakers, the Hungarian-Russian relationship is one that merits increased scrutiny for the foreseeable future.

Hungary’s Relationship with Russia Poses a Risk for Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Crimean Peninsula may have strategic significance for the Russian military, but Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer play the Crimea card at home for political gain. Even though the 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in a sharp increase in the Russian president’s approval ratings, five years on the matter has been overshadowed by widespread economic hardship.

Crimea is heavily subsidized by Moscow, with no hope of becoming economically self-sufficient in the current political climate. Russia has invested billions of rubles into the peninsula but has yet to resolve the most critical issue: water supply. Crimea, especially its northern region, is heavily dependent on Ukraine when it comes to water and power supply.

Following the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Ukraine imposed an economic embargo of the peninsula, cutting off its supply of water and power. The embargo resulted in severe economic and ecological problems for northern Crimea. More recently, Russia has established two power stations to strengthen the peninsula’s energy security. However, Moscow has been unable to ensure a sustainable water supply.

Had Russia seized the whole of southeastern Ukraine—and not just Crimea as some Russian hardliners suggested at the time—the water-supply problem may have been avoided. Since such actions weren’t taken, however, Crimea was without an overland connection to the Russian mainland until 2018, when Russia completed construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait that connected the mainland to the peninsula. 

The Kerch Strait, however, is a strategic vulnerability for Russia. In the event of a conflict, the bridge would be an easy target for sabotage. To hedge against this vulnerability, the Russian military deployed the S-400 integrated air defense system along with additional warships to Crimea in the aftermath of the November 2018 clash between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Kerch Strait.

The Kremlin must also contend with growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Crimea was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Today, Crimean Tatars—a Turkic ethnic group—retain strong cultural and religious ties to Turkey. Given that Turkey has been pursuing a more active foreign policy in recent years, it’s likely Ankara will pursue a more proactive role in Crimean affairs in the long-term. In the short-term, however, Turkey is expected to maintain its behind-the-scenes role.

The current geopolitical climate means that Moscow will have to manage Crimea like a suitcase without a handle for the foreseeable future. The Kremlin has invested heavily in integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation, but Western sanctions enacted in response to Russia’s behavior have helped to isolate the peninsula, raising prices and inhibiting economic development.

Despite these difficulties, approximately seventy-two percent of Crimean respondents said that their lives have improved since Crimea’s annexation, according to polling conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM).  However, in the long-run, the economic situation in Crimea and throughout Russia will only deteriorate due to the effects of Western sanctions.

Russia Faces Rising Costs 5 Years After Crimea’s Annexation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ukraine will remain aligned with the West and the United States; all major candidates support both E.U. and NATO integration and have pledged to, one way or another, reestablish Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas and Crimea.

Presently leading public polls is the well-known comedian, Vladimir Zelenskiy. He’s made the case that Ukraine can reestablish control over the Donbas and Crimea through negotiations with Russia. On the other hand, his main rivals, current President Petro Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have advocated for a more hawkish approach.

Tymoshenko’s rhetoric has been aggressive, but she has indicated that she favors a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Poroshenko, on the other hand, has ramped up defense spending to five percent of gross domestic product to prepare the country for a possible large-scale war with Russia.

The three leading candidates have much in common. All view Russia as Ukraine’s primary national security threat, they all support the political order that was established after the 2014 Maidan protests, and they all support de-oligarchization in the country, even though they’re all heavily linked with powerful oligarchs—or are oligarchs themselves.

Zelensky announced his intention to run for the presidency on New Year’s Eve on the popular Ukrainian television channel “1+1,” owned by Igor Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian oligarch currently residing in Israel. Kolomoisky was de-facto exiled by Poroshenko, after being accused of defrauding PrivatBank—Ukraine’s largest bank—of billions of dollars. The bank has since been nationalized, with many in Ukraine believing that Kolomoisky is seeking revenge against Poroshenko and is merely using Zelensky as a tool against him.

The incumbent, President Petro Poroshenko is himself an oligarch. He owns a large confection company called Roshen, and his assets are estimated to be approximately $979 million (USD). Although he won the 2014 election, his popularity has since fallen sharply. However, he has more of a chance than his main rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, of making it to the second round due to his having the entirety of the Ukrainian state apparatus behind him. For Poroshenko, this election is of crucial importance. If he loses, he would be hard-pressed to remain in the country due to the many enemies he’s made during his presidency.

Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s campaign recently accused Poroshenko of bribing voters through branches of the now-nationalized PrivatBank. Poroshenko’s campaign, in turn, accused Tymoshenko of entering into political and financial agreements with Igor Kolomoisky. Tymoshenko denied any links with Kolomoisky, but another oligarch, Sergey Taruta, said he would back Yulia Tymoshenko in the election.

Apart from Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, and Zelensky, there are 36 other candidates in the running for the presidency. Their candidacies are mostly symbolic, but their participation will likely preclude the possibility of a victor in the first round of the election. In a case where no candidate receives an absolute majority, the second round of voting will be held on April 21.

Over 34 million Ukrainian citizens will be eligible to cast their vote on March 31. However, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region will prevent several million from participating.

The Role of Oligarchs in Ukraine’s 2019 Presidential Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donbas has been in a state of frozen conflict since May of 2014. As the upcoming Ukrainian presidential elections near, many have started to wonder what the future holds for the Donbas.

Since the conflict originated in 2014, more than 10,000 people have been killed and over one million have been displaced. Unfortunately, Assistant Secretary-General Miroslav Jenca, a United Nations official associated with the ongoing Minsk accords, acknowledged that negotiations“appear to have lost momentum.”

Ukraine’s Options Going Forward

If the UN-backed negotiations have effectively stalled, Ukraine must evaluate its alternatives. There are over 44 candidates who hold varying views as to what the country’s options are. In the running for the presidency is the incumbent President Petro Poroshenko, the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky, and the former Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Boyko. For Zelensky and others, the answer is direct democracy. Zelensky argues the solution is for Ukraine to hold a referendum on the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine’s current President Poroshenko has opted to push for an international peacekeeping solution, calling for a UN-backed mandate. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, has a much more aggressive proposal. Her plan focuses on economic modernization, job creation, and reconstruction efforts for the Donbas region and tougher sanctions on Russia. She has spoken out against amnesty proposals for separatist fighters within the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, both of which are backed by Moscow. Tymoshenko has also criticized the “special status” policy that was adopted for the Donbas region under the Minsk Two protocol.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland have earmarked some $14 million (USD) for Ukraine as part of a UN project to “promote social cohesion and strengthen regional governance in eastern Ukraine.” While the three governments providing the funds likely expect it to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict, how that money is spent, however, very much depends on the candidate in office.

Poroshenko Seeks Greater Euro-Atlantic Integration for Ukraine

It’s no surprise that Poroshenko seeks closer ties with the West — even going so far as to pass a Constitutional amendment that reflects Ukraine’s E.U. and NATO aspirations. Poroshenko likely believes that if Ukraine is more closely aligned with Western institutions, Russian aggression will, at the very least, be tempered. In fact, Poroshenko has stated that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas is due to Ukrainian politicians “talking about the necessity for Ukraine to… stay away from all alliances.”

However, there are a number of practical obstacles to achieving this reality. First is the question of Ukraine’s disputed territory. If Poroshenko believes that NATO membership will induce the alliance to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, he is mistaken. The fact remains that many NATO members would likely not support Ukrainian membership in the alliance precisely due to the disputed nature of the country’s territory.

The Ukrainian Conflict Will Remain Frozen for the Foreseeable Future

There is no incentive for either side to seriously engage in meaningful negotiations. The gap between expectation and reality is widening. If a candidate such as Tymoshenko emerges as Ukraine’s next president, as some election observers suggest, the gap between expectation and reality will only widen further.

Similar to the case of the Republic of Georgia’s disputed South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, neither side has any reason to try and alter the status quo. Going forward, absent a major “black swan” event, the Donbas will continue to play host to a frozen conflict with little chance for a negotiated settlement.

The Future of the War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of Ukrainian state capture, Russian corruption, and bribery in other Eastern European and Central Asian states are on the rise. In all of the countries survey, only one country scores over 50 out of 100 points, with the average of countries only averaging a score of 35.

What’s the relationship between corruption and security?

Corruption undermines democratic consolidation and leads to voter disenfranchisement. This results in an overall lack of political will to combat illicit behavior in the public sector. In many Eastern European countries, history has provided few institutional checks and balances.

According to Transparency International, “one of the biggest impediments to fighting corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is state capture, where powerful individuals or groups seize control of national decision-making and use corrupt means to circumvent justice.”

It is unlikely that Eurasia will see widespread democratic stability in the near future, with countries like Azerbaijan (scoring 25), Russia (28), Kazakhstan (31), Kosovo (37), Serbia (39), and Montenegro (45) dropping in rank or continuing to stagnate.

While there are exceptions such as Ukraine’s increase from 30 in 2017 to 32 in 2018, given Ukraine’s weak enforcement of anti-corruption reforms enacted in 2014, any improvement is more superficial than it is long-lasting.

What’s wrong with the status quo?

For many, state capture and corruption have been everyday factors of life for the past two decades. Some see the status quo as essential for maintaining stability. Implementing a more equitable system carries a host of risks—from public trials to long-term imprisonment. For many in the ruling class, retaining current systems of informal governance seemingly carries zero cost.

However, the populist wave of 2018 might say otherwise. As voter frustration with corruption continues to rise, so too will their impatience with those currently in power. Leaders that rode those waves of anti-corruption legislation—such as Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan—must now follow through on their campaign promises, lest they risk being thrown out themselves.

Even countries like Russia, which have more entrenched systems of corruption, are beginning to see popular discontent. According to Russian’s Public Opinion Research Center, trust in Russian President Vladimir Putin has fallen to an all-time low since 2006.

While much of this can be attributed to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, observers must also take into account public disapproval over an increase in the retirement age and growing frustration with U.S. and European sanctions.

Corruption isn’t just a domestic concern—the extent to which corruption dictates domestic policies inherently affects domestic and regional stability and security. Therefore, endemic corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia doesn’t bode well for democratic cohesion and international support for human rights.

Corruption in Eastern Europe & Central Asia Is On the Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

When the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Partushev, claimed in mid-January that the continuation of policies “by the Kiev authorities can contribute to the loss of Ukraine’s statehood,” members of the international security community expressed outrage at what appeared to be a blatant threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, impulsive proclamations have overshadowed subtle diplomacy and enabled largely-unnoticed progress between Germany, Ukraine, and Russia to decrease tensions and facilitate a degree of quasi-cooperation.

In light of the November 2018 naval confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian vessels, maritime activities on the Sea of Azov, particularly in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, have exhibited the potential to escalate tensions between the two countries. Recently, however, the Russian government has accepted a German proposal for joint monitoring missions with France to ensure freedom of navigation for shipping on the Azov Sea—a proposal that is very much welcomed by Ukrainian officials. Joint Franco-German monitoring would help to prevent further confrontations between Ukrainian and Russian vessels and counter Russia’s claims to the right to regulate passage of the Kerch Strait.

In December, the Russian government rejected Germany’s initial proposal for monitoring missions by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Russian officials were disinterested in an expansion of OSCE missions beyond the current observations in the Donetsk-Luhansk region. However, with the removal of this stipulation, Russian President Vladimir Putin “immediately agreed” to allow German and French observers to evaluate Russian compliance with international law in the Sea of Azov and at the Kerch Strait, the site of the controversial bridge connecting the Russian mainland with Russian-annexed Crimea. The revised proposal, submitted to the Kremlin by Heiko Maas, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 18th, is intended to ensure Russian activities do not impede shipping through the Kerch Strait and comply with international maritime law.

Given Ukraine’s deep-seated interests in maintaining its freedom of navigation within the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has welcomed the German initiative as assurance against the potential for Russian forces to accuse Ukraine of noncompliance and induce penalties on Ukrainian maritime operations. Germany’s proposal arrives at a critical moment for Ukraine as twenty-four of its sailors involved in the November Kerch Strait incident remain in Russian custody  having been charged with illegal border crossing, which carries a sentence of up to six years in prison.

At a recent press conference, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin eagerly welcomed prospects of an international monitoring mission led by Germany with the caveat that he hopes Russian authorities “don’t manipulate it.” Klimkin further urged that the mission refrain from inadvertently legitimizing Russian activities on Azov and that it explicitly denounce the border between Ukraine and Crimea under international law while also refusing to acknowledge the Kerch Strait Authority.

Official negotiations between German, Russian, and Ukrainian officials have yet to occur as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas have constrained discussions of the mission to separate and private talks with Ukrainian and Russian leaders. However, upcoming talks between Ukraine and Germany to negotiate a “joint vision… to work with the Russian side” appear promising since diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine are, by-and-large, nonexistent. “They are at an absolute minimum – only for protecting our citizens,” Klimkin explained at a Kiev press conference earlier this month. “But we are looking for a formula, as soon as we find it, we will definitely apply it.” Germany’s effort to ensure the stability of the Sea of Azov and monitor the Kerch Strait may very well prove to be the missing variable in this formula.

Germany: The Subtle Mediator Between Russia and Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

These trends are particularly evident in Europe, where elections, treaties, and other events will reshape the continent. Before the end of 2018, the Italian government and the European Union were locked in a dispute over Italy’s budgetary plans. The European Commission sharply criticized the spending plans due to concerns that Italy’s approximately $3 trillion in debt combined with higher public spending could lead to a banking crisis that could spread to other countries in the Eurozone. While Rome did pass a revised budget to appease E.U. officials in Brussels, the ordeal has sewed divisions within Italy’s populist coalition government which are likely to persist throughout 2019. Tensions between Rome and Brussels will also continue, and possibly escalate.

The United Kingdom is scheduled to formally withdraw from the European Union on March 29, 2019. However, no agreement has been approved by the U.K. parliament that would avert a potentially catastrophic “no-deal” or “hard” Brexit. British Prime Minister Theresa May has come under considerable criticism from within her party over the tentative agreement her government negotiated with the E.U., but no alternative plans have been put forth. Regardless of the outcome, the U.K. will continue to strengthen bilateral relations with E.U. member states such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland.

In May, European Parliamentary elections will take place, while E.U. member states will appoint a new President of the European Commission in October. Despite a rise in nationalist and euro-skeptic parties, pro-European factions are expected to maintain overall control. A divided political landscape will make it difficult for the E.U. to implement any significant reforms. Furthermore, E.U. member states are divided when it comes to fiscal policy. Southern states like Italy, Portugal, and Spain are pushing for higher spending and greater risk-sharing, whereas northern states led by Germany are calling for greater fiscal responsibility in Frankfurt.

Ongoing Political Divisions in the E.U. and its Member States

E.U. member states after the U.K. withdrawal) to focus inwards. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced that her current term will be her last and resigned as leader of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party. The CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbaur as party leader in the latter part of 2018. However, the party is divided over a range of policy positions. Furthermore, the CDU’s coalition partner is facing an identity crisis of its own, which has already weakened the coalition government. Further disagreements and intra-coalition infighting could lead to early elections in Germany.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s institutional and economic reforms have fueled substantial, and in some cases, violent opposition. Large-scale protests have erupted throughout France. 2019 will see continued opposition to Macron’s reforms, opposition stoked by groups on both the far-right and the far-left ends of the political spectrum. Some of Macron’s economic reforms will succeed, but French citizens will be increasingly vocal in their rejection of his attempts to revitalize the French economy.

Domestic political concerns will require greater attention from both Paris and Berlin, decreasing both powers from critical external affairs. Political divisions will hamper initiatives to achieve greater strategic autonomy through the implementation of increased European military integration and the promotion of the Euro over the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve currency. Therefore, it is unlikely these major initiatives will see substantial progress in 2019.

Trade and China

Trade will be a significant area of focus. If the U.S. imposes higher tariffs on European-manufactured vehicles, for instance, approximately 10% of total U.S.-E.U. trade will be affected. In such a scenario, the E.U. would be forced to respond in kind, leading to a greater rift in transatlantic relations. Automobile tariffs would disproportionately affect the German auto industry, which manufactures one in every three cars produced in Europe. However, trade disputes will not lead to the collapse of the transatlantic alliance, as both the U.S. and E.U. have concerns over unfair Chinese trade practices.

Aside from trade, Europe has other concerns with China. Led by the governments in Berlin and Paris, policymakers across Europe are increasingly wary over Beijing’s economic activity on the continent. As a result, Europe has begun to exclude China from investing in critical infrastructures such as ports and telecommunications networks. China filed suit against the E.U. in the WTO, arguing that Beijing should be treated as a market economy. The case will come to a resolution in 2019, and the outcome will have a significant impact on the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S., the E.U., and China.

The complicated bureaucratic system of rules and regulations, however, put poorer or smaller member states at an economic disadvantage. As such, these states are more welcoming to Chinese investment and lending. Those states that are receptive to Chinese economic activity in Europe will likely continue to lobby against Berlin And Paris. The European bloc’s position towards China will be ambiguous, leading to more vocal action by those states that are concerned about China’s economic activities.

Escalating Tensions Between Russia and the U.S.

The relationship between Russia and the United States will continue to deteriorate. The U.S. is set to formally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans intermediate-range missiles. Washington has cited Moscow’s noncompliance with the treaty as the justification for its withdrawal. The collapse of the INF treaty will heighten tensions in Eastern Europe, leading to a military buildup. This will be particularly visible in Poland and Romania, both of which will continue to lobby the U.S. for increased military commitments. Moscow will continue to build up its military forces in Kaliningrad, and the Crimea, both of which will likely play host to Russian intermediate-range missiles should the U.S. decide to deploy its own in Europe.

U.S. discussions with Poland regarding a possible permanent deployment of U.S. troops will continue throughout 2019. The Kremlin, citing what it perceives as “NATO-encirclement” will maintain, or even increase its efforts to interfere in the domestic politics of European states through malign activity in cyberspace, possible covert actions, and support for Euro-skeptic and nationalist factions across the E.U. The European parliamentary elections in May will provide Moscow with an opportunity to bolster the ranks of nationalist and Euro-skeptic groups, further sewing divisions within the E.U.

It is also possible that Moscow will open a military base in Belarus, as had previously been hinted by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. However, Lukashenko has made increasing overtures to the E.U. and the U.S., which could lead to increased hostility from Moscow. Russia’s efforts to undermine the integrity of NATO and the E.U. will be particularly visible in the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

High Stakes for Ukraine as the Kremlin Deals With Domestic Challenges of its Own

Ukraine will face considerable challenges throughout 2019. Both the TurkStream and NordStream 2 natural gas pipelines are set to become active. The pipelines will circumvent Ukraine, providing Moscow with enormous economic leverage over Kiev. Ukraine will be deprived of substantial transit fees that it will now lose as the two pipelines exclude Ukraine from Russia’s natural gas supply lines.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated in the aftermath of Russia’s seizure of three Ukrainian Navy vessels in the Sea of Azov, and tensions are expected to continue throughout 2019. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine will continue, and Ukraine is set to hold presidential elections in March. Depending on the outcome, negotiations could reopen between Moscow and Kiev, however, it is unlikely the two parties will come to a resolution. It is in Russia’s interest to maintain a state of low-grade or frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which effectively prevents the former Soviet republic from joining NATO.

Russia, however, will face its own domestic challenges in 2019. The Kremlin has announced controversial economic reforms, including increasing the retirement age, raising the value-added tax (VAT), and imposing new taxes on certain consumer products and the tourism sector. The reforms are designed to bolster the government’s revenue but have generated considerable backlash from Russians across the country. It is the working class that will be hardest hit by the measures, which are due to come into effect this month. As such, there is likely to be a degree of social unrest. Meaningful changes are unlikely, however, as there is presently no viable opposition party capable of threatening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.

Overall, 2019 will be a year of volatility in Europe. Diplomatic, trade, and economic disagreements will persist between Europe and the United States, and within Europe itself. Tensions between Russia and NATO heighten anxiety for Eastern European states, which will lead to a buildup of military capabilities on both sides.

Political Uncertainty Will Plague Europe Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sanctions were first imposed in 2014 when the United States and European Union imposed visa restrictions and asset freezes on Russian officials in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in Ukraine.

Despite these sanctions, however, there appears to have been no change in Russian behavior. Given that the point of these restrictions was to change Russia’s rogue state mindset vis-à-vis Ukraine and interference in other states, it begs the question of how effective these measures are.

Russia has failed to change its behavior as the result of sanctions.

Russian activity in Syria has increased while Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns in the U.S. and European countries show no signs of decline. In 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England. Despite the evidence and testimony from chemical weapons experts, Russia continues to deny its involvement in the affair.

Lastly, if there is an event that is clear evidence that sanctions aren’t affecting changes in Russian foreign policy, it is the recent naval confrontation in the Kerch Strait. On November 25, 2018, a Russian Coast Guard vessel rammed a Ukrainian Navy tugboat — resulting in a series of dangerous actions as both Ukraine and Russia refused to back down, behavior that could have rapidly escalated the situation.

If sanctions had been effective, one might expect that such an action (i.e., the ramming of a Ukrainian Navy vessel) would have been deterred. By that logic, it’s reasonable to assume that the U.S. and E.U. would impose even more sanctions if Russia continued its pattern of behavior.

However, sanctions aren’t working.

Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia are targeted at the Russian elite, as a significant portion of Putin’s support base is comprised of then. It is believed that if Putin’s support base — mainly consisting of oligarchs whose fortunes are dependent upon the Kremlin — lost their ability to access funds and travel to Europe and North America — they would then demand Putin take steps to reverse his foreign policy.

However, that strategy doesn’t seem to be working in the way that Western states assumed it would. In fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia became the second-largest arms producer this year. Russia’s production rate is up 8.5 percent from 2017, which on an annual basis amounts to approximately $37.7 billion in weapons. India and China, both of which have purchased units of the S-400 air defense systems in the last year, are large buyers of Russian-produced arms.

The logic of Western sanctions fails to account for Russia’s political system.

Western sanctions don’t work because they fundamentally misunderstand the structure of Russia’s political system. In Russia, Putin gives the elites access to funding in exchange for their support and punishes those who step out of line, such as former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Such examples convince Russian elites and oligarchs alike that stepping out of line is not worth it. No matter the annoyances that come from Western sanctions, those are still not comparable to the negative reaction that would arise if they spoke out against Putin.

Companies owned or controlled by dissenting oligarchs could lose state support or funding, with the oligarchs themselves having political corruption and tax-evasion charges brought against them. Furthermore, the non-elite segments of the Russian population perceive sanctions as an aggressive tactic employed by the West to weaken Russia. In essence, Russia’s current political system rewards those who remain in line with the Kremlin — the consequences for speaking out are too high. At their current levels, sanctions will remain largely symbolic and will not lead to a reform of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Why Russian Sanctions are Ineffective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine claims to have informed the Russian coastguard ahead of time, a Russian ship nevertheless proceeded fire upon, and subsequently ram one of the Ukrainian ships, injuring six sailors. Russia accused the ships of acting recklessly and of illegally entering Russian territorial waters.

Tensions have been rising since Russia’s construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge in May 2018.

The bridge, which crosses the Strait to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula serves as an on-demand economic blockade of the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, both of which are located on the Sea of Azov. Ships carrying export goods from either port must pass through the Kerch Strait, and under the bridge, to reach their destinations.

Furthermore, the bridge is too low for some Ukrainian ships to pass under at all. While both Russia and Ukraine routinely accuse the other of harassing their respectively-flagged ships, the Kerch Strait bridge has had an impact on trade from the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Ukraine claims that trade from these ports has decreased by 30 percent since Russia began harrassing Ukrainian ships. While traffic has resumed as of Monday, November 26, tensions remain high.

Ukraine Declares Martial Law

Following the incident, Ukraine called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, demanding increased sanctions. Domestically, Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council recommended imposing martial law for sixty days.

The imposition of martial law is something that has never occurred, despite the past four years of Crimean annexation and continued violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Legally, this makes sense. While Russia never admitted guilt for the Crimean annexation and the violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, Russian actions here are quite public.

Martial law serves Poroshenko in more ways than one. The upcoming Ukrainian presidential election is set for March 31, 2019. Presidential elections cannot be held under martial law. On November 26th, one day after the incident, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favor of imposing martial law, albeit for a period of thirty days rather than the initially proposed sixty.

Furthermore, martial law was imposed in the coastal regions of Ukraine and in the regions bordering Russia and the breakaway Moldovan province of Transniestria (where Russian troops are stationed), rather than throughout the entire country.

As of now, Poroshenko stands in third place in presidential election polls. He is trailing behind former populist prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky. Looked at from that perspective, it's possible that Poroshenko may be looking to increase support for his presidency—or at least decrease support for his opponents—before the election through the imposition of martial law.

Putin may think he also stands to benefit from escalating tensions with Ukraine.

Putin’s popularity in Russia has been declining for the past year. His approval ratings took a particularly substantial hit following the implementation of pension reforms that raised the retirement age.

Putin's party, United Russia, also suffered four election losses in Russia’s countryside recently. Stirring up feelings of nationalism may serve to boost Putin’s domestic approval ratings and act as a distraction for the many Russians who are unhappy with the current status quo.

It does not serve Putin or Poroshenko to engage in a full-blown conflict. Escalating tensions to that extent would result in significant increases in civilian casualties and would almost certainly heighten tensions dramatically between Russia and the West. Raising the stakes—at least in the short term—benefits both presidents' interests.

Escalation in the Sea of Azov Benefits Putin and Poroshenko was originally published on Global Security Review.

The actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin should be easy to comprehend. According to prevailing wisdom, he is desperately attempting to solidify a sphere of influence along Russia’s borders and redeem a state with an aging population and stagnating economy from the humiliations it endured during the 1990s. To many in the West, however, Russia’s actions in the Sea of Azov on November 25th came as a complete surprise.

On Sunday, November 25, two Ukrainian gun-boats, the Nikopol and the Berdyansk, and a tugboat, the Yani Kapu, attempted to transit the Kerch Strait by passing beneath the newly constructed Kerch Strait bridge. However, Russian forces had placed a cargo ship beneath the bridge, blocking passage for any vessel attempting to transit between the Black and Azov Seas. The Kerch Strait is the only access point to the Sea of Azov—waters that are considered to be territory shared between Russia and Ukraine.

Soon after, four Russian FSB Border Guard patrol boats carrying “Spetznatz — the Russian equivalent of U.S. Navy SEALS,” seized the Ukrainian gun-boats and tug for a so-called illegal attempt to enter Russian waters. The four Russian vessels were supported by a smaller coastguard boat and two non-identified helicopters as the vessels repeatedly rammed the Ukrainian vessels, causing damage to them and wounding six sailors.

On the morning of November 26th, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed the developments on the Sea of Azov with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, assuring the latter of “NATO’s full support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its full navigational rights in its territorial waters under international law.” At Poroshenko’s request, NATO convened a Commission at the ambassadorial level in Brussels on Monday afternoon.

Poroshenko has since declared a thirty-day state of martial law and is operating under the assumption that Putin’s actions on Azov indicate a potential intention to fully consolidate Russian control of the Donbass region on the border between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, NATO is working to de-escalate tensions between Ukraine and Russia as we are left waiting for Putin’s next move.

However, the events of November 25th and 26th were not without pretext. Multiple factors have contributed to the tensions between Russia and Ukraine that should have indicated to those of us in the West that a high probability of Russian intervention in Ukraine was pending. Ukraine serves as a strategically significant buffer state between Russia and NATO.

Most Realist scholars of international relations believe that Russian leadership would never “tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West.” Therefore, intentional modifications to Ukraine’s orientation Westward are significant indicators to Russia that its border security may be vulnerable to NATO occupation; such indicators warrant an immediate reaction by the Russian government to decrease such a perceived vulnerability.

Russia Fears Further NATO Expansion to the East

The most recent indicator occurred just two days before the confrontation on the Sea of Azov when Ukrainian lawmakers voted in favor of amending the constitution to include NATO and E.U. membership as a strategic goal. Poroshenko described the vote as a message of Ukraine’s intentions of “parting completely and irrevocably” from Russia.

Given Russia’s keenness to prevent and counteract expansion by NATO and the European Union eastward, such a vote by the Ukrainian parliament sends signals to Russia that there is an increasing possibility that such an expansion may occur. NATO expansion has been considered a strategic threat by the Kremlin ever since the intention of NATO to eventually integrate Ukraine was announced during the 2008 Bucharest summit.

In a press statement after a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Bucharest, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that a “powerful military bloc on our borders… [is perceived] as a direct threat to the security of our country.” Furthermore, when the E.U. attempted to propel Ukraine’s path to membership via an Association Agreement, the Russian government responded with a counteroffer to then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych via a loan of $15 billion and a decrease in gas prices, which Yanukovych accepted. In 2014, Russia then responded to the anti-Russian protests and the subsequent political coup that erupted in Kiev by annexing Crimea and amassing forces along the border with Ukraine’s eastern Donbass Region.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Splits from Moscow

A second significant indicator signifying an intentional reorientation Westward by Ukraine was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s formal intent to separate from Moscow in October. Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, initiated a process to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. The decision, both geopolitical and religious, has been supported by the Ukrainian public since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

The dominance of the Russian Orthodox Church over Ukrainian Orthodoxy is considered by many to be a form of Russian hybrid warfare given the proximity of the Russian Orthodox leadership to the Kremlin. In response to the Patriarch’s decision, the Russian Church has severed ties entirely with the global Orthodox Church. A Kremlin spokesperson justified the separation as defending “the interests of Russians and Russian-speakers … [and] of Orthodox Christians.”

These two developments combined were sufficient to provoke Russian activity toward Ukraine as they indicated increased resolve by Ukraine to integrate Westward. As a strategic buffer state between Russia and the West, Ukraine’s integration is unthinkable to Russian leadership as it is perceived as directly threatening the country’s national security. Nevertheless, NATO membership is not feasible with the ongoing conflict in the Donbass.

Therefore, Moscow will do whatever it takes to maintain the conflict and unpredictability of its armed forces in the vicinity of Ukraine to decrease its perceived vulnerability and degrade NATO’s ability to present a potential security threat. As history has shown in Russia, a potential security threat is a legitimate security threat.

Tensions Between Russia and Ukraine Escalate to Four-Year High was originally published on Global Security Review.

Security is an inherently contested concept, encompassing a wide variety of scenarios, and is commonly used in reference to a range of personal and societal activities and situations.

Security can be distinguished between day-to-day security at the individual level (nutritional, economic, safety), security for favorable conditions (the rule of law and due process, societal development, political freedom), and security against adverse conditions or threats (war and violence, crime, climate change).

The term security is used in three broad segments. The first is the general, everyday use of the term. In this instance, security refers to the desire for safety or protection. Second is the usage of the word for political purposes; relating to political processes, structures, and actions utilized to ensure a given political unit or entity is secure.  The term “security” is frequently used as a political tool to assign priority to a given issue or perceived threat within the broader political realm.

Third, and finally, “security” can be employed as an analytical concept to identify, define, conceptualize, explain, or forecast societal developments such as security policy, institutions, and governance structures.

Politically speaking, the usage of the term “security” increased drastically in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the allied victory that ended World War II, the United States government’s military and intelligence institutions underwent a major restructuring.

The Advent of National Security

The National Security Act of 1947 not only created a “National Military Establishment,” which would later become the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency; the Act established the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as the primary vehicle for coordinating national security and defense policy across multiple government agencies.

The National Security Advisor oversees the U.S. National Security Council. This structure would become a model for other countries; the governments of Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the United Kingdom, to name a few, all maintain NSCs responsible for coordinating policy and advising heads of government or state on national security issues.

The advent of national security as a concept enabled states, and their political leaders, to rhetorically pursue a particular security policy. National security policy is broader than defense policy or military policy, and it is more than merely preparing for armed conflict or responding to security threats.  National security policy encompasses all of the above while also aiming to avoid war.

National security includes both internal and external security, foreign policy, economic development, and education. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put it, “security is development.”

National security policy became a critical tool for states to protect and further their interests within the broader international system. International security policy, which the United Nations was responsible for promoting, was often at odds with the national security interests of individual member states. Thus, the UN lost much of its influence as the world become increasingly divided between the U.S.-led West and the Soviet Union-led East.

It was in this context that the understanding of national security as a concept expanded from being based mainly on defense and military issues to focusing on those matters in conjunction with diplomatic, economic, and political issues, both domestically and internationally. Two major geopolitical blocs competed for global influence, but differently than great powers of the past. The UN provided a forum for the two superpowers to engage with one another to avoid another, likely far more destructive, global conflict.

A Shifting International Security Landscape

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the international landscape changed fundamentally. The previously bipolar world order was restructured under as a unipolar order. The United States, being the sole remaining superpower, was ideally positioned as the global hegemon.

A new international security framework was required when the Cold War ended. The previously bipolar international system became replaced by a unipolar global order dominated by the United States. Globally, the odds of a major war between two great powers were increasingly low. From the 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, major conflicts were asymmetrical. The United States and its allies, with or without a mandate from the UN Security Council, employed the use of force multiple times arguing that they were doing so on behalf of the international community.

Some actions, such as the first Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, enjoyed broad support from the international community. The only time (to date) that Article 5 of the NATO charter has been enacted was following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These operations were authorized by the United Nations Security Council, which has the responsibility of acting on behalf of all UN member states in matters of global security. The threat of significant conflict between two sovereign states substantially dissipated, for a time.

Security is Everything

With a return to great power competition, national security priorities are shifting. States, rather than non-state actors like terrorist groups or insurgencies, are the primary security threat. The idea that security encompasses more than military and defense issues alone has returned, particularly in light of threats posed by rising nationalism and hostile foreign information operations. The security paradigm of the twenty-first century has expanded to nearly every facet of human life.

Rising nationalism is driving ontological and societal insecurity. This trend is fueled, in part, by economic inequality and stagnation, coupled with an influx of migrants and refugees fleeing violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and economic hardship. Unless Western societies implement substantial reforms for integrating immigrants and refugees, existing social divisions will widen, damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions and polluting national identities with xenophobic sentiments.

There is also growing concern over gang violence, radicalization, transnational crime, privacy threats, and human rights violations worldwide. These issues all impact individual or personal security, and the widespread use of social media and other mass-communications technologies only serve to heighten the emphasis individuals and societies place on individual security.

Issues like climate change and pollution are also increasingly regarded through a security lens. These issues jeopardize human security, meaning they pose a threat to both individuals and humanity as a species.

Finally, cyberspace presents a whole host of new security threats. Cyber attacks not only compromise personal data and steal information, they can cause physical destruction, as well. Critical infrastructure like communications, power plants, water treatment centers, and oil refineries are all vulnerable to a debilitating cyber attack. Such an attack could disrupt operations, inflict sabotage, and even destroy the target facility. Cyber operations can be used by state and non-state actors to complement or augment kinetic operations to achieve a political goal. This is exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

In the twenty-first century, the concept of security is all-encompassing. The geopolitical element of great-power competition is further exacerbated by a transnational cyberspace, rapidly developing and increasingly accessible technologies, alongside a global economic system which has created complex inter-dependencies between states. In this new order, the traditional security debate between those who see it as a military and defense matter, and those who subscribe to the broader perspective that everything is security.

In this context, national security objectives can be only be achieved when hard power is seen as a compliment to soft power initiatives such as reducing societal and economic inequities, providing access to education and healthcare, and promoting intellectual and technological innovation.

What is Security? Everything. was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 11, elections will be held in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR, respectively). The outcome of the elections will determine the heads of government and state in both regions.

Western governments have strongly criticized the upcoming elections, and have urged Russian President Vladimir Putin not to recognize their results. Not only will the elections disrupt the Minsk process, threatening the increasingly unstable status quo in the region, they provide an air of legitimacy to the Russian-backed separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, allowing for a further consolidation of power.

Are the elections in violations of the Minsk Agreements?

European governments and the U.S. strongly disagree with the Kremlin over the legality of the DPR and LPR elections. The Ukrainian government—which sees the elections as violating both Ukrainian law and the Minsk Agreements—has already stated that it will not recognize the results. The United States and the European Union have also indicated they will not consider the results to be legitimate.

According to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the E.U. for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “all steps that would obstruct the advancement of the implementation of the Minsk agreement must be avoided.” The Minsk agreements state that elections must be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and be monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Kremlin-backed DPR leadership has rejected all criticism of the election, arguing that the Minsk Agreements only mention municipal elections, and as such, all criticism is “baseless” and the elections have a “solid foundation.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to answer questions whether Russia will recognize the results of the upcoming elections.

Filling the power vacuum in the Donbass

Some consider the upcoming elections as necessary to fill the power vacuum left after the assassination of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko in August 2018. Zakharchenko himself had previously postponed these elections for an indefinite period.

The identities of those behind Zakharchenko’s assassination remain unknown but there is rampant speculation. A popular theory attributes the assassination to Kremlin dissatisfaction with the corruption in the Donbass enabled by Zakharchenko and his right-hand man, Aleksandr Timofeyev. Russia and Ukraine have blamed each other for the murder.

Replacing Zakharchenko was not a complicated endeavor. Zakharchenko symbolized separatism in Eastern Ukraine and seemed to be genuinely respected by many in the Donbass region. Initially, Dmitry Trapeznikov was appointed as a successor. He was fired just days after his appointment by the Prosecutor General. Trapeznikov was replaced by Denis Pushilin, the former speaker of the DPR parliament.

Trapeznikov’s ouster, as well as Timofeyev’s swift disappearence from the political scene, were followed by a statement from Aleksei Chesnakov, a close associate of Russian presidential aid Vladislav Surkov. In his statement, Chesnakov blamed Timofeyev for ongoing corruption and criticized Trapeznikov for his lack of a legal mandate.

Pushilin—currently the acting prime minister and the presidential frontrunner—has ties to MMM, an infamous pyramid scheme that deprived millions of citizens across the former Soviet Union of their savings during the U.S.S.R.’s collapse and its aftermath in the 1990s. Despite his low popularity, Pushilin has enjoyed the Kremlin’s full support in the run-up to Sunday’s vote.

Viable presidential candidates have fallen out of the running.

The election campaign in Donetsk has been rather turbulent. Viable presidential candidates such as Alexandr Khodakovksy and Pavel Gubarev were quickly dismissed out of the running. Khodakovsky, who stood a real chance for the position, was not allowed into Donetsk on the date he needed to register as a candidate.

Pavel Gubarev did not collect enough valid signatures, according to the election commission. Igor Strelkov was disqualified on the basis of being a Russian citizen. Pavel Gubarev, one of the first political leaders of the 2014 separatist movement, was denied registration for not having collected enough valid signatures. It is interesting to note that the removal of strong candidates was accompanied by PR efforts to restore Pushilin’s reputation, and to position him as continuing the mission of Zakharchenko.

As a result, on November 11, only four relatively unknown candidates will be competing with Pushilin for the presidency: Vladimir Medvedev (deputy education minister of the DPR), Roman Yevstifeyev (head of the Museum of Afghan Veterans), Elena Shishkina (chairwoman of the Ukrainian People’s Tribunal for the Government of Ukraine), and Roman Khramenkov (former mayor of Yenakiieve and Horlivka).

Moscow’s approach

According to U.S. deputy ambassador Jonathan Cohen, the Kremlin is using the elections to support the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which are, in his words, “inseparable from the illegal armed groups controlled by Moscow.” Pushilin is considered to be less impulsive and more manageable for Moscow than Zakharchenko.

Given the Kremlin’s steadfast support for Pushilin, as well as a campaign to restore Pushilin’s reputation in the run-up to the elections, it is clear that Moscow views the Donbass elections as extremely important—whether it officially recognizes the outcome or not.

It is likely that Pushilin will claim victory on November 11. Less certain, however, is whether he will continue to abide by the spirit of the Minsk Agreements, which have been gridlocked for months. The most likely scenario is that nothing will change, breaches of ceasefires will continue, and Moscow—with its preferred candidate leading DPR—will continue pulling the strings of Eastern Ukraine.

Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius are analysts at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of HCSS.

November Elections in Eastern Ukraine Unlikely to Bring Major Change was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has substantially increased its presence in Black Sea since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Under Russian administration, Crimea plays host to Bastion and Bal coastal defense systems that both employ anti-ship missiles. Conceivably, the Bastion system can reach the Black Sea straits as well as Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish ports.

Russia has also deployed S-400 air defense systems to the peninsula with the capability to target strategic bombers, ballistic, and cruise missiles as well as surface targets. The S-400 system is further enhanced by the Pantsyr S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun system which was provided to the Crimean air defense forces.

Through these measures, Russia has established an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone over the Black Sea. The establishment of this A2/AD zone means Russia has the capability to block NATO access to the Black Sea. Granted, NATO's presence in the Black Sea is limited, but the threat remains nevertheless.

Russia's moves in the Black Sea threaten Ukraine's national security.

While NATO's interests aren't directly threatened by Russian actions in the Black Sea, Ukraine's are. Russian military deployments in the Black Sea region act as a deterrent to other Western forces who might consider assisting Ukraine militarily. Moscow's control over the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula has also resulted in Russian control over the disputed Sea of Azov.

Prior to the Crimean annexation, Ukraine and Russia shared sovereignty over the sea. However, in the wake of the annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that not only was Sevastopol perpetually a part of Russia, but Crimea as well as the Sea of Azov were inherently Russian, as well.

In the case of the Sea of Azov, Russia's actions speak louder than words. Earlier in 2018, Russia completed construction a bridge over the Kerch Strait, explicitly setting it at a height which prevented any Ukrainian commercial ships from transiting the Strait. In doing so, it has threatened the viability of Ukraine's ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Furthermore, Russian officials have illegally boarded Ukrainian ships, essentially preventing Ukrainian usage of the Sea of Azov.

These illegal actions act are parts of a psychological operation to convince the Ukrainian people that Russia has a right to act with impunity in its "near-abroad." In other words, Russia is attempting to persuade Ukraine that NATO and the greater West lack the will to intervene on Ukraine's behalf, despite political rhetoric to the contrary.

Russia finally gets what it wants.

In addition to impeding Ukraine's political shift to the West, Russian objectives in the region include obtaining and maintaining access to and control over a warm water port. The A2/AD zone means that Russia has open access to the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Access to a warm water port has been an objective that has been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy since the days of Gregory Potemkin, an advisor to Catherine the Great.

Potemkin advocated for Russian southward expansion through the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the northern Middle East. With control over the Black Sea, Russia has the capacity to embark on a significant naval buildup. This buildup would give a much-needed boost to Russia's stagnating economy.

Access and control over the Black Sea also gives Russia a springboard from which to project power into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the greater-Mediterranean. Given Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war, this ability to project power could have measurable implications for that conflict.

Russia has also been conducting a soft power offensive in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, and looks to be maintaining its partnership with Armenia. Russia is also taking steps to improve regional tensions, calling for an end to the Syrian war and agreeing to a resolution to the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The consequences of a delayed or minimal response to Russia's increasing control over the Black Sea could be substantial. The Black Sea is but one example of Russia's slow-but-steady consolidation of power and influence across the Eurasian landmass. If the United States and its fellow NATO allies fail to act, it may be too late to reverse shifting power dynamics in a region of major strategic value.

Russia is Consolidating its Control Over the Black Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

America is not alone in projecting itself as an exceptional power and vital force for good in the world. Russia makes the same claim. That sentiment is built upon centuries of defeating invaders, as I explore in “Russia: The Story of War.” And it plays a crucial role in how Russia sees itself in its increasingly tense relationship with NATO and the West.

The birth of Russian exceptionalism

For Russia, its triumph over Nazi Germany in the Second World War is a pillar of national identity. Outsiders don’t often realize that Russians’ belief in their special role in saving civilization from history’s villains predates the war.

In 1812, Napoleon, a tyrant bent on world domination, invaded Russia only to see his army destroyed. It was a tremendous victory and propelled Russia to lead a coalition of allies to liberate Europe from his grip. That campaign ended in 1814 with their occupation of Paris. While Napoleon’s final defeat came at Waterloo in 1815, Russians insisted that they had inflicted the mortal wound.

After the Napoleonic Wars, a volcano of patriotism erupted across Russian society. At its center was the widely shared belief that Russia had saved Europe. Moreover, no other country on its own had repelled an invasion by Napoleon or crushed his army, which had once seemed invincible. Commonly disparaged by Western Europeans as savages or barbarians, Russians could now turn their reputation on its head. As Denis Davidov, a flamboyant leader of partisans declared: “At last, with head lifted proudly, one can say: ‘I am a Russian.’”

Such pride caused many writers and intellectuals in the 19th century to look deeper into history for more evidence of this exceptionalism.

Roll call of invaders

That search led back to the 13th century when the Mongols invaded Europe. Known as “God’s scourge,” their forces advanced no farther than Eastern Europe, allowing Russians centuries later to claim that they had shed their blood to protect the rest of Europe from this dire threat.

Intellectuals advanced subsequent invasions to bolster the argument of exceptionalism. In the 16th century, the Crimean Tatars rode north, leaving Moscow in ashes. In the 17th, the Poles did the same while also deposing the tsar and murdering the head of the Russian Church. In the 18th, the Swedes invaded only to be defeated by Peter the Great.

With Napoleon’s invasion in the 19th, belief in Russia’s indispensable role was secure, and it enjoyed stable currency across the political spectrum. From Fyodor Dostoevsky, an arch-conservative, to Lenin’s idol, the radical revolutionary Nicholai Chernyshevsky – all awarded their nation pedigree status for serving as a shield to defend civilization.

The military, to no surprise, took this idea as an article of faith. At century’s end the head of Russia’s equivalent of West Point, General Nikolai Sukhotin, embraced it as “the key to understanding the special nature of Russia’s experience of war” – something to which, he also added, no other Western nation could lay claim.

Hitler’s attack in the next century – the most significant threat Russia has faced – has cemented its myth of exceptionalism. Just as no country has done what Russia has done to protect others from aggressors, so runs the belief, no other nation has itself also been such a frequent target of aggression.

What war means today

More than anything else, Russia’s experience of war has profoundly shaped its worldview and self-image. That legacy also feeds a national narrative, one nurtured over centuries, not just of epic proportion but of grand persuasion that can serve multiple purposes.

First, and perhaps foremost, it can be invoked whenever Russia is painted as an aggressor. It ensures a presumption of innocence and just cause, no matter the action taken. It even allows for a defensive gloss to burnish Russia’s campaigns of conquest that, by the end of the 19th century, made it the largest contiguous empire, encompassing one-sixth of the world’s landmass.

Defensive expansionism, for example, can be invoked to explain Russia’s annexation of Crimea – both times. The first instance was at the end of the 18th century in order to eliminate the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars who for centuries had raided Russia in pursuit of its most lucrative resource: Russians themselves bound for the slave markets of the Middle East. The second time, of course, was in 2014 when Russia argued it was protecting Russians on the peninsula from an ostensibly hostile Ukrainian government.

Second, it helps underwrite Russia’s suspicion of others that is often decried as overly paranoid or pathological. Here, too, one can go back to the Mongols. When they invaded, how did Russia’s western neighbors respond? By attacking Russia as well.

Also driving this suspicion of the West, besides the sheer number of invasions, is that the invaders have often been coalitions of nations, as if engaged in a collective conspiracy against Russia. Napoleon’s army included, among others, Poles, Italians and Germans, whereas Hungarians, Romanians and others joined Hitler’s ranks. In this reasoning, this is why NATO – especially after its expansion right up to Russia’s border – can be seen through the lens of deja vu, as if Europe once more is ganging up on Russia. Not for nothing do state-sponsored advertisements replay a joke favored by Tsar Alexander III in the late 19th century – but no longer in jest. He would ask, “How many allies does Russia have?” Two, s the punch line: its Army and its Navy.

Third, calling on this legacy plays into the Kremlin’s drive to centralize power. And in the hyper-patriotic climate it has caused, political opposition can be tagged as treason, and foreign entities on Russian soil easily rebranded as foreign agents.

In fact, the legitimacy of the office of president is inseparable from the aura of war. It is no coincidence that inauguration day is May 7, thus pairing it with May 9, VE Day, and the massive celebrations marking the end of World War II. To add effect, the presidential honor guard wears uniforms recalling the Napoleonic age. What else but the backdrop of Russia’s two greatest triumphs to cement the authority of the state with the sacrifices of the people?

Here we see the true function of this civic religion: showcasing a sense of exceptionalism that unites Russians behind an all-powerful center and unifies their turbulent and bloody thousand-year history along with a single continuum as the perpetual victim of foreign aggression. This mythic narrative is high-octane fuel for the engine of Russian nationalism, and today is pumped through all venues of culture and society. And precisely because of its deep roots extending back centuries, it enjoys widespread domestic support.

Nothing but war teaches Russians better that, while at the center of world-shaking events, they are on the side of the good and always come out on top. Nothing raises the ideological scaffolding higher than seeking to make Russia great again following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

“We are history’s makers,” the popular historian Vladimir Medinsky declared shortly before becoming minister of culture. And in this telling, Russians certainly are.

Why Russia Thinks It’s Exceptional was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 presidential election was historic not just for the outcome, but for the circumstances that contributed to that outcome, most notably Russian efforts to mislead the American public using fake news articles, fake Facebook accounts and fake Twitter accounts to disseminate all manner of misinformation.

It looks like Russia may be at it again — this time with a different target in mind. Russia is now using some of the same tools and tactics to spur opposition to hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” a controversial technology used in the production of natural gas.

Russia has run anti-fracking stories on its state-funded news outlet and possibly has purchased anti-fracking online ads. Russia’s efforts have earned the attention of Texas Republican Lamar Smith, who found it necessary to launch a probe into the matter, even though he dismissed Russia’s influence on last year’s election.

Here’s why Russia, a natural-gas superpower, is spreading anti-fracking messages, and why Smith, who has largely kept mum on Russia, wants to investigate.

Fracking allowed the United States to overtake Russia as the world’s largest producer of natural gas.

Russia enjoys the largest reserves of natural gas, and for years it reigned as the world’s top producer. That was until the U.S. natural gas boom. In 2005, natural gas production took off in the United States, thanks to improvements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that allowed producers to access previously inaccessible stores of shale gas at low cost. Gas output surged and prices fell. Over the next few years, gas overtook coal as the largest source of electricity in the country, and the United States surpassed Russia as the world’s most prolific producer of natural gas.

Russia still ranks as the world’s top gas exporter, supplying around one-third of the gas consumed by the European Union. The United States lags behind in exports, trading largely with Mexico and Canada. Because gas must be conveyed by pipeline, both the United States and Russia do most of their business with neighboring countries. Until recently, there was little risk of a turf war.

U.S. producers now want to sell gas in Russia’s backyard.

Now, however, the United States is trying to break into the European market by upping exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped overseas. European countries would certainly welcome another supplier of natural gas, given their history with Russia, which cut exports to Europe amid a 2008 dispute with Ukraine. In a speech given in Europe earlier this year, Trump said, “The United States will never use energy to coerce your nations, and we cannot allow others to do so.”

For now, the United States doesn’t pose a serious threat to Russian dominance in Europe, and it faces several hurdles to becoming a real competitor. It is costly to both cool natural gas to the point where it becomes a liquid and to heat it back up again. And liquefaction facilities are sparse on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia could always cut prices to ward off overseas competitors.

That doesn’t mean Russia is happy to sit back while U.S. producers gain a toehold in Europe. Russia’s economy is dependent on fossil fuel exports. So, in an effort to undercut U.S. producers, Russia has sought to raise concerns about hydraulic fracking, the technology that made American gas so cheap.

Russia is pursuing an anti-fracking campaign in an effort to undercut U.S. gas production.

There are plenty of reasons to oppose hydraulic fracturing. The chemicals used in fracking have been linked to infertility, miscarriage and birth defects. Fracking also has been shown to cause earthquakes. And drilling sites leak methane, a potent heat-trapping gas that contributes to climate change.

Russia has pursued a multi-pronged campaign to draw attention to these risks to stir public opposition to fracking within the United States. RT, Russia’s state-funded news agency, has published articles and aired TV segments that question the safety of fracking. In a report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, U.S. intelligence officials said RT’s anti-fracking programming likely reflects “the Russian Government’s concern about the impact of fracking and U.S. natural gas production on the global energy market.”

The House Science and Technology Committee is now investigating whether Russian entities bought anti-fracking ads on Facebook, Twitter, and Google. In letters to the CEOs of those companies, chairman Lamar Smith wrote that the committee is concerned that anti-fracking ads “have negatively affected certain energy sectors,” including natural gas.

In recent months, Smith suggested that Russia is bankrolling U.S. anti-fracking campaigns and called on Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to investigate possible ties between environmental groups and the Kremlin. Although, there is little evidence to suggest this is the case.

Russia doesn’t care about the environment. Its goal is to undermine the United States.

Russia isn’t concerned about the environmental impact of fracking. It recently issued tax breaks to incentivize fracking. It isn’t concerned about climate change either. Russian president Vladimir Putin is notoriously skeptical of the carbon crisis. He has said that rising temperatures “wouldn’t be so bad for a northern country like Russia.” In its pledge under the Paris Agreement, Russia gave itself room to increase emissions between now and 2030. The goal of its anti-fracking campaign is to undermine the United States.

This, notably, was also its goal in the 2016 presidential election. Intelligence officials say that Russia deliberately attempted to influence the election, having “a clear preference for President-elect Trump.” Russia infiltrated the Democratic National Committee, hacked into voter databases, and shared anti-Clinton messages on Facebook and Twitter. Experts say that Putin is determined to destabilize Western democracies.

Lamar Smith doubts Russia’s influence on the 2016 election.

Smith, who is working hard to expose Russia’s anti-fracking efforts, told the Texas Standard that he doesn’t believe Russia’s efforts to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election had any tangible effect. “I’ve heard the accusations. I’ve heard the assertions. I haven’t seen any hard evidence,” he said.

Smith’s dismissal of Russia’s role in the elections suggests a willingness to discount the meddling of a foreign power when it’s politically convenient. Last year, Putin supported Donald Trump, Smith’s preferred candidate. (The Texas Republican said he was the “first member of Congress to contribute to Donald Trump.”) Now that Russia is going after the oil and gas industry, a major donor to Smith’s campaign committee, the Texas Republican is taking a decidedly different stance.

Lawmakers have a duty to protect the sovereignty of the United States, both by warding off foreign interference in policymaking and by guarding the integrity of elections. Smith holds a more cynical view, dismissing Russian meddling on behalf of Donald Trump, and then lambasting Russia when its activities threaten his biggest donor.

The Fake News About Natural Gas was originally published on Global Security Review.

The status of U.S.-Russia relations is often explained by commentators as a “second Cold War.” This, however, is a misstatement. The Soviet Union and the United States were nowhere near as interconnected as Russia and the U.S. today. Even despite Western sanctions, Russia remains deeply integrated into the global trading, financial, and political systems—and it has exploited them.

American (and European) institutions, civil society, and social discourse—at all levels—have been caught almost entirely off-guard by the Kremlin’s strategic exploitation of a rigid military taxonomy.

Failure to accurately conceptualize war threatens national security and risks destabilizing the rules-based global order. Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct—or even mutually exclusive—entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

21st Century Wars Are Fought in all Domains

U.S. leaders have struggled to conceptualize asymmetric measures of influence-projection,  like the Russian concept of nonlinear warfare. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Russian military planners recognized that—a considerable nuclear arsenal notwithstanding—Russia’s conventional forces would have no means of matching NATO in terms of conventional force parity.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. military underwent a restructuring based on its experience fighting mostly insurgents and other non-state actors in the Middle East. Meanwhile, an increasingly emboldened Russia embarked an multi-domain campaign to counter what it perceives as the threat of NATO encirclement.

First and foremost, the U.S. must restructure the civilian and military components of its national security apparatus. Accordingly, the core notions of national security and warfare as legal, practical, and existential concepts that have been maintained for over seven decades are no longer applicable. Policymakers and strategists must regard warfare in an entirely new light.

Western military strategists over-rely on a rigid structure of categories or taxonomies in their effort to build a useful model for various types of conflict. Cyber operations have been treated as a distinct domain—a domain of lower strategic importance than warfare in the traditional sense.

Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

In contrast—to the detriment of U.S. strategic interests—adversarial powers have learned to rely on a nuanced mixture of conventional forces, cyber warfare, and the dissemination of strategic communications (propaganda) through traditional, digital, and social media outlets to deliberately sow confusion and dissent within a target territory or state.

Agile Warfare

With a perpetual “innovation-cycle,” Russian nonlinear tactics are strikingly similar to the Agile development methodology used by engineering teams in the technology sector.

The iterative cycle of establishing a hypothesis, experimentation (also known as a/b testing), analysis, and iterative review, repeated endlessly, has been a remarkably efficient way of creating disorder.

Such chaos makes it difficult for dissenters both outside and inside the country to effectively mobilize their compatriots, overloading social media and data streams with information and traffic from botnets and trolls.

The Age of Nonlinear Combat

Nonlinear warfare has been described by some “the Gerasimov doctrine”—following the publication of an essay by General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff —this is a misnomer. In contemporary parlance, nonlinear warfare is synonymous with hybrid warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense uses the term “hybrid threat.”

The notion of hybrid or nonlinear warfare is also incorrectly associated with the concept of asymmetric warfare, which originated following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the insurgencies that arose in the aftermath.

The U.S. had limited experience with long-term combat against non-state actors and lengthy counter-insurgency campaigns prior to the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The term asymmetric warfare was used to define this new paradigm.

However, the system of classification has, yet again, proved to be the United States’ achilles heel. Without a doubt, the United States possesses insurmountable conventional military strength and continues to pose an undoubtedly credible threat of mutually assured destruction through its strategic nuclear arsenal.

Both Russia and China realized early that technological advancements in the fields of information technology and population or market research and analysis could be effectively weaponized and integrated into a multichannel offensive military strategy that would have far-reaching advantages when it came to confrontations with the less-agile policies pursued by U.S. military planners.

Moscow’s success stems from its total or “all-in” conception of war. The Kremlin has been heavily investing in modernizing its outdated soviet-equipped military. This model depends on the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors, alliances and adversaries; even war and peace.

Starting in 2008, Russian special and conventional forces were assisted by political subversion, information warfare, and other active measures in simultaneous and complementary assault on Georgian infrastructure and territory. As a result, the Georgian state was paralyzed and unable to act to prevent the de-facto secession of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A similar scenario occurred in Moscow’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, with an executed apparatus of plausible deniability using information warfare, insurgent funding, and economic warfare to utilize proxy “local actors” to achieve individual goals. In the Crimean campaign, Russia’s non-kinetic operations—information, economic, and cyber attacks—laid the groundwork for a complementary military operation.

Nonlinear Thought and Military Planning

Linear thinking has long-dominated military planning and has dominated Western military strategy until the end of the twentieth century. In a linear thought model, a strategy is laid out through detailed planning, established processes, step by step detail management tips, and stakeholder expectations.

To combat foreign influence operations, all levels of the private and public sectors must develop and implement strategic plans to protect intellectual property, secure sensitive information, and deter acts of aggression. This requires a substantial degree of nonlinear thought. Nonlinear thought is less constrictive than linear thinking. A nonlinear combatant employs a range of tactics and measures across domains to gauge what is effective and what isn’t.

The ability to project force through a multitude of mediums is tantamount to U.S. national security interests—particularly if those means are utilized by a foreign adversary to subvert or threaten the interests of the United States.

To Counter Hybrid Threats, U.S. Must Redefine Conception of Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last few months, Russian planes have repeatedly violated NATO airspace. Two U.S. fighter jets intercepted Russian bombers over the Arctic Ocean in both September and May of 2018.

In August, British jets were scrambled to investigate provocative Russian incursions into NATO airspace. Increased deployments of military troops and equipment have also been reported in both Crimea and Kaliningrad.

Historically, military buildups have preceded major wars. Is this century different?

The question remains, to what end? Many historians and international relations scholars point to specific events prior to large-scale conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand or the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Empire.

However, the world works differently in this century. At least for now, large-scale conventional warfare seems like a remote possibility. Instead, the great power conflicts of this century have thus far been relegated active measures and information warfare campaigns, designed to subvert democratic systems and sow disorder.

Despite the growing tensions on each side of the Atlantic, the most active front seems to be virtual. While the United States and Germany have accused Russia of interfering in their political systems, the primary focus is on defending public opinion in vulnerable countries from Russian manipulation.

One such country is Macedonia, where the conflict between Russia and the West seems to be reaching a boiling point.

With the highly anticipated referendum on a name change, Macedonia has a high chance of joining the EU. It is not a surprise that both the United States and Russia are quite interested in the result of this referendum.

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis even stated that he was, "concerned about…the kind of mischief that Russia has practiced from Estonia to the United States, from Ukraine and now to Macedonia.”

At the very least, it seems less probable that this form of digital proxy war could easily escalate into a violent hybrid conflict.

Growing Chinese-Russian military ties could raise the possibility of conflict nonetheless.

At a visit to the Vostok-2018 training grounds, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that this was just the first of a series of regular training exercises between China and Russia.

While this could just be a sign of closer cooperation between the two countries as relations with Europe and the United States worsen, the large-scale posturing could devolve into a military conflict.

While Russian posturing is effective in deterring foreign aggression and diverting domestic attention away from divisive issues, it could also suggest that actual conflict is not as remote a possibility as we would like to believe.

Despite hopes for peace and reconciliation, countries are allocating more money to their defense departments and military budgets. Conflict is always on the horizon, whether diplomats and politicians prefer to acknowledge it or not.

War remains a realistic possibility, and Russia's actions indicate an effort to prepare for a range of scenarios, ranging from large-scale great power conflict to smaller-scale proxy wars in its periphery.

Russia’s Military Buildup: Posturing or Preparation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

From September 11 to 15, Russia will hold its largest war games since 1981. The exercise is called Vostok-2018 and will involve more than 300,000 troops, two Russian naval fleets, more than 1,000 military aircraft and all of Russia’s airborne units.

Chinese and Mongolian military units will participate alongside Russian forces. Despite Russia not being obligated to do so as the exercises will be held to the east of the Ural Mountains, NATO military attachés were invited to observe the exercises.

In justifying Moscow’s reasoning for holding Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov asserted Russia’s right to self-defense, noting that the international community is increasingly hostile towards Russia.

Moscow has cited the steady increase of NATO forces deployed in eastern Europe and the United States’ ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System deployed in Japan as evidence of a Western military buildup.

Russia, however, has been increasingly aggressive in developing and demonstrating its military capabilities. Russian warships have been deployed to the Mediterranean Sea, part of the country’s largest naval presence in the Mediterranean since 2015.

Russia’s Mediterranean fleet is comprised of ten vessels in total, each armed with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles. More provocative, British Royal Air Force fighter jets twice intercepted Russian military aircraft over the Black Sea in a single week in August.

War games are often a response to escalating tensions.

More often than not, war games are a way to demonstrate power-projection capabilities. The Vostok-2018 military exercises are a predictable reaction to increasing economic sanctions and perceived threats to the Kremlin’s hold on power.

While coverage of the Russian annexation of Crimea seems to have stagnated in the international media, the issue continues to be of interest to Russian officials. Serhiy Kostynsky, a member of the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting in Ukraine, discussed Russian transmissions jamming Ukrainian frequencies in Crimea and neighboring provinces within unoccupied Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government has constructed taller radio towers to combat Russian interference, but the Russian operations will likely continue. Concurrently, Russian “active measures,” or information warfare operations, spread fake news propaganda throughout the Baltic states.

While operations such as these may seem insignificant, they reveal the degree of aggression Russia is willing to employ to secure its interests. Information warfare, whether through the dissemination of fake news or jamming radio signals, is a cornerstone of Russia’s response to what it perceives as NATO expansionism.

Every Russian action merits a reaction.

While Russia may continue to employ subversive measures in addition to increasing the frequency and scope of its war games, its actions are not without consequence. In 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko withdrew Ukraine from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization comprised of former Soviet republics.

In August 2018, Ukraine officially closed its offices in all CIS member states. Again, this action may seem purely political in nature, but Ukraine’s departure is viewed in Russia an unacceptable move against what it sees as its traditional sphere of influence.

On the military front, the U.S. Navy reactivated its Second Fleet responsible for combatting Russia’s presence in the North Atlantic Ocean. The Second Fleet was initially formed in 1950 as a response to a Soviet force buildup. The Second Fleet’s reactivation is a high-level indicator of the increasing tensions between the U.S. and Russia.

War games can also distract from internal difficulties.

War games, much like actual conflict, have been used to distract from lackluster economic performance, diverting the attention of disaffected citizens. A planned increase in the retirement age sent Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings from 80 percent to 64 percent.

The original plan to raise the retirement age was scrapped after tens of thousands of Russians rallied throughout the country. The scale and coverage of the Vostok-2018 war games will likely soothe internal tensions, as coverage of the proposed increase of the retirement age is overshadowed by coverage of the military exercises.

Judging the Impact of Vostok-2018

On the one hand, regarding demonstrating the ability to mobilize military resources, Vostok-2018 will most be judged as a success by the Kremlin. Any form of mass military mobilization is done with the intent of maximizing the perception of power and strength.

On the other hand, it remains to be seen as to how effective the war games will be in tempering domestic discontent. Domestic Russian rhetoric regularly projects anti-Western viewpoints, so it is plausible the Vostok-2018 war games will serve to amplify this narrative.

The Levada Center, an independent Russian polling organization, stated in July 2018 that 19 percent of respondents supported the ‘Russia for Russians’ slogan—almost double the percentage of respondents asked the same question one year ago.

Given Russia’s documented success in manipulating public opinion through propaganda and control of the media, the Vostok-2018 war games will likely increase the nationalist fervor within Russia, at the expense of discontent directed towards the country’s stagnating economy and unpopular pension reforms.

Vostok-2018: Russia’s Largest War Games Since 1981 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has been threatened by invasions for centuries. The country’s western borders have always been distinctly vulnerable, with no mountain ranges, bodies of water, or other geographical features to serve as natural defenses.

The European landmass that borders western Russia is a large peninsula that lies between the Baltic and North Seas in the north, the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south.

In contrast to its European neighbors, Russia has few maritime access points. Its few ports are mostly unusable during the winter, and even during warmer months, the Arctic Ocean is far from Russia’s major population centers. Turkish waters to the south, much like Nordic waters to the north, can be easily blocked.

During the Cold War, airbases in the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland gave NATO air superiority which would, in the event of a conflict, enable the alliance to block Russian access to the Atlantic ocean through the strategic GIUK Gap.

The concept of containing Russian expansion wasn’t limited to the Cold War. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, both France and Britain made concerted efforts to contain Russian activities in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia. With limited defensive options available, Russia’s military doctrine has historically been offensive, with the aim of dominating its neighbors to prevent borderlands from being used against it.

Whereas the West views Russia’s fear of invasion as baseless, history has shown otherwise. The view in the Kremlin is that each era brings a fresh existential threat, be it overt or covert, conventional or asymmetric.

Russia’s history and geography have fostered the existence of a highly centralized and autocratic political system, with leaders obsessed with both internal and external security.

After World War II, Moscow saw the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and its western allies as a strategic threat. The incorporation of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, along with the creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, bolstered Russia’s feelings of security at the expense of the West’s.

NATO expands as the Soviet Union disintegrates.

As the Kremlin lost control over territory across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, its sense of security was eliminated entirely. At the end of the twentieth century, Russia’s security buffer had ceased to exist, and its western border was the farthest east it had been since the eighteenth century.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russian objections left few options when it came to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. One option was for a robust expansion of NATO, under the logic that Russia would always attempt to dominate its neighbors if not deterred by the threat of military force.

Alternatively, the NATO expansion could be delayed until Russia reneged on its pledges to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. However, NATO proceeded with its eastward expansion, arguing that it had done so on the premise of avoiding a confrontation with Russia, rather than preparing for a new or expected Russian threat.

After the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in March 1999, the alliance commenced a three-month bombing campaign against Serbia, a state with deep historical and cultural ties to Russia.

The campaign demonstrated the efficacy of NATO’s advanced conventional weaponry at a time when Russia was struggling to rebuild itself. Additionally, the concurrent NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries all but ensured that Russian leaders would once again be able to seize upon the tried-and-true narrative that NATO, led by the United States, was an existential threat to Russia.

Russia’s perpetual fear of invasion has always been a significant driver of its foreign policy.

While military conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have been attributed to aggressive Kremlin efforts to reestablish elements of the Soviet empire, it should be noted that, with the exception of Crimea (which houses the Russian Black Sea Fleet), Russia has not officially annexed any territory belonging to the states in which it has engaged in hybrid conflicts.

The Kremlin’s motives in Ukraine aren’t merely plausible deniability, the annexation of pro-Russian territories would only have the counter-productive effect of encouraging pro-Western forces to escalate their efforts.

Annexation would undermine Russia’s primary goal, which is to prevent countries in what the Kremlin considers to be its sphere of influence from joining NATO, essentially a strategy of reverse-containment.

The alliance typically rejects aspirants with unresolved border disputes, internal territorial conflicts, and insufficient military capabilities to provide for credible national defense. The presence of frozen conflicts in the Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine effectively blocks them from joining NATO.

Recommendations for Policymakers: Contain and Modernize

During the Cold War, the NATO alliance worked because the United States understand the reality of a Russian sphere of influence with which it had to balance to maintain global stability and security.

In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the timing of the Russian interventions coincided with those states’ respective overtures to both NATO and the European Union, entities viewed as inherently hostile to Russia’s interests.

The combined separatist territories, under de-facto Russian control, now form a protective barrier along Russia’s southwestern border. Just as Stalin used the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a security buffer against the perceived threat of western encirclement, Putin has done the same.

NATO members and partner states can better inform their view of Russian strategy by analyzing the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has employed hybrid warfare in both conflicts to great effect, in the form of conventional cross-border assaults accompanied by a combination of unconventional operations, information operations, cyber tactics, economic coercion, and political influence.

NATO requires a multi-faceted modernization strategy that goes beyond merely padding the frontlines with additional troops and assets. To effectively contain Russia in the twenty-first century, the transatlantic alliance urgently needs looking to modernize its maritime forces, as well as improve non-frontline capabilities such as cyber, information warfare, and missile defense.

Russian Expansionism is a Consequence of Geography was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine has received $8.7 billion in low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2015, the government continues to lose $4.8 billion a year from corruption.

In total, Ukraine has lost over $14.4 billion to corrupt officials.

While a simple number does not provide a definitive understanding of corruption, it does reveal the degree to which corruption has become endemic to Ukraine.

Corruption is not uncommon in former Soviet states, where customs officials are commonly bribed by smugglers and traffickers.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption policies have been lackluster in the past.

Ukraine has initiated several measures to address the problem of corruption within the government. The government overhauled the State Fiscal Service and has launched the “Ukraine Without Smuggling” campaign.

However, Ukraine requires more than a public relations campaign to solve its corruption problems. As a result of Ukraine’s geopolitically precarious position between the West and Russia, a solution is required sooner rather than later.

Ukraine has been relying on IMF and World Bank funds to stabilize the national currency (the hryvnia), reduce the budget deficit and bolster international currency reserves.

Without such funds, Ukraine is more likely to make a strategic tilt towards Russia. The loss of funds for Ukrainian oligarchs, in particular, that would result from a loss of international funding would present the Kremlin with the opportunity to re-exert its influence in Kiev.

A substantially decreased cashflow into Ukraine would require replacement funds. Russia would be more than willing to use the situation to pull Ukraine away from the West.

The World Bank seems to be making progress in stabilizing Ukraine’s economy.

The World Bank reported it is preparing a $650 million guarantee for Ukraine to fund its entry into global-debt markets, which would allow the country to raise around $800 billion. However, the Ukrainian government must implement IMF economic reforms to receive the guarantee.

Ukraine has already achieved a number of the reforms, such as the successful enactment of stronger banking and credit laws, which were passed in July 2018.

In September, an IMF mission will be visiting Ukraine to report on the state of Ukraine’s economic reforms.

While it is not definite that Ukraine has wholly fulfilled its IMF obligations, the possibility of receiving substantial funding from the West should be a great enough incentive to induce lasting economic reform.

The question remains, however, as to whether or not Ukraine can overcome the prevalence of public sector corruption?

Corruption threatens Ukraine’s sovereignty.

While corruption is widespread, it’s entirely possible that Ukraine will choose to implement substantial economic reforms in addition to significantly reducing corruption within the country.

Not only does IMF and World Bank financial assistance come at an opportune time for Ukrainian investors, it serves to further solidify Ukraine’s position as a Western democracy.

With Western financing, Ukraine can take further steps on a path towards European integration and fight back against Russian aggression.

Ukraine is already acting out against Russian provocations, by increasing its naval presence in the Sea of Azov.

In doing so, the country shows Russia that monetary persuasion is much more convincing than the history that it shares with Russia itself.

However, it may also be that corruption proves too difficult to unseat, as the World Bank and IMF funds are tied to Ukraine’s implementation of major economic reforms.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index rates Ukraine at 130/180, which is on the lower end of the scale.

However, in 2015, Ukraine established the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and three years later established an anticorruption court.

Signs may indicate a move towards meaningful reform, but only time will tell whether it will be successful.

Lack of Economic Transparency & Corruption Threaten Ukraine’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether through denying journalists the right to cover a story without security implications, or restricting reporting using scare tactics, there is a deeper meaning behind each time a government cracks down on journalists.

In attacking media outlets, the officials in question confirm that the story in question is worth covering. That is not to say it won’t be dangerous. Russia, in particular, has a long history of politically-motivated murders of journalists.

Perhaps the best-known is Anna Politkovskaya. As a reporter, she covered corruption within Russia and revealed much of the torture and the brutal warfare tactics employed by the Russian government and military in Chechnya. After multiple threats, being jailed, and forced into exile on various occasions, she was assassinated in 2006, in the elevator of her apartment building in central Moscow.

In doing so and without words, the Kremlin revealed its willingness to use forceful tactics in response to its decreasing patience for journalists covering controversial topics such as the Beslan crisis, the Moscow theater hostage situation, the Chechen wars, and the Ryazan apartment bombings.

Journalists will continue to be targeted and assassinated throughout the former Soviet Union.

In July 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered in the Central African Republic while investigating the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary group linked to the Kremlin. The Wagner Group is known to operate throughout the world in countries like Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

There is not yet confirmation that their deaths were linked to covering this organization. However, all of the journalists worked for the Investigation Control Center, a Russian news organization financed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky is a former Russian oil oligarch who was run out of his country by Russian President Putin after being accused of fraud, embezzlement and money laundering. The Wagner Group is known to be associated with Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, both of whom are Russian oligarchs with close ties to Putin.

Russia isn’t the only post-Soviet state where journalists are under threat.

Thus far in 2018, the deaths of two journalists, Maksim Borodin and Sergei Grachyov, have been confirmed. Although police claim that Borodin died after falling out of a window, his colleagues assert his death was due to his reporting on corruption.

In 2017, there were four journalists reportedly killed after writing critical articles about corruption. Six deaths may not seem extreme. However, all six deaths show that corruption is a dangerous topic to cover.

Although Russia tends to be the immediate enemy in the eyes of the free press, it is by no means the only country with this systemic restriction. Belarus, a former part of the Soviet Union, recently detained at least 18 journalists.

Authorities accused them of unlawfully obtaining information, searching the offices of independent news agencies in Minsk. This kind of action not only shuts down some of the independent reporting available in Belarus but also creates a hostile environment for journalists entering or leaving the country.

What is Motivating the Crackdowns in Russia and Belarus?

As with every action taken by an administration publicly sanctioned or not, there is always a reason behind it. In other words, there is more at play than a simple crackdown on journalists in Russia and Belarus.

These attacks and threats are happening for a reason. In Belarus, a new election looms on the horizon for Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and anti-regime reporting cannot be tolerated.

When examining some of the recent events in Russia, observers note an uptick in unofficial military actions abroad in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria. In order that the Kremlin prevent the discovery of unpleasant truths and avoid embarrassment, these areas cannot be independently covered.

In fact, Putin recently created a patriotic directorate in the military to increase “moral and political unity.” This is reminiscent of political actions taken in the Soviet Union, highlighting the need for Russia’s government to maintain an official line that cannot be challenged.

The security implications can be complex and multifaceted when journalists are targeted.

On one hand, the daily security for journalists and foreigners suspected on hostile action is immediately under threat. For the state itself, the crackdown represents that the state feels its own position is under threat. However, an objective reading of the situation might show that in states like Russia and Belarus, the maintenance of the current power dynamic is imperative.

The cycle of corruption in Russia is controlled by oligarchs, who in turn are given opportunities by President Putin that increase their own wealth. In doing so, Putin reinforces the belief that only with himself as president will this system continue to sustain itself.

Journalists who threaten exposing and destroying this system are seen as a threat. Observers should be mindful to look at more than the detentions and deaths of reporters, but rather look into what it was they could have exposed.

The Escalating Crackdown on Journalists in Russia and Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

That is not to say that foreign threats are not severe and ongoing. On July 19, Putin warned NATO “against cultivating closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia,” claiming it would have negative consequences for member states if they continued on that journey.

This may not be an idle threat from Kremlin, as it seems to have had an impact on the foreign policies of other countries, particularly that of the United States.

The following day, the United States announced that it would provide over $200 million in aid to Ukraine, to support training programs, operational capabilities, and increased security needs. With this latest string of funding, the U.S. will have provided over $1 billion to Ukraine since 2014.

Why the sudden movement of funds? Ukraine recently adopted a Law on National Security, allowing its armed forces improved interoperability with NATO. On July 23, ships of NATO’s Maritime Group 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 also entered the port of Odessa as part of the Partnership for Peace program.

The most significant security threats to Ukraine are of a domestic nature.

While the foreign threats facing Ukraine are significant, addressing daily security concerns such as access to fresh water and safety in everyday life is essential. Access to clean water may be at risk in the coming month, making this an issue of critical importance.

Dniproazot, a chemical plant owned by Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennady Bogolyubov, ceased operations in July due to increased gas prices. Dniproazot creates liquid chlorine, which is used by more than 170 water treatment and supply plants in Ukraine to clean water.

Without adequate supplies of liquid chlorine, Ukraine’s water filtration systems will be forced to employ alternative methods of filtration. Experts say that in some cities like Kropyvnytsky and Vinnytsia, these systems can only use stored chlorine and filter water for residents for 7 to 10 days.

Ukraine’s Association of Water Enterprises is negotiating with Dniproazot. Thus far, they have not reached an agreement. Building a new factory would cost money and time that many Ukrainian cities don’t have, and importing liquid chlorine from abroad would face its own logistical and cost challenges.

Other cities like Kiev are claiming that they have enough chlorine but face their other issues that threaten to erode internal stability. Approximately one-third of the city’s residents have not had access to hot water due to disagreements between Ukrainian state-owned companies and oligarchs.

Hate crimes are on the rise throughout Ukraine.

Beyond access to clean water, Ukraine is also facing a rise in hate crimes particularly towards their Roma population. Over the last two months, at least four attacks on Roma have been documented.

S14, the youth arm of right-wing party Svoboda, often takes part in violent acts towards the Roma. Often, these involve throwing stones and starting fires in their camps. Despite these acts, there have been no arrests.

Some such as Interior Minister Arsen Avakov claim that attacks on the Roma come from Russia. However, much of the internal disorder comes from right-wing Ukrainians. Hate crimes and trouble with access to clean water are two domestic concerns that Ukrainians must take time to address.

Although international attention towards Ukraine is more often paid towards the encroaching Russian threat, internal matters that have to do with infrastructure, public health, and security require increased attention.

Foreign Threats to Ukraine’s National Security Distract from Internal Disorder was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has transferred at least five warships out of the Caspian Sea into European waters in response to threats in that theater, at least temporarily leaving Russia without a substantial portion of its Caspian firepower.

There have been two separate redeployments over the past month. In the first, Russia sent three missile ships into the Sea of Azov, between Ukraine and Russia, along with two auxiliary vessels. In the second, it sent two corvettes into the Sea of Azov and then onward to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

The former deployment appears to be related to Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine: the Russian military blog BMPD and other observers have linked it to the opening of the new bridge across the Kerch Straits connecting Crimea to Russia. “It appears very likely that they are not preparing to return to the Caspian,” wrote analyst Sergey Ishchenko on the website Svobodnaya Pressa.

The latter is related to Russia’s operations in Syria, the state news website RT reported. After that, the ships could be heading to join the Baltic Fleet, BMPD speculated. “It’s not yet clear whether they will return to the Caspian Sea upon the completion of their military service in the Mediterranean,” BMPD wrote.

The Caspian is a closed sea, but a series of canals and the Volga and Don rivers connect it to the Sea of Azov, allowing Russia to move ships in and out.

The two corvettes are two of the Caspian Flotilla’s most powerful ships, having launched some of the Kalibr missiles that Russia used to strike targets in Syria in 2015. (The two ships now off the Syrian coast are the Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug. Another Corvette of the same class, the Uglich, remains on the Caspian, as do two frigates, the Tatarstan and Dagestan.)

The redeployments take place as the Caspian Flotilla is getting ready to move from its current home base in Astrakhan to Kaspiysk, in Dagestan. Russian officials have vowed that the new base at Kaspiysk will be one of Russia’s most technologically advanced naval bases.

“Enormous construction works are taking place now” in Kaspiysk, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said in April. “Piers, berths, servicing points, residences. The quantity of our officers and soldiers is going to grow manifold.”

At the same time, tension appears to be diminishing on the Caspian, with many of the other littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan – cooperating recently to an unprecedented degree. The five littoral states reportedly recently agreed on a long-awaited convention delimiting the sea, the foundation of much of the strategic uncertainty there, and so Moscow may be calculating that its limited resources are not best spent on the Caspian. In any case, the ships could always go back the way they came.

Russia Transfers Five Warships Out of Caspian Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

Should policies be localized or enforced at a European level? What should the rules be on migration and business deals with other countries? European leaders have often been stymied by these kinds of questions.

In the past few months, however, with the recent surge of right-wing parties, feuding has become more prominent within Europe. With the current anger towards American President Donald Trump, Russia sees an opportunity to rebuild its relations with Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin now has more leeway to strategically foster chaos and discord within Europe, particularly with the added bonus of increased feuding amongst E.U. member states.

Internal German feuding on migration may lead to unilateral action or no action at all.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, is embroiled in a  disagreement between herself and German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer on migration.

Seehofer claims that Bavaria ought to be allowed to refuse asylum-seekers who are trying to enter Germany if they are already registered with another European state or have previously been denied asylum in Germany. Merkel, instead, approaches the issue of migration from a European level. Rather than unilateral action, she opts for following European regulation.

Against Merkel’s European approach is Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. He is advocating for a plan that would strengthen borders and work against illegal immigration coming to Europe. Kurz has called for an “axis of the willing” with Germany, Austria, and Italy.

Germany is set to publish a ‘migration masterplan’ soon. However, there is no certainty as to what the consensus will be if there is one at all.

Italy’s rejection of a rescue ship sends a signal to European leaders.

In mid-June, Italy refused to accept a rescue ship filled with migrants. Although Spain took up the burden and allowed the 629 passengers to come to Valencia, the wound to European solidarity is still fresh.

Italy’s new government campaigned on anti-migrant policies and is now showing its willingness to act on those promises. When asked, Italy’s Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, claimed: “This was a first important signal that Italy cannot go on alone supporting this huge weight.” He also threatened to turn away other rescue boats that arrive with migrants in the future.

So, where does Russia fit in?

With more confusion and chaos within Europe itself, Putin has an opportunity to jump back onto the world stage. This would have seemed impossible only a few years ago. Russia was alienated from Europe because of its annexation of Crimea and its military interventions throughout Syria and eastern Ukraine.

Now, however, Russian-backed populist leaders are in power in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Austria. Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum have caused further fury within Europe. It’s the perfect moment to reassert Russia’s power as an economic and trading partner as opposed to the United States.

While Putin may claim that “it is not our aim to divide anything or anybody in Europe,” actions speak louder than words. It is to Russia’s advantage to have a fragmented Europe that can neither impose sanctions nor act unilaterally against deals like the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

Already, there are signs of this. Austrian leader Kurz refused to expel Russian diplomats after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Both Italy and Greece are calling to end sanctions against Russia.

It makes sense for Russia to encourage this departure from former European solidarity against their country. It may make more sense to pay attention to Russia’s actions towards Europe such as the support for right-wing parts such as France’s Front Nationale and German’s AfD rather than the political rhetoric. Discord is where Russia can make its move, and as it has often done it past, it may do again.

Russia Sees Opportunities as E.U. Member States Feud was originally published on Global Security Review.

The twelve-mile-long bridge (19 kilometers) connects Russia and Crimea by both road and rail. The road portion officially opened on May 15, with the rail portion slated for completion in 2019.

The bridge was constructed at the cost of $3.7 billion, and can reportedly sustain 13 million passengers and 14 million tons of freight per year, and is designed to accommodate around 40,000 vehicles per day.

Planning for the Kerch Strait Bridge began in 2014, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine’s Response

On May 22, Ukraine filed a claim with the International Tribunal stating that the bridge’s construction was illegal under international law and was a threat to Ukraine’s sovereign interests.

Two days later, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko levied sanctions on Russian state-run media outlets RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) and Rossiya Segodnya (Россия Сегодня), citing national security concerns as the primary reason for the sanctions.

Both outlets are banned from operating or broadcasting within Ukraine for a minimum of three years.

Over a week before Poroshenko sanctioned the two media outlets, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on May 15 that it had detained RIA Novosti reporter Kiril Vyshnysky in Kiev on charges of  “high treason for allegedly participating in hybrid information warfare.”

The SBU announced that it had uncovered a “network of media structures controlled by the Russian Federation” and had launched an investigation into the activities of RIA Novosti-Ukraine.

A spokesperson for the SBU stated that “law enforcers have determined that they [RIA Novosti] were used by the aggressor country in the context of a hybrid information war against Ukraine and investigative actions are now being carried out.”

The Decline of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Over the past few years, Ukrainian-Russian relations have soured. In a generous reading of the situation, the bridge could be seen solely as a means to connect Crimea with Russia.

Such schemes, however, are rarely so innocent. The very act of connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula infers the permanence of the Crimean annexation.

The bridge will be a perpetual reminder to Ukrainians that Russian troops have a direct, overland (read: bridge) route into Crimea, diminishing any plausible hope of Ukraine retaking the peninsula.

Meanwhile, clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have escalated. During the week of May 21, there were 7,700 ceasefire violations. The escalations in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian response to the opening of the Crimean bridge indicate that relations between Ukraine and Russia will continue to deteriorate.

As Ukraine continues to turn westward, Russia may seek to respond in more drastic ways to underscore its significance and importance to both Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Russian-Crimean Bridge Completion Escalates Ukraine-Russia Tensions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent announcement by the United States of Javelin anti-tank missile system shipments to Ukraine has been met with a litany of gratitude from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and condemnation from Moscow. In March, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of 210 Javelin Missiles and 37 Javelin Command Launch Units to Ukraine, worth $47 million.

However, it is not only American lethal aid that is being provided to Ukraine. Since 2015, Bulgaria has been exporting weapons to Ukraine, including DRTG-73 anti-tank grades. These have been used in combat operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as recently as November 2017.

The proliferation of Lethal Weapons

Bulgarian arms shipments aren’t just going to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, however. They are also going to Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. In December 2016, Bulgarian defense manufacturer VMZ’s RPG-22 weapon was discovered to be in use by separatist forces by Ukrainian Security Services. There is no question that Bulgarian lethal weapons have been widely proliferated throughout the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In 2015, Bulgaria exported over €16 million of armaments to Ukraine in 2016.

It isn’t surprising that these weapons are being proliferated on both sides of the Ukrainian conflict—it exemplifies a trend of foreign arms manufacturers exacerbating the conflict through increased arms shipments. As early as 2015, Lithuania was also in the business of sending lethal weapons to Ukraine.

In 2017, Lithuania announced that they intended to deliver weapons worth €1.93 million to Ukraine this year. Included, reportedly, are “more than 7,000 Kalashnikov rifles, two million cartridges, more than 80 machine guns, several mortars, anti-tank weapons and other military equipment.”

Escalation and the Javelin missiles

With the confirmation of delivery of U.S. Javelin missiles, the war in Ukraine enters a new phase. Western support of Ukraine creates the impression that this conflict is merely another proxy war between Russia and the United States. Although lethal weapons have been sent before from Bulgaria and Lithuania to Ukrainian forces, the higher caliber of Javelin missiles introduces a new level of escalation. The proliferation of these weapons is less likely—however, the danger lies in what now Russian-backed separatists will do.

In recent weeks, there has been an uptick in fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Despite the Minsk II Accords, the four-year-old conflict continues to simmer.

This new variable begs the question of what will happen next? Generally, when a country party to a conflict receives stronger weapons, the opposing side will attempt to match it in an arms-race-like scenario. Russian-backed separatists may be supplied with heavier-caliber armaments, and it’s possible Russia’s involvement in Ukraine will become more overt in the near future.

For now, the increased proliferation of weapons in Ukraine may increase Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s gratitude to the United States, but it remains to be seen how this will affect the conflict’s strategic landscape.

American and Bulgarian Weapons Shipments Enter Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years after drone operations were suspended in August 2016, the OSCE has elected to again introduce long-range unmanned drones (i.e., aerial vehicles – UAVs) to Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The OSCE will be using long-range Camcopter S-100 UAVs, which will both operate at night and during the day in areas where ground patrols of the OSCE are not permitted.

Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug stated that “Given that the Minsk agreements envisage the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other technology by the OSCE SMM, we expect the sides, as signatories to these agreements, to not interfere, by jamming, shooting or otherwise, with the operation of these UAVs.”

Part of the reason this monitoring system was initially canceled was that several of the OSCE’s drones were shot down using surface-to-air missiles and rifle fire, and were subjected to interference from jamming equipment.

Due to a lack of access to the crash sites, no blame was assigned to the downing of the drones. However, there was suspicion that the fire came from Russian-backed separatists.

Both Ukrainian fighters and Russian-backed separatists have attempted to shoot down drones in the past. After the cancellation of the long-range drones, short- and medium-range drones continued to function.

Lack of Enforcement of the Minsk Agreements

Perhaps one of the most concerning detriments in the Minsk Agreements was the lack of options on how to enforce it. Although the OSCE can act as a reasonably neutral actor in observing both sides of the conflict, there are many parts of the region where OSCE monitors are not allowed.

Naturally, these are the more common regions where violations are more likely to occur such as artillery attacks, weapons positioning, and prohibited weapons systems.

Why is the OSCE Reinstating the Program Now?

So, what has made it a necessity to restart this program? The main reasoning comes from a video sourced at Ukrainian NGO Come Back Alive, which shows a new electronic warfare system. Come Back Alive claims that this new system comes from Russia. However, Russia has disputed these statements.

The situation in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk’s regions has become somewhat of a hybrid conflict, where actual progress from either side does not occur often, but actual fighting and violations of the negotiated Minsk Accords continue to take place.

The real question is whether reintroducing the drone program will offer any new way of maintaining peace. While some state that monitoring systems decrease violence and increase incentives to follow the rules, what would stop separatists from shooting down these multi-million costing drones to merely be shot down again?

The reason why the OSCE is choosing to reinstate the drone program may have to do with the new electronic warfare system, with some stating it is an escalation of electronic warfare. The maintenance of such a program is, however, questionable.

OSCE Drones Reintroduced into Ukraine’s Donbass and Donetsk Warzones was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul
• The Ukrainian government could likely escalate the conflict within the next year.
• Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots
• Russian foreign policy has fed domestic nationalism and pride has become a source of power for the Kremlin.

Russia attempts to make inroads to the east as tensions persist with the West.

As relations with the West remain tense for the foreseeable future, Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul, playing them off each other, and off Beijing, to its benefit.

Despite talks between Russia and Japan in November 2017, the two countries are still at odds over a contested set of islands, and China remains Moscow’s most important partner in the region.

Russia’s proposal to send U.N. Peacekeeping forces to Donbas will gain traction, despite discussions between Russia and Ukraine, together with its Western supporters, over the installation’s parameters.

Expect Continued Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine

The plan likely will not come to fruition by the end of the year. However, there is a small chance it may reduce the violence in eastern Ukraine in the short-term.

In the medium- to long-term,  recent developments in Ukraine may mean an escalation of hostilities in the country’s east, as the Ukrainian military takes command over operations in the region.

A recently passed bill by the Ukrainian parliament outright labels Russia as a foreign aggressor. The law gives the President increased over Ukraine’s armed forces and eliminated the requirement for parliamentary support before ordering military action. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict in eastern Ukraine joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence, like the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict within the next year.

Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots

Two other post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan), and the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, will remain prone to internal instability and vulnerable to political, cyber, military, or other hybrid interference from Russia.

The long-term standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially flare up again. The joint border shared by Moldova and Ukraine will potentially result in an increased Russian security presence in the region, either by conduction more frequent military exercises or shipping more weapons to separatist groups.

While it is unlikely that either of these territories will result in a regional conflict, it remains to be seen whether Russia will seek to exploit ongoing political and social divisions in the West to advance its interests in either region.

Both lie within what the Kremlin considers its traditional “sphere of influence,” and maintaining this sphere is an essential component of its national security strategy

Russia: the aspiring—but declining–great power?

Russia aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber-rattling, and foreign engagements overseas. Russian foreign policy is centered on regaining and retaining the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, at home, it faces increasing constraints from a poorly-diversified economy and crippling U.S. and E.U. sanctions, levied in the aftermath of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin (and above all, Putin) prizes internal stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and political expression.

Moscow’s ability, through its foreign policy, to regain what it views as its traditional role on the world stage—even through aggressive expansionism and disruption abroad—has fed domestic nationalism and pride which has further legitimized the Kremlin and has become a source of regime power.

Russian nationalism features strongly in the Kremlin’s national narrative, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism.

Putin is personally popular, but recent protests driven by economic and administrative mismanagement reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power by government officials and those close to them.

However, Putin’s recent re-election has been used by the Kremlin as a referendum to buttress his continued rule. Domestically, authoritarianism and decreased rule-of-law are likely to be expected.

Foreign policy will be dictated by heightening tensions with the west due to the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and foreign interference operations will dictate Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Russian Foreign Policy: Expansionism Feeds Domestic Nationalism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instead of examining how domestic policies are impacting the health and social structure of a society, it’s usually in the best interest of a president or prime minister to turn the attention of their country to something outside. This policy is known as diversionary foreign policy and there no better implementer of it than Russia.

The woes of Russian infrastructure are many.

The Kremlin expertly distracts its population from growing problems within the Russian borders. From the 2014 annexation of Crimea to the continued military intervention in Syria, international issues become matters of national pride for Russians.

They need the distraction. In the last week of March, 64 people were killed in a deadly shopping mall blaze in Kemerovo, Siberia. Thousands protested throughout the country against the alleged negligence, cost-cutting measures and corruption that led to this and many other fires.

In fact, 10,068 people died as a result of a fire in 2014 in Russia in comparison to the number of 3,275 casualties in the United States during that same year. With a population of nearly twice Russia’s size, the death toll is almost a third lower.

Fire, however, isn’t the only problem. On March 21, 2018, twenty students were hospitalized in Volokolamsk due to the release of toxic gases from a local landfill. An additional fifty-seven children have sought out medical attention due to symptoms. Further, around 200 people living near the landfill have consistently registered complaints of nausea and headaches.

Despite local Russian news agencies covering the situation, nothing appears to have been fixed. Intermittent protests come and go locally – but this problem isn’t a new one. Regardless, a local court has refused to close the dump and garbage continues to flow into the landfill, poisoning the local Russian population.

But on the international front, Russia has more than enough distractions to use.

The prevalence and variety of infrastructure problems within Russia ought to perhaps take center stage. But luckily for Moscow, there are many scandals on an international front. When Russia is referred to as the subject of sanctions and as a state “acting in bad faith,” Western media outlets are feeding fuel to the fire of Russian nationalism; look at the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter.

As the United Kingdom and the United States along with their allies send home Russian diplomats because of this poisoning, Russia throws its hands up and claims that the accusations are all hearsay. The Kremlin has stated that without clear proof that the poison came from Russia, the allegations are baseless.

However, this hasn’t stopped other countries from expelling Russian diplomats. What does Moscow do? It plays the victim card.  When other states act against Russia, the Russian government can then turn to the population and say “See, look at how the world treats us, focus your anger on them.”

The Russian state media has similarly used the recent sanctions imposed by the US government on Russia to support an alternative narrative. In particular, these sanctions narrow in on those close to Russian President Vladimir Putin to punish the country for the Skripal poisoning.

What would Moscow have the populace believe? Not only does state-funded media outlet RT claim that the sanctions target ordinary Russians disproportionally, but it also claims the sanctions are retaliatory and a strategy to force Russians to play along to “Washington’s script.”

By refocusing their anger and frustrations on how the world treats Russia, Moscow distracts the population from their problems closer to home. Here’s a hint on how well that strategy is playing: Russian President Vladimir Putin was reelected with 76.7 percent of the vote this year.

Diversionary Tactics in Russian Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

On March 22, 2018, Nadiya Savchenko was arrested by the Ukrainian State Security Service on charges of plotting a coup.

If the name at all sounds familiar, it is due to Savchenko’s 2014 arrest. Savchenko was accused of killing two Russian journalists in the Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine. In Russia, she was charged with murder and sentenced to 22 years in prison.

A Ukrainian War Hero

During her time as a prisoner in Russia, she refused to admit guilt. She was eventually included in a 2016 prisoner swap. She was pardoned by President Vladimir Putin in exchange for the return of two Russian servicemen from Ukraine.

Savchenko was awarded the Star of the Hero of Ukraine and quickly rose to prominence within the Ukrainian Parliamentary Opposition movement.

Following her return, Savchenko has held talks with separatists and publicized lists of people who went missing or who were captured during the conflict. None of this has been conducted with the support or consent of the Ukrainian government.

Arrested on Suspicion

In the lead-up to her arrest, MPs in the Ukrainian parliament were shown a surveillance video of her discussing plans to attack the parliament. Ukraine’s Chief Prosecutor Yuriy Lutsenko accused Savchenko of working with Russian-backed rebels.

After watching this video, the MPs voted to remove her immunity from prosecution and for her arrest. When asked about the video, she claimed that “Ukraine’s corrupt government” needed to be overthrown.

In defending herself, Savchenko claimed that she had spoken with undercover agents who had encouraged her to overthrow the government. Her rationale was that she was playing along with them to bring the corruption of the government public. She additionally accused the MPs of not following through with the promises of the Maidan uprising, stating:

“To accuse me of treason against Ukraine … and to make anti-heroes out of yesterday’s heroes simply because they do not agree with the policies and positions of the current government, that’s all the authorities can do.”

Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman suggested that the matter was one of psychological health. However, other Opposition members such as Borys Kolesnikov believe that Savchenko should be allowed to defend herself from a position of freedom.

What’s next for Nadiya Savchenko?

Ukrainian MPs set a date for Savchenko’s trial for March 23. At the beginning of the trial, Savchenko announced she would start a hunger strike.

In her defense, she has claimed that transporting weapons from eastern Ukraine was not, as the accusation reads, for planning a terrorist-style coup against the government, but rather to determine the origins of the arms.

Savchenko is just one Ukrainian Opposition MP, and her guilt or innocence does not do much in either setting a new way forward or backward for Ukraine.

However, if as she claims, she was set up—it may say something about the continued corruption in the Ukrainian government.

Along with many in the Opposition movement, Savchenko believes that many of the previous corruption scandals that haunted Ukraine in the past continue to happen now under a new name with tacit agreement from the West.

It remains to be seen until 2019 if any government, new or existing, will make a difference.

Nadiya Savchenko Detained in Ukraine on Charges of Plotting Attempted Coup was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Russian flag was raised by residents of Crimea, not Russian soldiers. Russian forces were stripped of any identifying markers or insignia. Cyber attacks launched at Ukrainian infrastructure and internet domains were structured in a manner that obfuscated Russia’s involvement.

It’s widely understood that Russia was responsible for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, the confusion spawned by the disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and unmarked special forces, and the later actions in eastern Ukraine, would see the west committing further inaction allowing the Kremlin to consolidate, and then normalize the acquisition of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

After the conspicuous invasion of Georgia in 2008, the 2014 Crimea operation employed subtle paramilitary and special forces to seize critical points of interest while securing internal order. Russia applied a  broad swath of non-military, hybrid or “non-linear” warfare tactics designed to foster the rapid integration of the Crimean political, security, media, and financial sectors with those in Russia.

The period between the initial “invasion” of information and cyber attacks and the eventual referendum deciding Russian sovereignty over the peninsula was little more than a month.

The military involvement served as a deterrent to Ukrainian troops, while the lack of insignia or identifying features on Russian special forces provided a degree of plausible deniability. Accordingly, the NATO powers in Europe and North America would not have apparent cause to intervene.

Simultaneously, the political, economic, and information warfare campaigns that had been set in motion were masked by the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion in other parts of Ukraine.  Russian troop mobilizations and activity near the Ukrainian border diverted international attention from Crimea while pro-Russian non-military measures were implemented to politically, socially, and economically integrate the Crimean peninsula with Russia.

Having learned the mistakes of overt military action, and the risks that such action has for becoming embroiled in a heated civil war, Russian military strategists employed a mixture of both state-sponsored actors, state actors, and pro-Russian Crimean civilian protestors and militia groups.

All state-actors in Crimea were bereft of identifying marks that would associate Russia with the incursion.

All that was required for the Kremlin to deny any responsibility was for their special forces to show up wearing un-flagged uniforms. Regarding ensuring the viability and legitimacy of their actions in Ukraine, Russia proceeded to launch an aggressive campaign in the United Nations. As they had done before their 2008 invasion of Georgia, their disinformation campaign extended to Russian delegates at the United Nations.

Russia’s ambassador repeatedly—and forcefully—asserted that Ukrainian authorities were threatening and committing acts of violence against ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Superficially, the carefully crafted (artificial) legal context for this argument was structured similarly to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

It must be noted that the latter was to ensure the security and existence of critically vulnerable civilians. This is a stark contrast to the underlying reason for Russian aggression, which is to provide the continued hegemony of Russia in the post-Soviet space.

The efficacy of the Crimean campaign (and Russian non-linear warfare as a strategy) is evidenced by two factors.

One is the degree to which Russia was able to normalize the annexation. The other is the masterful execution of diplomatic and legal rhetoric which rendered the West inability of Western military intervention, to realize a controlled process of de-escalation and normalization.

The ongoing exploitation—and arguably weaponization—of International law and legal framework by State actors posits a critical urgency to reform theoretical conceptualizations of international law governing conflict, especially since purely conventional battles will be the exception in the 21st century. The blending of non-linear tactics with plausibly deniable conventional forces actively threatens the rule of law in the international order.

“Plausible Deniability” in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the early autumn of 2016, a Ukrainian hacker collective calling itself CyberJunta obtained and subsequently published emails reportedly belonging to Vladislav Surkov, a senior advisor and personal aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

CyberJunta stated that its efforts were undertaken in conjunction with other hacker collectives; specifically, groups referred to as “FalconsFlame,” “RUH8,” and “Trinity.” This grouping refers to itself the Cyber Alliance. Oft-referred to as the” Gray Cardinal of the Kremlin,” Surkov is considered the be the architect of Russia’s contemporary political system.

Who is Vladislav Surkov?

From 1999 to 2011, while serving as the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, Surkov acted as the Kremlin’s main ideologist; proposing and subsequently implementing the concept of “sovereign democracy” in Russia. Surkov is perceived by many—both in Russia and in the West—as a key figure with considerable influence in the Kremlin. According to The Moscow Times, this power is independent of any official title Surkov has held within the Putin administration or in the Russian government.

Observers have credited Surkov’s keen ability to manipulate public perception through an intricate blend of theater and managed politics with keeping Putin in power since 2000. As First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Surkov sat a desk laden with phones labeled with the names of nearly all of Russia’s “independent” or “opposition” political party leaders, “calling them and directing them at any moment, day or night.”

The Puppet Master of Moscow

Rather than directly oppressing opposition as traditional authoritarian governments had done, Surkov’s strategy was more complex. Under Surkov’s direction, dominant ideologies and movements were infiltrated with propaganda and misinformation, sewing chaos by exploiting their internal disagreements, rendering them ineffective.

This strategy is exemplified by Surkov funding civic forums and foreign non-governmental organizations while simultaneously providing support and encouragement to Russian nationalists who would accuse NGOs of being “tools of the west.” By placing itself at the center of all forms of political and ideological discourse, the Kremlin effectively owns any narrative an independent movement might try to seize.

In December of 2011, Surkov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. In May of 2013, Surkov forced to resign his position within the government, returned to the Presidential Administration to serve as a personal adviser to Vladimir Putin on Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Ukraine. Surkov has since been placed on U.S. and E.U. sanctions lists for his role in orchestrating the Crimean annexation.

The Kremlin Plot to Normalize Ukraine

The hacked emails detailed a Kremlin plan to further destabilize Ukraine in an effort favor Russia’s interests, by pushing for early Parliamentary elections through the extensive use of cyber and information warfare tactics, and through increased financial support to separatist or “pro-Russia” politicians.  Also published by hackers were copies of passports that are alleged to belong to Surkov and members of his family, which have been verified as authentic.

The plan detailed in Surkov’s purported emails states that de-escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine on Russian terms is possible—if the Kremlin can fundamentally shift the Ukrainian political landscape in its favor. De-escalation and normalization would then create favorable circumstances for the integration of the Donbass with Russia—Russian-armed separatist militias, and “little green men”—widely known to be Russian troops in unmarked uniforms continue to wage war against the Ukrainian armed forces in the Donbass and Donetsk regions of eastern Ukraine.

The campaign detailed in the alleged Surkov emails would increase non-kinetic tactics—i.e. active measures (subversion, kompromat, propaganda, economic influence)—that would bolster support for Russian interests in Kiev. If more pro-Russia or “separatist” politicians were elected to the Ukrainian parliament,  Russia’s influence would undoubtedly increase exponentially, allowing it to “de-escalate” the conflict on its terms.

Oleksandr Tkachuk, the chief of staff to the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU), said on Television Tuesday that after a thorough examination by experts, Ukraine’s intelligence services believe the emails to be authentic.  At the time, Tkachuk reiterated that the SBU only has access to documents that were released to the public and does not have any connections with CyberJunta or related hacker groups.

The Ukrainian presidential administration and the SBU declined requests for comment from domestic and international media regarding the alleged hack. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Surkov’s participation in any Russian plot to further destabilize in Ukraine and insisted that the documents released by the hacking group were forgeries.

Analysis: Kremlin Timeline Coincides with Political Disorder and Confusion in Post-Election U.S.

The leaked documents allege that the optimum time to proceed with the initiative was from November of 2016 through to March of 2017. Just as the United States’ presidential election was ending. In hindsight, one can note that this timetable perfectly coincided with increased dysfunction and divisions within the United States government.

This may indicate that senior Kremlin officials were anticipating a U.S. government in chaos, distracted by domestic issues and by the well-documented Russian-directed disinformation campaigns and cyber operations designed to damage the integrity of the United States’ democratic process and institutions. Surkov was—at the time—confident in the detrimental effect Russia’s interference would have on the U.S. political system, and in the U.S.’s ability to deter normalization in Ukraine that would favor Russia’s interests.

Top Putin Aide’s Hacked Emails Reveal Secret Plan to Invade Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In February, 2018, MIkhail Saakashvili was detained, flown to Poland, and eventually to the Netherlands, His wife’s home country. Saakashvili has responded defiantly, saying that he will ignore the ban and return to Ukraine claiming, “I will return home to Ukraine very soon now, much sooner than in three years.” That may be difficult seeing as Saakashvili’s Ukrainian citizenship was stripped in July 2017, after allegations were made charging him with corruption and poor governance.

How did Saakashvili come to get banned from Ukraine?

The former Georgian president was chosen to lead the fight against corruption in the Odessa region of Ukraine by his former friend, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Just a few years later, Saakashvili would be banned from yet another country he formerly called home.

Although he was known for his strong stance against Russia and anti-corruption position, Saakashvili is not as popular as he once was in the early 2000’s. In Georgia, his presidency lasted from 2004-2013. During that time, he presided over the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, in which Georgia lost control over the disputed territory of South Ossetia. In 2012, Saakashvili’s party lost the parliamentary elections and he was further term limited out of office in the following year.

Since losing that election, Saakashvili looked to university friend, Petro Poroshenko for help. Poroshenko was elected as the Ukrainian president in 2014. Saakashvili became an advisor to Poroshenko, and in 2015 became governor of Ukrainian region of Odessa region.

To become governor, he needed to become a Ukrainian citizenship. This meant Saakashvili needed to renounce his Georgian citizenship. This was no great loss for him, considering that he is convicted of abuse of power in relation to a 2006 murder case and sentenced to three years of prison in-absentia. He maintains his innocence, however, saying that the charges are politically motivated.

The following year, Saakashvili was again out of work. He resigned from his post as governor in November 2016, claiming that members of the Ukrainian government, Poroshenko in particular, were undercutting his efforts to fight corruption.

In the year that followed his resignation, Saakashvili became an outspoken critic of Poroshenko. He and his supporters claim that Poroshenko is a pawn of Putin, and that all of his political acts are purely motivated towards Russian dominance. His movement, however, is not particularly popular and is not expected to be particularly successful in the 2019 Ukrainian elections.

Why does Saakashvili have difficulty gaining support from Ukrainians?

In short, Ukrainians are tired of turmoil. From the Euromaidan protests to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine has been in a constant state of flux for over four years. Saakashvili’s own history is not one of stability. His past leadership is marred with unpredictable behavior and populist tendencies. Further complicating his reputation is a pending money laundering case in the Ukrainian courts that alleges that Saakashvili conspired with ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.

Although his Ukrainian citizenship was stripped from him in July 2017, Saakashvili succeeded in crossing the border illegally from Poland in September of 2017. He has organized and led anti-government protests. In response, the Ukrainian government has accused Saakashvili of working with a criminal organization. They further state that the anti-Poroshenko protests are a “Russian plot against the government in Kiev.”

Saakashvili appears at the Munich Security Conference to push his own agenda

Saakashvili made an appearance at the Munich Security Conference in February of 2018. Instead of joining the broader security discussion, he spent his time speaking out against the Ukrainian government. His claims of crooked business dealings and anti-democratic measures ring hollow against his own attempts to work with the Svoboda party and Azov Battalion, both of which are right-wing, xenophobic groups.

Although his supporters in Georgia and Ukraine would prefer otherwise, Saakashvili’s star seems to have waned. He will undoubtedly continue to speak out against perceived injustice, but the former president seems to have been reduced to a stateless agitator.

The Decline of Mikhail Saakashvili was originally published on Global Security Review.