President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks an Edge With Its Information War,” Iran is waging a sophisticated offensive to win the war of perception first, shaping the cognitive battlefield to paralyze U.S. decision-making. This poses a direct challenge to the U.S. Department of War’s core focus on “maximum lethality,” as outlined in the 2026 National Defense Strategy. That goal, however, is unachievable if the information battlespace is lost. Cognitive dominance in the operational information environment is not a distraction from lethality; it is the fundamental prerequisite for it. To win, the joint forces must complement their pursuit of kinetic overmatch with a mastery of the cognitive domain. 

Iran’s gray zone strategy, a mix of proxy warfare and calibrated escalation detailed in analyses by CSIS and Michael Eisenstadt, is designed to create dilemmas and exploit the seams in Western military thought. The U.S. response was to elevate “Information” to a joint function, a critical doctrinal step. But as then-Brigadier General Grynkewich noted when introducing the concept, doctrine-on-a-shelf changes nothing without a corresponding shift in the force’s “cultural mindsets.” The real work is building cognitive architecture to apply it. 

This is where a “Global Mindset,” defined by scholars in “A Whole New Global Mindset for Leadership” as “the capability to influence others unlike yourself,” becomes a warfighting imperative. This mindset is not an abstract virtue, but a tangible capability built on three pillars: (1) Intellectual Capital: The cognitive horsepower to understand the complex web of political, cultural, and social factors in a contested environment. (2) Psychological Capital: The resilience and fortitude to operate effectively in ambiguous, long-term struggles, countering an adversary’s “long game.” (3) Social Capital: The behavioral skill to build trust and show intercultural empathy, allowing for the creation of authentic partnerships and resonant counter-narratives. 

Yet, how do you build this mindset at scale? The answer lies in a structured, teachable framework. The Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model, a methodology developed at The Air University and Defense Information School. It was designed specifically to make the abstract actionable. It provides a repeatable process for planners to solve “wicked problems” in the information domain. Its five core elements are: 

(1) Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking: This foundational mindset shifts planners from linear predictable models to seeing the information environment as a dynamic ecosystem. It allows them to anticipate ripple effects and identify high-leverage nodes in an adversary’s network. 

(2) PESTLE and Ecosystem Analysis: Using a structured analysis of the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental domains, this step builds the deep situational awareness required to uncover the root grievances an adversary like Iran exploits. 

(3) Cynefin Sensemaking Framework: This framework helps leaders correctly categorize the environment. The gray zone is a “Complex” domain, where the only effective approach is to “Probe-Sense-Respond,” in essence to conduct small-scale, reversible actions, see how the system reacts, and adapt accordingly. This neutralizes an adversary’s probing tactics and reduces the risk of miscalculation. 

(4) Wicked Solutions for Complex Problems: This approach is the engine for building social capital. It forces planners to see the problem from the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders, enabling the creation of sustainable, locally resonant strategies that can “flip the script” on an adversary’s propaganda. 

(5) Strategic Foresight: This element breaks Iran’s “long game” advantage by shifting the U.S. focus from short-term reactions to long-term competition, allowing planners to anticipate future conflict domains and build strategic patience. 

Defeating our adversaries in the gray zone is a cognitive, not purely a kinetic, challenge. To achieve the Department of War’s goal of decisive lethality, we must first win the war of ideas. The time has come for U.S. military leaders to stop treating information as a supporting effort and recognize it as the central battlefield in modern competition. This requires a deliberate, sustained investment in the intellectual and cultural readiness of our warfighters. We must integrate cognitive frameworks like the Olympus Mons model into professional military education and operational planning. This is not just about improving human decision-making today; it is about future-proofing our force. The structured, logic-based nature of this model is the most compatible framework for integration with the Information Advantage large language models that will define the next generation of warfare, allowing our warfighters to serve as the critical ‘human-in-the-loop’ for AI-enabled operations in the information environment. 

The character of conflict is evolving, but the core of American strength, the ingenuity and adaptability of its warfighters, remains unchanged. The next generation of warfare will not be won by military might and technology alone, but by those who can master the cognitive battlefield of the Operational Information Environment which includes the complex human terrain where influence is wielded and will is broken. Frameworks like the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model do not replace the warrior’s ethos; they sharpen it, forging leaders who can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-compete our adversaries in the war of ideas. Seizing this cognitive high ground is the ultimate expression of ‘peace through strength.’ The tools to build this future are within our grasp; what is required now is the vision and the will to forge the victory of tomorrow. 

Oshawn Jefferson is a national security professional and strategic communication expert with over two decades of experience in the U.S. military and academic sectors. He is the creator of the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model and a leading voice on developing cognitive readiness and a global mindset within the Joint Force. The views of the author are his own. 

Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.

Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.

A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and strategic autonomy. Within this context, Turkey’s declared goal to develop long-range ballistic capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.

We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.

Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either restrict access to advanced weapons capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with arms embargoes, sanctions, and restrictions imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey’s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.

Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.

Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its National Technology Initiative, is part of a larger investment in civilian space and satellite launch initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in Somalia, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.

Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by Turkish officials criticizing the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM capable of carrying a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.

The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and develop its own nuclear capabilities—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its new doctrine of “forward deterrence,” which advocates for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both Poland and Germany have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.

At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.

Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.

Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy was originally published on Global Security Review.

For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements and prioritized military readiness in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel’s aggression nor Iran’s ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States’ changing focus in the Middle East, it will end up losing more than its economic potency and military confidence. It will lose the ability to arrange the chessboard.

The inability of the Arab world to synchronize with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Is staying mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?

To mitigate conflict spillovers, the Arab nations have prioritized active defense investments and air denial practices. Systematic defense procurements have streamlined their multi-domain operations to prevent entanglements, but out-spying Iran’s asymmetric warfighting or Israel’s intelligence warfare remains a political test. Israel’s intelligence directives of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlight the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA’s defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not synchronizing against a common enemy caused several problems: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world’s warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous productions of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic connections existing as a starting point, the underlying factors of alliance fragmentation have increased.

Consistent strategic differences are fracturing the prospects of political reconciliation and strategic retrospection. Facing multiple power projectors, shared security architecture has reshaped how the geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA’s high-fliers see this geography without one dominant actor. This vacuum has yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf’s current strategy to combine deterrence with diplomacy has been met with historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its fair share of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness to arrange the Middle East offers a

complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a cohesive block from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theater.

Israel’s versatile intelligence alters political entanglements for the Gulf. It introduced a hybrid wave of targeted psychological operations (PSYOPS). The open presence of Israel’s intelligence in the Middle East has resulted in its neighbors’ doctrinal fatigue. This ‘eye in the sky’ layering impacts the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA’s doctrinal postures. It pushes the Persian Gulf to enhance battlespace in three settings: Iran’s predictive intelligence, the Gulf’s threat assessment, and integrated weapons systems. Still, the absence of collective military intelligence and interoperability is glaring.

To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a threefold approach, by formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to succeed in collectively preserving power, let alone projecting it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) strategic behavior was observed. It preferred personalized military innovations and investments, while securing inter-regional strategic alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Tukey to the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the disconnected objectives. However, the Gulf’s common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios for a future strategy.

First, to become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making Five Eyes a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, to continue investing in personalized, ad-hoc security investments before active defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy provided the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the previous geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was the rump administration’s idea to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt’s withdrawal soured the idea MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.

Currently the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA. It has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding common ground remains an Achilles ‘ heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from inter-regional coalition lessons is one go-to strategy.

Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He has published his work in the Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, and the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). The views of the author are his own.

A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

The amalgamation of emerging technologies and nuclear weapons systems is significantly impacting the landscape of strategic stability. The primary problem associated with such technologies is their dual-use nature, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyper sonics, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. These technologies are evolving more rapidly than the treaties meant to regulate them.

The most significant emerging technology is Artificial Intelligence (AI), a prominent dual-use disruptor. In the civilian domain, it can help process large amounts of data based on its training. Meanwhile, in the nuclear domain, it affects among other things, the nuclear decision making process.

The U.S. is currently considering incorporating AI into its NC3 modernization process while maintaining a human-in-the-loop policy for launches, using AI to monitor abnormal patterns in adversary movements. Russia, on the other hand, is developing AI-driven upgrades to its automated retaliatory strike system to ensure that if the country’s leadership is decapitated, the system can autonomously verify a nuclear strike via seismic and radiation sensors before launching a retaliatory strike. These change decision timing and the deterrence dynamic.

The incorporation of hypersonic technology into delivery vehicles has revolutionized the exchange of weapons in warfare. The speed at which hypersonic systems travel can exceed Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound), potentially inducing miscalculation for an adversary, since it compresses the time window to clearly assess whether a missile is conventional or nuclear. In late 2024 and early 2025, India tested its Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) technology. Since these vehicles travel at such high speeds and at low altitudes with the ability to maneuver, it impacts the deterrence strategy between two nuclear countries. In response, Pakistan accelerated the Fatah series missiles, which are designed as flat-trajectory rockets. The geographical proximity of India and Pakistan compresses the decision-making window during a crisis.

The world’s largest naval force, the U.S. navy, is currently integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic system onto Zumwalt-class destroyers. A Zumwalt-class ship may appear as a nuclear threat on radar but carries conventional weapons, risking warhead ambiguity for an adversary who might launch a nuclear strike if provoked. The recent exchange of delivery vehicles during the Iran and Israel conflict of 2024-2025 has shown the effect of hypersonic missiles in military operations. Iran used the Fattah-2 hypersonic missile, capable of Mach 5+ speeds with mid-flight maneuverability. Such weapon-delivery systems create strategic ambiguity for the adversary because they provide only a few seconds’ window to decide whether to retaliate with conventional or nuclear missiles.

Advancements in quantum computing change warfare by providing more powerful algorithms producing vulnerabilities in secure systems. Nuclear launch codes, for example, are considered among the most secure encryption systems, which cannot be broken by classical computer methods. However, with advanced quantum computing methods, they become more vulnerable to hacking.

Additionally, Quantum sensing, which is facilitated with quantum electronic systems, allow for detection of minute changes in gravity or magnetic fields, which could produce systems that detect submarines, reducing their element of surprise. For example, China has made a huge leap by developing Quantum SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) sensors. These devices may be able to detect the magnetic signature of US Ohio-class stealth submarines from miles away, threatening the ultimate nuclear deterrent.

Cyber warfare has recently moved to the forefront of modern warfare tactics with potential impacts on nuclear deterrence. Cyber warfare may produce uncertainties due to disruption of detection mechanisms and nuclear command and control that could produce unstable strategic situations. The classic Cold War model of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was based on the visible, slow-moving, threat of nuclear weapons exchange. Cyber warfare introduces complexity and confusion. Thus, the deliberate nature of threats; instead, may instigate miscalculations driven by algorithms or false cyber signals.

A good example of how cyber operations can offset traditional military operations was the venture to physically damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges using malicious software (malware). The operation was carried out using Stuxnet malware installed from a USB drive that destroyed centrifuges without a single kinetic device. Similarly, Russian hackers have been carrying out cyber-attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and government agencies since 2015. Vis-à-vis in 2025, during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian intelligence conducted a cyber-operation shutting down the Russian railway and affecting digital infrastructure.

A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. During the height of the May 2025 crisis between the two South Asian rivals, cyber operations were at their peak. Consequently, in the post-crisis scenario, India is enhancing its cyber deterrence. In future conflicts, any state’s cyber space will be one of the primary targets; in a scenario where lines are already blurred, a single attempt to disrupt the cyber space of NC3 could be the initiating point of nuclear escalation.

The evolution of dual-use emerging technologies is fundamentally changing the traditional pillars of nuclear deterrence by compressing the action/reaction time required for rational decision-making. A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. In the volatile context of South Asia, dual-use technologies appear to destabilize a fragile strategic stability.

Ultimately, as machines outpace human thought in the decision loop, there is a danger that the resulting disruption is not just a technological arms race but the erosion of human-centric control, creating the risk of an accidental, algorithmically driven nuclear escalation as the defining strategic challenge of the future.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta. He can be reached at: usama.khalid.uk456@gmail.com. The views of the author are his own.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2022, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, it did not domestically produce any Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drones. They initially purchased a small quantity (up to around 6000) from Iran and quickly set their sights on building manufacturing plants. By 2023 they had the Alabuga drone factory where they were able to produce around 200 Geran-2 drones per month. In 2024, they saw a major increase in production and by December of that year it was reported that they were able to produce up to 2000 Geran-2 drones per month. By May of last year, Russia’s production capacity was up to around 2700 Geran-2 drones and another 2500 ‘simulator’ drones used to overwhelm air defenses in a single month (according to Ukrainian intelligence), and production is likely to increase further.

Mass production of these drones has changed what it means to be ‘war ready.’ A massive reduction in Iran’s arsenal of missiles, air capabilities, and ground capabilities would weaken the regime but Trump’s pronouncement should not convince anyone they are no longer a threat. If Iran follows Russia’s blueprint, even heavy losses today are unlikely to prevent them from sustaining a long campaign of drone attacks tomorrow.

Besides, Iran’s strategy is to delay. They retain the ability to threaten American bases in the Gulf, as well as Gulf allies, with their current stockpile of drones and missiles. From almost anywhere in Southern or Central Iran they can launch a Shahed which could reach the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that even if missile and naval drone production slows, they will continue to threaten global trade flows, should the status quo continue.

Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine should have shown to the United States what modern war looks like, and how a state can remain a threat at a low cost. Iran is more than capable of continuing this conflict, and their recent statements reaffirming their lack of interest in diplomacy a makes that clear.

Iran’s current stockpile of Shahed-136 drones has not been made public. Before the war started, estimates indicated it could be up to around 80,000 drones. Considering Russia’s demonstrated ability to create and grow a drone industry whilst at war, there is no reason Iran’s drone industry will not grow similarly. Between 2023 and 2025 Russia’s Geran-2 drone production grew by 1250%. Iran will not require this level of growth and is in a better placed position to start having produced a significant quantity of these drones.

The significance of this threat lies in the unique importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy. A sizable portion (around 25%) of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, so even limited disruptions can have huge consequences for energy prices. Crucially, Iran does not need to secure a complete shutdown of the Strait to achieve its aims, as even the threat of attacking merchant ships drives insurance premiums and forces ships to reroute. By demonstrating that the Strait can be reached, Iran has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and can maintain this very atmosphere without their arsenal of long-range missiles by building Shahed-136 drones. In this instance, drones are not strictly a military asset, but a way of exerting economic pressure on adversaries.

Securing the Strait of Hormuz to a point of trade continuation will prove to be almost impossible without either a negotiated settlement or a complete capitulation from the Iranian regime. If during this conflict Iran retains even a small portion of their current Shahed-136 stockpile, or the ability to manufacture them, then ships passing through the Strait cannot be guaranteed safe travel.

In short, claims that the Iranian threat has been significantly reduced are short sighted and ignore many of their existing capabilities. Their existing missile stockpile, combined with their production capacity, means that even heavy strikes will not eliminate their ability to project their power across the region. Just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, modern warfare requires cheap and easily mass-produced systems and Iran is very well positioned to meet these requirements. Until a diplomatic solution is reached, or the Iranian regime is somehow forced to end their war efforts, the threat to world trade and to the world energy market will persist.

Raphael Chiswick writes on Diplomacy, International Security, and the Defense Industry. He is based in the United Kingdom. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Shaheds to Strait Control: Why Iran Can Still Influence Global Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The seminar stressed a forward-looking discussion on next steps for policymakers, including the reimplementation of sanctions, the role of intelligence and satellite monitoring, and the need for a more enforceable agreement that addresses both enrichment and missile development.

HS-Iran’s Nuclear Crossroads: Strategic Risks, Diplomatic Dilemmas with Sarah Burkhard/Olli Heinonen was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

So sure was Israel in its southern security that intelligence reports were downplayed; the military even redeployed troops from Gaza prior to the October 7. The brutality of the attack and horror at the hostage crisis left Israel so shocked that it delayed a ground invasion for 20 days.

Despite the delay, calls for ceasefire and accusations of genocide existed before Israel’s offensive began. All the same, every first-semester international relations student knew what would happen next: with Hamas no longer deterred, Israel’s only recourse was compellence.

Compellence theory is simply acting on the threat that keeps your adversary deterred. Israel needed to compel Hamas to surrender the hostages, disarm, and realize that attacking Israel is a bad idea—restoring deterrence. For nearly two years since, Israel has tested compellence theory; at best, with mixed results, not only with Hamas, but across the region.

The Lebanese terror group Hezbollah launched its own attack on October 8, 2023, which by the end saw the launch of approximately 10,000–15,000 rockets and 2,500 drone attacks that displaced at least 70,000 Israelis and killed 75 soldiers and 45 civilians. Israel’s effort to restore deterrence devastated Hezbollah, killing 2,500–3,000 fighters, eliminating the majority of its leadership, through an exploding beeper attack in advance of a ground invasion. Seeing their losses, the group agreed to partially disarm and stay out of further hostilities, being effectively compelled.

In Yemen, the Houthis likewise joined the attack on Israel with rocket and drone attacks, as well as targeting ships off its coast, causing significant supply-chain disruptions. The attacks prompted the United States (US) to designate them a terrorist group and launch an aerial campaign alongside the United Kingdom—on top of Israel’s responses.

The Houthis endured severe damage to its offensive infrastructure and lost hundreds of fighters but still managed to occasionally launch limited attacks. The Houthis are more weakened than compelled.

Iran, the financier of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, for the first time acted against Israel directly. Retaliating against Israeli strikes, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone salvos against Israel in April and October of 2024. The tit-for-tat came to a head over 12 days in June 2025, as the two exchanged strikes while Israel tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Though the damage Iran’s nuclear capability took is debated, what is known is Israel’s air superiority destroyed nearly all of Iran’s defense framework and eliminated several senior military staff.

Israel endured significant damage as Iran managed to breach its defenses on a few occasions, and the two have since agreed to a ceasefire, while simultaneously pledging readiness to attack in the future. So perhaps, they are mutually deterred for now.

Syria recently entered a new phase of its civil war following the downfall of Assad, an Israeli push to expand its buffer region, and the emergence of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction. HTS is led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, an Islamic State affiliate who recently began targeting members of Syria’s minority populations, largely the Druze.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze, striking HTS sites until Julani quickly agreed to withdraw his troops from the Druze-populated areas. Prior to that intervention, there were rumors of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. While compellence worked to protect the Druze in the short term, it may have derailed a long-term peace deal.

Hamas remains the outlier. Ceasefire talks are again looking to collapse. The message is that despite the devastation, loss of leadership, approximately 17,000 lost fighters, and thousands of civilians killed in the crossfire, it can endure more. Israel’s attempt at compellence was so intense, that it sparked worldwide protests and allegations of genocide. Yet, rather than agree to Israel’s terms, Hamas continues to hold out, giving a statement that they will continue to fight until a Palestinian state is established.

The US attempted to broker multiple ceasefires, with some success in November 2023 and January 2025, but a deal to end the conflict remains elusive. If the US wants real results, compellence should target Hamas’ hosts and financiers, Turkey and Qatar.

While publicly on good terms with the US, the argument that Turkey and Qatar are state sponsors of terrorism would not be difficult to make given the support and protection they have offered Hamas. President Trump could threaten to add Turkey and Qatar to the list of state sponsors of terror unless Hamas agrees to Israel’s terms of ending the war.

There are indications that this could work. At least publicly, the two countries recently joined with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a call on Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This is a good first step, but the call has no “or else”–type clause that would actually pressure Hamas.

With that support gone, Hamas’ political leadership’s only choice would be deportation from its hosts which would likely jeopardize their finances and potentially put them within Mossad’s reach or accede to Israel’s conditions. Ever self-interested, the hope is they would be compelled to the latter. This type of diplomatic pressure directed at Hamas’ sponsors could trickle down to Hamas’ leadership and potentially be the last best hope for Gazan civilians as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signals plans for a renewed military offensive in the enclave.

Whether deterrence is restored by Israel is yet to be determined. For the sake of civilians on both sides, let us hope it is restored and soon.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, states pursued nuclear weapons under the protective assumption that deterrence begins once a program reaches maturity; that is, when nuclear devices are assembled, tested, or deployed. To some extent all nine nuclear weapon states achieved that level of deterrent threshold during their proliferation stages. Iran had not achieved such maturity. Furthermore, when looking at the region historically the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and the 2007 strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar site both hinted at a willingness on the Israelis’ part to act preemptively to stop regional proliferators.

But the scale and coordination of this most recent strike go further. It sends a global message that enrichment facilities themselves, when capable of being targeted and penetrated by American GBU-57 bombs, inherently means that once you are closing in on enrichment, your facilities are fair game. This will be the truest when referring to adversaries of the US and its alliance network. It remains to be seen what would take place if an ally of the US were to proliferate nuclear weapons in this modern era without its consent.

This shift has profound implications for the future of proliferation. Any adversarial state aspiring to build nuclear weapons will now face a new strategic prerequisite: it must first develop the defensive capability to withstand a preemptive strike before it can even hope to proliferate successfully. That means constructing extensive, deeply buried underground facilities, tunnel networks, and hardened bunkers. They must be capable of surviving the US military’s most sophisticated bunker-busting munitions. It also means investing in robust air defenses, redundancy, deception, and a level of operational secrecy that rivals the most advanced intelligence agencies in the world.

Not every state can afford this. Proliferation is already an expensive and politically risky endeavor. The need to develop advanced passive defenses only compounds those challenges. Most would-be proliferators simply will not have the financial or technical wherewithal to defend their nuclear infrastructure at such a level, especially in the early, vulnerable stages of enrichment.

Iran, of course, will likely try again. The Islamic Republic has proven resilient, adaptive, and committed to achieving strategic parity with its adversaries. Unless it develops an indigenous system of defenses that can shield its critical infrastructure from aerial bombardment, future attempts will likely meet the same fate as the current one. Even if Iran builds bunkers and tunnel systems deep enough to shield its centrifuges, it will still face challenges of concealment, resource constraints, and foreign intelligence penetration.

The broader lesson here is stark; the window of opportunity for slow, open, or vulnerable proliferation may be closing. In the post Iran–strike era, nuclear aspirants will have to prepare for war before they prepare for the bomb. The cost of entry into the nuclear club has just gone up, not only in material terms but in strategic risk. Any state hoping to proliferate must now assume it will be struck before it succeeds.

This may serve to slow the pace of proliferation, but it could also make it more dangerous. Proliferators who internalize the lessons of the Iran strike may respond with greater urgency, opacity, and desperation. They may forgo the traditional step-by-step approach in favor of crash programs hidden deep underground or even move toward asymmetric hedging strategies that involve acquiring key technologies without crossing visible red lines. In such an environment, the risk of miscalculation on all sides grows.

The strike on Iran may therefore reduce the number of proliferators in the long run. But for those that do try, the game has certainly changed. As Stephen Cimbala recently argued, the precedent set by the Midnight Hammer strike on Iran should not be viewed in isolation. It marks a return to kinetic counter-proliferation under conditions of rising global instability, where deterrence is increasingly challenged by uncertainty and misperception.

In parallel, Peter Huessy emphasizes that restoring deterrence requires more than just missile defense or military strikes; it demands clarity of will and credible commitment to prevent nuclear breakout by adversaries.

Together, their analyses suggest that the US-Israel strike was not just about denying Iran the bomb, but it was also about reestablishing the normative firebreak against nuclear proliferation. The broader message is unambiguous: in an era where deterrence is fraying, those who wish to proliferate must now calculate not only how to build a bomb, but also how to survive the storm that will precede it.

If Iran is the test case, the future of proliferation will be shaped as much by preemption as by prevention, and only those with the means to withstand a midnight hammer will have any chance at joining the nuclear club. From now on, the path to the bomb runs through the rubble of facilities like Natanz and Fordow, and only the most prepared will make it out the other side.

Aaron Holland is a PhD Student at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed are the author’s own.

How US and Israeli Attacks on Iran Will Reshape the Future of Nuclear Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic Drivers

There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in Gaza and its persistent pressure on disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.

Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable rifts in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.

Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.

Operational Indicators of Preparation

Mossad has already intensified intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from within Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.

Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force regeneration, given the apparent contradiction between political calls for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.

At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s formation of a National Defense Council under Ali Larijani and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.

Political Leverage and Timing

US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.

Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is coordinating with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.

The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept

Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.

However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah vowed not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.

International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment

Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.

Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.

Forecast and Likely Outcomes

Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.

If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.

While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.

Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.

Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for Global Security Review.

Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid ordered by US President Donald Trump took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.

Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, bunkers busters, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.

Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.

Israeli and American space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the Ofek, AMOS, and Eros-B space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely linked its space program to the IRGC.

With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems, and ground-based radars like the EL/M-2080 Green Pine with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.

Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems pit Unit 8200 against IRGC affiliated cyber units.

Israel’s missile shield includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-2/Arrow-3. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle Iranian ballistic missiles such as Fattah, Shahab, and Sejil. Iron Beam laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.

Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US Central Command and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. Aegis ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) systems in the region share radar feeds. American space-based infra-red system satellites provide missile-launch detection.

Bahrain hosts the US Navy and supports regional C4ISR, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in Tabuk to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing with the US and Israel. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.

Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4 identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the April 2024 and October 2024 Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.

A space-enabled Israel, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.

Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.

It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian taqiyya-driven regime and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond.

Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is déjà vu.

In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, the Iranian endgame may take different forms.

Yes, President Trump decisively played the hand he was dealt. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.

Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Adam, Curtis, and Jim tackle a bold and unsettling question:
After America’s successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, is the U.S. truly prepared to defend its nuclear arsenal?

This conversation dives deep into the heart of nuclear strategy and deterrence:

• The critical role of airborne alert systems and the lessons of the Looking Glass mission.
• The tension between traditional deterrence systems and emerging technologies.
• Why visibility, command, and control remain the pillars of credible nuclear deterrence.
• How modernization of nuclear forces shapes the future of U.S. security.

In an age of rapid technological change, understanding deterrence isn’t just for policymakers—it’s vital for anyone who values global stability.

Listen now to uncover why the strength of deterrence rests not just on weapons, but on resilient systems and clear strategy.

#NuclearDeterrence #NationalSecurity #Modernization #CommandAndControl #StrategicStability #DefenseInnovation

Watch now.

Is America Prepared for a Strike Against its Nuclear Command and Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The talk challenges conventional thinking and calls for renewed strategic clarity in deterring nuclear proliferation threats.

Huessy Seminar: After Iran, What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? with Henry Sokolski was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined.  Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

There also remained unsettled issues relative to American and allied strategy going forward. The Trump administration’s declaratory policy wants to draw a line between going to war with Iran, on one hand, and neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and potential, on the other.  This is a fine line to draw and Iran response, and follow-on condemnations, suggest they see the American position as a distinction without a difference.

Ater the strikes, President Trump indicated that Iran should come to the diplomatic table and negotiate the status of its nuclear future. Iran rejected further negotiations. This left the American and Israeli defense communities to await whatever diplomatic or military response the Iranians offered, including possible military attacks against American forces deployed in the Middle East.

Based on experience, Iran would likely respond with continuing missile strikes against Israel and asymmetrical warfare against the United States. With regard to the latter, Iran’s options included: (1) disrupting the flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; (2) committing cyberattacks against American military or societal targets; (3) committing missile or insurgent attacks against American military personnel in Iraq or elsewhere in the region; (4) supporting protest demonstrations or terrorism in the American homeland, perhaps making use of prepositioned cells made up of illegal aliens; and/or (5) encouraging Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to further harass American, Israeli, and allied interests.

Thus far, Iran limited its response to employing a small number of missiles against Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, even giving the Americans advance warning of the strike. For the Trump administration, this is the best possible outcome. Already, imagery intelligence suggests Iran is digging out its capabilities at Fordow and Esfahan. What the future may hold is uncertain. Whether Iran is simply buying time and learning lessons for future success or whether the regime truly desires peace is up in the air.

Future options for Iran have their positives and negatives. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy, which needs the infusion of cash from oil sales to China.

Cyberattacks are a low-risk, low-cost option that may appeal to Iran in the near term, but they present a more serious potential threat to civilian targets compared to more heavily defended military ones. They will also draw severe reprisals from very competent American and Israeli cyber forces.

Additional attacks against American military personnel and facilities in Iraq are an option, as are missile or unconventional warfare against other regional states hosting American military bases. However, this path was not successful the first time.

Support for antiwar demonstrations or outright terrorism in the American homeland, including “lone wolf” terrorists recruited online, are still a possibility. New stories of Iranian illegal aliens arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are almost a daily occurrence.

As for Iranian proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah are on the ropes, momentarily, due to prior engagements with Israel, but the Houthis declared their intention to plus-up their disruptions of commerce in the Red Sea in the wake of Midnight Hammer. Whether this is possible is yet to be seen.

With respect to Iran’s future nuclear options and American responses, they may proceed in one of three ways: (1) a continuing “whack-a-mole” competition in which Iran continues surreptitious enrichment and the US and Israel continue to monitor its progress and, if necessary, repeat Midnight Hammer, or worse; (2) Iran undergoes a change of regime due to domestic opposition, leaving uncertain for a time exactly who is in charge and who controls the supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear infrastructure, never mind the armed forces and security police; or (3) Iran agrees to negotiate with the US and representatives of the international community another deal to limit its stockpiles of fissile material and its levels of enrichment.

These are possible options, but by no means the only options. Iran may pursue an unexpected path in an effort to outthink the United States and Israel. Whatever the future holds, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must keep a close eye on a regime that is built on destroying both countries. Hope is critical to human perseverance, but it is not a strategy.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine. He is currently a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Midnight Hammer and After was originally published on Global Security Review.

The containers were then placed far inside Russia before launching the drones. One hundred seventeen drones were able to strike targets up to 2,500 miles away from Ukrainian territory. The hurdle of communicating with the drones and powering them was accomplished with local SIM cards and solar panels.

While the results are disputed, many Russian aircraft were damaged at a significant cost, especially since production lines for many of Russia’s bombers shut down decades ago. There is also the cost of embarrassment and the concern that Russia cannot protect its forces from drone threats. Understandably, there may be a concern that a similar follow-on attack is likely.

Those fears were proven correct, but in another country—Iran. Israel was able to strike numerous military and nuclear installations, as well as target specific individuals in air strikes throughout Iran, with minimal resistance and no known losses.

Despite Israel being only hours into a purported weeklong operation, they revealed they had a network within Iran that used drones to incapacitate anti-air defenses.

Incorporating covert use of drones into suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) doctrine is a critical development in air warfare. While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used in SEAD was theorized, this is the first time it was employed for that purpose. Unlike Ukraine, Israel used personnel within Iran to operate the drones. While increasing risk to their operatives, it most likely allowed more precise control of pre-placement and planning and minimized communications that could be intercepted or disrupted.

In the future, it is likely that covert pre-placement and distant operation will be used to “shape the environment” for more conventional strikes and attacks. The hurdles to overcome are power supply, detection, and communication. There is also the need to overcome any particular anti-drone technology that may exist.

Regardless, use of drones as a preliminary and surprise strike weapon works. It is a threat that will work particularly well against soft targets as well as military targets. While the US needs to develop its own capabilities, and fast, it absolutely needs to prioritize defeating drones and defending infrastructure from them. Whether they are pre-programmed or operated by fiber optics, radio, or lasers, the US must develop affordable ways to stop them.

The days of relying on a handful of military police to guard installations at home should have ended on September 11, 2001. In some cases, it did, but in others it did not. In the civil sector, not much has changed despite the increasing threat environment.

There are additional challenges that make attacks like Ukraine’s asymmetric attack more likely. The United States has seen tens of millions of illegal aliens enter the country, many from nations hostile to the United States. Many that do come legally come from every background imaginable and hold various ideologies, faiths, and allegiances that are not friendly to the United States. China’s extensive use of Chinese students and work visa holders to commit industrial espionage is another example of what can be turned into a fifth column.

Additionally, with only 6 percent of cargo entering American ports facing inspection, ports are also an easy target for exploitation. And as if this were not enough, Americans also allow hostile nations to purchase land next to military installations.

It is only a matter of time until such an attack happens on American soil. A terror attack, perhaps in retaliation for the recent air strikes in Iran or by Mexican drug cartels is possible. More likely and troublesome is the use of drones in conjunction with other strikes on infrastructure and installations, all to cripple the military in advance of conflict in the Pacific. The US Air Force and Navy are particularly at risk, as air frames and ships are expensive and take time to replace. The Navy, for example, struggles to build ships and submarines.

Today, the nation’s only defense against this threat is relying on signals intelligence to intercept communications, praying for defectors, and dumb luck. This is certainly no way to plan for asymmetric threats that are predictable. The time to find solutions is now, not after the attack.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Ukraine’s Drone Attack: What It Means was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.

A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety

The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.

The memory of Iraq’s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.

Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard

Iran: A Threat Undiminished

Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.

Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The proliferation of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.

Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North

While Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school education systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to Jarabulus.

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey’s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.

Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic resets, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.

Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation

Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with Druze militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.

While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.

Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection

Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.

1. Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking

Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The Captagon crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.

Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the resurgence of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.

2. Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence

Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions relief, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s debt to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.

Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.

An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence

Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an opportunity for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.

This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.

Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty

Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.

Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.

Syria as a Forward Defense Zone

Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.

In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was a seismic event, striking a blow to both Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. While Moscow, despite its war in Ukraine and mounting Western sanctions, remains committed to its military bases, Iran’s position is far more complex. Unlike Russia, whose primary interests are geopolitical and military, Iran sees Syria as an ideological and strategic battleground central to its regional ambitions.

The de facto regime in Damascus faces an uphill battle in asserting control over a fragmented and failing state. Recent upheavals have occurred, with over a thousand, including civilians, killed in Latakia and other coastal cities. These are historical Alawite strongholds, which highlights the government’s fragile grasp on power. These disturbances, fuelled by remnants of Assad’s rule, cannot be subdued through isolated security operations or curfews alone. They expose a deeper dissatisfaction that neither Damascus nor its external backer, Turkey, can easily suppress.

Despite its opposition to a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, Iran, as a Shia’ state, retains influence over the Alawite community—the backbone of Assad’s former regime. Tehran cultivated religious and political alliances with the Alawites, ensuring that its ideological footprint in Syria endures, even as the political landscape shifts.

The situation is further inflamed by the transitional constitution, which upholds Syria’s identity as the “Syrian Arab Republic”—denying the existence of non-Arab nationalities and imposing a Muslim president with near-absolute authority and Islamic law as “a main source” of legislation. This exclusionary framework was rejected by Kurds and Druze alike, who view it as a mere continuation of Assad’s rule, now under a Sunni Islamist veneer. The brutal repression that has accompanied the regime’s efforts to enforce this new order, resulting in thousands of civilian and military deaths, only fuels further opposition.

In southern Syria, the Druze, long wary of both Sunni Islamist factions and Iranian hegemony, are positioning themselves to consolidate local autonomy. Under Israel’s umbrella, the Druze are unlikely to align with any single faction, instead leveraging their position for greater self-rule. Meanwhile, Israel maintains a watchful eye on the evolving situation, preserving its military presence in the south of Syria. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, an extremist Sunni regime in Damascus presents a far greater security threat than a Shi’a-dominated government, making Israel’s calculations in Syria more complex than ever.

For Turkey, the evolving situation presents both opportunities and challenges. While Ankara may find common cause with Sunni factions seeking to assert dominance over Syria, it will remain constrained by Iran’s interests. Iran deeply embedded itself in Syria’s military, economic, and political structures, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) playing a pivotal role in shaping the previous regime’s policies. Iran has sacrificed thousands of Quds and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces and billions of dollars in Syria. Iran made significant efforts to keep Assad in power and no one can imagine that Tehran will simply walk away and abandon its investment.

The Iranian regime followed this strategy before. After eight years of war with Iraq and massive losses, it steadily expanded its influence over Iraq’s Shi’a sector. Even after the fall of Saddam and the rise of ISIS, Iran established military proxies, ensuring that Iraq remained unstable.

Through control over Shi’a political parties, it works to suppress the Kurdistan Regional Government and keep the Sunnis weak. Those with a stake in Syria’s future should expect a similar Iranian strategy, this time through the Alawites. Iran will seek an opportune moment to replicate the strategy and will not allow Turkey, which has invested significantly less in Syria, to reap the political and economic benefits that Syria offers.

Looking forward, Syria’s future will be shaped by the competing interests of regional and global actors, each pursuing their own trajectories. The western part of the country, where the new regime struggles to consolidate power, will remain a flashpoint for unrest. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze-controlled territories are likely to maintain relative stability. The Kurdish forces, with their well-organized military and political structures, have effectively consolidated power, establishing governance mechanisms independent of Damascus.

Israel has little incentive to back any radical transformation that could empower hostile factions. What remains undeniable, however, is that the new regime in Damascus lacks the capacity to curb Iran’s entrenched influence. Tehran has invested too much in blood and resources to relinquish its foothold.

In the ever-shifting sands of Syrian politics, Iran remains a force—one that neither Turkey nor the new rulers in Damascus should ignore as its axis of resistance has the potential to reshape itself—as evidenced by the conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus and Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran’s ally, Russia, continues to maintain bases in the Alawite-controlled region, which leaves the Russians ever a concern.

Loqman Radpey, PhD, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the international legal and political dimensions of the right to self-determination for peoples and nations, including the case of Kurdistan. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law.

Iran Can Reconfigure Its Foothold in Post-Assad Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

A new version, the Shahed-136B, is available for use in conflict. With an extended range of 4,000 kilometers, the increasing capability of Iran’s long-range drone raises important strategic questions as this weapon’s potential uses beyond Ukraine are considered. Consider Iran’s potential response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, should the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Shahed-136 in the Russia-Ukraine War

Iran is supplying the Shahed-136 to Russia as supply of the drone is available. Russia often uses the drone to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and military positions. The design of this Shahed-136 allows it to bypass traditional air defense systems due to its low radar cross-section and ability to deploy in swarms—ensuring the drone will always get through, at least some portion.

Military officials in Ukraine and the West identified the Shahed-136 as a persistent and cost-effective threat capable of overwhelming advanced air defense systems. In the case of the Shahad-136, quantity has a quality all its own. Russia’s use of this drone is giving Iran valuable battlefield data that allows designers to refine and improve the capabilities of the Shahed-136B, which is proving an even more lethal weapon.

Strategic Implications in a US-Iran Conflict

If tensions between the US and Iran escalate—particularly if the US conducts strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites—the Shahed-136B could become a key component of Iran’s retaliation strategy. With a 4,000-kilometer range, the Shahad-136B has the potential to strike American strategic assets across the region. With a large American presence spread across the Middle East, there are a large number of Americans and military targets that would make inviting targets. Although the Shahed-136B does not have the legs to strike targets beyond Southern Europe and the Middle East, the number of American bases and assets within the drone’s striking radius are significant.

Iran may also try to launch attacks from unfriendly nations in the Western hemisphere like Cuba or Venezuela or even work with Mexican drug cartels. This proximity, should such an approach work, could allow for attacks on critical targets in the United States. Iran believes the United States is seeking regime change, which will lead the regime to see any fight as a fight for survival.

While military analysts can debate the effectiveness and impact of such a response, the psychological effect achieved is significant. Israelis, for example, live in constant fear of attack from the air. An American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or other assets would surely elicit an Iranian attack from Iran’s most advanced capabilities.

Iran has a sophisticated network of asymmetric capabilities that extend across the Middle East and Europe. This means any direct confrontation with Tehran could lead to severe and unpredictable consequences for American security. Ensuring Iran does not field a nuclear weapon may be worth the risk of an Iranian response, but it is certainly unknown just how Iran may respond and how effectively the United States and its allies can limit the effect of any response.

Rather than pushing the region toward war, President Donald Trump, who presents himself as a pragmatic negotiator, should consider engaging Iran in constructive dialogue. Despite the difficulties in recent efforts by President Trump to work with the Iranian regime, a return to diplomacy could prevent a devastating conflict that neither side can afford.

Keep in mind, the regime in Tehran feels the United States is attempting to end the regime. The desire for nuclear weapons was spurred by American forces in Iraq, Iran’s western neighbor, and Afghanistan, Iran’s northern neighbor. Ratcheting down tensions will require an American effort to create a sense of security within the Iranian leadership.

While the Shahed-136B is not the only tool in Iran’s toolkit, it is an example of the growing capability fielded by Iran. It is also a strategic consideration for the United States. Iran is unlikely to let any attack go unanswered.

Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash is an independent defense analyst in Tehran.

Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why You Need This Report

The ICBM EAR (Emerging Affairs Report) for the Week of March 3, 2025, prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geo-Strategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, offers an authoritative, real-time assessment of critical defense and strategic developments impacting U.S. national security. This report consolidates essential intelligence and policy analysis on ICBM modernization, homeland missile defense, congressional budget battles, strategic threats from China, Russia, and Iran, and broader global deterrence dynamics.

As global threats intensify, policymakers, defense professionals, and industry leaders need a consolidated, insightful briefing to navigate the shifting landscape of great power competition and nuclear deterrence strategy. This report delivers precisely that—essential updates, expert commentary, and strategic foresight that decision-makers cannot afford to overlook.

Key Themes & Strategic Insights

1. Critical Developments in Homeland Missile Defense & Nuclear Deterrence

• The “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative, backed by congressional leaders and STRATCOM, underscores a growing commitment to protecting the U.S. homeland from emerging missile threats.
• General Alvin, USAF Chief of Staff, affirms the Air Force’s pivotal role in nuclear deterrence and missile defense, reinforcing its responsibility for two-thirds of the nuclear triad and three-fourths of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3).
• Upcoming ICBM infrastructure modernization at Vandenberg Space Force Base highlights the urgency of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent against adversarial advancements.

2. Congressional & Budgetary Realities Impacting National Defense

• As the FY25 budget debate intensifies, the threat of a yearlong Continuing Resolution (CR) poses risks to defense funding, potentially leaving the U.S. military underfunded by $8 billion below proposed levels.
• Misinformation regarding an “8% defense cut” is addressed—while no drastic cuts are proposed, funding reallocations emphasize priority programs like Sentinel ICBM modernization and Columbia-class submarines.
• With a $2 trillion annual deficit, balancing national security needs with fiscal realities remains a critical challenge.

3. Growing Threats from China, Russia, and Iran

• China’s defense budget expands by 7.2%, accelerating military modernization, expanding nuclear capabilities, and strengthening island chain defenses in the Pacific.
• Russia’s Arctic militarization, border buildups, and nuclear brinkmanship highlight its continued push for strategic dominance.
• Iran’s sevenfold increase in highly enriched uranium (HEU) production, coupled with escalating proxy conflicts, presents a growing nuclear proliferation threat.
• European defense spending surge ($860 billion over four years) signals a shift in NATO’s strategic posture amidst rising concerns over Russia’s long-term objectives.

4. Global Security & Deterrence Policy: Special Reports & Expert Analyses

• Heritage Foundation’s assessment of nuclear modernization emphasizes the necessity of rebuilding U.S. strategic deterrent forces to counter the evolving nuclear threats from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran.
• Michaela Dodge’s critical review of arms control policy challenges the viability of future U.S.-Russia agreements given Russia’s record of treaty violations.
• Victor Davis Hanson debunks misconceptions about U.S. deterrence strategies, highlighting historical lessons in negotiations and military strength.

5. The Ukraine Corner: Understanding the Stakes

• Russia’s history of broken agreements, including violations of the Minsk Accords and Budapest Memorandum, justifies Ukraine’s insistence on binding security guarantees.
• European defense commitments remain uncertain, despite recent rhetoric supporting increased military readiness.
• U.S. policy under the Trump administration seeks to reshape geopolitical alignments, reduce Middle East entanglements, and focus on countering China.

ICBM EAR Week of March 3, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.

In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.

In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to conduct a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.

External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.

Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally supported by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.

Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.

Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.

With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.

Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.

The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future

The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.

Continued Fragmentation

The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.

For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.

Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has indicated that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already fears that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.

Iranian Consolidation

Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.

For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.

Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts

While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.

On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to strike most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.

The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to conduct precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on “supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.”

The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.

As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Science and education are part of strategic ties in recent years. The “Program of educational cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the State of Israel for the years 2023-2026” forms the basis for developing this vital field in mutual cooperation. As Azerbaijan strives to reform its education system in order to make schools future-ready and sci-tech focused, it benefits greatly from the exchange of teachers and education experts to train and learn from the Israeli experience.

Cooperation on climate change, high tech agriculture, green energy, and water are also part of the educational and scientific ties. Israel’s high-tech economy and agriculture and its experience in green energy and water desalination provide Azerbaijan a unique opportunity to diversify and develop the non-oil sector of its economy.

Cybersecurity is also part of the educational ties between the countries with staff at the Technion, a public research university based in Haifa, contributing to the training of Azerbaijani students on a cybersecurity program.

Food security with a focus on grain is another new angle in Azerbaijan-Israel ties. Israel’s food security, and specifically its requirement for grain, will be met by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, following the disruption to supplies as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war. This will be a huge boost to both Israel’s and Azerbaijan’s food security, as Azerbaijan will receive advanced technology from Israel as part of the deal.

The high level of religious tolerance and historical lack of anti-Semitism in Azerbaijan form a strong basis for people-to-people relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The village of Qırmızı Qəsəbə (Red Village) in the Quba region of Azerbaijan, home to an old community of Mountain Jews, is believed to be the world’s only all-Jewish village outside Israel and the United States. The opening of the Mountain Jews Museum in the village is also a testament to the positive role of Azerbaijan in Jewish-Muslim coexistence and the promotion of harmony and tolerance. Azerbaijani Jews form a strong bond between the people of the two countries and their significant presence in Israel also promotes bilateral ties.

An important development in the energy sector, a key part of the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel, took place in October 2023, when Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR was granted a gas exploration license alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed to explore an area north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean. This is a significant boost to SOCAR, increasing its role in the world energy market and introducing a new aspect to Azerbaijan-Israel energy cooperation. Around 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports come from Azerbaijan.

Diversification of supply and non-reliance on Arab oil has been a key component of Israeli energy security over the years. Azerbaijani oil pumped to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and transported onwards to world markets forms a major source of revenue for the Azerbaijani budget and, as such, has been crucial in the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure, armed forces, and the large-scale reconstruction in Azerbaijan’s liberated lands.

Azerbaijan’s energy policy forms the backbone of the country’s independent foreign policy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline bypasses both Russia and Iran and has proved a key asset following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Kazakh oil shipments, for example, most of which pass through Russia, have been disrupted.

Since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Iran has singled out the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as well as Azerbaijan, putting them under pressure to cut off the key crude oil supply to Israel and thereby to damage the basis for Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy.     Iran launched media propaganda against Azerbaijan. Leftist so-called nongovernmental organizations, financed by Western-donor political figures such as Greta Thunberg and Qatar-financed outlets such as the Middle East Eye, also criticized Azerbaijan.

The attacks reveal the range of political sides that are keen to damage and destroy the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. Attacks against SOCAR’s HQ in Istanbul, organized by pro-Hamas Islamists and leftists, with the tacit approval of circles within the Turkish government, were also part of the campaign.

Azerbaijan-Israel strategic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, stood firm in the face of attacks from various circles, geopolitical turbulence, and pressure. The incoming Trump administration should value Baku’s role in the energy security of Israel, the European Union, and Turkey, which are key US allies.

Azerbaijan and Israel developed the defense component of their strategic partnership over the years. Israel is one of the main sources of Azerbaijan’s defense imports and modernization of the armed forces. Azerbaijan made skilful use of Israeli defence products in liberating its lands; most notably, Israeli’s Barak 8 anti-ballistic missile defense system intercepted an Iskander missile fired from Armenia over the capital Baku.

Israel, too, stood firm in the face of pressure during the war in 2020 and did not allow third parties to influence their defense cooperation with Baku. The defense cooperation also came under extensive media attack by pro-Armenia and pro-Iran elements who consider the Azerbaijani-Israeli defense partnership a threat to their interests. Iran feared Azerbaijan’s growing role since Baku’s victory in the Karabakh war and the high-level conduct of its armed forces.

A strong Azerbaijan on its northern border is a nightmare for Iran. Tehran invested heavily for decades to keep Azerbaijan weak, but this failed badly with the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Azerbaijan-Israel defense cooperation is vital for regional security and the containment of rogue actors such as Iran, which pose an existential security threat to both countries.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Israel and Turkey appear to have inflicted a strategic defeat on Iran. Considering the strained nature of Turkish-Israel relations, due to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backing Palestinian extremist groups, it is in the interests of both Israel and Turkey not to collide in Syria and to manage the risks.

In this regard, Azerbaijan can play a key role in coordinating and reconciling both Israeli and Turkish interests to avoid confrontation in Syria. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev visited Israel in December, where he had meetings with high-level Israeli officials including Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and President Isaac Herzog. The trip was a positive development in reducing confrontational elements in Turkish-Israeli ties and keeping backchannel communications open.

It is in Azerbaijan’s interests to reconcile or at least reduce the negative atmosphere between its two key strategic partners Israel and Turkey, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role in the recent normalization process between the two countries. Baku also proposed setting up a trilateral regional format for strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey before the Hamas terrorist attack derailed the fragile Israeli-Turkish ties with Erdoğan siding with Hamas.

Overall, it is worth noting that both Azerbaijan and Israel benefit strategically from their partnership in various fields. The contribution of their relationship to the security environment of the South Caucasus and the Middle East is important as it also opens new opportunities.

The role of Azerbaijan in easing the tension in Turkish-Israel ties becomes more significant with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Azerbaijan and Israel have both stood firm during geopolitical crises, protecting their strategic ties and blocking third-party attempts to influence them, thereby proving that their partnership is reliable and mutually beneficial.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Azerbaijan-Israel Strategic Relationship Proves Its Importance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies

Key Takeaways

• Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.
• U.S. Defense Leadership Changes: Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.
• Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments: Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.
• Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran’s growing missile capability.
• Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission: NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance’s credibility.
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates: Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.

International Developments

Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion

• Russia’s military spending will increase to 13.5 trillion rubles, estimated at 7-8% of GDP, its highest post-Soviet military budget.
• Significant investments in modernized nuclear and conventional forces to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.
• Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.

Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements

• Intelligence sources indicate Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China, raising alarms among Western security analysts.
• Iran continues uranium enrichment, prompting warnings from the UN about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.

China & Russia’s Nuclear Expansion

• Reports predict that by 2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
• Concerns grow over China’s accelerated nuclear development and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.

Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon

Escalation Risks in Space Warfare

• A RAND Corporation study warns that Russia may escalate conflicts in space early due to its heightened fears of a U.S. first strike.
• The study underscores Moscow’s increasing risk tolerance and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.

Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.
• U.S. extended deterrence remains under scrutiny, with debates over whether the Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization

• The U.S. Air Force confirms that the Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.
• Discussions continue over potential mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft to ensure nuclear survivability.

‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System

• President Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.
• Critics call it overly ambitious, but proponents argue that it is essential to counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Key Events

Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)

• Speakers: Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) & Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).
• Topic: Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)

• A 4-star USAF officer will serve as the featured speaker.
• Expected discussions on extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy.

Conclusion

The ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025, highlights key developments in U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues. With Russia’s increasing military budget, Iran’s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion, the U.S. faces a growing multipolar nuclear environment. Discussions on extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events will provide further insights into these critical security matters.

ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

These domains and areas are being weaponized for strategic purposes, as adversaries target cross-domain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests with the intent of weakening the Western security architecture and fragmenting alliance cohesion. The Trump administration must work closely with NATO allies to confront the many challenges that face them.

Strategic challenges, such as the Arctic, deep sea, and space, and the threats they pose require improved joint military readiness, enhanced deterrence by denial capabilities, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

“Over the last 15 years,” writes Scott Savits, “the Arctic has become a renewed theatre of military competition…. [T]op Russian officials have referred to the Arctic as Russia’s ‘Mecca,’ and a large fraction of Russia’s economy is based on Arctic fossil fuels and minerals.” Frustrating Russian efforts to gain a strategic advantage in the Arctic is of paramount importance to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Russia gaining an advantage in the Arctic will enhance its ability to establish escalation dominance against NATO in the event of a conflict with the alliance. Deterring Russia from broadening the scope of conflict, by threatening NATO’s vital interests in the Arctic, remains critical in dissuading other adversaries, such as China, from seeking to gain similar advantage.

With China developing and deploying new detection technologies in anti-submarine warfare, American nuclear submarine capabilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to detection and targeting. China’s “Death Star” satellite claims to possess detection capabilities that renders the ocean transparent for up to 500 meters beneath the surface, putting American submarines at risk.

In the space domain, it is estimated that loss of access to space would come at a cost of roughly One billion pounds per day to the British economy. The reported deployment of Russian anti-satellite weapons systems (ASAT) in space are clearly coercive moves designed to threaten NATO’s space assets.

Russia’s weaponization of space is especially concerning as NATO depends on space to conduct an array of operations across the spectrum of deterrence and defence. Most notably, NATO airpower relies on space-based and space-dependent systems to fulfil a series of critical security functions. Leveraging robust deterrence capabilities in orbit, through targeting Russian and Chinese space-based military and non-military assets, is critical to securing NATO’s vital interests in space.

Beyond seeking strategic advantage, China is also expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate since the end of the Cold War. The Pentagon forecasts that China will be a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035. The latest figures published by the Federation of American Scientists show that China now possesses at least 500 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—up 43 percent from 2020.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to undermine international norms by persisting in threats to use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Russia also deploys dual-use satellite technologies in space, capable of carrying nuclear warheads into orbit, in direct contravention of long-standing international treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the weaponization and nuclearization of space.

Meanwhile, Iran, a latent nuclear state, coerces the West by threatening the weaponization of its nuclear program. Iran also infiltrated the West by creating extremist networks through community centers, laundering money in major European and American cities that is used by criminal gangs to plot and execute terrorist attacks.

Proxies supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, can also launch increasingly devastating attacks. Furthermore, attacks like October 7, 2024, or September 11, 2001, do not warrant nuclear retaliation. A nuclear response to a terrorist attack, depending on the attack, is likely a disproportionate response.

China and Russia also engage in subversive activities within the cyber domain, sowing discord by using disinformation, intellectual property theft, and malign interference to destabilize NATO member states. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure can also inflict severe levels of damage. The appropriateness of cross-domain responses is yet to be decided.

The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, which lasted for 22 days, did not result in the triggering of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Yet, it was an attack on a NATO member state. The character of the attack complicated the process by which a viable and appropriate retaliatory response could be devised. In a multidomain threat landscape, hostile state actors conducting their operations in the grey zone can claim plausible deniability.

China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea also hold joint exercises, share intelligence, exchange military capabilities, and share a diplomatic and political kinship. This axis of Western adversaries shares the same geopolitical and economic objectives. They seek to replace the international rules-based order and establish alternative institutional frameworks to global order that undermine concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and national sovereignty.

Militarily, nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia, where Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers were provided to aid Putin’s war in Ukraine. Politically, emerging international blocs such as the BRICS demonstrate the extent to which countries like China and Russia are gaining traction in driving alternatives to the current order.

“As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the whole of digital and networked societies,” wrote Sean Monaghan, “so too will the capabilities required to deter them. A more complex threat environment will make predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more difficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.”

Hence, for deterrence to be effective today, credibility must incorporate more than hard power capabilities. Red lines must be communicated effectively across different channels. Resolve must be demonstrated through a force posture that includes a willingness to establish escalation dominance in a crisis scenario. The art of deterrence is also about determining and holding at risk what an adversary values.

As the outgoing US Secretary of Defence General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin said in 2022, cross-domain deterrence “is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause…. [It is] multidomain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”

Ultimately, deterrence is about credibly threatening to impose unacceptable costs, by denial or punishment, on a would-be aggressor. Those costs must convince the would-be aggressor that they outweigh any potential gains made.

Therefore, it is imperative for the US and NATO to increase cross-domain capabilities to match those of adversaries. Adopting a combination of different violent and non-violent means, to conduct deterrence credibly across multiple domains and at various levels of intensity, will enhance NATO’s ability to secure its vital interests in an increasingly volatile era of global strategic competition.

Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Deterrence and NATO’s Emerging Security Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains uncertain, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.

In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel launched Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.

This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.

Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos raided an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also captured Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.

Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency stated that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.

However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.

Degraded Proxy Capabilities

In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.

Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.

Israeli operations significantly degraded Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian S-300s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.

Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire economic situation of the country as well as the increasing repression by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.

Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, energy shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.

That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.

Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the installation of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in minimal progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.

Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.

Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.

While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.

Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.

Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.

Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

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ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Contacts with foreign sources were not very informative. The Chinese Ministry of Defense denied any use of drones over American or other territory, and their spokesperson added, “We get all the information we need from hacking into US government and industry sources.” They referred Americans to the Russians.

The Russian Security Council denied any involvement in flying drones over the East Coast. “Iran provides most of our drones, go talk to them,” was the only response we could get from officials. They added that President Putin has his own personal drone for use when he is hunting while riding bare chested in the Far East.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry was no more helpful on the issue saying, “Any drones we have will be used for surveillance of Israel or sent to the Russians for the Ukrainians to shoot down.”

Having exhausted foreign sources, Americans turned to domestic agencies. The Department of Homeland Security had no information about drones. “We are fully challenged to cope with unprecedented illegal border crossings, a meltdown of the Secret Service, and a FEMA fiasco in North Carolina to worry about drones,” said one agency official, on background.

The Department of Defense was not any more helpful. They denied having any information about drones, other than to say that there was no evidence of aliens being connected to drone activity in the United States. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the drones were not connected to aliens. They referred Americans to past episodes of The X Files.

The State Department reported that they had no contact with drones other than some foreign ambassadors who were posted to the United States and predictably uninformed about their activities.

The intelligence community said they did not necessarily know anything about drones, but even if they did, it would be classified and could not be shared with the media. This was an understandable reply.

A Republican member of Congress from New Jersey claimed that Iran had launched drones from a “mother ship” somewhere off the coast of the United States and that this information came from highly classified sources. This was corroborated by some boardwalk vendors of pizza in Ocean City and Wildwood, New Jersey. Their credibility was not challenged.

Some residents of New Jersey thought that tourists from Pennsylvania who visit New Jersey beaches during the summer are retaliating for exorbitant rental charges paid in previous years. Given prices, this is certainly an option worth exploring.

Others claimed that the drones were the work of environmentalists angered by shore communities’ wars against sea gulls, including the importation of hawks to chase gulls away from their natural habitats. Recent destruction of irreplicable works of art by environmentalists makes the illicit flying of drones over New Jersey easily conceivable.

Residents of New York suggested that New Jersey was seeking publicity to compensate for its comparative insignificance in national and regional affairs. “New Jersey is simply a suburb of New York and otherwise has no reason to attract news coverage,” was the explanation provided by one New Yorker.

But a New Jersey native came to her state’s defense. New Jersey residents, she said, were mentally exhausted from driving around in their infamous traffic circles until their brains boiled over; aliens or foreign enemies would be a welcome distraction.

An expert in artificial intelligence (AI) suggested that the drone swarms might be the result of an AI experiment gone awry, given the widespread use of “deepfakes” pervasive in social media and other sources. “The Jersey drone swarm could be the opening scene in the next Hollywood spectacular mixing fictitious events (alien invasions) with real events (military drone attacks) in order to smash box office records,” he noted.

Whatever the case may be is still undetermined. Needless to say, the longer it takes to find an answer, the more numerous the conspiracy theories will become. They will also grow increasingly more interesting for sure.

Professor Steve Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State-Brandywine.

Drones on the Loose was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

As discussions of retaliation by Israel continue, the media discuss Iranian oil refineries as possible targets that might be hit. Israeli Defence minister, Yoav Gallant, stated that retaliation against Iran’s missile attacks will be “lethal and surprising.” Meanwhile, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked social media accounts are already spreading reports that Tehran warned the United States that actions against Iranian oil refineries will lead the Islamic Republic to target oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to a Reuters report, Iran also warned the Gulf Arab states that any use of their airspace or military bases to target Iran will be unacceptable and threatened a military response.

Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s reference to Azerbaijan as a potential target, should Israel attack Iranian oil refineries, is an indication of the Islamic Republic’s growing threat to critical energy infrastructure not only in the Middle East, but also in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea basin region. Azerbaijan supplies 40 percent of Israel’s energy needs and Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure is the backbone of its independence in the geopolitically tense region.

Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR, alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed, was awarded a licence to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are a primary concern for Iran.

In anticipation of Israeli retaliation against the Iranian ballistic missile attacks, the Iranian media continues to make unsubstantiated claims about supposed secret Israeli military bases in Azerbaijan with a ridiculous accusation that Azerbaijan is one of the origins of sabotage against the Islamic Republic. Talking about possible Israeli retaliation against Iranian oil facilities, Iranian diplomat Abbas Mousavi falsely claimed in an interview to Tejarat News that Israel deployed many planes to Azerbaijan.

In fact, since Hamas launched the brutal terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023, Iran’s main goal is the consolidation of the members of the Organisation of Islamic States to achieve an economic blockade and diplomatic isolation from Israel. Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeatedly called on Arab and Muslim countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel. Iranian officials frequently repeat similar calls showing Tehran’s agenda behind the Hamas attacks, which aimed to disrupt economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and Muslim-majority nations.

Iran’s multidimensional strategy behind the Hamas attacks was based on several ambitious goals, including preventing possible normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; derailing the Abraham Accords; preventing efforts to improve strained Turkish-Israeli ties; and trying to inflict economic and diplomatic damage on Israel-Azerbaijan strategic ties. Iran’s strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian media outlets launched coordinated propaganda attacks against Turkey and Azerbaijan for supplying crude oil to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline since the Hamas terrorist attacks and start of the subsequent war in Gaza. Iran-inspired, pro-Hamas Islamist, and leftist circles in Turkey staged several demonstrations where they vandalised Azerbaijani oil company, SOCAR, offices in Istanbul in an attempt to halt oil exports.

Considering the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, the country is a comfortable space for Iranian propaganda and hybrid activities covered by so-called Islamic narratives. Ironically, the fact that Iran is a major energy supplier to Armenia and supplied the formerly Armenian-occupied Karabakh region received no similar response from Islamists or leftists in Turkey.

Coercive Actions

Iran’s military threats against Azerbaijan increased from the end of the Second Karabakh War, when the balance of power in the South Caucasus shifted in Baku’s favor. Iran conducted several military drills near Azerbaijan’s border, putting on a show of force against the geopolitical changes in the region. In late September and early October 2021 Iran suddenly conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s borders.

An Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman described the exercises as a “sovereign right,” saying, “Iran will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist regime” near its borders. Iran undertook another military provocation a year later when Tehran laid pontoon bridges across the Araz River near the Azerbaijani border and crossed the river as part of war games. In March 2023, an Iranian air force fighter jet violated Azerbaijan’s airspace. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador, and the Azerbaijani Defence and Foreign Ministries issued a joint statement condemning the incursion.

When Israel liquidated Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, in Damascus in April 2024, Iranian member of parliament, Jalal Rashidi Kochi, called for strikes on an Israeli embassy in the region, preferably in Azerbaijan. Iranian attempts to target the Israeli embassy and ambassadors in Baku were also foiled on many occasions over the years; the most recent reported attempt involved the arrest of an Afghan national in July 2023. Recently Iran has enhanced its naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea and increased naval drills, including joint drills with Russia.

Iran’s Missile and Cyber Capabilities

Iran possesses numerous capabilities to threaten critical infrastructure including energy and power in the region. Among them Tehran’s ballistic missiles and cyber tools are key. Iran maintains the largest ballistic and cruise missile force in the Middle East, capable of reaching 2,500 kilometres from its borders. Moreover, these capabilities combined with Iran’s drone arsenal can overwhelm missile defence systems. Iran’s missile attacks against Saudi oil facilities in 2019 were conducted by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.

Iran has improved its offensive cyber capabilities, too, and is capable of causing localised and temporary disruption to corporate networks for days or weeks. Drilling oil wells, pumping crude oil, and loading fuel are processes where cyberattacks can cause significant disruptions. According to an FBI report released in August 2024, Iran exploited computer network vulnerabilities to infiltrate and steal sensitive technical data from organisations in Israel and Azerbaijan. In July, cybersecurity firm Check Point reported that an Iranian hacker group named Muddy Water, affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, increased its cyber activities against targets in Azerbaijan, Israel, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Securing Critical Infrastructure

Overall, considering Azerbaijan’s key role in the energy security of vital American allies, such as Europe, Israel, and Turkey, and its significant help in supplying energy to US-friendly states Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the next administration needs to reverse shortsighted Biden State Department policy. The decision not to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, damages American interests in the South Caucasus. It is in the interest of the US and Azerbaijan to expand their military and technical partnership to secure critical infrastructure in the region.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Threat to Azerbaijan’s Critical Energy Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Network of Powerful Allies

One of the strongest indicators of America’s continued leadership is its robust network of alliances. Over 50 nations are directly allied with the US, forming a global coalition that includes some of the world’s most powerful economies. Countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia consistently align themselves with American leadership, not just in military terms but also economically and diplomatically. Even in regions like the Middle East, traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and emerging partnerships are fortifying the US’s global standing.

Contrast this with the coalition of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. While this quartet may represent a serious challenge, it pales in comparison to the extensive alliances that the US leads. Most crucially, while Russia and China may appear aligned in the short term, they are not close allies in any deep or historical sense. The two powers have a long and fraught history, marked by strategic rivalry and suspicion. Their partnership today is one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. In the end, history tells us that such partnerships are prone to fracture, especially when national interests clash.

The reality of America’s network of allies compared to the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is stark. This balancing coalition does not even come close to the strength of the band wagoning coalition the US possesses. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with its 31 member states, represents not only the most powerful military alliance in history but also an economic powerhouse, accounting for over 30 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).

In contrast, China and Russia are economic competitors more than collaborators, and their combined GDP does not come close to rivaling the economic output of the US and its allies. Furthermore, China’s partnerships with nations like Iran and North Korea are limited by geography, sanctions, and divergent interests. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned and isolated state with little economic or strategic leverage beyond its nuclear capabilities, while Iran is mired in regional conflicts that prevent it from playing a major global role.

In essence, while China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may occasionally coordinate to challenge the West, their relationships lack the cohesion, shared values, and the long-term strategic alignment of the American-led alliance system. This coalition cannot hope to rival the strength, stability, and global reach of America’s network of alliances. For all the talk of a multipolar world, the US remains at the center of the most powerful and united coalition of nations in modern history, a fact that ensures its continued dominance on the global stage.

The Strategic Advantage of Geography

Another underappreciated advantage is geography. The United States enjoys a position of unmatched security, largely thanks to what scholars like John Mearsheimer call the “stopping power of water.” Unlike any other global power, the United States benefits from being bordered by two vast oceans. These natural barriers serve as formidable buffers against potential adversaries, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct invasion or immediate military threats to the mainland.

This geographic advantage has profound implications for national security and global influence. Unlike Russia, which shares extensive borders with Europe and Central Asia, and China, which borders several regional rivals including India, Japan, and Vietnam, the US is largely insulated from the chaos of regional disputes.

Moreover, this geographic separation means that the US can maintain a relatively smaller standing army compared to continental powers—focusing instead on advanced naval and air forces capable of projecting power far from its shores. American military bases, fleets, and alliances stretch across the world, but the mainland remains safely beyond the reach of conventional military threats.

This position gives the US a level of strategic flexibility that few nations can match. That is not to say the US Navy does not have issues facing its future, especially with shipyards and defense procurement. However, it is still considered the greatest Navy in the world as of 2024.

The Monroe Doctrine

Part of what makes the US so unique is its role as the uncontested regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine has long established the principle that no foreign power should interfere in the affairs of the Americas, solidifying U.S. dominance in its own region. No other nation on Earth holds this level of regional control.

This unrivaled regional hegemony allows the US to focus on maintaining global stability and leading from a position of strength. As long as the Western Hemisphere remains secure, the US can project power abroad with confidence, knowing that its backyard is free from external threats.

The Interconnected Economies of the U.S. and China

Finally, the specter of the so-called Thucydides Trap—the idea that a rising power (China) will inevitably clash with an established one (the US)—is not as likely as it may seem. While it is true that China’s economic and military rise is a concern, the interconnectedness of the two economies makes a full-blown conflict far less probable. The US and China are not just rivals; they are deeply intertwined economically. From trade to investment to the global supply chain, the economic fates of both nations are linked in ways that make large-scale conflict costly for either side.

This economic entanglement offers a powerful deterrent against conflict. Both nations have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, knowing that any war would be mutually destructive. This interdependence, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force, reducing the likelihood that the US and China will fall into the trap of inevitable conflict. However, it is worth noting that much of the same was said about the European powers just before World War I.

Conclusion: A Future of Optimism, Not Decline

Despite the challenges posed by emerging powers and the uncertainties of the global political landscape, the US remains in a position of unparalleled strength. Its vast network of powerful allies, its strategic geographic advantage, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, and the economic interdependence with China all suggest that the US’s role as the world’s leading hegemon is secure for the foreseeable future.

Rather than succumbing to the doom and gloom of some political pundits, it is time to recognize the many reasons for optimism. The US has the tools, alliances, and strategic advantages to maintain its leadership and continue shaping a peaceful, prosperous global order.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed here are the author’s own.

The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Essays:

1. Extended Deterrence and No First Use Policy:
   • The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, emphasizing nuclear abolition.
   • The U.S. policy of extended deterrence involves the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, biological, or chemical attacks.​
   • The Biden administration considered a “No First Use” policy, which could undermine the U.S. extended deterrent strategy.​
2. Nuclear Security Challenges:
   • The U.S. faces nuclear threats from China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
   • Significant investments in both conventional and nuclear forces are necessary.​
   • The U.S. must address the coordinated campaign of unrestricted warfare by these nations.​
3. Cost of Nuclear Modernization:
   • The U.S. plans to spend $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years on nuclear deterrence.​
   • Modernization is essential to replace aging systems like the MMIII ICBMs, B52 and B2 bombers, and Ohio-class submarines.​
   • The annual cost of modernization is around $19 billion, which is 3.5% of the current defense budget.

Quotes of the Week:

• “President Zelenskyy says Ukraine expects N. Korean troops to be deployed in battlefield in few days” and also sees the choice between joining NATO or going nuclear.
• Congressman Don Bacon: Emphasized the need to strengthen U.S. nuclear command and control due to the Russia-China alliance.​
• Sen. Mike Rounds: Highlighted the importance of preparing for the B-21 stealth bomber at Ellsworth AFB.​
• Noah Robertson: Reported on China’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion.​
• Wang Zhen: Criticized the U.S. for misrepresenting China’s nuclear development.

Strategic Developments:

• Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Some essays support Iran acquiring nuclear weapons to establish deterrence against the U.S. and Israel.
• China’s Nuclear Strategy: China maintains a minimum deterrent strategy and proposes a “No First Use” treaty.

Budget Comparisons:

• Medicaid Costs: The cost of Medicaid to illegal aliens over three years is $16.2 billion, nearly equal to the annual cost of U.S. nuclear modernization platforms for FY25 ($16.4 billion).​

Important Commentary:

• AEI Essay: Urges the next U.S. president to address the aging nuclear arsenal and consider stop-gap measures to mitigate long-term issues.​
• Chinese Disarmament Stance: China calls for the U.S. to stop misrepresenting its nuclear policy and emphasizes its no-first-use stance.​

To read the report visit the Global Security Review ICBM EAR report.

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ICBM EAR Report – Summary for October 25th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.

Advantages of Standoff Warfare

One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.

Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.

The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.

Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.

Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare

Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.

The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.

Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.

Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.

The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.

China

China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.

China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.

Russia

Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.

Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.

Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.

Iran

Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.

Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.

Conclusion

Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many readers may not be familiar with the inner workings of constitutional monarchies, it is important to keep in mind that a prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch, in whose name the prime minister forms a government. While not common, the monarch can remove the prime minister due to a loss of confidence. In the case of Iran (1953), the Shah saw Mosaddeq as a threat to the constitutional order, which, in fact, he was.

The Shah’s restoration of constitutional order in 1953 also addressed three important geostrategic issues. The first concerned the nature of Iran’s government and how its leadership would be determined. In 1951, as a member of the parliament or Majles, and subsequently as prime minister, Mosaddeq pushed for a public referendum to have the parliament dismissed and the constitutional monarchy eliminated, which would have given him virtual dictatorial powers to rule.

By 1953, as prime minister, Mosaddeq again called for just such a public referendum to choose between his government by decree and what he viewed as an antiquated monarchy. The referendum passed overwhelmingly, and Mosaddeq signed a decree calling for the results to be implemented although Iran’s constitution recognized no such role for referendums. The prime minister was clearly seeking to engage in unconstitutional activities.

The second issue was Mosaddeq’s long sought effort to nationalize Iran’s oil reserves, then controlled jointly through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1951, prior to becoming prime minister, he led parliament to pass legislation nationalizing Iranian oil assets. The United Kingdom took Iran to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but because Iran did not recognize the authority of the ICJ, the court dismissed the lawsuit in 1952. This ultimately led the UK to organize a boycott of Iranian oil exports, which was effective in preventing Iranian oil, 50 percent of the nation’s foreign currency assets, from being sold on the international market.

The third issue was Mosaddeq’s growing rapprochement with the Soviet Union (USSR) and reliance on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party as an important source of political support. Moscow was looking to control more oil resources, particularly those in Iran and the Middle East, which led the Soviets to actively engage in the spread of communist propaganda and revolutionary efforts in the region.

The American Role

For supporters of today’s regime in Tehran, it is an article of faith that the US and UK illegitimately overthrew a popular and democratic ruler, Mosaddeq, over a desire to keep Iranian oil resources under British control and an unwarranted fear of communism.

The Associated Press for example, concluded that what they saw was a “reactionary CIA-led 1953 coup against revolutionary Mosaddeq” which “lit the fuse” for the 1979 Islamic revolution a quarter century later. All the elements were there—greed for oil, a supposed push to stop popular democracy, and an irrational fear of communism—to make the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the “bad guys” in this narrative.

By accepting the narrative that Iran’s path toward progressive democracy was hijacked by the CIA, wholesale excuses are possible to explain away Iran’s terrorist enterprise over the past four decades. For many fellow travelers in the West, the fictional “coup” against Mosaddeq provided an excuse for avoiding a confrontation with Iran over its rogue behavior.

Iran’s mullahs describe American and British action from 1953–1979 as “the great arrogance”—the meddling in Iranian affairs by foreign interests. However, the legitimate constitutional restoration of the Shah (1953) was led by a completely legitimate loyalist-royalist coalition made up of members of the Iranian military, the Iranian theocracy, Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi’s supporters, and supporters of the Iranian constitution. The Shah legitimately issued two decrees on August 19, 1953, dismissing Mosaddeq as prime minister and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister.

The American desire to staunch the spread of communism was a perfectly legitimate concern that led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to support constitutional government under the Shah. For the British, without whose investment in infrastructure, processing, and export there would be no Iranian oil to export, legitimate financial interests were at stake. The Soviet Union also cared about oil. In the early 1950s, Iranian oil and gas reserves were a growing part of known oil and gas reserves. Control over them would provide economic and diplomatic leverage for an economically impoverished Soviet state.

It should come as no surprise that a false narrative surrounding Mosaddeq’s removal developed almost immediately. Reality, however, is far different. Mohammad Mosaddeq was legitimately removed from power for attempting to topple the constitutional monarchy on behalf of the Soviet-supported Tudeh party. American and British support was exactly what the Shah required to restore the constitution. The ultimate collapse of the Shah’s government and its replacement with an Islamic fundamentalist theocracy is a tragedy the United States regrets even to this day.

Peter Huessy and Joe Buff are Senior Fellows at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.

Iran’s 1953 Coup that Wasn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, the international security environment is anything but stable, certain, and peaceful. And the future is trending in the wrong direction for the United States and its allies. American strategic force posture must be rebalanced. The US needs a policy of strategic sufficiency 2.0 with new regional nuclear triads as its centerpiece.

Those who favor a rules-based construct of international relations now face the specter of broad and catastrophic threats from a new axis of authoritarianism. This axis is a political union comprised of authoritarian China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, each guilty of intense human rights abuses of their own people. They seek to create a new world order of control, coercion, and, when needed, armed conflict where they reap the benefits. This new political union could include aggression against the US and its allies simultaneously.

Their military prowess is greatly increasing, through a nuclear arms race that the United States is passively observing. Most importantly, this includes theater nuclear forces of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific and Europe. Today, the US simply has no theater range nuclear forces forward-deployed to the Pacific. According to the Congressional Research Service, all American nonstrategic nuclear weapons are either forward-deployed with aircraft in Europe or stored in the United States. Further, with Russia possessing as many as 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US and NATO are outpaced in theater nuclear forces in Europe by perhaps a 10-to-1 margin.

Unlike the Cold War, these threats are undergirded by China’s economic power, ironically fueled for decades by liberal societies enamored with China’s cheap product and labor. It is meaningless to characterize the American relationship with these regimes as competition. The United States and its allies are in conflict with them, not yet armed conflict, but conflict, nonetheless.

The US has four broad policy choices for its strategic force posture. First, it can stay within guidance of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and slowly modernize the strategic nuclear triad while reducing reliance on nuclear weapons hoping adversaries follow. However, every nuclear-armed adversary is deepening reliance on nuclear weapons and expanding nuclear forces, with no signs of stopping.

Second, the US can seek an isolationist foreign policy and aid its allies in developing and deploying their own nuclear capabilities. This option requires that the US all but abandon its policy of extended deterrence and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), placing regional security in peril and fostering geopolitical atrophy.

Third, it can promote new security architectures in Europe and the Pacific, where a leading regional ally would assume responsibility for providing the needed “nuclear umbrella” over fellow regional allies. This option is likely unworkable.

The fourth option is for the US to embrace its historical leadership role, strengthen its strategic force posture, and, working with Allies, reconstitute regional conventional defenses. The last option is the only prudent one to prevent conflict through deterrence against multiple adversaries for the foreseeable future. The logic of such a strategy should start with President Richard Nixon’s approach.

In the late 1960s, Nixon formulated a realist policy of “strategic sufficiency.” It was designed to adjust the American strategic force posture to the threats, uncertainties, and instability of that time. Such threats included rapid growth in Soviet nuclear forces and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. Nixon concluded strategic balance was essential for overall security, though it meant expanding the American nuclear forces immediately. Quantity was a quality all its own. If numbers mattered to the Soviets, then the United States needed to include them in sufficiency assessments.

In his first annual foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon argued strategic sufficiency required a military calculation of forces for warfighting, but explicitly argued sufficiency’s core idea was political. Forces could only be sufficient if they accounted for vital and long-term American security interests and aspirations, including the protection of global commercial markets.

Combined, the military and political features of Nixon’s sufficiency enabled the US strategic force posture to accomplish a wide set of policy goals. These included deterring the Soviets, assuring allies, countering coercion, providing a president political bargaining power to successfully wage an escalatory battle, fight and finish war on multiple fronts, and safeguard long-term interests.

To rebalance the force, the Nixon administration moved to upload nuclear missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to be able to attack more targets and overcome enemy defenses without reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy. Nixon also hardened intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, increased the mobility of forces, and increased air and missile defenses. Nixon coupled American security to allied security but demanded more of allies especially for conventional forces to deter regional aggression. Such was the logic and choices of Nixon’s policy.

However, Nixon’s sufficiency policy was formed in the 1960s, in an era when large or surprise Soviet nuclear attack was feared. It focused on American strategic nuclear forces that provide central deterrence of attacks on the homeland. Today, the most likely pathway to nuclear escalation and attacks on the homeland is through regional conflict, where adversaries have a significant and growing theater nuclear advantage, particularly in sub-intercontinental-range missiles. Allies are faced with direct and immediate threats of aggression and nuclear attacks. The United States nuclear triad of strategic systems is neither designed nor credible for waging regional nuclear war and escalation. It invites nuclear retaliation on the homeland.

Therefore, a strategic sufficiency 2.0 for the future must include nuclear forces necessary to satisfy Nixon’s military-political goals, but with a focus on the theater. Beefing up the American strategic nuclear triad is important, but so is expanding regional conventional forces and homeland defenses. However, the greatest deterrence priority for this new axis of authoritarianism is building American theater nuclear triads.

Adversaries calculate the totality of war and the risks of escalation all the way through war termination prior to making the initial decision to wage war. And so, the strategic force posture must have the forces in place to succeed at every step of conventional and nuclear war in order to deter war. Regional nuclear triads plug the greatest force sufficiency gap in this spectrum.

Regional nuclear triads would create a deterrent wall between regional conventional conflict and escalation to strategic nuclear conflict against the homeland. Today, such walls are virtually nonexistent. Regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific would be sufficient to provide the president a wide range of theater options to counter simultaneous axis escalation threats, without having to move forces from one region to the other. Such diverse options enable a president to successfully wage the regional escalation battle without using the strategic triad. To use the strategic triad would pointlessly drive central deterrence risks to the homeland.

Regional nuclear triads not only build the critical deterrent wall, but they are also sufficient to accomplish, at the regional level, the full range of Nixon’s military and political features noted above (deterrence, assurance, counter-coercion, escalatory bargaining, and war winning). Theater nuclear forces of such strength also hedge against the uncertainties involved in adversary nuclear force projection and intentions in the outyears. This reduces regional and homeland risks, and builds the high confidence needed of a strategic sufficiency policy.

Regional nuclear triads would have varying ranges and yields for proportionality and credibility and would afford the same force attributes of survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility provided by the strategic triad. This combination of attributes creates the military, political, and psychological effects that maximize adversary doubts and fears of the consequences of undesired actions. Placing regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific achieves this strong regional deterrent effect unlike any other policy option.

This should be achieved in both theaters. For example, the United States can deploy a combination of ground-based nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and nuclear-armed F-35 aircraft, nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (the SLCM-N), and air-launched nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles. Regional nuclear triad means-of-delivery and nuclear weapons must also be of sufficient numerical strength to balance Russian theater nuclear forces in Europe and Chinese/North Korean theater nuclear forces in the Pacific.

As mentioned earlier, American strategic force posture must account for military and political force requirements across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, in addition to regional nuclear triads, strategic sufficiency 2.0 also requires an American strategic force posture to make three other adjustments to deal with threats.

First, the US must upload its ICBM force with additional nuclear weapons. In keeping with Nixon’s uploading policy, the US should use uploaded missiles to keep pace, weapon for weapon, with Chinese strategic nuclear weapon deployments. This achieves the military and political purposes stated earlier, but also demonstrates political resolve toward arms control at some point.

Second, the posture must safeguard key elements of the homeland from enemy coercion. Missile defenses reassure the American people, but also enable a president to take the risks necessary to effectively escalate and win a conflict where nuclear use is threatened or takes place. A limited defense against coercive attacks against major American population centers and adversary first-strike weapons against American leadership adds that needed reassurance to the deterrence equation.

Third, in partnership with allies, the US must restore regional conventional forces to deter axis aggression. This should include a substantial number of American air-, sea-, and land-based conventional hypersonic missiles capable of defeating, at range, enemy defenses and their anti-access area-denial capabilities. It will also require greater allied burden and risk sharing through increased defense spending, expanding regional combat power and expanding access for American theater nuclear forces.

Challenges to a strategic sufficiency 2.0 policy come in several forms. Detractors may make the following arguments.

First, some may argue that expansion of American nuclear forces will spark an arms race. Unfortunately, an arms race already exists. The United States is not a participant.

Second, some may argue nuclear expansion is unaffordable. Nuclear forces, including ongoing strategic triad modernization, account for 6 percent of the defense budget and less than 1 percent of federal spending. Regional nuclear triads, uploading, conventional hypersonics, and improved missile defenses are minimal in cost. Deterrence is, however, far less expensive than warfighting.

Third, some may suggest a single nuclear weapon system, such as the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), is all that is needed for regional deterrence. But this approach leaves out critical military and political features of sufficiency such as attributes, warfighting capabilities, and escalation options that regional nuclear triads offer.

Finally, some could argue that the United States can accomplish its military and political objectives if the nation can strike key targets with the strategic nuclear triad. This force sufficiency assumption is a common trap. Nixon argued that while narrow military planning is necessary in helping to discern strategic sufficiency, he warned against “debatable calculations and assumptions regarding possible scenarios.” Rather, sufficiency dealt more with force capacity in its “broader political sense.” Anything less than full force balance is unacceptable.

The policy of the United States should be to embrace leadership and engagement in the world to resolutely safeguard its national security and that of its allies and partners. To do so, American policy should be to reconstitute strategic force posture, including expanding the strategic nuclear triad through MIRVing ICBMs; establishing theater nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific; expanding missile defenses; and expanding theater conventional forces.

War prevention is the object of deterrence, a strategy that has worked for over 75 years. Deterrence, strategic stability, and nonproliferation were always the strongest when the US and its allies were strong. Power is the language respected by authoritarians, and the US should not be afraid to wield it. Strategic sufficiency 2.0, with an emphasis on regional nuclear triads, can rebalance the American strategic force posture and create the conditions of strategic stability and deterrence effectiveness against the multipolar axis threat.

Jonathan Trexel, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and on the faculty of Missouri State University. The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Strategic Sufficiency 2.0: Deploying Regional Nuclear Triads was originally published on Global Security Review.

It might be tempting to dismiss these statements as yet another instance of grandstanding by an aggressor portraying itself as an innocent victim. However, it might be worth putting Putin’s comments into context for some decoding of the next steps required not only for the Ukraine conflict but for the entire European deterrence picture.

The deployment of American intermediate-range missile systems on German territory is scheduled for 2026. When declaring Russia unbound by any unilateral moratorium on deploying medium- and short-range strike capabilities, Putin blamed the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) for Russia’s necessary actions.

Russia plans to produce weapons similar to those prohibited by the INF Treaty, increasing the nuclear component of Russia’s military budget. Overall, Putin presented the US deployment of missiles in Europe as a strategic threat to Russia and a potential justification for Russia’s own nuclear response. Russian invasion of Ukraine and nuclear threats against NATO had nothing to do with it.

During his speech at the Naval Day Parade, Putin raised concerns about Western tolerance for nuclear weapon use and the deployment of missiles in Germany. There was also an aspect of pleasing the crowd at home and impressing on them the irrefutable logic of his leadership. Reminding Putin’s audience of Russia’s military power and strategic importance, particularly regarding the Baltic Sea, was paramount.

Putin often refers to what he characterizes as the period of great tension between the tragically defunct Soviet Union and the West—the Cold War. The Russian narrative once again views the West as an enemy. It is helpful to listen to Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. He advocated for an offensive stance towards the West and revigorated the Russian complex of obsidionalism (under siege mentality), which views the West as a long-term adversary.

When in 2008 Putin invaded Georgia, French president Nicolas Sarkozy barely managed to understand what the invasion meant. The naivete of the West convinced Putin that Crimea was up for grabs. Indeed, not one shot was fired by the West when Putin grabbed Crimea in 2014.

Putin is also well aware of the fact that the current NATO defense math simply does not add up. For example, France used to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—at the end of the Cold War. France stopped just short of completely gutting its military after 1991 and kept its nuclear weapons in working order. Three decades later, France struggles to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, though it has now substantially increased defense spending as of late. Most of Europe, except for the voluntarist Baltic and Nordic countries, is in this situation or even worse.

On the one hand, Russia may be trying to extend the Ukraine conflict as a way to justify increased defense spending. On the other hand, extending the Ukraine conflict also postpones Russia’s rearming for a much larger and deeper fight against NATO.

When Putin publicly threatens the use of nuclear weapons, it plays to domestic audience reassurance. Russian naval struggles in the Black Sea are real. The enlargement of NATO to Sweden and Finland only makes matters worse as the Baltic Sea now sees Putin with NATO able to cut off access to the Atlantic and Kaliningrad. After all, the expansion of NATO leaves Russia with NATO forces much closer on land and able to completely cut off Russia by sea in the West. It should come as no surprise then that Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has decided a structural investment in nuclear forces is his best option.

In his protracted conflict with Ukraine, the Ukrainians are provided enough military support to avoid defeat, but not enough to unambiguously prevail over Russia. Finnish President Sauli Väinämö Niinistö made an ouverture to Russia to suggest peace negotiations. Considering economic and military recruitment challenges and struggles on the ground and in the Black Sea, Russia may eventually seek negotiations. However, Putin and Russian leaders may be reluctant to negotiate as it could be perceived as a sign of weakness.

Western diplomacy should look deeper at the strategic and deterrence picture. It is rather challenging to create a consensus within Russia’s political circles regarding Putin’s foreign policies, particularly towards the West. Even the rapprochement and convergence of interests that led to the China-Iran-North Korea-Russia nexus, the “Axis of Upheaval” according to British prime minister Keir Starmer, is not something straightforward. Russia’s concern for China’s ambitions should never be underestimated.

Ukraine, however, is the immediate concern and deterring further NATO intervention is most important. Thus, Putin will continue to threaten in an effort to coerce NATO restraint and the further deterioration of Russia’s position in Europe.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Putin’s Nuclear Swagger was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

In March 2023 Azerbaijan finally opened its embassy in Israel, despite establishing bilateral relations in 1992. Baku opted to open its embassy in Tel Aviv after restoring its territorial integrity. The next month, in April 2023, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, making it the closest Israeli embassy to Iran, just 17 km from the Iranian border. Iran followed all these diplomatic moves with annoyance and concern.

Normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations was also widely discussed as an extension of the Abraham Accords. Momentum similarly grew in 2022 for Israel and Turkey to normalize their strained relations. At the next meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed to continue developing bilateral relations and to pay official visits to each other.

Azerbaijan’s initiative to set a new trilateral format for cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey was advancing rapidly in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty for Tehran. The October 7, 2023, attack on Israel gave Iran the chance to derail possible Saudi-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties and stop the Azerbaijani initiative for trilateral cooperation in its tracks.

Tehran seized the opportunity of the war in Gaza to pursue its grand, multidimensional strategy. It is using economic means, via a set of coercive actions, to achieve foreign policy objectives, something widely overlooked. Iran’s multidimensional strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian strategy prioritizes using economic means to isolate Israel by derailing its relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s subtle, calculated, approach also intends to inflict an economic blow on Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which makes substantial revenue from the export of oil via Turkey to Israel.

Considering the global nature of the modern economy, economic power plays a significant role in shaping geopolitical outcomes and foreign policy. In this case, Iran’s usage of political, diplomatic, and media instruments, as well as its regional proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, merits analysis. The use of economic means to shape geopolitical outcomes and achieve foreign policy goals is the cornerstone of Iran’s multidimensional strategy. Iran does not possess the necessary economic means, by itself. However, the Islamic Republic does possess significant geopolitical assets in the form of proxy groups and diplomatic and media resources, which it is using to hinder or shut down global navigation and prevent the flow of strategic commodities to Israel.

The late Iranian foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, called on Muslim-majority countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel and expel its envoys in October 2023. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Muslim countries to cease trade, particularly food and oil with Israel, the following month. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, followed Ayatollah Khamenei’s call and appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel.

The call for an economic boycott of Israel by Muslim-majority states gives an insight into Iran’s multidimensional strategy. The late Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, also reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s call for a boycott of Israel at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2023. President Raisi argued that Islamic countries must cut diplomatic relations as well as refuse to buy Israeli goods, echoing Khamenei’s call. Weeks after his call for an economic boycott, Ayatollah Khamenei had urged Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel to halt diplomatic ties for a limited period. In January 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his call for a total blockade of Israel by Muslim countries.

The official rhetoric of Iran’s leaders clearly shows Tehran’s multidimensional strategy of using the war in Gaza to isolate Israel economically, impose an oil embargo, destroy economic and diplomatic ties between Israel and Muslim-majority countries, and position Iran as a major geopolitical force in the region. To implement this strategy Iran has employed coercive media propaganda against many countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Iranian media has intensified criticism of Turkey for its trade and economic ties with Israel and Azerbaijan for oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which meet 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil.

Iranian media has also targeted Turkish president Erdoğan for not cutting trade relations with Israel, which was actively used within Turkey by Islamist circles including the leader of the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), Fatih Erbakan, in recent local elections. The New Welfare Party, which sympathizes with Iran, managed to get 6.1 percent of the nationwide vote—contributing to Erdoğan’s first election loss in decades. When Erdoğan’s ruling party suffered the election setback, he launched economic measures against Israel, halting trade. Iranian media propaganda and the active shaping of the narrative in the run-up to elections in Turkey yielded a significant result by creating strain in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. The multidimensional Iranian strategy of achieving goals in multiple theatres has so far succeeded in two places: Turkey and Yemen. Using the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping, Iran positioned itself as a key player that can shut down trade not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Bab al Mandab Strait.

Iran’s strategy of using economic means to achieve its goals also entails containing and weakening Azerbaijan by inflicting significant revenue losses. Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed were awarded a license to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have long been a primary concern for the Iranian establishment. The military-technical partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan helped Baku boost its national security and defense, as well as to retake control of its territory from occupying Armenian forces. Changes in the realities of South Caucasus politics since 2020 are a security concern for Tehran. Constant Iranian media attacks against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline are part of the multidimensional Iranian strategy.

Better understanding Iran’s strategy is important if the United States desires to counter those efforts. Iran’s use of hybrid warfare, proxies, media propaganda, and blackmail—to force neighboring countries to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Israel—is having some success but is not in the interest of the region. Iran’s primary goal is to derail the normalisation process under the Arab-Israeli Abraham Accords; to strain Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic ties; to damage Azerbaijan’s independence by targeting its primary source of revenue; to prevent the emergence of the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey trilateral cooperation; and to prevent further diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. It is only through understanding Iranian efforts that the United States, Israel, and the larger region can prevent Iran’s success.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Multidimensional Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in 2007 and 2023 offer no evidence of success. Experts now say Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at Natanz and Furdow should be neutralized with GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their adits (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop North Korea from getting the bomb. Words and tighter sanctions will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a disruptive, warmongering, rogue state. Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical sect that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to Paradise. Iran’s leaders promise to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their extremist ideology. Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective nuclear counterterrorism.

Both Russia and China have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

North Korea shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei surely realizes, “Israel is a one-bomb country” because of its small size. This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated sleight of hand to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran’s latest threats to attack Israel’s nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran’s nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran’s covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine approach to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely 4 percent of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck…or a camel…or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel’s cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “mowing the grass,” or reticent watchful waiting, are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman recently said, “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently said, “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need more lectures about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

Joe Buff is a senior fellow for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since 2021, Russia upgraded or modernized approximately 85 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal. China undertook what then-Commander of United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, called “a strategic breakout,” with “explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces.” North Korea went from a fledgling 1980’s nuclear program to possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Iran’s nuclear program goes deeper underground, figuratively and literally, to avoid US threats and complicate US risk assessment.

Little occurred in the US nuclear arsenal during the same two decades. The nuclear enterprise is attempting to modernize each leg, with debatable levels of success. In June 2023, the Biden administration publicly confirmed and accepted American numerical nuclear inferiority for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The administration posits deterrence comes from quality over quantity. But how is a triad that is 30–50 years old qualitatively better than a new Russian arsenal?

The non-strategic nuclear arsenal rose in prominence as the Ukraine war began and Russia began making threats to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. Production of the B61-13 and life extension of the W80-4 emphasize regional nuclear deterrence and may preempt strategic conflict at a lower level but may arrive too late. Retiring the B83 purportedly transfers the hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) responsibility to the B61-13, streamlining the Department of Energy’s sustainment and modernization expenses. The Department of Defense is still weighing a 2022 study, evaluating future HDBT targets to demonstrate viability of the non-strategic capability.

Since 2021, the nuclear enterprise began receiving long-overdue attention, but it will take years to yield results. The enterprise competes for American talent, amongst lucrative technological fields, that it needs for successful reconstruction and for addressing the needs of the triad. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $500 million more than requested for plutonium pit production reconstitution at Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) goal is to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year, between the two facilities, by 2030. Assuming 80 pits per year went into refurbishing 85 percent of deployed nuclear warheads, matching Russia’s accomplishment, that pace would require nearly 16.5 years and almost 20 years for a 100 percent refurbishment. In FY 2024, the NNSA is requesting 8.6 percent more money than enacted in FY 2023 for the Product Modernization Program to support strategic nuclear weapons modification and life extension.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, refocused on strategic-level concerns, reprioritizing strategic power over Russia and China higher than post-9/11 terrorism. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for nuclear modernization, as previous NPRs did, but was followed by the financial resources outlined in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act required for execution.

There is a nexus between terrorism, nuclear weapons, and immigration. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and Hamas’ terror campaign against Israel. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon and provides it to any of these groups, the US may be left searching for nuclear fingerprints in the aftermath of a detonation. The Federation for American Immigration Reform reported Customs and Border Patrol data showing 3.2 million aliens illegally crossed into the US between October 2022 and October 2023. Among those apprehended, 172 aliens were suspected terrorists. One hundred sixty-nine attempted an illegal entry at the southern border. The notion of an attack on the homeland by terrorists using a smuggled weapon of mass destruction is a credible threat.

Law Enforcement sources assert terrorists can employ nuclear weapons without sophisticated delivery systems on US soil. Former FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker described the US as extremely vulnerable to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Swecker suggested that the mismanaged southern border is the key source of that vulnerability, concurring with a warning presented in December 2023 by the Department of Homeland Security. Preventing such dangerous exposure belongs at the forefront as policymakers seek to correct three years of negligent border protection. American strategic deterrence once overshadowed immigration, reducing temptation from adversaries abroad.

Nuclear-armed nations and proliferators alike must remember any nuclear attack against the United States from a terrorist organization will result in retaliation against the nation providing the weapon, as codified in the Bush Doctrine found in the 2002 National Security Strategy. While internal politics unnecessarily expose the US, those responsible can project strength by reiterating the consequences of exploiting that vulnerability and reemphasizing nuclear deterrence.

Terrorism and nuclear war are real. The US cannot afford to alternately overlook one in favor of the other. When adversaries see vulnerabilities, it invites aggression. Controlling who and what comes across US borders is essential to keeping Americans safe. Maintaining a modern, reliable, and lethal nuclear deterrent can foundationally dissuade terrorist attacks on US soil.

Dan Wasserman was both a missile operations and maintenance officer in the United States Air Force. He remains active in the field. The views expressed are his own.

Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Challenges of the New Security Environment

Western decision-makers tend to think about what characterizes the current strategic environment in terms of great-power rivalry. As President Joseph R. Biden’s National Security Strategy asserts, “The post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.” Indeed, Russian military aggrandizement and Chinese economic, political, and military expansionism led American decision-makers to think and plan in terms of great-power competition. The problem set is, however, much greater.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Strategic Culture

As Michael Eisenstadt notes, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), “The IRI’s strategic culture marked a distinct break with the strategic culture of Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, which was heavily influenced by Western thought and practice.” Since then, the Islamic Republic of Iran perceived the United States of America and Israel as its arch enemies. To confront the two enemies, the IRI deployed its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as its main instrument of power.

Over the years, the IRGC’s power substantially increased within the Iranian system of government. Indeed, as strategic history shows, in a revolutionary state civil-military relations are in a state of flux. “Revolutions have a dynamic all their own. They begin with high ideals, but conclude with (military) dictatorship.” In Iran, the IRGC became so dominant an economic and political power that it has turned the theological system of government gradually into a theological-military system.

At the early stage of its establishment in the 1980s, “The notion of combating imperialism, in all its forms, was central to the operations of the IRGC.” Since then, the Revolutionary Guard saw its mission as “exporting the revolution,” the practice that is defined as “a form of revolutionary or radical internationalism, which, unlike other forms of internationalism (such as liberal or imperialist), sees international relations through the lens of [constant] conflict.”

Implications

Kenneth Waltz maintained that Iran should build nuclear weapons because a nuclear-armed Iran would restore stability to the Middle East. Waltz argued that the IRI, like other would-be nuclear powers, is run by rational ayatollahs with no propensity for self-destruction,  which would ensure deterrence holds. He also argued, “No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.”

Waltz’s arguments were flawed at the time and remain so. Firstly, the mullahs, unlike leaders in current nuclear-armed states, are willing to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances that defy deterrence norms. The IRI and its military force, the IRGC, since their establishment, were, and are, engaged in “revolutionary internationalism” by way of irregular warfare and terrorism. As such, they conceive of nuclear weapons as an “equalizer” which compensates for their inferiority in conventional warfare.

Accordingly, nuclear weapons embolden ayatollahs and IRGC generals in their irregular activities against the United States and Israel. This increases malign activities and the “feeling” of having formidable power, which can lead to unintended direct confrontation with the United States. Most importantly, intended conventional confrontation with Israel whom the IRI’s leadership seeks to eliminate.

Waltz believed the nuclear threat against Iran prevents the IRI from achieving its policy objectives. Yet Waltz failed to consider two points. Firstly, any direct confrontation that the IRI finds itself in with Israel becomes a “war of honor.” In that case, the war becomes an ideological war for the religious government in which death for God’s sake is justified. Martyrdom is an important value in Shia Islam.

Secondly, Waltz confined his observations about the political system to the theological, failing to understand that, in strategic history, authoritarian and revolutionary systems of government are subject to political metamorphosis. Waltz was trapped by presentism.

The IRGC with its aggressive Islamic value system is the dominant power in Iran—increasing in power since Waltz originally wrote. The IRGC spends time on the battlefield, outside Iran, fighting American and Israeli forces.

Thus, they can carry with them the culture of war where “war exercises a powerful fascination in its own right” serving no political objectives. Deterring these ideological military forces poses a great challenge to exercising deterrence.

Additionally, a nuclear Iran could usher in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in an already destabilized region. As Muhammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, has vehemently asserted, “If they [the IRI] get one [nuclear bomb], we have to.” The threat is not in the bomb, but in who possesses the bomb. In the turbulent region where there are various religious Islamic ideologies, and a Jewish state, deterrence is not an easy task.

Recommendations

The focus of recent American administrations on preventing the IRI from achieving nuclear weapons by pursuing economic sanctions is a failure. The Islamic Republic is closer than ever to building nuclear weapons. Negotiation, demand for concessions, periodical hold out, and changing tactics are the methods that paid off for North Korea, allowing them to build a robust nuclear arsenal. The Islamic Republic is following suit.

To prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, there is only one option the United States can pursue—military action. There are costs to the use of force, but it is the only option that prevents the mullahs from possessing nuclear weapons. Force is feasible.

However, with the use of force, there are second and third order effects that are certain to follow. Most importantly, the Islamic Republic will launch missile strikes and use proxies against American forces in the Middle East and Israel and will attempt to close the Hormuz Strait. Here, the United States should send a clear message to the IRI that should the Islamic Republic decide to escalate, the United States will opt for the IRI’s centers of gravity—the political leadership, IRGC elites and forces, and IRGC bases in Iran. This threat focuses on Iran’s centers of gravity and works.

The reason threats against the centers of gravity are effective is not because the IRI is in and of itself afraid of losing its leadership or its forces, but because the Iranian government faces a legitimacy crisis and popular uprisings within the country. The attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria and the limited responses by Iran and Israel may prove the catalyst to change the current state of play.

The ayatollahs and the IRGC worry about being overthrown by the Iranian people once they are at war with the United States. Carl von Clausewitz’s point about the need for support from government, the army, and the people during war is relevant in the case of Iran. The ayatollahs and the IRGC know that support from the people is lacking. Their total war efforts against America and Israel are difficult without the people.

This leaves the United States in a good position to pressure the regime through military strikes and support for dissident groups. In short, the regime is more brittle than many in the West may think. The time to test the regime is now.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Iran: A Strategic Culture Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton, labels this issue the three body problem. As nuclear strategy experts suggest, American deterrence capabilities and overall numbers both matter.

Patrick McKenna and Dylan Land’s “Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates,” details four essential variables for right-sizing the arsenal: risk management, deterrence and assurance goals, force use guidelines, and operational constraints. This article will unpack the matter of risk management.

Risk management issues permeate virtually every decision about nuclear posture and arsenal right-sizing. The perspectives of tolerable nuclear risks held by America, this country’s adversaries, and this country’s allies all matter to effective global nuclear peacekeeping.

Deterrence theorists rightly argue that the US should start by understanding exactly what each adversary values most and their goals. This information is useful in determining what to hold at risk—the high value assets to target. The total number of those targets is an essential input to arsenal right-sizing.

Political and fiscal compromises have a major impact on arsenal size as well. For the United States, the finite capacity of the defense industrial base is a major current constraint. The less money available to sustain America’s triad, the greater the risk that the force structure is not adequate to deter adversaries and assure allies. The weaker the political will to resist coercion, and to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attacks, large or small, the less successful is deterrence and assurance.

Similarly, the less the production capacity of the defense industrial base, the less the US is able to implement on a timely basis whatever types and numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads are the chosen arsenal size and force structure.

Since nuclear deterrence has never failed, analysis is necessarily prospective and does not rely on large quantities of data or past experience. Instead, there is a reliance on inferences from military and political history, combined with playing out, on paper, the aftermath of a nuclear war.

The United States is now dealing with the unpleasant reality that any significant expansion in the nuclear arsenal is accomplished much less rapidly than adversaries can grow and strengthen their own arsenals. Actuarial science suggests that guarding against catastrophic failures calls for worst-case planning. Given the catastrophic results of nuclear warfare, right-sizing the nuclear triad must deter all adversaries simultaneously. This includes accounting for the instance in which China, North Korea, and Russia collaborate to coerce or attack the United States. Should they ever take the gamble to launch a nuclear attack, American deterrence has utterly failed.

An upper bound on American deployed warheads is the sum of what is needed to deter each adversary in isolation. This is because should US Strategic Command deploy enough nuclear weapons to simultaneously hold Chinese, North Korean, and Russian targets at risk, deterrence is likely to hold. Keep in mind, there is no historical example to suggest that all weapons will strike designated targets.

Thus, the fewer weapons there are to strike targets, the greater the risk of deterrence failure. This leaves the old pejorative, “We will make the rubble bounce,” important when considering that probability of target destruction is certainly much lower than many believe.

As with other inputs to triad right-sizing, wherein less of an important resource increases the risk of deterrence failure, the more the total number of deployed nuclear warheads falls short of the upper bound mentioned above, and the greater the risk becomes that one or another scenario of adversary coercion or attack will occur and possibly succeed.

But assuming the US fields a large enough and modernized arsenal, there is a disincentive for any single attacker to strike the United States and for a second adversary to wait, assess the damage, and perhaps complete what the initial attacker did not. There is also a disincentive for all adversaries to collaborate in a unified attack. Absent a large American arsenal, such considerations become more viable.

Risk is relative. There is seldom one right answer when many limited resources are being competed for, while the nation must also address other priorities besides the all-important national defense. But to go very far below the upper bound of the total number of high-value targets risks deterrence failure. Any resource savings are short-term and illusory. The costs of deterrence failure vastly eclipse any imagined benefits to a too-small arsenal.

Only further research and development, strategic planning, intelligence analysis, and open debate can lead to a sound consensus on exactly how big the nuclear arsenal needs to be during the risk-laden years that lie ahead. There is no time to waste.

Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with four decades of experience. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Right-sizing was originally published on Global Security Review.

European nations’ responses to the Russia challenge remain fragmented. They also show little concern about threats from China and North Korea. This led to a lack of strategic alignment between the US and Europe on the problem of facing the combined threat of China, North Korea, and Russia.

France and Germany prevented the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from qualifying China as a threat. France also torpedoed a NATO attempt to open a representative office in Japan. Neither does Europe plan to get involved in a Taiwan conflict. Max Hoell, during his talk, said, “European strategic autonomy thus appears to translate into a quasi-equidistance between Washington and Beijing.” This perspective appears correct.

The European political discourse is replete with concerns that a second Donald Trump presidency will usher in a post-NATO world. Such concerns miss the point. Regardless of who is in the White House in Washington, DC, the views of American presidents evolve as resources become finite. Europe needs to step up to the plate and not only pay their fair share for Europe’s defense, but also understand the need for a division of labor to defend a world threatened by revisionist powers. British and French deterrence face a credibility challenge. If faced with a conflict against China or Russia, Europe’s nuclear arsenals may not deter absent American support.

Realpolitik is to advocate a stronger transatlantic cooperation in extended deterrence. To rely solely on national European deterrence introduces reliability issues, such as the security of one country depending on the presidential power of another. Certain political parties, if victorious in French or German elections, would opt to appease China and Russia—possibly ending NATO and a European nuclear deterrent. Ideally, Europe should increase its contributions to deterrence efforts, including strategic alignment with NATO, increasing defense spending, and expanding European nuclear capabilities within the framework of transatlantic cooperation.

There is a need, though, for political leadership to engage domestic audiences in understanding the importance of nuclear deterrence to garner support for necessary security policies. Educating the public on nuclear realities and strategic imperatives is vital. European nations should continue evaluating their security strategies in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics and disruptive technological advancements. Only modernization can ensure adaptability and effectiveness in deterrence efforts.

Practically speaking, what are the options for a European nuclear deterrent involving France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) that operate in concert with the United States? A joint European nuclear force, unified under joint command and control involving France, Germany, and the UK, could provide a deterrent against threats to European security, but at a level well below that of Russia. Another option, an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella under a bilateral arrangement between the UK and France to cover other European nations, could provide security guarantees and potentially share nuclear assets.

Independently maintaining and enhancing European nuclear capabilities and further developing their own nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy may be a necessary step. But that would further fragment the approach to European security. Alternatively, Europe could create a European federation where a unified nuclear force is established. Spearheaded by France, Germany, and the UK, it could support a “European Federation Nuclear Force.” This option, which is no less than the Holy Grail of European unity and strategic autonomy, would require significant political integration and coordination among European states. Nationalist tendencies would prove problematic. This not only sounds far-fetched, based on decades of previous attempts, but the contemporary climate of election interference and electoral tactics make it not only a remote prospect, but also a repellant to a majority of voters.

A fiscally sustainable endgame could be an expanded NATO nuclear-sharing agreement, with additional European countries sharing the burden of nuclear responsibilities within the alliance, together with France and the UK. The feasibility and desirability of these options would depend on various factors, including intra-European political will and transatlantic cooperation, while getting the China and Russia strategic picture right. A combination of realist threat perception and American-led deterrence realpolitik can generate the kind of tremendous pressure under which Europe will prove itself to be adaptive and step up to demonstrate its ability to lead and deter.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

Several months ago, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an article by Zak Kallenborn in which he defended nuclear weapons and their utility. Rebuttal articles published made two fundamental arguments. First, realism predicts the unavoidability of war, which requires the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is unreliable because previous close calls predict future failure.

The authors believe that reducing nuclear weapons to [near] zero limits the danger in inevitable future wars because future cheating or proliferation would only take place in small numbers, thereby limiting the damage of nuclear use. History and game theory prove this argument dangerously flawed.

For two millennia, major power wars occurred several times per century. Oxford’s Max Roser charts this bloody cost over the past 600 years. In that time 5–10 people per 100,000 population died in these wars, most of them civilians. In the past century deaths topped 100–200 deaths per 100,000 population.

Then after World War II something happened. Over the past seven decades this death rate has plummeted 99 percent to near zero (0.1/100,000 population). This is in spite of small spikes, which are attributable primarily to ethnic genocide in the (non-nuclear) global South. The world did not magically become more pacific. It built nuclear weapons.

The same abolitionists who criticize Kallenborn are horrified by the scale of the slaughter in Gaza and Ukraine. Over 315,000 Russian and 31,000 Ukraine troops are dead in Ukraine and 12,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza. Nuclear abolitionists fail to grasp, this is a mere drop in the bucket compared to great power war.

For example, during World War I, there were 480,000 casualties in 7 days at the Battle of the Marne. There were 848,614 casualties at Passendaele and another 946,000 at Verdun. During World War II, more than 61,000 British civilians died in the Battle of Britain. Over 83,000 British and American airmen died over Germany

European deaths during World War II are estimated at 28.7 million people. Great-power war gave rise to Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler, who exterminated over 30 million people between them. Stalin’s genocide of  3.5 to 7 million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 is the historical context for Ukrainian resistance today.

When it comes to killing civilians, the Japanese beat Stalin and Hitler combined. They killed over 300,000 Chinese during the “Rape of Nanjing.” China suffered over 35 million casualties during the Japanese occupation. When atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese army was still killing an estimated 250,000 Chinese every month.

During World War II, conventional bombing raids killed more civilians in a single night than both atomic bombs. In the Dresden firestorm, caused by allied conventional bombing, 135,000 Germans were incinerated. The ability of today’s conventional weapons is even greater.

The only answer to the horror of war is to keep the peace through effective deterrence.  To do this, those who would wage war must know the reward does not justify the risk. Deterrence does this at every level of conflict.

Arms control treaty regimes, the source of stability for nuclear disarmament advocates, are largely a failure. Despite the existence of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa all sought or obtained the bomb. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also failed to stop nuclear testing, with the violations of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States have either not signed or ratified the treaty.

Russia breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during the Obama administration and then suspended participation in New START in 2023. As a result, for the first time in five decades, there is no nuclear arms limitation treaty between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union. Russia already maintained a policy of escalate to de-escalate during New START negotiations and, in fact, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military doctrines all contemplate nuclear warfighting across the spectrum of conflict.

Deterrence is working every day and is not reserved for discussions of nuclear war. As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia coalesce in an authoritarian coalition, deterrence remains the last best hope for averting war. It works along the entire continuum of conflict, reducing the likelihood of war. In short, nuclear weapons save lives.

Colonel Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Nuclear Weapons Abolition Will Kill Millions (Again) was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Chinese ‘Police Station Spy Network in the U.S. was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is not a proxy war from the Cold War or the Global War on Terror. The West is in a hot war with Iran, and the United States must act accordingly. American focus on containing the conflict in Israel and Gaza is undermining Israeli deterrence. An anemic campaign of limited attacks against the Houthis is failing to deter Iran in the Red Sea, damaging American credibility and promoting Iranian and Houthi prestige.

By contrast Israel understands it is in an existential fight and has an appropriate strategy.  They are systemically destroying enemy forces and can hold Iran’s high-value targets at risk.  Iran should not doubt that October 7, 2023, put its nuclear program and critical infrastructure on the target list. Israel will deal with the Iranian threat with or without American support.

For Israel, American involvement is always a two-edged sword. American politics, Western pressure, and arbitrary red lines are often liabilities that disadvantage Israeli deterrence.  In fact, Israel began a no-holds barred information campaign, targeting media and anti-Jewish forces in the US and Europe. Some Israeli voices attacked the “River to the Sea” narrative characterizing the “two-state solution” as a de facto Iranian occupation of the Jewish homeland.

Deterrence is a coercive spectrum from positive to punitive. Carrots are not working, which leaves only sticks. Curtis McGiffin argues that provocations by Iran, including more than 160 attacks on American forces since October 7, 2023, combined with anemic policies of appeasement and the bribery of Iran, irreparably damaged deterrence in the region.

McGiffin points to statements by IRGC General Hossein Salami that Iran is not afraid of war with the United States. Why should they? Iran’s conduct of grey zone war for decades, with few repercussions, only encourages further aggression. Finally, McGiffin argues that America must formally declare war if we are going to cross the Rubicon and attack targets inside Iran.

That position is debatable. After the Cold War, conventional military superiority empowered the US to act whenever there was sufficient will, constrained only by the imperative to avoid escalation with another nuclear-armed power.

Game theory can be instructive in this case. It teaches risk aversion (Prospect Theory) is a powerful incentive and a key predictor of behavior. Decision-makers will irrationally forego probable gains to avoid improbable losses. It also shows that in an iterative game, players learn from previous opponent actions. The Mullahs learned from American behavior that the US is irrationally risk-averse when it comes to conflict with Iran.

Diplomacy is insufficient without a credible threat to back it up. The United States is standing in a forest fire asking everyone to put away the matches when it needs the deterrence equivalent of backburning. This requires the President to take a significant step up the escalation ladder to re-establish deterrence. Israel is doing this while the US dithers.

Iran is a cancer that has metastasized to threaten the region and the world. America’s ineffective tit-for-tat strategy only emboldens Iran. However, since the hostage crisis (1979) and the Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw fiasco, there was/is little American appetite to deal effectively with Iran. As a result, Tehran has capitalized on American weakness at every turn.

Presidents Ronald Regan and George W. Bush deterred the nation’s enemies by inflicting unacceptable losses, backed by overwhelming military and economic capacity. Operation El Dorado Canyon missed killing Muammar Gaddafi by minutes. The US Air Force enforced no fly zones over Iraq for a decade to punish and contain Saddam Hussein. After the American removal of Saddam, Gaddafi opted out of the extended axis of evil, voluntarily eliminating his weapons of mass destruction programs and long-range ballistic missiles. Even President Bill Clinton “went downtown” bombing Serbian power plants and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s cronies. Instead, Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden bribed Iran and put the United States only twelve days away from an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Iranian instigated attacks in the region can no longer be met with impotence and half measures. Swift decisive American action directly against Iran is now essential. Drone attacks on American forces call for the prompt destruction of Iranian drone production facilities and IRGC command and control nodes inside Iran. Harassment of international shipping and attacks on US naval vessels require the destruction of Iranian naval forces and oil-exporting infrastructure.

Chamberlain was wrong in 1939 and his disciples are wrong today. Iran is an implacable foe, and it must be de-fanged. America must make rational choices based on reality. The Mullahs began their war against the US on November 4, 1979. After 45 years, the only rational strategy is to eliminate Iran as an existential threat.

The immediate elimination of the Iranian nuclear program is a necessity. Anything less is delaying an inevitable conflict with a nuclear-armed enemy determined to kill Americans and incinerate Israel.

Colonel (Ret.) Kirk Fansher (USAF) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

The US Is Undermining Deterrence with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

The escalating tensions with Iran present a serious problem that cannot be ignored. The continued attacks on American troops by Iranian proxies underscores the urgent need for the Biden administration to define and communicate clear red lines to prevent further acts of aggression and protect the lives of American military personnel in the region.

 The Need for Red Lines

 Firstly, the absence of a defined red lines allows Iran to push the boundaries of acceptable behavior without facing substantial consequences. Currently the Biden administration is “weighing responses” to the attack. However, red lines were required once the administration entered office. Iran needed a clear picture of aggression’s consequences, especially aggression causing American casualties. This continued lack of clarity from the administration not only undermines the safety of American soldiers but also weakens the credibility of the United States on the international stage. Without a clear stance, there is a risk of further attacks and a wider regional conflict.

Secondly, defined red lines serve as a deterrent, signaling to Iran that the United States will not tolerate attacks on its military personnel. Establishing such boundaries is essential to maintaining stability in the region and preventing an escalation that can have far-reaching consequences. This sends a powerful message that acts of violence will not go unanswered, fostering a more secure and predictable relationship.

Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding American responses can embolden other hostile actors in the region and elsewhere to test the waters. Clear red lines are not only about dealing with Iran but also about deterring other potential aggressors and ensuring that the United States is perceived as steadfast and resolute in defending its interests. The Biden administration must follow through on any violations of red lines to solidify credibility.

 The American Response

 To address this critical issue, the Biden administration must take decisive action. First, it is imperative to communicate clear and non-negotiable red lines to Iran, making it unequivocally clear that attacks on American soldiers will trigger severe consequences. Simultaneously, diplomatic engagement with Iran is needed to convey the seriousness of the American position, emphasizing the importance of de-escalation and constructive dialogue—but always backed by the threat of overwhelming violence.

However, to fortify its position and respond effectively to the heightened tensions with Iran, the United States must go beyond diplomatic initiatives and reinforce its military capabilities in the region. The US should bolster its military presence, which serves as both a deterrent and a tangible demonstration of the nation’s commitment to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its troops and allies. A visible and formidable American military presence sends a powerful signal, not only to Iran but to the entire region. The United States is prepared to defend its interests and respond decisively to any acts of aggression.

Additionally, the US must respond forcibly to the recent attack. As William Wechsler recently argued, it should be done in ways to avoid a wider regional war from occurring. Matthew Kroenig, however, suggests the United States can incapacitate the Iranian navy. It could conduct strikes on Iranian naval bases or even emulate former President Donald Trump’s approach by targeting Iranian leadership, as demonstrated in the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. Additionally, the Biden administration should consider the option of striking and dismantling Iran’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons, especially considering American officials believe Iran can build a bomb in roughly twelve days.

Lastly, strengthening alliances with regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, etc.) is another pivotal aspect of a comprehensive strategy that the Biden administration should pursue. Solidifying a unified front with its allies and friends in the Middle East fosters a collaborative approach to regional security. Collective efforts enable the sharing of intelligence, joint military exercises, and coordinated responses to potential threats. Such partnerships not only enhance the effectiveness of American actions but also contribute to regional stability by creating a cohesive and united response to aggression from Iran and its proxies.

Ultimately, well-defined red lines, coupled with a robust response to aggression, is essential for safeguarding American lives and maintaining stability in the Middle East. President Biden must seize the opportunity to demonstrate strength, resilience, and a commitment to protecting American interests in the face of escalating threats. If he fails to do so, deterrence will continue to falter, and attacks on American troops will continue to escalate. The stakes are high and clear red lines coupled with strict enforcement is the first step toward ensuring the US protects its interests within the region and enhances the credibility to deter further aggression.

 Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the teams take the field, their profiles are worth noting. After all, they each bring a different style of play to the field of competition.

The United States

The United States is a titan of technological innovation and military prowess. With a defense apparatus that leverages cutting-edge technology, including cyber capabilities, stealth technology, and unmanned systems, the Americans exemplify agility both in thought and action.

Its strength lies not just in its superior hardware but in its ability to integrate information warfare, space dominance, and artificial intelligence to outpace and outthink its adversaries. These strengths are also seen as weaknesses by the opponent, which they plan to exploit.

The Challengers

On the other side, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea form an axis of strategic adversaries. Each brings unique strengths to the table. What holds this team together is shared desire to defeat the United States.

China, with its rapid military modernization and significant advancements in areas like hypersonic weapons and space technology, poses a multidimensional threat. With the second largest economy in the world and a population only rivaled by India, is should come as no surprise that China finds itself in the Super Bowl of Deterrence.

Russia, seasoned in electronic warfare, unconventional strategies, and disinformation brings a wealth of experience in disrupting adversary operations. Although Russia’s performance shows a weakened player, the United States can never forget Russia’s trump card, which it has yet to play.

Iran, with its asymmetric warfare tactics, proxies, and extensive international network, excels in creating unpredictable challenges. In short, Iran is an agent of chaos on the field.

North Korea, as the smallest player on the field, adds a wildcard element with its nuclear capabilities and cyber warfare tactics. America’s advantage against North Korea is that the North Korean objective is a simple one: preserve the regime.

The Game Plan

The Super Bowl of Deterrence is not won by brute force alone but by the ability to disrupt the adversary’s decision cycle and achieve strategic overmatch. In many respects it is like a game of chess, where the objective is to force the other player into a position where the only option is defeat.

The US strategy hinges on its agility and technological edge, aiming to outmaneuver its opponents by disrupting their communications, blinding their sensors, and sowing confusion within their ranks. This game is about anticipation, where the US seeks to predict and counter its adversaries’ moves before they can execute, effectively scoring preemptive strikes in this lethal contest of wits and will.

The autocrats have a simple game plan: prevent the United States from moving forces into the region by making them blind, deaf, and dumb through cyberattacks on command-and-control systems and the American military’s logistics network. Attacks on American space assets is also a key element of the autocrat strategy.

Role of Allies and Partnerships

In this complex game, American allies and global partners play a crucial role, akin to the role played by special teams. The US leverages its network of alliances and partnerships to extend its reach, gather intelligence, and coordinate actions that pressure and isolate the opposing side. These relationships enhance the United States’ strategic positioning, providing logistical support and enabling joint operations that amplify its power-projection capabilities.

The autocrats do not have a similar set of alliances and partnerships. With their team built on a mutual desire to defeat the United States, the same level of trust and cooperation the United States has with its allies does not exist. Thus, team cohesion is tenuous.

Conditions for Victory

Victory in the Super Bowl of Deterrence is measured not in points on a scoreboard but in the ability to maintain global stability and prevent conflict. The ultimate goal for the United States is to deter aggression and ensure that its adversaries think twice before acting. This requires a delicate balance of showing strength without escalating tensions unnecessarily. This includes employing a mix of diplomacy, economic power, and military forces to maintain the status quo and protect national interests.

For the autocrats, victory is the toppling of the American-led international order. The asymmetry of interest in the contest means that the two teams will play a very different game for very different purposes. The dynamics of this contest are inherently unpredictable. Just as in football, where a single play can change the outcome of the game, the Super Bowl of Deterrence is fraught with uncertainties. Technological advancements, shifts in global politics, and unexpected moves by any player can alter the strategic landscape, requiring constant vigilance and adaptation by all involved.

Conclusion

The Super Bowl of Deterrence stands as a testament to the importance of strategy, technological supremacy, and the human element in the quest for global security. In this game, the stakes are immeasurably high, and the consequences of failure are real. Through agility, innovation, and strategic partnerships, the United States is positioned well and viewed by its opponent as a formidable contender that is ready to defend its title and ensure peace in an ever-changing world.

This epic contest is a vivid reminder that in the arena of global security, the game is always on, and victory favors the prepared, agile, and resilient. Like football, good intentions mean nothing. Preparation and capability mean everything.

Greg Sharpe is the Director of Communications and Marketing at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The Super Bowl of Deterrence: The Ultimate Showdown in Strategic Overmatch was originally published on Global Security Review.

The article’s opening line sets the articles tone, “The world is entering a dangerous nuclear arms race unlike anything since the first atomic bomb, but it does not have to end in catastrophe.” The problem with this assertion is twofold.

First, the one example of nuclear arms racing we saw, which took place between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was likely responsible for the fact that the two great power never fought World War III. Rather than sparking conflict, the arms race deterred it.

Second, what is happening today is in no way comparable to the Cold War arms race, which saw global nuclear arms climb to a total of 63,632 fielded weapons in 1985. According to the Washington Post, the Russians field 1,588 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 1,912 tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese number is less well known but the Department of Defense’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023) estimates the People’s Liberation Army fields about 500 nuclear weapons and will field about 1,500 by 2035. The same Washington Post article suggests the United States fields 1,644 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—with no plans for growing the size of the American arsenal.

This about a 90 percent reduction in the number of fielded nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States removed more than 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe between 1991 and 1993.

This means that the number of deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the three major powers sits at about 5,050 weapons. If you include the arsenals of India, Pakistan, North Korea, France, and the United Kingdom, the number rises to about 6,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons.

It is hard to compare what is taking place today with what occurred during the Cold War. For an arms race to take place, there must be participants. The Biden administration has made it very clear; the United States will not increase the size of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. Russia has the capacity to expand its arsenal rapidly. China is doing just that. The United States is sitting in the stands and watching its adversaries.

The editorial board then laments the lack of arms control agreements to prevent adversaries, the Chinese in particular, from growing the size of arsenal. If the editorial board shares the view of many within the arms control community, then they too incorrectly assume that all arms control agreements are inherently good and stabilizing. In reality, arms control agreements are only good when they advance the United States’ national interest, which is not synonymous with their very existence.

When you take into account Russian violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Opens Skies, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and likely violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the at all costs desire for arms control with Russia is too often a bad deal for the United States that sees the nation constrain its military capability while the Russian buy time to overcome military weakness.

In short, arms control for arms control sake is neither an inherent American interest, nor is it inherently stabilizing.

The editorial board also places great hope in recent meetings between the United States and China in which arms control was discussed. What the editorial board’s article fails to reveal is that the November talks were an utter failure in which the Chinese made it clear that no arms control agreement is possible.

Finally, there is a mistaken and unsubstantiated belief that more nuclear weapons is inherently destabilizing. This idea is not born out by the historical record. A careful reading of Cold War history makes it clear that the large Soviet and American nuclear arsenals of the era caused leaders in both the United States and Soviet Union to exercise great caution, avoid provocative actions, and demonstrate restraint in the face of uncertainty.

It is not strength that is provocative but weakness. If the United States seeks to ensure nuclear weapons are never used, it should meet the threat head on and follow the recommendations of the bi-partisan Strategic Posture Commission Report. Authoritarians respect strength. It is time the United States shifts from blind optimism to just that.

Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Curtis McGiffin in the Vice President for Education and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

FTO designations can be assigned to groups if they meet three criteria under U.S. Code §1189—the group must be foreign, engaged in terrorist activity, and threaten U.S. national security. By labeling a group as an FTO, the United States creates extraterritorial criminal and civil liability for parties engaged in providing them with material support. There are currently 73 groups listed, and their status is reviewed every five years by the U.S. State Department.

Maintaining the FTO designation applies political pressure on states that interact with the IRGC—namely Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—to significantly alter their relationships or risk international pariah status. The Iranian marketplace becomes dangerous for prospective business partners, as any dealings with the country could be perceived as IRGC financing since it is state-sponsored. Designations also clarify U.S. attitudes toward international actors and let Iran know that the actions of its paramilitary organization are not tolerated by the United States, irrespective of any future diplomatic re-engagement.

FTO de-designations are less common, with the United States removing only 15 groups from the list since its inception. In most de-designation cases, the groups have been removed due to their outright disbandment, which would not be the case with a de-designation of the IRGC. Attempts to remove groups still active from the list, such as the Houthis, have had negative consequences for U.S. national security.

In February 2021, the United States removed the FTO label from the Houthis, a Yemeni Shi’ite militia group that receives direct funding from the IRGC. The purpose of this de-designation was to better provide Yemeni civilians with humanitarian aid. The designation made it difficult for human rights groups and charitable individuals to donate food, medical supplies, and money while a Saudi-led blockade effectively starved the country. However, the Houthis did not provide any concessions, and less than a year later, the group took advantage of this gesture by launching drone strikes on the United Arab Emirates.

The backlash to this attack was swift. Within the month, the Saudis and Emiratis worked together to conduct lethal airstrikes on the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. The Houthis, using Iranian-supplied weapons, responded with strikes on Saudi airports and other civilian locations. The U.S. Treasury Department subsequently crafted new sanctions on the Houthis’ financial network, implicating the IRGC by name. De-designating the IRGC to return to a nuclear deal would send mixed messages from the Biden administration to the Arab world and encourage Iran to spend its newly sanctions-free assets on more excellent militia investment to counter Sunni influence.

Not only will the UAE and the Saudis feel abandoned by the United States if it takes this course of action, but Israel will also question the sincerity of the United States in its stated goal to preserve Israeli sovereignty, which Iran doesn’t recognize. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei demands that “all Muslims must fight until the annihilation of Israel,” and easing Tehran’s ability to supply its most extreme fighting force with outside money will get the regime closer to that goal.

Instead of dropping the IRGC’s FTO designation without concessions, the United States should consider publicizing the non-statutory factors involved in assigning such a designation. This action would inform the international community about the objective criteria involved in U.S. counterterrorism strategies and prevent Washington from appearing disorganized on designation issues between presidential administrations.

Iran’s recent budget and presidential cabinet appointments should inform the Biden administration that a nuclear agreement will not change Iran’s priorities to support the IRGC at the expense of the civilian population. Iran is spending more on the Guards than ever before. Removing the red tape around the IRGC as it expands its research and weapons production capacities would betray close relationships that have taken decades to build. No nuclear agreement should impact the FTO de-designation process, and past conduct by the Houthis justifies the hesitancy to cave to Iranian demands. Removing the label of terrorism should take effort on behalf of the offending party, something the Islamic Republic is unwilling to provide.

A New Nuclear Deal with Iran Shouldn’t Be Accompanied by Terrorist Legitimization was originally published on Global Security Review.

Voting for him seemed like the only chance for Iranians to end the corruption and mass murder of the post-revolution years. But, sadly, the more Khatami grew in his presidential role, the more distant he became from the people and the more obedient to the Supreme Leader. Although he later denied it, before the end of his presidency, he said: “the president is no more than a middleman in Iran.”

By now, the United States seems to be realizing that too, albeit very late. Khatami left in 2005, with a legacy of student arrest and murder and the raid on Tehran University in 1998. His successors Ahmadinejad and Rouhani and their record of repression are much the same.

The Iranian people carry the trauma of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. However, it is clear that they do not want another war, and the low voter turnout of the recent election sends a clear message that they do not support the regime, either. Starting with the people inside Iran, promoted by the Iranian diaspora abroad, the virtual campaign of #NO2IRI paid off and should be a wake-up call for Iranian authorities.

Resentment against the regime is high, and its reasons are abundant. The Iranian people are suffocating from shooting citizens on the streets in November 2020 to shooting down Ukrainian flight PF752 with missiles. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suppressing human rights for over 40 years. First, the mass cleansing of the opposition inside Iran in the 80s, enforcing anti-women and anti-freedom regulations and then targeting dissidents abroad in the 90s. Today, complete control of state media and social media filtering put freedom at risk more than ever. One must either express support for the regime or say nothing at all.

So if Iranians want neither this regime nor war, what do they want?

Iranians may have taken part in the 1979 revolution, but the outcome blindsided them. Today, they blame President Carter for his lack of support to back the Shah. Thirty years later, in 2009, they blamed President Obama for not standing firm on the Green Movement protests. President Obama regrets the same in his book, “A Promised Land.” Rightfully, Iranians are terrified that President Biden will sacrifice them to make a weak deal with a rogue regime. In his first presidential interview, new President Raisi said, “He will not meet with the U.S. President.”

The United States should not be afraid of the regime. The Iranian people showed their courage by staying home and not participating in a predetermined election. The U.S. should do the same by standing high on the foundation of America: democracy and freedom for all.

President Biden and his national security team have the chance, for the first time since the revolution, to make it right with the people of Iran:

1. The U.S. can and should add all human rights demands to the negotiating table in Vienna and stand by them. Such demands should go beyond merely asking to free American hostages in Iran. They must include higher international law standards, such as prevention of torture and access to free and fair trials, equal rights for women, minorities, and LGBTQs. Iran will not like it and claim domestic sovereignty, but it too signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945. Human rights for all is what President Biden has promised. With his leadership, the Europeans will follow.
2. The White House should support the Iranian people in every way short of the use of force. Iranians want the President to condemn regime atrocities strongly. Since January 2021, the State Department Farsi section has lost followers on social media. Human rights content is far more critical than scattered messages on Jazz or birthday wishes. The State Department should transform its Farsi page and tailor it to the target audience of Iranians. Information on fundamental human rights and needs, privacy protection, and accessible VPNs should be the contents of USABEHFARSI. It is wrong to think the U.S. will blame the people by supporting them. The Iranian regime always blames the U.S; the U.S. should always stand by what is right and what the regime despises.
3. The word on the ground among the Iranian diaspora is that Iran lobby groups such as NIAC (National Iranian American Council) did not establish themselves independently and that the CIA played a role in setting them up as a concession to the regime. The U.S. government should set the record straight, denounce these regime lobby groups, and stay as far from them as it can. These groups have only worked against U.S. interests and the regime in the last decade.
4. The U.S. Justice Department’s actions against Iranian malign activities should go beyond shutting down IRGC websites. Instead, it should focus on those individuals who create division and hate among Americans, claiming the U.S. is at fault for everything wrong in Iran. A specific Task Force is now needed to target those individuals, their travel, and finances.
5. Meeting with Iranian groups from all perspectives must be a top priority within the State Department. In the last decade, the regime lobby groups have gotten close enough to the U.S. government and bought time for the regime. This should change, and the U.S. should hear out everybody.

The path ahead for the United States to deal with the Iranian government is neither war nor fruitless diplomacy, rather fierce advocacy for human rights and the freedom of the Iranian people. The regime has the money and the tools of repression, but it doesn’t have the people’s support.

The United States now has the chance to do the right thing for the people of Iran. The regime needs to know the world is watching. The Iranian people will surprise themselves and the world with their courage to change and a better future.

The JCPOA is Dead—Renewal Not Required was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, the United States held an unparalleled political, economic, and military position in the post-communist era. For nearly three decades, liberal values propped up by an unrivaled technological superiority outpaced its European allies and dwarfed the concerted efforts of Asian and Latin American developing nations. International organizations, such as NATO, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization facilitated cooperation among nations and created incentives for states to work together.^[i] Consecutive international agreements, treaties, and conventions aimed to stabilize regions, resolve disputes and deep conflicts of interest, and remedy residual power imbalances which thwarted institutional cohesion and domestic prosperity. The rising tides of economic globalization promised to lift all boats. 

Yet, “instead of a peaceful world order and near-universal acceptance of benevolent U.S. leadership,” as one well-regarded international scholars has indicated, “the post-Cold War world continued to operate according to the more traditional dictates of realpolitik”^[ii] necessitating extensive budgetary commitments to the U.S. security and military. The increase in total global wealth failed to sufficiently proof emerging democracies against the likelihood of war and the 2001 treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and China came to yield contrasting dividends in 2020. The U.S.’ “constructive relationship” with China and a “special relationship” with Russia have been outpaced by Chinese appropriation and near-monopolistic power over global supply chains, aggressive Russian exercise missions in the Arctic, the Baltic, and the outer space, and further exacerbated by the pandemic-affected social, political, and economic realities on the ground. 

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The National Defense Strategies issued in the past three years have acknowledged an “increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order.”^[iii] For the authors of the NDS 2018, it has become gradually more apparent that China and Russia strive to shape a world that is consistent with their authoritarian model, while Iran and North Korea seek to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage by seeking nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional weapons.^[iv]

The new millennium has thus been marked by rapid technological and social change provoking geopolitical realignments, regional power struggles, and unabated military, research, and economic rivalry. The United States recognizes that international strategic competition between trade partners as well as political foes is on the rise and that it must adjust its national security and defense strategies to unilaterally meet the emerging challenges.^[v]

What’s at issue

In the next great power competition, traditional forms of kinetic warfare will undoubtedly give way to simulated but not less effective non-military methods involving close collaboration between civilian and military sectors of the economy and society. These phantom warfare scenarios will likely occur in the cybersphere through unmanned agents of surveillance, manipulation of algorithmic data, and advanced use of Artificial Intelligence and drone technologies. Scientific advances will breed a new generation of sophisticated biotechnologies enabling synthetic engineering of pathogens and biological compounds which will permanently alter the national security landscape and their use for offensive and defensive purposes, will make the conduct of future conflicts a permanent feature in the military toolkit of industrialized and highly developed nations as well as developing and rising or revisionist powers seeking strategic advantage via non-traditional means. 

The resulting cool war – or “an on-going conflict that involves constant offensive measures that seek to damage the economic health of a rival and the targeting of ‘cutting edge technologies’”^[vi] – sets as its goal the maintenance of a stable thermal equilibrium preventing the conflict from turning hot or resulting in full kinetic or nuclear engagement. 

Non-kinetic violence unleashed to maximize political and economic goals will be accompanied by a considerable diffusion of power across networks of state and non-state actors capable of inflicting damage to vital state interests without the possibility of being traced, actively monitored, or prevented by current legal and extra-legal systems in place. Future theaters or war will undoubtedly blur conventional lines of distinction drawn in international law between civilians and combatants, international and non-international conflicts as well as challenge states’ responses to asymmetric warfare and the degree of proportionality required to effectively repel unconventional attacks on state-owned infrastructure and resources.

The post-9/11 intelligence threat assessments focused heavily on biological weapons in the hands of terrorist groups. Substances such as anthrax, smallpox, and other conventional biological agents comprised a list of the most likely culprits instigating terror on a global scale. As late as 2017, Homeland Security cited concerns with threats of bioterrorism which included high-profile disease outbreaks, such as Ebola and viruses like dengue, chikungunya, and Zika.^[vii] Highly virulent compounds and substances resulting from marked improvements in nanotechnologies and bio-engineering can also constitute a novel form of asymmetrical “hybrid” conflict defined by the NATO 2014 Wales Summit Declaration as a specific set of challenges and threats (including cyber and terrorism) “where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.”^[viii]

There is a reason, therefore, to assume that bio- incidents will, in the future as much as they had in their disreputable past, become once again more fully integrated into the “hybrid” warfare design and constitute, along with cyber and terrorism, a (re)emerging threat paradigm in the new state-power competition. 

The White House’s 2018 Biodefense Strategy in alignment with the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies biological threats – whether naturally, occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin – as among the most serious challenges facing the United States and the international community.^[ix] The document puts significant emphasis on enhancing the national bio-defense enterprise to protect the United States and its partners abroad from biological incidents. It sets out five goals and objectives for ameliorating the risks stemming from the evolving biological risk landscape. They are: (i) Enabling risk awareness to inform decision-making across the bio-defense enterprise; (ii) Ensuring bio-defense capabilities to prevent bio-incidents; (iii) Ensuring bio-defense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bio-incidents; (iv) Rapidly responding to limit the impacts of bio-incidents; (v) Facilitating recovery to restore the community, the economy, and the environment after a bio-incident. 

The United States Government Accountability Office’s “National Biodefense Strategy” report underscored, however, several lapses in the 2018 Biodefense Strategy Report, such as lack of “clearly documented methods, guidance, processes, and roles and responsibilities for enterprise-wide decision-making”^[x] complicating coordination of response mechanisms to bio-incidents thus putting the initiative in danger of failing to meet its long-term bio-defense objectives. 

In recognition of the changing threat environment, the Trump Administration’s 2021 budget priority requests call for $740.5 billion for national security, $705.4 billion of which will be dedicated to the Department of Defense’s investment priorities, which include building a more lethal, agile, and innovative joint force.^[xi]

An overview of funds allocation demonstrates an emphasis on traditional tools and methods of warfare, such as nuclear modernization ($28.9 billion), missile defeat and defense ($20.3 billion); munitions ($21.3 billion) as well as newer frontiers of potential conflict, including cyberspace ($9.8 billion) and the space domain ($18.0 billion). The proposed budget also anticipates expenditures in bio-research but does not explicitly support or articulate specific bio-weapons defense research and development objectives. Its investments in bio-technologies focus on (1) “$1.3 billion for the Agricultural Research Service, which conducts in-house basic and applied research, develop vaccines, and provide enhanced diagnostic capabilities to protect against emerging foreign animal and zoonotic diseases that threaten the Nation’s food supply, agricultural economy, and public health.”^[xii] (2) “$14 billion investment in DOD science and technology programs that support key investments in industries of the future, such as artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and biotechnology.” (3) “HHS bio-defense and emergency preparedness procurement through the BioShield program and the Strategic National Stockpile, and includes $175 million to support Centers for Disease Control’s global health security activities, an increase of $50 million compared to the 2020 enacted level.”^[xiii]

The United States continues to invest heavily in medical intelligence under the auspices of the Department of Defense to monitor the research terrain in order to identify the known knowns and known unknowns.

Bio-events: Who’s in Charge?

The Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture have been tasked with bio-surveillance responsibilities, which include developing personnel, training, equipment, and systems to support a national bio-surveillance capability.^[xiv] As of May 2020, Homeland Security has been working on future-oriented enhancements comprising of: 

1. The Enhanced Passive Surveillance program geared toward delivering a “surveillance system for identifying endemic, transboundary and emerging disease outbreaks in livestock…and  identify trigger points to alert officials for action.” 
2. The BioThreat Awareness APEX program will “develop affordable, effective and rapid detection systems and architectures to provide advance warning of a biological attack at indoor, outdoor and national security events.” 
3. The Bio-surveillance Information and Knowledge Integration Program seeks to develop a Community of Practice (COP) Platform prototype that integrates multiple data streams to support decision making during a biological event as well as inform training tools for state responders.”^[xv]

The programs here enumerated aim to complement the existing systems in place, including the BioWatch program managed by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs monitoring aerosol releases of select biological agents, natural and man-made as well as the Department of Defense’s Airbase/Port Detector System or Portal Shield System designed to provide early warning of biological threats to high-value assets, such as air bases and port facilities.^[xvi]

The 2010 Report to Congress issued by the US Government Accountability Office claims, however, that “there is neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a focal point with the authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national bio-surveillance capability” and that “efforts to develop a bio-surveillance system could benefit from a focal point that provides leadership for the interagency community.”^[xvii]