

## Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb

By

Joe Buff

Iran is now “[closer than ever](#)” to having nuclear weapons, which should “[alarm](#)” every American. Given Iran’s professed [genocidal](#) objectives toward Israel, Tehran’s [terrorism-sponsoring](#) regime should never be allowed to get nuclear arms.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in [2007](#) and [2023](#) offer no evidence of success. [Experts now say](#) Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in [Iraq](#) in 1981 and [Syria](#) in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at [Natanz](#) and [Furdow](#) should be neutralized with [GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator](#) ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their [adits](#) (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop [North Korea](#) from getting the bomb. [Words and tighter sanctions](#) will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a [disruptive, warmongering, rogue state](#). Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical [sect](#) that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to [Paradise](#). Iran’s leaders [promise](#) to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the [Cuban Missile Crisis](#). A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their [extremist ideology](#). Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective [nuclear counterterrorism](#).

Both [Russia](#) and [China](#) have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s [Arab neighbors](#). They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

[North Korea](#) shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali [Khamenei](#) surely realizes, “Israel is a [one-bomb](#) country” because of its [small size](#). This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated [sleight of hand](#) to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran's latest [threats](#) to attack Israel's nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran's nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran's covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and [October 7, 2023](#)—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine [approach](#) to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely [4 percent](#) of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck...or a camel...or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel's cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “[mowing the grass](#),” or [reticent watchful waiting](#), are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman [recently said](#), “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu [recently said](#), “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need [more lectures](#) about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

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