At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.

Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.

A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and strategic autonomy. Within this context, Turkey’s declared goal to develop long-range ballistic capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.

We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.

Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either restrict access to advanced weapons capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with arms embargoes, sanctions, and restrictions imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey’s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.

Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.

Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its National Technology Initiative, is part of a larger investment in civilian space and satellite launch initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in Somalia, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.

Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by Turkish officials criticizing the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM capable of carrying a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.

The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and develop its own nuclear capabilities—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its new doctrine of “forward deterrence,” which advocates for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both Poland and Germany have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.

At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.

Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.

Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relationship between the federal government and American universities is tense and often misunderstood. The gap between the purposes and priorities of government, on one side, and the missions and functions of universities, on the other, is alarming.

Historically, the United States has relied on its colleges and universities for several things critical to national defense. First, higher education produces a more educated work force for a globally competitive marketplace. Second, advanced learning fills federal, state, and local government positions that citizens rely on for necessary services. Third, the military and civilian defense establishments require leaders who understand the science and engineering behind modern weapons. Future defense and national security leaders must also understand the American military experience and the relationship between the armed forces and society.

The current and prospective international system is one that poses a wide variety of threats to world peace and international order. U.S. armed forces will be tasked for deterrence and war fighting missions across the entire spectrum of conflict,  from nuclear weapons spread and the possibility of war in space, to the nuances of urban terrorism and counterinsurgency. Officers who rise to senior command will need the perspective of innovators and adaptors, sometimes improvising in combat when exigent conditions override old rules of engagement.

As technology advances and the geostrategic environment grows more complicated, the United States will need a stronger educational establishment to compete with China and other rising powers. Nowhere in Europe or among major Asian military powers is national education under such crossfire as it is in the United States today. How did we get here, and what is to be done?

A primary cause of the war against American education is the perception among politicians, activists, and journalists that higher education has been colonized by radicals who hate America, misrepresent its history, and aim to produce dissidents who attack traditional culture and values, including patriotism and military service. This narrative has spread through misleading political campaigns, indifferent media coverage, and, unfortunately, some missteps by educators themselves.

At the center of this narrative is conflict between the Trump administration and Ivy League universities where demonstrations included violence and charges of antisemitism. Coverage of episodes at Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia has emphasized the behavior of a small percentage of students, sometimes supported by nonstudents and outside money, and overlooked the far larger share of students and faculty who avoid political violence and intimidation.

Admittedly, some leaders in higher education were slow to confront agitators who crossed the line between permissible speech and harassment. On July 24, 2025, Columbia University announced a settlement with the Trump administration: $220 million in fines in exchange for an end to attacks on Columbia’s federally funded research program. Some commentators and observers saw a dangerous precedent; others preferred Harvard’s decision to litigate. Acting Columbia President Claire Shipman argued the agreement was needed to prevent further disruption, and possible destruction, of the broader research enterprise. Whatever the outcome, we are far from the day President John F. Kennedy, at Yale’s 1962 commencement, joked that he enjoyed the best of both worlds: a Harvard education and a Yale degree.

Attacks on higher education also suggest that students, faculty, and administrators are elitists out of touch with Middle America. In fact, most students that attend public institutions come from middle class families, and do not learn their basic values from professors. Values are learned years before college through family and other primary groups. Professors rarely convert diehard conservatives into liberals, or vice versa. Radicals who break the law and violate campus codes are seldom motivated by instructors and more often they are encouraged and funded by activists who move from campus to campus. For example, antisemitism at some universities has been fueled by provocateurs exploiting student concern for non-terrorist Palestinians in Gaza while mischaracterizing Israel’s response to the October 7, 2023, attacks.

Administrators can also be faulted for negligence in defending First Amendment rights and for suppressing speech on spurious grounds. Unlike high school students, most college students are legal adults. They have the right to use confrontational rhetoric and provocative discourse protected by the First Amendment, however infuriating it may be. Too many universities have come to see themselves as providers of reassurance and guarantors of good feeling, backing that impulse with coercive training and sanctions against so-called offensive remarks inside and outside the classroom. The result is an atmosphere in which conversation is reduced to clichés and the celebration of the obvious instead of the clash of ideas from which great minds are molded.

It is an irony that more cut-and-thrust classroom testing of ideas can be found in some U.S. military war colleges and service academies than in many civilian institutions. Even there, however, trends toward government micro-management of curricula and textbook selection are troubling. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia since the February 2022 invasion is lesson to be learned in this debate: Ukraine turned a failed coup de main into a war of attrition through determination, drones, better intelligence, and a faster OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) than Russia.

Going forward, educators, politicians, warriors and voters will have to decide: do we want rigorous and results-oriented learning experiences for our future generations of leaders, or, instead, do we prefer ritualized feelgood rites of passage that will produce generations of intellectual bobbleheads majoring in conspicuous consumption?

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The Halls of Ivy and National Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.

Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on Nigerian soil and the deployment of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.

The Mosul Parallel

Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly 50,000 ghost soldiers on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. Leaked UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. Transparency International gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.

The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years deployed without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.

ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor

ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically destroyed forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP intercepted his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.

The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved Lakurawa, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded attack on Nigerian soil in 2025.

The Air Power Deficit

The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians killed in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The February 2026 Woro massacre showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.

External Partners and the Limits of Assistance

The United States launched 16 Tomahawk cruise missiles against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. CSIS assessed that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.

The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus

Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.

A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an estimated $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated $1.42 billion in ransom in a single year.

Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.

Outlook

The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes 5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion). However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.

Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.

Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic & Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hollow Ranks & Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria’s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.

This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against manned armored vehicles which are now routinely labelled as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several rudimentary measures like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted jammers have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.

Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as cost effective alternative vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, torpedo, and even smaller drones, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan innovatively employed aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression & Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.

However, the inherent limitations of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption and have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.

In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides sinking multiple Russian warships in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an underwater suicide drone. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.

Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled American, British, French, and German warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in pre-mature withdrawal. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.

Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian Andrea Doria class destroyer shot down an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using DART projectiles fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, high-energy lasers (HELs) onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, soft-kill measures such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.

In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to outclass adversary air-defenses, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.

The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.

Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.

Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Judicial reform for many post-socialist countries is an ongoing process. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw several Eastern European states embark on a journey to integrate into the EU, facing extensive pressure to conform to more stringent standards of judicial independence and rule of law. Anti-corruption campaigns have become central to this effort, particularly across the Balkans. Yet the question remains, “How can governments pursue aggressive anti-corruption prosecutions while still safeguarding democratic justice systems?”

Pressure increased significantly in February of 2018 when the EU–Western Balkans Strategy was adopted. This ramped up pressures through the introduction of comprehensive rule-of-law initiatives. Regional judicial overhauls commenced, with efforts to create specialized anti-corruption bodies taking center stage, whereas structural judicial changes in each country have often been paired with anti-corruption efforts encouraged by the EU. The aim of these efforts has been the eradication of entrenched exploitative networks. As a cursory review of these processes reveal, reform can often create new imbalances.

The case of Albania is one example. There was a time when Tirana was depicted as a leader for EU accession. Indeed, the country commenced one of the region’s most ambitious justice reforms, with extensive international support from the U.S. and the EU, with the centerpiece of this new anti-corruption architecture being the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK), established in 2019.

Highlighting the extent of the involvement of actors from outside the EU, this institution was created with assistance from USAID and the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), also played supporting roles, creating a structure that would resemble that of the FBI.

SPAK was intended to strengthen investigative capacity, supporting broader rule-of-law reforms and civil society oversight. SPAK was depicted as a landmark achievement capable of accelerating the country’s path toward EU membership, however SPAK has increasingly become the subject of debate. Possessing the mechanism and budgets to combat corruption the challenge facing Albania today is how to ensure the methods used remain consistent with rule-of-law principles.

Fighting corruption does not produce immediate results. Institutional restraint and procedural fairness are required. Concerns have grown that the sweeping powers granted to anti-corruption prosecutors risk undermining these very safeguards. Congressman Keith Self  noted that Albania’s judicial reforms have created delays of 8 to 15 years, a backlog that “undermines the rule of law, public trust, and due process.” Systemic delays illustrate how institutional reforms are not a catchall solution.

An area of particular concern is the expanded use of pretrial detention, which usually serves as an exceptional measure when courts determine there to be a genuine flight risk, threat of interference with an investigation, or threat to public safety. In Albania this has increasingly become a routine prosecutorial tool.

The case of Tirana mayor Erion Veliaj illustrates the controversy. Veliaj was detained by SPAK over a year ago, while to date, no formal charges have been levied. He continues to be held without bail, with another postponement in March 2026, and prevented from being able to perform his municipal duties. Veliaj’s detention, and that of other elected officials, presents a governance dilemma.

When elected officials are held for extended periods without conviction, public service becomes inhibited and voters disenfranchised. Tirana’s Council of Ministers attempted to remove Veliaj from office after three months of detention but the Constitutional Court later reinstated him as mayor, ruling that elected officials cannot be removed from office solely due to being detained.

Similar controversies have emerged in Turkey, where the detention, and trial of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, has been criticized as politically motivated. In Bulgaria, the detention of Varna mayor Blagomir Kotsev sparked nationwide protests. Although each case must be seen within its own political context, together they illustrate a broader tension between anti-corruption enforcement and democratic governance.

A November 20, 2025, Washington Post article described Albania’s approach as an example of “muscular prosecution,” as part of which Albania seems to emphasize that no one should be above the law. Yet framing anti-corruption in these terms risks conflating aggressive enforcement with lawful enforcement. Effective justice systems depend not only on the vigor of prosecutions but also on strict adherence to procedural safeguards, without which the legitimacy of such prosecutions should be brought into question.

In Veliaj’s case, for example, SPAK has barred him from communication with the public. Criticisms have also been levied against the prosecution for violating the principle of equality of arms, a core judicial standard according to which all parties must have equal procedural opportunities, including access to evidence. The balance of power between prosecutors, judges, and defendants within Albania’s evolving justice system is thus brought into question.

Albania’s reliance on pretrial detention has drawn criticism from the U.S. State Department, the European Court of Human Rights, and United Nations torture prevention experts. NGOs have similarly warned about structural imbalances that leave judges reluctant to challenge anti-corruption prosecutors.

Concerns have also been raised by regional leaders. The mayors of the B40 Balkan Cities Network, representing 76 municipalities across the region, recently issued a joint letter warning of a “dangerous trend” threatening local democracy. Citing both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Venice Commission’s October 2025 report, the mayors emphasized that pretrial detention of sitting elected officials must remain a measure of last resort.

Under Albanian law, consistent with prevailing standards across the EU and the U.S., detention before trial is intended to remain exceptional. The EU, considering Albania’s accession ambitions, has a clear interest in this. At the same time, the U.S. cannot simply distance itself from an institution it helped create. Successful judicial reforms must be judged through the way institutions can uphold accountability while preserving democratic liberties. For Albania, it must reconcile the need to fight longstanding corruption while maintaining an open and fair judicial system that is acceptable to the global community.

Luka Petrović is a political analyst of Balkan descent based in Germany, with a focus on the Western Balkans, international relations, and human rights. Luka has contributed research and analysis for major international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with a focus on human rights monitoring, minority protection, and conflict-affected communities in the Balkans. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Can the Balkans Fight Corruption Without Weakening Due Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whenever the United States resorts to military force, the same question echoes through Washington and beyond: Did President Trump act within the law? Recent controversies surrounding the War Powers Resolution—especially the requirement to notify Congress—have only intensified that debate. This article steps aside from that familiar battleground. Instead, it asks a more fundamental constitutional question: would an air campaign against Iran be lawful under the United States Constitution? A careful reading suggests that the answer may well be yes.

There are two sections in Article I of the Constitution that address the authority to declare war. Clause 11 of Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning capture on land and water. It is not the only provision that discusses war-making authority.

Clause 3 of Section 10, which is rarely mentioned in war powers discussions, deprives the states of the authority to maintain a standing army or navy, or to engage in war. It is the federal government’s responsibility to provide for the nation’s common defense, with two exceptions. First, Congress may permit states to possess these powers. Second, states may go to war if they are “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

War Powers Act of 1973

Using general legislative authority, as well as power granted to it from Article I, Section 8, Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973. The Act came after frustration over the Korean War and the bombing campaign over Cambodia during the Vietnam War.

The Act creates several limitations on the President’s abilities to make war and requires: 1) a declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

“In every possible instance,” the President is required to consult with Congress prior to beginning hostilities and do so within 48 hours. Congressional approval is needed if hostilities are to continue beyond 60 days.

From a prescriptivist perspective, there are compelling arguments that certain provisions of the Act may be unconstitutional. While some argue that Congress cannot delegate its authority to make war, others argue that the Act infringes on the President’s duties as Commander in Chief. Article I, Section 10, creates exceptional circumstances for the exercise of war-making powers. Moreover, there is a strong textual argument that those powers expressly granted to the states inherently apply to the President.

Principles of Presidential War Powers

Using the two clauses of the Constitution referenced above, we can extract two principles regarding war-making authority: Consent of Congress and Imminent Danger.

1. Consent of Congress

Congress can consent in three ways. It can issue a formal declaration of war. It can also pass legislation to create conditions for the use of force. And it can give the Commander in Chief limited flexibility, as they did with the War Powers Act.

Alternatively, Congress can signal passive approval by not responding to the Presidential action at all. This last approach is controversial, but common sense and Supreme Court precedent suggest it is lawful. Moreover, Congress is the only body that can legally correct an unauthorized or undesired war. They can pass laws to restrict war-making authority, end a war, or use their impeachment power. When Congress chooses not to use these options, it is effectively granting passive consent.

2. Imminent Danger Exception

As stated in the preamble to the Constitution, the purpose of creating a constitution is to provide for the common defense of the people, among other goals. While Congress has the Article I power to declare war or legislate how the President can wage war, responsibilities are commingled. The President is the Commander in Chief per Article II, Section 2. One of the implied duties of heading the armed forces is directing them in a defensive attack or addressing imminent danger, which refers to an immediate threat that poses a risk of harm without prompt intervention. This is not a tangential power of the President, but a core constitutional power as well.

It would be ludicrous to suggest that the initial response to the War of 1812 was unauthorized because Congress could not meet to deliberate on a declaration. While it is clearly the primary duty of the federal government to repel invasion, it is also in the purview of the states to act when “actually invaded” or placed in “imminent danger.” The Founding Fathers clearly recognized the need for flexibility in responding to threats, especially in an era when communication delays were the norm. If the states are given such power in exceptional circumstances, certainly the Commander in Chief would have these powers.

What is peculiar is that the flexibility afforded to states is not restricted to times of invasion. An invasion is already an imminent danger. Neither is the exception in Section 10, Clause 3 restricted to actions on the sea for events such as intercepting a flotilla attempting to invade. It is easy to believe the Founders contemplated threats from their immediate borders with France, Britain, and Spain.

If a state had a border along a river, and an enemy nation started concentrating forces on the other bank of the river, one could argue the existence of imminent danger, especially in historic times where standing armies were statements in and of themselves.

How This Applies to Iran

There is clearly some lawful justification for offensive use of force when Congress does not provide express consent. Just War Theory and the preemption doctrine can be discussed all day long until we are blue in the face, without concluding whether the current use of force is theoretically justified. The answer is truly a matter of prudence and congressional will.

Using threats of imminent danger as justification seems to be a stretch in this scenario, particularly because many in positions of authority have hinted the imminence originates with Israel’s decision to carry out strikes and the retaliation that would bring upon American forces within the region.

One can argue that the intent of the imminent danger exception in the Constitution is limited to public defense. The War Powers Act considers imminent danger to military forces. Say that the military came across evidence of a nation trying to repeat a USS Cole-style bombing. Retaliating against that nation or striking first to reduce their capability would be the prudent thing to do, and it would be a lawful use of force under the Constitution alone, regardless of what acts of Congress say.

It is also important to consider the specific moment used to assess whether the actions are lawful. At the start of a conflict, one might not actually be in immediate danger or have given consent. Nevertheless, arguing imminent danger becomes easier in the chaos of war, especially after the first shot is fired.

It is unknown what the actual intelligence is behind the scenes, nor is it known the veracity of public comments by members of the Administration and Congress. Some say it is about nuclear weapon production, preempting retaliation that would stem from Israel’s strikes against Iran, retaliation for the alleged killings of thousands of Iranian civilians, or regime change. Others who are just as authoritative contradict these claims.

While there may be classified intelligence to the contrary, this is a rare instance in which the justification for the strikes has not been communicated to the public. Normally, the public is aware of escalating tensions and seeing the President or other officials give warnings or make demands before we see strikes. On the evening of March 3, 2026, many members of Congress took to social media to discuss their briefing on the conflict. Representatives Seth Magaziner and Stephen Lynch, Senator Richard Blumenthal, among others, indicated that the administration failed to articulate any justification, while most republicans stated support for the strikes.

Just as there is a fog of war, there is a fog of politics. Commentary is often on partisan lines; it is an election year, and members often vote against public statements, and to the chagrin of public opinion. It is also common for members to offer support privately and behind the scenes while publicly posturing against matters. What matters is what Congress does as a body. Congress has not yet revoked the President’s war-making ability. Until they do so, they are at least providing passive consent for the President to use force against Iran. While some may find the prudence of this conflict distasteful, until Congress votes otherwise, the war and that the President’s actions are lawful per the Constitution itself.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Is The Air Campaign Against Iran an Illegal Use of Force? was originally published on Global Security Review.

(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.) 

After successful US regime-change operations in Venezuela, Washington is aiming for similar endeavor again, this time in Middle East against Iran. Mass mobilization of US military assets—most notably the deployment of naval armada in the Arabia Sea, the forward deployment of Patriot air-defense system and THAAD missile defense systems, and the sudden evacuation of non-essential personnel from regional military bases, were among advanced preparatory measures by Washington for kinetic action against Iran. Amid heightening tension, few incidents preceded US military actions. Iran seized two foreign oil-tankers allegedly smuggling oil and had attempted to approach US flagged tankers. And a US Navy F-35C shot down a Shahed-139 MALE UAV in the Arabian Sea.

Amid growing tensions, hurried to leave the Persian Gulf. The US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration issued guidelines to US flagged commercial ships to keep distance from Iran’s territorial waters and reject Iranian forces permission to board ship.

It is apparent that Trump Administration does not want a prolonged war, rather a quick precise and decisive operation to facilitate regime change. The US Navy was expected to take the lead using carrier-based airpower and cruise-missile strikes from guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and nuclear guided missile attack submarines (SSGNs), followed by bombardment by US Air Force bombers flying from US mainland or from Diego Garcia.

But unlike the Venezuela operation, which was conducted in American backyard, Washington has limited territorial room available for military action against Tehran given limited territorial support by Gulf nations. Therefore, it is likely kinetic operations will be highly dependent on naval forces.

This makes complete sense. At sea, the US enjoys overwhelming technological superiority. The US Navy has an estimated nine warships in the region. Three Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) stationed in the Persian Gulf but of limited value as these vessels have little  offensive capability.

The Most prominent formation is the Carrier Battle Group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), with embarked Carrier Air-Wing Nine (CVW-9). CVW-9 boasts F-35C Lightening-II stealth fighters, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets attack aircraft, E/A-18G “Growler” electronic warfare jets, E-2D “Hawkeye” Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and MH-60R Sea Hawk Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopters. The Lincoln is accompanied by three Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke class DDGs – each armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for offensive missions and an arsenal of air-defense missiles for multi-layer defense.

Two additional Arleigh Burke class DDGs are deployed in Strait of Hormuz. Besides surface combatants, an unknown number of Ohio class SSGNs –equipped with a formidable payload of 154 land attack Tomahawk cruise missiles – are also patrolling in the area.

In theory, this naval armada is an instrument of coercion at sea, capable of projecting power against Iran and establishing local sea-control in the Arabian Sea. The employment of force through the maritime domain against various types of targets including: military targets like air-defense systems, nuclear enrichment facilities, and missile sites; high visibility targets like economic infrastructure; and high value targets like Iran’s political leadership itself, complicate Iran’s defensive measures as US Navy can launch from multiple vectors and over vast oceanic distances.

Any Iranian retaliation will mirror this logic. In a low-level response, Tehran has in the past attempted assertive signaling in the maritime domain, i.e., harassing merchant shipping and conducting naval exercises with Russian and Chinese partners.

A mid-level escalation includes counterstrikes on military assets of US and its allies in the Gulf. Facing an existential threat Iran is attempting maritime escalation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move represents a strategic gamble with global consequences and risks overwhelming US retaliation.

Iran, for its part, understands this asymmetry well. Iranian Navy, with obsolete surface and sub-surface fleet, stands no chance against US Navy in a traditional conflict. However, Iran has structured its naval strategy on sea denial rather than sea control. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) operates hundreds of fast-attack crafts (FACs) equipped with missiles and rockets for saturated strikes against surface vessels. In addition, hundreds of coastal missiles and suicide drones have been dispersed and concealed along the Iranian coast.

Additionally, Iran has commissioned rudimentary specialized vessels, like Shahid Bagheri, Shahid Roudaki and Shahid Mahdavi, which have the capability to launch swarms of drones and containerized missiles at floating targets. Together, these assets manifest Iran’s asymmetrical warfare strategy in the maritime domain through which it seeks to overcome US defenses through overwhelming numbers.

Geography facilitates Iran’s strategy. The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s most potent political leverage. At its narrowest point between the Omani Musandam Peninsula and Iran, merely 33 kms wide with the shipping lane just 3 kms wide in either direction. Iran’s ability to block this channel using coastal missile batteries, FACs, naval mines, midget submarines, and unmanned systems provide its greatest capability to counter any major aggression.

The US understands this very well. Therefore, instead of venturing in close waters, the US Navy is likely to operate mostly outside the Persian Gulf while relying on Over-The-Horizon (OTH) precision strikes using distance as a buffer.

A blockade of Strait of Hormuz, by Iran will have immediate ramifications at the global scale. Oil tankers carry more than 17 million barrels of oil each day through this strait which accounts for approximately 20% of global net oil consumption.  Saudi Arabia and UAE have alterative pipelines operational which can transit about 2.6 million barrels per day. However, compared to the net volume passing through Start of Hormuz, these pipelines can carry 15.29% at maximum capacity and cannot overcome the economic spillover of any disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

Yet, for Iran this leverage of Strait of Hormuz is fragile and unsustainable in longer run. Israel’s comprehensive air-campaign against Iranian high value assets and subsequent Operations Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer have already exposed major capability voids in Iranian air-defense capability. The Iranian Air Force is obsolete, and its air-defense systems – including domestic as well as Russian and Chinese systems – are mediocre at best.

Against a well-coordinated multi-domain offense, Iran lacks a credible and workable retaliatory option at its disposal. Yes, a large stockpile of short-range ballistic missiles and drones pose a threat, but again, Israel’s precise targeting of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers during Iran-Israel conflict indicates that US can also undertake a similar campaign at a much greater scale employing far more robust options.

But the central question remains: what is Washington’s endgame with Iran? Can limited air strikes realistically cripple the Iranian political regime or permanently degrade its nuclear ambitions, or are they more likely to reinforce the regime’s ideological narrative and deepen Tehran’s perceived necessity for a nuclear deterrent? There are no clear answers.

Mr. Ahmad Ibrahim is research associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. His areas of research include Modern Warfare, Military Technology, Conflict Studies, and Nuclear Strategy. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

CARRIER, CHOKEPOINT, AND COERCION: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-US CONFLICT was originally published on Global Security Review.

Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

Policy planning reflected that belief. Governments prepared for escalation management, energy disruption, and post-conflict instability not for sustained deterrence or a prolonged, high intensity war. This failure was neither accidental nor confined to a single capital or political party. It was the result of long-standing policy choices, alliance design decisions, and a shared belief that restraint could substitute for credible deterrence.

A Long Arc of Under-Resourcing

The NATO alliance arrived at this moment after more than a decade of deliberate under-investment. Under Presidents Barack Obama and later Joe Biden, U.S. defense policy emphasized escalation avoidance, fiscal restraint, and risk management over capacity, readiness, and industrial depth. Deterrence became a matter of signaling rather than a consistent force structure.

This trajectory did not change meaningfully during President Donald Trump’s first term. Budgetary turbulence, government shutdowns, continuing resolutions, and inherited top lines constrained structural change. Europe took its cues from Washington as strategic restraint aligned with European politics. Risk aversion, energy accommodation with Russia, and the belief that diplomacy could compensate for declining hard power. This was publicly validated when Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, not for altering U.S. strategy, but largely for reaffirming a posture Europe favored. The signal was unmistakable: restraint would be rewarded, not penalized.

Alliance Design and the Shock of 2022

NATO functioned exactly as designed. After the Cold War, the United States explicitly asserted its leadership and structured the alliance accordingly. Command arrangements, rank hierarchies, and decision-making processes ensured that Washington always held the most senior voices in the room—and an effective pocket veto.

The shock in 2022 was not that Europe took the lead, but that President Biden was so timid as to reinforce Russian risk assessments. Escalation anxiety, combined with under-resourced deterrence, produced caution when decisiveness was needed. Europe, constrained by years of deferred defense investment and structural energy dependence, lacked both the capacity and the political will to move faster than Washington. The result was paralysis by design: American restraint set the ceiling, European limitations set the floor, and the Western alliance’s action was trapped in between.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders deserve credit for attempting to break the paralysis when the scale of Russian aggression became unmistakable. Boris Johnson effectively accelerated the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by signing bilateral security guarantees that would have placed NATO forces on the ground and triggered Article 5 through cascading alliance obligations. It was a brilliant realist move, anchoring deterrence in forward commitment rather than process. Overcoming a Europe constrained by alliance structure, capacity, and the limits of American political cover.

Energy Sovereignty as a Deterrence Variable

A critical and under-appreciated failure was Europe’s abandonment of energy sovereignty. Years of policy choices have left European economies structurally dependent on Russian hydrocarbons at precisely the moment when deterrence required resilience. In 2024, the EU bloc purchased approximately €21.9 billion ($23.5 billion) worth of fossil fuels from Russia—exceeding the €18.7 billion ($20 billion) it reported allocating to Ukraine in financial aid over the same period. Climate change was elevated as the dominant strategic threat, displacing hard-power competitors such as Russia and China in threat prioritization and in efforts to defend Ukraine from Russian invasion. That disordering of risk mattered.

Europe compounded its vulnerability by dismantling reliable nuclear capacity before a dependable replacement baseload was in place. Rather than sequencing decarbonization alongside firm alternatives, several states removed nuclear generation while relying on Russian gas to bridge the gap. This was not a technical error but a strategic one.

Deterrence is weakened by dependence and strengthened when leverage is denied. The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines did not create Europe’s vulnerability; it exposed and accelerated its resolution. It removed Russia’s most potent instrument of coercive leverage over Europe. The act dismantled a dependency that had distorted European decision-making and narrowed the range of credible responses.

The Burden-Sharing Reality

The deeper problem exposed by the war is not under-spending, but misaligned responsibility. Europe accounts for nearly 44 percent of NATO’s combined GDP yet contributes 32 percent of alliance defense spending and a smaller share of high-end industrial capacity. That disparity was sustainable only so long as American support was unconditional and inexhaustible. It is not.

Fixating on President Trump’s demand for fairness obscures this structural reality. Trump did not create alliance stress; he exposed it. The core issue is that NATO has evolved into a system in which the United States bears disproportionate escalation risk while Europe enjoys disproportionate security benefits. In any conflict in which U.S. and European equities are asymmetric, that imbalance creates credibility problems—and adversaries can see them clearly.

Europe has begun to wake up. Defense budgets are rising, industrial capacity is being rebuilt, and strategic rhetoric has hardened. However, it took Vladimir Putin’s war—his willingness to use force at scale on Europe’s borders—to force a reckoning that European leaders had long postponed.

Interests, Narratives, and Credibility

Deterrence rests on perception of strength and credibility. When responsibility, risk, and capability are asymmetric, resolve is questioned. Credibility erodes quietly, long before it collapses publicly.

The uncomfortable truth is that U.S. and European interests are not perfectly aligned. Europe increasingly speaks the language of realism. Deterrence, balance, and forward defense, while framing policy through a liberal narrative of norms, process, and institutional legitimacy. That mismatch is not illegitimate, but it becomes dangerous when it masks unequal contributions and obscures who bears the true costs of failure.

Necessary Correction

The solution is neither retrenchment nor recrimination. It is a shift toward genuine Regional Shared Deterrence: a model in which European states meet NATO obligations proportionate to their economic weight, rebuild industrial capacity at scale, restore energy sovereignty, and assume visible responsibility for regional defense outcomes. That, in turn, would allow the United States to lead decisively without carrying the alliance alone—restoring credibility through aligned incentives and shared risk.

Ukraine did more than halt a Russian invasion. By refusing to collapse, it shattered Western assumptions and disrupted plans built around convenience rather than genuine deterrence. That disruption has exposed a simple truth: deterrence that is under-resourced by design and shared only in rhetoric will fail when tested. Whether this moment produces a strategic correction—or merely another cycle of improvisation—will determine the next crisis long before it arrives.

Kirk Fansher is a retired Colonel, Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Editor at Global Security Review. A Yale graduate and U.S. Naval War College alum, he has published extensively on nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and burden sharing. The views expressed are his own.

Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The return of great power competition is especially concerning in the Indo-Pacific, with the expansion of Chinese military capabilities eroding the status quo of a regional rules-based order. An evolution in Chinese strategic objectives has created a shift among American defense planners and strategists, who now see China as the primary adversary of the United States. As written within the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, “The [People’s Republic of China] PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades… this conclusion [is based] on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences, alongside a keen awareness of the PRC’s clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernization and expansion of its military.”

In the Cold War, Western strategists and planners spent most of their intellectual capital examining the challenges posed by the Soviet Union, in particular, the deterrence challenges posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Policymakers subsequently developed defensive strategies and associated concepts including extended deterrence and force posturing in Europe and the role that the American industrial, economic, and military could play. Not least among these considerations was the role of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to its allies in NATO, particularly those allies on the front lines of the Cold War stand-off in Europe.

Put simply, extended deterrence refers to the stated policy to defend a foreign ally, including the use of nuclear weapons in said defense, as part of a mutual defense treaty. Many policies supported the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe, to include public statements by American presidents, the presence of American military personnel abroad, and U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe. Extended nuclear deterrence, along with the forward deployment of vast amounts of conventional power, was a central element of America’s defense of its European allies. One of the factors that strengthened the conventional defensive posture of Europe is that Europe enjoys a certain amount of strategic depth.

Strategic depth is defined as the space available within a territory to halt an adversary attack, execute a counterattack, and end the conflict on terms acceptable to the counterattacking party. During the Cold War, NATO enjoyed a regional depth which allowed not only for NATO forces to fall back to more defendable geographic features in the face of a conventional attack, such as the Rhine, the Rhone, or even the Pyrenees, but strategic depth within Europe allowed either side to carry out strikes on European soil without escalating or expanding the conflict to a nuclear war on each other’s homelands.

While this geography served U.S. and allied interests in the Cold War, the United States lacks a similar level of strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific as it confronts the prospects of a large-scale conflict with China. Much of the geography in a U.S.-China conflict would take place over the open ocean and skies of the Western Pacific. As such, there are few defendable terrain features such as rivers or mountain ranges behind which an actor can rest, reset, and prepare for a counterattack.

Just as importantly, a battlefield in the Western Pacific means that there are fewer options for the distribution of basing. American and allied bases would therefore have to generate combat operations from a limited number of high priority bases in a conflict. The lack of defensible features and small number of high-value bases is in many ways the opposite condition of what the United States and its NATO allies experienced in the Cold War.

In contrast, China has enormous strategic depth due to its ability to generate combat power from any number of bases, launch sites, or ports along its enormous Pacific coast and its deep hinterland. In the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners are dispersed and in some cases thousands of miles away from each other, with neutral and non-aligned states dotted in between. As a result of the United States’ limited number of bases, owing to the scarcity of permanent land features in the Western Pacific, China can focus on a small number of critical targets to diminish American and allied combat effectiveness.

Further, the limited number of in theater bases increases the demands and stress on an aerial fleet and the logistics involved in keeping U.S. forces adequately supplied. It also makes for significantly longer ship and submarine transit times to and from more distant resupply points. Already in 2015 there was the issue of the rate at which missiles can be launched.

To counter China, the number and availability of sensor resources that can be devoted to integrated air and missile defense systems versus other missions must increase given the vertical proliferation of such systems. Also, the capacity of combat logistics forces needed to cycle ammunition ships between rear bases and forward reloading areas, maintain long-range, high-capacity carrier-based aerial refueling, and to sustain different operational concepts over prolonged periods of conflict must be expanded.

The United States, Japan, and Australia should consider pre-positioning substantial amounts of military capabilities directly relevant to deterrence operations, such as missile defense capabilities, fuel, and conventional munitions, in each other’s territories to create targeting dilemmas for China. Doing so would not only enhance knowledge of deterrence methods and challenges between allies in theater that are vastly different from Western Europe during the Cold War but also create existential misery for PRC defense planners.

Regardless of personal preference, complex issues related to nuclear strategy are now central in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. and its allies must deliberately evaluate the profound responsibilities that come with being members of a nuclear alliance.

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Prior to joining Heritage, Peters served as the lead strategist at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, where he oversaw the office that developed the Agency’s five-year strategy, conducted the Agency’s research and tabletop exercise program, and executed Agency-level program evaluations. Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Views expressed by the author’s are their own.

Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth was originally published on Global Security Review.

The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Meanwhile, the US Department of Defense (DoD) appears to be doing the opposite. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) recently axed its Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate, a move many analysts view as strategic self-sabotage.

This directorate, responsible for overseeing more than $340 million in AI and digital integrations in fiscal year 2024, represented a critical nexus linking battlefield innovations with institutional infrastructure. Its elimination, justified under “efficiency” mandates, alarmed defense observers who fear it fractures continuity, erases institutional memory, and sends a dangerous signal to adversaries willing to exploit perceived American weakness.

The Strategic Misstep

The CDAO was formed in 2022 by fusing key functions from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service, Chief Data Office, and Advana analytics, aiming to unify policy, technology, and digital services. Embedded within CDAO, the CTO led cross-functional teams in AI, cyber, logistics, and command-and-control systems, ensuring that new technologies remained interoperable and aligned with warfighter requirements.

Abruptly dismantling this directorate not only removes a pivotal vision and coordination role but also creates a void with no clear replacement. The result is fragmented efforts, lost synergy across mission areas, and a battlefield advantage handed to adversaries.

Expertise Lost, Momentum Undermined

Leadership and expertise take years, even decades, to develop. Figures like Bill Streilein, former CTO of CDAO and veteran of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, carried institutional memory and high standards into Pentagon AI programs. But when top-tier professionals are sidelined under the label of “streamlining,” they often leave and seldom return.

This pattern has already occurred. The Defense Digital Service (DDS), once lauded as the Pentagon’s “SWAT team of nerds,” lost almost all of its members by May 2025, prompting its demise. Nearly every DDS member, citing bureaucratic pressure from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), chose to depart rather than conform.

These departures are not benign transfers. They represent the scattering of core innovators and connectors whose insight and trust networks are irreplaceable. Without them, emerging AI systems risk becoming siloed projects rather than battlefield-enabling capabilities.

DOGE: Efficiency or Engineered Evisceration?

DOGE, instituted by a presidential executive order in January 2025, is authorized to slash perceived inefficiencies across federal agencies—often through AI-enhanced, automated assessments. Under the leadership of figures tied to Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, DOGE has repurposed its mandate to aggressively target leadership and innovation roles across the board—including in national defense.

DOGE has justified cuts using its proprietary AI systems to flag and eliminate “inefficient” programs, often without human oversight or contextual nuance. The CTO’s directorate was among its most high-profile targets, methodically identified and removed, despite its mission-critical nature.

To make matters worse, DOGE is reportedly comfortable with these decisions. One Pentagon official described it as a “theater of dominance,” not just cost-cutting, but deliberate erasure of institutional anchors to obfuscate the depth and breadth of the sacrifice.

The High-Stakes Fallout

Adversaries feast on the narrative that the US champions AI yet purges its own tech leadership overnight. “America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare,” such narratives go. These optics weaken American deterrence, erode allied confidence, and provide cover for Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang to reframe the battlefield narrative.

Domestic consequences are equally grim. The consistent removal of flagship tech roles projects a clear message to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) professionals; serve, and risk being discarded. That weakness is a recruitment boon for adversaries, national lab contractors, and tech-armed autocracies solving tomorrow’s warfare puzzles.

Real efficiencies lie not in gutting leadership but in fortifying it. Per the National Security Commission on AI, prioritizing disciplined recruitment and retention of technical talent, including a Digital Corps and AI fellowships, is key to American competitiveness. Instead, we witness the dismantling of precisely those anchor roles meant to shepherd AI innovation into combat-relevant systems.

The DOGE-Driven Dismantling of Tech Leadership

The concepts herein are alarming and reflect an institutional unraveling that directly undermines America’s global security posture and strategic deterrence in five critical ways. First, the elimination of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate from the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) strips away a core pillar of the Pentagon’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for battlefield advantage. This directorate was not redundant bureaucracy; it was the crucible in which ideas from national labs, industry, and warfighters were harmonized into operational capability.

By abruptly dismantling this team, the Department of Defense has extinguished a pipeline of institutional memory and strategic insight at the precise moment when rapid, informed, and integrated decision-making is needed. This brain drain parallels a historical pattern of self-sabotage and leaves adversaries uncontested in the tech talent race.

Second, the removal of high-level AI leadership is a propaganda gift to revisionist powers like China and Russia. These states are watching America voluntarily decapitate its own strategic leadership, an act they can now frame as proof of American decline. This strengthens their strategic messaging in influence campaigns aimed at allies, neutral states, and even American citizens.

“America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare” is not just a phrase, it is a weaponized narrative that demoralizes partners and emboldens adversaries to challenge American dominance in contested domains like cyberspace, space, and AI warfare.

Third, strategic deterrence hinges on credible capability and the perception of cohesion. DOGE’s algorithmic-driven targeting of leadership roles without contextual assessment introduces chaos into the acquisition and integration life cycle of military AI systems. Instead of creating synergistic effects across logistics, cyber, and command and control, the US risks building a fractured, siloed ecosystem that fails in joint operations.

By removing the very leaders who prevent stove piping, the US sabotages its ability to develop and field interoperable, scalable, and warfighter-ready AI tools. This systemic breakdown makes deterrence brittle, vulnerable to being cracked in future high-end conflicts.

Fourth, the US has struggled to compete with the private sector for AI and cybersecurity talent. By signaling that even elite government technologists are disposable under the guise of “efficiency,” this policy drives future talent away from public service. Those who might have joined a modern “Digital Corps” will instead seek stability and respect elsewhere, perhaps even abroad.

Strategic deterrence depends not only on weapons but on technologists who know how to deploy them. Gutting these roles ensures that tomorrow’s innovations will not make it past the lab, let alone onto the battlefield.

Fifth, DOGE’s use of automated assessments to eliminate “inefficiencies” without human oversight is a grotesque parody of reform. Its reliance on cold, context-blind algorithms to purge critical roles mimics adversary models of techno-authoritarianism, not democratic accountability. If allowed to continue, this will hollow out innovation across government agencies and military branches.

Efficiency is not the enemy, misapplied efficiency is. Strategic deterrence requires smart investments, not cost-cutting theater that sacrifices our warfighting edge on the altar of political optics.

Strategic Self-Sabotage Must Be Reversed

This is not merely streamlining, it is full-blown surrender. The dismantling of the CDAO’s CTO directorate and the broader DOGE initiative represents an engineered unraveling of the very leadership needed to project U.S. strategic deterrence in the AI era. Leadership is the vector through which technology becomes capability. Remove it, and you hand your adversaries not only the advantage, but the narrative.

Unless reversed, these concepts and actions will echo through wargames, deterrence failures, and battlefield losses. The US must stop cannibalizing its competitive edge and re-center its national security strategy on strengthening, not sidelining, its AI leadership.

Conclusion

Leadership is not just overhead on the funding spreadsheet; these leaders are our ammunition in the fight for global AI dominance. Removing them during a strategic inflection point is not reform, it is a self-made vulnerability, and as the US disables its own leadership of advanced technologies, it is dismantling future readiness.

The nation must insist on accountability. Cost-cutting means nothing if it costs the technological coherence to compete in tomorrow’s battles. In the strategic competition unfolding now, leadership is the weapon, and ceding it is surrender. This page out of the DOGE handbook should be shredded and burned. Remember, Iranian nuclear scientists were not dismantled by their own regime, they were destroyed by US and Israeli bombs.

Greg Sharpe is Marketing Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is retired from the US Air Force. The views expressed are his own.

The Quiet Dismantling of America’s AI Warfighting Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends was originally published on Global Security Review.

The election took on a new importance following the breakdown of the once powerful alliance between the Marcos and Duterte political dynasties—after the rapid political decline of the previously popular Duterte family. The Dutertes accused President Marcos of leading a deliberate effort to eliminate his most significant political rivals.

What began as a unified political force that dominated the 2022 elections disintegrated into a bitter rivalry, characterized by personal attacks and an impeachment move against Vice President Sara Duterte. She faces allegations of fund misuse, unexplained wealth accumulation, and even issuing threats against President Marcos, the First Lady, and the House Speaker.

The outcome of the Senate race was crucial, as senators will serve as jurors in the impeachment trial of the vice president. To convict Duterte and permanently bar her from public office, at least 16 of the 24 senators must vote in favor of removal.

The elections, which determined half of the Senate, the entire House of Representatives, and thousands of local officials, revealed a surprisingly even split between Marcos- and Duterte-aligned candidates, defying pre-election polling that predicted a weaker performance from the Duterte faction. The final tally of votes shows that neither Marcos nor Duterte were the big winner in the Senate. Instead, a solid block of both Marcos and Duterte supporters was joined by various reformist candidates who are likely to serve as wild cards in both an impeachment trial and future legislative debates.

Meanwhile, former President Rodrigo Duterte was elected by a massive margin in his bid to reclaim the mayorship of Davao City, despite being detained by the International Criminal Court (ICC). He remained eligible to run because he has not been convicted of any crime. Unexpectedly, the strong showing from the Duterte bloc, combined with the deepening political divide, raises concerns about potential unrest, power consolidation efforts, or gridlock within key institutions even in the intelligence community. As rival factions jostle for influence, the risk of politically motivated violence, destabilizing protests, or coercive maneuvers at both the national and local levels may increase, threatening the country’s governance stability and democratic integrity.

President Marcos publicly distanced himself from the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Duterte. The President denies accusations that he is pursuing a personal vendetta against the Duterte family. Instead, Marcos focused his campaign narrative on the country’s economic progress and his firm stance on defending national sovereignty, highlighting his administration’s opposition to China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. With tensions over Beijing’s regional behavior rising, China is a major political flashpoint in this election cycle.

By downplaying his involvement in the impeachment process, Marcos aims to protect his image as a unifying leader above partisan revenge, possibly to appeal to moderates. This move also helps shift public discourse away from the political feud and refocus it on policy, allowing him to sidestep accusations of using state power to silence rivals.

Marcos’s hardline rhetoric on China serves as a strategic appeal to nationalist sentiment, which grew amid repeated maritime confrontations in the South China Sea. By taking a strong position against Beijing, he seeks to rally public support, differentiate himself from Duterte’s historically China-friendly stance, and secure backing from defense-focused and pro-sovereignty voters.

The spotlight on China in the campaign reflects a broader trend of foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue. This signals a growing alignment between national security concerns and electoral strategy.

Marcos’s tougher China policy also aligns with American interests in the region, potentially strengthening his international legitimacy while further polarizing his rivalry with the Dutertes, who are seen as closer to China.

Conclusion

The convergence of internal political rivalries, external geopolitical interests, and a shifting demographic base marks a potentially volatile era for Philippine democracy where political missteps could quickly escalate into security threats or international incidents. While the Philippines has a civic society and the institutional framework necessary for democratic resilience, political reform, especially an enforceable anti-dynasty law, is essential to revitalize governance.

The results from the Philippine midterm elections illustrate not only the enduring power of political dynasties, but also the rising intensity of intra-elite competition, as both the Marcos and Duterte factions entrench their influence in the Senate. The election’s implications extend beyond politics into questions of institutional credibility, legal accountability, and long-term political stability. How this battle unfolds will shape the Philippines’ democracy in the face of deepening polarization.

The Philippine midterm elections are no longer routine legislative exercises. They are a crucible for deeper structural tensions in the country’s democracy. With institutional legitimacy, political accountability, and regional stability at stake, the results of elections could redefine the Philippines’ democratic trajectory and security outlook in the years to come.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense.

Power Play in the Philippine Midterm Election was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

If you are interested in understanding the complexities of democratic governance in South Korea, you will find a comprehensive analysis of how the country navigates political turmoil, get insights into the strengths and vulnerabilities of its democratic system, and get a pulse on the broader implications of presidential impeachments in democratic societies.

This must read is a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and anyone tracking global political dynamics.

Read Article

South Korea: Challenges and Lessons of a Presidential Impeachment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vice President Kamala Harris certainly grasps the fact that voters respond to promise that their cost of living will come down, but they rarely understand the implication for the economy of government intervention. Harris’ calls for price controls on drugs and groceries and promises of tax cuts for the poor or benefits increases fails to explain how and who will pay for them.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s call for 10 percent tariffs on all imports and 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods, plus his threat to deport many of the estimated 20 million illegal aliens currently in the United States, not only amounts to higher prices, but it will devastate the agricultural, restaurant, construction, and hospitality industries. It is certainly not a free trader perspective. Thus, neither party’s perspective offers a clear path to growth, offsetting tax hikes, like tariffs, or increased federal revenue with which to pay for all the benefits they are offering.

Since the US is both the principal and ultimate arbiter of international order, whose power rests on the sound management of its economy, both examples of this illiteracy endanger not just the American economy, but that of other states around the world. Worse yet, these examples of misconceived economic thinking come at a time when international challenges are rapidly multiplying. Indeed, bipartisan reports describe the American military as increasingly maladapted to contemporary and future threats.

These reports underscore the urgent need for comprehensive modernization, recapitalization, and increases of both conventional and nuclear arsenals due to mounting challenges from the axis of authoritarianism: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Indeed, even the Biden administration, which cannot be accused of partiality towards nuclear weapons, has stated the need for modernization and investment in newer and more nuclear weapons and, recently, went so far as to alter nuclear employment guidance.

At the same time, Americans have equally urgent domestic pressures that must be seriously addressed but are not discussed. These include the need to reduce deficits, ensure long-term non-inflationary growth, increase the labor participation rate, maintain technological leadership, reform and simplify the tax code, and apply existing immigration law while determining if new laws are needed. Yet nobody is seriously raising these domestic issues let alone addressing the fact that a strong economy is needed to address defense challenges—and build the military needed.

For example, neither campaign mentioned that servicing the national debt, for the first time in history, exceeded defense spending in 2024. This fact represents an unmistakable sign of decline and is a canary in the coal mine that the nation must reduce domestic redistribution programs while also carefully employing military force when absolutely necessary.

Neither should a response to these challenges lead the nation, as some Republicans argue, into a new unilateralism that would isolate the US from its allies and lead to further chaos. Nor can the nation afford a progressive policy of ever greater spending on redistribution programs—without paying for them.

Both sets of delusional thinking ultimately bring about the worst of all possible outcomes. Americans will find themselves with a greater probability of war and lower economic growth.

It is time both campaigns’ economic policies are subjected to tougher scrutiny by the media and voters. They must be persuaded, if not compelled, by the exigencies of politics, to explain how they will pay for future needs, balance the budget, and confront well-known challenges.

This requirement should apply to defense modernization as well. If history is any guide, only a serious threat to the nation motivates government and industry to mobilize capability for the required defense buildup. The bipartisan reports, mentioned above, clearly suggest the United States is facing a similar threat to that faced by imperial Japan and Nazi Germany before World War II began.

Vice President Harris and former President Trump must address questions going far beyond the partisan bickering that is endemic of this election. Perhaps the September 10 presidential debate will offer some clarity on important issues.

Commentators suggest that this election is about generational change. This, however, is no guarantee that change is for the better. Eastern Europe experienced great change after 1945, but it was decidedly for the worse.

Thinking strategically about medium- and long-term challenges and consequences is imperative. The abiding delusion that American prosperity, world leadership, and security is unending and self-sustaining deserves a much more rigorous evaluation. The nation may very well be standing on a precipice, and it will be the next president who either pulls the nation back or sends it over the edge. Let’s hope it is the former.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue came to the forefront of debate when the RAND Corporation’s peace plan began circulating in Kabul as early as January 2019. Entitled “Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan,” the draft document proposed a joint interim government with the Taliban as the first essential step towards a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Adding to the controversy and fueling speculations was a statement by the Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting new governing arrangements in Afghanistan to facilitate and speed up the ongoing Afghan peace talks.

The idea of an interim administration also has supporters among Afghan politicians and power brokers who most probably see it as their ticket for returning to the center of Afghan power politics.

However, lost in the noise are the consequences of going down the road of a joint interim administration with the hardliner Taliban who isn’t compromising on their regressive demands at all, and the likelihood of its success, especially when the international community is wrapping up its Afghanistan adventure and are preparing to leave the country altogether?

Jeopardizing the Peace Process and Achievements

Proponents of the idea of an interim government forget, and the new Biden administration must know, that any discussion of an interim administration with the highly infamous Taliban—more than 80 percent of Afghans have no sympathy for the group—further boosts the insurgents’ morale and feeds into their narrative.

In other words, talks of an interim government with the Taliban inadvertently acknowledges the insurgent groups false rhetoric and blatant propaganda that paints the U.S.-led international community’s retaliatory intervention (in response to 9/11 attacks) as an invasion, degrades the UN-sanctioned multinational security forces presence in Afghanistan to occupation, and justifies their own bloody campaign as freedom fighting and just war for some delusional salvation of Afghanistan.

An interim administration would also tip the balance of power further in favor of the Taliban, especially after their diplomatic victory of discussing troop pullout with the Trump administration, and provide them with an opportunity to take on the scattered Afghan parties and groups and squeeze them to the extent of reversing the gains and rewriting everything.

Existing democratic institutions, freedom of speech and free press, women’s rights and advancements, and above all, the Afghan Constitution that guarantees all of the above would be in great jeopardy.

Although some claim that the Taliban have changed and are now open to discussing previously taboo and highly sensitive issues, including women’s rights and freedom of expression and press, ground realities indicate otherwise.

The recent rise in violence across the country coupled with targeted killings of any and every Afghan who might speak against or could potentially challenge the Taliban’s narrative and worldview cast severe doubt on the insurgents’ intentions. The Taliban’s vague verbal commitments wrapped up with Islamic suffixes about women, the press, and the inclusive government just adds to the suspicion.

Furthermore, the interim government’s volatile environment coupled with the Taliban leadership’s highly negative view of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) could cause panic among the ANDSF rank and file. Fear of the unknown future plus inclination to survive could easily force the ANDSF to vie for political and even ethnic support, causing the ANDSF disintegration.

And this is not an exaggeration; Afghanistan’s defense and security establishment has previously experienced overnight breakdown and integration into ethnolinguistic factions after the dramatic fall of the Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullahs government in the early 1990s.

Funding And Oversight Challenges

It is important to note that this is not the year 2001. Thus, the international community is not as enthusiastic about prolonged engagement with and rebuilding Afghanistan as they were back then in the first Bonn Conference held nearly two decades ago.

A lot has changed over the last twenty years, and Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the international community. The world is facing new challenges, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, and its grave impact on the world economy cannot be overlooked.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the donor countries, already on the verge of leaving Afghanistan, to embark on a new state-building mission in the war-torn country. Even if some of these donor countries would like to contribute generously, they will have a tough time selling the idea of engaging with and sponsoring a Taliban-dominated government to their respective citizens, many of whom have lost their sons and daughters in the fight against insurgents over the last two decades.

The United States’ principal partners in Afghanistan, European Union, and India are highly skeptical about an interim administration with the Taliban. India has clearly stated that it doesn’t like the idea.

And this isn’t the only issue. The U.S.-led international community has also drastically reduced its military presence in Afghanistan. As part of the Trump administration’s peace deal with the Taliban, the international coalition has already reduced itself to just a few thousand troops scheduled to leave the country in the next few months, pending the new Biden administration’s review.

Even if the remaining foreign troops stay in Afghanistan, their tiny footprint is not enough to ensure the country’s political stability. In the absence of a sizable security assistance force coupled with no disarmament program for the insurgents, the probability of interim government success between two opposing poles, the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, is zero.

Rather than acting as a catalyst for lasting peace, an interim administration at present would further exacerbate the already uncertain environment in favor of the militant Taliban, fuels infighting among democratic forces currently serving and supporting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and result in chaos for the country, which could be costly to the international community down the road.

Therefore, to minimize the probability of an apocalyptic scenario in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international community must look up and push for other options such as convincing the Taliban (with the help of their main patron, Pakistan) to share power with the current Afghan government or participate in UN-supervised early presidential as well as parliamentary elections in the country.

A militant group changed for the good and willing to share power and respect the will of the people as has been claimed about the Taliban, and a critical external player, Pakistan, satisfied with the Taliban’s return to power should have no problem with alternative governing and power-sharing arrangements.

An Interim Government Could Cause Chaos in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yes, Turkey is a NATO member and an important regional actor, but Turkish democracy has waxed and waned. Despite these challenges, one key group—the Hizmet movement, inspired by the teachings of Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen – has been a staunch advocate for Turkish democracy. But Hizmet has been demonized by Erdoğan as an “enemy of the state” and repeatedly scapegoated by Erdoğan’s regime. As Erdoğan owns the megaphones in Turkey, he has used them so frequently against Hizmet that he has created an alternate reality that, unfortunately, has recently been amplified in the West.

From 1923 when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey up until the Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) took office in 2002, the Turkish state was defined by anti-religious and anti-Kurdish military-cum-judiciary rule. During this period, the Turkish state frequently scuttled popular democracy through military intervention in the name of protecting the regime. In 1960, 1970, and 1980, military coups overthrew the civilian governments.

After decades of the military pulling the strings, the AKP called for real reforms and won popular support in 2002. The AKP’s success was driven by both the cultural capital provided by Hizmet’s international outreach and political support from Western powers eager for a moderate Islamic foothold in the region in the aftermath of 9/11.

At the time, Hizmet and the AKP shared a vision of a democratic Turkish state (2002-2011) with civil society bolstered by moderate Islam. The AKP, dominated by its relatively liberal faction that was genuinely committed to creating a democratic Turkish state and Hizmet, a Sufi-influenced socio-religious movement focused on promoting universal human understanding and democratic values, cooperated and coexisted. This convergence of a social movement (Hizmet) and a political force (AKP)—but without any programmatic alliance—ushered in Turkey’s most democratic period, characterized by rule of law, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, an independent judiciary, and regular elections.

During this period, Hizmet helped prepare Muslim students to compete for positions in state institutions and Hizmet participants emerged as effective democracy advocates, helping to sway public opinion to support meaningful constitutional reforms in 2010. The movement’s increased visibility and civic contributions, however, produced two unintended consequences: resentment from opposition groups and fear within the Erdoğan-led Islamist faction of AKP that the movement could erode Erdoğan’s political power.

On the heels of successful and popular constitutional reforms in 2010 limiting the military’s political power, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan sought to deploy Hizmet as a political tool to solidify his own power. He demanded that the movement’s growing global network align behind his leadership and promote him as a leader of the Muslim world.

Gulen personally opposed both the concentration of power in a single executive as well as the politicization of his ideas. Although the final decision was left to the movement’s volunteers, Gulen advised against granting Erdoğan’s request which fueled the latter’s growing resentment and suspicion of the movement.

In 2014, Erdoğan narrowly won the presidential election after three terms as Prime Minister (2003-2014). After taking office, he bolstered his power by transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential system and changing the constitution. Erdoğan also marginalized perceived opposition including the AKP’s liberal faction, independent media, Kurdish opposition, and Hizmet.

In 2016, Erdoğan used the pretense of the failed military coup to further consolidate power. Despite lacking any credible evidence, Erdoğan alleged that the Hizmet movement and Gulen had orchestrated the coup. Both Hizmet participants and Gulen himself have repeatedly denied any involvement. These allegations, as well as hundreds of thousands of arrests, not only imprisoned Gulen’s supporters—and others including Pastor Brunson—but also cast anyone with tangential Hizmet connections as a traitor. This ostracization as well as purges of Hizmet participants and allies deprived hundreds of thousands of livelihoods and access to social institutions.

Despite Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism, Turkey has remained an essential ally for Western powers. To maintain political and economic ties, Western leaders have walked a fine line, neither embracing nor alienating Erdoğan’s regime. Even actions that flouted Turkey’s status as a NATO member, such as purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system and attacking the U.S.’s Kurdish allies in the fight against ISIS, have produced few consequences.

Western powers, including the United States, however, must recognize that Erdoğan is the real threat to Turkish democracy. His regime will continue to persecute critics, undermine regional stability, and weaken key alliances. Erdoğan has made it abundantly clear that he will continue to act with impunity and distort facts to undercut those that stand in his way, particularly movements like Hizmet that have been longstanding champions of Turkish democracy. Erdoğan cannot be allowed to rewrite history.

Turkey’s Faltering Democracy and Western Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the two edifices are on opposite ends of Europe, they have much in common. Both are arguably the most beautiful standing expressions of Mediterranean civilization, and both represent a vanquished world. Hagia Sophia was the crowning architectural achievement of Orthodox Christianity and the Byzantine Empire, and the Great Mosque of Cordoba remains the unparalleled testimony of Islamic identity in Spain. When the civilizations that built the monuments collapsed, both structures underwent forced conversions.

Speaking after the July 10 decree to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wasted no time in riling up Islamist support for his controversial decision, saying it appeals to those from “from Bukhara to Andalusia.”Andalusia references the Mosque of Cordoba – which, although it resides in Spain, has long been a point of obsession for AKP elites with visions of restoring what they view as the golden age of their civilization. They believe that this civilization is locked in an irreconcilable struggle with Christendom.

Other key members of the AKP have made their feelings about the Cordoba Mosque well known. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently cited the conversion of Cordoba into a church to defend Ankara’s decision to convert Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Likewise, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu justified the Hagia Sophia decision by evoking the Cordoba mosque, opining that under Spanish administration, “the miracle of Cordoba Mosque almost disappeared.” Davutoglu further asserted that it was hypocritical to discuss Hagia Sophia without talking about the Great Mosque of Cordoba.

Yet this comparison is merely a pretext for supremacist policies. In fact, notwithstanding their similarities, there are vast differences between the two buildings. While the Great Mosque of Cordoba is the primary historical monument to Islamic civilization in Spain and was of regional significance, its influence and place within Islam were not comparable to Hagia Sophia. As the former capitol of Orthodox Christianity, Hagia Sophia has a place within the Orthodox world that is more comparable to the Kaaba for Muslims or Saint Peter’s Basilica for Catholics – it was the capitol and cultural center of Orthodoxy. Hagia Sophia is, according to Theophilos III, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, “The heart of the Eastern Orthodox Christian world as a site of Christian worship, sanctified by the blood of martyrs.”

Moreover, the AKP’s rhetoric of right by conquest belies its disingenuous concern for the Great Mosque. Popular Turkish discourse influenced greatly by the AKP, portrays the 1453 conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, an event that represents the culmination of the conquest of the Christian Byzantine Empire and Constantinople, as a moment of glorious military triumph, the capstone in the myth of the creation of the Turkish nation. “In our civilization,” said Erdogan in late August, “conquest is not occupation or looting – it is spreading the dominance of Allah in the conquered land.” Thus, according to Ankara, the conquest of Hagia Sophia is fundamentally good and therefore dissimilar to the conquest of the Great Mosque.

Hagia Sophia and the Great Mosque of Cordoba are priceless artifacts of a now long-lost world. To subject them to conquest rhetoric and to use them to settle scores disgrace their multi-faith legacy.

Turkey Uses Medieval Score-Settling to Justify Its Hagia Sophia Conversion was originally published on Global Security Review.

Some were using the same flag in the shape of a giant sphere trying to devour a sad-looking Earth. One even superimposed the profile photo of the Chinese ambassador over an illustration of the virus with a “Made in China” tag hanging from the neck of the ambassador-virus. One celebrity shared the #ChineseVirus hashtag after being blocked by the Chinese ambassador and expressed that she had never been happier in her life as a result of being blocked by another user.

All this, as well as numerous attacks on Chinese cuisine and culinary culture, is increasingly more noticeable as a result of widespread global xenophobia directed towards people of Chinese descent and origin due to China being the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. Can a definition of racism be applied to this behavior in Iran (and around the world), although many users are unaware of the implications their behavior carries? What consequences could arise in the long-term?

Is it racism?

“Racism,” writes Hamid Dabashi, professor of Iranian studies at Columbia University, “is not a question of one’s blood type (the Christian criterion used in the sixteenth-century Spain to distinguish Christians from Moors and Jews in Europe) or the color of one’s skin (African and the New World civilizations).” Racism, Dabashi continues, “consists in devaluing the humanity of certain people by dismissing it or playing it down (even when not intentional).”¹ Racism—as a classic component of the spread of colonialism by creating the “civilized” and “primitive” binary—would not exist without the desire for hierarchical categorization or classification.

The trick of this classification is simple, as the classifiers place themselves at the top of the classification table (basing the classification system on their culture, including cuisine, hygiene, eating habits, etc.) and those who are classified as ‘outsiders’ or ‘others’ are considered to be less human, and even dangerous. In this respect, the recent phenomenon in Iran could undoubtedly be interpreted as racist, as individuals engage—however unintentionally—in a system of a hierarchical categorization and classification. Labeling an entire group of people with a submicroscopic agent that could have spread anywhere on the planet—as other viruses like H1N1/Swine Flu did—is the mass classification of people of Chinese origin, and is as wrong and unjust as the Chinese Communist Party’s mass detention of Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps.

Origins

Racism in Iran is twofold: internal (towards the racialized minorities such as the Kurds, Azaris, etc.), and external (mainly towards the Arab “others”) in the form of an absurd belief in the supremacy of the Aryan race and their purportedly noble past. As an example, many members of the Iranian diaspora identify as Persian, not Iranian; the term “Persia” evokes a sense of historical magnanimity, while “Iran” is more associated with the ignominy of the present. The roots of Iranian racism and xenophobia can largely be traced to successive invasions of the country by Arab and Mongol forces.

The recent upsurge in racist behavior towards individuals of Chinese origin, however, can best be described as politically-motivated racism. In an “ABC” (Any country But China) duel with the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy establishment, many Iranians, especially the opposition, can’t help drawing attention to anything that could damage the ruling regime, even at the cost of their rhetoric being loaded with xenophobia and racism.

Consequences and Repercussions

The most critical and immediate outcome as a consequence of heightened anti-China sentiment in Iran could be the potential metamorphosis of public animosity towards the West into a blind hatred of the [Far] East. The same self-described lovers of democracy, who rightly condemn the burning of U.S. flags and the chanting of the Takbir during Friday Prayers (“Down with America”) seem to have a hard time condemning the ongoing COVID-19-driven racism against China, probably for fear of being labeled as an Islamic Republic apologist or Sinophile. Reckless xenophobic behavior and rhetoric, however, combined with widespread poverty, populist trends, bigotry, and a pinch of nationalism, can snowball into unimaginably devastating forces with equally catastrophic consequences.

¹Dabashi, Hamid, Can Non-Europeans Think?, 2015. Page 23.

COVID-19 Sparks a Wave of Racism in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

In his annual state-of-the-nation speech this January, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for broad changes to the Russian constitution that would strengthen the Russian Parliament’s powers as well as weaken those of the president. This comes just as many Russian scholars and analysts are asking the 2024 question that must also be on the Russian President’s mind. What will Vladimir Putin do when his fourth presidential term comes to an end? Who will replace him if he steps aside? How can he ensure that in his post-presidential life, he remains outside the realm of prosecution?

Analysts have studied the various scenarios that could arise when Putin’s fourth term comes to an end. Some have involved constitutional reform which would allow him to stay in the presidency past his fourth term. Others have focused on Putin becoming the head of a merged federal state, including both Russia and Belarus. Still, others have suggested the creation of a ‘real seat of power’ within Russia, to which Putin would be appointed.

While Putin did not explicitly address the 2024 question in the constitutional reforms, he did suggest ways that he would maintain a veneer of control. By proposing decreasing the power of the presidency, he might be implying that he will no longer maintain that position. By increasing the power of the State Council, he implies that he may consider a ‘real seat of power.’ But for now, it remains unclear how Putin will precisely navigate his post-presidential life.

What are the proposed constitutional reforms?

The proposal to amend the constitution would firstly give the power to appoint cabinet ministers and the prime minister to the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of Parliament. This power currently belongs to the President. However, the Russian presidency would retain the authority to dismiss those same cabinet ministers and prime minister. The presidential term would also be limited to two terms in total instead of two successive terms.

Further, Putin suggested restricting the requirements for the Russian presidential role. He suggested that any candidate should have lived in the country for 25 years and have no foreign citizenship or residency. The proposal also suggested a constitutional change that would place predominance on domestic legislation over international law. Among other changes, Putin also proposed strengthening the State Council, which currently remains as an advisory body to the Russian Parliament. The State Council would be transformed into an organ that would shape domestic and foreign policy.

How are the proposed reforms being received?

Not long after the reforms were proposed, all 432 lawmakers in the State Duma unanimously approved the first reading of them. The reforms must undergo two more readings, the second on February 11^th and the third reading down the line. Once the reforms are approved in all three readings in the Duma, the constitutional changes will then go to the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house of Parliament. Then, they will go to Putin’s desk.

While the State Duma was busy approving the bills, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s government resigned in support of the upcoming changes. In his place, Putin appointed Mikhail Mishustin, the former head of Russia’s tax service.

What will happen when Putin’s term ends in 2024?

While many of the proposed constitutional reforms suggest that Putin is preparing his power transition many years ahead of schedule, the vast array of changes still leave the exact plan vague. Many point to the strengthened Security Council as the new nexus of power after 2024. This would be a similar situation to the former president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev led Kazakhstan for thirty years before resigning and maintain power in the country’s Security Council. Others claim that the strengthened prime minister position suggests that Putin will make a return to that role. Another option could also be leading as the head of a confederation between Belarus and Russia.

Regardless of what path Putin chooses to take, it is unlikely that he will take a backseat in Russian politics anytime soon. Furthermore, this constitutional change in Russia suggests that Putin would prefer a continuation of the status quo rather than any shake-up of power. In such a highly personalized system like Russia, the state lacks institutional mechanisms such as a political power to guide the transition smoothly.

Moving away from a presidentially focused system, Putin may seek to illustrate to domestic Russian audiences as well as the international stage that a post-Putin Russia is possible without turmoil. For now, it is too early to predict which path Putin will take or whether he will be successful in stepping away from the presidency without complications.

Constitutional Reform and Presidential Term Limits in Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Last week, Ukrainian oligarchs Igor Kolomoyskiy and Hennadiy Boholyubov lost their case against the nationalized Ukrainian bank, PrivatBank, in the London Court of Appeals. In an official statement, the Court of Appeals stated that PrivatBank “has a good arguable case to recover the full $1.9 billion—$3 billion including interest—given in the particulars of claim.”

PrivatBank CEO Peter Krumphanzi expressed his satisfaction with the ruling, noting that “this is an important step towards achieving justice for the bank and the people of Ukraine.” The Ukrainian bank was nationalized three years ago in 2016 against the wishes of Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov after accusations arose of fraud.

During a routine check, auditors found $5.5 billion (USD) missing from the bank’s records. Kolomoisky and Boholyubov were subsequently accused of insider trading and fraud. In the court case in London, PrivatBank alleged that the former owners cost the bank billions of dollars. Both oligarchs denied the claims and are pursuing legal action to force the privatization of the bank and their shares. Kolomoyskiy is seeking $2 billion in PrivatBank capital returned to him.

The implications of the PrivatBank case go beyond money

While the ruling is ostensively positive for the Ukrainian state, it has consequences for Ukraine’s renegotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been renegotiating a $3.9 billion agreement that is set to expire in January 2020.

However, these negotiations came under pressure when concerns arose that a Ukrainian court could reprivatize PrivatBank and return ownership of the bank to Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov. Additional concerns arose surrounding Kolomoyskiy’s and Boholyubov’s close business relationships with Zelensky. Zelensky’s old television show not only ran on a TV station owned by Kolomoyskiy, but Zelensky’s current chief of staff used to act as Kolomoyskiy’s lawyer on the PrivatBank case.

While Zelensky claimed that as president he would remain neutral regarding the PrivatBank case, many commentators expressed concerns that this would be impossible for him. This case, in particular, has been watched closely by investors as a measure of Ukraine’s changing business climate.

Ukraine’s corruption challenge

While the court case against Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov is only one aspect of Ukraine’s struggle against corruption, it is an illustrative example of how corruption continues to touch many parts of Ukrainian society and playing a role in determining its future. Without IMF funding, Ukraine would be forced to turn to other monetary sources and benefactors.

It is unlikely that Ukraine would turn to Russia for such aid. However, it would be one potential political avenue to both reduce tensions between the two countries. Therefore, it should be considered as one, however improbable option that geopolitical analysts ought to consider.

For now, it seems as though Ukraine will continue its anti-corruption efforts and work with Western institutions such as the IMF. However, considering Zelensky’s past connections as well as the willpower of Ukraine’s oligarchs—it is important to recognize that tackling corruption in Ukraine could have unintended consequences.

London Court Rules Against Ukrainian Oligarchs in PrivatBank Case was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donetsk and Luhansk has killed more than 13,000 people since its onset in April 2014. While many in Ukraine see this as a surrender to Moscow, Zelensky asserted that “there will be no capitulation.” As part of this new peace deal with Moscow, Zelensky also set up a prisoner exchange with Moscow—swapping 35 prisoners each. While Moscow and other members of the international community expressed their support for this new détente in relations between Moscow and Kyiv—local politicians did not agree.

Response in Ukraine

Within Ukraine, this move was met with anger and betrayal. Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko criticized the agreement, while Andriy Biletsky, leader of the right-wing National Corps, claimed Zelensky “chose shame and now he will get war too.” National Svoboda member Yuriy Syrotyuk also added his voice to the discussion, stating that Zelensky “committed treason.”

Many politicians claim that while Ukraine is now committed to holding an election, Russia has not agreed to give back control of the border—moving the scales heavily in Russia’s favor. This was particularly concerning for Zelensky’s reputation as he came to power promising to end the war rather than prolong it.

Will this mean peace?

While this step might herald a new warmer point in relations between Russia and Ukraine, it does not necessarily immediately foretell immediate peace. Even the four-way talks between Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia have stalled since October 2016. However, both states have already renewed pulling troops and equipment from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions starting October 7. Despite this positive step, the process toward peace will take time. Although the agreement to hold elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk has already provoked much aggression from local politicians, no elections can take place without promises that all armed groups will vacate the area before the election.

The elections are one part of the Steinmeier Formula; a plan put together by former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016. In short, it first proposes free and fair elections in Ukraine’s east under Ukrainian law, verification by the OSCE, and self-governing status in return. It is the only plan that Russia has also agreed to as part of reopening talks.

If elections bring peace, what will the cost be?

Although elections in Donetsk and Luhansk may seem to be beneficial for the peace process, results will likely heavily favor Russia and the current Russia-backed separatist leaders. Most of the population with pro-Ukrainian views left for western Ukraine at the start of the conflict. Therefore, those remaining will likely harbor pro-Russian views, and the election, rather than get a broader range of opinion in the region, will consolidate the already dominant position of Russia-backed leaders currently in place.

It is to Russia’s advantage to have and support a federalized Ukraine as it will allow for more pro-Russian dissent against Ukraine’s current pro-European stance. Moreover, a more heavily divided Ukraine also favors Russia’s wish that it remains in its sphere of influence. Already, many Ukrainians do not support special status for Donetsk and Luhansk and do not think that the Steinmeier formula is appropriate. Elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk might decrease violence right now, but, in the future, they could lead to a Ukraine that is more likely to head into civil conflict in the future.

Elections in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk Regions: Peace, But At What Cost? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The two leading candidates are the incumbent President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, who serves as de-facto prime minister of the country.

President Ghani has studied and lived abroad. Before returning to Afghanistan, he worked as an anthropologist at the World Bank. In 2001, Ghani served as Special Adviser to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary General’s special envoy to Afghanistan.  He then went on to advise interim-President Hamid Karzai and served as Finance Minister in the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan until December of 2004.

After a stint as Chancellor of Kabul University, Ghani announced his nomination for the 2009 presidential election. Keen to bolster his credentials as the favorite candidate of the international community, Ghani hired Clinton-campaign chief strategist James Carville as his campaign advisor. In the end, however, he secured a minuscule 2.94% of the vote, against Abdullah securing about 40% and incumbent Karzai controversially securing around 49% of the votes.

Ghani ran for president again in 2014, trailing second behind the leading candidate Abdullah Abdullah. However, since neither candidate could secure 50-plus one percent of the vote, a majority, the election went into a runoff which became controversial due to widespread allegations of ‘industrial scale’ fraud. The United States Government intervened and brokered a power-sharing agreement between the two leading candidates, where Abdullah compromised to settle for the position of Chief Executive, and Ghani became President.  

Abdullah’s career has been both colorful and reflective of Afghanistan’s tumultuous recent past. Trained as an ophthalmologist but perturbed by the repressive political environment in the wake of the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979, Abdullah opted to join the anti-Soviet resistance in the early 1980s. From the early days of the resistance up to the U.S.-led War on Terror and the campaign for the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, Abdullah’s relentless efforts for promotion of a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan have earned him both national and international recognition.

Following the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001, Abdullah played a crucial role in establishing the new Interim Administration where he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2006. He reinvigorated Afghanistan’s international relations, engaging in active foreign diplomacy to reestablish not only old ties but also to open new embassies as the country reeled from years of international isolation under Taliban’s rule and factional conflicts.

In 2009, Abdullah ran a highly impressive and dynamic campaign under the slogan of “Hope and Change” and a national agenda to institute needed reform and change Afghanistan’s system of governance from an over-centralized one to power devolved into local governance. Abdullah was the runner up against the incumbent Karzai who drew on all the resources and benefits of his incumbency could accrue to him.

A runoff election between the Karzai and Abdullah was called after the Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission decided through a rigorous verification process to invalidate a large number of questionable ballots, with the majority of those votes being in favor of Karzai. Having seen his efforts for reforms of the electoral bodies frustrated by the incumbent, Abdullah declined to participate in the runoff. 

After the United States brokered the National Unity Government accord, Abdullah brought a much-needed sense of sobriety and moderation to a beleaguered government as the Chief Executive, with a president known for his irritability. Abdullah’s credibility is further strengthened by his secure political connections with grassroots level politics, having worked in different roles during the resistance against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the resistance against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the 1990s.

Ghani and Abdullah are widely considered the top two candidates in the presidential election scheduled for 28 September. However, Ghani’s ranks are increasingly depleted with the departure of influential erstwhile allies like General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Karim Khalili, Anwarul Haq Ahadi, Hanif Atmar, Sayed Mansoor Naderi, and many others who felt alienated with the president’s highhanded governance.

Abdullah Abdullah has built a strong and multiethnic team under the banner of “Stability and Partnership” with leading politicians from across Afghanistan, including those who defected from Ghani’s camp as well as others. Abdullah is known as a trustworthy candidate with robust political networks and substantial public support.

The 2019 Afghan presidential election remains a serious matter for not only Afghanistan, but the international community, as well—especially at a time when the United States is in negotiations with the Taliban. It is essential to avoid political deadlock and crisis of the sort that afflicted the 2014 presidential election, requiring a tremendous effort to prevent any possible vote-rigging.

Amid the presidential campaign, the peace process is still a priority for the people of Afghanistan and the international community. Considering the fragility of the situation in Afghanistan, a domestic consensus over the peace process is a must, which is only possible with a strong leadership playing a unifying role.

The country’s combustive internal identity politics could become worse if not controlled through a rational approach. One of the significant upcoming challenges for Afghanistan and its allies, particularly the United States, will be the question of how to handle the likely political deadlock as well as manage the peace process. 

This could be done through backing a unifying national leader who has genuine popular support many regions of the country and can bring political leaders and ethnic groups together under one umbrella through a consensus. In such critical times, Afghanistan needs strong and reliable leadership that can position itself as a central player in the Afghan peace process by striking a delicate balance between engaging with the Taliban and maintaining strong relations with the international community.

Afghanistan’s 2019 Presidential Election: Leading Contenders was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Transitional Justice Process So Far

Since 2006, the transitional justice process has seen some developments, including the CPA in 2006 and the Interim Constitution of 2007, both of which committed to providing justice to victims of human rights abuses by the institutions of the Nepalese state and the Maoists. In 2015, the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) were instituted and received approximately 66,000 complaints of torture, rape, and murder by all parties to the conflict.

The Commissions, while in-principle representing steps towards ensuring accountability of crimes, were perceived as moves to build leniency into the transitional justice process. This was primarily because they had been empowered by the Transitional Justice Act of 2014 to grant amnesty. But this leniency was checked by the Nepalese Supreme Court when it ruled that the Nepalese Supreme Court could only establish criminality. A positive development, but four years later this remains to be integrated—and therefore actionable—by amending the 2014 Act. 

As the transitional justice process has ebbed and flowed, a fleeting appetite for transitional justice remains, given as some may argue that Nepal has “moved on” from the conflict, but much to the detriment of those who have and continue to suffer. 

Problematic Political Will

One of the primary challenges to the transitional justice process has been the attempts to co-opt it politically. Since April 2019, the two Commissions have been inactive as new members remain to be appointed. In the current format, a recommendation committee makes the recommendations which are subsequently approved by the political parties in Nepal. 

While the process to identify new members has been underway, the three main political parties—the Nepali Congress (NC) and the two factions of the Nepali Communist Party (NCP)—have been trying to influence the membership in favor of those individuals who these parties believe will do their bidding. The inadequate political willingness stems from a deep concern that pursuing a proper transitional justice process will implicate present-day leaders and members of these political parties.

Moreover, the NC and NCP were on opposite ends of the conflict given as the NC formed the government while members of the NCP were the rebels. As a result, they have not been able to agree on members. The Nepalese Army, also a party to the decade-long conflict, has consistently maintained that members of the Nepalese armed forces must be tried separately in a military court and not in civilian courts or other transitional mechanisms.  

The culmination of repeated iterations of such problematic political will is that the transitional justice process has come to be centered around those in positions of power, thereby sidelining the victims.

The Lack of a Victim-Centric Approach 

The Conflict Victims’ Common Platform (CVCP), a collective of regional victim groups enabled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), has demanded the process of appointments to the Commissions be undertaken only after the Transitional Justice Act is amended as per the 2015 Nepalese Supreme Court ruling. By ensuring this amendment, the Act will ensure that those in power will have a lesser say in determining the nature of justice and the nature of reparations.

The CVCP has also reiterated that membership in the two Commissions is determined through a public and consultative process. In the current format, a recommendation committee is selecting the members to the Commission without any meaningful consultation with the conflict victims and other stakeholders. Thus, the ongoing nature of the process resembles one that is working to protect the perpetrators, rather than ensure the delivery of justice to the victims. Echoing this sentiment, human rights organizations and the United Nations have also been calling for a more victim-centric and consultative transitional justice process to address the general apathy towards addressing the impact of the war on victims. 

Where to, Hereon?

A natural result of this problematic political will and the lack of integration of victims is a transitional justice structure that has been consciously deprived of a definitive end. A tendency to move on and look towards the future has also emerged. Some speculate how this is plausible, especially when legacies from the past continue to create the future landscape. In the aftermath of the brutal rape of a 13-year-old girl in 2018, one editorial spoke of how the disastrous fact-finding process that followed may not have been so if the post-war legacy would have been one of building accountability and ensuring justice. 

At this juncture, it is imperative to make two changes to help correct course. The first is that the members to the committees must be appointed through a more public and consultative process per the directive of the CVCP. The victims must have a say in determining this selection. The second is that the committee must also take into account the merit of the members it selects in the human rights domain. The transitional justice literature often makes references to the role that wise and respected individuals could play in enabling trust into the transitional justice process. At this juncture, the transitional justice process in Nepal needs this trust to be rebuilt into it. 

No End in Sight to the Struggle for Transitional Justice in Nepal was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, civil unrest in Iran—ongoing since December 2017—is reaching historic levels. For the first time since 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranians are chanting the name of the last Shah, Mohammad Reza, calling for the return of his son Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and invoking the memory of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the founder of modern Iran and the Crown Prince’s grandfather. However, these aren’t nostalgic expressions by demonstrators so much as they are assertions of national pride. 

Iranians, regardless of political ideology, remain proud of the nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) by the government of then-Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1951. Iranians today are well-aware of the fact that Mosaddegh was a crucial figure in those events, yet it is the names of two previous Shahs and the current Crown Prince they chant. 

Iranians are invoking the names of members of the imperial family primarily because of the legacy left by the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah. Reza Shah modernized Iran—he created a robust police force and a strong judiciary and built roads and railways. Rather than ignoring or bypassing Iran’s clerical establishment, Reza Shah sought the cleric’s counsel when it came to matters of governance. 

In Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey and Reza Shah’s contemporary—was engaged in a campaign of secularization that worried the Iranian clerical establishment. Reza Shah had initially wanted to declare Iran a republic, as Atatürk had done in Turkey, but rejected the idea following clerical opposition. 

One of Reza Shah’s most significant accomplishments was establishing the first university in Iran, the University of Tehran. An institution that has fostered generations of professionals and intellectuals, Mosaddegh himself taught at the university for some time. 

Mosaddegh was, arguably, not a man of compromise. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became Shah following the abdication of his father, Reza Shah. In 1951, the young Shah accepted the decision of the Iranian parliament and appointed Mosaddegh to be his prime minister.  Mosaddegh accepted, swearing to defend Iran and the Iranian Constitution as the country’s head of government with the Shah as head of state. 

While the parliament had already drafted a bill that would reduce foreign ownership of and interference in the oil industry, Mosaddegh demanded increased powers and threatened to disband parliament if his demands weren’t met. The prime minister’s demands only damaged an already-fraught relationship. For a while, Mosaddegh and the Shah only communicated via courier. 

The Shah was reluctant to take action against Mosaddegh for several reasons. Iran faced many threats, from domestic Islamic extremist groups to the Soviet Union.  When Mosaddegh failed to back down, the Shah dispatched General Nematollah Nasiri with a handwritten letter, in which Mosaddegh was asked to step down. Under the Iranian Constitution, the Shah had the authority to dismiss the prime minister in the absence of parliament. Instead of complying, the prime minister had the general arrested and refused to resign. Mosaddegh later claimed that he was unsure if the letter was genuinely written by the Shah.

The people of Iran recognize that they owe much to Reza Shah and his son, despite their shortcomings. Walls in Iran are covered with slogans like “Long Live the Shah,” and demonstrators are chanting the names of members of the former imperial family. 

Washington is neglecting to pay attention to the current unrest in Iran. Iranians are distributing flyers featuring members of the Pahlavi family and are increasingly chanting their names. Furthermore, Iranians are petitioning Prince Reza Pahlavi—not their current government—to advocate at the United Nations for the preservation of Iran’s rights in the Caspian Sea. That Iranians are seeking help from the son of their deposed monarch and not their government suggests that U.S. recognition of and support for pro-democracy activists in Iran is long overdue.

Iranians yearning for democratic freedoms and should be allowed to decide for themselves if Iran should retain its status as a republic or reestablish itself as a constitutional monarchy. It wouldn’t be the only such monarchy—Japan, the U.K., Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are all constitutional monarchies, and all have excellent relations with the United States. In time, Iran will, too.

Washington’s Rationale for Ignoring Iranian Civil Unrest is Inexcusable was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a strong likelihood, however, that it will guarantee the opposite—an enduring condition of violence and unrest that can spill over into South Asia and beyond.

The Indian Government has repealed Article 370—the article in the Indian Constitution that guaranteed Jammu & Kashmir’s status as an autonomous territory, rather than a union state of India—greatly angering Kashmiris, who have been protesting since the announcement on August 5th, stunning observers worldwide. The move also violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 38.

Kashmiris knew something was wrong as the announcement was foreshadowed by widespread Indian state activity in Indian-administered Kashmir. Curfews along with a media and communications blackout were imposed, former Kashmiri Chief Ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti were put under house arrest, and additional troops were deployed, bringing the total up to 46,000. 

The Indian Government gave no warning ahead of the lockdown, announcing the article’s repeal the next day.  Mass protests have rocked the streets of Kashmir since the announcement, the region’s biggest demonstrations thus far. In the town of Soura alone, at least 10,000 demonstrators protested the repeal of Article 370. Despite the relaxing of travel restrictions, protests are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Indian security forces resorted to using pellet guns to disperse protesters. The use of pellets has been the subject of a great deal of international scrutiny and condemnation, as it violates international law and has left thousands of Kashmiris permanently blinded. Between July 10th and 12th of 2016, SMHS Hospital in Srinagar received 570 patients for eye treatments and surgeries after they had been fired upon with birdshot pellets. Pellet blindings, along with other human rights violations by Indian security forces,  lead some Kashmiris to join and participate in a homegrown insurgency.

There is a case to be made that repealing Article 370 was a response to American offers to mediate the Kashmir Issue. India has long tried to keep the issue bilateral, rather than internationalize it. When Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the U.S. at the end of July, President Donald Trump said in an Oval Office press conference that India had asked him to mediate the Kashmir Issue—something Indian authorities robustly denied, in keeping with their line of keeping the issue bilateral and off the international agenda. All of this has been on the tail of worsening Indian-U.S. relations, following a dispute regarding increased Indian tariffs on American goods, and India’s exclusion from the Afghan Peace Process in favor of Pakistan.  

What does repealing Article 370 mean?

Article 370 guaranteed that the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh would be governed autonomously rather than from New Delhi. A sub-article, Article 35A, ensured that non-Kashmiri Indians would not be able to buy land or vote within Indian Kashmir, meaning that Kashmiris would remain in control of their territory as well as their governance.

Repealing Article 370 means that sub-Article 35A will be reversed as well, meaning Hindus and other non-Kashmiris can purchase property, settle, and participate in politics within Kashmir. Native Kashmiri Muslims are fearful this may be the first step in a campaign of ethnic cleansing by majoritarian Hindus. Indeed, such concerns were voiced by former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti in response to the decision, saying that the reason behind repealing Article 370 was to change the demographics of Indian-controlled Kashmir and render India’s only Muslim-majority state ethnically homogenous.

By purchasing land in Kashmir and settling, they would eventually be able to force the native Muslim population out or replace it by marrying Kashmiri women. Such fears are reinforced by the vitriolic nationalist rhetoric espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government in Delhi, as well as by a swath of the Indian media. As a result of New Delhi’s decision to repeal Article 370, Kashmir faces a higher risk of sub-state violence and the potential for a mass-emigration of Kashmiris.

Increased Militancy and Violence

The Kashmiri population will lash out more violently against the Indian state than before, having already been on the receiving end of state violence and repressive policies. The potential for violence is likely the underpinning factor in the logic behind the pre-announcement media blackout and troop deployments. 

Repealing Article 370 could end up inciting increased violence in Kashmir due to the end of the autonomy that has been highly-valued by Kashmiris for the past seven decades. A violent response to the repeal could beget even more violence and heavy-handed action from Indian authorities, threatening regional peace. Pulwama was the deadliest attack against Indian forces in Kashmir, and the response threatened global security and turned more Kashmiris against the Indian state.

Established movements like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) could re-emerge, alongside a range of newer actors fighting the Indian state. In either case, a violent uprising would lead to an enduring and far more ferocious condition of insurgent violence, with more frequent and intense attacks adding to the nearly 50,000 casualties resulting from the 30-year-long dispute. The prolonged enactment of humiliating and repressive policies by the Indian government against Kashmiris has, for decades, arguably fostered a condition of hatred and a loss of allegiance to India, leaving an endless pool of potential recruits for an insurgent movement. Repealing Article 370 could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. 

While the Indian government’s decision has profound ramifications for Kashmiris, who will be targeted by security forces in retaliation, a renewed Kashmiri insurgency would impact regional security as well, depending on how New Delhi responds.

In the aftermath of the February 2019 Pulwama bomb attack, India immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack (with minimal evidence), before launching airstrikes against Pakistani territory (this author previously published a two-part article covering the Pulwama Incident for Global Security Review). While neither side escalated to full-scale war, there was a genuine potential for nuclear conflict.

Simply blaming Pakistan is not an effective strategy for India, nor is baiting Pakistan into military adventurism. Given the sensitive nature of the Article 370 issue, a heavy-handed response to militancy in Kashmir would detrimentally impact regional security.

A mass-movement of Kashmiri refugees

As mentioned earlier, the settlement of non-Kashmiris will have a profound impact on the area’s demographic make-up. Rampant Islamophobia emanating from New Delhi raises fears that native Kashmiris will be forced out of their territory, either into India or over the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. 

Kashmiris are already one of the most marginalized communities in India, being the targets of pogroms and Islamophobic violence by Hindu extremists and repressive policies enforced by security forces in Kashmir itself. Following the Pulwama attack, Kashmiri students across India were targeted in acts of violence and harassed at school. Increasingly alienated by India, Kashmiris who can leave, will. 

Kashmiris have previously crossed the LoC into Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since the 1990s, 38,000 refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir fled the fighting and escaped across the LoC, with some leaving their families on the other side. Like many in Indian-administered Kashmir, the refugees were subject to repressive policies enforced by Indian security forces.

Due to their shared religion and history of mass migration, Kashmiri refugees will head for Pakistan, despite its economy being unable to cope with an influx of refugees. A Kashmiri exodus would be the last nail in the coffin, compounding other problems like overpopulation and mismanaged funds. Additionally, should Pakistan be blacklisted at the Financial Action Task Force meeting in October, it will be precluded from receiving the loans it so desperately needs to keep itself going. 

Pakistan is still reeling from the influx of refugees from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion, along with internecine civil unrest in cities like Karachi during the 1990s. According to UNHCR, there are 1.4 million registered Afghans living in Pakistan. The mass movement of refugees has had a detrimental impact on Pakistan’s resources, and security through Afghan involvement in crime and terrorism. 

India’s BJP government will achieve the opposite of what was intended if it believed that Indian security would be enhanced by bringing Kashmir into the Indian Union. To Kashmiris, it seems that the government has written them off entirely, which more radical elements see as a green light to conduct acts of violence against India. 

Pakistan has successfully been able to lobby the UN Security Council to discuss the current Kashmir Crisis in a meeting on the 16th of August. Whatever the outcome, Kashmiris have the most to lose as a result of the BJP’s political adventurism.

Ending Kashmir’s autonomy will mean wide-ranging implications for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring brought about renewed optimism in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, it ended in catastrophic failure. Over 180,000 individuals were killed, and over six million were displaced—a solemn reminder to demonstrators and activists today. While the defiance of demonstrators is laudable, lives were lost as the death toll increased to seemingly little avail as negotiations between the military government and opposition in Sudan seemed destined for failure, until talks brokered by the African Union yielded a breakthrough agreement.

The United States dispatched an envoy to facilitate ongoing talks in Sudan, and the African Union suspended the country’s membership. While the situation in Sudan appears to have stabilized to a degree, the unrest in Sudan and Algeria has spread to other North African states, in a reverberating echo of the 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt. As economic discontent spreads throughout the Middle East, political unrest is growing. 

In Morocco, a BBC survey has revealed that more than half of respondents in the country seek immediate political change. Whether mass protests will erupt in Morocco is unknown; however, grievances are palpable, signaling a possible rerun of the unrest experienced in the Arab Spring protests. Eight years after the failure of the mass protests of 2011 to affect meaningful reform, lessons must be learned to avoid similar outcomes—or worse.

With the removal of the Mubarak dictatorship, came the election of Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Just as Morsi’s election symbolized the dawn of a new era for many, his demise by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup and recent unexpected death was emblematic of democracy’s often brutal fate in the Middle East and North Africa—a statement which does not imply support for the Muslim Brotherhood or deflect from the short-lived hopes for a chaotic presidency, but rather highlights its reverse effect: the emboldening of military dictatorships. Except for Tunisia, many states in the region have seen the implementation of greater autocratic control or have spiraled into anarchy since the Arab Spring. 

The convoluted role of the United States in the Arab Spring, whereby President Obama sanctioned regime change in Libya while supporting the military-backed coup in Egypt, arises from the contention between abiding by America’s foreign policy and national security interests and aligning with local democratic movements. 

One conspicuous feature of the United States’ approach to recent unrest is resounding silence. This could reflect the Trump’s antipathy to foreign intervention or precautionary measures after the inefficacy of U.S. involvement in 2011. Nonetheless, the protests in Sudan and Algeria are organic movements of ordinary citizens, many of whom are young people—the nemesis of autocratic dictatorships. The large-scale involvement of youths was illustrated in the successful attempt to block 82-year-old Algerian President Bouteflika from running for a fifth term. 

Almost seventy percent of Algeria’s population is under the age of 30, resembling the demographic profile of the Arab Spring protests, aided by social media and propelled by economic hardships seeking to topple military-backed regimes. These similarities present similar obstacles with a decentralized opposition being unsustainable in the long-term. Meanwhile, the presence of social media as a weapon for democracy remains a concern for Arab governments, evidenced by the internet blackout in Sudan, which only served to further fuel public grievances. 

A case study of Egypt reveals that deposing the front-facing leadership is merely a smokescreen to the power structure that remains—mainly bureaucrats, members of the security and military establishments, and oligarchs loyal to the old regime. While delaying elections in Algeria favors protestors in buying time to prevent Army Chief Gaid Salah’s preferred candidate taking office—a remnant of Bouteflika’s regime—the action highlights how a lack of organization amongst the opposition impedes progress. The militaries in both Sudan and Algeria are the repositories of power. Salah’s description of protestors who opposed the army as being “enemies of Algeria,” reinforces the brevity of hope instilled by the protests, before being silenced by the military. 

Revolutions enthuse the masses with optimism, however, the experiences of the 2011 protests reveal an illusory and temporal effect in the face of a powerful military and security establishment. The Sudanese and Algerian cases highlight growing dissent in the Middle East and North Africa. Without an organized opposition with overwhelming international support, political unrest in the MENA region is likely to bear an uncanny resemblance to the events of the first Arab Spring, potentially resulting in anarchy, civil war, or the imposition of stronger autocratic rule.

The Return of the Arab Spring was originally published on Global Security Review.

After President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was sworn in as Ukraine’s sixth president, his first order of business was to dissolve the current parliament. Zelenskiy announced this move in his inaugural address; a strategic move meant to capitalize upon his present popularity in the hopes of gaining a majority. In this address, he also criticized the current Cabinet of Ministers and called for a change in the office of the General Prosecutor, presently held by Yuriy Lutsenko.

Zelenskiy, however, may face difficulties in moving his agenda forward in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament). While the decree to dissolve the Rada was accepted and snap elections are in preparations for July 21, Zelenskiy also called for this new election to be based on votes for parties rather than people. His argument centers around corruption, where he claims that voting for individuals promotes corruption. In the emergency session of the Rada to vote on this, only 92 lawmakers voted in favor. To place any such proposal on the agenda, a majority of 226 votes is necessary. This proposal was also voted down, along with another plan submitted by Zelenskiy that would change the rules for state purchases during election campaigns.

Does this precede a standoff between Zelenskiy and the Rada?

Due to Zelenskiy’s unique electoral support base and the fact that he ran without a political party, he has little to no formal support within the Parliament itself. This has meant that even though Zelenskiy has called for the government to step down, the Rada did not accept it. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman only received 97 of the 226 votes necessary to accept his resignation. Even more important is the fact that Rada speaker Andriy Parubiy has claimed that Zelenskiy’s decree to dissolve parliaments and to call snap elections in July is illegal. He has stated he will appeal to the Constitutional Court, saying that “it is sad and alarming that the guarantor of the constitution starts his work in the post with a gross violation of the constitution.”

Interestingly, other members of the government are also attempting to call appointments illegal and in violation of lustration legislation. Tetyana Kozachenko, the head of the public council on lustration issues, has claimed that Zelenskiy’s appointment of Andriy Bohdan violates lustration legislation because he held posts under former President Viktor Yanukovych.

Is dissolving the current Rada possible?

According to the Ukrainian Constitution, there are three strategies through which Zelenskiy could dissolve the Ukrainian parliament. The first is if the Rada fails to build a coalition. Second is if there are no plenary meetings within thirty days of the start of the legislative session. Alternatively, the Rada could be dissolved if, after sixty days after the resignation of the Cabinet of Minister, it has not reformed.

According to Volodymyr Fesenko, a political scientist, such a dissolution is not possible right now because there are no norms on how the absence of a coalition set within the Regulations of the Rada. Fesenko also notes that “Before this, the president must hold consultations with the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada and heads of factions on the expediency of dissolution. And all this needs to be done within a few days, since, according to the Constitution, six months before the end of Rada’s powers (no later than May 27), it cannot be dissolved.”

If Fesenko is to be believed, dissolving the Rada would precede a political crisis. How does he know this? Because Yushchenko used this strategy in 2007. However, it was only achieved after compromise with the representatives of every parliamentary faction. According to writer Anastasia Zaremba, the problem is that Zelenskiy does not have any motivation to work with the current parliament. Due to his popularity, he can use his recent election to claim that the Rada is stonewalling him rather than choosing to work with his constructively.

Given Parubiy’s appeal to the Constitutional Court, observers will have to wait and see whether such a dissolution of the Rada is possible. As for Zelenskiy, his choice of advisors will likely prove whether or not this brief standoff will continue to endure for the foreseeable future.

President of Ukraine Moves to Disband Parliament was originally published on Global Security Review.

Out of a population of 81 million, there are at least 47 million active social media users in Iran. Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram, which claims to have 40 million users, are also widely used in Iran. This high number of Iranian social media users and a lack of media literacy, provide a fertile ground for vast disinformation campaigns. Propaganda bots, known as “botnets” when working together, are normally used in such campaigns. They can masquerade as humans to amplify political messaging that suit specific agenda by liking, sharing, retweeting, and following genuine accounts. They can also be used to make hashtags trend, which improves the visibility of a political message.

As we approach the run-up to the Majles (parliament) and presidential elections in Iran, more hands from both pro-regime and opposition groups will be on keyboards to read, be read and possibly affect the result of the elections. For the Iranian people who are fighting for a transition from theocracy to democracy, disinformation campaigns—which are designed to sow confusion and reap chaos—are undoubtedly harmful; a look at Iran’s modern history reveals that turmoil has favored authoritarianism rather than democratic movements.

Iranian Opposition Groups’ Bot Toolkit

Supposing these campaigns in Iran are inspired by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) model that was used to polarize the U.S. public, it is not difficult to predict that there will be a focus on the societal cleavages that already exist among the Iranians and an effort to bold them through the twitter botnets’ traffic manipulations. The final goal would be to create as much distrust and chaos as possible; such that could finally lead to a “regime change.” The main target could be religious divide and ethnic minorities like Kurds, Baluch, and Turks. There could also be some Twitter campaigns designed to influence voters to boycott the elections with the main focus on delegitimizing both reformist and conservative parties in Iran. Furthermore, sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and disinformation could be spread among the voters across the political spectrum to dissuade them from voting.

The disinformation and fake news that have already gained sizable audiences in rural areas could also possibly be another target. Residents of these areas in Iran rarely use Twitter, but the content from the platform could quickly enter Telegram or Instagram and influence users on those platforms. Before and during the course of elections, these rural areas could turn into the epicenters of fake news and rumors that are amplified by bots. This, no matter how small the scope, could change the fate of a nation.

The Islamic Republic’s Bot Arsenal

The bots that are most probably handled by the Iranian cyber army or IRGC could be used to amplify any political message that is on the agenda of the ruling forces. They can be used to attack other candidates, harass them, or even spread rumors and fake news to smear their campaign.

Furthermore, in the event of uprisings before or during the elections, the regime in Tehran has its bot methods to fight back. These methods were tested and rehearsed during the nationwide protests of January 2018 to create distrust among the Iranian protestors. One of the tactics used is the creation of the bots whose task is to call the widely shared videos of the rallies fake and to discourage potential protestors from joining the crowds by creating a sense that nothing is going on. These bots were also used to guide the demonstrators to the wrong locations and to create an impression that the protests were on a small scale.

Democracy down

Iran might not be the Switzerland of the Middle East, but has a unique political structure and activism with elections held every four years to choose the president and the members of the parliament. It is these elections that create democratic glimmers of hope for reform to which propaganda bots could be a significant setback. If in 2015 and due to Iranian public’s willingness to join the international community, the P5+1’s primary concern, was Iran’s nuclear activities, now, a non-nuclear but politically polarized Islamic Republic—radicalized by propaganda bot—could raise even more significant concerns.

Furious with Trump’s withdrawal from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and disillusioned with Rouhani cabinet’s mismanagement and inability to deliver economic promises, many Iranians are now anything but moderate. Hardliners, armed to the teeth with twitter bots, will be taking full advantage of this situation to intensively spread their propaganda and rally their supporters for a landslide victory in the next round of elections. A déjà vu of another Ahmadinejad, with a bot army, long-range missiles, and possibly an urge to withdraw from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would then only be one round of election away from all of us. Whether Iran’s fragile moments of democracy can survive is a question that only time can answer.

Iran’s Fragile Moments of Democracy May Not Survive the Propaganda Bots was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of course, much has been said about Brexit over the past years, so much so that it has become nearly impossible to escape the daily dose of Westminster’s drama. Economic experts have warned of the potential danger of exiting the E.U. without a deal, to then warn of the genuine damage that Britain’s Brexit limbo is doing to the economy. British entrepreneurs have been split on the consequences of the vote, with some embracing the opportunities that free trade agreements beyond the E.U. framework might bring, and others complaining of the reduction in market access and the difficulties in attracting skilled workers to the country.

Political activists, journalists, and experts have been mobilized as early as the Brexit vote, providing commentaries, analyses, and opinions on the thousand political, social and historical implications of the referendum result. Immigrants, from both the EU and beyond, have either stoically braced themselves hoping for a painless outcome, or packed their bags and given up on a country that has made its views so painfully clear. In short, and whatever political inclination one might have, one thing is sure: the Brexit quagmire has profoundly altered the fabrics of British society, irreversibly changing how the nation-state functions, exists and is perceived, both domestically and abroad. 

There is, however, one segment of British society that, arguably more than others, encapsulates the dramatic changes occurring in the post-Brexit landscape and, ironically, it is the same segment that has created the conditions for its demise. The irresponsibility of the British political class and its increasingly apparent detachment from various societal predicaments has led to a forceful renegotiation of the pact between government and individuals, whereby deep-seated resentments have found their way into a new wave of mainstream ultra-nationalism.

With the era of austerity—prompted by the collapse of the global financial system—weighing heavily on the shoulders of the poor and shrinking the middle class, the rescue of the super-rich by governments entrenched in neoliberal market logic has opened the door for a general reassessment of the political order, and for a growing mistrust towards the promised benefits of the current status quo. The global landscape further played a role in creating such a strong polarisation.

The E.U.’s eastbound expansion has put the Kremlin on high alert, encouraging Putin to a more proactive role in propping up Eurosceptic leaders, as he funnels millions into the pockets of parties such as the French Front National, the German Alternative for Germany, the Italian La Lega, and, allegedly, the British “Leave.EU” campaign team. Simultaneously, the legacy of the war in Syria has had far-reaching socio-political implications, effectively increasing the gap between nativist and non-nativist groups in Europe and framing European political discourse along the lines of the “Us vs. Them” paradigm.

It is in this context of fear, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement that nationalistic sentiments find their way to the dinner table, as mainstream society becomes progressively more exposed to narratives advocating for the reform of internationalism, a retreat from the global, and a general denunciation of the foreign. This was, after all, the pillar upon which the Brexit campaign was built, and the underlying message that resonated the most with the public. “Take back control” became the simplest and most effective way to channel the entire spectrum of pro-Brexit stances into a hopeful slogan, but also to tap into the primary driver of people’s anxieties – the widespread sense of abandonment and impotence, and the promise of social redemption. 

The Politics of Politics

It is likely that historians will write down Cameron’s decision to hold the E.U. referendum as one of the greatest political miscalculations in British history. As the story goes, the former British Prime Minister called the Brexit referendum in the hopes of consolidating the unity of the Conservative Party ahead of the 2015 general elections, effectively tying British membership to the E.U. to strategic considerations of party politics.

As leader of a party that had traditionally maintained a certain scepticism towards the European Union—perfectly encapsulated in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, in which she claimed: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels”—Cameron knew that the easy “remain” victory he had anticipated and hoped for would help him consolidate his leadership, draw the hardliners out of his party, and finally put the E.U. issue to bed. Even more, Cameron hoped that the promise of a referendum would be enough to stave off the risk that the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP)—which had made of anti-immigration and anti-E.U. sentiments the pillars of its political agenda—would attract conservative votes and play in favor of the Miliband-led Labour Party: “Look, we have heard the message loud and clear about the things you want to see changed. We will change those things”—he pleaded—“come with us, come back home to us rather than risk all of this good work being undone by Labour.” 

People did hear him, loud and clear. Not only was Cameron re-elected into a second term, but he had also won a majority that, however thin, allowed him to head the first majority conservative government for twenty years. The cheering in Downing Street, however, might have been short-lived. According to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Cameron did not expect to win a majority in 2015; rather, he thought that he would again have a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, who would promptly block the referendum in exchange for concessions on the alternative vote in local elections.

Had things gone to plan, Cameron would have arguably had his cake, eaten it, and enjoyed it too. He would have stabilized his party, silenced the E.U. issue among conservative MPs, inflicted a severe defeat to UKIP, scared the E.U. into renegotiating some of the most disputed aspects of British membership, and secured another five years into government without taking responsibility for a referendum that was promised but never happened. But with the ideologically-awkward, yet politically-convenient, Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition now out of the picture, Cameron had to deliver on the promise made: give British citizens an in/out option on the EU. As Tusk put it: “Paradoxically David Cameron became the real victim of his victory.”

With the referendum now sure to take place, further political miscalculations were made by the Prime Minister in the run-up to the vote. By late 2015, the House of Lords passed a motion with a majority of 82 to lower the voting age to 16, which was aimed at enfranchising youngsters to politics and give them a voice on the E.U. referendum. While Brexiteers predictably trembled at the prospect—as the “leave” and “remain” camps were segmented along  “old” and “young” demographic lines—Cameron too firmly rejected the idea, fearing that left-inclined young voters would turn the tide against the conservatives in future general elections. Thus, putting again party politics before the upcoming E.U. vote, Cameron disenfranchised around 1.5 million potential young voters that were likely to vote “remain.” In retrospect, considering that “leave” won by approximately 1.2 million votes, a young pro-E.U. vote could have indeed saved Cameron’s political career. 

The voting age miscalculation was not the only one committed by the government, but one of the many that occurred since the referendum was promised in January 2013. Above all, there was Cameron’s inability to appreciate popular moods concerning the question of Britain’s E.U. membership, which in turn severely restricted his chances of selling home the new deal he negotiated with Brussels after the 2015 elections.

The popular argument is that Cameron’s attempt to revisit the parameters of the UK-E.U. relationship was mostly unsatisfactory—or as The Sun put it, “pathetic” and “gutless”—and that he should have pressed for more concessions. While there might be some truth in this, since Cameron had repeatedly downplayed the chances of a “leave” vote to E.U. leaders—even commenting back in 2014 that he would easily win “by 70:30”—the three main miscalculations lied elsewhere.

First, Cameron believed that the concessions obtained from the EU, particularly in relation to the issue of immigration, would be enough to sway popular consensus towards the “remain” camp, as he misread people’s anxiety as stemming from in-work benefits for E.U. immigrants (which he managed to renegotiate) instead of from the numbers of E.U. immigration (which he could not).

Immigration ranked first among people’s top concerns, and although the “emergency break” on benefits was aimed at discouraging new migrants from moving to Britain, it was surely not enough to placate the fears of the British people. Second, Cameron failed to read the overarching mood and narratives driving the Brexit campaign, which had become increasingly polarising, slogan-driven, and dominated by strong popular emotions. There was arguably little room for in-depth analyses of the legal niceties of the summit’s set of conclusions, and many of the concessions obtained were either lost in the wind or swept under the carpet by Brexiteers, who simply adjudged they amounted to nothing as they were not binding. Third, and perhaps even more importantly, Cameron’s failure to bring home concrete results that practically addressed people’s fears, directly played into one of the most effective Brexit tropes, one which claims that Britain has given up its sovereignty to the EU.

When Ian Duncan Smith, Cameron’s former Work, and Pensions Secretary, lashed out at German Chancellor Angela Merkel accusing her of directly sabotaging the government’s efforts to control immigration, the British press went on overdrive. The Sun, which claims 33.3 million readers each month, promptly ran the news story titled: “Cam’s in her hans: Germany SABOTAGED David Cameron’s E.U. renegotiation, and he let them, IDS [Ian Duncan Smith] sensationally claims,” in which Ian Duncan Smith’s point was clearly made: “The Germans said from the outset, you are not getting border control. Full stop… We put ourselves in a compliant position to another country which doesn’t have your best interests necessarily at heart… We are now in a worse position than we were before.”

Here lay one of Cameron’s main miscalculations, or perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of his political naïveté. The prime minister hoped that he could both quell the “leave” side’s unrest by securing a better deal with the E.U.—which would have in turn afforded him an almost certain victory in the referendum—while simultaneously win over E.U. leaders, Merkel above all, by forcing them to make concessions on free movement.

Of course, no one in Brussels was willing to sacrifice the unity and fundamental principles of the Union to get Cameron out of the political jam he had put himself into. This meant that, when the E.U. deal was brought back home with accusations of German interference and of Cameron’s incompetence, Brexiteers were able to find yet another reason to push for the “leave” vote. As UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage commented: “[David Cameron] is not aiming for any substantial renegotiation… no promise to regain the supremacy of Parliament, nothing on ending the free movement of people and no attempt to reduce Britain’s massive contribution to the E.U. budget”.

With the deal being presented to the public as nothing short of a major disappointment, pro-leave elites came to be equipped with the perfect rhetorical weapon which allowed them to tie together the issue of immigration with the issue of sovereignty: if Britain wanted a chance at regulating the migration flux into its borders, it had to make itself “independent” from the European Union.

The final, fatal blow to David Cameron’s “remain” campaign was delivered by a series of misguided steps that the prime minister took as he attempted to keep the Conservative Party united and avoid public clashes between high-profile conservative MPs. Indeed, by the time he returned to London with an underwhelming set of promises on the future of Britain’s relationship with the EU, the pro-Brexit faction in Westminster was in full swing, relentlessly campaigning to give Britain a supposed “independence” from Brussels. With the European Research Group (ERG) moving conservative MPs towards a hard-Brexit stance that was directly opposed to the European ambitions of their party leader, two senior figures in the conservative party, Michael Gove—himself a ERG member—and Boris Johnson, came to the forefront of the “leave” campaign as early as February 2016, the former out of (primarily) principles, the latter out of (primarily) ambitions. 

In line with his overarching belief that “remain” would get an easy win, and that remaining in Europe was, by all means, the sensible thing to do, Cameron rested assured that both MPs would back him in the campaign out of loyalty to the premiership, out of friendship, and out of reason. The miscalculation, however, proved itself costly. Indeed, not only was Cameron forced to resort to convoluted maneuvers to soften the blow when his friends moved to the other side—first by attacking Johnson and then calling for a truce—but it also meant that the leave campaign could now benefit from the support of two, high-profile conservatives.

Indeed, both Gove and Johnson had different ideas from David Cameron when it came to Europe, as throughout their political career both had, more or less publicly, argued cases against Brussels’s legislative influence over London, as well as criticized EU’s laws on free movement. More than that, the former London mayor saw in the Brexit referendum the political opportunity of a lifetime, as he reasoned that, although Brexit was a major political gamble, it could offer the perfect chance to advance his trajectory to Downing Street, effectively guaranteeing him enough conservative support to prop him up to become next prime minister, either after the end of Cameron’s mandate or after his resignation.

On the other hand, Michael Gove’s Brexit stance was underpinned by a stronger Euroscepticism, by an ever-lingering sense of ideological fatigue, and by an equally strong Orientalism which had made him a central player during the “Trojan Horse’ affair—a scandal that eventually contributed in convincing Cameron to remove him from his role of education secretary. As such, while the £30,000 pay-cut might have played a role in spoiling his friendship with Cameron, his “Us VS Them” ideology informed his stance in relation to the issue of immigration, so much so that the speech with which he announced his support to the “leave” campaign was primarily framed along those lines: 

“E.U. immigration policies have encouraged people traffickers and brought desperate refugee camps to our borders. Far from providing security in an uncertain world, the EU’s policies have become a source of instability and insecurity… the E.U. is proving incapable of dealing with the current crises in Libya and Syria. The former head of Interpol says the EU’s internal borders policy is ‘like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe.'”

Crucially, that is not to say that both MPs jumped on the Brexit wagon light-heartedly. As Shipman notes, both Gove and Johnson remained on the fence for as long as it was possible for them to do so, sincerely torn between their beliefs and their loyalty, and between the comforting certainty of a “remain” vote, and the many unknowns of the Brexit gamble. But when Cameron presented the result of his E.U. negotiations, and with the Conservative Party already effectively fractured between “leavers” and “remainers’, both MPs saw slim chances of casting a vote in favour of Brussels, opting instead for what they believed was the natural outcome of a political career never shy of anti-E.U. sentiments. 

After February 2016 delivered two important and highly regarded MPs to the Brexit cause—which spread the feeling that “leave” was not, after all, utter lunacy—it should have been an all-out war for a prime minister whose chances of winning were getting increasingly slim. It was not. Instead, Cameron refused to confront either Johnson or Gove in television debates for fear that Brexit would turn into, as he commented, “a Tory psychodrama.”

Indeed, Cameron became more concerned with the idea of rebuilding the Conservative Party after Brexit than with Brexit itself and reasoned that a public confrontation against leading conservative MPs of the caliber of Johnson and Gove would demolish any appearance of party unity. Perhaps, Cameron still believed that “remain” would be the natural outcome of the referendum, or perhaps he was willing to sacrifice his political career for the good of the party. Regardless, the prime minister scrapped the idea of a “blue on blue” debate and opted instead for a confrontation with a very familiar face in the “leave” camp: Nigel Farage, on June 7.

Although the two never shared a stage—rather had allocated slots to make their case and take questions from the audience—the show unveiled the underlying logic behind the entire Brexit debate, giving a clear sense of what real drivers of the “leave” campaign were and which popular sentiments were underpinning it. Indeed, for as much as David Cameron attempted to play the “economy card”—claiming, at times arrogantly, that every expert had warned against the economic repercussions of Brexit—immigration remained the salient issue which many in the audience wanted to keep as the focus of the debate. This played directly into the hands of the UKIP leader, for Farage—a controversial figure in British politics whose 20-year long political career was built on anti-immigration sentiments—knew too well that his audience was not in the TV studios, but at home, and was eager to hear more about the dangers of the EU’s free movement policy.

Crucially, although many in the press were quick in attributing the victory to the more polished David Cameron, any mention of immigration virtually assigned a point to the “leave” side. Indeed, on the one hand, Cameron had no real answers to give, for there was no easy solution to the question of immigration; and on the other, Farage was quite happy to keep the debate on that specific issue, even if that meant casting himself as an untouchable hardliner in the “leave” camp. For example, when a woman from the audience raised the issue of Farage’s comments linking the Cologne sexual assaults to remaining in the EU, he promptly responded: 

“It’s a massive issue in Germany; it’s a huge issue in Sweden. I think Angela Merkel has made a big mistake by saying “please anyone come.” And what’s happened is, a very large number of young, single males have settled in Germany and in Sweden, who come from cultures where attitudes towards women are different.”

Although Farage’s stance sits at the far-end of the Islamophobic discourse that emerged during the Brexit campaign, it is useful to remember that such a narrative was widely and happily shared among Brexiteers. Ian Duncan Smith repeatedly claimed that a vote to remain would expose the UK “to terror risks.” Gove’s announcement that he would back the “leave” vote revolved around the security threat posed by the E.U. free movement rule, which, he claimed, “actively abets terrorists.” Johnson too, despite his long history of controversial comments, seized the opportunity to argue that Brexit would improve Britain’s security against the terror threat. 

Of course, this is not to say that the Brexit campaign was centered on the question of Muslims in Britain, nor that “leave” voters were solely motivated by their views on Islam. Instead, British discontent with the European Union encapsulated a wide array of popular beliefs and discontents with social issues, with the political class, and with the country’s economy. Even so, however, it is significant that Brexit came to be framed along the lines of security, terrorism, and multiculturalism, rather than, for example, practical considerations of economic stability.

Sure, Gove dismissed any attempt at rationality when he claimed that Britons “have had enough of experts,” but the “leave” team could not win the debate by merely rebutting technical arguments. Instead, they needed something that they could tie to both the global landscape and to the question of Britain’s E.U. membership.  As “Take back control” offered them the perfect slogan to silence pragmatism, the issue of Middle Eastern migrants and the widespread panic around terrorist attacks in Europe gave them the ideal ammunition to make their stronger case: leaving the E.U. could rid the country of Muslim migrants, and with them, of the risk of terrorism. 

These arguments had a profound impact on British society, which came to the inevitable conclusion that there was, in fact, a link between terrorism and Brexit. In January 2016, the vast majority of people polled by YouGov (77%) demanded a ban of the Islamic veil in British schools, and another 58% believed that many economic restrictions had to be imposed on asylum seekers. By February 2016, 56% believed that “a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society” existed. As Brexit slowly paved the way for a wave of Islamophobic sentiments across the country, by June 2016 immigration became the most important issue for voters. After the referendum, hate crimes against racial and religious minority reached an all-time record. 

The Turkish Question 

Much of David Cameron political credibility had also being compromised by his fearless stance in support of Turkey’s entry into the European Union, which in the run-up to the referendum vote became another significantly hot topic for British society, busy assessing the pros and cons of its membership to the Union. In that sense, Cameron was more Tony Blair than he was Margaret Thatcher.

Indeed, while the Iron Lady became responsible for introducing the concept of “Britishness” in an attempt to emphasize the need to preserve British national identity against the growing European one, the New Labour leader had long advocated the idea of a Turkish seat at the European table. Behind Blair’s support of Ankara lied practical considerations of foreign policy, as Turkey’s strategic value—further increased by the events that followed 9/11—trumped the socio-cultural factors that had made other member state sceptical, for a country boasting a population of nearly 80 million, 99% of which Muslim, was perceived by many European bureaucrats as a threat to Europe.

Ironically, one key argument which would underpin both Blair’s and Cameron’s stance concerning the Turkish question was more sectarian than pragmatic. Indeed both leaders believed that Turkey’s accession would contribute towards staving off the risk of a “clash of civilisation” between Muslims and non-Muslims, as it could strengthen Turkey’s resistance against Islamist fundamentalism while simultaneously shutting down “intense arguments about the incompatibility of Islam with democracy or Islam with human rights and modernity.”

Secure in his belief that Turkey, sitting at the border between Europe and the Middle East, could indeed bridge Christianity and Islam, in 2010 Cameron commented: “Turkey can be a great unifier. Because instead of choosing between East and West, Turkey has chosen both. And it’s this opportunity to unite East and West that gives Turkey such an important role with countries in the region in helping to deliver improved security for us all.”

However, with the Brexit referendum unveiling the country’s real mood about immigration—and even more so in relation to multiculturalism—Cameron sensed that his support for Turkey’s entry in the E.U. was misplaced. Indeed, the question of Turkey’s membership was quickly weaponized by Brexiteers—both outside and within Cameron’s own government—who began to spread claims that Britain would be flooded by Muslim migrants carrying crime, security threats and the risk of further strains on the country’s public services such as the National Health Service (NHS). As new posters reading “Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU: Vote leave, take back control” began to circulate, David Cameron spectacularly U-turned on his pro-expansion stance, ridiculing the Ankara government during a May 2016 interview, in which he claimed that it would not be able to join the E.U. “until the year 3000”.

Equally spectacularly, however, David Cameron maintained a somewhat ambiguous stance over this issue, which was made even more suspicious after leading Brexiteers such as Gove and Johnson had demanded from the government a clear commitment to veto Turkey’s entry. Arguably to their delight, this never happened. Whether because he feared that such a commitment could jeopardize Britain’s bilateral relationship with Turkey, or because he did not want to face future diplomatic awkwardness at European level, Cameron never clearly gave assurances that he would, in fact, veto Turkey’s accession, rather, he relied on the French government—which had conveniently called for a referendum on the issue—to stop Ankara from entering the Union. Again, however, Cameron’s political calculations played into the wrong hands: as questions about Britain’s loss of sovereignty lingered, his decision to pass the gavel to Paris on such a crucial issue made many wonder why was Downing Street “relying on somebody else” to stop Turkey’s accession. “Take back control” scored another important victory. 

The issue of Turkey became central in the Brexit saga. Indeed, by then the “leave” campaign had begun to show one of its ugliest faces, creating a sectarian divide that leveraged on pure prejudice against migrants—and even more so against Muslims. Crucially, while early efforts to sway public opinion towards the “leave” option had focused on issues of sovereignty and economics (with strong emphasis being placed for example on Britain’s E.U. membership fee), Brexit supporters were quick in shifting towards arguments that could be more easily understood, and that could have a more significant impact among the “anxious middle” in British society.

While it was arguably difficult to make an economic case in support of Brexit—for the E.U. remains the largest single market in the world and the world’s largest economy—the global context that framed the Brexit vote provided “leave” campaigners with anti-immigration ammunition. In the years that followed the rise of the Islamic State (IS), Europe had witnessed increasing anti-Muslim sentiments stemming from large numbers of migrants fleeing war zones in the Middle East, as well as from some high-profile Islamist terror attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and England.

Thus, fuelled by its furthest-right activists operating in the streets and online, anti-Muslim sentiments in Britain found unexpected legitimisation in the words of mainstream politicians such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, who promptly linked their Brexit ambitions to the issue of immigration, which was in turn connected to the question of opening British doors to Turkish Muslims. Completing the picture, Nigel Farage’s infamous “Breaking Point” poster—showing a large queue of non-white, Middle Eastern-looking migrants and a sign reading “We must break free from the E.U. and take back control”—further strengthened the connection between the “leave” vote and Muslim existence in Britain, regardless of their nationality or status.

Little did it matter that the majority of mainstream Brexiteers promptly distanced themselves from the radical views of the UKIP leader. In a short period, Brexit had not only come to be firmly discussed in terms of immigration and border control but had come to be framed within a “Us VS Them” paradigm that further allowed for a mainstream scapegoating of Muslims. It is thus unsurprising that a record surge in anti-Muslim hate crimes occurred in fact in the aftermath of the vote, as abuses such as “Get out – we voted Leave,” or “Shouldn’t you be on a plane back to Pakistan? We voted you out,” became the clearest, and ugliest, a manifestation of what the Brexit vote meant for many.

The Economy, Stupid

Any analysis of the Brexit referendum and the moods that it encapsulated would be incomplete without an assessment of the economic backdrop within which the vote occurred. Indeed, while party politics and the question of Turkey steered the outcome towards the “leave” side, revealing the significant political capital that issues such as multiculturalism and immigration have in such circumstances, it was the economic situation in Britain that provided the conditions for anti-Muslim sentiments to emerge. 

A plethora of studies have convincingly demonstrated that there exists a direct correlation between economic conditions and openness towards immigration and that, specifically, worse economic condition—such as high rates of unemployment—directly impacts how migrants come to be perceived by nativist groups. For example, Johnston and Lordan have found that “prejudice among native-born whites increases with the unemployment rate,” and that a mere 1% increase in unemployment can result in a 4% increase in prejudice among middle-class men in full employment.

Others have contended that “While a functioning welfare state can compensate the globalization losers… welfare cuts may do the opposite,” suggesting that austerity programs have a direct effect in attracting individuals to populist parties and in increasing anti-immigration sentiments. And others yet have contended that “once unemployment and austerity hits, people tend to turn against themselves by using their last democratic weapon: turning against democracy itself by voting for extreme right-wing parties.” In short, many notable studies (including post-Brexit ones) have given empirical and theoretical evidence in support of the broadly held belief that Britain’s economy played a key role in swaying public opinion against migrants and Europe. 

From a political perspective, Cameron’s decision to call for a referendum after years of austerity was, by all means, political suicide. Just months before the general elections of 2015, The Guardian ran an article in which it was stated that the government planned to slash out a further £55 billion by 2019, which added to the already £35 billion cuts since the Conservative Party seized Downing Street. The cuts were unforgiving. Funding for social enterprises providing help for the disabled, for refugees, or even for job seekers, almost entirely disappeared—forcing many to shut down.

Funding for councils was nearly halved, with public services for housing and leisure, libraries, and even roads maintenance collapsing. Proposals to freeze working-age benefits, to reduce the benefit cap of £3000, and to limit access to housing benefit for people under 21, loomed. Child poverty increased, police cuts turned into higher crime rates, food banks emptied, and 120,000 deaths came to be directly linked to Cameron’s austerity program under the unforgiving label “economic murder.” 

Ironically, the Cameron government was both relieved and surprised by the muted reaction to its austerity program, particularly considering that when Spain adopted equally severe austerity measures, the country went into something resembling a civil war. In truth, however, Britain’s discontent had a very different face, short of Spanish hot-blood and full of British aplomb. Indeed, instead of taking the streets, Britons took the polling booth and cast a vote that reflected years of frustration and disillusionment, preferring the unknowns of a “leave” vote to the economically unsustainable status quo. And while ascribing the Brexit vote solely to the economic disaster that the conservative elite-driven austerity caused might be reductive, enough research exists to substantiate the claim that the thousand cuts brought about by the Cameron government did play an important role in channeling anti-E.U. sentiments. 

For example, people in the poorest households were more likely to support “leave” than those in households with incomes over £60,000 per year; people out of work were equally more likely to favor Brexit than those in fulltime employment, as were people in low-skilled and manual labor. The most impoverished towns in England overwhelmingly voted for “leave’, with Boston (Lincolnshire) heading the group with 76% of people in favor of Brexit, and with South Holland (Lincolnshire) and Castle Point (Essex) following with nearly 74% and 73% respectively.

Interestingly, all three towns witnessed dramatic cuts on services and benefits. Lincolnshire, for example, suffered from severe cuts to the police force, which caused a sharp increase in “austerity crimes that led to an overall crime increase”; meanwhile, emergency funding for low-income families in Essex shrunk by 87%. All this accompanied a variety of other measures that dramatically shrunk towns” budgets and compromised the lives of millions. Significantly, the districts that suffered the most from the austerity cuts imposed by the government recorded a surge in votes for UKIP, “whose raison d’etre,” argues Fetzer, “was Britain’s exit from the EU.” 

While Cameron’s ruthless subscription to neoliberal logics of anti-welfare, state-slashing, poor-punishing, strict policies of pro-market madness might explain his inclination to subjugate Britain under a 10-year long austerity plan, his decision to call for an in/out E.U. referendum amid his austerity project remains puzzling at best. On balance, it could also be cynically interpreted as the clearest sign of how self-entitled, privately-educated elites had lost touch with the reality on the ground. Enveloped in a happy bubble of self-righteousness and privilege, Cameron severely misjudged how the economic impact of his austerity program was providing populist narratives of division and ultra-nationalism with powerful ammunition.

UKIP, conversely, sensed that trend, as since 2012 it moved from targeting the middle class and focused on the “less educated, worse off, insecure and pessimistic (white) voters.” To be sure, Cameron’s follow-up decision to use his face for the “remain” campaign was also profoundly misguided, as by 2016 his approval rating had sunk to 34%, with 58% claiming he was not “doing a good job.” When the Panama Papers showed to the public that their prime minister had benefited from a comfortable family nest of offshore money—which inspired the famous nickname “Dodgy Dave”—another good chunk of public confidence went missing. With 68% of surveyed Britons claiming they would not trust him on tax avoidance, David Cameron’s “remain” campaign inevitably came to suffer from another important blow.

Brexit Orientalism 

While the analysis of the Brexit saga’s economic backdrop provides a partial explanation of the sentiments with which millions of British citizens approached the referendum, it also sheds light on the dynamics that helped to frame the E.U. vote within an anti-Muslim discourse. Indeed, keeping in mind that the last decade has witnessed explosive tensions in the Middle East—first with the Arab Spring, then with the rise of IS, and then with the war in Syria—the popular mood created by Cameron’s austerity program helps understand why anti-Muslim rhetoric came to the forefront during the campaign and, more violently, after the vote. Two reasons can be found for this. 

First, Cameron’s view of migration contributed to the creation of a space for anti-migrant sentiments to emerge so forcefully during the Brexit campaign and, ironically, in limiting the effectiveness of his own “remain” campaign. Having already advocated “good immigration, not mass immigration” during a 2011 speech in parliament, Cameron repeatedly lashed out at Brussels’s free movement policies claiming that the weak economies of certain member states were preventing Britain from reducing its capacity for migration. As noted earlier, he sought to reduce immigration by making the prospect of living in Britain unattractive, first through the emergency break discussed with E.U. leaders in the 2015 summit, and second through the Immigration Act 2014, the goal of which was to “create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration” by making it increasingly difficult for non-British to access basic services such as employment, healthcare, housing, education, banking, and others. 

What is particularly striking, however, is that Cameron’s position was not limited to the issue of free movement in Europe, but extended to a racializing narrative that effectively created an overlap between the need to control migration and the issue of multiculturalism. In October 2011, the government’s view on this became abundantly clear, as a direct connection between the economic difficulties faced by many and the presence of minority communities across the country was spelled out:

“Excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country. Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and social pressures too. When large numbers of people arrive in new neighborhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same language as those who live there, perhaps not always wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a discomfort and tension in some of our communities… And there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while the better off reap many of the benefits. So I think it’s absolutely right to address all of these concerns because if people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues, they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest.”

Remarkably, the October speech followed another memorable moment in Cameron’s relationship with cultural diversity. Speaking in Munich in February 2011, he stated that multiculturalism had failed, because “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream…We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.” The speech was significant, as the juxtaposition of multiculturalism with terrorism effectively reframed interfaith and interethnic relationships along the lines of securitization. In the space of a few months, Cameron had thus managed to link multiculturalism—and Muslims specifically—to both economic issues and terrorism.

As such, while much of his follow-up measures created a strong degree of separation between the government and British Muslims (for example, during the Trojan Horse scandal, or when he rejected calls for annual meetings with Muslims, or when he threatened deportation for Muslim women who failed English language tests, or when he introduced the concept of “British values” to tackle extremism, or when his cabinet asked Muslim leaders to demonstrate that Islam is compatible with “British values’), they also contributed in conflating the issue of economic immigration with that of multiculturalism and race. Thus, by the time the Brexit campaign came to be centered squarely on immigration, “leave” came to be construed as a means to stop Muslims from entering, or living, in the UK. The high circulation of Islamophobic tweets in the immediate aftermath of the referendum effectively showed that Brexit had “framed “western” identity in non-inclusive terms and unleashed social anxieties about Muslims as the foreign “other’.” 

The second factor that contributed to bringing Brexit about, among other things, Muslim existence in Britain, ought to be found in UKIP’s political revival. Moving from being a fringe party of “loonies” and “closet racists”—as Cameron once described them—to becoming one of the fastest growing parties in British politics as early as 2013, UKIP traditionally ran on inflammatory political agendas centered upon strong anti-E.U. and anti-immigration sentiments. Its 2015 manifesto, for example, spells out the party main objectives and shows its aggressive stance in relation to the issue of immigration: 1) End immigration for unskilled jobs for a five-year period; 2) Tackle the problem of sham marriages; 3) Introduce a new visa system for workers, visitors, students, families and asylum seekers; 4) End access to benefits and free NHS treatment for new immigrants until they have paid tax and NI for five years; 5) Require all visitors and new immigrants to the UK to have their own health insurance; 6) End welfare tourism with a five-year embargo on benefits for migrants; 7) Allow British businesses to choose to employ British workers first.

UKIP’s nationalist agenda accompanied an even more concerning stance about Muslims and Islam. The investigative group Powerbase identifies many links between the party and Islamophobic organizations such as the Dutch Freedom party, the EDL, Pegida UK, Liberty GB (formerly British Freedom Party); as well as with European far-right parties within the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) umbrella. Even more, UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage had never made a mystery of his views on Muslims and Islam. In 2012 he argued:

“On the issue of Islamification, I think we have to do a bit more, probably starting in our schools to actually teach people about the values of our Judeo-Christian culture… There are over twenty police forces now in this country turning a complete blind eye to the operation of Sharia courts and Sharia law…  if you’re not prepared as a nation to stand up for your cultures and your values, then those cultures and values will be threatened.” 

In 2014, he blamed Muslims for anti-Semitism in Europe; in 2015 he claimed that people’s concerns over immigration were founded, as Muslims were attempting to create a “fifth column” to effectively “kill” Britons. He further added:

“There is an especial problem with some of the people who’ve come here and who are of the Muslim religion who don’t want to become part of our culture. So there is no previous experience, in our history, of a migrant group that comes to Britain that fundamentally wants to change who we are and what we are. That is, I think, above everything else, what people are really concerned about.”

 A few months later, he accused Muslims of having “split loyalties”; and later in 2017 he stated:

“There are quite big areas of east London that have become wholly Muslim areas… There are gangs of men out saying to women in short dresses there shouldn’t be there; to people in having a drink that they shouldn’t be there. There are parts of Paris and parts of Brussels that are even worse. Any woman, in a normal manner, if she walks down the streets, she will receive abuse.”

With such a long history of Islamophobic comments, it is perhaps unsurprising that when Farage became one of the most recognizable faces in the “leave” camp, the Brexit campaign turned squarely on a debate about multiculturalism, which focused on Muslims above any other ethnic group. Indeed, while pro-leave MPs and activists were “playing defense” on the economy for the entire duration of the campaign, a shift in focus towards the issue of immigration afforded them the greatest yet fighting chance. Farage himself knew too well that immigration had to be played up if “leave” wanted that chance. He was so sure of this that in April 2016 he declared:

“What I have urged “Vote Leave”—the official designated vehicle—we have got to get onto the other part of the pitch, we gotta start attacking the enemy’s goal, and where the enemies are at their absolute weakest is at this whole question of open door migration, the effects that it’s had on the lives of ordinary Britons over the course of the last decade, and the threat that it poses given the new terror and security threat that we face in the West… I would love myself and UKIP to work with you [Vote Leave] on this campaign. Because actually we are the form horses when it comes to immigration when it comes to the impact that it’s had on people in this country.” 

The official “leave” campaign never allowed Farage to add his name to the team, and promptly distanced itself from his most controversial moves. In a bid to secure a favorable outcome, Brexiteers across the political spectrum found themselves resorting to very similar arguments. 

Conclusion

Research conducted by Hope Not Hate showed that 49% of “leave” voters believed that “There are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter,” against a mere 19% of “remain” voters. Similarly, 54% of “leave” voters agreed that “Islam is generally a threat to the British way of life,” against 17% of remainers. Subsequent polls showed that 47% of “leavers” believed that the government was deliberately hiding the truth about the number of migrants living in the UK, and 31% believed that “Immigration to this country is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims a majority of the country’s population.” 

The conflation between the issue of E.U. migrants and the securitization of Muslims came to the forefront of the Brexit campaign as a result of clever political calculations on one side, and not-so-clever political mistakes on the other. 

Mistakes punctuated Cameron’s political career since the announcement of the referendum up to his resignation. Failing to read popular moods stemming from his aggressive austerity policy, the prime minister called for a simple in/out referendum on the future of Britain in the EU, incidentally at a time in which his approval rate was at historical lows. This was followed by a series of missteps that directly helped the “leave” side to build a case for Brexit.

First, Cameron returned from the E.U. negotiations without significant achievements. While it could not have been otherwise, as Brussels does not negotiate on the four indivisible freedoms, his mistake lied in his belief, or hope, that E.U. leaders would rescue him out of the political jam he had put himself into.

Second, Cameron failed to give practical reassurances on the question of Turkey’s entry in the EU, choosing to rely on the French government for a potential veto. This was further inflamed by his traditional pro-Turkey stance, which made his U-turn appear insincere and contributed to spreading conjectures about European power vis-à-vis Britain’s sovereignty.

Third, he put party politics above any other consideration or concern. This occurred when he called the referendum to strengthen his leadership; when he misjudged Gove and Johnson’s stance losing them to the “leave” camp; when he refused to debate conservative Brexiteers; and when he rejected the idea of lowering the voting age.

Finally, he blamed the failings of his austerity policy on migrants, further declaring the failure of multiculturalism and conflating Muslim existence in Britain with issues of terrorism and extremism. On the opposite side, Brexiteers displayed incredible flexibility in their willingness to capitalize on such mistakes. Recognizing their slim chances of winning on the economy front, “leave” MPs, activists, campaigners, and newspapers bet everything on immigration, further strengthening the link between immigration and terrorism.

The vilest manifestation of this trend was Farage’s “Breaking Point” poster, arguably a culmination of a 20-year long career built upon the demonization of minorities. But while the poster might have horrified some of the most moderate Brexiteers, the increased support for UKIP during the 2015 elections, and the relentless anti-Muslim narrative upon which UKIP had consolidated its appeal, proved that the “Muslim card” could indeed be a wise one to play. 

Brexiteers across the political spectrum capitalized on this. Gove, for example, claimed he “shuddered” after seeing the poster, yet his speech in support of Brexit was built within the framework of security, terrorism, and immigration. Hardly a surprise. His view that “The west faces a challenge to its values, culture, and freedom as profound in its way as the threat posed by fascism and communism,” had made him a key player during the infamous Trojan Horse affair.

To be sure, the entire “Vote Leave” campaign—the mainstream face of the otherwise ugly affair—came to be centered upon the Muslim-Immigration-Terrorism triad as soon as Brexiteers realized technical arguments on the economy were unbeatable. At the sound of “Murderers, terrorists and kidnappers from countries like Turkey could flock to Britain if it remains in the European Union,” they secured the long-awaited victory—condemning millions of Muslims to violence and discrimination in the process.

Brexit and the Politics of Islamophobia was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, the results of the country’s recent local elections—described by commentators as a significant blow to the AKP party—reveal an uncertain future for the president and his party. The AKP lost in three of Turkey’s major cities, of which one—Istanbul—was instrumental in Erdoğan’s early political career before ascending to the presidency. A key influencing factor in the March elections was the country’s slowing economy, which opposition parties attributed to government mismanagement as they urged voters to hold the government accountable.

The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) won the 2019 elections in Istanbul and the capital of Ankara, Turkey’s two largest cities. The ruling AKP secured a nationwide victory with a slim majority of 51%, despite losing in Istanbul and Ankara, due in part to an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The CHP’s victories in Turkey’s Istanbul and Ankara represents a turning point in Turkish politics and an obstacle for Erdoğan, as the two cities are the financial and political hubs of Turkey.

However, the opposition’s attempts to pin the blame on the government for the country’s ailing economy failed to resonate with many Turkish voters. Many nationalists and AKP-supporters perceive the economic situation as the work of interfering foreign powers, a reflection of a broader, ongoing power play between Ankara and Washington. Many Turks feel the effects of this strained relationship as growing distrust of the United States becomes increasingly widespread throughout the population. Relations between Erdoğan and U.S. President Donald Trump had fluctuated substantially and nearly collapsed when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey in retaliation for the detention of the American pastor Andrew Brunson.

Turkey’s economy has suffered as a consequence of U.S. sanctions. The lira has dropped by 25%, embattling the corporate sector and creating hardships for ordinary Turks. Threatening rhetoric from the Oval Office continued in 2019, as Donald Trump took to Twitter with a threat to devastate the Turkish economy if Turkey moved against Kurdish militias in Syria following the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The rift between Washington and Ankara widened during the Syrian conflict, in which the United States supported Kurdish militias, a move denounced by Turkey, which sees such groups as terrorist organizations. These developments evidence a shift in the geopolitical landscape as Turkey turns to regional partners like Iran and Russia. Despite a shifting landscape, U.S. sanctions and threats have proven effective in damaging the Turkish economy by halting foreign investment, increasing inflation levels to an all-time high, and curbing economic growth. 

Erdoğan’s performance on the world stage resonates with many Turkish voters. This corresponds with Kiniklioglu’s analysis, in which he describes nationalism as an incredibly influential force in Turkish politics. For example, the Turkish government was successful in gaining overwhelming domestic and international support during the investigation into Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, wherein Turkey was instrumental in leading the investigations. As a result, Turkey’s foreign policy has received strong support from all sides of the political spectrum.

Erdoğan’s nationalist appeal increased during the election, amid suggestions that the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, the former Greek Orthodox cathedral and mosque which is now a museum, should once again become a mosque in response to the U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Furthermore, the AKP government was credited with a strong economic record, and in a bid to retain public support has pledged to increase public expenditure on infrastructure, such as the new Istanbul Airport, and rebalance the country’s current account deficit.

Turkey paid off its IMF debt in 2013, a success that remains a hallmark achievement for the government. Turkey’s tourism industry has boomed, with growth in 2018 reported being 63%, a positive development for an industry tarnished by regional conflicts. Turkey is on target to host 40 million foreign tourists this year, which would make it the sixth most-visited nation in the world. Many Turkish voters and government-supporters are proud of these accomplishments and attribute the country’s economic woes to foreign powers dedicated to weakening Turkey.

The local elections of 2019, in which the government achieved a narrow victory won, are indicative of the presence of democracy in Turkey. The claims of Islamisation of Turkey under Erdoğan is misunderstanding the contextual background of Turkey, as Professor Aktar states, “one cannot Islamise a country that is already Muslim.” Islam in Turkey is rooted in the Ottoman tradition of Sunni Islam, an empire that was “multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural.”

Erdoğan’s faith comes from the Sufi strain of Islam, the antithesis of Wahhabi Islam. Many of the tariqas (Sufi groups) are vital political influencers whose support Erdoğan needs to remain in power. The nuances of AKP’s Islamism are often disregarded in naive attempts to conflate Erdoğan and ISIS (Daesh) ideologically. One of Erdoğan’s key political objectives is ensuring Turkey’s national security in a volatile region. While Erdoğan’s nationalist tactics during the election backfired, Turkey’s political future remains unclear. Despite the government’s significant electoral loss in Turkey’s major cities, it obtained a narrowly won mandate to govern until the next round of elections in 2023. 

Turkey’s Local Elections and the Future of Erdoğan’s Leadership was originally published on Global Security Review.

The seemingly omnipotent regimes in each of these countries are on increasingly shaky ground after years of corruption, public deception, and coercion. Protests in Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan have laid the groundwork for potentially positive changes in those countries. In Iran, many wish for a similar movement towards reform. However, they face critical challenges ahead if any changes are to be realized. Going forward, it would behoove policymakers, particularly those in Western countries, to closely monitor events in Iran.

From the outset, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran undermined the functioning of an effective government in the country. Revolutionaries established parallel institutions alongside each government apparatus which imposed obstacles on nearly every decision-making process in Iran. The Islamic Revolution enmeshed itself in domestic, economic, and foreign policymaking to ensure its interests were upheld. For example, the religious Guardian Council of the Revolution can impede the Parliament, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) meddles with the country’s economy and interferes with the Iranian armed forces whenever it deems necessary to do so.

Today, parallel institutions in Iran have amassed substantial power, and it’s unlikely they will relinquish it voluntarily. The Guardian Council is a hindrance to parliamentary decision-making on critical matters like international anti-money laundering bills, while the IRGC provides support, funding, and resources to foreign militia groups, and brings them into Iran.

During the 2009 Iranian Green Movement, the IRGC deployed armored vehicles into volatile cities alongside anti-riot security forces and attacked protestors, arresting and subsequently torturing them. When it came to fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iranians were never fully supportive of the IRGC’s actions. Many disregarded Tehran’s strong support for the Assad regime in Syria and disapproved of money that was badly needed at home being spent on expansionist programs.

Presently, Iranians are even more furious with the IRGC following widespread flooding in several Iranian provinces, further underscoring the regime’s inability to manage a crisis effectively. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of infrastructure and economic development projects in Iran are awarded to firms connected to the IRGC. Many projects have been entirely unnecessary or were improperly planned.

During a visit to areas affected by the flooding, IRGC commanders were confronted by angry and disappointed residents, in some cases being on the receiving end of “long live the Shah” chants. Their solution is to bring in al-Hashd ash-Sha’abi—or the Iraqi Shia Militia of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—to the province of Khuzestan under the guise of providing aid. In reality, the group is there to suppress protesters and dissenters. Khuzestan is home to a significant population of Iranians of Arab descent, so it’s ironic that foreign Arabs are charged with suppressing dissent.

During the 2009 Green Movement, protests across Iran in 2017, and in the aftermath of the 2019 flood, the IRGC has repeatedly shown that it holds no reservations about using brutal tactics to oppress the Iranian people. Thus, once the IRGC begins to feel that it is losing its grip on power, it’s likely Iran will descend to the verge of civil war. Practically speaking, any foreign actors intent on constraining the IRGC should establish an agile taskforce to monitor, identify, and block every IRGC financial transaction and trade deal from North Africa to East Asia.

The Islamic Republic’s long and tragic record on human rights has been overlooked by the West—primarily Europe—for the sake of business and commercial opportunities in Iran. Iran’s rank of civil and political rights was stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, Iran’s human rights ranking out of a score of one hundred) improved by just eleven points over two decades—from six to seventeen. It is a false hope to believe that the current system in Iran will bring about any positive or substantive changes to both Iran and the broader region.

With or without sanctions, with or without the nuclear deal, with or without the IRGC being officially designated as a terrorist organization, the theocratic regime in Tehran will continue as it has for forty years. The Iranian presidency was held first by a moderate, then by a reformist, then by a fundamentalist, and now by a moderate—yet any case for true peace within the country or with the rest of the world is nonexistent. Real reform in Iran would mean the release of imprisoned members of the Baha’i faith, journalists, women’s rights activists, and citizens of the U.S. and U.K. accused of espionage. This is, however, unlikely as the regime’s survival is increasingly dependent upon the repression of dissent.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iranian opposition groups increasingly felt that the international community was turning a blind eye to the regime’s repressive policies. For some time, the Iranian opposition movement appeared to stagnate. In recent years, however, the Iranian diaspora has led to a resurgence of opposition. As older generations hold meetings and conferences around the globe, younger groups such as Iran Revival are breathing new life into the fight against the regime of the Islamic Republic.

Iran Revival’s members are primarily younger Iranians who have left the country. The group has established a ten-point transition path for Iran. Since the group’s establishment in September, it’s social media following has grown substantially and the group’s Instagram features numerous videos filmed by Iranians residing in Iran. The U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, met with representatives of the group during Nowrooz, the Iranian New Year. Officials in other Western governments would do well to engage with groups that have a vision for Iran such as Iran Revival. Engagement with opposition groups is essential if the country is to have a peaceful path to political transition.

Iran—similar to Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan—displays the right criteria for a possible regime change. The country is facing severe economic woes, Iranian opposition groups are organizing themselves more effectively over issues like corruption and women’s rights, and possible alternatives to the current regime are emerging. No authoritarian regime in history has survived indefinitely, and the one currently ruling Iran will be no exception.

Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Venezuela Have One Major Similarity was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ukraine will remain aligned with the West and the United States; all major candidates support both E.U. and NATO integration and have pledged to, one way or another, reestablish Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas and Crimea.

Presently leading public polls is the well-known comedian, Vladimir Zelenskiy. He’s made the case that Ukraine can reestablish control over the Donbas and Crimea through negotiations with Russia. On the other hand, his main rivals, current President Petro Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have advocated for a more hawkish approach.

Tymoshenko’s rhetoric has been aggressive, but she has indicated that she favors a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Poroshenko, on the other hand, has ramped up defense spending to five percent of gross domestic product to prepare the country for a possible large-scale war with Russia.

The three leading candidates have much in common. All view Russia as Ukraine’s primary national security threat, they all support the political order that was established after the 2014 Maidan protests, and they all support de-oligarchization in the country, even though they’re all heavily linked with powerful oligarchs—or are oligarchs themselves.

Zelensky announced his intention to run for the presidency on New Year’s Eve on the popular Ukrainian television channel “1+1,” owned by Igor Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian oligarch currently residing in Israel. Kolomoisky was de-facto exiled by Poroshenko, after being accused of defrauding PrivatBank—Ukraine’s largest bank—of billions of dollars. The bank has since been nationalized, with many in Ukraine believing that Kolomoisky is seeking revenge against Poroshenko and is merely using Zelensky as a tool against him.

The incumbent, President Petro Poroshenko is himself an oligarch. He owns a large confection company called Roshen, and his assets are estimated to be approximately $979 million (USD). Although he won the 2014 election, his popularity has since fallen sharply. However, he has more of a chance than his main rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, of making it to the second round due to his having the entirety of the Ukrainian state apparatus behind him. For Poroshenko, this election is of crucial importance. If he loses, he would be hard-pressed to remain in the country due to the many enemies he’s made during his presidency.

Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s campaign recently accused Poroshenko of bribing voters through branches of the now-nationalized PrivatBank. Poroshenko’s campaign, in turn, accused Tymoshenko of entering into political and financial agreements with Igor Kolomoisky. Tymoshenko denied any links with Kolomoisky, but another oligarch, Sergey Taruta, said he would back Yulia Tymoshenko in the election.

Apart from Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, and Zelensky, there are 36 other candidates in the running for the presidency. Their candidacies are mostly symbolic, but their participation will likely preclude the possibility of a victor in the first round of the election. In a case where no candidate receives an absolute majority, the second round of voting will be held on April 21.

Over 34 million Ukrainian citizens will be eligible to cast their vote on March 31. However, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region will prevent several million from participating.

The Role of Oligarchs in Ukraine’s 2019 Presidential Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

While not as traditional as the president’s New Years Address, the State of the Nation speeches an important signal of what is to come domestically as well as what the international community can expect from Russia in the upcoming year.

Putin focused heavily on domestic matters

While it might seem counterintuitive for Putin to concentrate on internal affairs when Russia is essentially seen in the West as an international pariah, he proceeded to do so nevertheless. The reasoning behind this is likely due to his public approval ratings, which have been in a steady free-fall since October of 2018.

Putin’s approval ratings, rather than being a reflection of public sentiment towards Putin’s performance as president, are instead an indicator of widespread dissatisfaction over recently-enacted pension reforms. To deflect blame, Putin reached into the standard “strongman” leader’s toolkit, stating that “[Russian] development projects are not federal, and even less so agency-based. They are national.” To paraphrase, any failures shouldn’t be attributed to the Kremlin.

Conversely, the Kremlin is to be credited for any policies that are viewed more favorable, such as subsidies for children, new hospitals, and tax-breaks for construction companies. Putin’s rejection of responsibility for policy failures while simultaneously taking credit for any-and-all successes exemplifies his use of rhetoric to deflect blame and negative feedback.

Putin drew unexpected attention to Russia’s high poverty rate

Even as poverty in Russia is, overall, decreasing, the poverty rate is estimated to remain above 13 percent for the next three years. In his “State of the Nation” speech, Putin announced that social programs would be implemented to help those living in poverty work their way out.

As for poverty caused by corruption, Putin stated that “[the Kremlin] will draw the appropriate conclusions about the work quality and performance at all levels of executive power.” In short, he is saying that those who step out of line will be fired.

Putin also focused on the issue of medical care in Russia, explicitly drawing the attention of listeners to how poor the country’s healthcare was in the 1990s in contrast with how much the system has improved since then. Importantly, he did not mention continued difficulties within the current Russian system, choosing instead to draw attention to problems with municipal waste, which, coincidentally, is connected to the son of the Russian Prosecutor General, Igor Chaika.

Unsurprisingly, Putin emphasized the importance of cultural history and educational improvements. Given Russia’s continuous focus on valorizing its history as well as keeping a careful eye on possible “traitors” from an early age, this statement wasn’t particularly unexpected.

One item of note, however, was Putin’s proposal to exempt from taxation not only medical and educational institutions, but also regional museums, theaters, and libraries. In typical form, Putin provided few details about how precisely this proposal would work.

There was hardly any mention of “active measures.”

In terms of foreign affairs, Putin opted out of discussing accusations of ongoing Russian election interference and Kremlin-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Instead, Putin merely said that he hopes the relationship between Europe and Russia can return to one of cooperation—a statement that frames European leaders within Russia as impeding progress.

Moreover, Putin explicitly refuted all American accusations regarding the INF Treaty and simplified the matter into a single sentence: “Russia does not intend to deploy such missiles in Europe first,” although U.S. and NATO officials have accused Russia of doing just that.

Russia is here to stay

The last two paragraphs of Putin’s speech are unquestioningly aimed at the Russians. “Solidarity in striving for change,” and “a unified society”are both phrases that imply that all Russians need to stand together going forward. Even while Putin suggested that peace is essential for Russian development, whether or not peace will continue to allow him to remain in power is another question altogether.

To foreign leaders, Putin is unsubtly reestablishing his control over Russian society, as well as not-so-coincidentally highlighting Russia’s missile capabilities just before the speech ending. In sum, Putin’s 2019 “State of the Nation” address is a warning to both Russians and the international community: Russia will continue to see itself a global player with influence and won’t tolerate any attempt to curtail its ambitions.

Putin’s “State of the Nation” Speech, Examined was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban held its fourth round of direct talks with the United States in January of 2019. This month the group revealed it will participate in a fifth meeting with the aim of agreeing on a set of issues and to craft a framework for ending the war that began with the U.S. invasion in 2001. The widely-lauded meeting between more than fifty Taliban and Afghan political figures in Moscow this month was simply unprecedented, and an important step forward to ending years of stalemate and creating the conditions for direct inter-Afghan dialogue.

The significance of these meetings can be discerned from their venues, timing, participants, and the progressive nature of the discussions. The presence, involvement and engagement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati representatives—countries with significant influence on the Taliban—have undoubtedly raised the stakes of the events.

The Afghan government, an essential factor in the process, has been left out of any meetings with Taliban on the latter’s insistence. However, if both the U.S. and Taliban proceed with good faith and achieve mutually-agreeable progress, the meetings could ultimately pave the way for direct talks between Taliban and Afghan officials—with increased engagement and support from Afghan political elites.

The U.S. and its coalition partners appear to believe they have exhausted almost all military options that would effectuate an end to the Afghan conflict and thus have come to the conclusion that to withdraw forces—something the Trump administration is seriously considering,—political and diplomatic options that would entail some combination of restraint, compromise, and incentives must be considered.

The United States’ demands of the Taliban are clear: the Taliban must abandon support for global terrorist groups, it must not use Afghanistan as a base from which to stage attacks against the United States or its interests, and it must cease using violence and enter into talks with the Afghan government. There is a greater realization on the part of the Taliban as well that it cannot achieve a decisive victory—let alone overtake the state—despite years of inflicting heavy losses on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and expanding the territory it controls.

The Taliban has every reason to maximize its return from the talks. The resilience of its forces, a strict adherence to a battlefield chain of command, increasingly diversified foreign support, and—most importantly—its operational advantage in the harsh conditions of rural Afghanistan make it simply insurmountable. Yet, the Taliban also has its own calculations and realizes that no matter its leverage in peace talks, the return of the Islamic Emirate is beyond reach. Afghans, including Taliban sympathizers in most rural parts of the country, simply demand better lives than they had under the Taliban for the price they have paid to endure the last eighteen years of conflict and misery. However, the Taliban continues to hold onto its traditional demands which include withdrawal of foreign forces, release of prisoners, lifting of sanctions, changes to the constitution with greater provision for sharia law, and a practical roadmap for its inclusion in power sharing and governance. Furthermore, the Taliban recently asked for a permanent end to U.S./NATO air strikes targeting its fighters.

Then there is the matter of Pakistan, another essential element of the Afghan conflict. Some, including the U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, have stated that Kabul is where the subject of peace in Afghanistan will be decided. Others argue that Islamabad is the ultimate decider. The question isn’t so much about where the key to peace in Afghanistan is, but rather, it is fundamentally one of whether now is the time to use that key.

The reality is that peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan. If Pakistan has genuinely succumbed to U.S. pressure and is ready to end its rigorously institutionalized support for the Taliban insurgency, and is genuinely willing to cooperate in the peace and reconciliation process, the possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict is more real now than at anytime previously.

As it stands, as agreed in Doha, both the U.S. and the Taliban officials are expected to meet again this month. Assuming that the Taliban and U.S. reach an agreement that includes a timetable for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces— a non-negotiable precondition for the Taliban—the next step will be an effective inter-Afghan dialogue. Are the two sides ready and able to make peace? Will the Taliban agree to talk with the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG)? Is NUG prepared to reach and implement a settlement that would entail substantial concessions, including significant legislative amendments and political accommodation? More importantly, does President Ghani have the domestic political backing essential to enter into a durable peace treaty with the Taliban and honor certain demands? To consider this and other key questions, a review of the reality on the ground in Afghanistan is necessary.

Is Peace Within Reach?

The Taliban has thus far refused to directly negotiate with Ghani’s National Unity Government, which it views as a puppet of the West with no authority or legitimacy to make decisions or to represent the will of the nation. Instead, it has insisted on first talking only to the U.S. To date, the Taliban has had one meeting with Afghan political leaders, and it is likely they will meet again.

At a conference in Geneva in November of 2018, Ghani presented a five-phase approach for the negotiating process. First, the Afghan government will hold direct talks with the Taliban, followed by discussions with Pakistan and the United States. Then, regional actors and the Arab-Islamic world will be included, and finally, NATO and non-NATO countries. At the moment, what has been happening is precisely the opposite of what Ghani envisioned. The U.S. and the Taliban have had four direct meetings. In between which, U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad visited Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., India, and Qatar to consult with their officials. Ghani’s government is, so far, not even in the game despite the president’s recent attempts to soften his tone.

According to recent projections by military experts and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)¹ the Taliban controls nearly fifty percent of the territory in Afghanistan. While this figure is contested, the Taliban has an active presence in seventy percent of the country. Afghanistan remains a largely rural country with less than twenty eight percent of its population living in the cities.²

Even though the government predominantly controls the cities and urban areas, the rural territory is either under Taliban control or at best is contested.³ This leaves the Taliban at a distinct advantage as only a small proportion of the rural territory effectively remains in control of the government. In case of a peace settlement, it is highly unlikely the group would be willing to cede any control it has thus far gained and power to a government it ultimately considers to be illegitimate. Unsurprisingly, in response to Ghani’s offer of a Kabul office for the Taliban made during a recent visit to Nangarhar province, the Taliban restated its position that it will not, under any circumstances, talk with Ghani’s government.

It is an open secret that a significant portion of the Taliban’s income that used to run its war machine is generated from illegal taxation, opium, extortion, and ransoms, among other means. Drugs make up at least sixty percent of the Taliban’s income, a figure estimated at between $300 and $400 million each year.⁴ Furthermore, militia groups make more than $50 million annually from the mining industry, which is harvesting talc, chromite, marble and precious stones.

Foreign funding is another significant source of revenue for the Taliban. Although not easy to measure as these transactions are primarily carried out in unofficial and unregulated ways, including the hawala system, most experts estimate this funding to be between $200 to $300 million a year—coming mostly from the Gulf states. The fundamental question is what incentives will the NUG offer to the Taliban? Will the peace dividend for a local Taliban commander match what he currently makes each month as the result of the group’s drug trafficking and criminal activity, it’s myriad of other business ventures, and foreign funding?

Despite describing its direct talks with the United States as highly agenda-driven and articulate, the Taliban seems to lack a clear political objective. Unlike Hizbi Islami, which, at the time of its negotiations with the NUG⁵ had a clearer picture of how it might govern from Kabul, articulating what an end-state might look like and how some of its conditions could be feasibly implemented in a settlement has been a challenge for the Taliban. This is partly because the group realizes the limited degree of its acceptability within mainstream Afghan society.⁶

What is clear though is that the Taliban will demand a clear, comprehensive, and guaranteed plan from the Afghan government for its social, economic, and political needs—even if the group itself is lacking one. At almost every meeting, the Taliban has articulated its now-familiar demands, but beyond that, it struggles with how it sees itself back in the country. What form of a government will work? What specific laws would need to be changed? Will it respect the democratic processes and elections or will it only seek a share power with the existing government? In response to a question in Moscow related to power sharing, the Taliban’s chief envoy Sher Mohammad Abas Stanekzai said, “the Taliban has a clear roadmap for how to work with all political groups in the country to form a government based on the Sharia law.” Obviously, this isn’t enough even if the group had such a plan.

For its part, Ghani’s government is fraught with numerous problems. It might even be incorrect to call it a full and functioning government given that it has never had a full cabinet. For over fourteen months (May 2017 – July 2018), Ghani’s first Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum was in exile; currently, he is dispossessed of his authority and denied permission to attend cabinet and National Security Council meetings. More than half of the government’s twenty-five ministries and dozens of independent bodies have remained without legal heads since his presidency.

Ghani’s closest and top policy-making team is, at its best, made up of many junior, inexperienced individuals with no authority to make decisions. Despite Ghani’s obsession with bringing the country’s younger generation to the government, he has failed to find a practical balance in government recruitment. His administration has had a penchant for disregarding necessary qualifications for some of the most senior positions and has made hasty appointments. This is partly because he is deeply insecure and has a severe trust deficit. Moreover, a textbook micromanager, Ghani involves himself in every detail of the country’s business. This situation has caused serious problems for both the government and the state as a whole.

The security situation within Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Since the NUG was formed in 2015, More than one million Afghans have fled the country due to a lack of jobs and increasing insecurity and uncertainty. According to UNAMA, from 2015 to 2018, civilian casualties caused by both Taliban attacks and ANDSF operations reached nearly 35,000—the highest number since the civil war in the 1990s—almost half of whom are women, children and elderly.⁷

In a recent interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Ghani admitted that the ANDSF had lost up to 45,000 personnel since he took power.⁸ a figure that still seems modest when one consider the average casualties on a daily basis. Despite massive support from the U.S. and other NATO nations to strengthen the ANDSF, its institutions remain weak, disorganized, corrupt, and void of morale. Most importantly, political stability, the most critical indicator of a nation’s prosperity, is seriously crumbling. Afghanistan’s history has shown that when any leader ignored this element of polity, his demise and destruction was certain.

King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), President Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978), and Mullah Mohammad Omar Hotak (1994-1998) are only few examples of leaders whose individualistic, hasty, and poorly conceived approach to changing the country overnight put the country on the verge of destruction. To their credit, perhaps none of these leaders had any ill intent, rather it was their respective individual characters that led to their downfall. Regrettably, we are seeing similar trends today. While the mainstream political elites may be highly divided, when it comes to their relations with NUG, they have never been so united.⁹

The Afghan government’s foreign diplomacy is in shambles. Ghani’s day-to-day business with some of the most powerful and complicated countries in the region— Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—appears to be guided by books he has read. It has become commonplace these days that when Ghani or his policy team makes a statement on any issue, they then change their minds shortly thereafter. This shows a lack of strategic thinking and experience in the presidential palace. At a time when the future of the country is being debated on the world stage, the NUG’s diplomacy is seriously faltering. The government needs to demonstrate creative diplomacy, statecraft, and political ingenuity now, more than ever.

Recommendations for Policymaking

In light of the above and assuming that the Taliban will ultimately enter into an inter-Afghan dialogue, the following six points may help to guide participants in the Afghan peace process toward a successful and lasting outcome:

1. The government must go beyond a mere plan on paper and demonstrate its readiness to provide concessions based on the fundamental demands of the Taliban. President Ghani has spoken about roadmaps, plans or strategy, but has offered no details or evidence to indicate that a plan is in place. Any peace talks would require a plan that has immediate results and is based on, at a minimum, national consensus building, recognition of the Taliban as a political party, transitional confidence-building measures, a lifting of sanctions, release of prisoners, the reintegration of Taliban fighters and relocation of senior Taliban members along with their families. Ghani’s recent call for a possible Loya Jira (Grand Council) to discuss peace is a welcome step to engage in dialogues with Taliban, although that doesn’t seem to change the Taliban’s calculation about him.
2. At the moment, the biggest challenge for Ghani is securing a strong national support base for peace with the Taliban in Kabul, let alone in the rest of the country. The current situation, beset by a highly fragile political environment and pervasive security threats, calls for thinking beyond daily business. It is time to begin a meaningful national dialogue. Ghani must reprioritize his time and demonstrate leadership by facing reality. Afghans are frustrated with empty promises and by a lack of measurable progress. Every peace has a price, and strong leadership is needed to convince the majority of the country that it is in their interest to shoulder this cost. As such, if the Taliban continue to deny talking with the NUG, but is willing to talk to other Afghans, Ghani must not block it, let the process begin and must instead help a council of prominent Afghan leaders and politicians who can advance the talks. The government can serve as a coordinator of the process and can gradually take a more substantive role as was the case in negotiations with Hizb Islami successfully led by former National Security Advisor, Haneef Atmar, who is now a contender for the country’s presidency.
3. If the Taliban continues its rejection of talks with the Afghan government as a legitimate and trustworthy party with the authority to make a peace settlement work, the upcoming presidential elections may be a perfect opportunity for the group to talk to the new government. The current talks will take time and can be advanced by a future government. The period between now and the formation of the new government will be critical for both parties, however. It will also provide an opportunity for Taliban representatives to reach out to political leaders and, most importantly, potential presidential candidates to understand their visions and plans for peace. For its part, the Taliban can begin to explore its own future reconciliation and reintegration in Afghan society and the resolution of grievances. They must not forget that this war has affected millions of Afghans. Perhaps the biggest challenge for any future government will be to heal the wounds, pains, and suffering of the nation.
4. While Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is unlikely to completely cease in the near future, recent developments give cause for cautious optimism. These developments include the death of Maulana Samiul Haq, known as the father of Taliban, the release of key Taliban leaders including Mullah Berader, former Deputy to the Taliban leader who was recently named by Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhund as head of the Taliban political office in Doha; security reinforcement measures by Pakistani military along the Durand Line and the role Pakistan played in encouraging Taliban to meet with U.S. in Abu Dhabi and Doha. If Pakistan is truly committed to resolve the Afghan conflict, there is every reason to expect a settlement, even if talks take a longer amount of time. However, Pakistan needs to do much more in order to gain the confidence of the U.S. and the Afghans. For years, Pakistan has been playing a double game in which it does just enough on the surface to get incentives from the U.S., while still supporting the Taliban in the shadows.
5. There have been talks about forming an interim government with the Taliban to facilitate its full participation in future political activities. The Taliban has, however, denied that it has made such a proposition as many Afghans reacted negatively to the idea calling it a return to the country’s dark times after enduring tremendous sacrifices for so long. While holding timely and successful elections planned for July this year may be a challenging task for the Afghan government and its current weak and incompetent electoral bodies, it still can be the best possible option to show the country is moving ahead. Given the urgency of peace, if the current talks between the U.S. and the Taliban produce results, many Afghans will most likely be ready to accept another delay in elections or continue the talks with a newly elected government rather than having an interim government. Given the country’s history and the widening fractures within the Afghan political elites, it will be a mistake to expect a smooth transition beyond an interim government just like early 1990s. However, if talks do not yield results beyond March, elections will be the only and best way to go in July, yet the current momentum for achieving peace must not be lost.
6. Since President Ghani is running for a second term, he must respect the independence of the electoral bodies and avoid using state resources to manipulate the electoral timeline and process. The international community that supports and observes the Afghan elections must ensure that between now and July both the IEC and the NUG undertake the necessary measures to address the key technical and security concerns. Moreover, to increase confidence and public trust in the outcome of the election, Ghani and Abdullah’s term must officially end by April 20. During the period between April 20 to July 20, 2019, both the NUG and the international partners can focus on issues that can strengthen the capacity of the electoral bodies, in order to ensure they have sufficient technical resources and most importantly improve security and confidence in the country. Meanwhile, the most crucial issue will be to continue supporting peace initiatives—including aiming to achieve and maintain a ceasefire.

¹ SIGAR, Quarterly Reports, October 30, 2018
² World Population Review: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan-population/
cities/
³ There are areas in rural Afghanistan where no one has control. In some of these areas, the government operates for certain hours of the daylight and then Taliban emerge at night or vis versa.
⁴ Interview with Afghan Security Officials, September 2018.
⁵ Afghan government signed a peace accord with the Afghan insurgent group – Hizbi Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in September 2016 after nearly 18 months of negotiations.
⁶ While Taliban will undoubtedly continue to enjoy support of local communities in rural areas, which can be significant in case it enters talks and competes in politics, it will be viewed as the least favourable in the mainstream political scene.
⁷ UNAMA civilian casualty Report, 2018
⁸ CNN Anchor, Fareed Zakaria’s Conversation With President Ghani during World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting (2019) In Davos, Switzerland, January 25, 2019
⁹ Their recent rejection of Ghani’s call for joining the Peace Consultation Board was a clear sign of their distaste of the NUG. Following a presidential decree that formed a peace consultative board comprising of the majority of the influential political and Jehadi leaders, a majority of them rejected the offer or simply ignored it. The leaders who did not attend the board’s first meeting included former President Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, First Vice President Dustom, Professor Sayaf, Hazrat Mujaddadi, Mohammad Asif Muhsini, Mohamamd Younus Qanooni, Ismail Khan, Atta Noor, Sayed Mansoor Naderi and Sayed Hamed Gailani.

The Twin Goals of Peace and Elections in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, Mr. Atmar played a key role in the election of his former ally and current opponent, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, often referred to as “the Shadow President” during his tenure because of his enormous influence and clout within the Afghan political elite and the international community. He was the moderator, the glue, and the firefighter of a fragile unity government that was often at quarreling with itself. His moderation, inclusivity, wide consultative approach, and farsightedness combined with patience to Afghan politics is well-known within the Afghan political scene. He is a man to rely upon during crises and hardship—a crisis manager in turbulent times. In short, an all-weather friend of the international community and a man for all seasons for the Afghans.

Mr. Atmar served as Afghanistan’s Interior Minister, Minister of Education, and Minister of Rural Development after years of service in the development and non-governmental communities. during the tenure of former President Hamid Karzai. Mr. Atmar is credited with many institutional reforms and large-scale poverty reduction programs—such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP). He signed the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States to ensure sustained U.S. financial and technical support for the Afghan security forces. He also kept intact a shaky regional consensus on the Afghan war and peace efforts which broke down immediately after his departure from the National Unity Government due to the region’s lack of trust on his replacement and the incumbent President.

Mr. Atmar is a mixed Kandahari-Laghmani. He has lived an eventful life, having started his career with the former Afghan communist regime’s intelligence service an intelligence officer. He was subsequently injured during the famous battle of Jalalabad fighting Arab-Punjabi anti-communist jihadists who were attempting to take controls of Jalalabad city. He then left the service and started his career in the NGO community, heading several well-known non-government organizations that delivered aid and humanitarian assistance to communities across Afghanistan. During this time, he traveled through some of the most hostile environments in the country.

Mr. Atmar was a key participant in the first Bonn conference representing the Afghan community and NGOs. Later on, he was appointed to be Afghanistan’s first Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development by President Karzai. During his tenure as the Minister of Rural Development, he made a name for himself as a reformist, a builder of institutions, and as a service provider. He rolled out some of the most ambitious rural development programs in the history of the country such as the National Solidarity Program, microfinance initiatives, and National Area Based Development programs, among others.

His name was known in every Afghan village—more than 3,000 of them then—because of his community-driven, bottom-up approach to development. President Karzai, for political reasons as well as the desire to replicate his success in other ministries, asked to move and reform the Afghan Ministry of Education, he agreed and enacted similar reforms and institutional development measures on a vast scale.

Subsequently, again on political advice and given Mr. Atmar’s security background, President Karzai appointed him as the first technocrat Minister of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan in charge of local governance and the Afghan police. He designed and rolled out comprehensive reforms and institutional development measures in the Afghan police force, the ANCOP, the APPF, the ANTIC, and others.

At the time, many western and American officials even dubbed him as Afghanistan’s next president. He left the government over political differences with former President Karzai and launched his own political party, the Right and Justice Party, along with a successful business. During his time out of the government, Mr. Atmar and his party members adhered to strict political discipline and refrained from public accusations and playing dirty politics —engaging in amoral and unethical politics—with his opponents, winning him respect within the Afghan political class.

Mr. Atmar made a comeback with the election of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani as President of Afghanistan. Many credited Atmar for being the architect and brain behind Ghani’s election. He took the job of National Security Advisor, responsible for overseeing various domestic and foreign policy matters. During his tenure, he was the point person for and architect of many of the war and peace initiatives of both President Ghani and the international community, including the 4-year ANDSF development roadmap, negotiations with Hizb-e-Islami, regional security, and military diplomacy with Afghanistan’s neighbors.

Often referred to as the “Shadow President,” he was also subjected to a lot of criticism and attacks as the center of gravity of the national unity government. In Machiavellian form, the incumbent president used him as a scapegoat for his political and security failures while the Afghan opposition targeted him due to his serving as the center of gravity holding the government together. However, Atmar maintained his patience and ethical mindset. Many of his former critics, after witnessing his ethical behavior, are now his allies in his quest for high office. Mr. Atmar resigned his post to run for the presidency upon realizing the divisive, conspiratorial, and crisis-manufacturing actions of the incumbent, who is often surrounded by inexperienced Afghans with little affinity to the country and in pursuit of sectarian agendas.

A famous saying used to circle within the diplomatic community in Kabul which demonstrates the extent of Atmar’s influence and credibility: “If you want a lecture, go to the president. If you want to keep abreast of the latest fashion, go to the Chief Executive’s office. If you want to get things done, go to National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar’s office!”  Today, history once again has a calling for Haneef Atmar: to unite Afghanistan and put an end to politics of division, crisis manufacturing, ethnic politics, grudge, and humiliation and lead Afghanistan out of its current crisis. He has proven he is up to the task, so long as the people of Afghanistan give him the chance to take it on.

Mohammad Haneef Atmar: The Silent Unifier was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of Ukrainian state capture, Russian corruption, and bribery in other Eastern European and Central Asian states are on the rise. In all of the countries survey, only one country scores over 50 out of 100 points, with the average of countries only averaging a score of 35.

What’s the relationship between corruption and security?

Corruption undermines democratic consolidation and leads to voter disenfranchisement. This results in an overall lack of political will to combat illicit behavior in the public sector. In many Eastern European countries, history has provided few institutional checks and balances.

According to Transparency International, “one of the biggest impediments to fighting corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is state capture, where powerful individuals or groups seize control of national decision-making and use corrupt means to circumvent justice.”

It is unlikely that Eurasia will see widespread democratic stability in the near future, with countries like Azerbaijan (scoring 25), Russia (28), Kazakhstan (31), Kosovo (37), Serbia (39), and Montenegro (45) dropping in rank or continuing to stagnate.

While there are exceptions such as Ukraine’s increase from 30 in 2017 to 32 in 2018, given Ukraine’s weak enforcement of anti-corruption reforms enacted in 2014, any improvement is more superficial than it is long-lasting.

What’s wrong with the status quo?

For many, state capture and corruption have been everyday factors of life for the past two decades. Some see the status quo as essential for maintaining stability. Implementing a more equitable system carries a host of risks—from public trials to long-term imprisonment. For many in the ruling class, retaining current systems of informal governance seemingly carries zero cost.

However, the populist wave of 2018 might say otherwise. As voter frustration with corruption continues to rise, so too will their impatience with those currently in power. Leaders that rode those waves of anti-corruption legislation—such as Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan—must now follow through on their campaign promises, lest they risk being thrown out themselves.

Even countries like Russia, which have more entrenched systems of corruption, are beginning to see popular discontent. According to Russian’s Public Opinion Research Center, trust in Russian President Vladimir Putin has fallen to an all-time low since 2006.

While much of this can be attributed to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, observers must also take into account public disapproval over an increase in the retirement age and growing frustration with U.S. and European sanctions.

Corruption isn’t just a domestic concern—the extent to which corruption dictates domestic policies inherently affects domestic and regional stability and security. Therefore, endemic corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia doesn’t bode well for democratic cohesion and international support for human rights.

Corruption in Eastern Europe & Central Asia Is On the Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

Venezuela kicked 2019 off with a turbulent and fragile political start of the year. President Nicolás Maduro began his second presidential term on January 10th. The May 20th presidential election last year was internationally decried as illegitimate by the United States and the 14-member Lima Group throughout the region. On January 5th, a new face in Venezuelan politics emerged, Juan Guaidó, the 35-year-old newly elected President of the National Assembly.

As public and military support continue to mount, Guaidó is preparing to challenge Maduro and has called for a change of power. At Guaidó’s behest, the first public rally for Maduro to resign took place on January 23rd, with a massive protest against the Maduro government.

Guaidó rapidly emerged as a young new leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. Following his participation in the 2007 student protests of Hugo Chavez, Guaidó began to make a name for himself within the Venezuelan opposition. His involvement in the protests ultimately led him to Leopoldo Lopez, the long-standing leader of the Venezuelan opposition. Lopez ultimately mentored Guaidó through the Voluntad Popular (Popular Will) political party, preparing him to assume the Presidency of the National Assembly.

With Lopez’ continued house arrest and ban from serving public office, Guaidó emerged as the leader of the opposition within the National Assembly. Upon assuming his new position, on January 5, Guaidó became increasingly vocal through his first few weeks in office, declaring Maduro a usurper of the presidency. On January 13, Guaidó was briefly detained by police officers in La Guaira on the way to a town hall rally. A video of the detainment taken by a motorist rapidly circulated social media. Guaidó was soon released, but the detention spread international awareness about the opposition’s struggle and brought Guaidó to the international stage.

Despite Guaidó’s prominence in the National Assembly, his efforts will lead to limited results without the support of the armed forces. While the military command remains under the control of the Maduro regime, personnel have begun to desert their ranks. Voluntad Popular has called on the National Guard to break ranks to help bring about a transition in government in exchange for amnesty. Videos were circulated on Monday of dissident soldiers swearing loyalty to Guaidó in Cotiza. The soldiers in question headed to the special security unit headquarters to commandeer military vehicles and call for a local uprising. On Monday, 27 soldiers of the National Guard were detained for their insubordination in connection to the transgression.

Maduro has overseen a steady decline in his executive power and public approval since taking office. In 2017, protestors took to the streets of Caracas for months, beginning in March and ending in August. Despite their conviction, the protestors were forced to discontinue their demonstrations after six months of continuous protesting and heavy-handed police repression. The repression of political dissent in Venezuela caused many countries within the Lima Group began to question the policy of diplomatic support for Maduro. In August of 2017, a bizarre drone attack was launched against Maduro during an open air rally. The Maduro government blamed the Lima Group for organizing the assault.

Maduro’s consistent response to the decline of the state has been to centralize state authority. Although the Supreme Court remains under the bridle of Maduro, the majority in the National Assembly remains unyielding in opposition of Maduro. In March 2017, the Supreme Court tried to dissolve the National Assembly and engineer a replacement executive-run legislative body called the Constituent Assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately failed to win the legal battle following strong pressure from the international community and fierce opposition from the National Assembly. Yet Venezuela’s highest court remains a central voice in Venezuelan politics — on January 21st, the Supreme Court ruled Guaidó’s leadership and calls to remove Maduro illegal.

Going Global

Debate and politicking over the Venezuelan Crisis is not confined to the domestic space. For years, the United Nations, U.S., Europe, and neighboring states have decried the abuse of executive authority, illiberal governance, and repression of the Venezuelan public. Now, it seems, the world is ready to assume a more active role in countering Caracas.

In the past year, Trump expressed on several occasions that all options remain on the table with the Venezuelan conflict. In September 2018, the New York Times reported that the Trump administration had met with dissident Venezuelan military officers about plans to overthrow Maduro. The meetings proved inconclusive — U.S. officials ultimately decided not to aid the officers in a coup attempt. However, the fact that the U.S. administration actively considered a kinetic engagement to support a regime change in Venezuela at a time when President Trump is scaling back the United States’ military presence in the Middle East underscores the dire threat that Maduro’s grip on power poses to regional stability and the level of engagement that the international community believes necessary to restore democratic governance to Caracas.

As widespread disapproval across the region for a military coup persists and the U.S. government remains mired in its own political showdown, it is unlikely that Washington will sponsor or encourage a military coup d’état in Venezuela. However, Guaidó has already indirectly presented the United States with a way to support the struggling democratic opposition. By amplifying Guaidó’s message and drawing attention to the conflict — Washington has already contributed to Guaidó’s international image and credibility.

The United States and the Lima Group have already voiced public support for Guaidó and backed his denouncement of the Maduro regime as illegitimate. Taking it a step further, on January 15, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence spoke on the phone with Guaidó and expressed the U.S. government’s “unwavering support” for the opposition. That message was then amplified by a public video that the Vice President released on Twitter, expressing the U.S. government and American people’s support for both the Venezuelan opposition and general public.

In the video, Pence affirms that “We will stay with you until Democracy is restored and you reclaim your birthright of Libertad.” In response to the video, Maduro has called for a revision of diplomatic relations with the United States on television and on Twitter, claiming that Pence is overstepping his authority.

Diplomatic reprisals in U.S.-Venezuelan relations are nothing new. In 2008, President Hugo Chávez expelled U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy from Caracas, citing a U.S.-crafted coup plot against his administration. Since then, the United States has been unable to send an official ambassador to Venezuela, relying on Foreign Service Officers to serve as the Chargé d’Affaires. That tenuous diplomatic thread was finally cut last year after Maduro targeted the remaining leadership of the diplomatic mission and expelled the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Todd D. Robinson and the Deputy Chief of Mission Brian Naranjo. Given the current state of relations, it is difficult to see how Maduro can take any meaningful action against Washington short of military escalation, which would immediately undermine his efforts at diverting international engagement.

In addition to the brazen violation of civil liberties and human rights, the U.S. Government has denounced Venezuela’s burgeoning relationship with Russia. The Russian government has become a key ally of the Maduro government, providing aid in the form of debt-restructuring, the creation of the petro crypto-currency, and recently, procurement of military bomber planes. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly criticized American support for the Venezuelan opposition.

Trial by Fire

Regardless of the outcome, these events will prove to be a turning point in Venezuela. Either the opposition will succeed in rallying the people and the military to overthrow Maduro with the support of the Lima Group, or Maduro will demonstrate his unshakable control over Venezuela’s government. The culmination of the opposition’s appeal to the people combined with the gravitas placed upon the outcome by the international community has given the occasion particular weight. The opposition must demonstrate to the Venezuelan people and the international community that they can — and will — bring about a peaceful democratic transition. The time is now, or never.

In a grand gesture, Guaidó timed the widespread protests to coincide with the anniversary of the 1958 ousting of Venezuelan Dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez. Responding to a fellow member of the National Assembly on Twitter, Guaidó proclaimed, “We only have one clear action: to remain united and firm for a democratic and free Venezuela.” The stage is set. Whatever follows will influence Venezuelan politics and governance for years to come.

This article was originally published on The International Scholar.

Trial by Fire: Guaidó Calls on Venezuela to Oust Maduro was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eighteen candidates have registered themselves for what is ultimately expected to be a tight race between the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani and his charismatic former National Security Advisor, Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has assembled a strong team of political heavyweights. Both known for their strong credentials as visionaries and leaders, they have embraced a progressive agenda for Afghanistan are anti-corruption advocates.

However, the two men have different approaches to governance; President Ghani is known to be short-tempered, impatient, and a results-based micromanager while Haneef Atmar has a reputation as a patient, strategic thinker and as a unifying figure who calls for moderation, inclusivity, and a broad-based government. Many political analysts predict that they might unite in the event of a second round given the complementary nature of their respective qualities, a fact which made them win the first presidential election of the post-Hamid Karzai era.

Afghan elections have always been chaotic but are a manifestation of how far the country has come.  Former archrivals are now settling scores at the ballot box, not with bullets. One of the highlights of the upcoming election is the candidacy of the infamous warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who once fought a bloody civil war against his rivals over the control of capital Kabul and until recently considered the Afghan government to be an illegitimate puppet. He later reconsidered and now seeks the Afghan presidency.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s current Chief Executive Officer and former foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, known to be a chronic campaigner, is a candidate for the fourth time. Out of five elections, Abdullah’s name has been on the ballot in four of them. This election is a clash between political titans who have different visions for a post-U.S. Afghanistan that is more self-reliant. This narrative is already present in the rhetoric used by the candidates; terms such as “Afghanization”. “ownership,” “standing on our own feet,” and “taking responsibility” are some of the buzzwords used by the candidates to signal preparation for a post-American future in Afghanistan.

What is on the Ballot?

The 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be a referendum on the devolution of power from the presidency to provincial units versus further centralization of power in the administration. With no constitutional justification, President Ghani has removed the Chief Executive Office, which created on the basis of the National Unity Government agreement mediated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and has called for a strong, centralized, and united presidency. Ghani’s his main rival, Mohammad Haneef Atmar,  has pledged to further devolve the powers of the presidency by creating a third vice president position and an Executive Prime Minister office after the approval of an Afghan Loya Jirga.

Many fear that, if left unchecked, both cases pose a real danger to the governance structures and overall unity of the country. On the one hand, there is concern that a centralized state in the hands of President Ghani, given his temperament and impatience, could descend into authoritarianism. On the other side, further devolution of power and the creation of a Prime Minister’s office could pave the way for federalism and the subsequent disintegration of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the 2019 elections represent a contest between two generations of Afghan politicians and political activists, and between two different visions of the country’s future. The first is the old generation, a mixture of jihadi-communists and royalists. The second group is the new generation of post-9/11 Afghans, mostly educated in the West and adhere to western values of democracy, freedom of speech, and fundamental human rights. The standard bearer of each of these visions will set the tone of the Afghan political landscape for many years to come.

Whoever takes the helm will have the tough job of providing security and developing a stagnant Afghan economy in light of dwindling U.S. resources and interest in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a divided and chaotic region is resulting in geopolitical spillover effects on the security and political situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace, security, the economy, and a balanced foreign policy will be critical priorities for the next Afghan presidential administration.

The Tyranny of Duality: Elections or Peace Process.

A new class of Afghan elites, politicians, and former officials have joined the Taliban in calling for an interim administration and the postponing the presidential election to a later date to accommodate the ongoing peace talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Many others don’t see the peace talks and the election as mutually exclusive. Instead, they see them as complementary and parallel to one another.

Both the peace talks and presidential elections can proceed concurrently for three purposes. The first is to put pressure on the Taliban to participate in the elections. The second purpose is to demonstrate the realities of a new Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the third being that the candidates can use peace as a rallying point to boost public opinion for the peace and reconciliation process. The choice should not be between either the election or peace talks, but rather both the peace process and the Afghan presidential elections can be mutually inclusive, complementing one another.

The Crisis of Afghan Electoral Bodies

The ineffectiveness, incompetence, and politicization of Afghanistan’s electoral bodies are primarily rooted in two areas. The first is a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government to build strong, impartial, and competent bodies. The second is the failure of the United Nations and the international community at-large to efficiently invest donor money and resources in electoral bodies to build capacity and systems.  These two factors are the key drivers of many of the problems within Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) today.

Successive Afghan governments and UN mission chiefs vowed to address these problems but to no avail; dozens of roadmaps and electoral reform programs were drawn up to overhaul the electoral bodies’ legal and policy frameworks significantly, but many of those plans remained on paper. Successive Afghan governments saw it as being to their benefit to keep Afghan electoral bodies weak to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities will give a government the opportunity to machinate and engineer the results of elections.

Afghan elections are considered to be one of the costliest elections per capita in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the logistical and security arrangements for elections in the country. Generous donations from various donor countries provide these funds. For Afghans to be able to afford elections in future, they will have to fundamentally change the economics of their electoral system and switch to more affordable technologies. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s electoral bodies require a significant legal, policy, and operational overhaul. At present, however, it seems impossible to carry out such a process given the limited timeframe, the risks of the election being engineered, and a lack of trust. Many in Afghanistan question the legitimacy of any election held under the current legal, policy, and institutional structures.

The Role of Kingmakers

The Afghan kingmakers are three distinct groups which play an essential role in shaping and paving the way for any potential candidate to win the seat of the presidency in the country. The first group depend of personalities such as former President Hamid Karzai, Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Atta Noor, among others. The second group is made up of influential families such as legendary former commander Masood’s family, former Vice President Marshal Fahim’s family, the Mojaddidi family, the Gilani family, and others. The third and final group are foreign powers in the region, the broader Islamic world, and the United States..

As of now, the majority of these factors favor the incumbent’s main rival, former National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has garnered the support of many of these personalities, families, and countries. However, unseating an incumbent president remains a difficult task given the state of the resources at his disposal.

The Role of the United States and the Region in the Afghan Elections

Regional and global politics have always played out in the Afghan elections with rival countries supporting one or several Afghan candidates to win favors with the Afghan political elites.  The support of external actors in the Afghan election scene has mainly been through three mediums: campaign money, propaganda through their state media outlets, and by leveraging their influence through proxies in favor or against one candidate or the other.

Unfortunately, these bitter realities still have not changed and play out in the Afghan electoral scene. It is increasingly evident that this time there will be three types of candidates from a geopolitical viewpoint which will face off in the Afghan presidential race: a candidate of the region, a candidate of the West, and others. In previous races, one or two of the candidates have been favored by both the region and the west, but in this race, it is clear that the preferred candidate(s) of regional powers differs from the candidate(s) favored by the United States and the West.

Afghan Elections: Unifiers or Dividers?

Elections are double-edged swords in post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. Elections can be both a unifying entity and a divisive power. In Libya. an election drove a large divide in a country where there are two administrations in two capitals. The last presidential election in Afghanistan could have resulted similarly, sending Afghanistan into disarray and a bloody civil if not for the wisdom and farsightedness of the candidates and the diplomatic skills of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

This time around, the threat of a disputed or drawn-out election remains. The legitimacy and acceptability of the presidential race depends upon the conduct of the electoral bodies and on the incumbent not to use government resources for campaign purposes. In fact, there is a high risk of a “non-government” this time if we the election is disputed.

Afghanistan’s presidential elections are set for July 2019, typically the peak of the Taliban’s summer offensive which will detrimentally impact the security and accessibility of electoral sites, which will be highly vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban attacks. Thus, certain population centers and pockets of Afghan towns and cities will be prevented from voting in the presidential elections. Such an outcome could lead to questions about the credibility and viability of the elections.

What to Expect: Winners and Losers

Many experts believe that due to the high number of candidates and a divided electoral landscape, the Afghan elections will go to a second round between the two candidates who manage to secure the most votes. In this case, many experts believe a runoff would be between the incumbent and his former National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar. Success will be contingent upon the coalition building and negotiation skills of both candidates. There is also the chance of a coalition government to avoid a deadlock.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the election won’t be held in the event of a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban, or if U.S. President Donald Trump makes an abrupt decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Of course, nobody can predict the future, but if history is any indicator, it seems highly likely that the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be tightly contested and will result in a runoff vote, followed by drawn-out negotiation period until the formation of the next Afghan government.

The Politics of Ballots over Bullets: Afghan Elections and Peace Process was originally published on Global Security Review.

After a contentious election and subsequent runoff, Salome Zurabishvili claimed victory as the next President of Georgia. The 2018 Georgian Presidential Elections mark the final stage in a process introduced by former President Mikhail Saakashvili that aims to shift Georgia’s system of governance from a presidential to a parliamentary-based state. Georgia’s new president, Zurabishvili, will be the last elected via a direct popular vote. From this point on, executive power will rest almost exclusively with the Prime Minister.

Why is Georgia’s introducing constitutional reforms?

Changing the system of governance is meant to stop some of the more flagrant abuses of power that were formerly exercised by the ruling elite. The constitutional reforms effectively transfer executive power from the president to parliament. In Georgia, however, this will result in the ruling Georgian Dream party having substantial political power. Georgian Dream currently holds 115 out of the 150 seats and the next parliamentary elections are set to be held in 2020.

Additionally, the constitutional reforms will change how the president and members of parliament elected. The president, until now, were elected via popular vote. Going forward, Georgian presidents will will now be elected from a college of political officials, somewhat similar to the Electoral College in the United States.

Members of parliament will no longer be allowed to form electoral blocs, making it difficult (if not impossible) for smaller parties to meet the five percent threshold required for a party to be seated in parliament. Even more controversial is a new rule that will give unallocated seats to the majority party if the five percent threshold isn’t met by the party that won those seats.

Despite the loss of the presidency’s political authority, the elections garnered significant attention worldwide.

While the presidency will lose much of its power, the opposition party contends that the election was ‘stolen.’ Even with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker supporting the results of the election, Grigol Vashadze, the opposition candidate, refused to accept the results.

Around 25,000 gathered in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, to protest Zurabishvili’s election to the presidency and demanding snap parliamentary elections. More than 60 percent of Georgians claimed that they either did not understand the constitutional reforms or they did not agree with them. Former President Saakashvili, who now lives in the Netherlands, claimed the vote was rigged. There were allegations of fraud while others complained that by purchasing the debts of 600,000 people, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and funder of the Georgian Dream, was essentially buying votes for his candidate of choice.

International observers characterized the election as “free but unfair.” The main cause of concern? The 600,000 people whose debt was purchased by Ivanishvili. Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze personally announced the policy, which applied to nearly one-third of the entire adult population of Georgia. In essence, Ivanishvili offered to buy back the debt of much of the Georgian voting population. However, even while domestic politicians claim that the vote was rigged, no international observers have stated that the election itself was illegitimate.

Going forward, it’s likely international observers will call for peaceful protests but will urge acceptance of the result. The opposition will continue to fight against what it perceives was an unfair and illegitimate election. While there has been negligible signs of interference, Western governments should closely monitor for any malicious or hostile interference. Such a possibility isn’t unlikely, given Russia’s history of exploiting internal divisions in the post-Soviet space.

Georgian Constitutional Reforms Alter Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 11, elections will be held in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR, respectively). The outcome of the elections will determine the heads of government and state in both regions.

Western governments have strongly criticized the upcoming elections, and have urged Russian President Vladimir Putin not to recognize their results. Not only will the elections disrupt the Minsk process, threatening the increasingly unstable status quo in the region, they provide an air of legitimacy to the Russian-backed separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, allowing for a further consolidation of power.

Are the elections in violations of the Minsk Agreements?

European governments and the U.S. strongly disagree with the Kremlin over the legality of the DPR and LPR elections. The Ukrainian government—which sees the elections as violating both Ukrainian law and the Minsk Agreements—has already stated that it will not recognize the results. The United States and the European Union have also indicated they will not consider the results to be legitimate.

According to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the E.U. for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “all steps that would obstruct the advancement of the implementation of the Minsk agreement must be avoided.” The Minsk agreements state that elections must be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and be monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Kremlin-backed DPR leadership has rejected all criticism of the election, arguing that the Minsk Agreements only mention municipal elections, and as such, all criticism is “baseless” and the elections have a “solid foundation.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to answer questions whether Russia will recognize the results of the upcoming elections.

Filling the power vacuum in the Donbass

Some consider the upcoming elections as necessary to fill the power vacuum left after the assassination of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko in August 2018. Zakharchenko himself had previously postponed these elections for an indefinite period.

The identities of those behind Zakharchenko’s assassination remain unknown but there is rampant speculation. A popular theory attributes the assassination to Kremlin dissatisfaction with the corruption in the Donbass enabled by Zakharchenko and his right-hand man, Aleksandr Timofeyev. Russia and Ukraine have blamed each other for the murder.

Replacing Zakharchenko was not a complicated endeavor. Zakharchenko symbolized separatism in Eastern Ukraine and seemed to be genuinely respected by many in the Donbass region. Initially, Dmitry Trapeznikov was appointed as a successor. He was fired just days after his appointment by the Prosecutor General. Trapeznikov was replaced by Denis Pushilin, the former speaker of the DPR parliament.

Trapeznikov’s ouster, as well as Timofeyev’s swift disappearence from the political scene, were followed by a statement from Aleksei Chesnakov, a close associate of Russian presidential aid Vladislav Surkov. In his statement, Chesnakov blamed Timofeyev for ongoing corruption and criticized Trapeznikov for his lack of a legal mandate.

Pushilin—currently the acting prime minister and the presidential frontrunner—has ties to MMM, an infamous pyramid scheme that deprived millions of citizens across the former Soviet Union of their savings during the U.S.S.R.’s collapse and its aftermath in the 1990s. Despite his low popularity, Pushilin has enjoyed the Kremlin’s full support in the run-up to Sunday’s vote.

Viable presidential candidates have fallen out of the running.

The election campaign in Donetsk has been rather turbulent. Viable presidential candidates such as Alexandr Khodakovksy and Pavel Gubarev were quickly dismissed out of the running. Khodakovsky, who stood a real chance for the position, was not allowed into Donetsk on the date he needed to register as a candidate.

Pavel Gubarev did not collect enough valid signatures, according to the election commission. Igor Strelkov was disqualified on the basis of being a Russian citizen. Pavel Gubarev, one of the first political leaders of the 2014 separatist movement, was denied registration for not having collected enough valid signatures. It is interesting to note that the removal of strong candidates was accompanied by PR efforts to restore Pushilin’s reputation, and to position him as continuing the mission of Zakharchenko.

As a result, on November 11, only four relatively unknown candidates will be competing with Pushilin for the presidency: Vladimir Medvedev (deputy education minister of the DPR), Roman Yevstifeyev (head of the Museum of Afghan Veterans), Elena Shishkina (chairwoman of the Ukrainian People’s Tribunal for the Government of Ukraine), and Roman Khramenkov (former mayor of Yenakiieve and Horlivka).

Moscow’s approach

According to U.S. deputy ambassador Jonathan Cohen, the Kremlin is using the elections to support the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which are, in his words, “inseparable from the illegal armed groups controlled by Moscow.” Pushilin is considered to be less impulsive and more manageable for Moscow than Zakharchenko.

Given the Kremlin’s steadfast support for Pushilin, as well as a campaign to restore Pushilin’s reputation in the run-up to the elections, it is clear that Moscow views the Donbass elections as extremely important—whether it officially recognizes the outcome or not.

It is likely that Pushilin will claim victory on November 11. Less certain, however, is whether he will continue to abide by the spirit of the Minsk Agreements, which have been gridlocked for months. The most likely scenario is that nothing will change, breaches of ceasefires will continue, and Moscow—with its preferred candidate leading DPR—will continue pulling the strings of Eastern Ukraine.

Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius are analysts at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of HCSS.

November Elections in Eastern Ukraine Unlikely to Bring Major Change was originally published on Global Security Review.

Disinformation has become the norm in Latvia, where ethnic Russians comprise approximately 25% of Latvia’s population.

Over the past few years, European states have been observing the steady increase in popularity for populist and Eurosceptic parties within their borders. Political parties like Front Nationale in France, Jobbik in Hungary and Alternativ für Deutschland have all capitalized on anti-European sentiment to gain more seats and power within their countries.

While the support for Harmony might seem absurdly high, that number is 23.1 percent less than their election results in 2014. Where did those votes go? The populist Latvian party KPV LV won 14.1 percent of the vote and will get 16 seats in parliament. Another populist party, the New Conservative Party, came in with 13.6 percent of the vote and will also receive 16 seats.

In the past, many parties have unequivocally stated they wouldn’t work with Harmony because of their pro-Russian stance. The Harmony chairman, Nils Ushakovs, argued that any coalition government without Harmony would be unstable and non-representative of the Latvian people.

With more populist parties in the parliament, it is more likely that KPV LV and the New Conservative Party will attempt to enter into a coalition government with Harmony. To form such a government, only 51 out of 100 seats are required.

In prior elections, the other pro-European parties like the Development and the National Alliance have banded together to ensure that Harmony did not take part in the government. However, with this election, that may change. The Development only received 13.4 percent of the vote while the National Alliance received 12.6 percent.

Disinformation in Latvia is at an all-time high.

With a host of populist and pro-Russian parties gaining power, questions are raised about how exactly they got where they are. In Latvia, there is a huge amount of disinformation. In fact, on the day of the elections themselves, Draugiem.lv, the ninth most popular social network in Latvia, was hacked with a pro-Russia message.

Even more concerning, disinformation has become the norm in Latvia rather than the exception. Groups like the Latvian Russian Union spread disinformation during the summer that ethnic-Russians were placed in ghettos and that NATO planned on using the country as a base for attacking Russia.

That same summer when Canadian troops were deployed in Latvia to help NATO, Russian-language sites portrayed the Canadians as “beer buying homosexuals who lived in apartments at the expense of local taxpayers.”

Disinformation is not the only culprit.

Rising populism also stems from citizen discontent with high levels of corruption and opposition to a law mandating that Latvian be the only language taught in schools. This language law is eerily similar to the law proposed in Ukraine that only Ukrainian could be taught in schools.

The similarity is no coincidence. Latvia has one of the highest level of Russian-speaking citizens within their borders. Prior anti-Russian parties have seen the implementation of a language law as a protective measure to prevent against Russian disinformation targeted at young Russian speakers in their respective countries.

Luckily, Latvia has a history of disinformation with Russia and more experience combating it than other Western countries. Coalition talks are expected to take several weeks so as of yet, it is still unknown whether or not Harmony will be allowed to take part in the government.

While certain parties have pledged not to cooperate with Harmony, other parties have been less clear. Russian-language media outlets also have been promoting Harmony whilst simultaneously directing negative sentiment towards the current government and other pro-European groups.

Whether or not Latvia will accept a pro-Russian platform as a part of their government may seem like a small matter, but it will ultimately answer the question of whether a rise in anti-establishment sentiment can be hijacked and turned into pro-Russian support. For the rest of Europe, the question is very relevant and may have an impact on cooperation within the bloc for the next election cycle to come.

Pro-Russia and Populist Parties Gain Support in Latvia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 left Spain scrambling to reassemble a broken economy and combat soaring unemployment. European austerity measures and Catalonian dreams of independence have since occupied all of Madrid’s bandwidth and effectively back-seated Spanish foreign policy for over a decade. With the rise of Pedro Sánchez and the wounds of the financial crisis healing, Madrid has turned its attention back to Brussels and is ready to assume the role of a leading power in Europe. 

With the unexpected departure of now Former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, the heavily pro-European Socialist Party (PSOE) has returned to power with a decidedly European agenda. In the months following the vote of no confidence that unseated Rajoy and installed Pedro Sánchez, the new Prime Minister embarked on a grand tour of Europe to court Spain’s closest partners in an effort to drum up support for Spain’s new European agenda.

During a visit to Paris, Sánchez spent several hours with President Emmanuel Macron discussing the French leader’s ambitious Eurozone reform project, from which Spain and other Southern European nations heavily impacted by the euro’s failings stand to benefit. As Rome embarks on a decidedly eurosceptic agenda for financial reform and migration policy of the E.U., Madrid is well-positioned to reclaim the mantle of leadership of the Southern bloc of E.U. member states.

Underscoring this new role, in June, Sánchez offered the ship Aquarius, carrying refugees from Northern Africa that were denied access at both Italian and Maltese ports, the opportunity to dock in Valencia. The Sánchez administration made clear that La Moncloa would carefully and thoroughly review each migrant for refugee status and provide them full protection under the law.

Sánchez’s actions not only signaled Spain’s willingness to take on a more active role but also rekindled the debate over E.U. migration policy and became the main topic of focus at the subsequent European Council meetings, held a few weeks later.

Spain has also taken a slightly more vocal role in debates over NATO defense spending, refusing to increase its military expenditure. The Sánchez administration argued that its contribution to NATO is not limited to its defense budget but comprises its considerably large aid, development, and human rights initiatives as well.

Though the government maintained a respectful tone of disagreement — wary of provoking an unnecessary conflict with Washington — it is a notable shift in the rhetoric Spain has traditionally used with Europe’s closest ally. The notably more vocal and engaged Sánchez administration suggests a more active Spanish presence on the world stage.

As the United Kingdom prepares to withdraw from the European Union and Eastern European states continue to butt heads with Brussels, Spain’s position as a large and active pro-European voice in the E.U. is a welcome prospect. It is also an opportunity — one that Madrid should approach with vigor and enthusiasm.

Seizing the Mantle of Leadership Under Sánchez

Spain is a unique outlier in Europe these days—it has no eurosceptic or far-right parties in Congress, its political leadership remains enthusiastically pro-European, and it has a welcoming domestic attitude towards immigration.

Sánchez’s PSOE is also one of just three social democratic parties in power in E.U. states, alongside Portugal’s PSD and Germany’s SPD. This leaves Madrid in a position with great potential to influence European policy and claim its place amongst Paris and Berlin as a leading European power within the EU.

Given Prime Minister Sánchez’s prior working experience within European Union institutions, his fluency in English and French, and the appointment of strong and respectable cabinet members, in particular Foreign Minister Josep Borrell, there is considerable room for engagement with President Macron and Chancellor Merkel to advance European reforms and take on a leading role in European foreign policy.

Both Spain and Portugal maintain strong, positive diplomatic ties to Latin America, where the EU has recently shifted its attention, opening the door for trade negotiations with MERCOSUR after finalizing a new free trade agreement with Mexico in April. As Lisbon shares a strong, pro-European attitude and views Spain as its closest working partner in the EU, Spain can expect to enjoy the collective weight of Iberia backing its European agenda and policy initiatives.

Spain also maintains an active presence in the Sahel region of Northern Africa and is a member of the Western Mediterranean Forum. Commonly referred to as the 5+5 Dialogue, it brings together the European five — Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Malta — with the North African states of Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

The dialogue aims to provide a space to “discuss subjects of topical interest for the region and to identify new areas for practical cooperation.” As terrorism and forced migration continue to plague the Sahel and Central Saharan regions, Spain should increase its diplomatic and security engagement with its partners in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania.

With Brussels still hamstrung on European migration policy, it is incumbent upon Spain to engage with its partners in the Mediterranean to lead European efforts to strengthen North African rule of law and economic development. This could be done most effectively by providing civil support for elections monitoring and establishing working groups at both the national and local levels in the region. In particular, Spain should boost its support for the democratization and economic development of Tunisia, the sole surviving democracy of the Arab Spring, which could serve as a politically stable economic anchor for its neighbors.

As the United States withdraws its support for the advancement of democracy and human rights, Spain should also take the opportunity to leverage its strong human rights record, and take a more active role, both individually and within the framework of the United Nations. Here, Madrid can again leverage its relations with Ibero-American states, many of which are also strong supporters of the UN, human rights, and democratic principles. 

By working closely with its Latin American allies, especially within the scope of collective principles and values, Spain and Portugal can begin to forge a new transatlantic alliance with Latin America. Greater cooperation along these lines would not only help Brussels win new allies to preserve the liberal world order from which it has benefitted, but also win Madrid greater influence in both continents as a focal point in the relationship.

Spain has also developed a strong working relationship with China. As a recent paper from the leading Spanish think tank, Real Instituto Elcano pointed out, technological collaboration has become a major component of Sinohispanic relations. Spain should encourage further collaboration within the framework of European collective policy towards China and develop a joint strategy with Beijing for future scientific and technological collaboration.

Capitalizing upon stronger bilateral ties, Madrid can then better position itself to negotiate with China over issues of broader concern to the European Union, such as combatting climate change, encouraging multilateralism, and supporting E.U.-Chinese collaboration on the JCPOA and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Sánchez and his successors might also find a willing partner in Beijing to advance its own agenda for economic development and stabilization in Northern Africa given the high level of foreign direct investment (FDI) that Xi’s administration has funneled into African development projects.

By developing a stronger working relationship with Beijing, Madrid may also find itself better positioned to check Chinese human rights violations and security-compromising FDI in Europe. In any case, Spain will need a more comprehensive strategy to address the world’s largest economy and rising global power.

Cultivating Staying Power for Spain

For all the potential for evolution into one of Europe’s leading powers, there is still the risk of Spain devolving into internal crisis. The issue of Catalonian independence is far from resolved, and political leaders are divided on how to address it.

There is also the potential for Spain to fall back into financial chaos if issues over Eurozone reform are not addressed in time for the next global economic shockwave. Yet Spain remains the best candidate for the vacancy left by the United Kingdom and Italy in the European triumvirate.

For Spain to cultivate staying power in the role, however, Sánchez will need to work closely and assertively with Macron to address Eurozone reform and establish greater solidarity with the EU states most affected by the last financial crisis. It will also have to demonstrate a willingness to compromise with the Visegrad states over issues of ongoing integration.

Madrid should also continue to opt into organizations for greater defense cooperation and collectivization such as PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative to gain influence and encourage other EU states to follow suit.

At the moment, Spain, like Portugal remains inoculated against eurosceptic right-wing political extremism that has plagued Germany and France due to the strong living memories of life under the Salazar-Caetano and Franco dictatorships. While this buttresses Spain’s leadership credibility, Madrid should not become complacent. After all, only a few years ago it was nearly unthinkable that Germany would become host to an active and growing far-right, eurosceptic movement. 

Short of Brussels developing political savvy in communicating with the wider European public overnight, politicians from all Spanish parties should continue to engage in public diplomacy efforts to engage the Spanish public with the rest of Europe and help make European Union institutions, Spanish representation, and policymaking at the EU level more transparent.

As Spain emerges as a third leading power in the European Union, it should seek to actively expand its influence within and beyond Europe. Madrid must not shy away from the role of leader but embrace the opportunity to redefine its place within Europe and the world to secure its future and preserve the European project.

The New European Triumvirate: Spain as a Leading Power in the European Union was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a firm grip on power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there are a number of ethnic, religious, and economically-motivated groups which pose a number of threats to the control that the CCP holds over the politics, people, and territory of the PRC.

The local populations in the western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang have historically sought greater autonomy from Beijing. Many in both regions desire complete independence from China. The Communist Party leadership perceives any separatist sentiments as a threat to internal order and, ultimately, party control over the country.

To combat separatism, the central government has implemented programs designed to assimilate local populations into a dominant “Chinese” national narrative. In Xinjiang, up to a million Muslim Uyghurs (a Turkic-ethnic group largely concentrated in the restive western region) have been reportedly interned in “reeducation” labor camps. Those who have managed to avoid the internment camps are subjected to near-totalitarian levels of surveillance and security measures.

On the economic front, a multitude of issues could pose major threats to the Communist Party’s power monopoly. Any significant economic disruption or slowdown could reduce public confidence in the party and potentially lead to political destabilization.

Ensuring sustainable economic growth is key to the Communist Party’s hold on power. Now that CCP Chairman Xi Jinping has consolidated power and begun his second term, China’s debt-laden economy will continue to undergo substantial reform in order to ensure the state’s control over economic activities.

The Communist Party is taking steps to mitigate the risk of social unrest in the event of an economic downturn.

When it comes to economic threats to the Communist Party, the next several years—or even decades—will be critical in sustaining party control and legitimacy. The government has elevated the status of Xi Jinping, in both the party and the state, to a level not seen since the days of Mao Zedong.

Xi’s purported anti-corruption drive will persist, if not escalate, and Xi’s economic policies, which have resulted in millions losing their jobs, will proceed as well. The anti-corruption drive has been a vehicle to rid the party’s upper-echelons of any challengers to Xi’s authority. Xi’s economic reforms stand in contrast to the policies pursued by his more market-oriented predecessors, as Xi strives to ensure state-dominance over China’s economic affairs.

Both Chinese state-owned and private companies are laden with increasing levels of debt, and a number of firms are failing as a result. If discontent were to persist, the growing number of unemployed could present a threat to the party. However, the government has offered urban unemployed job opportunities in rural infrastructure development, tourism, and education in China’s eastern provinces.

Programs such as these offer urban-dwelling unemployed wages they would otherwise be unable to earn. They also serve the dual-purpose of dispersing highly-concentrated urban populations to rural provinces, reducing the likelihood of large-scale societal unrest in the event of a sharp economic downturn.

In a similar vein, the central government has offered economic incentives to members of the majority Han ethnic group to establish themselves in both Tibet and Xinjiang. Ostensibly, Beijing argues that it is merely providing opportunities for unemployed or underemployed citizens along China’s densely populated eastern coast.

What’s more likely, however, is that Beijing is counting on significant numbers of Han Chinese relocating to China’s western regions incrementally suppress Tibetan or Uyghur identities. This would effectively reduce the threat of Uyghur or Tibetan separatism as both groups are forcibly assimilated into a national “Chinese” identity.

Beijing is Increasingly Wary of Separatism

Tibet has historically sought complete independence, rather than autonomy from the People’s Republic of China. Having achieved total independence from China after the demise of the Qing dynasty’s rule in Tibet in 1912, the Tibetan people enjoyed sovereignty for approximately 36 years. After the Chinese Civil War, the CCP emerged as the dominant power in Mainland China and subsequently incorporated the region of Tibet into their territorial holdings.

The CCP granted a significant amount of autonomy to Tibet, which was renounced during the failed Tibetan Rebellion of 1959, during which the Tibetan government, including the Dalai Lama, the head of the Tibetan faith, fled to India. It is important to note that the Tibetans did not perceive the Chinese invasion as a threat to the territorial integrity of Tibet, although Tibet had assumed a distinct geographical entity as a nation beginning in the seventh century. The assault was seen more as a threat to their faith. Since this so-called offensive against the Tibetan faith occurred, the CCP has treated the citizens of the Tibetan region much differently than citizens of the rest of the country.

In 2008, violent protests and riots, caused by resentment towards the inequalities that Tibetans experience relative to other parts of China, erupted throughout Tibet. Tibetans were angered by inflation, inadequate education and low access to employment. The riots were mainly ethnically driven, as rioters attacked business owners and pedestrians of the Han and Hui ethnic groups. These actions by the people of Tibet are indicative of a desire for greater independence from the government of the PRC, reveal the fact that Tibet is a significant threat to the CCP’s authority.

This is because it is an issue of ethnicity and religion, rather than being an issue of government reform or democratization. The desire for equality and with that, independence is something that the CCP cannot reform without weakening itself by sacrificing territory. This issue will continue to plague the Party until Tibet wins full autonomy or is obliterated by the CCP.

There are a significant number of Tibetan exiles living outside the reach and influence of the central government, who can both influence foreign governments to take action against Beijing and provide valuable information and assistance to activists within Tibet. The fact that there are elements outside of the party’s control concerning the issue of Tibet—variables that it cannot predict or control—makes this an even more substantial threat from Beijing’s perspective.

Preventive Oppression and Cultural Cleansing of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Beginning in the 1990s, the CCP started to tightening restrictions on religious practices as part of a crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslims in response to public demonstrations in the 1980s and a violent mass uprising in 1990. Today, Xinjiang has effectively become a totalitarian police state. Residents are subjected to regular security checks, mandatory spyware, and there are reportedly anywhere from several hundred thousand to over a million Uyghurs in “reeducation” or internment camps.

The repression of Islam in Xinjiang has gone so far that the government has mandated that mosques be closed and that clerics submit to supervision by party officials. As Islam is no doubt a large part of the Uyghur population, as part of their spiritual and cultural expression, this is viewed as a highly oppressive act by the central government.

This oppression exists because China’s leadership perceives the practice of religion as a potential threat to the integrity of the atheist state and CCP authority. Likewise, they fear that the free practice of Islam encourages radicalism and separatism among Uyghurs and other Muslims in China.

This fear of radicalism has encouraged both the Party and government to go so far as charging individuals who try to practice Islam peacefully of ‘separatism,’ and it persecutes religious leaders and Muslim opposition figures linking them to terrorism.

Beijing has implemented a number of programs designed to systematically assimilate members of non-Han ethnic groups such as Uyghurs. Education policies in the region are designed around integrating youths of Uyghur and non-Han ethnicities into Chinese society through means such as Mandarin language instruction, while discouraging or prohibiting the use of the native languages of these ethnic groups.

While it can be said that the central government’s fear of dissent by the population of Xinjiang has motivated their policies of religious intolerance and discouragement of native languages, these policies are most likely encourage anti-social activities on the part of the Uyghur populace. The statement that the ruling party enacts more oppressive policies when it feels threatened reigns very true in this instance.

As the elite of the CCP reacts to its fears of separatists in Xinjiang, it only encourages more resentment from the people it fears. In 2009, a small percentage of the Uyghur population of Xinjiang reacted to the oppressive policies of the CCP, attacking members of the Han ethnic group in Xinjiang, and encouraging protests in cities as far away as Beijing.

While the CCP realizes the legitimacy of this threat, CCP policymakers will likely find it difficult to address the long-term separatist risks as long as Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang perceive the PRC policy in Xinjiang as unjust and oppressive.

China perceives its actions in Xinjiang as both a means of population management and as a national security strategy.

The same goes for the population of Tibet. Oppressive policies and omnipresent surveillance creates a sense of inequality for residents. The separatist sentiments that exists in both Xinjiang and Tibet will only grow larger as Beijing attempts to oppress the population through harsher means.

Affirmative Action With Chinese Characteristics?

While the government’s repressive tactics are well-documented in both Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing has stepped up its use of “soft-power” in both regions. Alongside the discouragement of the use of local languages in favor of Mandarin in schools, Beijing has encouraged Tibetans and Uyghur students and young people with education opportunities, offering them disproportionate acceptance rates to state universities, similar to Affirmative Action programs in the United States.

Dissimilar to the programs in the United States, China’s were conceived to assimilate a potentially separatist population into a constructed national culture, rather than to correct a historical discrimination and injustice. In short, China perceives its version of “affirmative action” as both a means of population management and as a national security strategy.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Biggest Fears are Separatism and an Economic Crisis was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sasna Tsrer, the gunmen behind a bloody 2016 rebellion, are forming a political party and positioning themselves as allies of the new government.

Among liberals, Sasna Tsrer may have the reputation of being a group of violent radicals, but in Armenia’s flamboyant political culture, its leader Jirair Sefilian presents a markedly sober image.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a young liberal democrat, recently threatened to smash his opponents against the wall. The leader of the second-largest faction in Parliament, oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, is a former world arm-wrestling champion who keeps a private zoo with lions. His party chair, Naira Zohrabyan, recently wore a Dolce & Gabbana dress in a farfalle pasta print to the floor of parliament. In Armenia, politics is one the most popular forms of entertainment, on par with football and Bollywood.

In this environment, Sefilian’s self-disciplined figure stands apart. The Lebanese-born military-commander-turned-opposition-figure is the leader of Armenia’s newest political party, Sasna Tsrer. The party takes its name from one of the most notorious episodes in Armenia’s recent history: the 2016 drama in which a group of armed men close to Sefilianseized a police station in Yerevan and held officers hostage; several were killed.

Belying that violent heritage, however, Sefilian himself presents a calm, measured image. He is soft-spoken, and, outside of TV studios – where he appears in a formal suit and white shirt – his sense of fashion can best be described as normcore, a “dad style” channeling deep indifference to all things sartorial.

On TV, Sefilian has two modes: When he speaks about the former ruling regime of presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan – his sworn enemies – he is serious, but never raises his voice. When interviewers ask about his own views and plans, he responds with a wry half-smile.

His plans now include leaving his direct-action days behind and running for office. Sasna Tsrer intends to hold its founding convention on September 29, after which it will formally file the paperwork to become a registered political party. It is a development that would have been impossible to imagine before April, when massive street protests led to Sargsyan stepping down after 10 years in office, and propelled Pashinyan into power.

What significance Sasna Tsrer will have is up for debate. Sefilian and his allies point to fundraising success, fueled by small donors, and a recent, enthusiastic town hall meeting in the city of Martuni, to indicate that they are poised to be the second-leading political force in the country behind Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. “Even our worst enemies consider us number two,” said Garo Yegnukian, a lawyer and activist who is also one of Sasna Tsrer’s leaders.

But others are skeptical. “I think they’re overestimating themselves,” said Mikayel Zolyan, a Yerevan-based political analyst. “It’s not 2016 anymore, when they enjoyed popular support. I don’t expect them to get more than 5 to 10 percent of the vote” in upcoming parliamentary elections.

But Zolyan added that the emergence of Sasna Tsrer as a political party still portends significant political shifts in Armenia. “First, it’s always better to coopt hardliners into the system then leave them out of it,” he said. “Also, Sasna Tsrer brands itself as a force defending Armenia’s sovereignty, and that includes standing up to Russia. This can be convenient for Pashinyan. There’s already a number of pro-Russian actors. [..] If there’s no counterweight, Pashinyan could be forced to make concessions to Moscow.” With Sasna Tsrer in parliament, though, “Pashinyan can become a centrist figure.”

Hrachya Arzumanian, a Stepanakert-based political scientist, echoed this forecast. During negotiations with Russia, Pashinyan “can always point out that there are more radical political forces,” Arzumanian wrote on Facebook. “That gives the new prime minister room for maneuver. He wouldn’t need to advocate radical views and approaches. Sasna Tsrer will do that.”

From Beirut to Karabakh

Sefilian was born in Lebanon in 1967 and fought with Armenian militias in the civil war there. Sefilian still speaks Western Armenian, the dialect spoken among descendants of the Armenians who lived in what is now Turkey; Eastern Armenian is the language spoken in modern Armenia. To Yerevantsis, the dialect sounds like a Southern U.S. drawl to a Londoner: comprehensible, yet deeply foreign. (As a compromise, he writes Facebook posts in Eastern Armenian.)

In 1990, as part of the nationalist group Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Dashnaktsutyun, he went to Armenia, which was just embarking on a war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. With his military experience from Lebanon he served as a military trainer, teaching soldiering basics to local volunteers.

That war, ultimately won by the Armenian side, produced the first generation of post-Soviet Armenian political leaders: former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan were both prominent Karabakh leaders. Even the current Armenian Church leader, Catholicos Karekin II, as a young bishop helped raise funds (and, some say, supply arms) for the cause.

While his former comrades-in-arms were capitalizing on their credentials and concentrating power, Sefilian found himself in a new struggle, this time a political one. “I never wanted to be a politician. I don’t enjoy politics,” Sefilian told Eurasianet in an interview. “But at some point I realized that the country needs people like me to go into politics.”

After Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire in 1994, Sefilian returned to Beirut. He was unable to return to Armenia for several years because the country’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, had banned the ARF. In 1997 he made it back and upon his return he served briefly as a brigade commander in the de facto armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Armenian government was actively working on a peace deal with Baku, which would include the return to Azerbaijan of some territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that the Armenian forces also had seized during the war. Sefilian acted as spoiler, coordinating two initiatives: Defense of the Liberated Territories and Union of Armenian Volunteers. Both sought to mobilize Armenian society against any compromise. “We made our concession to Azerbaijan in 1994, when we stopped our offensive on its request. Otherwise that state would have already fallen apart,” he said at the time. He coordinated efforts to settle the territories in question with ethnic Armenians. He also tried to mobilize Armenians inJavakheti, a region in Georgia with a large ethnic-Armenian population.

Together with a close circle of like-minded nationalist activists, in 2012 Sefilian created a movement they called Founding Parliament, holding hundreds of rallies and traveling the country demanding regime change. While still focused on Karabakh, he also opposed Sargsyan’s domestic agenda, protesting widespread voter fraud and corruption. Successive governments responded by cracking down, and Sefilian has on and off spent more than three and a half of the last 12 years in prison.

Hardline figure

Throughout more than a decade of political activism, Sefilian had repeatedly said that he opposed the use of force. But his long years of nonviolent activism gained him only scant support in the country.

That all changed in July 2016. In April of that year, aresumption of fighting with Azerbaijan resulted in the deaths of 94 Armenian soldiers, including volunteers and reservists. Armenian forces lost three square miles of territory – insignificant strategically, but as the first substantial Azerbaijani advance since 1994, it was a psychological blow. Sefilian accused Sargsyan of downplaying the defeat. (The president said the lost territories were “of no strategic importance.”)

Sargsyan responded by cracking down. Sefilian was arrested and sentenced to over a decade in prison on charges of planning a coup and possessing illegal weapons. Pashinyan, at the time an opposition member of parliament, called the ruling a “a bogus verdict” and argued that Sefilian was a political prisoner.

A month later, an armed group of Sefilian allies calling itself Sasna Tsrer – “the Daredevils of Sassoun,” after an ancient Armenian epic – seized a police precinct on the outskirts of Yerevan. The gunmen demanded that Sargsyan step down. In the scuffle, they allegedly killed three policemen. The group admits to killing only one, saying he had opened fire after disregarding their calls to drop his weapon. (Last week, the father of one of the other officers said that he believed it was the police who killed his son, and not Sasna Tsrer.)

Although the gunmen claimed to act independently from Sefilian, they were known to be close to him and tried to negotiate his release while holding policemen hostage. As a result, his political allies suffered. “That was a weak argument, and the regime used the occasion to arrest me,” Andrias Ghukasyan, one of Sefilian’s former allies and founder of the Armenian Constructive Party, told Eurasianet.

During the crisis, Ghukasyan spoke at rallies in support of the takeover. At one rally, he said that “Yerevan showed that our society supports Sasna Tsrer’s demands. [… Sasna Tsrer] know what they are doing and how they’re doing it. […] Don’t forget who they are. Don’t worry, trust them. I trust them.”

In an interview, however, he expressed regret at his cooperation. Ghukasyan, along with dissidents Paruyr Hayrikyan and Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovannisian had made an alliance in 2015 to try to stop a controversial rewriting of the constitution, but they pledged to oppose the government without violence.

“The police precinct takeover was a violation of our agreement,” he told Eurasianet. Ghukasyan spent nearly two years in prison as a result. “National-revolutionary forces of a particular Middle-Eastern blend are always ready to sacrifice themselves, but also to sacrifice others.”

Today Sefilian embraces the legacy of the takeover. He is confident the gunmen eventually will be acquitted, arguing that their actions qualify as “rebellion against tyranny and oppression” as envisaged in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Asked about those who died as a result, he has said, “Serzh Sargsyan is guilty of bloodshed. This tragedy happened because of the oppressive system he built.”

Uncompromising positions

Since Pashinyan came to power, Sasna Tsrer’s leadership has consistently endorsed the new government and offered full cooperation. But they also have called on Pashinyan to dismiss the constitution, dissolve parliament and form a new provisional government, of which they would be part. In terms of geopolitics, Sasna Tsrer aims to launch a sort of Armexit, or “the liberation of Armenia from Russian colonial rule,” withdrawing Armenia from Russia-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. “Russia can’t be our strategic ally. We can’t be allies. Armenians should understand that,” Sefilian said.

The group instead advocates for a strategic alliance with the West. Armenia should “ally itself with the United States and the West and regain its traditional role as a bridge-mediator for Iran and the region,” the group’s current four leaders said in a 2017 statement. They, however, said they opposed Armenia joining NATO.

The movement also holds irredentist views about Armenia’s borders. Sefilian said that he envisages an Armenia that includes the territories of Nakhichevan – an exclave of Azerbaijan that once had a large Armenian population – and eastern Turkey, or “Western Armenia,” the territories formerly inhabited by Armenians until the genocide of 1915.

Sefilian says that is a long-term goal, but some of his erstwhile allies aren’t so sure. Sasna Tsrer “cannot openly promote launching a new war, so they try to mask their rhetoric in order to avoid looking like the war party,” Ghukasyan said.

“Sasna Tsrer fits into the framework of populist parties on the rise in Europe, sometimes presenting a mix of leftist and nationalist ideas, but in general right-wing,” said Zolyan, the political analyst in Yerevan.

War hero, illegal alien

One significant obstacle to Sefilian’s political ambitions: his citizenship.

Born a Lebanese citizen, he has applied for Armenian citizenship repeatedly since 2003, but says his applications are always denied without explanation. His applications for permanent residency also have been denied, and technically he lives in Armenia illegally. He believes the authorities have been waiting for him to leave the country and then bar him from re-entering. So he hasn’t left Armenia in 18 years.

Sefilian reapplied for citizenship on August 1. In his application, he asked for it to be granted retroactively, overturning previous presidents’ decisions. “Armenian law doesn’t include a provision on issuing citizenship retroactively – but it doesn’t bar authorities from doing so, either,” Yegnukian said.

The decision will be crucial to his political career – one needs to be an Armenian citizen and permanent resident for at least four years to run for parliament. Thus, any outcome of Sefilian’s petition will have political ramifications. Pashinyan has not been shy about awarding Armenian citizenship to other prominent ethnic Armenians, including the Canadian-Armenian actress-director power couple Arsinee Khanjian and Atom Egoyan.

Neither an ally nor a competitor

Pashinyan and Sefilian had a common enemy in the old regime and have made a number of cooperating gestures over the years. In 2008, when Pashinyan first took the national stage to lead protests against fraudulent elections, Sefilian supported his cause in an open letter from jail. But the two have never directly collaborated.

“It was always a respectful attitude from both sides as far as I can remember,” Sefilian said. “We didn’t publicly disagree in those years, but rather tried to understand each other.”

When the two disagreed, it was about tactics rather than principles, Sefilian said. “There are two ways to make change – through elections and through civil disobedience,” Sefilian said. “We supported the second option. Nikol [Pashinyan] always tried to convince us that no, it’s possible through elections. Time proved that it was only possible through civil disobedience. Fortunately, Nikol succeeded in it.”

Sefilian was released this June with the help of a bond signed by thirteen members of parliament, including one member of Pashinyan’s party. Sefilian said he has met Pashinyan once since his release, and there have been a few occasions when he had to call the prime minister’s aides.

At least one vocal Sasna Tsrer supporter now has a high-level government job: David Sanasaryan led rallies in support of the group in 2016 and spent a month in jail as a result. He now heads the State Oversight Service, a watchdog that reports to the prime minister’s office.

“We have a constructive relationship,” Sefilian said of Pashinyan. “But we hope to deepen our relationships. We have to be together until there is a new, legitimate National Assembly.”

He also lobbied for a Sasna Tsrer role in the new cabinet. “We’re ready to be engaged,” Sefilian said, adding that the group envisions itself in the “power bloc” that includes the military, police, and the National Security Service. Another Sasna Tsrer leader, Colonel Varujan Avetisyan, served in different roles at the Ministry of Defense from 1994 to 2013, including as deputy chief of the ministry’s Defense Policy Center.

A spokesperson for Civil Contract told Eurasianet that “the question of collaboration hasn’t been discussed.” An op-ed in TASS, the Russian state news agency, suggested that if Sasna Tsrer joined the cabinet, it could be interpreted as “a move against Russia, which would be followed by an immediate response from Moscow.”

“The fact that he hasn’t stretched out his hand means that he’s afraid of the competition,” said Yegnukian, referring to Pashinyan.

Pashinyan is proving to be a troublesome ally. Not only is he reluctant to engage with new partners, but he has alienated some in his parliamentary faction, who in response have publicly criticized him and hinted that they may withdraw their support.

“Pashinyan now sees other political leaders as not worthy of partnering with him, as marginal figures,” Karen Aghekian, an editor for Hamatext, an online magazine covering Armenian politics, told Eurasianet.

But in the case that Pashinyan decides to build a coalition, it’s still highly unlikely he would invite Sasna Tsrer, Aghekian said. “I don’t think that of all parties, Nikol would associate himself with them. First, they’re vehemently anti-Russian, and some voters reject them based on the bloodshed,” he said, noting that Pashinyan had crusaded against Kocharyan for his use of violence in breaking up protests in 2008, making it tricky to fully embrace Sasna Tsrer.

Political scientist Zolyan agreed: “I think cooperation with Nikol is unrealistic. [Pashinyan] has little to gain from such a partnership.”

With or without Pashinyan, Sasna Tsrer’s leaders say they’re strategizing for the long term. Their headquarters in downtown Yerevan is open for visitors. One recent visitor, a Western official, said the bustling office “felt like Smolny in 1917.” The Smolny Institute was the Bolshevik headquarters during the Russian Revolution.

Armenia’s Hardliners Try Going Mainstream was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be facing off against his political opponent, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership election on September 20. Already, five of the seven intra-party factions of the LDP have endorsed Abe over Ishiba.

The support of the LDP members will practically guarantee his reelection as their party leader and, by extension, another term as Prime Minister due to the LDP’s significant majority in the Diet.

Despite this likely political victory, one of Abe’s top priorities for his upcoming term will almost certainly remain unfulfilled. Abe has long desired to revise the 1947 Japanese constitution in order to extend Japan’s military defense capabilities.

The threat of North Korea, despite its claim to denuclearize; China’s rising aggression; as well as the uncertainty of the United States-Japan security alliance under President Trump, are all strong reasons for Japan to take a stronger stance on national security.

However, the lack of public support and trust in Abe, from cronyism scandals, neo-nationalist ideology, and an unaccommodating 2020 deadline he set for the revision, will ultimately hinder Abe’s ability to advance such a divisive political initiative.

Abe is pushing for the revision of Article 9 of the constitution, which would officially recognize Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) as the country’s military. The proposal would first have to obtain a two-thirds supermajority in the Diet, and then a simple majority in a national referendum to become law.

Although Abe has the supermajority in both chambers of the Diet, gaining the necessary support from the public in a national referendum remains unlikely. A Kyodo News survey, conducted before Japan’s Constitution Day on May 3, 2018, found that 61 percent of voters oppose constitutional revision under the Abe administration. However, 58 percent believe that amending the constitution sometime in the future is “necessary” or “somewhat necessary.”

A year of scandals has damaged public opinion towards Abe’s government.

Public wariness towards Abe and his administration will make constitutional reform extremely difficult to achieve during his premiership. Cronyism scandals throughout the past year have also diverted attention away from Abe’s proposal and damaged public trust in his administration.

The Moritomo Scandal made headlines when Abe and his wife, Akie, were tied to a suspicious government land deal for an ultraconservative kindergarten. This scandal was amplified when it was revealed that the Finance Ministry falsified documents related to the deal and erased dozens of references to both Shinzo and Akie Abe.

The prime minister was also accused of favoritism for approving Kake Gakuen, a veterinarian school run by a close friend, for a special deregulation project. A Mainichi Shimbun poll found that 75 percent of respondents were not convinced by Abe’s explanations concerning both cases.

Abe’s political affiliations and neo-nationalist ideologies also give pause to potential supporters. Abe is a special advisor to the ultra-nationalist group Nippon Kaigi, a parliamentary league that advances the restoration of imperial values through historical revisionism, remilitarization, and veneration of the emperor.

Abe’s association with this ideology reinforces the public’s concern with possessing a military, as it glorifies a more belligerent form of statecraft and could incite conflict with China and South Korea over historical wounds.

Abe’s self-imposed deadline underestimates the time needed to win over a wary public.

In the end, Abe’s unrealistic timeline might be the most damaging aspect of his campaign for constitutional revisionism. At a Nippon Kaigi affiliated gathering in 2017, Abe called for 2020 to mark a “significant rebirth of Japan” in the ratification of a revised Constitution.

However, the distractions of an upcoming imperial transition, as well as the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo limits the window of opportunity to implement such a divisive and time-consuming campaign. Ultimately, the relatively short time frame Abe has to start the revision process underestimates the time needed to win over the public.

Ishiba, his rival for LDP leadership, is also a proponent of constitutional revision. He goes even further than Abe’s proposal, advocating for Japan to have the right to use its military outside of merely defensive measures, including the right to go to war.

However, during an August news conference, Ishiba argued, “We should ask the public to vote for or against something only after they fully understand the issue.” Instead of instilling a sense of urgency into revising the constitution, he highlights the importance of patience, transparency, and information to win over a reluctant public.

Ultimately, the public is not ready for such a dramatic change.

An Asahi Shimbun public survey from earlier this month found that only 5 percent of respondents who are in support of Abe want to see a debate on constitutional revisionism during the campaign. Instead, economic policy and social security remain the public’s biggest concerns.

It is imperative that Abe first addresses public unease and awareness with the revision process before moving forward. Without public accommodation, he will not garner enough support to win in a national referendum.

Prime Minister Abe is considered ‘teflon’ for surviving numerous setbacks and unpopular policies with both the public and his political party. Currently, 65 percent of LDP supporters prefer Abe over Ishiba in the election.

Yet, Ishiba’s realistic perception of public wariness and historical sensitivities surrounding the revision should not be discounted. Abe would be wise to advance Ishiba’s more accommodating timeline rather than attempting a last ditch effort to score a political victory under his administration.

Winning the LDP Election Won’t Win Shinzo Abe Constitutional Revision was originally published on Global Security Review.

This story was originally published by Eurasianet.

Amid a period of heightened tensions between Yerevan and Moscow, Armenia has charged the head of the Russia-led security bloc with the crime of “subverting public order.”

Yuriy Khachaturov, the head of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was freed on bail after a late-night court appearance past midnight on July 28. He has been charged as part of an investigation by Armenia’s Special Investigative Service into a bloody crackdown on protesters in 2008. Former president Robert Kocharyan was arrested on July 28 as part of the same investigation, also charged with “subverting public order.”

Armenian officials emphasized that the charges have only to do with Khachaturov’s role in the 2008 events – he was the head of the Yerevan military garrison at the time of the crackdown – and had nothing to do with the CSTO.

“This is purely an internal process, within the framework of a criminal case under investigation in Armenia involving an Armenian citizen,” said Tigran Balayan, spokesman for Armenia’s foreign minister.

Khachaturov was named secretary-general of the CSTO last year, only the second person to hold the position, taking over from longtime head and high-ranking Russian intelligence officer Nikolay Bordyuzha.

Armenia has the right to choose a new secretary-general. “Secretary generals are appointed from member states in alphabetical [order],” Valery Semerikov, a deputy CSTO secretary-general, told Armenian news site Tert.am. “That authority is vested with Armenia until January 1, 2020.”

Armenia was moving to find a replacement for Khachaturov. “Placing great importance on the authority and ensuring uninterrupted work of the organization, Armenia has proposed to the CSTO countries to start the procedure of replacing the secretary-general,” Balayan said. “Armenia is loyal to its responsibilities to strengthen and increase the power of the CSTO.”

It’s not clear how important the CSTO secretary-general is now that it is no longer in the hands of Russia. Khachaturov was a very low-profile leader compared to Bordyuzha, who regularly spoke to the press and was one of Russia’s most prominent foreign policy voices.

Armenia’s new leadership has a delicate relationship with the CSTO. On the one hand, it is a conservative organization and has made an explicit priority of trying to prevent “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space; Pashinyan’s “Velvet Revolution” is a color revolution in pretty much every respect except Russia’s decision not to oppose it head-on.

On the other hand, the CSTO is a key element of Russia’s security guarantee for Armenia, which will be crucial in the case that a large-scale war breaks out with Azerbaijan. If that happens before 2020, Yerevan will be choosing the person who – at least nominally – will be managing the alliance’s response.

The reactions from Russia to Khachaturov’s legal troubles were mixed.

The Russian foreign ministry issued a statement commenting only on the bureaucratic next steps, without commenting on any political ramifications: “In accordance with the procedural rules of the CSTO, the Armenian side itself must officially initiate the recall of its citizen from the post of secretary-general of the CSTO, if such a decision has been made in Yerevan.”

But a “high-ranking diplomatic source” told the Russian news agency Tass that Balayan’s statement was “unprofessional.”

“To hear something like this is especially strange considering that the recent changes in Armenia did not affect the working of the foreign policy apparatus, which not long ago presented to the CSTO Khachaturov’s candidacy, and most importantly knows very well the procedure” of replacing a secretary-general, the Tass source said.

Fyodor Lukyanov, the leading Russian foreign affairs analyst, told the newspaper Vedomosti that Khachaturov’s legal issues were purely related to Armenia and so “no one will interfere.” But military analyst Ruslan Pukhov told the paper that “the arrest of the CSTO secretary-general would undoubtedly lead to a decrease in trust in Russian-Armenian relations, including in the military sphere.”

For those Russians inclined to see the worst in Armenia’s new government, this was just more evidence of Yerevan’s untrustworthiness. “Imagine that, for example, Norway without warning put on trial the secretary-general of NATO. But with Russia, something very similar has happened – Armenia has charged the current head of the CSTO, the most important military-political bloc for Moscow,” wrote the news site Vzglyad.

“Pashinyan’s claims that he wants to continue the policy of good neighborly relations with Russia are not true,” the analyst Sergey Markov told Vzglyad. “We see that he speaks about friendship, but persecutes political figures oriented toward Russia. The persecution of an official figure in the CSTO is a manifestation of bad relations with the Russian leadership.”

Looking on the bright side, Markov concluded that “losing” Armenia wouldn’t be that bad for Russia. “It’s good that Russia has no vital interests in Armenia. Even if Pashinyan invites American soldiers to Armenia I’m not sure that it would be a significant blow to Russian interests.”

Armenian Investigators Charge Head of Russia-Led Security Bloc with “Subverting Public Order” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether through denying journalists the right to cover a story without security implications, or restricting reporting using scare tactics, there is a deeper meaning behind each time a government cracks down on journalists.

In attacking media outlets, the officials in question confirm that the story in question is worth covering. That is not to say it won’t be dangerous. Russia, in particular, has a long history of politically-motivated murders of journalists.

Perhaps the best-known is Anna Politkovskaya. As a reporter, she covered corruption within Russia and revealed much of the torture and the brutal warfare tactics employed by the Russian government and military in Chechnya. After multiple threats, being jailed, and forced into exile on various occasions, she was assassinated in 2006, in the elevator of her apartment building in central Moscow.

In doing so and without words, the Kremlin revealed its willingness to use forceful tactics in response to its decreasing patience for journalists covering controversial topics such as the Beslan crisis, the Moscow theater hostage situation, the Chechen wars, and the Ryazan apartment bombings.

Journalists will continue to be targeted and assassinated throughout the former Soviet Union.

In July 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered in the Central African Republic while investigating the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary group linked to the Kremlin. The Wagner Group is known to operate throughout the world in countries like Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

There is not yet confirmation that their deaths were linked to covering this organization. However, all of the journalists worked for the Investigation Control Center, a Russian news organization financed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky is a former Russian oil oligarch who was run out of his country by Russian President Putin after being accused of fraud, embezzlement and money laundering. The Wagner Group is known to be associated with Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, both of whom are Russian oligarchs with close ties to Putin.

Russia isn’t the only post-Soviet state where journalists are under threat.

Thus far in 2018, the deaths of two journalists, Maksim Borodin and Sergei Grachyov, have been confirmed. Although police claim that Borodin died after falling out of a window, his colleagues assert his death was due to his reporting on corruption.

In 2017, there were four journalists reportedly killed after writing critical articles about corruption. Six deaths may not seem extreme. However, all six deaths show that corruption is a dangerous topic to cover.

Although Russia tends to be the immediate enemy in the eyes of the free press, it is by no means the only country with this systemic restriction. Belarus, a former part of the Soviet Union, recently detained at least 18 journalists.

Authorities accused them of unlawfully obtaining information, searching the offices of independent news agencies in Minsk. This kind of action not only shuts down some of the independent reporting available in Belarus but also creates a hostile environment for journalists entering or leaving the country.

What is Motivating the Crackdowns in Russia and Belarus?

As with every action taken by an administration publicly sanctioned or not, there is always a reason behind it. In other words, there is more at play than a simple crackdown on journalists in Russia and Belarus.

These attacks and threats are happening for a reason. In Belarus, a new election looms on the horizon for Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and anti-regime reporting cannot be tolerated.

When examining some of the recent events in Russia, observers note an uptick in unofficial military actions abroad in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria. In order that the Kremlin prevent the discovery of unpleasant truths and avoid embarrassment, these areas cannot be independently covered.

In fact, Putin recently created a patriotic directorate in the military to increase “moral and political unity.” This is reminiscent of political actions taken in the Soviet Union, highlighting the need for Russia’s government to maintain an official line that cannot be challenged.

The security implications can be complex and multifaceted when journalists are targeted.

On one hand, the daily security for journalists and foreigners suspected on hostile action is immediately under threat. For the state itself, the crackdown represents that the state feels its own position is under threat. However, an objective reading of the situation might show that in states like Russia and Belarus, the maintenance of the current power dynamic is imperative.

The cycle of corruption in Russia is controlled by oligarchs, who in turn are given opportunities by President Putin that increase their own wealth. In doing so, Putin reinforces the belief that only with himself as president will this system continue to sustain itself.

Journalists who threaten exposing and destroying this system are seen as a threat. Observers should be mindful to look at more than the detentions and deaths of reporters, but rather look into what it was they could have exposed.

The Escalating Crackdown on Journalists in Russia and Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

That is not to say that foreign threats are not severe and ongoing. On July 19, Putin warned NATO “against cultivating closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia,” claiming it would have negative consequences for member states if they continued on that journey.

This may not be an idle threat from Kremlin, as it seems to have had an impact on the foreign policies of other countries, particularly that of the United States.

The following day, the United States announced that it would provide over $200 million in aid to Ukraine, to support training programs, operational capabilities, and increased security needs. With this latest string of funding, the U.S. will have provided over $1 billion to Ukraine since 2014.

Why the sudden movement of funds? Ukraine recently adopted a Law on National Security, allowing its armed forces improved interoperability with NATO. On July 23, ships of NATO’s Maritime Group 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 also entered the port of Odessa as part of the Partnership for Peace program.

The most significant security threats to Ukraine are of a domestic nature.

While the foreign threats facing Ukraine are significant, addressing daily security concerns such as access to fresh water and safety in everyday life is essential. Access to clean water may be at risk in the coming month, making this an issue of critical importance.

Dniproazot, a chemical plant owned by Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennady Bogolyubov, ceased operations in July due to increased gas prices. Dniproazot creates liquid chlorine, which is used by more than 170 water treatment and supply plants in Ukraine to clean water.

Without adequate supplies of liquid chlorine, Ukraine’s water filtration systems will be forced to employ alternative methods of filtration. Experts say that in some cities like Kropyvnytsky and Vinnytsia, these systems can only use stored chlorine and filter water for residents for 7 to 10 days.

Ukraine’s Association of Water Enterprises is negotiating with Dniproazot. Thus far, they have not reached an agreement. Building a new factory would cost money and time that many Ukrainian cities don’t have, and importing liquid chlorine from abroad would face its own logistical and cost challenges.

Other cities like Kiev are claiming that they have enough chlorine but face their other issues that threaten to erode internal stability. Approximately one-third of the city’s residents have not had access to hot water due to disagreements between Ukrainian state-owned companies and oligarchs.

Hate crimes are on the rise throughout Ukraine.

Beyond access to clean water, Ukraine is also facing a rise in hate crimes particularly towards their Roma population. Over the last two months, at least four attacks on Roma have been documented.

S14, the youth arm of right-wing party Svoboda, often takes part in violent acts towards the Roma. Often, these involve throwing stones and starting fires in their camps. Despite these acts, there have been no arrests.

Some such as Interior Minister Arsen Avakov claim that attacks on the Roma come from Russia. However, much of the internal disorder comes from right-wing Ukrainians. Hate crimes and trouble with access to clean water are two domestic concerns that Ukrainians must take time to address.

Although international attention towards Ukraine is more often paid towards the encroaching Russian threat, internal matters that have to do with infrastructure, public health, and security require increased attention.

Foreign Threats to Ukraine’s National Security Distract from Internal Disorder was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, setting the stage for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e., for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

The worst-case scenario for Venezuela

A prolonged economic crisis and food shortages, coupled with rapidly escalating violence and unchecked arms proliferation could lead to a civil war.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or a decrease in public anger, Dr. McCoy says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Instead, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some fundamental differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

How will the events in Venezuela affect the region geopolitically?

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a fragile government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence. Notably, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

A negotiated political settlement is the best-case scenario for ending Venezuelan political and economic upheaval

Dr. McCoy discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that specific political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, the Venezuelan government would have to agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy needs an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a significant effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.”

There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it has granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, transitional justice typically provides reduced sentences for abusers of human rights, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity.

Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. An interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela has never before occurred, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Venezuela’s Economic Collapse & the Rise of Authoritarianism was originally published on Global Security Review.

Fewer than half of Venezuela’s registered voters participated in the South American country’s May 20 election, punishing a government they don’t support by simply not voting.

Nevertheless, Nicolás Maduro was re-elected as president of Venezuela by a wide margin over his strongest opponent, Henri Falcón.

Maduro received 6.2 million votes, or 68 percent of total votes cast. Falcón followed with 1.9 million, and a third-place contender, evangelical minister Javier Bertuchi, received 925,000 votes.

Few Venezuelans, with the possible exception of Falcón, expected otherwise. Most opposition parties boycotted the May 20 election, which they said was rigged. Venezuela’s parliament declared it an illegal “electoral drill” and asked the international community to ignore the results.

Democratic fraud

As in recent elections, the ruling Socialist Party used all the power of its increasingly authoritarian regime to tip the May 20 election in Maduro’s favor. For months, the regime coerced citizens to register as Socialist Party members, traded food for votes and blacklisted opposition candidates.

Even so, it is difficult for me to believe – both as a political scientist and as a Venezuelan citizen – that amid a profound political, humanitarian and economic crisis, more than half of Venezuelans voting supported Maduro.

Since taking office in 2013, the president has overseen the country’s descent into chaos. According to national surveys, Maduro’s popularity is at its lowest ever. Just 18 percent to 25 percent of Venezuelans support his administration.

I do not know whether the election results announced by the regime-controlled Venezuelan electoral authority correctly reflect the ballots cast. Falcón has challenged the tally, saying it “lacks legitimacy.”

Authoritarianism in the 21st century

Certainly, Venezuela’s was not a competitive election. Many believe Maduro’s re-election constitutes a fraud against democratic principles. Nearly 50 countries worldwide – including the United States and almost every Latin American nation – have declared Venezuela’s election results illegitimate.

In response, President Donald Trump imposed new sanctions limiting how U.S. companies and citizens can do business with Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela.

Only Russia, China, Cuba and 13 other nations have recognized the election results.

Maduro will start his second term, which beings in January 2019, quite isolated. Despite promises to work with the opposition, he is vilified domestically as an autocrat who seized power illegally.

But Maduro is not alone in the world. In recent years, Venezuela has rebuilt its strategic global alliances, giving clear preference – in the form of oil diplomacy and insider access to Latin American politics – to countries that share Maduro’s worldview and governing style.

The regime’s relationships with the authoritarian governments of Russia, China, Turkey, Bolivia, and Cuba – all of which congratulated Maduro on his win – are strong.

These countries’ leaders practice a new kind of authoritarianism. In the 21st century, dictatorships do not necessarily take on the classic form – that of Mao, Lenin or the Latin American military juntas of the 1970s and 1980s.

Instead, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the like often maintain a democratic facade. They hold elections – but they do so under corrupt conditions, ensuring that they and their parties stay in power.

They decry capitalism and imperialism, claiming to rule in the name of the people. Meanwhile, they amass great personal wealth and power.

Venezuela’s Maduro, who enriched his inner circle while the country starved, is now indisputably part of this crowd.

El Chavismo

Venezuela’s path to dictatorship has been decades in the making.

In 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected president based on promises to transform Venezuelan society. His movement, “El Chavismo,” enacted deep and progressive changes in the country.

Throughout most of his 15 years in office, Chávez enjoyed high international oil prices, which made Venezuela rich – and bought him significant popular goodwill. His government spent heavily on social programs, funding public education, poverty reduction, and cultural programs.

But Chávez, a populist and ardent Cuba admirer, also eroded Venezuela’s democratic institutions and consolidated power in the executive. He nationalized oil production, telecommunications companies, and other Venezuelan industries. He assailed the “bourgeoisie” and declared globalization to be imperialist.

Over three administrations, his government eroded civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech and independence of the media.

Strategies to maintain power

Oil prices have fallen consistently during Maduro’s reign, cutting government revenue and ending Venezuela’s lavish, Chávez-style lavish government spending. Maduro’s mishandling of the national economy led to widespread poverty and mass civil unrest starting in 2015. His regime brutally repressed protests.

These, in part, are the reasons Maduro could not risk a legitimate, democratic election on May 20.

The country is now firmly in his command. The military – potentially the only domestic force that could destabilize him – seems to be under control. Maduro recently imprisoned a former general, Rodríguez Torres, whom he accused of conspiring against his regime. The regime also arrested several other colonels for the same alleged crime.

Maduro’s next step could be to change Venezuela’s Constitution, transforming the country from a democratic republic to a Cuba-style “communal state,” in which state-controlled committees decide the country’s future and control most aspects of society.

Maduro may even run for office again, or hold regular elections, as 21st-century dictators do. But they won’t be free, fair or democratic. I suspect he will be in power for a long time to come.

Venezuela is Now a Dictatorship was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of former Armenian President and Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian’s resignation on April 23, a shift in of policy might have been expected.

At the meeting, Pashinian not only supported maintaining the current Russian-Armenian relationship but also suggested a “new impulse” for political and trade relations.

Interestingly, Pashinian does not precisely have a history of supporting Russian-Armenian relations. His party, the Yelk Coalition, submitted legislation last year to leave the Eurasian Union. Further, he has spoken out against the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In response to these claims, Pashinian has claimed that now that he has accepted the prime minister position, his focus is on the country rather than maintaining loyalty with his old party positions.

Where did the revolution in Armenia come from?

The demonstrations against Sarkisian were fueled by a number of factors, including electoral fraud in 2008, changes in pensions and municipal services, a hike in energy bills in 2014, Sarkisian’s re-election as president in 2013 and his subsequent run towards prime minister this year.

Although there was no suggestion that a protest bringing such a radical change in government would come, within weeks, Sarkisian had resigned. This is primarily because there were widespread protests, including more than 100,000 people gathered in Yerevan’s main square the day before his resignation.

Perhaps more blatant Russian interference was expected, as Pashinian actually praised Russia’s “balanced position… it was a very constructive position. And I think this is highly valued not just by our government but in Armenian society in general.”

Where are new Russian-Armenian relations headed?

Pashinian’s new government position on crucial matters such as the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory are as of yet unknown. Despite this populist win in Armenia that was very much sought by the people, right now the country remains at a crossroads.

Pashinian has stated he wants to work with the old governing party but also fight ingrown corruption. Confrontations in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region have reached an all-time high since 1994 when more than 200 people died in April 2016. Since then, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been building up military might on both sides of the border.

The simmering conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh might prove to be one of the factors in the maintenance of the Russian-Armenian relationship. Since the beginning of the tensions, Russia has acted as Armenia’s security guarantor, providing training and weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia also has been dependent on Russia for financial aid, military development and protection in general.

Notably, in Sochi, Pashinian told Putin that he wanted Armenia to buy more Russian weaponry. So, despite this revolution against a ruler that was supported by the Kremlin – how much can really change? Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh implies that Armenia must continue to turn to Russia for regional security and assistance.

As tensions rise in the region and there are signs of Azerbaijani destabilization, will the ceasefire and uneasy peace continue to hold? Armenia’s estrangement from Azerbaijan and Turkey means that they remain dependent on Russia.

Beyond that, as this change in government continues to grow and develop, wouldn’t this be a convenient time for Azerbaijan to decide to take back some territory?

“Velvet Revolution” in Armenia Indicates a Stronger Russian-Armenian Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.

Demonstrations first erupted on April 16 after the government announced social security reforms that would raise costs for retirees and workers. When police cracked down on protesters, they unintentionally fanned the flames. By April 20, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans were taking to the streets daily to protest in cities and towns nationwide.

Ortega, a former leftist revolutionary, has moved to the right since his 2006 election. He has also centralized his power, controlling the media, restricting opposition and giving government jobs to family and friends. His wife, Rosario Murillo, was Ortega’s running mate in 2016 and is now Nicaragua’s vice president.

In 2014, Ortega abolished term limits for the presidency, with the blessing of a National Assembly stacked with loyalists.

As scholars of social conflict and regime change in Latin America, we know that authoritarian governments’ survival depends on controlling institutions and maintaining alliances with powerful forces like the military, the Church and the elite class. Nicaragua’s protest movement has imperiled Ortega’s carefully constructed coalition – perhaps fatally.

Ortega then and now

Ortega first came to power in 1979 after Nicaragua’s Sandinista revolution overthrew dictator Anastasio Somoza.

Back then, Ortega’s rise hinged on creating a broad coalition. With the support of traditional opposition parties, many business elites, students, and peasants, his Sandinista National Liberation Front moved from marginal guerrilla group to ruling party.

The Sandinista government stayed in power for 10 years, creating a socialist economy, undertaking land reform and wealth redistribution.

Ortega returned to power by winning elections in 2006 – this time with a new, right-leaning platform that espoused traditional Christian values and pro-business economic policies.

Ortega had rocky relations with the Catholic Church during the revolution. But since 2006 he has embraced both Catholic bishops and evangelical groups. Beyond religious rhetoric, he has maintained Nicaragua’s abortion ban and sought to control LGBTQ activism.

The business elite likewise struck a new bargain with Ortega when he was elected in 2006. In the 1980s, Ortega worked to seize private enterprises and redistribute farmland. Now, he works with business leaders to set Nicaragua’s economic policy and labor conditions. In turn, they have supported his regime.

For a while, this coalition held. Until recently, Ortega’s opposition was fragmented and weak. Since 2007, there have been few protests, which were usually met with violent repression.

Fractured coalition

Ortega’s unilateral announcement of the social security reforms on April 16 – a decision he made without consulting Nicaragua’s business community – ruptured the business side of this pact.

By April 20, the major business associations were calling on workers to protest the reforms.

Police repression and the perceived injustice of the social security reforms drove the Church away from Ortega, too. First, Managua Bishop Silvio Baéz said that the protesters’ cause was “just” and offered the Cathedral in Managua as a refuge for student protesters. Soon, the bishop was publicly calling for negotiation and “democratization” in Nicaragua.

Ortega’s coalition has crumbled. In contrast to the spontaneous protests, this government is so unpopular that it has to bus supporters into Managua to stage pro-regime counterdemonstrations.

The military

Suddenly, Nicaragua seems to be on the brink of momentous change. What happens next depends heavily on Nicaragua’s security forces.

Numerous studies confirm that autocratic leaders can survive mass protest movements only if police and the military are willing to continually repress protesters.

In neighboring Honduras, the right-wing president Juan Orlando Hernández, for example, has stayed in power through deadly demonstrations against his government largely because security forces have suppressed protests.

When the armed forces refuse orders, on the other hand, dictators can fall. The 2011 Tahrir Square protests toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak within weeks, once the military abandoned his regime.

Since 2007, Ortega has worked hard to make Nicaragua’s security forces personally loyal to him. He has offered military and police officers promotions, political positions and business opportunities.

These efforts partially succeeded. The police have actively stifled dissent in Nicaragua, beating and arresting protesters. They also cooperate with the Sandinista youth wing as a kind of paramilitary force.

As April’s protests expanded, Ortega appeared on television flanked by police commissioner Aminta Granera and military commander General Julio César Áviles, demonstrating that he would use military force to stay in power if necessary.

But neither the police nor soldiers seem keen to shed more blood. On April 20, the military sent troops to guard government buildings – but not to confront protesters themselves.

Around April 20, some police were actually arrested for refusing orders to crack down on protests.

Most significantly, on April 21, as massive protests roiled central Managua, police violence suddenly and completely ceased – a sign that police commissioner Granera issued an order to stand down. She was soon reported to resign.

Legacy of the revolution

This resistance to violence is not surprising given the history of Nicaragua’s security forces.

During the 1979 revolution, President Somoza’s National Guard met the Sandinistas’ popular uprising with murderous repression. It was Sandinista troops who helped sweep away the dictator and his predatory security apparatus.

Over time, these revolutionary forces took on a professional, nonpartisan and apolitical identity. Today, Nicaragua’s police and the military are considered among the most effective in Central America.

Somoza’s legacy looms large in Nicaragua. In our assessment, today’s military is far more likely countenance Ortega’s ouster than to murder Nicaraguan citizens in his defense.

Repression may be off the table, but Ortega is a wily politician. To stay in office peacefully, he’ll have to negotiate his way back into the good graces of the Catholic Church and business leaders. He has dominated Nicaragua’s political life and consolidated so much power for so long, however, that he could offer numerous concessions without losing full control.

Nicaragua protests threaten an authoritarian regime that looked like it might never fall was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Chinese Communist Party’s careful preparation for a change of direction was realized in mid-October during its national congress. The event has reshuffled the highest ranks of the party and proved a significant test of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate power.

To date, all signs indicate towards success in Xi’s efforts to strengthen his grip over the nation’s top decision making bodies. Xi has already achieved the status of core leader, not merely of the Communist Party, but of the Chinese state and military, as well.

He’s also managed to quickly promote a lot of his allies to prestigious positions in recent months. Looking ahead, as many Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members have retired,  Xi has had the chance to fill nearly all seats in the bodies with political allies.

Even more significant, party members have endorsed the addition of Xi’s philosophy of the Communist Party Constitution in the approaching Congress, allowing him to rise to the revered ranks of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong.

Xi emerged from the party’s congress with the political capital required to see a lot of his ambitious visions through. However, in the aftermath of a widespread exodus of the Communist Party’s top ranks, Xi will largely focus his attention on stabilizing the country.

The recent abolishment of the two-term requirement that previously applied to the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party is another sign of Xi’s near-total consolidation of power. This could be a sign that the central leadership, or even Xi himself, forecasts economic instability in the short- to medium-term, and decreased dissent within the upper ranks of the Chinese Communist Party would allow for Xi to respond to unrest or internal challenges without dissidence.

Xi will seem to contain any economic issues in the home or disputes overseas that may damage the image of the Chinese state, the Communist Party, or Xi’s status within both entities. This will likely consist of attempts by the central government to stabilize the Chinese financial system with its hugely leveraged companies while mitigating the possibility of domestic social and economic volatility.

The government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country could be a preemptive attempt to disperse concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

To that end, China has tried to blunt the impact of U.S. trade measures, engaged in high-level discussions with North Korea, while discouraging U.S. military actions, and implementing a temporary deal with India to end their tense border standoff.

China faces a daunting test—with its political stability in the balance.

China’s sensitive environment won’t lead its leadership to ignore economic reform entirely. The party’s newly instated officials, after all, will have to boost the public’s confidence in the authorities as the economy stays stable but weak.

Within the last several months, Beijing has combined broad-based structural reforms like the consolidation of businesses, production cuts, and the enforcement of environmental regulations, with renewed attempts to chip away at the mountain of debt crippling state-owned enterprises, public and private financial sectors, and local governments. These reforms will only accelerate in the short- to medium-term.

After three decades of record financial growth and social change, Beijing, amid slower growth and the aftermath of a debt binge, is transitioning from an investment-driven, export-based economy to one fueled by domestic consumption of goods and services.

Meeting demands for clean air, affordable houses, improved services, and continued opportunities are going to be essential for the government to maintain legitimacy and political order.

Xi’s consolidation of power could threaten an established system of steady succession, while Chinese nationalism—a force Beijing occasionally encourages support for when facing heightened foreign tensions—might prove difficult to control.

China’s economy appears to be on shaky ground, as layoffs increase and consumer debt levels and capital flight skyrocket.

Xi Jinping has suggested sending China’s increasingly debt-prone youth to work in the country, in a “Second Cultural Revolution.” Few have taken the offer, despite an abundance of promised employment opportunities in farming, food processing, and rural tourism.

Industrial manufacturing—comprising approximately 45 percent of China’s GDP—is suffering from debt–laden overproduction. Chinese corporations owe an aggregate amount equivalent to 170% of China’s GDP.

The state-supported National Institute for Finance and Development (NIFD) stated in 2017 that local and provincial governments, small businesses, and households owe an amount totaling 154 trillion yuan (almost $23 trillion)—228 percent of China’s GDP. The NFID estimates that household debt alone is projected to reach 66 trillion yuan ($8.45 trillion) within the next three years.

The government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country could be a preemptive attempt to disperse concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

Corruption, Speculation, and Money Laundering

Economists and media pundits within China have recently escalated rhetoric critical of financiers and industrial elites. Wang Xiangwei, a Beijing-based media pundit, harshly criticized speculators and financial tycoons for their prolific exploitation of regulatory loopholes and government connections.

In the South China Morning Post, Wang wrote that these speculators secured cheap loans for themselves while issuing high-risk financial products to finance projects and investments both within and outside of China.

Furthermore, China’s wealthy have begun moving massive amounts of capital abroad, under the guise of the government’s call for investing overseas—termed “going out.”

A particular tactic being used is inflating the value of one’s domestic assets and guaranteeing these funds to overseas branches of Chinese banks, which in turn provide them with overvalued loans which finance asset acquisitions abroad.

Lay-Offs and Labor Disputes

China’s massive labor force has enabled it to become the globe’s manufacturing hub, creating massive domestic economic growth. Unemployment insurance covers only about 10% of China’s 270 million migrant workers according to the Chinese Government’s statistics agency.

Lin Yanling, of the Beijing-based China Institute of Industrial Relations, says that “the size of China’s labor force has peaked, but it’s wrong to think that there will be no employment problems.” Lin said 80% of China’s workers are “in a weak position” regarding their job and wage security, adding “if the economic situation is not good, their position will become even weaker.”

Any mass-disruption for manufacturing workers, migrant workers, or other low-wage worker is bound to have consequences for internal stability that could prompt a forceful intervention by the government. This and ongoing wage stagnation are the two issues of most significant concern.

Thus, the government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country through offers of paying jobs could be a preemptive attempt to avoid internal disruption by dispersing concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

Beijing’s Balancing Act of Long-Term Stability over Short-Term Growth

According to the South China Morning Post, the root-cause of the impending economic crisis is expansive fiscal policy, increased government spending, rising property values, extremely lax monetary policies, record-high bank lending, and exploitation of regulatory loopholes.

In 2009, during the last economic crisis in China, then-Premier Wen Jiabao oversaw the disbursement of over $500 billion to stimulate the stagnating economy. This provided severely needed relief to the economy, but ongoing corruption and crony capitalism, combined with rising competition from lower-wage countries like Vietnam, have ensured that growth continued to stagnate.

Between 2010 and 2015, Chinese economic growth steadily declined from 10.5% (annual GDP growth) to 6.9%, respectively. The current GDP growth target is 6.5%. Louis-Vincent Gave, co-founder of Gavekal Research, said that “the 6.5% growth target, you can still achieve it, but at a higher and higher cost. So why would they [the Chinese Government] want to keep doing that?” Gave added that the practice of dropping growth targets could serve to decrease short-term growth, but promote long-term sustainable growth.

Beijing probably has ample resources to prop up growth while efforts to spur private consumption to take hold. Nevertheless, the more the government cracks down on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), allowing them to fail, the higher the risk of financial shocks that could cast doubt on the fiscal management capabilities of the central government.

Automation and competition from low-cost producers elsewhere in Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America will put pressure to raise wages for unskilled workers. Furthermore, China’s long-term economic growth will be challenged demographically by the country’s rapidly shrinking working-age population.

Xi’s Power Consolidation a Signal of an Impending Economic Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European ‘bad boy’, Viktor Orban, the man who can be single-handedly attributed to Hungary becoming a semi-authoritarian regime, claims yet another victory in the Hungarian elections. An infamous figure in Hungarian politics since the late 1980s, Orban is a symbol of anti-communism and the face of nationalism in a state that is increasingly ostracised by its liberal European neighbors.

Perhaps the Eastern bloc and the legacy of its demise penetrates far deeper than we could have assumed. Orban’s condemnation of the petering Christian sentiment across the continent is microcosmic for the swelling rifts between his beliefs and the liberal swathes of his neighbors: Orban’s re-election doesn’t spell unity across Eastern Europe.

Orban’s ‘illiberal democracy’ stirred the pot of international cohesion with its rather uncouth response to the refugee crisis that has shaken Europe since 2015. His plans to hold immigrants in prison-like shelters to prohibit their exploitation of the Schengen area unmasks the blatantly xenophobic sentiments that have plagued his reign. Orban himself has insinuated that his agenda is beginning to infiltrate popular opinion across Europe and that the election of Trump has near advocated his anti-immigrant perspective.

Orban presents significant challenges for the E.U.

Orban’s third term presents significant challenges for the European Union; it’s conscious liberality and the leaders of Brussels attempting to dispel Brexit fever. An orchestrated media, a judicial system under the thumb: Hungary continues to polarise itself against the swathe of shared European values. The almost satirical likening by Orban of the relationship between Hungary and the E.U. as a ‘peacock dance’ laughs in the face of European unity.

It’s difficult to anticipate the behavior of Orban and his Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance. Since his march of alliance alongside other European heavyweights in retaliation to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, the erratic behavior of the Hungarian leader couldn’t have been predicted. From building walls to prohibit the movement of refugees, to actively denouncing Islam, it’s difficult to sketch a trajectory for the future of Hungarian foreign policy.

Of course, it’s cruel to demonize Orban without looking at the bigger picture. Jingoism and xenophobia have run rampant in the streets of Budapest for some time. Gyongyosi (a member of the Hungarian far-right Jobbik party) publically demanded a list of professional Jews in 2012, arguing they posed a ‘national security risk.’ This charge has been ineffective with Orban witnessing another landslide victory—but despite his ‘reinvention,’ Gyongyosi’s remarks are a conceit that riddles through the policy of Hungarian Parliament.

The trouble with Hungary is that it’s seen to use Poland as its proxy, that Hungary has its foot on the pedal of Polish foreign policy. The conflation of these two states is easily justifiable; the two most overtly authoritarian countries in Europe are likely to bear a few parallels. When Junker and his European posse condemned Poland to face E.U. sanctions, Orban was the first to offer an olive-branch in defense of his ally.

Kaczynski and Orban’s love affair as the “bad-boys of Europe” can only maintain for a certain amount of time before they conclude that their lack of well-established democratic values and far from up-standing economies would collapse unaided. This story has a happier ending for Hungary than Poland however, as it is only Poland that is being threatened with Article 7, and in such its European voting rights. This is as much of a threat as Trump is with a nuclear response to North Korea: one is aware that it’s doubtful, but the threat itself is resounding.

Hungary is doing her best to propel the presupposition that she will continue her pursuit of weakening the E.U. to prohibit any imposition on the nationalistic endeavors of her foreign policy. German foreign policy inclinations, that being a balmy opposition to the Visegrad Group, might be Hungary’s only hand to coerce Berlin into addressing its concerns—including both migration to and within Europe, alongside economic growth in the East.

Fortress Hungary

The impact that Fortress Hungary will have on the rest of Europe is uncertain. The increasingly shadowy relationship between Orban and Putin, some say, should be a cause for concern. As Orban is courted by Putin’s financing of the Hungarian Soviet-era nuclear plant to reduce dependency on Russian oil (or so we’re told), our knowledge of allies and enemies in the E.U. muddies.

Of course, the relationship between Russia and Hungary is more sinister than one may believe—Russian linked paramilitary organizations are embedded into Hungarian territory, the Hungarian National Front a specter of fear for any minority residing within the ‘Fortress.’

Orban, his Hungarian Parliament, and his xenophobic attitudes pose a considerable threat to the European Union. His anti-immigrant policies have far from assuaged the right-wing fever spreading across Europe, and his intolerance of anything dispelling traditionally Hungarian values exemplifies how he is feeding rhetoric of anything anti-E.U.

His re-election poses a threat in many ways, but those whom must be protected chiefly are the immigrants. Perhaps the damning marriage of Poland and Hungary in international politics shall peter away, and Putin’s puppeteering of Orban will cease—but until then Hungary poses a genuine threat and its leader a real menace.

What Viktor Orban’s Victory Means for Europe and Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Individual freedoms are secondary to the interests of the state, and there is an absence of constitutional authority or supremacy over the government in an authoritarian regime.

Authoritarianism has been the norm in countries like Russia and China. However, there is a growing trend towards authoritarianism among democratically-elected governments in countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland.  Here are recently published stories that relate to this trend.

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China’s Role in Ousting Mugabe During the Zimbabwe “Coup”

The ouster of Robert Mugabe dominated global coverage of Africa at the end of 2017.

In Western coverage of the first week after the coup in Zimbabwe, there was speculation about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.

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10 Elections to Watch in 2018 

Millions of people around the world voted in elections this year. The French elected Emmanuel Macron president, while South Koreans elected Moon Jae-in president. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani won reelection with a much wider margin of support than his first time around. Turkey voted to expand President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s constitutional authority. Britain’s Theresa May gambled and lost her parliamentary majority, whereas Japan’s Shinzo Abe gambled and came away with a big victory. German Chancellor Angela Merkel led her party to a first-place finish but is struggling to form a coalition government. A disputed independence referendum in Catalonia triggered a constitutional crisis in Spain, and a similarly controversial independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan raised political tensions in Iraq. Next year will see equally important and consequential elections. Here are ten to watch.

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Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East

The impact of the Arab Spring, the retraction of the U.S. military, and diminishing economic influence on the Arab world—as displayed during the Obama Administration—are facts. The first visit of a Saudi king to Russia shows the growing power of Russia in the Middle East. It also shows that not only Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also Egypt and Libya, are more likely to consider Moscow as a strategic ally.

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Explore all Stories Relating to Authoritarianism

Geopolitical Trend: Authoritarianism Spreads Around the Globe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Leaders and analysts in the West are now stepping forward to acknowledge that they have misunderstood China. As a journalist at The Economist put it, “Decades of optimism about China’s rise have now been discarded.”

As someone who has been teaching and writing on Chinese politics since the 1970s, I know that China’s current president, Xi Jinping, is fundamentally different from his predecessors. The West has held out hope that each leader after Mao Zedong, including Xi, would move in the direction of democracy. Now, constitutional reform has snapped the West back to reality. But can the West fashion a unified, viable strategy to deal with an emerging superpower that refuses to accept Western political values?

Chinese versus Western media

The difference in how Western and Chinese media have reacted to China voting to abolish presidential term limits underscores a gap in perception of Xi’s presidency.

Within China, reporting in state-run media has been extremely low-key. There has been little mention of it beyond noting the repeal as one of a number of constitutional changes. The state-run press noted that the change was merely an “adjustment” or “a perfecting of the term system for the president.”

By contrast, it has been a major topic on Chinese social media, and censors have been hard at work removing the many critical comments that have appeared online.

In the absence of much official Chinese commentary, China’s English-language media has stepped in. The nationalistic Global Times, which the state uses to explain Chinese policies to foreigners, has emphasized the necessity of this constitutional amendment. Its writers have argued that it will promote stability through centralized and unified leadership. This type of strong leadership, the argument goes, is needed for China to realize Xi’s long-term plan to develop China “into a great modern socialist country” by the middle of the 21st century.

Reporting in the West, meanwhile, has differed significantly. It has focused on the removal of the institutional norms and democratic safeguards. Western analysts assert that this indefinite presidential term could make China less stable by substituting one-man rule in place of a broader Communist Party consensus.

Taken aback by the strong Western response, after the approval of the constitutional changes, the Global Times noted that Western theories and advice on China’s developmental path are irrelevant.

From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping

Why has the West’s perception of China been so misguided? The answer is complex but is likely rooted in the reforms led by the late Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.

In the aftermath of the Mao years, Deng created a political system that he hoped would prevent the concentration of absolute power that characterized the era. In 1982, Deng ensured that term limits on the presidency and vice presidency were written into the Constitution. He wanted to prevent the rise to power of a new Mao, who could rule indefinitely, subject to no institutional safeguards. This was part of his ongoing effort to create some separation between the Communist Party and the state.

Then, in 1990, there was a global backlash from the 1989 Chinese military assault on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Deng sought to pull China out of the limelight and eventually re-engage with the world gradually. This strategy was enshrined in a series of pithy phrases intended to govern policy: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Xi’s assertiveness in foreign policy has marked a key departure from this approach.

One important reason why Xi has felt less constrained than his predecessors is that he is the first leader post-Deng who was not personally chosen by Deng. Deng’s death in 1997 marked the end of an era. He was the last of the great revolutionary leaders who founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Deng had held such great authority in the Communist Party that he handpicked both of the party leaders who came before Xi: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Deng was motivated to prevent a new Mao. Xi is motivated by the dangers of weak leadership. Xi views weak leadership as a primary reason for the 1989 student movement and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In effect, he has sought to resurrect a carefully airbrushed Mao.

Deng was concerned with restoring legitimacy and rebuilding China’s global role after 1989. Xi sees the current decline of the West as a golden opportunity for China to rise. As far as Xi is concerned, Deng’s policies served their purpose. China today needs new policies to reflect its new global status, while the West, in turn, needs a new strategy to cope with this newly emerging China.

Xi’s indefinite grasp on power has finally captured the West’s attention—now what? was originally published on Global Security Review.

On March 22, 2018, Nadiya Savchenko was arrested by the Ukrainian State Security Service on charges of plotting a coup.

If the name at all sounds familiar, it is due to Savchenko’s 2014 arrest. Savchenko was accused of killing two Russian journalists in the Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine. In Russia, she was charged with murder and sentenced to 22 years in prison.

A Ukrainian War Hero

During her time as a prisoner in Russia, she refused to admit guilt. She was eventually included in a 2016 prisoner swap. She was pardoned by President Vladimir Putin in exchange for the return of two Russian servicemen from Ukraine.

Savchenko was awarded the Star of the Hero of Ukraine and quickly rose to prominence within the Ukrainian Parliamentary Opposition movement.

Following her return, Savchenko has held talks with separatists and publicized lists of people who went missing or who were captured during the conflict. None of this has been conducted with the support or consent of the Ukrainian government.

Arrested on Suspicion

In the lead-up to her arrest, MPs in the Ukrainian parliament were shown a surveillance video of her discussing plans to attack the parliament. Ukraine’s Chief Prosecutor Yuriy Lutsenko accused Savchenko of working with Russian-backed rebels.

After watching this video, the MPs voted to remove her immunity from prosecution and for her arrest. When asked about the video, she claimed that “Ukraine’s corrupt government” needed to be overthrown.

In defending herself, Savchenko claimed that she had spoken with undercover agents who had encouraged her to overthrow the government. Her rationale was that she was playing along with them to bring the corruption of the government public. She additionally accused the MPs of not following through with the promises of the Maidan uprising, stating:

“To accuse me of treason against Ukraine … and to make anti-heroes out of yesterday’s heroes simply because they do not agree with the policies and positions of the current government, that’s all the authorities can do.”

Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman suggested that the matter was one of psychological health. However, other Opposition members such as Borys Kolesnikov believe that Savchenko should be allowed to defend herself from a position of freedom.

What’s next for Nadiya Savchenko?

Ukrainian MPs set a date for Savchenko’s trial for March 23. At the beginning of the trial, Savchenko announced she would start a hunger strike.

In her defense, she has claimed that transporting weapons from eastern Ukraine was not, as the accusation reads, for planning a terrorist-style coup against the government, but rather to determine the origins of the arms.

Savchenko is just one Ukrainian Opposition MP, and her guilt or innocence does not do much in either setting a new way forward or backward for Ukraine.

However, if as she claims, she was set up—it may say something about the continued corruption in the Ukrainian government.

Along with many in the Opposition movement, Savchenko believes that many of the previous corruption scandals that haunted Ukraine in the past continue to happen now under a new name with tacit agreement from the West.

It remains to be seen until 2019 if any government, new or existing, will make a difference.

Nadiya Savchenko Detained in Ukraine on Charges of Plotting Attempted Coup was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Chinese Communist Party’s proposed abolition of China’s presidential term limit means that it has forgotten one of the main lessons of Mao’s long despotism. The two-term limit was inserted into the People’s Republic of China Constitution after the Cultural Revolution ended and reflected a widespread desire to prevent the return of one-man dictatorship.

Its abolition signals the likelihood of another long period of severe repression. This should prompt us to think of Chiang Kaishek as well as Mao and Yuan Shikai and, in a comparative Asian vein, of Marcos and Park among others. Of course, some recognize that Putin’s example may also have significantly influenced Xi Jinping.

Xi’s move will have a profound effect on world order.

It will enable him to move more boldly and increases the risk of his acting arbitrarily and perhaps mistakenly in international relations. It will surely hinder China’s efforts to be respected for “soft power” as well as military and economic prowess.

Xi decided to strike while the iron is hot rather than wait for later in his new term when increasing problems might have made the change more difficult. His brash step has undoubtedly aroused profound concern among the elite. Many high Party personnel, bureaucrats, judicial officials, lawyers, intellectuals, academics and business people, mindful of the past Maoist dictatorship and the increasingly repressive and arbitrary government under Xi, have seen this coming and now, in social media and other informal ways, are showing their anxieties and opposition.

But not many public signs of protest can be expected, since he has stifled free expression in the past few years. There must be great grumbling and concern among the country’s elite and educated, especially since the same Party “proposals” that have eliminated term limits have also confirmed the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission that will make the regime more repressive and more free of legal restraints than ever, imposing what amounts to “the Inquisition with Chinese characteristics.”

There is big risk for Xi at home since, as it becomes more obvious that China’s problems are catching up with its achievements, the government will look less impressive and the masses will begin to lose their enthusiasm and hold the great leader responsible. The elite will be less surprised but less forgiving.

The external risk is more immediate.

Xi’s bold consolidation of power will enhance fear of “the China threat”, and his ever greater repression will make people think of Stalin’s decades-long centralization of power, even though, one hopes, Xi will not engage in mass executions. He already is engaging in mass detentions in Xinjiang even though “re-education through labor” was abolished in name a few years ago.

These “proposals” are at least a 1-2 punch against the Constitution when we consider the simultaneous establishment of the National Supervisory Commission. People often wonder—even now—how in 1937 Stalin could have said: “We need the stability of the law more than ever” while at the very same time displaying the infamous “purge trials” to the world and lawlessly executing huge numbers of people. Xi claims to be strengthening the “rule of law” while making certain that it will never get off the ground. Tell it to all the tens of thousands in Xinjiang who are locked up in Xi’s successor camps to the supposedly abolished “re-education through labor”.

It’s Likely China Will Enter Another Long Period of Severe Dictatorship was originally published on Global Security Review.

In February, 2018, MIkhail Saakashvili was detained, flown to Poland, and eventually to the Netherlands, His wife’s home country. Saakashvili has responded defiantly, saying that he will ignore the ban and return to Ukraine claiming, “I will return home to Ukraine very soon now, much sooner than in three years.” That may be difficult seeing as Saakashvili’s Ukrainian citizenship was stripped in July 2017, after allegations were made charging him with corruption and poor governance.

How did Saakashvili come to get banned from Ukraine?

The former Georgian president was chosen to lead the fight against corruption in the Odessa region of Ukraine by his former friend, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Just a few years later, Saakashvili would be banned from yet another country he formerly called home.

Although he was known for his strong stance against Russia and anti-corruption position, Saakashvili is not as popular as he once was in the early 2000’s. In Georgia, his presidency lasted from 2004-2013. During that time, he presided over the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, in which Georgia lost control over the disputed territory of South Ossetia. In 2012, Saakashvili’s party lost the parliamentary elections and he was further term limited out of office in the following year.

Since losing that election, Saakashvili looked to university friend, Petro Poroshenko for help. Poroshenko was elected as the Ukrainian president in 2014. Saakashvili became an advisor to Poroshenko, and in 2015 became governor of Ukrainian region of Odessa region.

To become governor, he needed to become a Ukrainian citizenship. This meant Saakashvili needed to renounce his Georgian citizenship. This was no great loss for him, considering that he is convicted of abuse of power in relation to a 2006 murder case and sentenced to three years of prison in-absentia. He maintains his innocence, however, saying that the charges are politically motivated.

The following year, Saakashvili was again out of work. He resigned from his post as governor in November 2016, claiming that members of the Ukrainian government, Poroshenko in particular, were undercutting his efforts to fight corruption.

In the year that followed his resignation, Saakashvili became an outspoken critic of Poroshenko. He and his supporters claim that Poroshenko is a pawn of Putin, and that all of his political acts are purely motivated towards Russian dominance. His movement, however, is not particularly popular and is not expected to be particularly successful in the 2019 Ukrainian elections.

Why does Saakashvili have difficulty gaining support from Ukrainians?

In short, Ukrainians are tired of turmoil. From the Euromaidan protests to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine has been in a constant state of flux for over four years. Saakashvili’s own history is not one of stability. His past leadership is marred with unpredictable behavior and populist tendencies. Further complicating his reputation is a pending money laundering case in the Ukrainian courts that alleges that Saakashvili conspired with ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.

Although his Ukrainian citizenship was stripped from him in July 2017, Saakashvili succeeded in crossing the border illegally from Poland in September of 2017. He has organized and led anti-government protests. In response, the Ukrainian government has accused Saakashvili of working with a criminal organization. They further state that the anti-Poroshenko protests are a “Russian plot against the government in Kiev.”

Saakashvili appears at the Munich Security Conference to push his own agenda

Saakashvili made an appearance at the Munich Security Conference in February of 2018. Instead of joining the broader security discussion, he spent his time speaking out against the Ukrainian government. His claims of crooked business dealings and anti-democratic measures ring hollow against his own attempts to work with the Svoboda party and Azov Battalion, both of which are right-wing, xenophobic groups.

Although his supporters in Georgia and Ukraine would prefer otherwise, Saakashvili’s star seems to have waned. He will undoubtedly continue to speak out against perceived injustice, but the former president seems to have been reduced to a stateless agitator.

The Decline of Mikhail Saakashvili was originally published on Global Security Review.

In June 2017, President Donald Trump ordered that special counsel Robert Mueller be fired, but backed off when the White House counsel threatened to resign in protest, according to reports published by The New York Times and The Washington Post. Trump described the reports as “Fake news, folks Fake news. Typical New York Times fake news” to reporters at the World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland.

Trump reportedly ordered the White House Counsel Don McGahn to direct the Justice Department to fire Mueller because Trump felt three separate conflicts of interest disqualified Mueller from leading the investigation.

The first reason he gave was an alleged dispute over membership fees at a Trump-owned golf course that caused Mueller to end his membership at the course. The second reason given was that Mueller had previously worked for a law firm that had represented Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and advisor. The final reason given by the president was that Mueller was interviewed to return to his old job as FBI director the day before he was appointed as the special counsel.

According to the reports, McGahn refused to deliver Trump’s order to fire Mueller to the Justice Department. McGahn reportedly believed firing Mueller would have a catastrophic effect on the Trump presidency and cast a more significant cloud of alleged obstruction of justice, according to the news reports. Trump’s attorney Ty Cobb declined to comment “out of respect for the Office of the Special Counsel and its process.”

More Evidence of Obstruction of Justice?

Mueller is investigating allegations the Trump campaign colluded with Russia in interfering in the 2016 presidential election. He is also looking into possible obstruction of justice by the Trump and other members of his administration.

Mueller was appointed special counsel in May after Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, who was then heading up the Russia probe. Comey’s firing has raised questions of whether the president tried to obstruct justice in the investigation.

Trump’s legal team has stated that, as of January 2018, more than 20 White House employees have voluntarily talked to investigators working on the special counsel’s investigation. Additionally, Trump’s lawyers have reported that the White House has given more than 20,000 pages of documents to the special counsel’s office.

Trump reiterated that there was no collusion with Russia to help him win the election and suggested he is being investigated for obstruction of justice because he was “fighting back” against the investigation. Trump’s interview with investigators from the Office of the Special Counsel has not been scheduled.

Mueller’s investigation into the Russian election interference has extended into Trump’s Cabinet, with Attorney General Jeff Sessions having been interviewed. Sessions met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak while a U.S. senator and a surrogate for the Trump campaign.

Trump Unsuccessfully Ordered Firing of Robert Mueller in June 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Summary

• Madrid takes immediate control of its institutions and sets early regional elections for December 21.
• If the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.
• If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid.
• In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship.

A couple of weeks following the election, which took place October 1, Madrid responded to Catalonia’s subsequent declaration of independence by dissolving the Catalan government, taking immediate control of its institutions and calling early regional elections for December 21. But Catalan society is broken, and also the political and emotional distance between the Catalan nationalists and the Spanish trade unionists so high, that the vote alone won’t end the region’s issues. The gap that separates the nationalists out of unionists raises questions regarding Spain’s future.

The nation which managed to construct a democracy following the conclusion of a dictatorship in the late 1970s seems disoriented as it endures its most significant crisis in four decades. Opposing Views of the Identical Event. Catalans were divided between nationalists and unionists long before last month’s referendum. The events of October 1 only created more controversy.

The nationalists argue that the vote, which occurred against all the odds, confirmed Catalonia’s desire. They also see the police crackdown on voters as evidence of Spain’s hostility towards Catalonia. The Spanish government and unionist voters, and on the other hand, assert that the referendum is illegal, that it lacked a proper electoral roll along with a valid electoral commission.

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From their viewpoint, the vote confirmed only that regional leaders are willing to violate the law to achieve their political goals. Although the interpretations of what happened differ broadly, there is no denying the fluctuations the vote produced. Before October 1 the proud and provocative–though internally fragmented—separatist government headed Catalonia.

The pro-freedom flag known as the estelada hung from balconies throughout the region, while the Spanish flag flew in only a couple of public buildings. Only the expert independence organizations seemed capable of phoning millions of Catalans to the streets to maintain the most significant demonstrations Europe has experienced in quite a long time.

Catalonia’s secession movement is part of a growing trend of nationalism in Europe

Nationalists controlled the streets, the story of the events, and they had been the only ones with a transparent strategy to sell their origin to the rest of the planet. By early November things had changed drastically. The Spanish administration ignored the Catalan government, and several former Catalan officials have been in prison or take shelter in Belgium.

Spanish flags competed with the esteladas on balconies and terraces, particularly in Barcelona. Unity groups had organized two massive demonstrations, demonstrating that they, too, can mobilize large crowds. It seemed as if Catalonia’s quiet majority, as politicians and commentators called them, had finally woken up that the region was facing the abyss.

Outside Catalonia, a form of nationalism has begun to take on as well. Merchants have happily announced that sales of Spanish flags had skyrocketed lately as a result. However, the growing nationalism also had a darker side. Conservative groups called for a boycott of products, and small far-right groups chanted fascist slogans at unity demonstrations.

Catalan nationalism has existed for hundreds of years, and the region has rebelled against Madrid many times. Economic troubles and corruption cases involving members of Spain party strengthened separatist sentiments in recent decades.

Catalan leaders are accountable for the situation, having encouraged independence to divert voters attention from unpopular spending cuts and their very own corruption scandals. Catalan conservatives decision to abandon their traditional quest for autonomy and concentrate instead of independence helped the secessionist parties to gain ground from the center-left and left, to the point that they now command the independence movement.

The 3 Core Ideas of Catalan Secessionism

The secessionist storyline is based on three core ideas: The Spanish state is hostile to Catalonia, it threatens Catalonia’s identity, and it takes advantage of Catalonia’s wealth. The fiscal issues are subject to endless debate because though Catalonia is a contributor to the Spanish state, other regions are, too. A debate in which Spain is hostile to Catalonia and the Catalan identity is contentious. Catalan is widely spoken in the region’s public administration. Also, schools instruct Catalan history and civilization, a radical difference in the life under Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, which banned regional languages. Hardcore Spanish nationalists, in actuality, lament Madrid’s decision to give Catalonia control of its education system, which they see as a secessionist factory.

To be specific, a few Spanish government representatives have spoken with contempt of Catalonia in latest months, and the pictures of cops using force to prevent individuals from voting October 1 did not help. However, these episodes aren’t elements of a plot against the region. A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has made a more substantial effort to create secessionists than Spain’s prime minister. Catalonia’s freedom movement is active, but it’s heterogeneous. The individuals who’ve voted for secessionist parties lately fall into three principal groups. The first includes individuals who want freedom as quickly as possible, at any cost.

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They feel no cultural or emotional connection to Spain, a country they consider as alien, remote and antagonistic. They consider Catalonian institutions more legitimate than their Spanish counterparts, plus they believe that Spain’s judicial system is corrupt and subject to Madrid’s political sway. They also tend to have negative opinions of southern Spanish regions, which in their view receive too much money from the state. This category is firm in the Catalan hinterland, where only Catalan is spoken and where migrants from elsewhere in Spain well.

The second group consists of those who consider independence as ideal, they’re angry at the Spanish government for its reluctance to negotiate with a legal referendum, plus they attribute Madrid’s intransigence to the crisis. This group has some relations with the 3rd one, made up of those who don’t need independence, but who vote for separatist parties in protest against the Spanish authorities. For them, the problem isn’t necessarily Spain, but the Spanish state and, particularly, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s authorities. Both of these voting blocs eventually could go back to a more moderate position, if Spanish authorities listened to them.

A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has done more for the secessionist cause than Rajoy. Catalonia’s communications infrastructure is a well-oiled broadcasting and propaganda machine. Everything, from radio and TV to WhatsApp classes and events, is utilized to disperse pro-independence views. Catalan nationalists also have a knack for promoting their origin abroad. For the last five years, pro-independence organizers have designed demonstrations to be unusual events which will draw the attention of Television broadcasters and captivate social network users around the world. Even Barcelona’s football team plays a part in the marketing campaign: Its games are a stage for expert independence messages.

In each game, for instance, people start to sing in favor of independence when the clock reaches 17:14. Catalan officials are almost always keen to speak to international media to market their platform, and the area has started unofficial embassies in dozens of nations. By comparison, Catalonia’s unionists lacked a collective voice, then later, in a lot of cases, would decide to remain quiet on the topic of secession to prevent a confrontation with the pro-independence camp. The Spanish authorities, meanwhile, have done little to win back the minds and hearts of ordinary Catalans who’ve turned into independence only as a protest against a government that appears uninterested in them.

The Spanish Government’s strategy (or lack thereof) for managing the Catalan secession issue only increases secessionist legitimacy.

Madrid’s strategy to deal with the secessionist movement concentrates on the fact that independence is illegal. The central government has made no visible attempt to present a story to counter that of the separatists. The strategy seems to work everywhere in actuality, The ruling party, the Popular Party, is still the most famous political force in the nation. Taking into consideration the region’s political situation, however, employing the same strategy in Catalonia is insecure.

What the separatists need can be illegal under the current constitution, but that does not make their emotions any less real. Six weeks after the independence referendum, the psychological and political space between a society and the rest of Spain is as vast as ever. Madrid cannot afford to ignore the millions of Catalans who no longer feel at home in Spain. In the same time, the Catalan leadership is trapped in its own story, the snowball it’s generated is getting ever more significant as it rolls out of control.

Whichever side wins the December 21 regional elections, the Catalan conflict won’t end there. If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid. And if the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.

In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship. Spain’s transition to democracy gave policymakers chance to explore the sort of country they desired for the future. Thus far, however, no signals have emerged that any form of debate will take place between Madrid and Catalonia.

Spain-Catalonia Secession Crisis Won’t End After December Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

Special Counsel Robert Mueller has indicted Former Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort on 12 counts, including conspiracy against the United States, conspiracy to launder money, and for making false and misleading Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) Statements. Richard Gates III, an associate of Manafort, was also indicted.

The indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates funneled over $75 million through offshore accounts and that Manafort himself laundered more than $18 million to fund property acquisitions, home renovations, and private school tuition.

Manafort and Gates are alleged to have received tens of millions of dollars in income as political consultants in Ukraine. The indictment states that to hide that income, they laundered it through “scores of United States and foreign corporations, partnerships, and bank accounts.” Manafort and Gates consulted pro-Russia Ukrainian politicians on lobbying, public relations, and political strategy. Gates is referred to as “Manafort’s right-hand man” in the 32-page indictment.

Political Consulting in Ukraine

A primary focus of their work in Ukraine was the advancement of the pro-Russia Party of Regions, and their presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, who would be elected in 2010. Yanukovych would later flee to Russia in 2014 amidst widespread uprisings in Ukraine.

In the indictment, Mueller highlights an entity called the European Centre for Modern Ukraine as “a mouthpiece for [deposed Ukrainian President ] Yanukovych and the Party of Regions.” It is alleged that the Centre was part of a “cover story” that was developed by Manafort and Gates to distance themselves from their work in Ukraine.

U.S. law mandates that when American citizens are engaged in work for a foreign country, they must register as foreign agents of that state, as stipulated under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Neither Manafort nor Gates registered as foreign agents during their time working as consultants for then-President Yanukovych.

Manafort and Gates initially stated to FBI investigators that their role was to introduce various companies to the Centre and that their efforts did not include lobbying work on behalf of the Party of Regions within the United States. However, the indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates not only selected the companies that would conduct the work on behalf of Yanukovych, but they also engaged in weekly calls and email communications to direct the steps that would be taken by the lobbyists. The indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates paid lobbyists more than $2 million from offshore accounts to conduct work on behalf of Yanukovych and the governing pro-Russia Party of Regions within the United States.

Asset Forfeiture

A critical aspect of the indictment is that Special Counsel Mueller is seeking the forfeiture of assets obtained using laundered money on which no taxes were paid. The assets listed in the charges include a life insurance policy, and multiple properties, including Manafort’s residences in Virginia and the Hamptons, New York.

Trump Campaign Officials Indicted in Special Counsel Investigation was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1793, in his letter to Britain’s King George III, China’s Qianlong emperor rejected all the British requests to improve the state of trade between England and China. After all, the Middle Kingdom “possesses all things in prolific abundance … there is no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians.”

Half a century later, China was defeated by Britain in the Opium Wars and started to rethink its place in the world. Ever since Chinese elites have been searching for answers to the same question: how to make China great again?

The Communist party in China has always claimed that the answer is communism – in more recent years, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – and that the party is the only force capable of building and maintaining that order. This claim has been driven home as strongly as ever at this year’s 19th party congress, an essential meeting of the party that only happens once every five years.

The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, inaugurated the Congress with a three-hour-and-20-minute opening speech. His message was clear: a confident China is coming back to claim its rightful place in the world and find the past glory of Chinese civilization again.

The speech was striking for its sheer ideological confidence. The party has always set great store by ideological and theoretical innovation, and Xi is intent on continuing the tradition. His preferred framing, “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” is supposedly the new great ideological direction, a successor to the party’s past guiding philosophies: Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Three Represents, and Scientific Outlook on Development.

So far, so traditional: another (somewhat dull) ideological brand for the party’s plans. But Xi’s speech also issued a politically urgent appeal to the general public: to be more confident about the current one-party system.

Harmonious and beautiful

According to Xi, China will push for political system reform and develop China’s socialist democracy, but it will never “copy the foreign political model” of Western liberal democracy. Almost every party congress emphasizes this point, but this year, the party is driving it home as confidently and assertively as ever.

Chinese state propaganda consistently warns that were Western liberal democracy imported to China; it would only drag the country into chaos and instability. As far as the Chinese authorities are concerned, Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in the US and the chaos of Brexit in the UK are glaring examples of democratic failure, and they make excellent grist for the propaganda mill.

Xi and the party are confident that the shifting international landscape is also in China’s favor, perhaps more than ever in modern history. In a US-dominated unipolar world, China never had the space nor the capacity to realize its potential as a global power. But even before the rise of Trump, China had by some measures become the largest economy in the world, and it’s long been perceived as the next superpower. Now, the power gap left by America’s global retreat under Trump will only elevate China’s role in the world order.

Xi Jinping Lays Out Plans to Make China Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a saying in Catalonia:  “once they send in the tanks, they may have missed the battle.” Spanish authorities didn’t send the Spanish military to intervene against the independence referendum. However, they did ship in the police, which, in turn, lead to clashes that reportedly left over eight-hundred individuals injured.

The events of the referendum haven’t only exacerbated Spain’s worst political crisis since democracy was re-established four decades ago, they’ve given the independence movement serious momentum, which Madrid will fight to stop.

Madrid Paid a High Price for a Nominal Victory

At the weeks leading up to the vote, the Spanish administration’s strategy was to delegitimize the referendum by interrupting its organization. It was a partial success. Polling centers were closed, and the ballot boxes were confiscated, forcing individuals to vote under abnormal circumstances, without a legal electoral list and without any control to prevent them from voting several times. Consequently, the referendum results, by which 90 percent of voters favored liberty, with a participation rate of roughly 40%, per the Catalan authorities, can’t be considered reliable.

If the Spanish state has even obtained a partial legal victory, it arrived at a high price. Though a judge allowed the police crackdown on voters, it was met with shock by Catalans and international public opinion. The resulting peaceful disobedience of thousands of Catalans gave the liberty process an appearance of validity it didn’t have before.

Therefore, even though a lot of the Catalan government’s arguments for liberty are dubious, Madrid’s actions have given the additional pretext for Barcelona to declare independence unilaterally. From the start, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s approach to coping with the Catalan situation was controversial.

Spain’s mountainous geography has led to the emergence of strong regional identities which are distrustful of the central government.

For the past five hundreds of years, successive governments have chosen for a carrot-or-stick approach to ensure the integrity of Spain. The twentieth century offers clear samples of both: While Francisco Franco’s dictatorship from 1939-1975 attempted to suppress Spain’s regional identities by denying them cultural and political rights, the constitution of 1978 generated probably the most decentralized political systems in Europe, providing Spanish regions high levels of autonomy. This was intended to curb Spain’s natural tendency towards fragmentation. However, it did not eliminate it, and Spain today remains divided.

The present conservative government in Madrid is not likely to authorize a referendum in Catalonia, as it’d open the door for other regions, most notably the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, to need the same. Even a progressive administration will be skeptical of any decision which can lead to the dissolution of the nation.

Then there’s the dilemma the emotional connection between Catalonia and Spain, that has deteriorated over the last decade. An economic crisis, increasing anti-establishment sentiments, recurrent corruption scandals and controversial political events, like the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision to block portions autonomy status of Catalonia in 2010, have all ruined the image of the Spanish state in the opinion of many Catalans.

The Catalan government has made a conscious effort to deepen nationalist and anti-Spanish sentiments in the region. A strong narrative has taken root in the area, presenting the Spanish state as something alien, remote and hostile to Catalonia. Consequently, support for Catalonia’s freedom climbed from approximately 20% to about 50% between 2007 and 2017.

Opinion polls before October 1 indicated that a substantial part of Catalan society would welcome institutional reforms to give Catalonia greater control over its taxes while maintaining the region within Spain. Catalonia represents approximately 20% of the Spanish gross domestic product and Madrid will be hesitant to give up substantial quantities of cash it uses to conduct the state and also to invest in other regions.

The Catalan issue will persist for some time.

But these reforms might prevent the nation from breaking, even though they aren’t on the desk. That is since Madrid and Barcelona have presented their dispute as a zero-sum game where one of the two parties has to be defeated.

The events during and after the referendum only made things worse. The Catalan government is one step closer to declaring independence, which might induce Madrid to react by suspending the autonomy of Catalonia or calling for early regional elections. While either of those options would remove the present Catalan leadership, which Madrid does not consider legal, from the equation, they’d only lead to further social unrest and potentially new episodes of violence.

Furthermore, suspending autonomy or holding ancient regional elections without first introducing real institutional reforms at the national level would do little to solve the crisis. Pro-independence sentiments are not likely to go away anytime soon. In this context, the minority government of Rajoy would become fragile domestically as well as internationally. To date, two of the three opposition parties in Spain have affirmed Madrid’s decision to obstruct the Catalan referendum.

However, the pictures of the police cracking down on voters are making it hard for unionist parties to side with the government of Rajoy. The same holds for the European Union, which affirmed Rajoy before the referendum but chose to remain quiet as events unfolded on October. In the event social unrest in Catalonia rise, the bloc will likely change its perspective of the catastrophe as an internal issue and pressure Madrid to negotiate a compromise.

In the end, Brussels and a lot of the bloc’s authorities are not likely to tolerate prolonged instability at the 4th largest economy in the eurozone. In fact, on October 2, the EU Commission urged all relevant actors at the referendum to move very quickly from confrontation to dialogue. Things in Catalonia are likely to get worse before it gets better. And when the Spanish government manages to keep the nation together, the catastrophe will leave long-lasting scars, that will form politics for many years to come.

Catalonian Secession: Madrid Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place was originally published on Global Security Review.

On Oct. 4, the region’s pro-independence parties, Junts pel Sí, along with the Popular Unity Candidates, declared that the Catalonian parliament would hold a session on Oct. 5th to proceed with its move towards independence. A Spanish Court ruling has since suspended the Catalan Parliament.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

While the official purpose of the session would be to explore the results of the referendum that took place on October 1, secession forces within Catalan’s regional government initially planned to use the meeting to announce independence. Based on a Sept. 7 law passed by the Catalan parliament, the regional legislature must declare independence if people vote in favor of secession.

However, the Catalan President has decided hold off on a formal declaration, pending negotiations and discussions with Madrid. However, he stated that the catalonian people have a right to a vote to independance, and this issue is not one that will die quickly.

The current situation in Catalonia

On Oct. 1, 90 percent of poll respondents supported independence from the Spanish state. Presently, all communication channels between the Spanish and the Catalan governments seem to be broken. Madrid insists that the referendum was prohibited and refuses to negotiate with the government which has broken the law.

Furthermore, on Oct. 3 Spanish King Felipe VI accused the Catalans authorities of violating the Spanish Constitution. The Catalan government, in turn, insists that it’ll only negotiate with Madrid if a legally binding referendum is on the table, something which  Spanish authorities vehemently oppose.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

Could Madrid seize control and suspend Catalan autonomy?

Not only could this decision be controversial in Catalonia and the rest of Spain, but it could also be challenging to enforce. This step would lead to significant street protests and potential acts of vandalism against Spanish institutions throughout the region. Support from security forces will be required.

However, Madrid expresses worry over the fact that Catalonia’s regional police, known as the Mossos d’Esquadra, did not obey a Spanish judge’s order to close down polling centers on referendum day to prevent individuals from voting. Courts in Catalonia have already begun investigations against Mossos for an offense of disobedience. Since the beginning of the independence process, expert secession forces have organized many massive demonstrations.

Their main aim was to show Madrid as well as the international community that countless thousands of Catalans support independence. However, they’re also a broader demonstration of strength along with a reminder that any action contrary to Catalonia, especially one as drastic as suspending the region’s autonomy, will lead to massive protests.

Analysis: Outside mediation may be necessary if tensions escalate and violence increases.

In a situation of widespread regional revolt, Madrid will face the dilemma of having to choose between using force in Catalonia or entering into negotiations with the regional government. The former could come to the price of deepening one already considerable catastrophe and possibly triggering an intervention from the European Union.

Thus far, the bloc and most of its authorities have sided with Madrid, calling the Catalan referendum prohibited and pledging to honor the unity of Spain. However, E.U. leaders have also cautioned that a continued forceful response by the central government in Madrid would result in an escalation of violence, and have advised Spanish and Catalan authorities to reestablish dialogue to reach an agreed-upon solution.

However, if tensions between Madrid and Barcelona carry on or escalate, an outside mediator may be required to ensure stability and security both in Spain and in the European Union.

Catalonia Moves Toward Independence—Will Madrid Seize Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Through analyzing Donald Trump’s role in legitimizing Russia’s propaganda, and the separate—though arguably related—issue of the Trump campaign’s own manipulation of voters via social media, it becomes apparent that, when all elements are considered together, there is a substantial argument to be made that social media was used to manipulate voters and swing an election. The precision with which voters were targeted was unprecedented.

This is the third piece in our series examining Russian information warfare, the use of social media, and the US election. Part one, Cold War 2.0: Russian Information Warfare, introduces the information warfare concept and its role in cyberspace.

Part two, Facebook, Compromised: How Russia Manipulated U.S. Voters with Social Media delves deeper into the mechanics of Russian disinformation and misinformation strategies; revealing how they manifest online and influence the electorate.

Last, Cambridge Analytica: the Darker Side of Big Data, investigates the involvement of an ethically dubious “election management” firm in the 2016 presidential elections.

Trump’s Twitter Theater

Presently, Trump’s controversial Twitter activity is under scrutiny as part of the ongoing Senate Intelligence Committee investigation and hearings.

“Today, ‘gray outlets,’ Soviet-pushing accounts, tweet at President Trump during high volumes, when they know he’s online, and they push conspiracy theories’…Watts flatly stated that the president himself has become a cog in such Russian measures… why, if Russians have long used these methods, they finally worked in this election cycle, Watts’ answer… ‘I think this answer is very simple and is one no one is really saying in this room…the commander in chief has used Russian active measures at times against his opponents.’”

Former FBI Special Agent Clint Watts, giving testimony before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee 

Regardless of whether or not the Trump campaign’s alleged coordination with Russian government-directed misinformation/disinformation campaigns was intentional, the result was nevertheless devastating. Donald Trump wields immense influence in the social media sphere: an article published in January 2017 reveals his combined following on popular social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allows him to reach an audience of over 46 Million people.

Exploiting the Platform of the Presidency

Furthermore, Trump’s elevated status as the Republican Presidential candidate, and subsequently as Commander-in-Chief, arguably provides him with the discursive power necessary to validate the authenticity of his claims in cyberspace (and the real world). The audience exposed to information shared by Trump is primed to believe in its authenticity. During his testimony, Watts substantiates the claim above with the following evidence:

“Trump’s citation of an apparently false Sputnik story at an October 2016 campaign appearance; his ongoing denial before and after the campaign of U.S. intelligence of Russian interference in the election; his claims of voter fraud and election rigging, which Watts said was pushed by RT and Sputnik; and Trump’s questioning of the citizenship of former President Barack Obama and even his primary rival Ted Cruz.”

Echoing the aforementioned themes of Russian propaganda, the examples Watts provides elucidate the relationship between the Russian Information warfare operation and the Trump campaign’s (intentional or otherwise) complicity in the spread of fake news. Trump and his associates’ repeated claims from fake news sites, implicitly sanctioning their authenticity, then feeding it back into the social media sphere, where it was then widely disseminated by real people and automated bots.

Watts explains that “the disinformation is kept alive and gradually becomes more real and plausible.” If this social media platform-mediated sabotage of the truth was not enough, the Trump campaign also employed other social media manipulation maneuvers, made possible with Big Data analytics.

This is the third piece in our series examining Russian information warfare, the use of social media, and the US election. Part one, Cold War 2.0: Russian Information Warfare, introduces the information warfare concept and its role in cyberspace.  

Part two, Facebook, Compromised: How Russia Manipulated U.S. Voters with Social Media delves deeper into the mechanics of Russian disinformation and misinformation strategies; revealing how they manifest online and influence the electorate.

Last, Cambridge Analytica: the Darker Side of Big Data, investigates the involvement of an ethically dubious “election management” firm in the 2016 presidential elections.

The Trump Campaign’s Exploitation of Social Media was originally published on Global Security Review.

While everyone is obsessed with following the twists and turns of the ties between Putin and President Trump, it is important to bear in mind that the relationship between the two countries will long outlast these two men.

Putin will run again in the March 2018 presidential election, and he is sure to win. His approval rating is above 80 percent, and the opposition has been co-opted, preempted or repressed. Putin’s term would end in 2024, at which point he will be 72 years old.

As a scholar of the Soviet Union back in the 1980s, I saw how the failure to develop an effective mechanism to rotate political leaders contributed to that system’s stagnation and ultimate collapse. Could a similar situation soon unfold?

Follow the leader

Given the problems facing Russia, it is understandable why Putin might not feel comfortable handing over the reins of power to a successor next year. With the global oil price stuck at US$50 a barrel, the Russian economy is barely growing, and Russia remains subject to Western sanctions imposed after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. But by 2024, “Project Successor” will surely be back on the agenda of the Russian elite.

The Russian Constitution requires Putin to step down after two consecutive terms. Putin solved that problem in 2008 by moving sideways, becoming prime minister while his protégé, Dmitry Medvedev, took over as president. Putin decided to return to the presidency in 2012, presumably because he felt Medvedev was not doing a good enough job.

Now, analysts are divided over whether the political regime Putin has created will survive beyond his tenure. Many believe that power is so deeply embedded in Putin’s web of informal ties that it is impossible to imagine another individual stepping into his shoes. There is so much at stake – so many illegally acquired fortunes that need state protection – that the day after he steps down, the Kremlin could erupt into faction fighting of the sort that ravaged Russia in the 1990s, and which plagues Ukraine to this day.

However, it is important to remember that Putin is not a dictator who wields unchallenged authority. Nor is he the head of a disciplined ruling party, such as the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar shows, he is a broker, balancing the interests of rival clans – business oligarchs, regional bosses, the heads of the security forces (siloviki) and the technocrats who run the government ministries. These were the men who brought Putin into power, and without whose cooperation, nothing in Russia gets done.

Certain rules of the game have emerged. The oligarchs stay out of politics, and in return are mostly protected from the seizure of their assets by the state.

Over the years, Putin has also skillfully won more autonomy for himself, but he is still aware of the limits of his power. Russian analysts speak of the number of individuals around Putin who hold power as the “collective Putin,” or the “Politburo 2.0,” a reference to the ruling Cabinet of the Communist era that represented diverse bureaucratic interests.

But to secure his place in Russian history – something that concerns him – Putin faces the challenge of installing a reliable successor. This person will have to guarantee Putin’s security and wealth and that of his inner circle. This is apparently what Putin promised his predecessor Boris Yeltsin and his family when he was selected as Yeltsin’s successor. Putin will probably try out the person as prime minister before nominating him as president. Indeed, this was the path Putin himself took back in 1999.

Putin’s system does not, however, have any mechanism in place for picking a successor: a major structural flaw. In the 17 years that Putin has been in power, China has smoothly cycled through three leaders. In the oil-rich former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, Gaidar Aliev groomed his son Ilham, who took over the presidency upon his father’s death in 2003. But Putin has no son, only daughters, traditionally not seen as successors to power. Presidents Karimov in Uzbekistan and Niyazov in Turkmenistan, who ruled for decades, also did not have sons to whom they could hand over power.

Nevertheless, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have both experienced relatively smooth leadership transitions in recent years. When Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov died in 2016, he was replaced by the man who had served as his prime minister since 2003. In Turkmenistan in 2006, Saparmurad Niyazov was succeeded upon his death by his former dentist, then serving as deputy prime minister.

Admittedly, those countries are smaller and more homogeneous than Russia, and their leaders wielded far more personal power than Putin. But it is evidence for the argument that the authoritarian regimes that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union may be more stable than they appear to outsiders, even though they have not developed the institutions of a liberal democracy.

The next president of Russia

Dmitry Medvedev, the current prime minister, is unlikely to return to the presidency. He is not a popular figure and was the target of a recent documentary by opposition leader Aleksei Navalny which detailed his wealth, including owning a vineyard in Tuscany. Since its release on YouTube in March 2007, it has been viewed more than 23 million times, and Medvedev’s approval rating swung negative, losing 15 points in one month.

Three men stand out as more likely successors to Putin, trusted by the elite and with the potential to be sold to the public as an effective leader.

Sergei Shoigu, currently defense minister, is the second-most popular politician in Russia after Putin (26 percent trust versus Putin’s 55 percent), but he has no experience in business or foreign affairs, having spent most of his career in the civil emergencies ministry.

Sergei Sobyanin, Moscow’s mayor, was formerly the head of the oil-rich Khanty-Mansi province.

Yurii Trutnev, a former regional governor and natural resources minister, currently serves as deputy prime minister, is intelligent and a proven manager.

Shoigu and Sobyanin are both from a mixed ethnic background. Shoigu comes from Tuva on the Mongolian border, and Sobyanin is part Mansi, a people of the Arctic north. This could be a problem since many Russians harbor negative stereotypes about ethnic minorities and may be reluctant to see one as president of Russia.

Despite the grave problems facing Russia, Putin has undoubtedly brought a degree of stability to Russia, especially when compared to the chaos of the 1990s. In the 17 years since he took office in 2000, living standards have more than doubled, the problem of Islamist terrorism and Chechen secession has been contained, and Russia has reemerged as an influential player on the international stage. In my view, Putin – and Russia – would be best served by his stepping aside sooner rather than later, establishing a precedent for a peaceful transition of power as part of his legacy.

Imagining Post-Putin Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Jared Kushner reportedly discussed the possibility of setting up back-channel communications with Russian Intelligence Officials to facilitate secret and secure communications between the top levels of government in Washington and Moscow.

In December, Kushner reportedly asked Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, about the possibility of the Trump administration utilizing Russian diplomatic communication lines or facilities in order to circumvent the United States national security and intelligence bureaucracies.

Kushner’s lack of prior experience in national security and foreign policy was hopelessly apparent. In national security and diplomatic circles, it’s common knowledge that the FBI makes a practice of intercepting the communications of Russian officials within the U.S., while the National Security Agency (NSA) continuously monitors the communications and SIGINT of Russian government officials overseas.

American officials told the Washington Post that Ambassador Kislyak subsequently informed Russian officials in Moscow of the request Kushner made. Reportedly, Kislyak was surprised at the suggestion—the proposed backchannel would have carried obvious security risks for the soon-to-be-installed Trump administration, and for Russian national interests.

“Kislyak…was taken aback by the suggestion of allowing an American to use Russian communications gear at its embassy—a proposal that would have carried security risks for Moscow as well as the Trump team.”

What was going through Kushner’s mind when he presented this proposal? Objectively, one can determine that Kushner’s naiveté got the best of him; he was either unaware of the security risks associated with such an arrangement, or he assumed that his contacts in Moscow trusted him to the same degree that he trusted them. Regardless, it’s increasingly obvious that—for all his reported brilliance as a political tactician—Kushner remains ignorant—almost pathetically so—to the nuances and details of foreign policy and national security strategy.

Vnesheconombank Chairman Sergey Gorkov Met With Kushner—at Kislyak’s Request

“The idea of using Russian facilities to skirt Russian surveillance would either be a serious attempt to hide something or the actions of a young amateur,” said former FBI special agent Clint Watts to The Atlantic. Former CIA acting-Director John McLaughlan provided that “I can’t keep out of my mind the thought that, if an American intelligence officer had done anything like this, we’d consider it espionage.”

This meeting is one of several that took place between senior Trump campaign officials or Trump surrogates and Russian diplomatic or intelligence officials that are of investigative interest to the FBI’s ongoing counterintelligence and criminal investigations into Trump’s campaign and subsequent administration.

Kushner is also reportedly involved in a number of other, high-profile, and clandestine meetings with Russian and other foreign officials.  Just days after making the backchannel inquiry to Kislyak, Kushner met with Sergey Gorkov—at Kislyak’s request. Gorkov is a former Russian intelligence officer and chairman of Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB). He maintains close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Putin effectively runs VEB as his private slush fund. If Putin wants to throw money at something like a bailout, or [the Winter Olympics in] Sochi, or Ukrainian industrial manufacturing, he uses VEB,” according to Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Aslund added, “VEB does not do any ordinary banking business. Therefore it is so remarkable that Jared Kushner met with the head of VEB.”

Vnesheconombank’s board is made up largely of Kremlin ministers; its chairman is Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and  Bank chairman Gorkov was trained at an FSB academy and has strong ties to both the KGB and its successor organization, the FSB. VEB frequently collaborates with Russian security services, providing agents with cover identities and institutional affiliations. VEB acts as the funding vehicle for Russian operations in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria, and the Caucasus—effectively providing an entirely off-the-books budget for the Putin regime.

Initially founded as a traditional development bank along the lines of the World Bank, Vnesheconombank’s initial purpose was to deliver long-term funding for projects private sector banks would likely avoid, according to a Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit analyst.

However, as time passed VEB was systematically converted into a “special purpose agency to finance politically important projects.” For instance, VEB has been heavily involved in efforts to forge inextricable economic links between Ukraine’s industrial and energy sectors and Russia—which would then give the Russian government enormous influence over the domestic politics of Ukraine.

Photo credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via Visual Hunt / CC BY

Jared Kushner Wanted Secret Back-Channel with Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.