Russia – Militarization, Oil, and Gas

Russia’s approach to the Arctic is heavily informed by its geographic and historic place as an Arctic power. Fifty-three percent of Russia’s coastline is in the Arctic, which makes it a prime place to project power. Russia also has the largest population of Indigenous People in the Arctic, numbering around 1.4 million. Most importantly, however, Russia has a huge economic interest in oil and gas extraction in the Arctic as well as the further economic development of the Northern Sea Route. For Russia, then, the Arctic is a place of high stakes. Over the past few years, Russia has been steadily increasing its military and commercial presence in the Arctic, developing new bases as well as refurbishing old ones. Further, Russia is also constructing new icebreakers and submarines – some of which are nuclear powered – making it the country that likely has a distinct advantage in terms of actual military equipment.

Although Russia’s current military buildup in the Arctic is primarily defensive, some of its actions can be perceived as dually offensive and defensive. For example, in 2014, Russia established a new Strategic Command center for the Arctic both to increase Arctic security as well as to defend its interests – leading to an increase in Arctic exercises. Russia has also built more than 475 new military outputs and 16 new deep-water ports.

While this militarization might paint a very aggressive picture, it’s important to note that Russia’s interest in the Arctic also revolves around oil and gas. Much of the untapped resources in Russia’s territorial boundaries lies in the Arctic, leading the region to be extraordinarily economically important to the country. As a country that historically has prided itself on resource exports, Russia’s aggressive control over the Northern Sea Route, twenty icebreakers, and interest in the Arctic makes more sense. Regardless, Russia’s Arctic focus is certainly notable and will play an important role as the ice continues to melt, and resources become easier to access.

China: The Near-Arctic Newcomer

China plays another interesting role in the Arctic. Notably, it is not one of the Arctic Eight represented in the Arctic Council. Instead, it considers itself a near-Arctic power, joining the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013 – and in 2018 released its first white paper on Arctic Strategy. In this paper, China presented its Polar Silk Road component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most importantly, the white paper claims that China will develop new shipping lanes that have been opened by global warming. Beyond that, China sees the development of oil, gas, fishing, and tourism as key industries to become involved in as global warming progresses.

Although China’s interest appears to be economic and commercial for now, other states do not view it as such. Former US Secretary of State Pompeo, for example, called China a threat to Arctic peace and pointed to its actions in the South China Sea as an example of what could happen in the Arctic if China’s inroads were allowed to continue. Another flashpoint between the US and China is Greenland. Recently, China attempted to buy an older naval base and build a new airport in Greenland – an effort that was halted by the US government, who allegedly has claimed they will invest in these projects instead of China. However, China is still moving forward to build investment relationships with Greenland, Iceland, and Finland concerning geothermal energy and potentially a data silk road.

Another partner in the Arctic for China may be Russia. Russia and China are increasingly working together on Arctic development, where China has been providing funding for Russian infrastructure and energy project in the Arctic. It remains to be seen whether these two powers, who arguably do not have a historically close relationship, will continue to work together moving forward.

The United States – Reactor-in-Chief

Out of the US China, and Russia, the US is likely the most reactive of the three powers. Most of its policies are in response to what it sees as unwelcome incursions of China and Russia. The American approach to the Arctic is to see the region as the next theatre in great power competition, slowly increasing its presence militarily and economically. For example, the US recently commissioned the construction of two new icebreakers. With the advent of the Biden administration, however, the US has shown a growing interest in the region. Both the US Navy and the US Department of Homeland Security released new Arctic strategies for the first time this year – illustrating the country’s renewed Arctic focus. In short, while the US is not nearly as aggressive as Russia, American rhetoric is becoming more pointed at keeping Chinese influence low and containing what it sees as Russian militarization.

While the three powers certainly are not going to head to total war anytime soon, it bears watching that rhetoric on all sides of the region is becoming more bellicose and sharper. With the new Biden administration, it will be interesting to watch the extent to which American rhetoric may change or whether temperatures and pressures will continue to rise in the Arctic.

Arctic Great Power Competition: The United States, Russia and China was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Geopolitically-Fraught Northern Sea Route

In March, the Kremlin published an Arctic decree, paving policy plans for the next fifteen years that focus on the industrialization of the region and its’ military defense. Perhaps the most topical geopolitical approach in the decree is the importance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR decreases the sailing time from China to Europe by 40% compared to traveling through the Suez Canal—making it a popular route for trade. With melting polar ice caps and increasing climate change, the NSR is also becoming more passable than ever.

While Russia views the NSR as an internal waterway, most of the international community does not. This makes the decree’s allotment of responsibility to Rosatom to limit traffic in the NSR from foreign warships without a 45-day notification a clear indication of Russia’s claim in the region. Other states, such as the United States, do not agree with Russia’s claim of sovereignty. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in 2019, “In the Northern Sea Route, Moscow already illegally demands that other nations request permission to pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard foreign ships, and threatens to use military force to sink any that fail to comply.”

Beyond the usage of the NSR waterway, Russia’s military posture in the Arctic demonstrates a clear and present focus on the region for the foreseeable future. With the reopening of 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts, Russia currently emphasizes early warning and defense as its military doctrine. To fulfill this doctrine, Russia has recently tested new capabilities, including hypersonic cruise missiles and nuclear-powered undersea drones. These new capabilities are supported by Russia’s nuclear and non-nuclear icebreaker 40 ship fleet, which is the largest in the world.

Russia’s interests are more than geopolitical—they’re also economic.

Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil company, is currently developing the Zapadno-Irkinsky field and building 2000 km of new long-distance pipelines and 7000 km in local-branch pipelines. They are also building 50 new ice-class tankers, three new airports, and 10 helipads. Their goal is to produce 115 million tons of oil per year by 2030.

Rosneft is also building the Sever terminal and engaging in drilling in the Kara Sea, both of which will be instrumental in NSR shipments. Tourism is also on the rise in the Arctic, with the Russian government incentivizing tourism initiatives in the region.

The Arctic’s importance for Russia cannot be underestimated

With the intersection of economic and geopolitical interests in the region, it is important to not discount the Arctic’s importance within Russia’s grand strategy. In the same way that Russia sees former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia as part of its sphere of influence, the Arctic is to Russia part of its historic geography. For policymakers, this means being cognizant of Arctic policies.

However, the melting Arctic ice leaves Russia stuck between eventual necessary cooperation and growing regional militarization. It is true that the Arctic is critical to Russian policy, but the impacts of climate change will become an issue that Russia cannot solve alone. In other words, climate change will eventually necessitate cooperation amongst states in the region. In all likelihood, however, this cooperation will not take place for some time. For now, the growing militarization of the region will continue for the foreseeable future. Russia’s interest in the region is not going away anytime soon and will actually probably increase over time, leading to increasing claims of economic interest and military defense.

Russian Ambitions in the Arctic: What to Expect was originally published on Global Security Review.

Currently, Russia holds a third of Europe’s gas imports and imports 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually through Ukrainian pipelines. The two most important reasons for Russia’s gas monopoly are economical and practical: distance and cost. Geographic proximity makes Russian gas not only more reliable than other competitors but also cheaper and closer.

Why Build Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream?

The pre-existing monopoly begs the question of why build two new pipelines, both of which have attracted ardent criticism from the United States and certain European countries. Many critics claim, for example, that Russia has the potential to exploit that energy dominance for political gain. Others argue that Nord Stream 2 would supply gas to Germany first, effectively removing other EU nations from the decision-making process and exacerbate inter-EU tensions.

However, building two new pipelines broadly serves Russian interests. Both projects not only cement Russia’s monopoly on gas but also open the door towards Russian gas exports reaching China as well as seize a share of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Nord Stream 2 mainly helps Russia export gas to the northern European market and bypass Ukraine and the corresponding political situation there. TurkStream also plays a role in circumventing Ukraine, carrying gas to south and southern Europe and Turkey.

To answer critics’ concerns about energy security, many European politicians point to proposed legislation that aims to prevent Russian market manipulation, long-term goals to address the security of supply challenges, and diversification away from fossil fuels. The Third Energy Package, for example, aims to liberalize and integrate natural gas markets—ultimately aiming to break up the Russian-state own monopoly (i.e., Gazprom and Rosneft).

The EU’s Energy Union strategy further commits to ensuring that every EU state has access to at least three different sources of gas. Additionally, many EU states are moving away from fossil fuels. Some Baltic states, for example, are developing LNG terminals (ex: the Klaipeda LNG terminal) to diversify their gas imports and supporting low-carbon energy sources.

Despite these attempts to become more energy-dependent, Europe truly does not have a leg to stand on. Up until 2030, Russian pipeline gas and global LNG will remain the two main sources of gas for the EU. Further, no significant pipeline gas that does not already originate in Russia will be available in the EU before 2025.

TurkStream

After the cancellation of Russia’s South Stream project in 2014, Russia quickly moved to replace one pipeline project with another. The South Stream project was led by Gazprom and aimed to transport Russian gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and, from there, disperse within Europe. However, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine, along with a regulatory dispute between Gazprom and the EU, the project was canceled.

In response, Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Turkish state-owned gas company) to construct TurkStream in December 2014. In 2019, TurkStream was officially completed and on January 8, 2020, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated TurkStream and certified it ready for use.

Nord Stream 2

In 2012, after the successful construction of the initial Nord Stream pipeline, Gazprom also moved to expand to additional lines (later named Nord Stream 2). In 2015, Gazprom signed an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, E.On, OMV, and Engie to build Nord Stream 2. Poland blocked this plan in 2017—leading Gazprom to develop a financing plan with Wintershall, Engie, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, and Uniper instead.

In 2018, Germany approved Nord Stream 2’s construction permits in German waters. Although the U.S. has threatened sanctions on companies that work with Gazprom—causing Allseas to pull its support—Gazprom has claimed that it would complete construction alone and would finish by 2020.

Many observers note that TurkStream is likely a counter to the original U.S. backed Southern Gas project, which was developing a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe and that Nord Stream 2 is a bid to replace Ukraine as a transit state. Not surprisingly, members of the U.S. government have expressed concern over TurkStream and Nord Stream 2—claiming that it threatens European energy independence and security.

Many Central and Eastern European states see the pipeline as an attempt to undermine European unity and bypass transit states such as Poland and Ukraine—also depriving those countries of transit fees. However, Germany has argued that the pipeline was purely market-driven. In response to threatened U.S. sanctions, Germany warned the U.S. to “mind its own business.”

Together, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 provide Russia with over 140 bcm in capacity—amounting to almost the same as Ukraine’s total transit capacity. TurkStream not only provides Russia with a stronger monopoly on gas in southern and southeastern Europe but also strengthens an already-strong Turkish-Russian relationship. Given the financial incentives to be Europe’s new gas hub, it is no wonder that Nord Stream 2 has also led to a stronger German-Russian relationship.

Russia’s Energy Dominance: Reinforced

The construction of TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 reinforce Russia’s dominance of the energy market, even though it may not lead to the political leverage that many critics expect. With one pipeline already completed and another expected in 2020, both TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 illustrate Russia solidifying its grip on the European market while also expanding its reach to other markets. This monopoly on gas is strengthened by Europe’s gas market—where demand is only growing.

In 2019, Europe imported 123 bcm of gas last year, nearly twice as much as 2017. Further, critics who point to energy security and independence, such as the U.S. do not affect policy in practice. While sanctions against working with Gazprom have somewhat of an effect in cooling interest, in this case, economic interests trump security interests. Russia’s geographic proximity to Europe means that Russian gas will be closer and cheaper than other competitors for the foreseeable future.

However, while Europe’s gas markets may be inherently dependent on Russian gas, Russia is similarly reliant on the European market as a buyer for its gas. In short, Europe is Russia’s most important market for Russian natural gas exports. This limits Russia’s ability to manipulate energy politically without severely compromising its economic relations with Europe. Therefore, Russian renewed energy dominance in Europe is certainly on the horizon with the imminent arrival of Nord Stream 2 and preexisting TurkStream. However, it is not nearly as concerning as Russophobic critics would have the public believe.

Russia’s Renewed Energy Dominance in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

In his annual state-of-the-nation speech this January, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for broad changes to the Russian constitution that would strengthen the Russian Parliament’s powers as well as weaken those of the president. This comes just as many Russian scholars and analysts are asking the 2024 question that must also be on the Russian President’s mind. What will Vladimir Putin do when his fourth presidential term comes to an end? Who will replace him if he steps aside? How can he ensure that in his post-presidential life, he remains outside the realm of prosecution?

Analysts have studied the various scenarios that could arise when Putin’s fourth term comes to an end. Some have involved constitutional reform which would allow him to stay in the presidency past his fourth term. Others have focused on Putin becoming the head of a merged federal state, including both Russia and Belarus. Still, others have suggested the creation of a ‘real seat of power’ within Russia, to which Putin would be appointed.

While Putin did not explicitly address the 2024 question in the constitutional reforms, he did suggest ways that he would maintain a veneer of control. By proposing decreasing the power of the presidency, he might be implying that he will no longer maintain that position. By increasing the power of the State Council, he implies that he may consider a ‘real seat of power.’ But for now, it remains unclear how Putin will precisely navigate his post-presidential life.

What are the proposed constitutional reforms?

The proposal to amend the constitution would firstly give the power to appoint cabinet ministers and the prime minister to the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of Parliament. This power currently belongs to the President. However, the Russian presidency would retain the authority to dismiss those same cabinet ministers and prime minister. The presidential term would also be limited to two terms in total instead of two successive terms.

Further, Putin suggested restricting the requirements for the Russian presidential role. He suggested that any candidate should have lived in the country for 25 years and have no foreign citizenship or residency. The proposal also suggested a constitutional change that would place predominance on domestic legislation over international law. Among other changes, Putin also proposed strengthening the State Council, which currently remains as an advisory body to the Russian Parliament. The State Council would be transformed into an organ that would shape domestic and foreign policy.

How are the proposed reforms being received?

Not long after the reforms were proposed, all 432 lawmakers in the State Duma unanimously approved the first reading of them. The reforms must undergo two more readings, the second on February 11^th and the third reading down the line. Once the reforms are approved in all three readings in the Duma, the constitutional changes will then go to the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house of Parliament. Then, they will go to Putin’s desk.

While the State Duma was busy approving the bills, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s government resigned in support of the upcoming changes. In his place, Putin appointed Mikhail Mishustin, the former head of Russia’s tax service.

What will happen when Putin’s term ends in 2024?

While many of the proposed constitutional reforms suggest that Putin is preparing his power transition many years ahead of schedule, the vast array of changes still leave the exact plan vague. Many point to the strengthened Security Council as the new nexus of power after 2024. This would be a similar situation to the former president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev led Kazakhstan for thirty years before resigning and maintain power in the country’s Security Council. Others claim that the strengthened prime minister position suggests that Putin will make a return to that role. Another option could also be leading as the head of a confederation between Belarus and Russia.

Regardless of what path Putin chooses to take, it is unlikely that he will take a backseat in Russian politics anytime soon. Furthermore, this constitutional change in Russia suggests that Putin would prefer a continuation of the status quo rather than any shake-up of power. In such a highly personalized system like Russia, the state lacks institutional mechanisms such as a political power to guide the transition smoothly.

Moving away from a presidentially focused system, Putin may seek to illustrate to domestic Russian audiences as well as the international stage that a post-Putin Russia is possible without turmoil. For now, it is too early to predict which path Putin will take or whether he will be successful in stepping away from the presidency without complications.

Constitutional Reform and Presidential Term Limits in Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, that presumably quiet and intense series of talks was matched by more than 1,000 demonstrators in Minsk who rallied against integration with Russia. Many of these demonstrators expressed concern that “politicians are playing with Belarusian sovereignty,” and that they didn’t want their independence on the bargaining table.

Both during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Belarus have shared a close fraternal relationship. Recent negotiations suggest that Russia is invested in an even closer integration of the two countries while Belarus remains wary.

Belarus and Russia Have a Tangled History

In 1997, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement that anticipated close political, economic and military ties. However, this agreement has not come to pass as cleanly as its writers perhaps believed. Regardless, ties between the two countries have always remained close. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, the two countries share a free travel area similar to Europe’s Schengen Zone.

Historically, Belarus has relied upon Russia for cheap gas, low-cost loans, and energy. Currently, Russia provides Belarus with around $5 billion worth of subsidies for its Soviet-era economy. This support has allowed Lukashenko to stay in power, where he has stayed for the last quarter of a century.

Negotiations: Why Now?

Ostentatiously, negotiations restarted ahead of the 20^th anniversary of Russia and Belarus’s initial agreement. However, in recent years, Russia also claimed that they can no longer subsidize lower energy and gas prices to Belarus. As a solution, Russian officials have suggested that should Belarus agree to closer economic integration, lower energy prices would follow. In response, Belarus insisted that any further integration must be preconditioned on handling bilateral economic issues.

Belarus objects to paying higher prices for Russian gas and energy than Russian households and businesses. Some documents have leaked suggesting that Belarus and Russia are negotiating a deal that would result in an economic confederation. However, details and confirmation still remain to be seen.

In the days before the most recent set of negotiations, Lukashenko also spoke to parliament. He assured parliamentarians that there was no plan to join Russia, but rather remain as fraternal nations.

What Next?

Despite concern internationally about the union between Belarus and Russia, most of this likely comes from uncertainty. The talks are shrouded in uncertainty with no one leak explaining exactly what the two leaders are discussing. Moreover, Russia and Belarus’s history suggests that many agreements, while present on paper, are not actually fulfilled. In short, many issues that would need to be included in an economic confederation, such as unifying tax codes, would take many years of work rather than a simple agreement by two leaders.

The overarching gap between the two leaders is that while Lukashenko has been only open to integration on the basis of equal treatment, Putin has not been willing to accept that in the past or now. One speculation about the heightened pressure on Belarus and the changing nature of these negotiations, however, is connected to Putin’s presidential term, which expires in 2024. Some claim that full integration with Belarus would provide Putin with a way to stay in power as the head of the proposed new union state. Putin and Lukashenko will meet again on December 20^th in Saint Petersburg.

Belarus and Russia: Fraternal Nations But Not a Union State was originally published on Global Security Review.

Last week, Ukrainian oligarchs Igor Kolomoyskiy and Hennadiy Boholyubov lost their case against the nationalized Ukrainian bank, PrivatBank, in the London Court of Appeals. In an official statement, the Court of Appeals stated that PrivatBank “has a good arguable case to recover the full $1.9 billion—$3 billion including interest—given in the particulars of claim.”

PrivatBank CEO Peter Krumphanzi expressed his satisfaction with the ruling, noting that “this is an important step towards achieving justice for the bank and the people of Ukraine.” The Ukrainian bank was nationalized three years ago in 2016 against the wishes of Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov after accusations arose of fraud.

During a routine check, auditors found $5.5 billion (USD) missing from the bank’s records. Kolomoisky and Boholyubov were subsequently accused of insider trading and fraud. In the court case in London, PrivatBank alleged that the former owners cost the bank billions of dollars. Both oligarchs denied the claims and are pursuing legal action to force the privatization of the bank and their shares. Kolomoyskiy is seeking $2 billion in PrivatBank capital returned to him.

The implications of the PrivatBank case go beyond money

While the ruling is ostensively positive for the Ukrainian state, it has consequences for Ukraine’s renegotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been renegotiating a $3.9 billion agreement that is set to expire in January 2020.

However, these negotiations came under pressure when concerns arose that a Ukrainian court could reprivatize PrivatBank and return ownership of the bank to Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov. Additional concerns arose surrounding Kolomoyskiy’s and Boholyubov’s close business relationships with Zelensky. Zelensky’s old television show not only ran on a TV station owned by Kolomoyskiy, but Zelensky’s current chief of staff used to act as Kolomoyskiy’s lawyer on the PrivatBank case.

While Zelensky claimed that as president he would remain neutral regarding the PrivatBank case, many commentators expressed concerns that this would be impossible for him. This case, in particular, has been watched closely by investors as a measure of Ukraine’s changing business climate.

Ukraine’s corruption challenge

While the court case against Kolomoyskiy and Boholyubov is only one aspect of Ukraine’s struggle against corruption, it is an illustrative example of how corruption continues to touch many parts of Ukrainian society and playing a role in determining its future. Without IMF funding, Ukraine would be forced to turn to other monetary sources and benefactors.

It is unlikely that Ukraine would turn to Russia for such aid. However, it would be one potential political avenue to both reduce tensions between the two countries. Therefore, it should be considered as one, however improbable option that geopolitical analysts ought to consider.

For now, it seems as though Ukraine will continue its anti-corruption efforts and work with Western institutions such as the IMF. However, considering Zelensky’s past connections as well as the willpower of Ukraine’s oligarchs—it is important to recognize that tackling corruption in Ukraine could have unintended consequences.

London Court Rules Against Ukrainian Oligarchs in PrivatBank Case was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donetsk and Luhansk has killed more than 13,000 people since its onset in April 2014. While many in Ukraine see this as a surrender to Moscow, Zelensky asserted that “there will be no capitulation.” As part of this new peace deal with Moscow, Zelensky also set up a prisoner exchange with Moscow—swapping 35 prisoners each. While Moscow and other members of the international community expressed their support for this new détente in relations between Moscow and Kyiv—local politicians did not agree.

Response in Ukraine

Within Ukraine, this move was met with anger and betrayal. Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko criticized the agreement, while Andriy Biletsky, leader of the right-wing National Corps, claimed Zelensky “chose shame and now he will get war too.” National Svoboda member Yuriy Syrotyuk also added his voice to the discussion, stating that Zelensky “committed treason.”

Many politicians claim that while Ukraine is now committed to holding an election, Russia has not agreed to give back control of the border—moving the scales heavily in Russia’s favor. This was particularly concerning for Zelensky’s reputation as he came to power promising to end the war rather than prolong it.

Will this mean peace?

While this step might herald a new warmer point in relations between Russia and Ukraine, it does not necessarily immediately foretell immediate peace. Even the four-way talks between Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia have stalled since October 2016. However, both states have already renewed pulling troops and equipment from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions starting October 7. Despite this positive step, the process toward peace will take time. Although the agreement to hold elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk has already provoked much aggression from local politicians, no elections can take place without promises that all armed groups will vacate the area before the election.

The elections are one part of the Steinmeier Formula; a plan put together by former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016. In short, it first proposes free and fair elections in Ukraine’s east under Ukrainian law, verification by the OSCE, and self-governing status in return. It is the only plan that Russia has also agreed to as part of reopening talks.

If elections bring peace, what will the cost be?

Although elections in Donetsk and Luhansk may seem to be beneficial for the peace process, results will likely heavily favor Russia and the current Russia-backed separatist leaders. Most of the population with pro-Ukrainian views left for western Ukraine at the start of the conflict. Therefore, those remaining will likely harbor pro-Russian views, and the election, rather than get a broader range of opinion in the region, will consolidate the already dominant position of Russia-backed leaders currently in place.

It is to Russia’s advantage to have and support a federalized Ukraine as it will allow for more pro-Russian dissent against Ukraine’s current pro-European stance. Moreover, a more heavily divided Ukraine also favors Russia’s wish that it remains in its sphere of influence. Already, many Ukrainians do not support special status for Donetsk and Luhansk and do not think that the Steinmeier formula is appropriate. Elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk might decrease violence right now, but, in the future, they could lead to a Ukraine that is more likely to head into civil conflict in the future.

Elections in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk Regions: Peace, But At What Cost? was originally published on Global Security Review.

If you’ve not heard of Transnistria—the de-facto state nestled between Moldova and Ukrain—you could easily be forgiven. The territory is just over 4,000 square kilometers, is home to just under 500,000 people and recognized only by three additional de-facto states. While Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Artsakh may treat Transnistria as an independent state, the rest of the world sees Transnistria as a breakaway portion of Moldova. Moldova itself calls the tiny strip of land on the eastern bank of the Dniester river an autonomous territorial unit with special legal status.

Since the conflict that led to its secession in 1992, Transnistria has used its uncertain legal status to act as a thriving market for illegal arms. The country is estimated to house Europe’s largest ammunition stockpile. This stockpile alongside easily corrupted officials and porous borders has allowed Transnistria to operate as prime real estate for much business that cannot be conducted openly in many other countries. This business includes the monopoly Sheriff corporation, Sheriff LLC, which is owned and founded by Viktor Gushan, a former Soviet KGB officer.

What makes Transnistria so popular for illegal trade?

Perhaps Transnistria’s largest asset for illegal trade is its proximity to Odessa, Ukraine’s Black Sea port which operates as a prime spot for most Eurasian trade. Transnistria’s main exports are cigarettes, arms, alcohol, and food. Historically, much of this trade was unable to go through Moldova or to the European Union due to trade boycotts. Instead, Transnistria relied on the porous borders between itself and Ukraine. However, given the ongoing civil war in Ukraine, that approach has shifted.

After 2014, Ukraine’s border policy has become much more aggressive. Instead of allowing illegal products to travel to Odessa, Ukraine border patrols are much stricter now both regarding products and people. In its place, Transnistria has been forced to turn westward. After a long series of negotiations, Moldova signed a tariff-free trade deal with the European Union in 2014. This deal additionally allowed trade to be conducted from Transnistria with a few caveats. Businesses in Transnistria could take advantage of this deal so long as they were registered in Moldova and agreed to customs inspections. This shift within Transnistria gave way to massive change. While in 2014, While in 2014, 27 percent of exports went to the European Union, in 2016, that data point increased to 58 percent.

Will Transnistria continue to be an illegal trade hub?

While Transnistria has certainly shifted most of its trade to the West, it remains to be seen whether or not it has ended its reliance on illegal trade. Sheriff LLC, for example, has a monopoly not only on all domestic business within Transnistria but also on illicit trade. Even with increased trade with the European Union, it is unlikely that such a behemoth like Sheriff would give up a significant portion of its income. Moreover, while it certainly appears as though Transnistria is slowly turning westward, its historical connection with Russia cannot be understated.

This relationship with Russia implies that even with stricter Ukrainian border policies, there will be a portion of the population that feels close to and therefore travels to Russia. Naturally, not all of this travel will involve illegal trade. Given Transnistria’s experience with smuggling, it would be surprising if black market trade ceased simply due to new border restrictions.

Transnistria: No Longer an Illegal Trade Hub? was originally published on Global Security Review.

After President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was sworn in as Ukraine’s sixth president, his first order of business was to dissolve the current parliament. Zelenskiy announced this move in his inaugural address; a strategic move meant to capitalize upon his present popularity in the hopes of gaining a majority. In this address, he also criticized the current Cabinet of Ministers and called for a change in the office of the General Prosecutor, presently held by Yuriy Lutsenko.

Zelenskiy, however, may face difficulties in moving his agenda forward in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament). While the decree to dissolve the Rada was accepted and snap elections are in preparations for July 21, Zelenskiy also called for this new election to be based on votes for parties rather than people. His argument centers around corruption, where he claims that voting for individuals promotes corruption. In the emergency session of the Rada to vote on this, only 92 lawmakers voted in favor. To place any such proposal on the agenda, a majority of 226 votes is necessary. This proposal was also voted down, along with another plan submitted by Zelenskiy that would change the rules for state purchases during election campaigns.

Does this precede a standoff between Zelenskiy and the Rada?

Due to Zelenskiy’s unique electoral support base and the fact that he ran without a political party, he has little to no formal support within the Parliament itself. This has meant that even though Zelenskiy has called for the government to step down, the Rada did not accept it. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman only received 97 of the 226 votes necessary to accept his resignation. Even more important is the fact that Rada speaker Andriy Parubiy has claimed that Zelenskiy’s decree to dissolve parliaments and to call snap elections in July is illegal. He has stated he will appeal to the Constitutional Court, saying that “it is sad and alarming that the guarantor of the constitution starts his work in the post with a gross violation of the constitution.”

Interestingly, other members of the government are also attempting to call appointments illegal and in violation of lustration legislation. Tetyana Kozachenko, the head of the public council on lustration issues, has claimed that Zelenskiy’s appointment of Andriy Bohdan violates lustration legislation because he held posts under former President Viktor Yanukovych.

Is dissolving the current Rada possible?

According to the Ukrainian Constitution, there are three strategies through which Zelenskiy could dissolve the Ukrainian parliament. The first is if the Rada fails to build a coalition. Second is if there are no plenary meetings within thirty days of the start of the legislative session. Alternatively, the Rada could be dissolved if, after sixty days after the resignation of the Cabinet of Minister, it has not reformed.

According to Volodymyr Fesenko, a political scientist, such a dissolution is not possible right now because there are no norms on how the absence of a coalition set within the Regulations of the Rada. Fesenko also notes that “Before this, the president must hold consultations with the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada and heads of factions on the expediency of dissolution. And all this needs to be done within a few days, since, according to the Constitution, six months before the end of Rada’s powers (no later than May 27), it cannot be dissolved.”

If Fesenko is to be believed, dissolving the Rada would precede a political crisis. How does he know this? Because Yushchenko used this strategy in 2007. However, it was only achieved after compromise with the representatives of every parliamentary faction. According to writer Anastasia Zaremba, the problem is that Zelenskiy does not have any motivation to work with the current parliament. Due to his popularity, he can use his recent election to claim that the Rada is stonewalling him rather than choosing to work with his constructively.

Given Parubiy’s appeal to the Constitutional Court, observers will have to wait and see whether such a dissolution of the Rada is possible. As for Zelenskiy, his choice of advisors will likely prove whether or not this brief standoff will continue to endure for the foreseeable future.

President of Ukraine Moves to Disband Parliament was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2017, Catalonia held an illegal referendum on independence from Spain, despite it having been declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court. While 92% of referendum voters supported independence, only 43% of registered voters voted. Amid police crackdowns and massive protests, the Spanish National Court ordered the imprisonment of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, two Catalan separatist leaders. In spite of this, Catalonian MPs voted to declare independence. In response, Spain imposed direct rule over Catalonia. However, the situation is not as straightforward as many commentators make it seem, as vital information key to understanding the unrest has been overlooked.

Both the United States Senate and an independent study conducted by the George Washington University have claimed that Kremlin-connected media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik created “zombie accounts” or bots to perpetuate a negative perception of Spain in the days leading up to the referendum. Half of the stories shared by RT highlighted police violence to deliberately disrupt internal cohesion in Spain.

Spain is not Moscow’s only target, however. Over the last year, the E.U. East StratCom Task Force reported 993 reports of disinformation cases, 152 of which targeted the E.U. and originated from Russia. Furthermore, eighty-three percent of Europeans believe “fake news” is a danger to democracy.  Disinformation is on the rise, and there is ample evidence that Russian disinformation is part of an orchestrated campaign to overwhelm democracies and free media outlets. Coined by Russian expert Mark Galeotti, the “Gerasimov doctrine” is a colloquial term that refers to the employment of non-kinetic or non-military methods to achieve political ends—to destabilize the E.U. and NATO from within through the exploitation of existing social, ethnic, and religious divisions.  The so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” merely describes an operational concept and isn’t a reference to a Russian military doctrine.

For decades, the trans-Atlantic alliance has remained stable, but history is no guarantee of stability in perpetuity. Despite mostly positive support for NATO amongst the citizens of its member states, Russia seizes upon existing dissatisfaction felt by a minority of citizens and pushes messaging that employs terms like “occupying power” to describe the alliance. The same goes for the European Union. Member states regularly disagree over issues such as refugee resettlement, Russian sanctions, and the resurgence of nationalism across the continent. Such subjects are prime targets for Russian disinformation campaigns, which are disseminated by Kremlin-controlled media outlets like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik, as well as on fringe websites and social media accounts to amplify the message further.

Disinformation is challenging to counter, despite increasing and widespread awareness. Some European states like France have enacted laws that compel social networks to disclose the source of funding for sponsored political content and allow for candidates to sue for the removal of contested news reports during elections. In 2018, the E.U. enacted a non-binding disinformation code of practice, aimed at targeting “fake news” in upcoming European elections.

Such measures, however, are merely reactive and fail to anticipate the continually adapting strategies of disinformation purveyors. To avoid laws that target foreign influence campaigns, state-sponsored actors are buying political ads in local currency. Actors are increasingly adept at masking their locations and are moving towards image-based disinformation campaigns, which are less regulated and significantly more difficult to legislate.

Rather than perpetually being one step behind, Europe should emulate the strategies of states like Estonia that have been dealing with Russian disinformation campaigns for years. Rather than allow for Russian disinformation campaigns to gather steam, the websites such as the Estonia-based Propastop continuously debunk disinformation. The Estonian government also operates a Russian-language news channel to serve as an alternative to RT. Moreover, all Estonian politicians and public administration officers do not give interviews to Russian state-controlled media outlets. This strategy of national resilience is also strengthened by Estonia’s National Center for Defense and Security Awareness (NCDSA), a non-governmental organization that aims to foster a society that is resilient and resistant to hostile foreign influence.

France: The Yellow Vests

Counter-disinformation tactics must be adaptable because disinformation comes in many different forms. Catalonia and Estonia are not the only case studies by far. France, for example, is currently dealing with an enormous surge of anti-government protestors who disagreed vehemently with an increase on the gas tax. These protestors are better known by their moniker “yellow vests.” Although the demonstrators’ original demand of suspending the gas tax increase was met, the next day, more than 125,000 yellow vest protestors took to the streets, clashing with police and looting stores as they went.

According to New Knowledge, 340 pro-Kremlin accounts created and magnified “the brutality of the French police, Macron’s inability to lead the nation, and anti-NATO or anti-migrant sentiments more than 20,000 times.” Since late October 2017, these accounts have posted at least 1,600 times a day on Twitter, retweeting false information to increase its believability. These accounts, as well as others, impersonated journalists and legitimate news outlets to craft a narrative of France being embroiled in a civil war and blaming Macron for its onset.

What does the Kremlin hope to accomplish through its disinformation campaigns in France? Ultimately, Russia wants to undermine the French government’s ability to govern effectively. If the French government’s focus is entirely domestic, it can no longer point fingers at Russia, continue its sanctions regime, and pose any serious threat to Russia. By amplifying societal discontent in France with disinformation through social media, Russia is creating a reality where French democracy is indeed under threat. As the yellow vest protests continue, it remains to be seen whether or not Russia has achieved its goals.

Georgia: Disinformation as the Status Quo

Unfortunately, Russian disinformation in Georgia is nothing new. During the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the former launched an intense pro-Russian propaganda campaign to spread claims that the Georgian government was violating the human rights of Russian speakers in Georgia. Although the accusations were widely discredited, they were used by Russia to justify the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While Georgian politicians are aware of threat Russian disinformation poses, they lack the political will to enact meaningful countermeasures.

According to the Georgia-based Media Development Foundation (MDF), this lack of response may be problematic given that almost 2000 anti-Western messages were detected throughout Georgian media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016, when most of the Russian disinformation campaign was centered on human rights, the dominant topic in 2017 was the polarization of the Georgian domestic political landscape. Pro-Kremlin actors focused on targeting everyday Georgian’s perceived loss of national identity paired with demonizing rhetoric of the U.S., NATO, and the E.U.

Russia’s disinformation campaigns in Georgia are based on a three-part strategy. First, create a threat. Second, foster distrust of Georgia’s Western allies and partners. Third, reinstate and reinforce the belief that Russia is the sole trustworthy partner. Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia used fake photos and videos to encourage conspiratorial thinking and increase radicalism in groups like Georgian Neo-Nazi parties. One example of this tactic is the “lab of death” narrative, where it was claimed that a U.S.-funded laboratory in Georgia which was giving untested drugs to Georgians, causing them to die.

In Georgia, the goal of such disinformation campaigns is quite different than in France. As Georgia is not presently a member of the E.U., the bulk of Russian messaging is intended to ensure that will never happen. Russia sees Georgia as lying within its sphere of influence, and any attempt to align with the West is seen as a threat. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war, for example, is primarily seen as the driver behind Georgia’s push to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan.

Despite the troubled relationship between the two countries, Georgia has adopted a pragmatic approach for its foreign policy, where it has downplayed tensions with Russia and even is in talks to create trade corridors through the frozen conflict zones of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Again, Russia’s disinformation campaigns are having the desired impact. Despite Georgia’s westward orientation, Tbilisi continues to adopt a less aggressive and more pacifist tone towards Moscow.

Europe Needs to Fight Back

From Western Europe to the Eastern Neighborhood, disinformation campaigns are having a severe impact on societal cohesion. In France, the “yellow vest” protests are ongoing. In Georgia, right-wing radicalism is on the rise, threatening Georgia’s turn to the West. Disinformation is even suspected to be involved with Brexit, and the recent German parliamentary election. In this hostile environment, Europe must reorient itself and learn from the E.U. East Stratcom Task Force and Estonia. Otherwise, the E.U. risks further fragmentation within itself and other Western democracies.

Russia’s campaigns are succeeding within Europe because countries are not adopting the appropriate countermeasures. Instead of simply acknowledging that disinformation is a problem, European countries must take proactive measures to debunk Russian propaganda. The E.U.’s East Stratcom Task Force is already doing much of this work, but it could receive further funding and publicity from all E.U. member states.

Counter-disinformation efforts can only be successful if they are marketed effectively. Furthermore, European countries ought to create more societal resilience programs, modeling them off the Estonian model. While not every European country has a Russian-speaking minority, each has segments of disenfranchised people who are vulnerable to disinformation. Put bluntly, the best way to combat the current successes of Russian disinformation is to fight back.

How Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns are Succeeding in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is hardly surprising to many—Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn has been espousing an anti-European and pro-Russian campaign for some time now. While Hungary has not outright rejected all of Europe’s values, he is firmly against immigration and increasingly receptive towards the overtures of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia agrees to supply Hungary with natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline—bypassing Ukraine.

The European Union imports the majority of its natural gas from Russia. For some time, this relationship has relied on the free flow of gas through Ukraine. In recent years, the trading relationship between the E.U. and Russia has been under increasing strain due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and rising prices.

For Eastern European member-states, this has meant a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to energy acquisition. Therefore, it will be critical to monitor a recently signed agreement under which Russia will supply natural gas to Hungary beginning in 2020, “regardless of agreements on gas transit between Moscow and Kiev.”

The gas transit arrangement between Russia and Ukraine will expire at the end of 2019. Given that Ukraine and Russia remain in a de facto state of war, it is unlikely that a new transit agreement will be implemented. What does this mean for Hungarian natural gas imports? According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian gas exports to Hungary will transit via the TurkStream pipeline.

Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is growing.

Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is an increasingly contentious issue in the realm of international relations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline—a project led by Gazprom—will directly connect Germany with Russia, bypassing Ukraine.

Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 has been repeatedly criticized by the United States. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both strongly opposed the pipeline because Nord Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependency on Russian energy while simultaneously harming Ukraine’s economic and national security.

It’s not likely that Russia would move to cut off European gas supplies if the E.U. failed to support specific policies, but the possibility is nevertheless a matter of concern for both European and American policymakers. Furthermore—beyond the energy sector—further amelioration in an already warm Hungary-Russia relationship is a matter of concern for the E.U. as many worry Hungary could serve as a Trojan horse in an increasingly fragmented European Union.

Why does the Hungarian-Russian relationship matter?

The European Union is based on the principle that democratic states are stronger and more peaceful when they act together rather than alone. Unfortunately, for the past few years, neither the E.U. nor Hungary has seen eye-to-eye.

Under Prime Minister Orbàn, Hungary has been accused of breaching democratic norms. Orbàn’s government has severely weakened the plurality of the country’s media while cracking down on civil society as well as educational freedom. Orbàn has touted Hungary as Europe’s first “illiberal democracy,” going so far as to object to E.U. sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, in June 2018, Hungary was the only E.U. member to vote against providing increased aid to Ukraine.

The destabilization of the European Union and other Western institutions is a crucial objective for the Kremlin, and one that has been successful with regards to Hungary. Natural gas deals that thumb the nose at the European Union coupled with Orbàn’s anti-European rhetoric all act in Putin’s favor. Even more concerning is the International Investment Bank (IIB)’s imminent move to Hungary.

The IIB is a Moscow-based development bank that is seen by many European officials as a cover through which Russia can subvert European institutions. Orbàn has already granted the IIB immunity from any regulatory or prosecutorial authority and has accorded IIB officials with diplomatic status in Hungary. For European and American policymakers, the Hungarian-Russian relationship is one that merits increased scrutiny for the foreseeable future.

Hungary’s Relationship with Russia Poses a Risk for Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such rhetoric is unusual for the head of state of a country that claims to have brotherly relations with the Russian Federation and is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU)—but not necessarily surprising.

Belarus and the European Union: Embargoes, Diplomacy, and Slow Progress

Belarus and the European Union have been steadily increasing their cooperation for several years. In 2019, Belarus welcomed the foreign ministers of both Hungary and Austria to the country to assist them in opening embassies. These visits, in conjunction with high-level diplomatic visits to Italy and Poland by Belarusian officials, reveals, more than anything, Belarus’ willingness to work with the West—and hedge against Russia.

While it’s likely that economic matters are pushing Belarus to work more closely with the E.U., the growing state of rapprochement is nevertheless a positive development. Increased trade and investment between Belarus and the E.U. will provide more opportunities for social, political, and economic engagement.

Despite the overall improvement in E.U.-Belarus relations, there’s been little to show in terms of concrete partnership agreements. This primarily has to do with Lithuanian concerns over a Belarusian power plant located close to the city of Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital. Lithuania has repeatedly pushed for the power plant’s closure, citing risks to the safety and well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, some European states continue to impose new conditions in the ongoing negotiations for visa-free travel.

The European Union has a policy of promoting and advocating for human rights and democracy in Belarus. It encourages these values by introducing new mechanisms and so-called “democratic” clauses into negotiations with Belarus to induce changes to Belarusian policies that don’t align with European values. Belarus’ continued use of capital punishment is a particularly contentious issue for the E.U.

Belarus and Russia: An Enduring But Turbulent Relationship

Despite the close bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus, the two countries have recently been increasingly at odds with one another. In January of 2019, Russia began to gradually increase its mineral extraction tax and reduce its oil export duty. While this is undoubtedly financially beneficial for Russia, it means that Belarus will lose one of the main benefits of its relationship with Russia: cheap oil and revenue from Russian oil duties. Over the next five years, Belarus is expected to lose eight to twelve billion dollars (U.S.)—even as it remains dependent on Russian oil and gas.

In spite of this disagreement, however, Russia and Belarus continue to engage in negotiations to further the implementation of the 1999 Union State Treaty, which established goals of introducing a single currency, customs regulations, courts, and legislative chambers for Russia and Belarus.

Where Does This Leave Belarus?

It’s unlikely that Belarus would willingly cede its sovereignty. Perhaps most importantly, entering into a union with Russia would mean giving up much of the power he currently enjoys. Moreover, there is no strong political will for a Russia-Belarus union.

When looking at Belarus’ relationship with the European Union alongside its relationship with Russia, it comes as no surprise that Lukashenko himself is walking a tight rope. On one hand, Belarus’s traditional slant has always been towards Russia and Eurasia. However, the E.U. can offer much in the way of trade, energy, and economic diversification—and is a way for Minsk to hedge against deterioration of its relationship with Moscow. For two decades, Belarus has played a game of “Monkey in the Middle.” Amidst increasing tensions between Russia and the West, however, it remains to be seen how much longer it can continue to do so.

Belarus: The State in the Middle was originally published on Global Security Review.

While not as traditional as the president’s New Years Address, the State of the Nation speeches an important signal of what is to come domestically as well as what the international community can expect from Russia in the upcoming year.

Putin focused heavily on domestic matters

While it might seem counterintuitive for Putin to concentrate on internal affairs when Russia is essentially seen in the West as an international pariah, he proceeded to do so nevertheless. The reasoning behind this is likely due to his public approval ratings, which have been in a steady free-fall since October of 2018.

Putin’s approval ratings, rather than being a reflection of public sentiment towards Putin’s performance as president, are instead an indicator of widespread dissatisfaction over recently-enacted pension reforms. To deflect blame, Putin reached into the standard “strongman” leader’s toolkit, stating that “[Russian] development projects are not federal, and even less so agency-based. They are national.” To paraphrase, any failures shouldn’t be attributed to the Kremlin.

Conversely, the Kremlin is to be credited for any policies that are viewed more favorable, such as subsidies for children, new hospitals, and tax-breaks for construction companies. Putin’s rejection of responsibility for policy failures while simultaneously taking credit for any-and-all successes exemplifies his use of rhetoric to deflect blame and negative feedback.

Putin drew unexpected attention to Russia’s high poverty rate

Even as poverty in Russia is, overall, decreasing, the poverty rate is estimated to remain above 13 percent for the next three years. In his “State of the Nation” speech, Putin announced that social programs would be implemented to help those living in poverty work their way out.

As for poverty caused by corruption, Putin stated that “[the Kremlin] will draw the appropriate conclusions about the work quality and performance at all levels of executive power.” In short, he is saying that those who step out of line will be fired.

Putin also focused on the issue of medical care in Russia, explicitly drawing the attention of listeners to how poor the country’s healthcare was in the 1990s in contrast with how much the system has improved since then. Importantly, he did not mention continued difficulties within the current Russian system, choosing instead to draw attention to problems with municipal waste, which, coincidentally, is connected to the son of the Russian Prosecutor General, Igor Chaika.

Unsurprisingly, Putin emphasized the importance of cultural history and educational improvements. Given Russia’s continuous focus on valorizing its history as well as keeping a careful eye on possible “traitors” from an early age, this statement wasn’t particularly unexpected.

One item of note, however, was Putin’s proposal to exempt from taxation not only medical and educational institutions, but also regional museums, theaters, and libraries. In typical form, Putin provided few details about how precisely this proposal would work.

There was hardly any mention of “active measures.”

In terms of foreign affairs, Putin opted out of discussing accusations of ongoing Russian election interference and Kremlin-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Instead, Putin merely said that he hopes the relationship between Europe and Russia can return to one of cooperation—a statement that frames European leaders within Russia as impeding progress.

Moreover, Putin explicitly refuted all American accusations regarding the INF Treaty and simplified the matter into a single sentence: “Russia does not intend to deploy such missiles in Europe first,” although U.S. and NATO officials have accused Russia of doing just that.

Russia is here to stay

The last two paragraphs of Putin’s speech are unquestioningly aimed at the Russians. “Solidarity in striving for change,” and “a unified society”are both phrases that imply that all Russians need to stand together going forward. Even while Putin suggested that peace is essential for Russian development, whether or not peace will continue to allow him to remain in power is another question altogether.

To foreign leaders, Putin is unsubtly reestablishing his control over Russian society, as well as not-so-coincidentally highlighting Russia’s missile capabilities just before the speech ending. In sum, Putin’s 2019 “State of the Nation” address is a warning to both Russians and the international community: Russia will continue to see itself a global player with influence and won’t tolerate any attempt to curtail its ambitions.

Putin’s “State of the Nation” Speech, Examined was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war in the Donbas has been in a state of frozen conflict since May of 2014. As the upcoming Ukrainian presidential elections near, many have started to wonder what the future holds for the Donbas.

Since the conflict originated in 2014, more than 10,000 people have been killed and over one million have been displaced. Unfortunately, Assistant Secretary-General Miroslav Jenca, a United Nations official associated with the ongoing Minsk accords, acknowledged that negotiations“appear to have lost momentum.”

Ukraine’s Options Going Forward

If the UN-backed negotiations have effectively stalled, Ukraine must evaluate its alternatives. There are over 44 candidates who hold varying views as to what the country’s options are. In the running for the presidency is the incumbent President Petro Poroshenko, the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky, and the former Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Boyko. For Zelensky and others, the answer is direct democracy. Zelensky argues the solution is for Ukraine to hold a referendum on the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine’s current President Poroshenko has opted to push for an international peacekeeping solution, calling for a UN-backed mandate. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, has a much more aggressive proposal. Her plan focuses on economic modernization, job creation, and reconstruction efforts for the Donbas region and tougher sanctions on Russia. She has spoken out against amnesty proposals for separatist fighters within the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, both of which are backed by Moscow. Tymoshenko has also criticized the “special status” policy that was adopted for the Donbas region under the Minsk Two protocol.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland have earmarked some $14 million (USD) for Ukraine as part of a UN project to “promote social cohesion and strengthen regional governance in eastern Ukraine.” While the three governments providing the funds likely expect it to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict, how that money is spent, however, very much depends on the candidate in office.

Poroshenko Seeks Greater Euro-Atlantic Integration for Ukraine

It’s no surprise that Poroshenko seeks closer ties with the West — even going so far as to pass a Constitutional amendment that reflects Ukraine’s E.U. and NATO aspirations. Poroshenko likely believes that if Ukraine is more closely aligned with Western institutions, Russian aggression will, at the very least, be tempered. In fact, Poroshenko has stated that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas is due to Ukrainian politicians “talking about the necessity for Ukraine to… stay away from all alliances.”

However, there are a number of practical obstacles to achieving this reality. First is the question of Ukraine’s disputed territory. If Poroshenko believes that NATO membership will induce the alliance to intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, he is mistaken. The fact remains that many NATO members would likely not support Ukrainian membership in the alliance precisely due to the disputed nature of the country’s territory.

The Ukrainian Conflict Will Remain Frozen for the Foreseeable Future

There is no incentive for either side to seriously engage in meaningful negotiations. The gap between expectation and reality is widening. If a candidate such as Tymoshenko emerges as Ukraine’s next president, as some election observers suggest, the gap between expectation and reality will only widen further.

Similar to the case of the Republic of Georgia’s disputed South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, neither side has any reason to try and alter the status quo. Going forward, absent a major “black swan” event, the Donbas will continue to play host to a frozen conflict with little chance for a negotiated settlement.

The Future of the War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of Ukrainian state capture, Russian corruption, and bribery in other Eastern European and Central Asian states are on the rise. In all of the countries survey, only one country scores over 50 out of 100 points, with the average of countries only averaging a score of 35.

What’s the relationship between corruption and security?

Corruption undermines democratic consolidation and leads to voter disenfranchisement. This results in an overall lack of political will to combat illicit behavior in the public sector. In many Eastern European countries, history has provided few institutional checks and balances.

According to Transparency International, “one of the biggest impediments to fighting corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is state capture, where powerful individuals or groups seize control of national decision-making and use corrupt means to circumvent justice.”

It is unlikely that Eurasia will see widespread democratic stability in the near future, with countries like Azerbaijan (scoring 25), Russia (28), Kazakhstan (31), Kosovo (37), Serbia (39), and Montenegro (45) dropping in rank or continuing to stagnate.

While there are exceptions such as Ukraine’s increase from 30 in 2017 to 32 in 2018, given Ukraine’s weak enforcement of anti-corruption reforms enacted in 2014, any improvement is more superficial than it is long-lasting.

What’s wrong with the status quo?

For many, state capture and corruption have been everyday factors of life for the past two decades. Some see the status quo as essential for maintaining stability. Implementing a more equitable system carries a host of risks—from public trials to long-term imprisonment. For many in the ruling class, retaining current systems of informal governance seemingly carries zero cost.

However, the populist wave of 2018 might say otherwise. As voter frustration with corruption continues to rise, so too will their impatience with those currently in power. Leaders that rode those waves of anti-corruption legislation—such as Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan—must now follow through on their campaign promises, lest they risk being thrown out themselves.

Even countries like Russia, which have more entrenched systems of corruption, are beginning to see popular discontent. According to Russian’s Public Opinion Research Center, trust in Russian President Vladimir Putin has fallen to an all-time low since 2006.

While much of this can be attributed to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, observers must also take into account public disapproval over an increase in the retirement age and growing frustration with U.S. and European sanctions.

Corruption isn’t just a domestic concern—the extent to which corruption dictates domestic policies inherently affects domestic and regional stability and security. Therefore, endemic corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia doesn’t bode well for democratic cohesion and international support for human rights.

Corruption in Eastern Europe & Central Asia Is On the Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

Around 10,000 people attended these protests, an unprecedented number for Ingushetia, where the population is just over 450,000. The protests stemmed from a lack of public deliberation regarding the bill and a history of adverse sentiments concerning land swaps. Furthermore, the text of the agreement was not published, and some members of the Ingush Parliament have issued statements saying that their signatures were falsified.

Protestors also argued that the ratification of the bill should be nullified because the Russian Constitution requires a public referendum on all territory changes. According to official media, the bill swapped allegedly uninhabitable lands in Chechnya’s Nadterechny District and Ingushetia’s Malgobeksky District. However, the equality of the swap was very much in question, as Chechnya is taking control of 25 times more land than Ingushetia.

As protests grew, demonstrators began demanding Yevkurov’s resignation. While he did not resign, his government put forth several alternatives to the nullification of the land swap agreement. Eight days of demonstrations were allowed by the government of Ingushetia, which also outlawed the use of force against protestors. This drastically reduced fears of a police crackdown that had been predicted by many international human rights groups including Amnesty International.

Ingushetia and Chechnya Have a History of Border Disputes

For the Ingush, the mere idea of a land swap brings up painful memories. North Ossetia gained control over the Prigorodny district in 1991, which resulted in an ethnic cleansing that claimed the lives of 600 Ingush. The border dispute between Chechnya and Ingushetia is similarly nothing new, it has remained unresolved since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was divided into Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1991.

While the Republic of Ingushetia joined the Russian Federation, Chechnya chose to declare its independence from Russia twice but failed on both counts. Despite this, then Ingush-President Ruslan Aushev and the then-President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzokhar Dudayev, signed a border demarcation agreement in 1993. Even though the deal wasn’t ratified, it set a precedent whereby the majority of the Sunzhensky District remained within Ingushetia.

In March 2003, then-President of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, and then-Ingush leader Murad Zyazyko signed a similar agreement. It followed the precedent of the Aushev-Dudayev agreement, giving full jurisdiction over the Sunzhensky District to Ingushetia while entitling Chechnya to the settlements of Assinovskaya and Sernovodsk. While disagreement remains between Chechnya and Ingushetia, these two agreements served to appease the local populations.

However, since Ramzan Kadyrov took power in Chechnya in 2006, the norms in the Northern Caucasus have shifted. The Kremlin implicitly handed the reins over to Kadyrov within Chechnya, and in doing so, allowed his authoritarian style of governance to continue as long as Chechnya remained peaceful. This is seemingly at-odds with Kadyrov’s interest in pursuing regional power and interference within Ingushetia. In 2012, three Chechen militants were killed in the Ingush village of Galashki. A year later, six Ingush police officers were killed when 300 Chechen security Spetznaz (special forces) entered the town of Arshty.

That same year, Kadyrov introduced an amendment to the Chechen Constitution which asserted Chechen claims to six further settlements in the disputed Sunzhensky District (Voznesenskoye, Karabulak, Nesterovskoye, Sleptsovskoye, Troitskoye, and Chemulga). This particular incident caused serious friction between the two republics and ultimately had to be resolved with the Kremlin’s mediation.

What Prompted the Chechen-Ingush Land Swap?

In August, construction began on a road that would lead into the Sunzhensky district, leading many to fear expansionism by Chechnya. Other reports have cited the construction of a Chechen border post in the village of Arshty, which is two kilometers past the border with Ingushetia. These actions may have convinced Yevkurov that it was better to avoid escalation and settle with a land swap.

Some local commentators have expressed concerns that Kadyrov is using the land swap as a tactic to assume control over Ingushetia with the Kremlin’s consent. Given his experience with pacifying Chechnya, Kadyrov could easily offer to similarly pacify Ingushetia, taking a burden off the Kremlin’s shoulders. According to Russian political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin, “Kadyrov can afford what Yevkurov, for example, cannot. Kadyrov is active, he is increasing political weight and has ambitious plans. Kadyrov is pushing his interests and, apparently, not without the support of Moscow.”

Perhaps the main reason why the Kremlin has been so supportive of Kadyrov is the fear of a resurgence of radicalism in the North Caucasus. Chechnya was a source of substantial regional instability throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Kadyrov’s actions have since brought Chechnya under control, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by the Kremlin. Accordingly, they may feel the need to reward Kadyrov, to ensure his loyalty during a possible future uprising in Dagestan, where the Kremlin has been purging local elites. As such, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has recently said “the Kremlin is closely following the situation,” but stated that it is a regional issue rather than a federal one.

In all likelihood, the protests in Ingushetia won’t amount to much, at least in the near-term. However, the land swap raises the probability of future instability within the North Caucasus region as a whole. With Chechen minorities in both Dagestan and Ingushetia, there is a significant chance that Kadyrov could choose to use the same rationale that Russia adopted in Crimea to seize land and gain more power for himself.

Russia Can’t Afford Another Crisis in the Caucasus

Given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s low approval ratings, any instability or deterioration of security in the Caucasus is bad for Moscow. It is difficult to forecast how tensions in the North Caucasus will be managed. The Kremlin has yet another volatile matter on its list of problems, which includes Crimea and Ukraine, poor turnout in recent gubernatorial elections, ongoing sanctions, and poor public approval.

Protestors have planned to travel around Ingushetia and inform citizens of this agreement and submit please to local courts, the Council of Europe, the UN, and the Islamic League to have the border agreement nullified. Despite these protests, the border agreement came into force on October 16, 2018, with Kadyrov decrying attempts against the deal as “inadmissible and futile.”

However, Ingushetia’s Constitutional Court declared on October 30 that the land swap was illegal. The Court decreed that any changes to the territory of Ingushetia require a referendum, which wasn’t held in the case of the Chechen-Ingush land swap. However, rather than stating that the agreement was invalid, the judge referred the matter to the Russian Constitutional Court.

On December 6, Russia’s Constitutional Court upheld the land transfer as legitimate, further stating that Ingushetia’s Constitutional Court lacked the jurisdiction to make any judgments on the matter. As of yet, there has been little reporting of further discontent in the Caucasus, but the long-term implications of the Chechen-Ingush land swap remain to be seen.

Border Dispute Between Chechnya and Ingushetia Threatens Regional Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sanctions were first imposed in 2014 when the United States and European Union imposed visa restrictions and asset freezes on Russian officials in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in Ukraine.

Despite these sanctions, however, there appears to have been no change in Russian behavior. Given that the point of these restrictions was to change Russia’s rogue state mindset vis-à-vis Ukraine and interference in other states, it begs the question of how effective these measures are.

Russia has failed to change its behavior as the result of sanctions.

Russian activity in Syria has increased while Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns in the U.S. and European countries show no signs of decline. In 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England. Despite the evidence and testimony from chemical weapons experts, Russia continues to deny its involvement in the affair.

Lastly, if there is an event that is clear evidence that sanctions aren’t affecting changes in Russian foreign policy, it is the recent naval confrontation in the Kerch Strait. On November 25, 2018, a Russian Coast Guard vessel rammed a Ukrainian Navy tugboat — resulting in a series of dangerous actions as both Ukraine and Russia refused to back down, behavior that could have rapidly escalated the situation.

If sanctions had been effective, one might expect that such an action (i.e., the ramming of a Ukrainian Navy vessel) would have been deterred. By that logic, it’s reasonable to assume that the U.S. and E.U. would impose even more sanctions if Russia continued its pattern of behavior.

However, sanctions aren’t working.

Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia are targeted at the Russian elite, as a significant portion of Putin’s support base is comprised of then. It is believed that if Putin’s support base — mainly consisting of oligarchs whose fortunes are dependent upon the Kremlin — lost their ability to access funds and travel to Europe and North America — they would then demand Putin take steps to reverse his foreign policy.

However, that strategy doesn’t seem to be working in the way that Western states assumed it would. In fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia became the second-largest arms producer this year. Russia’s production rate is up 8.5 percent from 2017, which on an annual basis amounts to approximately $37.7 billion in weapons. India and China, both of which have purchased units of the S-400 air defense systems in the last year, are large buyers of Russian-produced arms.

The logic of Western sanctions fails to account for Russia’s political system.

Western sanctions don’t work because they fundamentally misunderstand the structure of Russia’s political system. In Russia, Putin gives the elites access to funding in exchange for their support and punishes those who step out of line, such as former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Such examples convince Russian elites and oligarchs alike that stepping out of line is not worth it. No matter the annoyances that come from Western sanctions, those are still not comparable to the negative reaction that would arise if they spoke out against Putin.

Companies owned or controlled by dissenting oligarchs could lose state support or funding, with the oligarchs themselves having political corruption and tax-evasion charges brought against them. Furthermore, the non-elite segments of the Russian population perceive sanctions as an aggressive tactic employed by the West to weaken Russia. In essence, Russia’s current political system rewards those who remain in line with the Kremlin — the consequences for speaking out are too high. At their current levels, sanctions will remain largely symbolic and will not lead to a reform of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Why Russian Sanctions are Ineffective was originally published on Global Security Review.

After a contentious election and subsequent runoff, Salome Zurabishvili claimed victory as the next President of Georgia. The 2018 Georgian Presidential Elections mark the final stage in a process introduced by former President Mikhail Saakashvili that aims to shift Georgia’s system of governance from a presidential to a parliamentary-based state. Georgia’s new president, Zurabishvili, will be the last elected via a direct popular vote. From this point on, executive power will rest almost exclusively with the Prime Minister.

Why is Georgia’s introducing constitutional reforms?

Changing the system of governance is meant to stop some of the more flagrant abuses of power that were formerly exercised by the ruling elite. The constitutional reforms effectively transfer executive power from the president to parliament. In Georgia, however, this will result in the ruling Georgian Dream party having substantial political power. Georgian Dream currently holds 115 out of the 150 seats and the next parliamentary elections are set to be held in 2020.

Additionally, the constitutional reforms will change how the president and members of parliament elected. The president, until now, were elected via popular vote. Going forward, Georgian presidents will will now be elected from a college of political officials, somewhat similar to the Electoral College in the United States.

Members of parliament will no longer be allowed to form electoral blocs, making it difficult (if not impossible) for smaller parties to meet the five percent threshold required for a party to be seated in parliament. Even more controversial is a new rule that will give unallocated seats to the majority party if the five percent threshold isn’t met by the party that won those seats.

Despite the loss of the presidency’s political authority, the elections garnered significant attention worldwide.

While the presidency will lose much of its power, the opposition party contends that the election was ‘stolen.’ Even with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker supporting the results of the election, Grigol Vashadze, the opposition candidate, refused to accept the results.

Around 25,000 gathered in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, to protest Zurabishvili’s election to the presidency and demanding snap parliamentary elections. More than 60 percent of Georgians claimed that they either did not understand the constitutional reforms or they did not agree with them. Former President Saakashvili, who now lives in the Netherlands, claimed the vote was rigged. There were allegations of fraud while others complained that by purchasing the debts of 600,000 people, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and funder of the Georgian Dream, was essentially buying votes for his candidate of choice.

International observers characterized the election as “free but unfair.” The main cause of concern? The 600,000 people whose debt was purchased by Ivanishvili. Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze personally announced the policy, which applied to nearly one-third of the entire adult population of Georgia. In essence, Ivanishvili offered to buy back the debt of much of the Georgian voting population. However, even while domestic politicians claim that the vote was rigged, no international observers have stated that the election itself was illegitimate.

Going forward, it’s likely international observers will call for peaceful protests but will urge acceptance of the result. The opposition will continue to fight against what it perceives was an unfair and illegitimate election. While there has been negligible signs of interference, Western governments should closely monitor for any malicious or hostile interference. Such a possibility isn’t unlikely, given Russia’s history of exploiting internal divisions in the post-Soviet space.

Georgian Constitutional Reforms Alter Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine claims to have informed the Russian coastguard ahead of time, a Russian ship nevertheless proceeded fire upon, and subsequently ram one of the Ukrainian ships, injuring six sailors. Russia accused the ships of acting recklessly and of illegally entering Russian territorial waters.

Tensions have been rising since Russia’s construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge in May 2018.

The bridge, which crosses the Strait to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula serves as an on-demand economic blockade of the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, both of which are located on the Sea of Azov. Ships carrying export goods from either port must pass through the Kerch Strait, and under the bridge, to reach their destinations.

Furthermore, the bridge is too low for some Ukrainian ships to pass under at all. While both Russia and Ukraine routinely accuse the other of harassing their respectively-flagged ships, the Kerch Strait bridge has had an impact on trade from the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Ukraine claims that trade from these ports has decreased by 30 percent since Russia began harrassing Ukrainian ships. While traffic has resumed as of Monday, November 26, tensions remain high.

Ukraine Declares Martial Law

Following the incident, Ukraine called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, demanding increased sanctions. Domestically, Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council recommended imposing martial law for sixty days.

The imposition of martial law is something that has never occurred, despite the past four years of Crimean annexation and continued violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Legally, this makes sense. While Russia never admitted guilt for the Crimean annexation and the violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, Russian actions here are quite public.

Martial law serves Poroshenko in more ways than one. The upcoming Ukrainian presidential election is set for March 31, 2019. Presidential elections cannot be held under martial law. On November 26th, one day after the incident, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favor of imposing martial law, albeit for a period of thirty days rather than the initially proposed sixty.

Furthermore, martial law was imposed in the coastal regions of Ukraine and in the regions bordering Russia and the breakaway Moldovan province of Transniestria (where Russian troops are stationed), rather than throughout the entire country.

As of now, Poroshenko stands in third place in presidential election polls. He is trailing behind former populist prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky. Looked at from that perspective, it's possible that Poroshenko may be looking to increase support for his presidency—or at least decrease support for his opponents—before the election through the imposition of martial law.

Putin may think he also stands to benefit from escalating tensions with Ukraine.

Putin’s popularity in Russia has been declining for the past year. His approval ratings took a particularly substantial hit following the implementation of pension reforms that raised the retirement age.

Putin's party, United Russia, also suffered four election losses in Russia’s countryside recently. Stirring up feelings of nationalism may serve to boost Putin’s domestic approval ratings and act as a distraction for the many Russians who are unhappy with the current status quo.

It does not serve Putin or Poroshenko to engage in a full-blown conflict. Escalating tensions to that extent would result in significant increases in civilian casualties and would almost certainly heighten tensions dramatically between Russia and the West. Raising the stakes—at least in the short term—benefits both presidents' interests.

Escalation in the Sea of Azov Benefits Putin and Poroshenko was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 11, elections will be held in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR, respectively). The outcome of the elections will determine the heads of government and state in both regions.

Western governments have strongly criticized the upcoming elections, and have urged Russian President Vladimir Putin not to recognize their results. Not only will the elections disrupt the Minsk process, threatening the increasingly unstable status quo in the region, they provide an air of legitimacy to the Russian-backed separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, allowing for a further consolidation of power.

Are the elections in violations of the Minsk Agreements?

European governments and the U.S. strongly disagree with the Kremlin over the legality of the DPR and LPR elections. The Ukrainian government—which sees the elections as violating both Ukrainian law and the Minsk Agreements—has already stated that it will not recognize the results. The United States and the European Union have also indicated they will not consider the results to be legitimate.

According to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the E.U. for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “all steps that would obstruct the advancement of the implementation of the Minsk agreement must be avoided.” The Minsk agreements state that elections must be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and be monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Kremlin-backed DPR leadership has rejected all criticism of the election, arguing that the Minsk Agreements only mention municipal elections, and as such, all criticism is “baseless” and the elections have a “solid foundation.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to answer questions whether Russia will recognize the results of the upcoming elections.

Filling the power vacuum in the Donbass

Some consider the upcoming elections as necessary to fill the power vacuum left after the assassination of Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko in August 2018. Zakharchenko himself had previously postponed these elections for an indefinite period.

The identities of those behind Zakharchenko’s assassination remain unknown but there is rampant speculation. A popular theory attributes the assassination to Kremlin dissatisfaction with the corruption in the Donbass enabled by Zakharchenko and his right-hand man, Aleksandr Timofeyev. Russia and Ukraine have blamed each other for the murder.

Replacing Zakharchenko was not a complicated endeavor. Zakharchenko symbolized separatism in Eastern Ukraine and seemed to be genuinely respected by many in the Donbass region. Initially, Dmitry Trapeznikov was appointed as a successor. He was fired just days after his appointment by the Prosecutor General. Trapeznikov was replaced by Denis Pushilin, the former speaker of the DPR parliament.

Trapeznikov’s ouster, as well as Timofeyev’s swift disappearence from the political scene, were followed by a statement from Aleksei Chesnakov, a close associate of Russian presidential aid Vladislav Surkov. In his statement, Chesnakov blamed Timofeyev for ongoing corruption and criticized Trapeznikov for his lack of a legal mandate.

Pushilin—currently the acting prime minister and the presidential frontrunner—has ties to MMM, an infamous pyramid scheme that deprived millions of citizens across the former Soviet Union of their savings during the U.S.S.R.’s collapse and its aftermath in the 1990s. Despite his low popularity, Pushilin has enjoyed the Kremlin’s full support in the run-up to Sunday’s vote.

Viable presidential candidates have fallen out of the running.

The election campaign in Donetsk has been rather turbulent. Viable presidential candidates such as Alexandr Khodakovksy and Pavel Gubarev were quickly dismissed out of the running. Khodakovsky, who stood a real chance for the position, was not allowed into Donetsk on the date he needed to register as a candidate.

Pavel Gubarev did not collect enough valid signatures, according to the election commission. Igor Strelkov was disqualified on the basis of being a Russian citizen. Pavel Gubarev, one of the first political leaders of the 2014 separatist movement, was denied registration for not having collected enough valid signatures. It is interesting to note that the removal of strong candidates was accompanied by PR efforts to restore Pushilin’s reputation, and to position him as continuing the mission of Zakharchenko.

As a result, on November 11, only four relatively unknown candidates will be competing with Pushilin for the presidency: Vladimir Medvedev (deputy education minister of the DPR), Roman Yevstifeyev (head of the Museum of Afghan Veterans), Elena Shishkina (chairwoman of the Ukrainian People’s Tribunal for the Government of Ukraine), and Roman Khramenkov (former mayor of Yenakiieve and Horlivka).

Moscow’s approach

According to U.S. deputy ambassador Jonathan Cohen, the Kremlin is using the elections to support the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk, which are, in his words, “inseparable from the illegal armed groups controlled by Moscow.” Pushilin is considered to be less impulsive and more manageable for Moscow than Zakharchenko.

Given the Kremlin’s steadfast support for Pushilin, as well as a campaign to restore Pushilin’s reputation in the run-up to the elections, it is clear that Moscow views the Donbass elections as extremely important—whether it officially recognizes the outcome or not.

It is likely that Pushilin will claim victory on November 11. Less certain, however, is whether he will continue to abide by the spirit of the Minsk Agreements, which have been gridlocked for months. The most likely scenario is that nothing will change, breaches of ceasefires will continue, and Moscow—with its preferred candidate leading DPR—will continue pulling the strings of Eastern Ukraine.

Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius are analysts at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of HCSS.

November Elections in Eastern Ukraine Unlikely to Bring Major Change was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has substantially increased its presence in Black Sea since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Under Russian administration, Crimea plays host to Bastion and Bal coastal defense systems that both employ anti-ship missiles. Conceivably, the Bastion system can reach the Black Sea straits as well as Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish ports.

Russia has also deployed S-400 air defense systems to the peninsula with the capability to target strategic bombers, ballistic, and cruise missiles as well as surface targets. The S-400 system is further enhanced by the Pantsyr S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun system which was provided to the Crimean air defense forces.

Through these measures, Russia has established an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone over the Black Sea. The establishment of this A2/AD zone means Russia has the capability to block NATO access to the Black Sea. Granted, NATO's presence in the Black Sea is limited, but the threat remains nevertheless.

Russia's moves in the Black Sea threaten Ukraine's national security.

While NATO's interests aren't directly threatened by Russian actions in the Black Sea, Ukraine's are. Russian military deployments in the Black Sea region act as a deterrent to other Western forces who might consider assisting Ukraine militarily. Moscow's control over the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula has also resulted in Russian control over the disputed Sea of Azov.

Prior to the Crimean annexation, Ukraine and Russia shared sovereignty over the sea. However, in the wake of the annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that not only was Sevastopol perpetually a part of Russia, but Crimea as well as the Sea of Azov were inherently Russian, as well.

In the case of the Sea of Azov, Russia's actions speak louder than words. Earlier in 2018, Russia completed construction a bridge over the Kerch Strait, explicitly setting it at a height which prevented any Ukrainian commercial ships from transiting the Strait. In doing so, it has threatened the viability of Ukraine's ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Furthermore, Russian officials have illegally boarded Ukrainian ships, essentially preventing Ukrainian usage of the Sea of Azov.

These illegal actions act are parts of a psychological operation to convince the Ukrainian people that Russia has a right to act with impunity in its "near-abroad." In other words, Russia is attempting to persuade Ukraine that NATO and the greater West lack the will to intervene on Ukraine's behalf, despite political rhetoric to the contrary.

Russia finally gets what it wants.

In addition to impeding Ukraine's political shift to the West, Russian objectives in the region include obtaining and maintaining access to and control over a warm water port. The A2/AD zone means that Russia has open access to the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Access to a warm water port has been an objective that has been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy since the days of Gregory Potemkin, an advisor to Catherine the Great.

Potemkin advocated for Russian southward expansion through the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the northern Middle East. With control over the Black Sea, Russia has the capacity to embark on a significant naval buildup. This buildup would give a much-needed boost to Russia's stagnating economy.

Access and control over the Black Sea also gives Russia a springboard from which to project power into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the greater-Mediterranean. Given Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war, this ability to project power could have measurable implications for that conflict.

Russia has also been conducting a soft power offensive in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, and looks to be maintaining its partnership with Armenia. Russia is also taking steps to improve regional tensions, calling for an end to the Syrian war and agreeing to a resolution to the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The consequences of a delayed or minimal response to Russia's increasing control over the Black Sea could be substantial. The Black Sea is but one example of Russia's slow-but-steady consolidation of power and influence across the Eurasian landmass. If the United States and its fellow NATO allies fail to act, it may be too late to reverse shifting power dynamics in a region of major strategic value.

Russia is Consolidating its Control Over the Black Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

Out of the few issues that Russia and the United States agreed on during the Cold War, arms control was one of the more prominent subjects. Both countries recognized that some form of control was needed as tensions escalated in the early 1980s. This understanding culminated in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, known as the INF Treaty, signed by then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Forty years later, the United States has indicated it will withdraw from the treaty.

On October 20, 2018 U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that according to U.S. rationale, there are “Russian INF-violating missiles in Europe now… the threat is not American withdrawal from the treaty. The threat is Russian missiles already deployed.” Bolton also argued that the U.S. doesn’t find the treaty fair because other countries like Iran, China and North Korea can develop weapons that are prohibited under the treaty while the U.S. cannot.

According to Bolton, Russian violations of the INF treaty imply that the U.S. is the sole party in compliance. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov criticized the move, claiming that to proceed without any sort of new agreement was not welcomed by the Russian Federation.

What is the INF Treaty?

The INF Treaty prevents the United States and Russia from possessing, developing, or deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Almost 2,700 short and medium range missiles were eliminated by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The initial treaty was formed in response to a Cold War crisis, when Russia installed around 400 nuclear warheads pointed at Europe. In turn, the U.S. deployed Pershing and Cruise missiles within Europe itself. Anti-nuclear campaigners protested that the deployment would turn Europe into a nuclear battleground.

Negotiations were initiated in 1981 but only continued for two years before falling apart. However, in 1986, negotiations restarted thanks to the Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher. This time, talks not only surrounded the proposed INF treaty, but also the START I Treaty. Due to the bilateral nature of the treaty, neither China nor any other country besides Russia is party to the INF treaty.

Accusations of non-compliance are nothing new.

In 2014, the Obama administration accused Russia of violating the treaty by testing a ground-based cruise missile that fell within the intermediate range distance. This time, the accusation stems from that same missile, the 9M729, which the Trump administration claims has been successfully tested. However, in 2014 there was no threat of the then U.S. government leaving the treaty. Many of the United States’ European allies objected to the idea, particularly Germany, as they saw it as a precursor to a new arms race.

Even now, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, has publicly stated that Russia is willing to discuss mutual grievances with the U.S. Ensuring that intermediate missiles are not a threat is a positive aspect of the treaty for both countries. It also means that European countries are not concerned about becoming the newest battleground between the US and Russia.

Is terminating the INF treaty a mistake?

Although it can be argued that the bilateral nature of the INF treaty is outdated in a world where the U.S. considers its main rival to be China, that is no reason to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. In fact, by exiting first, the U.S. will receive all the blame for terminating the treaty.

Once the U.S. withdraws from the treaty, there will be no reason for Russia to, at the very least, feign compliance. In other words, Russia and the US will feel free to deploy these short and intermediate range missiles. That does not sit well with European allies, who have all cautioned that leaving the treaty is a mistake.

In the 1960s, the U.S. had more than 30,000 nuclear warheads. As of last year, that number dropped to around 4,480. Without arms control treaties, there is every chance that another arms race could commence. Particularly the New START treaty, which is set to expire in 2021, may no longer seem necessary in a world where, according to President Trump, “until they get smart, there’s going to be nobody that’s even going to be close to us.”

The United States Announces Unilateral Termination of INF Treaty was originally published on Global Security Review.

Disinformation has become the norm in Latvia, where ethnic Russians comprise approximately 25% of Latvia’s population.

Over the past few years, European states have been observing the steady increase in popularity for populist and Eurosceptic parties within their borders. Political parties like Front Nationale in France, Jobbik in Hungary and Alternativ für Deutschland have all capitalized on anti-European sentiment to gain more seats and power within their countries.

While the support for Harmony might seem absurdly high, that number is 23.1 percent less than their election results in 2014. Where did those votes go? The populist Latvian party KPV LV won 14.1 percent of the vote and will get 16 seats in parliament. Another populist party, the New Conservative Party, came in with 13.6 percent of the vote and will also receive 16 seats.

In the past, many parties have unequivocally stated they wouldn’t work with Harmony because of their pro-Russian stance. The Harmony chairman, Nils Ushakovs, argued that any coalition government without Harmony would be unstable and non-representative of the Latvian people.

With more populist parties in the parliament, it is more likely that KPV LV and the New Conservative Party will attempt to enter into a coalition government with Harmony. To form such a government, only 51 out of 100 seats are required.

In prior elections, the other pro-European parties like the Development and the National Alliance have banded together to ensure that Harmony did not take part in the government. However, with this election, that may change. The Development only received 13.4 percent of the vote while the National Alliance received 12.6 percent.

Disinformation in Latvia is at an all-time high.

With a host of populist and pro-Russian parties gaining power, questions are raised about how exactly they got where they are. In Latvia, there is a huge amount of disinformation. In fact, on the day of the elections themselves, Draugiem.lv, the ninth most popular social network in Latvia, was hacked with a pro-Russia message.

Even more concerning, disinformation has become the norm in Latvia rather than the exception. Groups like the Latvian Russian Union spread disinformation during the summer that ethnic-Russians were placed in ghettos and that NATO planned on using the country as a base for attacking Russia.

That same summer when Canadian troops were deployed in Latvia to help NATO, Russian-language sites portrayed the Canadians as “beer buying homosexuals who lived in apartments at the expense of local taxpayers.”

Disinformation is not the only culprit.

Rising populism also stems from citizen discontent with high levels of corruption and opposition to a law mandating that Latvian be the only language taught in schools. This language law is eerily similar to the law proposed in Ukraine that only Ukrainian could be taught in schools.

The similarity is no coincidence. Latvia has one of the highest level of Russian-speaking citizens within their borders. Prior anti-Russian parties have seen the implementation of a language law as a protective measure to prevent against Russian disinformation targeted at young Russian speakers in their respective countries.

Luckily, Latvia has a history of disinformation with Russia and more experience combating it than other Western countries. Coalition talks are expected to take several weeks so as of yet, it is still unknown whether or not Harmony will be allowed to take part in the government.

While certain parties have pledged not to cooperate with Harmony, other parties have been less clear. Russian-language media outlets also have been promoting Harmony whilst simultaneously directing negative sentiment towards the current government and other pro-European groups.

Whether or not Latvia will accept a pro-Russian platform as a part of their government may seem like a small matter, but it will ultimately answer the question of whether a rise in anti-establishment sentiment can be hijacked and turned into pro-Russian support. For the rest of Europe, the question is very relevant and may have an impact on cooperation within the bloc for the next election cycle to come.

Pro-Russia and Populist Parties Gain Support in Latvia was originally published on Global Security Review.

This September, Poland was also suspended from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary due to concerns over the level of judicial independence in Poland. Many in Poland and throughout the European Union have raised questions about the independence of the Polish judicial system from political interference, in light of a judicial reform law that came into effect on April 3, 2018.

40% of Polish Supreme Court justices are over 65—including Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf.

Not only does Poland's judicial reform legislation terminate the term of office for existing members by decreasing the retirement age and making it mandatory, it also gives the parliamentary majority the right to nominate a majority of their replacements.

In other words, all judges over the age of 65—over a third of all judges—will be forced to retire unless the president expressly approves an extension. Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf’s mandated six-year term is also set to be terminated early.Some judges have asked for presidential approval. However, many are concerned that only judges with politically agreeable views will be approved.

This law gives the PiS complete control over the supreme court, which acts as the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court is responsible for validating elections, thus implying that PiS could have the option to contest the outcome of unfavorable elections to a court that is politically dependent on the party.

Maintaining rule of law and other essential rights is essential for a functioning democracy.

In July 2017, a similar attempt was made to reform the constitution, in particular the judicial branch’s National Judiciary Council. That is the council which makes judicial appointments. The European Commission even threatened to trigger Article 7 of the EU treaty. However, protestors and observer’s collective sigh of relief was evidently short-lived.

The controversial bill was signed into law by President Andrzej Duda in December 2017. In January 2018, the Polish Supreme Court released a strongly worded statement claiming that the law goes “against the standards of the Polish Constitution, in addition to violating the principle of separation of powers, the independence of the courts and judges and the security of tenure of judges.”

Alongside the Supreme Court’s condemnation of the law, the European Commission elected to officially trigger sanctions under Article 7. These sanctions would strip Poland of its voting rights within the E.U. However, the chances of this are slim because enacting the sanctions requires a unanimous vote in the European Council, where Hungary has vowed to oppose it. The lack of meaningful response on the part of the council forced the European Commission’s hand in referring the matter to the European Court of Justice.

While this European Court cannot directly strip Poland’s voting rights, it can impose large fines. Despite the passage of the law, most of the Supreme Court justices also came into work after the law was implemented. There is widespread confusion over which judges are members of the court.

Poland is divided over its judges.

All of this controversy begs the question – why is there such a societal dislike of the judicial system in Poland? The majority of this rhetoric came from the PiS party, which has called judges a “caste of superhumans” and labeled the judiciary as “a state within a state.” Currently, polls indicate that Poles are split over the reforms, which 44% agreeing that judges should be forced into retirement at 65 with 33% disagreeing.

The rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union was founded. Therefore, the E.U. is bound to respond to any attempt to curtail it. While it is unlikely that that the Article 7 will enter fully into force, it is notable that the European Union felt it necessary to move to this step. It remains to be seen how the E.U. can respond effectively while maintaining strong partnerships with its more illiberal members.

E.U. Commission Refers Poland to European Court of Justice Over Rule of Law Concerns was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last few months, Russian planes have repeatedly violated NATO airspace. Two U.S. fighter jets intercepted Russian bombers over the Arctic Ocean in both September and May of 2018.

In August, British jets were scrambled to investigate provocative Russian incursions into NATO airspace. Increased deployments of military troops and equipment have also been reported in both Crimea and Kaliningrad.

Historically, military buildups have preceded major wars. Is this century different?

The question remains, to what end? Many historians and international relations scholars point to specific events prior to large-scale conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand or the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Empire.

However, the world works differently in this century. At least for now, large-scale conventional warfare seems like a remote possibility. Instead, the great power conflicts of this century have thus far been relegated active measures and information warfare campaigns, designed to subvert democratic systems and sow disorder.

Despite the growing tensions on each side of the Atlantic, the most active front seems to be virtual. While the United States and Germany have accused Russia of interfering in their political systems, the primary focus is on defending public opinion in vulnerable countries from Russian manipulation.

One such country is Macedonia, where the conflict between Russia and the West seems to be reaching a boiling point.

With the highly anticipated referendum on a name change, Macedonia has a high chance of joining the EU. It is not a surprise that both the United States and Russia are quite interested in the result of this referendum.

U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis even stated that he was, "concerned about…the kind of mischief that Russia has practiced from Estonia to the United States, from Ukraine and now to Macedonia.”

At the very least, it seems less probable that this form of digital proxy war could easily escalate into a violent hybrid conflict.

Growing Chinese-Russian military ties could raise the possibility of conflict nonetheless.

At a visit to the Vostok-2018 training grounds, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that this was just the first of a series of regular training exercises between China and Russia.

While this could just be a sign of closer cooperation between the two countries as relations with Europe and the United States worsen, the large-scale posturing could devolve into a military conflict.

While Russian posturing is effective in deterring foreign aggression and diverting domestic attention away from divisive issues, it could also suggest that actual conflict is not as remote a possibility as we would like to believe.

Despite hopes for peace and reconciliation, countries are allocating more money to their defense departments and military budgets. Conflict is always on the horizon, whether diplomats and politicians prefer to acknowledge it or not.

War remains a realistic possibility, and Russia's actions indicate an effort to prepare for a range of scenarios, ranging from large-scale great power conflict to smaller-scale proxy wars in its periphery.

Russia’s Military Buildup: Posturing or Preparation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

From September 11 to 15, Russia will hold its largest war games since 1981. The exercise is called Vostok-2018 and will involve more than 300,000 troops, two Russian naval fleets, more than 1,000 military aircraft and all of Russia’s airborne units.

Chinese and Mongolian military units will participate alongside Russian forces. Despite Russia not being obligated to do so as the exercises will be held to the east of the Ural Mountains, NATO military attachés were invited to observe the exercises.

In justifying Moscow’s reasoning for holding Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov asserted Russia’s right to self-defense, noting that the international community is increasingly hostile towards Russia.

Moscow has cited the steady increase of NATO forces deployed in eastern Europe and the United States’ ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System deployed in Japan as evidence of a Western military buildup.

Russia, however, has been increasingly aggressive in developing and demonstrating its military capabilities. Russian warships have been deployed to the Mediterranean Sea, part of the country’s largest naval presence in the Mediterranean since 2015.

Russia’s Mediterranean fleet is comprised of ten vessels in total, each armed with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles. More provocative, British Royal Air Force fighter jets twice intercepted Russian military aircraft over the Black Sea in a single week in August.

War games are often a response to escalating tensions.

More often than not, war games are a way to demonstrate power-projection capabilities. The Vostok-2018 military exercises are a predictable reaction to increasing economic sanctions and perceived threats to the Kremlin’s hold on power.

While coverage of the Russian annexation of Crimea seems to have stagnated in the international media, the issue continues to be of interest to Russian officials. Serhiy Kostynsky, a member of the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting in Ukraine, discussed Russian transmissions jamming Ukrainian frequencies in Crimea and neighboring provinces within unoccupied Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government has constructed taller radio towers to combat Russian interference, but the Russian operations will likely continue. Concurrently, Russian “active measures,” or information warfare operations, spread fake news propaganda throughout the Baltic states.

While operations such as these may seem insignificant, they reveal the degree of aggression Russia is willing to employ to secure its interests. Information warfare, whether through the dissemination of fake news or jamming radio signals, is a cornerstone of Russia’s response to what it perceives as NATO expansionism.

Every Russian action merits a reaction.

While Russia may continue to employ subversive measures in addition to increasing the frequency and scope of its war games, its actions are not without consequence. In 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko withdrew Ukraine from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization comprised of former Soviet republics.

In August 2018, Ukraine officially closed its offices in all CIS member states. Again, this action may seem purely political in nature, but Ukraine’s departure is viewed in Russia an unacceptable move against what it sees as its traditional sphere of influence.

On the military front, the U.S. Navy reactivated its Second Fleet responsible for combatting Russia’s presence in the North Atlantic Ocean. The Second Fleet was initially formed in 1950 as a response to a Soviet force buildup. The Second Fleet’s reactivation is a high-level indicator of the increasing tensions between the U.S. and Russia.

War games can also distract from internal difficulties.

War games, much like actual conflict, have been used to distract from lackluster economic performance, diverting the attention of disaffected citizens. A planned increase in the retirement age sent Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings from 80 percent to 64 percent.

The original plan to raise the retirement age was scrapped after tens of thousands of Russians rallied throughout the country. The scale and coverage of the Vostok-2018 war games will likely soothe internal tensions, as coverage of the proposed increase of the retirement age is overshadowed by coverage of the military exercises.

Judging the Impact of Vostok-2018

On the one hand, regarding demonstrating the ability to mobilize military resources, Vostok-2018 will most be judged as a success by the Kremlin. Any form of mass military mobilization is done with the intent of maximizing the perception of power and strength.

On the other hand, it remains to be seen as to how effective the war games will be in tempering domestic discontent. Domestic Russian rhetoric regularly projects anti-Western viewpoints, so it is plausible the Vostok-2018 war games will serve to amplify this narrative.

The Levada Center, an independent Russian polling organization, stated in July 2018 that 19 percent of respondents supported the ‘Russia for Russians’ slogan—almost double the percentage of respondents asked the same question one year ago.

Given Russia’s documented success in manipulating public opinion through propaganda and control of the media, the Vostok-2018 war games will likely increase the nationalist fervor within Russia, at the expense of discontent directed towards the country’s stagnating economy and unpopular pension reforms.

Vostok-2018: Russia’s Largest War Games Since 1981 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine has received $8.7 billion in low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2015, the government continues to lose $4.8 billion a year from corruption.

In total, Ukraine has lost over $14.4 billion to corrupt officials.

While a simple number does not provide a definitive understanding of corruption, it does reveal the degree to which corruption has become endemic to Ukraine.

Corruption is not uncommon in former Soviet states, where customs officials are commonly bribed by smugglers and traffickers.

Ukraine’s anti-corruption policies have been lackluster in the past.

Ukraine has initiated several measures to address the problem of corruption within the government. The government overhauled the State Fiscal Service and has launched the “Ukraine Without Smuggling” campaign.

However, Ukraine requires more than a public relations campaign to solve its corruption problems. As a result of Ukraine’s geopolitically precarious position between the West and Russia, a solution is required sooner rather than later.

Ukraine has been relying on IMF and World Bank funds to stabilize the national currency (the hryvnia), reduce the budget deficit and bolster international currency reserves.

Without such funds, Ukraine is more likely to make a strategic tilt towards Russia. The loss of funds for Ukrainian oligarchs, in particular, that would result from a loss of international funding would present the Kremlin with the opportunity to re-exert its influence in Kiev.

A substantially decreased cashflow into Ukraine would require replacement funds. Russia would be more than willing to use the situation to pull Ukraine away from the West.

The World Bank seems to be making progress in stabilizing Ukraine’s economy.

The World Bank reported it is preparing a $650 million guarantee for Ukraine to fund its entry into global-debt markets, which would allow the country to raise around $800 billion. However, the Ukrainian government must implement IMF economic reforms to receive the guarantee.

Ukraine has already achieved a number of the reforms, such as the successful enactment of stronger banking and credit laws, which were passed in July 2018.

In September, an IMF mission will be visiting Ukraine to report on the state of Ukraine’s economic reforms.

While it is not definite that Ukraine has wholly fulfilled its IMF obligations, the possibility of receiving substantial funding from the West should be a great enough incentive to induce lasting economic reform.

The question remains, however, as to whether or not Ukraine can overcome the prevalence of public sector corruption?

Corruption threatens Ukraine’s sovereignty.

While corruption is widespread, it’s entirely possible that Ukraine will choose to implement substantial economic reforms in addition to significantly reducing corruption within the country.

Not only does IMF and World Bank financial assistance come at an opportune time for Ukrainian investors, it serves to further solidify Ukraine’s position as a Western democracy.

With Western financing, Ukraine can take further steps on a path towards European integration and fight back against Russian aggression.

Ukraine is already acting out against Russian provocations, by increasing its naval presence in the Sea of Azov.

In doing so, the country shows Russia that monetary persuasion is much more convincing than the history that it shares with Russia itself.

However, it may also be that corruption proves too difficult to unseat, as the World Bank and IMF funds are tied to Ukraine’s implementation of major economic reforms.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index rates Ukraine at 130/180, which is on the lower end of the scale.

However, in 2015, Ukraine established the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and three years later established an anticorruption court.

Signs may indicate a move towards meaningful reform, but only time will tell whether it will be successful.

Lack of Economic Transparency & Corruption Threaten Ukraine’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether through denying journalists the right to cover a story without security implications, or restricting reporting using scare tactics, there is a deeper meaning behind each time a government cracks down on journalists.

In attacking media outlets, the officials in question confirm that the story in question is worth covering. That is not to say it won’t be dangerous. Russia, in particular, has a long history of politically-motivated murders of journalists.

Perhaps the best-known is Anna Politkovskaya. As a reporter, she covered corruption within Russia and revealed much of the torture and the brutal warfare tactics employed by the Russian government and military in Chechnya. After multiple threats, being jailed, and forced into exile on various occasions, she was assassinated in 2006, in the elevator of her apartment building in central Moscow.

In doing so and without words, the Kremlin revealed its willingness to use forceful tactics in response to its decreasing patience for journalists covering controversial topics such as the Beslan crisis, the Moscow theater hostage situation, the Chechen wars, and the Ryazan apartment bombings.

Journalists will continue to be targeted and assassinated throughout the former Soviet Union.

In July 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered in the Central African Republic while investigating the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary group linked to the Kremlin. The Wagner Group is known to operate throughout the world in countries like Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

There is not yet confirmation that their deaths were linked to covering this organization. However, all of the journalists worked for the Investigation Control Center, a Russian news organization financed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky is a former Russian oil oligarch who was run out of his country by Russian President Putin after being accused of fraud, embezzlement and money laundering. The Wagner Group is known to be associated with Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, both of whom are Russian oligarchs with close ties to Putin.

Russia isn’t the only post-Soviet state where journalists are under threat.

Thus far in 2018, the deaths of two journalists, Maksim Borodin and Sergei Grachyov, have been confirmed. Although police claim that Borodin died after falling out of a window, his colleagues assert his death was due to his reporting on corruption.

In 2017, there were four journalists reportedly killed after writing critical articles about corruption. Six deaths may not seem extreme. However, all six deaths show that corruption is a dangerous topic to cover.

Although Russia tends to be the immediate enemy in the eyes of the free press, it is by no means the only country with this systemic restriction. Belarus, a former part of the Soviet Union, recently detained at least 18 journalists.

Authorities accused them of unlawfully obtaining information, searching the offices of independent news agencies in Minsk. This kind of action not only shuts down some of the independent reporting available in Belarus but also creates a hostile environment for journalists entering or leaving the country.

What is Motivating the Crackdowns in Russia and Belarus?

As with every action taken by an administration publicly sanctioned or not, there is always a reason behind it. In other words, there is more at play than a simple crackdown on journalists in Russia and Belarus.

These attacks and threats are happening for a reason. In Belarus, a new election looms on the horizon for Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and anti-regime reporting cannot be tolerated.

When examining some of the recent events in Russia, observers note an uptick in unofficial military actions abroad in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria. In order that the Kremlin prevent the discovery of unpleasant truths and avoid embarrassment, these areas cannot be independently covered.

In fact, Putin recently created a patriotic directorate in the military to increase “moral and political unity.” This is reminiscent of political actions taken in the Soviet Union, highlighting the need for Russia’s government to maintain an official line that cannot be challenged.

The security implications can be complex and multifaceted when journalists are targeted.

On one hand, the daily security for journalists and foreigners suspected on hostile action is immediately under threat. For the state itself, the crackdown represents that the state feels its own position is under threat. However, an objective reading of the situation might show that in states like Russia and Belarus, the maintenance of the current power dynamic is imperative.

The cycle of corruption in Russia is controlled by oligarchs, who in turn are given opportunities by President Putin that increase their own wealth. In doing so, Putin reinforces the belief that only with himself as president will this system continue to sustain itself.

Journalists who threaten exposing and destroying this system are seen as a threat. Observers should be mindful to look at more than the detentions and deaths of reporters, but rather look into what it was they could have exposed.

The Escalating Crackdown on Journalists in Russia and Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

That is not to say that foreign threats are not severe and ongoing. On July 19, Putin warned NATO “against cultivating closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia,” claiming it would have negative consequences for member states if they continued on that journey.

This may not be an idle threat from Kremlin, as it seems to have had an impact on the foreign policies of other countries, particularly that of the United States.

The following day, the United States announced that it would provide over $200 million in aid to Ukraine, to support training programs, operational capabilities, and increased security needs. With this latest string of funding, the U.S. will have provided over $1 billion to Ukraine since 2014.

Why the sudden movement of funds? Ukraine recently adopted a Law on National Security, allowing its armed forces improved interoperability with NATO. On July 23, ships of NATO’s Maritime Group 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 also entered the port of Odessa as part of the Partnership for Peace program.

The most significant security threats to Ukraine are of a domestic nature.

While the foreign threats facing Ukraine are significant, addressing daily security concerns such as access to fresh water and safety in everyday life is essential. Access to clean water may be at risk in the coming month, making this an issue of critical importance.

Dniproazot, a chemical plant owned by Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennady Bogolyubov, ceased operations in July due to increased gas prices. Dniproazot creates liquid chlorine, which is used by more than 170 water treatment and supply plants in Ukraine to clean water.

Without adequate supplies of liquid chlorine, Ukraine’s water filtration systems will be forced to employ alternative methods of filtration. Experts say that in some cities like Kropyvnytsky and Vinnytsia, these systems can only use stored chlorine and filter water for residents for 7 to 10 days.

Ukraine’s Association of Water Enterprises is negotiating with Dniproazot. Thus far, they have not reached an agreement. Building a new factory would cost money and time that many Ukrainian cities don’t have, and importing liquid chlorine from abroad would face its own logistical and cost challenges.

Other cities like Kiev are claiming that they have enough chlorine but face their other issues that threaten to erode internal stability. Approximately one-third of the city’s residents have not had access to hot water due to disagreements between Ukrainian state-owned companies and oligarchs.

Hate crimes are on the rise throughout Ukraine.

Beyond access to clean water, Ukraine is also facing a rise in hate crimes particularly towards their Roma population. Over the last two months, at least four attacks on Roma have been documented.

S14, the youth arm of right-wing party Svoboda, often takes part in violent acts towards the Roma. Often, these involve throwing stones and starting fires in their camps. Despite these acts, there have been no arrests.

Some such as Interior Minister Arsen Avakov claim that attacks on the Roma come from Russia. However, much of the internal disorder comes from right-wing Ukrainians. Hate crimes and trouble with access to clean water are two domestic concerns that Ukrainians must take time to address.

Although international attention towards Ukraine is more often paid towards the encroaching Russian threat, internal matters that have to do with infrastructure, public health, and security require increased attention.

Foreign Threats to Ukraine’s National Security Distract from Internal Disorder was originally published on Global Security Review.

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all expressed concerns that their dependence on the Russian power grid network increases their exposure to Russian interference in their internal affairs and presents a grave threat to their sovereignty and national security.

As Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite noted, “that tool of blackmail, which was used [by Russia] to buy our politicians and meddle in our politics, will no longer exist,” should Lithuania acquire energy independence.

On June 28, 2018, Poland, the three Baltic States, and the European Union signed a deal in which all Baltic electricity systems will be connected to the Continental European Network (CEN) via Poland by 2025. The agreement is a significant step towards eliminating the Baltic states’ dependence on Russian energy, further bolstering their sovereignty as well as security.

The Polish-Lithuanian link will integrate the various power systems.

The Polish-Lithuanian interconnection, in particular, will serve to improve supply reliability for Baltic consumers, as well as open up new opportunities for energy trade and competition. The LitPol Link was set up to facilitate this integration. LitPol Link is co-owned by Polish and Lithuanian system operators.

In total, the project cost 494.4 million euros, with 244.5 million of those euros coming from the E.U.’s European Regional Development Fund. Using this system, Lithuania, as well as other Baltic countries, will be able to cultivate more diversity amongst their suppliers.

Russian actions spurred this move towards Baltic energy independence.

There is always a motivating factor, domestically or internationally, when there is a significant shift in global energy politics. In this instance, the motivator is Russian expansionism and aggression.

When Russia cut off gas flow to Ukraine in response to late payments from Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz in 2015, it was a warning signal to other states that were reliant on Russian gas. If it could happen to Ukraine, what was to say it wouldn’t happen to Lithuania or Latvia?

Since 2015, both Lithuania and Poland have worked to construct liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to import such gas from other countries like the United States and atar. However, even with LNG terminals, much of these countries remained heavily reliant on Russian energy.

The deal struck in late June 2018 took nine years to negotiate, revealing not only the complexity of the negotiations but the involved states’ dedication to this shift in policy, as well. One of the reasons for the deal’s timing was impending E.U. funding deadlines, in addition to potential Russian upgrades which would allow Russia to decouple from the Baltics unilaterally.

Russia remains Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas.

Interestingly, Russia has never threatened to cut off power to the Baltic states. As these negotiations have entered into their final phases, Russia has neglected to speak out against this shift aggressively. Why? Perhaps the main reason is that while Russia does face being kicked out of the Baltic states, Gazprom, Russia’s top gas producer, is still Europe’s largest supplier.

In the first half of 2018, Gazprom increased gas production by 8.7 percent, with exports to Europe rising by 5.8 percent. Gazprom’s President, Aleksey Miller, reported that gas exports to Europe could reach a record high of 200 billion cubic meters. Why worry about three small states when you already supply most of the European continent?

While Baltic states may be excited about a move towards more energy independence in Europe, the Russian share of the European gas market increased to 34 percent last year. It may seem more reasonable for these countries to see this new opportunity as an option to diversify amongst suppliers, but Europe is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to gas diversification.

Russian gas will always be cheaper and more reliable than LNG from other countries such as the United States and Qatar. As such, are the Baltic states moving away from Russian reliance, or are they just shifting towards a new political reality where a wall of European bureaucracy serves to mitigate the immediate threat of Russian influence?

Poland and Baltic States Reduce Reliance on Russian Energy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past few weeks, turmoil has engulfed the two countries of Greece and Macedonia – all over a simple name change. The debate over Macedonia’s name is a point of contention between both countries and has been for many years.

However, on June 20, 2018, Macedonia’s parliament ratified an agreement with Greece to change its formal name from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Although the opposition party boycotted the vote and there is much public opposition against it, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev believes this compromise on the name is a step in the right direction for his country. If ratified, the deal will end 27 years of dispute between both countries.

The question of Macedonia’s name has to do with a Greek province.

Greece argues that the usage of the name Macedonia is at odds with a northern Greek province with the same name.

Specifically, Greece is concerned that by allowing their northern province as Macedonia as a whole to have the same name, they are opening themselves to potential future issues of territorial claims.

This dispute arose in 1991 when Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Even Macedonia’s admittance to the United Nations was done under a provisional name.

Greece has boycotted Macedonia’s attempts to join the European Union and NATO for years.

Due to the dispute, Greece has continually vetoed Macedonia’s acceptance into both the European Union and NATO. However, with this agreement in sight, European Union foreign ministers have agreed to open accession talks for both Albania and Macedonia in June 2019.

Before negotiations can take place, both countries will have to show significant progress regarding their human rights and democratic reforms. Regardless, the door is now open for both countries to enter the E.U.

At the July 11-12 NATO summit, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also indicated that he hopes members will agree to start accession talks with Macedonia. Greece has been the primary objector to Macedonia joining NATO.

This change in attitude by Greece might mean a shift in these organizations. Macedonia may be a small country, but a new Eastern member to NATO and the E.U. is always of concern to Russia. Consider that the last time an Eastern non-E.U. state showed interest in joining, part of that state’s territory was annexed by Russia. Naturally, Macedonia is not nearly as strategically important to Russia as Ukraine was. Regardless, any expansionist policy by NATO or the E.U. is watched with suspicion by Russia.

There’s still a long way to go for Macedonia.

Although it is notable that both country’s foreign ministers signed off on this historic deal, there are many hurdles to come. On June 26, 2018, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov refused to sign the agreement, calling it a “criminal act.” However, his refusal to sign it may have no impact.

If the parliament convenes again and approves the change with a two-thirds majority – then he cannot block the name change. Moreover, widespread support for the name change in both countries is at an all-time low.

After provisional approval in the Macedonian parliament, the deal will then be voted on by the Greek parliament. Even that is up in the air, although, Greek Foreign Minister, Nikos Kotzias, claims there is no reason for concern. However, the political volatility of both countries may mean that the necessary majorities in both countries may not exist by the time of the deal.

As far as security ramifications go, the change of Macedonia’s name might not seem noteworthy. The slow process of diplomacy means that the realist urges of each country may soon halt any speedy changes. Ignoring this change, nevertheless, would be a mistake. Any shift in the unpredictable Balkan region is one to be watched with care.

With such small countries, any political turmoil is relevant. Particularly with Erdogan’s recent reelection, the upcoming NATO summit and the subsequent summit between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin – small shifts remain relevant. Will the name change be used as fodder? Or will it operate as a new expansionist shift in NATO and E.U. rhetoric? And how will Russia respond? Only time will tell.

Macedonia Changes Its Name—Or Does It? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Should policies be localized or enforced at a European level? What should the rules be on migration and business deals with other countries? European leaders have often been stymied by these kinds of questions.

In the past few months, however, with the recent surge of right-wing parties, feuding has become more prominent within Europe. With the current anger towards American President Donald Trump, Russia sees an opportunity to rebuild its relations with Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin now has more leeway to strategically foster chaos and discord within Europe, particularly with the added bonus of increased feuding amongst E.U. member states.

Internal German feuding on migration may lead to unilateral action or no action at all.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, is embroiled in a  disagreement between herself and German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer on migration.

Seehofer claims that Bavaria ought to be allowed to refuse asylum-seekers who are trying to enter Germany if they are already registered with another European state or have previously been denied asylum in Germany. Merkel, instead, approaches the issue of migration from a European level. Rather than unilateral action, she opts for following European regulation.

Against Merkel’s European approach is Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. He is advocating for a plan that would strengthen borders and work against illegal immigration coming to Europe. Kurz has called for an “axis of the willing” with Germany, Austria, and Italy.

Germany is set to publish a ‘migration masterplan’ soon. However, there is no certainty as to what the consensus will be if there is one at all.

Italy’s rejection of a rescue ship sends a signal to European leaders.

In mid-June, Italy refused to accept a rescue ship filled with migrants. Although Spain took up the burden and allowed the 629 passengers to come to Valencia, the wound to European solidarity is still fresh.

Italy’s new government campaigned on anti-migrant policies and is now showing its willingness to act on those promises. When asked, Italy’s Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, claimed: “This was a first important signal that Italy cannot go on alone supporting this huge weight.” He also threatened to turn away other rescue boats that arrive with migrants in the future.

So, where does Russia fit in?

With more confusion and chaos within Europe itself, Putin has an opportunity to jump back onto the world stage. This would have seemed impossible only a few years ago. Russia was alienated from Europe because of its annexation of Crimea and its military interventions throughout Syria and eastern Ukraine.

Now, however, Russian-backed populist leaders are in power in Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Austria. Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum have caused further fury within Europe. It’s the perfect moment to reassert Russia’s power as an economic and trading partner as opposed to the United States.

While Putin may claim that “it is not our aim to divide anything or anybody in Europe,” actions speak louder than words. It is to Russia’s advantage to have a fragmented Europe that can neither impose sanctions nor act unilaterally against deals like the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

Already, there are signs of this. Austrian leader Kurz refused to expel Russian diplomats after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Both Italy and Greece are calling to end sanctions against Russia.

It makes sense for Russia to encourage this departure from former European solidarity against their country. It may make more sense to pay attention to Russia’s actions towards Europe such as the support for right-wing parts such as France’s Front Nationale and German’s AfD rather than the political rhetoric. Discord is where Russia can make its move, and as it has often done it past, it may do again.

Russia Sees Opportunities as E.U. Member States Feud was originally published on Global Security Review.

The twelve-mile-long bridge (19 kilometers) connects Russia and Crimea by both road and rail. The road portion officially opened on May 15, with the rail portion slated for completion in 2019.

The bridge was constructed at the cost of $3.7 billion, and can reportedly sustain 13 million passengers and 14 million tons of freight per year, and is designed to accommodate around 40,000 vehicles per day.

Planning for the Kerch Strait Bridge began in 2014, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine’s Response

On May 22, Ukraine filed a claim with the International Tribunal stating that the bridge’s construction was illegal under international law and was a threat to Ukraine’s sovereign interests.

Two days later, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko levied sanctions on Russian state-run media outlets RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) and Rossiya Segodnya (Россия Сегодня), citing national security concerns as the primary reason for the sanctions.

Both outlets are banned from operating or broadcasting within Ukraine for a minimum of three years.

Over a week before Poroshenko sanctioned the two media outlets, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) announced on May 15 that it had detained RIA Novosti reporter Kiril Vyshnysky in Kiev on charges of  “high treason for allegedly participating in hybrid information warfare.”

The SBU announced that it had uncovered a “network of media structures controlled by the Russian Federation” and had launched an investigation into the activities of RIA Novosti-Ukraine.

A spokesperson for the SBU stated that “law enforcers have determined that they [RIA Novosti] were used by the aggressor country in the context of a hybrid information war against Ukraine and investigative actions are now being carried out.”

The Decline of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Over the past few years, Ukrainian-Russian relations have soured. In a generous reading of the situation, the bridge could be seen solely as a means to connect Crimea with Russia.

Such schemes, however, are rarely so innocent. The very act of connecting the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula infers the permanence of the Crimean annexation.

The bridge will be a perpetual reminder to Ukrainians that Russian troops have a direct, overland (read: bridge) route into Crimea, diminishing any plausible hope of Ukraine retaking the peninsula.

Meanwhile, clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have escalated. During the week of May 21, there were 7,700 ceasefire violations. The escalations in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian response to the opening of the Crimean bridge indicate that relations between Ukraine and Russia will continue to deteriorate.

As Ukraine continues to turn westward, Russia may seek to respond in more drastic ways to underscore its significance and importance to both Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Russian-Crimean Bridge Completion Escalates Ukraine-Russia Tensions was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of former Armenian President and Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian’s resignation on April 23, a shift in of policy might have been expected.

At the meeting, Pashinian not only supported maintaining the current Russian-Armenian relationship but also suggested a “new impulse” for political and trade relations.

Interestingly, Pashinian does not precisely have a history of supporting Russian-Armenian relations. His party, the Yelk Coalition, submitted legislation last year to leave the Eurasian Union. Further, he has spoken out against the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In response to these claims, Pashinian has claimed that now that he has accepted the prime minister position, his focus is on the country rather than maintaining loyalty with his old party positions.

Where did the revolution in Armenia come from?

The demonstrations against Sarkisian were fueled by a number of factors, including electoral fraud in 2008, changes in pensions and municipal services, a hike in energy bills in 2014, Sarkisian’s re-election as president in 2013 and his subsequent run towards prime minister this year.

Although there was no suggestion that a protest bringing such a radical change in government would come, within weeks, Sarkisian had resigned. This is primarily because there were widespread protests, including more than 100,000 people gathered in Yerevan’s main square the day before his resignation.

Perhaps more blatant Russian interference was expected, as Pashinian actually praised Russia’s “balanced position… it was a very constructive position. And I think this is highly valued not just by our government but in Armenian society in general.”

Where are new Russian-Armenian relations headed?

Pashinian’s new government position on crucial matters such as the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory are as of yet unknown. Despite this populist win in Armenia that was very much sought by the people, right now the country remains at a crossroads.

Pashinian has stated he wants to work with the old governing party but also fight ingrown corruption. Confrontations in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region have reached an all-time high since 1994 when more than 200 people died in April 2016. Since then, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been building up military might on both sides of the border.

The simmering conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh might prove to be one of the factors in the maintenance of the Russian-Armenian relationship. Since the beginning of the tensions, Russia has acted as Armenia’s security guarantor, providing training and weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia also has been dependent on Russia for financial aid, military development and protection in general.

Notably, in Sochi, Pashinian told Putin that he wanted Armenia to buy more Russian weaponry. So, despite this revolution against a ruler that was supported by the Kremlin – how much can really change? Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh implies that Armenia must continue to turn to Russia for regional security and assistance.

As tensions rise in the region and there are signs of Azerbaijani destabilization, will the ceasefire and uneasy peace continue to hold? Armenia’s estrangement from Azerbaijan and Turkey means that they remain dependent on Russia.

Beyond that, as this change in government continues to grow and develop, wouldn’t this be a convenient time for Azerbaijan to decide to take back some territory?

“Velvet Revolution” in Armenia Indicates a Stronger Russian-Armenian Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent announcement by the United States of Javelin anti-tank missile system shipments to Ukraine has been met with a litany of gratitude from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and condemnation from Moscow. In March, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of 210 Javelin Missiles and 37 Javelin Command Launch Units to Ukraine, worth $47 million.

However, it is not only American lethal aid that is being provided to Ukraine. Since 2015, Bulgaria has been exporting weapons to Ukraine, including DRTG-73 anti-tank grades. These have been used in combat operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as recently as November 2017.

The proliferation of Lethal Weapons

Bulgarian arms shipments aren’t just going to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, however. They are also going to Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. In December 2016, Bulgarian defense manufacturer VMZ’s RPG-22 weapon was discovered to be in use by separatist forces by Ukrainian Security Services. There is no question that Bulgarian lethal weapons have been widely proliferated throughout the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In 2015, Bulgaria exported over €16 million of armaments to Ukraine in 2016.

It isn’t surprising that these weapons are being proliferated on both sides of the Ukrainian conflict—it exemplifies a trend of foreign arms manufacturers exacerbating the conflict through increased arms shipments. As early as 2015, Lithuania was also in the business of sending lethal weapons to Ukraine.

In 2017, Lithuania announced that they intended to deliver weapons worth €1.93 million to Ukraine this year. Included, reportedly, are “more than 7,000 Kalashnikov rifles, two million cartridges, more than 80 machine guns, several mortars, anti-tank weapons and other military equipment.”

Escalation and the Javelin missiles

With the confirmation of delivery of U.S. Javelin missiles, the war in Ukraine enters a new phase. Western support of Ukraine creates the impression that this conflict is merely another proxy war between Russia and the United States. Although lethal weapons have been sent before from Bulgaria and Lithuania to Ukrainian forces, the higher caliber of Javelin missiles introduces a new level of escalation. The proliferation of these weapons is less likely—however, the danger lies in what now Russian-backed separatists will do.

In recent weeks, there has been an uptick in fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. Despite the Minsk II Accords, the four-year-old conflict continues to simmer.

This new variable begs the question of what will happen next? Generally, when a country party to a conflict receives stronger weapons, the opposing side will attempt to match it in an arms-race-like scenario. Russian-backed separatists may be supplied with heavier-caliber armaments, and it’s possible Russia’s involvement in Ukraine will become more overt in the near future.

For now, the increased proliferation of weapons in Ukraine may increase Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s gratitude to the United States, but it remains to be seen how this will affect the conflict’s strategic landscape.

American and Bulgarian Weapons Shipments Enter Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years after drone operations were suspended in August 2016, the OSCE has elected to again introduce long-range unmanned drones (i.e., aerial vehicles – UAVs) to Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The OSCE will be using long-range Camcopter S-100 UAVs, which will both operate at night and during the day in areas where ground patrols of the OSCE are not permitted.

Principal Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug stated that “Given that the Minsk agreements envisage the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other technology by the OSCE SMM, we expect the sides, as signatories to these agreements, to not interfere, by jamming, shooting or otherwise, with the operation of these UAVs.”

Part of the reason this monitoring system was initially canceled was that several of the OSCE’s drones were shot down using surface-to-air missiles and rifle fire, and were subjected to interference from jamming equipment.

Due to a lack of access to the crash sites, no blame was assigned to the downing of the drones. However, there was suspicion that the fire came from Russian-backed separatists.

Both Ukrainian fighters and Russian-backed separatists have attempted to shoot down drones in the past. After the cancellation of the long-range drones, short- and medium-range drones continued to function.

Lack of Enforcement of the Minsk Agreements

Perhaps one of the most concerning detriments in the Minsk Agreements was the lack of options on how to enforce it. Although the OSCE can act as a reasonably neutral actor in observing both sides of the conflict, there are many parts of the region where OSCE monitors are not allowed.

Naturally, these are the more common regions where violations are more likely to occur such as artillery attacks, weapons positioning, and prohibited weapons systems.

Why is the OSCE Reinstating the Program Now?

So, what has made it a necessity to restart this program? The main reasoning comes from a video sourced at Ukrainian NGO Come Back Alive, which shows a new electronic warfare system. Come Back Alive claims that this new system comes from Russia. However, Russia has disputed these statements.

The situation in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk’s regions has become somewhat of a hybrid conflict, where actual progress from either side does not occur often, but actual fighting and violations of the negotiated Minsk Accords continue to take place.

The real question is whether reintroducing the drone program will offer any new way of maintaining peace. While some state that monitoring systems decrease violence and increase incentives to follow the rules, what would stop separatists from shooting down these multi-million costing drones to merely be shot down again?

The reason why the OSCE is choosing to reinstate the drone program may have to do with the new electronic warfare system, with some stating it is an escalation of electronic warfare. The maintenance of such a program is, however, questionable.

OSCE Drones Reintroduced into Ukraine’s Donbass and Donetsk Warzones was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instead of examining how domestic policies are impacting the health and social structure of a society, it’s usually in the best interest of a president or prime minister to turn the attention of their country to something outside. This policy is known as diversionary foreign policy and there no better implementer of it than Russia.

The woes of Russian infrastructure are many.

The Kremlin expertly distracts its population from growing problems within the Russian borders. From the 2014 annexation of Crimea to the continued military intervention in Syria, international issues become matters of national pride for Russians.

They need the distraction. In the last week of March, 64 people were killed in a deadly shopping mall blaze in Kemerovo, Siberia. Thousands protested throughout the country against the alleged negligence, cost-cutting measures and corruption that led to this and many other fires.

In fact, 10,068 people died as a result of a fire in 2014 in Russia in comparison to the number of 3,275 casualties in the United States during that same year. With a population of nearly twice Russia’s size, the death toll is almost a third lower.

Fire, however, isn’t the only problem. On March 21, 2018, twenty students were hospitalized in Volokolamsk due to the release of toxic gases from a local landfill. An additional fifty-seven children have sought out medical attention due to symptoms. Further, around 200 people living near the landfill have consistently registered complaints of nausea and headaches.

Despite local Russian news agencies covering the situation, nothing appears to have been fixed. Intermittent protests come and go locally – but this problem isn’t a new one. Regardless, a local court has refused to close the dump and garbage continues to flow into the landfill, poisoning the local Russian population.

But on the international front, Russia has more than enough distractions to use.

The prevalence and variety of infrastructure problems within Russia ought to perhaps take center stage. But luckily for Moscow, there are many scandals on an international front. When Russia is referred to as the subject of sanctions and as a state “acting in bad faith,” Western media outlets are feeding fuel to the fire of Russian nationalism; look at the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter.

As the United Kingdom and the United States along with their allies send home Russian diplomats because of this poisoning, Russia throws its hands up and claims that the accusations are all hearsay. The Kremlin has stated that without clear proof that the poison came from Russia, the allegations are baseless.

However, this hasn’t stopped other countries from expelling Russian diplomats. What does Moscow do? It plays the victim card.  When other states act against Russia, the Russian government can then turn to the population and say “See, look at how the world treats us, focus your anger on them.”

The Russian state media has similarly used the recent sanctions imposed by the US government on Russia to support an alternative narrative. In particular, these sanctions narrow in on those close to Russian President Vladimir Putin to punish the country for the Skripal poisoning.

What would Moscow have the populace believe? Not only does state-funded media outlet RT claim that the sanctions target ordinary Russians disproportionally, but it also claims the sanctions are retaliatory and a strategy to force Russians to play along to “Washington’s script.”

By refocusing their anger and frustrations on how the world treats Russia, Moscow distracts the population from their problems closer to home. Here’s a hint on how well that strategy is playing: Russian President Vladimir Putin was reelected with 76.7 percent of the vote this year.

Diversionary Tactics in Russian Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

On March 22, 2018, Nadiya Savchenko was arrested by the Ukrainian State Security Service on charges of plotting a coup.

If the name at all sounds familiar, it is due to Savchenko’s 2014 arrest. Savchenko was accused of killing two Russian journalists in the Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine. In Russia, she was charged with murder and sentenced to 22 years in prison.

A Ukrainian War Hero

During her time as a prisoner in Russia, she refused to admit guilt. She was eventually included in a 2016 prisoner swap. She was pardoned by President Vladimir Putin in exchange for the return of two Russian servicemen from Ukraine.

Savchenko was awarded the Star of the Hero of Ukraine and quickly rose to prominence within the Ukrainian Parliamentary Opposition movement.

Following her return, Savchenko has held talks with separatists and publicized lists of people who went missing or who were captured during the conflict. None of this has been conducted with the support or consent of the Ukrainian government.

Arrested on Suspicion

In the lead-up to her arrest, MPs in the Ukrainian parliament were shown a surveillance video of her discussing plans to attack the parliament. Ukraine’s Chief Prosecutor Yuriy Lutsenko accused Savchenko of working with Russian-backed rebels.

After watching this video, the MPs voted to remove her immunity from prosecution and for her arrest. When asked about the video, she claimed that “Ukraine’s corrupt government” needed to be overthrown.

In defending herself, Savchenko claimed that she had spoken with undercover agents who had encouraged her to overthrow the government. Her rationale was that she was playing along with them to bring the corruption of the government public. She additionally accused the MPs of not following through with the promises of the Maidan uprising, stating:

“To accuse me of treason against Ukraine … and to make anti-heroes out of yesterday’s heroes simply because they do not agree with the policies and positions of the current government, that’s all the authorities can do.”

Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman suggested that the matter was one of psychological health. However, other Opposition members such as Borys Kolesnikov believe that Savchenko should be allowed to defend herself from a position of freedom.

What’s next for Nadiya Savchenko?

Ukrainian MPs set a date for Savchenko’s trial for March 23. At the beginning of the trial, Savchenko announced she would start a hunger strike.

In her defense, she has claimed that transporting weapons from eastern Ukraine was not, as the accusation reads, for planning a terrorist-style coup against the government, but rather to determine the origins of the arms.

Savchenko is just one Ukrainian Opposition MP, and her guilt or innocence does not do much in either setting a new way forward or backward for Ukraine.

However, if as she claims, she was set up—it may say something about the continued corruption in the Ukrainian government.

Along with many in the Opposition movement, Savchenko believes that many of the previous corruption scandals that haunted Ukraine in the past continue to happen now under a new name with tacit agreement from the West.

It remains to be seen until 2019 if any government, new or existing, will make a difference.

Nadiya Savchenko Detained in Ukraine on Charges of Plotting Attempted Coup was originally published on Global Security Review.

Earlier in the negotiation process, Radio Free Europe reported that Hungary additionally wanted to include helicopter spare parts to the exemption list along with biathlon rifles and small caliber sports guns. However, this was later taken off the table. With these two exceptions, both Hungary along with Slovakia see the potential for the small arms market in Belarus. Sports hunting is popular in the post-Soviet country; both small caliber guns and biathlon rifles are popularly used.

Why the embargo?

The arms embargo was initially announced in 2011 after Belarusian officials initiated a violent crackdown on protestors in the 2010 presidential election. This election brought Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko another term in office, an office he held which he’s held since 1993. Four Belarusian companies had their assets frozen and access to EU visas restricted. Also, 174 individuals, including President Lukashenko, were sanctioned.

EU-Belarusian relations were somewhat tarred with the feathers of human rights violations, and the rule of law violations and a lack of press freedom. That all began to change in 2015 when Belarus released the country’s final remaining six political prisoners. Why bother? As a dictator, what could motivate Lukashenko to don a mantle of European civility?

The answer is Russian leverage. Lukashenko was under pressure to allow a Russian airbase to be constructed in Belarus. In the background of this Russian move towards a more concrete show of their power was the fear of NATO beginning to reach eastward. Rather than agree with Russia, however, Lukashenko believed that the construction of such a base would exacerbate tensions. So, when Belarus began to court the European Union, the reasoning was not so difficult to understand.

Two years ago, in February of 2016, the EU removed four companies and 170 individuals from the sanctions list, leaving four individuals remaining. The rationale given was that the human rights situation in Belarus had improved. However, the four individuals remain on the sanctions list. The EU claims that these four individuals played roles in the unresolved political disappearances of four Belarusians in 1999-2000. They consisted of opposition politicians Yuri Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar, businessman Anatol Krasouski and journalist Dzmitry Zavadski.

So, who is still sanctioned?

• Former Interior Minister Uladzimir Naumau
• Former Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Sheiman
• Former Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakou
• And Former Commander of the Special Forces Brigade of the Interior Ministry Dzmitry Paulichenka

It’s an interesting list—particularly given that Uladzimir Naumau, Dzmitry Paulichenka, and Yury Sheiman are also included on the list of sanctions in the United States. Though given their role in the earlier repressive steps taken by the Belarusian government, it’s not surprising. Their continued lack of ability to travel to Europe and the United States as well as their overseas assets being frozen is business as usual.

The arms embargo today is more a symbolic statement, a sign that the European Union is promoting democracy and human rights, even in countries with which they share a border. But if the tendency to add more and more exceptions continues to grow—it won’t be surprising if all that remains is the four individuals associated with political disappearances. After all, more often than not, economic gains rates higher on the scale of political choice than the idealistic urges of human rights advocates.

European Union Extends Arms Embargo Against Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

In February, 2018, MIkhail Saakashvili was detained, flown to Poland, and eventually to the Netherlands, His wife’s home country. Saakashvili has responded defiantly, saying that he will ignore the ban and return to Ukraine claiming, “I will return home to Ukraine very soon now, much sooner than in three years.” That may be difficult seeing as Saakashvili’s Ukrainian citizenship was stripped in July 2017, after allegations were made charging him with corruption and poor governance.

How did Saakashvili come to get banned from Ukraine?

The former Georgian president was chosen to lead the fight against corruption in the Odessa region of Ukraine by his former friend, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Just a few years later, Saakashvili would be banned from yet another country he formerly called home.

Although he was known for his strong stance against Russia and anti-corruption position, Saakashvili is not as popular as he once was in the early 2000’s. In Georgia, his presidency lasted from 2004-2013. During that time, he presided over the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, in which Georgia lost control over the disputed territory of South Ossetia. In 2012, Saakashvili’s party lost the parliamentary elections and he was further term limited out of office in the following year.

Since losing that election, Saakashvili looked to university friend, Petro Poroshenko for help. Poroshenko was elected as the Ukrainian president in 2014. Saakashvili became an advisor to Poroshenko, and in 2015 became governor of Ukrainian region of Odessa region.

To become governor, he needed to become a Ukrainian citizenship. This meant Saakashvili needed to renounce his Georgian citizenship. This was no great loss for him, considering that he is convicted of abuse of power in relation to a 2006 murder case and sentenced to three years of prison in-absentia. He maintains his innocence, however, saying that the charges are politically motivated.

The following year, Saakashvili was again out of work. He resigned from his post as governor in November 2016, claiming that members of the Ukrainian government, Poroshenko in particular, were undercutting his efforts to fight corruption.

In the year that followed his resignation, Saakashvili became an outspoken critic of Poroshenko. He and his supporters claim that Poroshenko is a pawn of Putin, and that all of his political acts are purely motivated towards Russian dominance. His movement, however, is not particularly popular and is not expected to be particularly successful in the 2019 Ukrainian elections.

Why does Saakashvili have difficulty gaining support from Ukrainians?

In short, Ukrainians are tired of turmoil. From the Euromaidan protests to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine has been in a constant state of flux for over four years. Saakashvili’s own history is not one of stability. His past leadership is marred with unpredictable behavior and populist tendencies. Further complicating his reputation is a pending money laundering case in the Ukrainian courts that alleges that Saakashvili conspired with ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.

Although his Ukrainian citizenship was stripped from him in July 2017, Saakashvili succeeded in crossing the border illegally from Poland in September of 2017. He has organized and led anti-government protests. In response, the Ukrainian government has accused Saakashvili of working with a criminal organization. They further state that the anti-Poroshenko protests are a “Russian plot against the government in Kiev.”

Saakashvili appears at the Munich Security Conference to push his own agenda

Saakashvili made an appearance at the Munich Security Conference in February of 2018. Instead of joining the broader security discussion, he spent his time speaking out against the Ukrainian government. His claims of crooked business dealings and anti-democratic measures ring hollow against his own attempts to work with the Svoboda party and Azov Battalion, both of which are right-wing, xenophobic groups.

Although his supporters in Georgia and Ukraine would prefer otherwise, Saakashvili’s star seems to have waned. He will undoubtedly continue to speak out against perceived injustice, but the former president seems to have been reduced to a stateless agitator.

The Decline of Mikhail Saakashvili was originally published on Global Security Review.

As Germany and Russia begin construction phases for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline underneath the Baltic Sea, Polish lawmakers echoed by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson continue to oppose its construction. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki asked the United States to consider extending sanctions that would hamper its development. Secretary Tillerson has stated that he sees the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a threat to European energy security.

What do gas pipelines and security have to do with one another? The United States and Poland both consider the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to be a potential political tool for Russia. Both countries have raised the frightening possibility that Russia could use the flow of gas as geopolitical leverage in Europe. In other words, if political tensions escalated significantly to Russia’s detriment, the Kremlin could just turn off the tap.

What is Nord Stream 2?

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will link Germany and Russia, bypassing several Eastern European states. Once constructed, it will be one of the world’s longest offshore pipelines measuring at over 745 miles (1,200 kilometers). Once it makes landfall, natural gas from Russia will flow through to access European energy markets.

Permits were granted to begin construction on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the landfall area in Lubmin, near Greifswald, Germany on January 31, 218. The Stralsund Mining Authority issued the permits. Other countries that will need to also provide licenses to Nord Stream 2 are Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. The scheduled completion of the pipelines is marked for the end of 2019.

Europe will face a deficit of 120 billion cubic meters of gas over the next two years. Nord Stream 2 and LNG aim to mitigate that gap. In response to claims that Nord Stream 2 is will place Europe under Russian influence, the gas company claims that Russian gas makes up approximately thirty percent share of EU energy consumption. Even with the construction of Nord Stream 2, Russian gas exports to Europe are not expected to increase or decrease drastically.

Energy diversification as a tool of political power.

Energy diversification has long been the desired policy of European states. However, with the expansion of Russian natural gas pipelines across Europe and Eurasia – that possibility grows smaller. Smaller countries like Poland are naturally worried about the intentions that a monopoly on gas could cost Europe. Poland has started imported liquid natural gas (LNG) from the United States, but overall – the majority of energy comes directly from Russia.

One of the more significant questions is whether or not this is a situation that requires a negotiation mandate from the European Commission. Does Germany need permission from the EU for this project? Countries like Poland would say yes. However, Germany doesn’t believe there is a need for it. With that comes a degree of regulatory uncertainty. Furthermore, the question of how seriously Bulgaria will take energy diversification when it takes up the EU Council presidency remains unanswered.

Another issue that arises is that Ukraine makes around 1 billion USD annually from transport costs of Russia using their territory to access Europe. With the Nord Stream 2 in place, that will no longer be the case. Bulgaria, like Ukraine, is also highly dependent on Russian gas. On the security front, how will Nordic countries handle construction preparation with a more aggressive Russia on their literal sea borders?

Taking all of this into account, however, Nord Stream 2 will translate more gas and in turn more competitive pricing for European consumers. As a political tool, though, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a potentially useful way for Russia to increase its influence in the European Union, which has restricted Russia’s economic activities through sanctions that were levied in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It remains to be seen, at present, whether or not the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a vehicle for Russian foreign policy and political influence.

The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Threatens European Energy Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

On January 18, 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that labels names both the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as “temporarily occupied territories,” a moniker shared by the Crimea peninsula.

Ukraine continues to deal with the occupation of its Luhansk and Donetsk regions, along with occasional outbreaks of skirmishes along the border separating territory controlled by Russian-backed separatists from areas controlled by the Ukrainian military.

The Chairman of the Russian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachyov, responded to the passage of the bill by saying, “Kyiv has gone from sabotaging the Minsk agreements to burying them.” The bill outwardly labels Russia as an aggressor. However, it neither claims there is a current state of war nor specifies when said conflict began.

While this might seem like a small oversight on behalf of backers of the bill, which include Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, it might cause difficulty later in international criminal proceedings against Russia. The law also gives the President more direct power over Ukraine’s armed forces while eliminating the need for the support of the Ukrainian parliament. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

Failures of the Minsk Accords

The bill fails to address anything concerning the Minsk accords. After the first agreements failed, Minsk II was agreed to in February 2015 but has yet to be fully implemented. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, French President Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel spent 16 hours negotiating the Minsk II ceasefire agreement for the Ukrainian region in February of 2015. As comprehensive as the deal is, it relies heavily on a yet-to-be-implemented bilateral ceasefire. The Minsk II agreement called for:

• An immediate, bilateral ceasefire
• Withdrawal of heavy weaponry
• OSCE Monitoring and Verification for both the ceasefire and the removal of armaments
• Dialogue on holding local elections
• Amnesty for all figures involved in the Donetsk and Luhansk conflict
• The release all hostages and detained individuals
• Access to humanitarian aid
• Restoration of economic and social links
• Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups from Ukrainian territory
• Ukrainian government control through the conflict zone
• Constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution to be in place by the end of 2015

In other words, beyond a simple ceasefire, the accords agreed to compelled Ukraine to give autonomy to the separatist-held regions, which they did by passing a law giving “special status” to Donbas and Luhansk in March of 2015.

Ukrainian Opposition to a Diplomatic Solution

To complicate matters further, President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones. Minor skirmishes continue to take place along the border, and U.S. State Department officials have claimed that heavy weaponry continues to flow into both regions from Russia.

There have been various attempts at further ceasefires in the last two years. One attempt in September 2016 lasted for a few days before reports emerged of violations by parties on both sides of the conflict. Heavy fighting restarted in January 2017, with a subsequent ceasefire negotiated in February 2017. In December of 2017, another temporary ceasefire was attempted. With the occasional exception, it was more-or-less observed. 2017 ended with a prisoner exchange. 73 Ukrainian soldiers were exchanged for 200 separatist fighters.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence such as the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict in the upcoming year. The continued failure of ceasefire agreements lends legitimacy to the argument that military escalation is the only solution for Ukraine to regain or maintain control over its eastern regions.

Ukraine’s “Occupied Territories” Law is Enacted as Donbas Conflict Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.