For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements and prioritized military readiness in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel’s aggression nor Iran’s ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States’ changing focus in the Middle East, it will end up losing more than its economic potency and military confidence. It will lose the ability to arrange the chessboard.

The inability of the Arab world to synchronize with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Is staying mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?

To mitigate conflict spillovers, the Arab nations have prioritized active defense investments and air denial practices. Systematic defense procurements have streamlined their multi-domain operations to prevent entanglements, but out-spying Iran’s asymmetric warfighting or Israel’s intelligence warfare remains a political test. Israel’s intelligence directives of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlight the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA’s defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not synchronizing against a common enemy caused several problems: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world’s warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous productions of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic connections existing as a starting point, the underlying factors of alliance fragmentation have increased.

Consistent strategic differences are fracturing the prospects of political reconciliation and strategic retrospection. Facing multiple power projectors, shared security architecture has reshaped how the geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA’s high-fliers see this geography without one dominant actor. This vacuum has yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf’s current strategy to combine deterrence with diplomacy has been met with historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its fair share of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness to arrange the Middle East offers a

complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a cohesive block from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theater.

Israel’s versatile intelligence alters political entanglements for the Gulf. It introduced a hybrid wave of targeted psychological operations (PSYOPS). The open presence of Israel’s intelligence in the Middle East has resulted in its neighbors’ doctrinal fatigue. This ‘eye in the sky’ layering impacts the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA’s doctrinal postures. It pushes the Persian Gulf to enhance battlespace in three settings: Iran’s predictive intelligence, the Gulf’s threat assessment, and integrated weapons systems. Still, the absence of collective military intelligence and interoperability is glaring.

To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a threefold approach, by formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to succeed in collectively preserving power, let alone projecting it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) strategic behavior was observed. It preferred personalized military innovations and investments, while securing inter-regional strategic alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Tukey to the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the disconnected objectives. However, the Gulf’s common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios for a future strategy.

First, to become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making Five Eyes a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, to continue investing in personalized, ad-hoc security investments before active defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy provided the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the previous geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was the rump administration’s idea to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt’s withdrawal soured the idea MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.

Currently the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA. It has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding common ground remains an Achilles ‘ heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from inter-regional coalition lessons is one go-to strategy.

Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He has published his work in the Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, and the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). The views of the author are his own.

A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready? was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.

A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety

The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.

The memory of Iraq’s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.

Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard

Iran: A Threat Undiminished

Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.

Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The proliferation of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.

Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North

While Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school education systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to Jarabulus.

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey’s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.

Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic resets, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.

Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation

Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with Druze militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.

While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.

Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection

Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.

1. Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking

Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The Captagon crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.

Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the resurgence of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.

2. Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence

Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions relief, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s debt to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.

Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.

An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence

Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an opportunity for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.

This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.

Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty

Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.

Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.

Syria as a Forward Defense Zone

Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.

In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

The escalating tensions with Iran present a serious problem that cannot be ignored. The continued attacks on American troops by Iranian proxies underscores the urgent need for the Biden administration to define and communicate clear red lines to prevent further acts of aggression and protect the lives of American military personnel in the region.

 The Need for Red Lines

 Firstly, the absence of a defined red lines allows Iran to push the boundaries of acceptable behavior without facing substantial consequences. Currently the Biden administration is “weighing responses” to the attack. However, red lines were required once the administration entered office. Iran needed a clear picture of aggression’s consequences, especially aggression causing American casualties. This continued lack of clarity from the administration not only undermines the safety of American soldiers but also weakens the credibility of the United States on the international stage. Without a clear stance, there is a risk of further attacks and a wider regional conflict.

Secondly, defined red lines serve as a deterrent, signaling to Iran that the United States will not tolerate attacks on its military personnel. Establishing such boundaries is essential to maintaining stability in the region and preventing an escalation that can have far-reaching consequences. This sends a powerful message that acts of violence will not go unanswered, fostering a more secure and predictable relationship.

Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding American responses can embolden other hostile actors in the region and elsewhere to test the waters. Clear red lines are not only about dealing with Iran but also about deterring other potential aggressors and ensuring that the United States is perceived as steadfast and resolute in defending its interests. The Biden administration must follow through on any violations of red lines to solidify credibility.

 The American Response

 To address this critical issue, the Biden administration must take decisive action. First, it is imperative to communicate clear and non-negotiable red lines to Iran, making it unequivocally clear that attacks on American soldiers will trigger severe consequences. Simultaneously, diplomatic engagement with Iran is needed to convey the seriousness of the American position, emphasizing the importance of de-escalation and constructive dialogue—but always backed by the threat of overwhelming violence.

However, to fortify its position and respond effectively to the heightened tensions with Iran, the United States must go beyond diplomatic initiatives and reinforce its military capabilities in the region. The US should bolster its military presence, which serves as both a deterrent and a tangible demonstration of the nation’s commitment to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its troops and allies. A visible and formidable American military presence sends a powerful signal, not only to Iran but to the entire region. The United States is prepared to defend its interests and respond decisively to any acts of aggression.

Additionally, the US must respond forcibly to the recent attack. As William Wechsler recently argued, it should be done in ways to avoid a wider regional war from occurring. Matthew Kroenig, however, suggests the United States can incapacitate the Iranian navy. It could conduct strikes on Iranian naval bases or even emulate former President Donald Trump’s approach by targeting Iranian leadership, as demonstrated in the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. Additionally, the Biden administration should consider the option of striking and dismantling Iran’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons, especially considering American officials believe Iran can build a bomb in roughly twelve days.

Lastly, strengthening alliances with regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, etc.) is another pivotal aspect of a comprehensive strategy that the Biden administration should pursue. Solidifying a unified front with its allies and friends in the Middle East fosters a collaborative approach to regional security. Collective efforts enable the sharing of intelligence, joint military exercises, and coordinated responses to potential threats. Such partnerships not only enhance the effectiveness of American actions but also contribute to regional stability by creating a cohesive and united response to aggression from Iran and its proxies.

Ultimately, well-defined red lines, coupled with a robust response to aggression, is essential for safeguarding American lives and maintaining stability in the Middle East. President Biden must seize the opportunity to demonstrate strength, resilience, and a commitment to protecting American interests in the face of escalating threats. If he fails to do so, deterrence will continue to falter, and attacks on American troops will continue to escalate. The stakes are high and clear red lines coupled with strict enforcement is the first step toward ensuring the US protects its interests within the region and enhances the credibility to deter further aggression.

 Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ISAB report was also issued by a bipartisan group, comprised of strategic policy experts from both professional and academic backgrounds. The ISAB report recommends a DoS-led response in several areas of nuclear deterrence strategy and is unsurprisingly heavily focused on diplomacy and arms control efforts. The ISAB report also unsurprisingly continues the DoS clarion call for lowering the overall American inventory of nuclear weapons while recognizing the increased nuclear threat created in a multipolar environment. The ISAB report contains little that would be unexpected in such reports, but a few problematic items emerge in the report.

The ISAB report notes that the nature of deterrence is unchanged by moving into a multipolar environment. The report concludes:

Fundamentally, deterrence is about convincing an actor not to take specific actions for fear of not achieving its planned objective, or of being forced to absorb unacceptable levels of punishment. Deterrence by both denial and punishment relies on the capability to deliver an effective response to an enemy action, the credibility of threats to follow through with that response, and effective communication of the promised response.  Extended deterrence threatens retaliation on behalf of allies and partners, and assurance signals US commitment to their security.

The argument offered is that deterrence is about convincing an actor not to act because they will fail or suffer unacceptable levels of punishment.

The DoS is the primary diplomacy arm of the US government. The DoS’ role is, therefore, to pass along the correct information regarding American policy, to assure both competitors and allies alike of American capability, and to take a leading role in developing foreign policy that forces our nuclear competitors to choose between costly arms build-ups and more peaceful paths to achieving international respect for their legitimate interests. A report that advocates only for arms control and ignores the role of assuring denial is problematic.

Assuring allies of American capabilities and intentions is good. Better is assuring them of American understanding of enduring mutual interests and how the United States can work with them to strengthen deterrence. The United States must convince its allies that working together makes the world safer. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report issued in May 2023 offers, as a conclusion, that the United States must commit to signaling a bipartisan commitment to alliances as this may “assuage concerns about abandonment.”

One key element of assurance and alliance management is showing that the US is a responsible nuclear actor committed to nuclear arms control. Commitment to alliances and nuclear arms control is an important element in alliance management. But this commitment also requires the US to show it will respond quickly to put pressure on adversaries and competitors who engage in irresponsible behaviors. Commitment to nuclear arms control is how the DoS operationalizes “taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy as wells as the risks of nuclear war, while also ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, and our extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible.”

The biggest role that the DoS should play is in assurance of allies. South Korea and Saudi Arabia are expressing interest in acquiring nuclear arms and uranium enrichment. The DoS must lead the way in assuring these key allies of American commitment to their security from opponents such as North Korea and Iran. The DoS will need not just to assure these governments of American support, but other populations as well. “Frequent polls show a strong majority of South Koreans—between 70 and 80 percent in some surveys—support their nation acquiring atomic weapons or urging Washington to bring back the tactical nuclear weapons it removed from the South in the early 1990s.”

The ISAB report states that making extended deterrence and assurance credible requires making allies understand the “indispensable nature of our co-dependencies.”  What are the economic and cultural dependencies of South Korea or Saudi Arabia and the US? Additionally, the ISAB report says that assurance strategies must be tailored to the allies’ situation and requires continuous efforts in coordinating and consultation. The report points to intelligence and information sharing with European allies before Russia invaded Ukraine as an example of how the US can effectively create assurance among key allies.

The ISAB report states, “It is also far from certain that the United States or our allies have a full and accurate picture of what PRC and Russian leaders value, and how to effectively influence their nuclear and strategic decision-making.” A major responsibility of the DoS is collecting information about other governments and their populations. In fact, the United States does understand Russian and Chinese leaders’ goals and objectives. Reports issued by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2022) and the Federation of American Scientists (2022) both outline Russian nuclear doctrine in detail. Reports such as “Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces” also exist. A large volume of research exists concerning the very subjects that the ISAB says we do not know much about.

The DoS is the largest information-gathering agency in the US government, so how do they not know or understand Chinese and Russian nuclear doctrine or what Russian and Chinese leaders value? If the ISAB report wants to make the point that DoS reports come up short in the area of understanding foreign leaders’ goals and foreign governments’ nuclear postures, the ISAB report should advocate for increased information analysis and better sharing of information between US government agencies.

The DoS needs to perform their most fundamental duty of interpreting the actions and assessing the intentions of the most important American adversaries by clearly and succinctly stating the nation’s competitor’s broad expectations for the mid-term. For instance, the report misses the opportunity to urge the DOS to work on assuring allies in Asia that the United States understands the strategic goals of China and understands how these goals negatively impact allies. The DoS needs to assure allies that working together is the best way to prevent China from acting hegemonically and threatening their security.  The United States needs to make sure that allies in Europe know America understands their concerns about Russian aggression and engages with them in countering Putin’s behavior.

Both Russia and China are improving the quality and quantity of their nuclear forces to improve coercive nuclear threats. The DoS needs to take a leading role in assuring allies that the US understands this threat to their security. If the DoS is interested in arms control, it must figure out what pressures are needed to bring Russia and China to the arms control table.

Had the ISAB report spent more time focusing on denial of success and assurance strategies for the DoS, perhaps this report would not have been as overlooked. Instead, the report came up short. What the report really needed to offer was suggestions for ways to properly engage allies in joint efforts to deny success to nuclear challenges. The report also undermined effective assurance by intimating that the US government, represented by the DoS, does not understand the goals and strategies of nuclear competitors. In short, the ISAB report was largely a failure and will rightly find a home in the ash heap of history.

Sam Stanton, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The State Department Assessment of American Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the record high gas prices of this past summer still on the minds of American voters, some in Congress are hoping to revive an old proposal that they claim would help prevent future pain at the pump. Known as the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act (NOPEC), the measure, if passed, could unfortunately seriously backfire, creating more volatility in the oil market as well as hurting the American economy and international relations.

From my time in Congress, I recall many instances of knee jerk reactions to “do something” legislatively even if the result would have unintended effects of harming American interests. The NOPEC bill fits that example. Both during the lame duck session and in the new Congress come January, this counterproductive policy should be rejected.

While naming a culprit may be easy, the reality is that oil markets are notoriously complicated. At a time when the United States and European Union are tightening sanctions on Russian oil exports in response to the Ukraine conflict, policymakers should be looking to promote stability in oil markets and encourage domestic American production.

Yet despite this reality, some lawmakers are pointing to NOPEC as a possible tool to better control oil markets. Passage of NOPEC would do the opposite, not only creating volatility in oil supplies but also removing a safety net of sorts that prevents prices from dropping precipitously or spiking astronomically. This stability allows for planned investments to be made in future American production capacity, which benefits U.S. energy exporters and our European allies who face an uncertain energy future.

Passage of NOPEC could also further upset already strained U.S.-Saudi relations and create a spiral where American companies doing business in Saudi Arabia are retaliated against and vice versa. In the wake of an awkward diplomatic meeting earlier this year between President Biden and Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman and with American and Saudi energy production efforts so closely intertwined, this could jeopardize domestic refining capacity and oil supplies.

Operating U.S. refineries are already running full-out, at about 95% of total capacity and the Motiva refinery in Texas – which is the largest oil refinery in the U.S can process a staggering 607,000 barrels per day (b/d) – is Saudi-owned. Meanwhile, while U.S. crude oil production has risen to 11.9 million b/d, almost back to its pre-pandemic high, Saudi Arabia is still the largest OPEC petroleum exporter to the United States, accounting for 5% of U.S. total petroleum imports.

Additionally, NOPEC’s broad anti-trust mandate could deter foreign investment in the U.S and lead to greater legal liabilities. An initial version of the bill that was introduced in 2000 proposed to strip state immunity from national oil companies of OPEC member countries, a theme that has carried through the no less than 16 iterations of the bill that has been introduced since.

This could also lead to “tit-for-tat” laws or sanctions that target American energy firms. A Rice University Baker Institute report suggests that a retaliatory OPEC “could include avoiding dollar transactions and the American financial system,” creating a strong economic blow. Added to those business concerns are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s warning that suing nations over alleged oil market tampering could be met with similar lawsuits against the U.S., its agents, and possibly even the military.

Further efforts that would allow federal prosecutors to sue other nations under the assertion of unfair competition, despite the fact that this action is already allowed under the Sherman Antitrust Act, could also prove problematic. The text of S.977 would “make oil-producing and exporting cartels illegal” which, upon passage, arguably would place OPEC’s twenty-one (21) sovereign nations, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Mexico, in violation of US statutes and complicate international relations.

Would OPEC accept US claims their pre-existing agreements are illegal?  More importantly, is the US willing to go to war against some countries that are considered allies to impose NOPEC law on OPEC nations?  At a minimum, NOPEC would result in market disruptions resulting in higher prices and at worst could result in a second oil embargo.

Solving energy supply and oil prices won’t come from passing NOPEC. In fact, the measure is likely to create more unpredictability and more negative consequences. If lawmakers really want to help, they should pursue efforts that strengthen American energy production and infrastructure, creating more long-term supply and a hedge against OPEC production. It’s time to hang up the idea of NOPEC and focus on more helpful solutions.

Lame Duck Energy Bill Threatens International Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

He should move forward with the embargo, and every successive administration should reaffirm the policy with its own restrictions on Saudi oil. Such a move, while sudden and seemingly radical, is a practical and pragmatic way of advancing both American economic interests at home and Washington’s geopolitical concerns abroad.

First, we must understand the relationship between Saudi oil and the broader U.S. energy landscape. While gauging the importance of Saudi oil to the American economy may seem straightforward, the history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, as seen by lawmakers and voters, serves to complicate contemporary sensibilities. The oil shocks of the 1970s, the Carter Doctrine, and U.S. adventurism in Iraq and Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks overinflates the strategic importance of our Saudi counterparts and their natural resource endowment in the minds of the American people. One can forgive the ignorance of this popular sentiment because, for decades, it was reflective of American energy realities: since the mid-1980s, Saudi oil imports to the U.S. grew steadily, peaking at 2.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2003.

But a series of technological advancements have brought about unprecedented changes in American energy since the early 2000s. The advent of horizontal drilling has made shale oil a lucrative and reliable source of energy in the United States. And while the U.S. is by no means isolated from global oil markets, net imports of petroleum reached an all-time low of just over half a million b/d in 2019, down from a peak of nearly 13 million b/d in 2006. Saudi oil imports have not been immune to this dramatic reversal, decreasing more than seventy-five percent to little more than half a million b/d—a paltry six percent share of total U.S. petroleum imports last year. This amount is exceptionally minute when comparing it against imports from other major U.S. allies, especially Mexico (holding a seven percent share) and Canada (nearly fifty percent share).

In this context, we can understand Saudi oil not as a pivotal source of energy but as a dribble that has been gradually but consistently thinned by an innovative and resourceful American energy industry.

Of course, cutting permanently any number of barrels from the supply would spook markets and have a dramatic effect on oil and gas prices. But a rise in prices—which have cratered in recent weeks due to concerns regarding oversupply and lack of storage space—would be enormously beneficial for American producers, who have suffered greatly under the pandemic regime of low prices and bottomed-out demand. A modest, sustained price spike caused by a permanent supply cut would enable American shale producers to restart drilling and operate profitably, saving thousands of energy jobs and bridging the supply gap created by missing Saudi barrels. This fact is not lost on American upstream stakeholders, who are increasing pressure on the White House to slap a permanent ban on Saudi imports.

Downstream players, however, feel somewhat differently than their upstream counterparts. Ailing American refiners argue that a ban on Saudi imports would hurt their bottom line by denying access to the crude they are tooled to refine. But a slight retooling of the refineries, says U.S. Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND), could enable them to refine U.S. crude, saving their business models and giving a boost to domestic producers. Doing so would provide a desperately needed sense of unity within the energy industry, which has been in a constant state of emergency due to foreign competition and deep slumps in demand caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

Favoring American crude over foreign materials could also win refiners a very public pat on the back from the president, who is never shy to trumpet his support for “made in America” products. Indeed, firms such as these are in sore need of a public relations boost, according to a new survey from the Brunswick Group, which details just how disdainfully the American public views the oil industry.

The benefits of blocking Saudi imports are not limited to American oil producers. In forever removing oil as a factor that unduly influences the fundamentals of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, Washington gains a free hand to reassess geopolitical dilemmas that have plagued its long and fraught history with the Kingdom without being restrained by energy concerns.

First and foremost, removing oil from the equation would give the Pentagon and the White House additional leverage over their counterparts in Riyadh. Unable to further enjoy their traditional influence over the American energy supply, Saudi decision-makers could prove to be malleable on a particularly hot point of contention should they wish to continue being a beneficiary of American military support.

Such newfound clout can and should be used to pressure the Saudi government and its de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (or MbS) into scaling down the Kingdom’s devastating military presence in Yemen, which has caused the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, displaced nearly two million people and created the most acute humanitarian crisis in the world—all with the logistical support of the United States. In backing such an atrocious Saudi-led campaign, Washington is simultaneously damaging its credibility as a beacon of human rights and enabling the creation of a power vacuum to the advantage of Iran and other regional players like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the world’s deadliest terror groups.

If MbS wishes to continue protecting his nation’s most crucial resource using nearly three thousand American servicemembers (as he has since a drone knocked out Saudi Arabia’s largest and most strategically significant oil fields last September), he will be particularly receptive to bipartisan American demands that he work to limit Yemeni casualties and ultimately scale down his presence there. There is encouraging precedent for tying U.S. military support to most any demand: in a successful effort to end the oil wars last month, Trump himself ordered the Crown Prince to cut the Kingdom’s oil production or risk losing American military aid. And while MbS has yet to acquiesce to demands that he end his useless adventurism in Yemen, a U.S. that is not materially affected by Saudi oil—Riyadh’s one trump card—would have the best chance at convincing the strongman to think differently.

While Saudi crude makes up much less of our energy supplies than it used to, importing any barrels from the Kingdom gives the false impression to Beltway policymakers and the broader public that the American economy relies on the graces of the Al Saud family to function. It is in this way that divorcing from Saudi oil—and thus disentangling from the fiction that the U.S. relies on a young prince—that the United States can work to establish a foreign policy consensus that privileges long-term strategic interests over rabble-rousing in the Middle East on behalf of an inexperienced ruler who ordered the death of an American journalist and has repeatedly shown disdain for American values of freedom of expression and due process.

If the United States aspires to lead the charge against this century’s most significant geopolitical challenges—great power competition with China and Russia, eradicating infectious diseases, and climate change—it must work to separate itself from those whose actions hurt both its standing on the world stage and credibility with sorely-needed allies. Washington cannot afford to continue to serve the interests of unreliable allies in the Middle East if it wishes to reclaim its place as leader of the free world. By refusing Saudi imports and further disengaging from Saudi recklessness, the United States would take a small but necessary step to strengthen both its domestic front and position in the world.

The United States Should Block Saudi Oil Imports—For Good was originally published on Global Security Review.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, President Trump and President Rouhani had agreed on a four-point document brokered by Emmanuel Macron as a basis for a meeting and relaunching negotiations between their respective countries. According to the text, which POLITICO claimed to have seen, Tehran would agree that “Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon” and will “fully comply with its nuclear obligations and commitments and will accept a negotiation on a long term framework for its nuclear activities.” It would also refrain from any aggression and will seek genuine peace and respect in the region through negotiations.”

The U.S. would agree to “lift all the sanctions re-imposed since 2017” and “Iran will have full ability to export its oil and freely use its revenues.” The meeting did not take place, though, as President Rouhani reportedly called it off because of Mr. Trump’s remarks in the UNGA of imposing further sanctions on Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian Supreme Leader has forbidden any talks with the U.S. unless the U.S. lifts all the sanctions on Iran. 

Meanwhile,  Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan had said in an address to media during the UNGA that both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and President Trump had asked him to work to deescalate the situation between them and Iran. He subsequently made a trip to Iran and Saudi Arabia in a bid to facilitate dialogue between both the countries. Also, shortly after UNGA, it was reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi had undertaken efforts to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the consent of Saudi Arabia. Abbas al Housavi, an official in Iraqi PM’s office, told Middle East Eye that the Saudis and Iranians both have conditions before the negotiations process starts. Middle East Eye later reported that Tahnoun bin Zayad, UAE national security adviser and crown prince’s brother, was in Tehran for at least 48 hours to defuse the Gulf crisis. 

Even though the agreed Trump-Rouhani meeting did not take place, it is nevertheless appreciable what President Macron was able to achieve through his shuttle diplomacy efforts. This instance is perhaps the closest the presidents of Iran and the U.S. have been to directly engaging with each other. Additionally, the four-point document was agreed upon by the two presidents, according to reports, and acknowledges the concerns of stakeholders. Thus, mediation efforts can now be augmented accordingly. It remains to be seen, however, what will come from the efforts of Pakistani and Iraqi Prime Ministers, as well as from the UAE National Security Advisor’s visit to Tehran.

Recent events underscore the necessity for dialogue

Furthermore, the events following the explosions that occurred on board the Iranian oil tanker Sabity in the Red Sea indicate genuine efforts by both Iran and Saudi Arabia to not only avoid tensions but also to de-escalate them. Iran has so far avoided explicitly blaming Saudi Arabia for explosions, despite alleging that two missiles hit the tanker near the Saudi Port of Jeddah. The Saudi Foreign Minister rejected any involvement in the Sabity incident. The spokesperson of the Saudi General Directorate of Border Guard claimed that Saudi Arabia’s attempts to assist the tanker were unsuccessful since the Sabity’s GPS was turned off, and it did not respond to repeated Saudi attempts to make contact. Ahead of PM Imran Khan’s visit to Iran, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Mousavi expressed Iran’s willingness to hold talks with Saudi Arabia in a bid to reduce or eliminate misunderstandings.

The attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last month is perhaps the event that can be most strongly attributed to the dramatic turn of events that is being observed. The Aramco attacks not only damaged the facilities but exposed Saudi Arabia’s military and economic vulnerabilities. Further, the U.S. shied away from overtly responding to Iran. It’s possible that MBS was made to realize the Kingdom can no longer rely on the U.S. for its security and that dialogue is needed to de-escalate the situation and find a way for sustainable, long-term regional coexistence with Iran.

“Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to directly label Iran for the Aramco attacks as the culprit demonstrates Riyadh’s uncertainties as to how to react given its obvious vital military and economic vulnerabilities. More than that, Riyadh has reportedly shown willingness to engage in talks with Iran mediated by Iraq—a dramatic turn from its more hawkish stance so far. In a nutshell, it seems that Iran’s risky game of brinkmanship since at least May has been quite successful in demonstrating its power of nuisance in the region,” said Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Visiting Fellow at the Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings Doha Center, when asked by the author for comment via email.

In a nutshell, there is a growing consensus about the necessity for talks. Yet, the occurrence of these talks remains only bleakly probable. This is because of the complications that arise out of Iranian, Saudi, and U.S. concerns, as well as from domestic politics in Iran and the U.S.

Dr. Nejad describes it this way: “Despite Macron’s strong efforts to arrange a Trump–Rouhani meeting at the sidelines of the UNGA and a four-point plan designed to exchange the lifting with U.S. sanctions with Iranian concessions in regional geopolitics and its ballistic missile program, Rouhani refused to take part in such a meeting, arguing that the U.S. needed to first lift sanctions. Rouhani’s position reflects that of the Supreme Leader Khamenei who, beyond that, seems to be opposed to the idea of his president engaging in talks with the U.S., which would lift Rouhani’s status at home—something Khamenei is unsympathetic to amid ongoing intra-elite rivalries in view of post-Khamenei Iran.” As for President Trump, he wants to talk to the Iranians but without lifting sanctions. His objective is to be seen as pressuring the Iranians via sanctions, thus forcing them to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the approaching 2020 U.S. Presidential Election has made it even more difficult for Mr. Trump to change course, lest he appears weak. 

Ending the stalemate

There have been attempts at mediation, but perhaps none of them have dedicated an adequate amount of effort at confidence-building measures between the rival countries. Thus far, mediators have tried to leverage the trust of the respective parties to facilitate talks, but have only managed to serve as interlocutors. Therefore, it is essential that confidence-building among these countries be considered a primary objective, which can then be further developed upon to get them to participate in a dialogue. This can only happen if reservations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. be addressed first, at least to an extent, if not completely.

In terms of the Iranian position with regards to negotiation, Dr. Nejad says that “although Iranian foreign-policy at times is Janus-faced, Iranian strategy since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has been a result of elite consensus, involving various domestic factions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary by the Supreme Leader, Iran, via Zarif, has been regularly testing the waters of entering into negotiations with the U.S., which is indispensable if Tehran wants to improve its economic situation.” The main hindrance is that Iran wants to be respected by the U.S., and President Trump is doing precisely the opposite. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Tehran Correspondent of Financial Times, quoted a relative of the Supreme Leader in a recent article as saying, “Mr. Khamenei is not fundamentally against negotiations but he believes the U.S. intends to turn talks into a trial of the Islamic republic.” The relative goes on to say that “he believes that we first need to be very strong in the region. We have shown that we are not too far from that point of determining regional developments. The U.S. should not be able to ignore our power.”

As for Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Yemen crisis will make the most important feature in any negotiations or talks between them. As Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former Iranian policymaker in his article in Los Angeles Times, has suggested that the solution of crisis can act as a precursor to talks between the two countries and also the U.S in long run. This can serve as an appropriate confidence building measure. Mr. Mousavia suggests that the UN Secretary General can take initiative and invite both countries, as well as member countries of the European Union and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to hold a dialogue aimed at ending the bloodshed in Yemen. Looking at the statements from both, Saudi Arabia and Iran, it seems as though both the countries have already realized in part that neither can hope to have security by levying insecurity on the other and it is time to quit the competition for regional hegemony. 

In a meeting with PM Imran Khan, Supreme Leader Khamenei said properly ending the war in Yemen can have positive effects for the region. The Supreme Leader added that “we have no motivation for animosity with these countries (Saudi Arabia), but they are influenced by the United States and act against the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with the United States’ will.” Both these remarks are critical in the sense that the Supreme Leader has made them himself, perhaps implying he also thinks working to resolve the crisis in Yemen is a good starting point. Furthermore, based on the rhetoric of its leaders, Iran is arguably more comfortable about dialogue with Saudi Arabia right now than it is with the U.S.

Thus, as Mr. Mousavian has suggested further in his article, and it makes sense that if Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, the EU, and the U.S. are able to reach consensus about an end game for the Yemen war, there is a greater opportunity for a reduction in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lastly, this can set the stage for U.S. and Iran to reduce their tensions, as it would mean the solution of a significant point of contention between the U.S. and Iran: the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Mr. Trump can use this as a basis for granting concessions to Iran and not appear weak. In return, Iran would consider revisiting its earlier stand that all sanctions on Iran be lifted and participate in talks with the U.S.

Confidence Building Measures Needed Before the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Start a Dialogue With Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The secretary’s statements came after Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen took credit for the strikes. The U.S. rejected this claim, citing intelligence that the attacks did not originate within Houthi-controlled territory. On the sidelines of the 2019 UN General Assembly, the leaders of the U.K., France, and Germany backed the U.S. position that Iran was behind the attacks. “It is clear for us that Iran bears responsibility for this attack. There is no other explanation,” U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in a joint statement. However, the three European leaders stopped short of labeling the incident an “act of war.”

This is not to say that the strikes were in any way inconsequential. The two fields—located in the eastern part of the Kingdom—are by themselves responsible for half of the country’s total oil production and around five percent of all oil production globally, approximately 5.7 million barrels a day. Taking into account the nearby supergiant Ghawar field, eastern Arabia is the largest and most concentrated oil production site in the world.

Oil markets responded appropriately: Brent futures spiked almost fifteen percent to $69.02 (USD), the most significant jump in more than a decade. Gas futures skyrocketed more than thirteen percent, and consumers have been feeling the effects at the pump. For just the third time in its history, authorization was given to draw from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a means to mitigate worries about supply and assuage markets.

More than a week after the attack, prices stabilized: Brent prices have settled at just over $63 and WTI at $58 (USD). For now, the worst economic effects of the incident seem to have petered out before any last damage could be done.

But this episode serves as a stark warning and reminder to American policymakers and energy stakeholders: modern global energy infrastructure is exceptionally centralized and situated in the most geopolitically sensitive areas in the world, which makes the highly integrated system susceptible to the numerous and ever-changing risks associated with such geographies. Those seemingly abstract hazards can translate into real crises, which can have considerable implications for American economic and security interests at home and abroad.

The United States is certainly no stranger to energy concerns stemming from insecurities in the Middle East. Indeed, such fears were the very foundation of the Carter Doctrine and, more recently, was a driving force behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And the Abqaiq oil field itself has been a target in the years since then; the most high-profile incident has been an unsuccessful attempt by al Qaeda to disrupt production using suicide bombers in trucks. Prices only increased moderately after that episode, which occurred in 2006.

Why, then, has the United States continued to subject itself to the risks of relying on such a fragile and insecure part of the world for price assurance and supply security?

Rather than go through great pains and international embarrassment to arm the Kingdom to the teeth with advanced weapons systems (which has only served to encourage and exacerbate the very reckless adventurism that produces events like those that occurred last month), the United States should do all it can to reduce its exposure to the price instabilities wrought by Middle Eastern conflicts, thereby hedging against further unrest.

This means doubling down on existing trends: capitalizing on innovations in drilling technologies to continue the shale revolution and increase crude oil production capacity, utilizing the nation’s genuinely mammoth natural gas endowment, taking advantage of both developments to increase our exports of both oil and natural gas, and continuing to shift the share of energy imports away from OPEC—whose output is greatly affected by the political turmoil that grips its members—and toward more reliable neighbors like Canada and Mexico.

But ensuring protection from global energy shocks means more than relying on what’s beneath our feet. Renewables are inexhaustible, emissions-free, and an increasingly economically competitive source of energy. Here too, the United States is trending in the right direction: electricity generation from renewable resources has doubled since 2008 and is now responsible for nearly eighteen percent of total electricity supply.

This change has come in spite of the deep-seated antipathy the Trump administration has towards the renewable sector, despite the current political climate and economic inclinations of significant industry players. To promote energy diversification and thus an insurance policy against price spikes, the White House should reexamine its policy of propagating political fantasies like “clean coal” at the expense of market forces, which are pushing the American energy portfolio toward embracing renewables.

This sort of diversification and due diligence will prevent something like what occurred in Abqaiq and Khurais last month into “an act of war.” In short, if the security of American energy supply—the foundation of economic growth and national security—no longer hinges on a few oil fields across the pond, there would be no need to sacrifice more blood and treasure on another unpopular war in the Middle East.

Moreover, if security concerns did arise there or in another energy chokepoint—Venezuela, the Steppes, or Russia, for example—Washington could launch a strategic offensive without concern for the effect such a war would have on gas prices or general energy supply. Top military and political brass could make decisions without the fear of energy insecurity weighing on their every move.

As tensions between the regional powers of the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel—heat up, the possibility of war is the highest it’s been in a decade. As war rages in Yemen and Iran continues breaching the limits outlined by the nuclear deal, the long-lasting proxy fight that has decimated the region could transform into an all-out war between nations. If the Israelis feel emboldened to fight back against Iranian aggression (as recent news reports suggest), a cataclysmic conflict could decommission more than sixty percent of the world’s crude oil supply and send markets into a tailspin.

Americans no longer have the patience nor tolerance for U.S. interventionism in the Middle East. Significant fuel price increases have severe short- and long-term economic consequences for low- and middle-income earners. Furthermore, the Middle East is no longer as strategically important for U.S. national security interests in light of shifting power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The future of U.S. national security and economic prosperity depends on the Trump administration (and future administrations) pursuing a policy of energy diversification while exercising restraint in Middle Eastern affairs.

Rethinking U.S. Energy Security to Hedge Against Heightened Instability in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict in Yemen—one of the Arab world’s poorest states—has roots that extend back to the Arab Spring uprisings of the early 2010s—and beyond. The Houthi insurgency has been in existence since the early 2000s, but it wasn’t until 2012 when a wave of protests forced Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down after ruling the country for 22 years.

Saleh’s successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was elected in a single-candidate election in 2012, much to the opposition of the Houthis, who boycotted voting. Hadi failed to successfully manage the country’s problems with food insecurity, unemployment, corruption, and militancy. Political instability only widened once a proposal to reorganize Yemen as a federal state divided into six regions was rejected, and security deteriorated significantly. Hadi was eventually forced from office in February 2015 as his relationship with the Houthis deteriorated severely.

Houthi militants began engaging with the Yemeni Army, and Hadi was placed under house arrest. However, he managed to flee the capital to his hometown of Aden, from where he made a public declaration that he retained executive power. However, he fled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the Houthi’s expanded the territory under their control.

In the years since Hadi’s ouster, the situation in Yemen has significantly worsened. In addition to hosting a bloody civil war, Yemen has seen numerous acts of terrorism, carried out mostly by groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS (Daesh). The United Nations has said it considers the humanitarian crisis in Yemen as the world’s worst. Millions of Yemeni civilians have been displaced, with millions more lacking access to clean water, food, and healthcare. Over one million cases of cholera have been reported in the country, resulting in thousands of deaths. 

Foreign Intervention

Like the majority of Iranians, the Houthis are members of the Shia sect of Islam. In the broader Islamic world, Shia Muslims are a minority; the majority of Muslims belong to the Sunni sect. In involving itself in the Yemeni civil war, Iran likely saw an opportunity to advance its interests in a region where it has few friends while frustrating the efforts of Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s regional rival, to consolidate its influence on the Arabian Peninsula.

Part of Iran’s strategy in Yemen was providing Houthi forces with arms—crucially, drones, and ballistic missiles which are regularly employed against targets in Saudi Arabia. In the past several months alone, there have been numerous drone or missile strikes on critical infrastructure and energy facilities in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Tehran has mobilized its most important proxy group, Hezbollah.

In response to the Iranian regime’s support for the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of its regional allies to prosecute a military campaign aimed at restoring Hadi to power. The United States and the United Kingdom have assisted the coalition, providing intelligence, logistical support, and arms to the Saudi-led coalition to counter what they perceive as Iran’s growing influence and the Iranian regime’s efforts to further destabilize an already-troubled region. Complicating Riyadh’s efforts, however, the United Arab Emirates—the Saudi’s primary ally in the conflict—recently began withdrawing its forces from Yemen.

Iranian Proxy Groups

Providing material, financial, and advisory support to proxy forces in lieu of direct engagement enables Iran to engage in regional conflicts with a degree of deniability. Proxy forces are utilized to shape political developments in specific areas while minimizing potential costs for Iran and are arguably regarded within the regime as a beneficial tool for achieving its foreign policy objectives.

The Islamic Republic provides Houthi forces with weaponry, supplies, training, and logistics, a strategy that aligns with Tehran’s playbook for shaping political and security conditions in a favorable manner. Hezbollah, based in Lebanon and perhaps the best-known Iranian proxy, has, over time, acquired substantial political powers, influence, and capabilities—both in Lebanon and beyond. 

In Yemen, Hezbollah has advised and delivered Iranian weapons to the Houthis. In Syria, the group has provided support to Bashar al Assad’s government forces. Among other groups that have served as Iranian proxies in Syria are Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) and the Iraqi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), established in 2006.

U.S.-Iran Tensions and Escalation

Tensions between Tehran and Washington have continued to escalate for the past few months. However, direct military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. remains an unlikely option given U.S. President Donald Trump’s continued restraint despite escalatory provocations by the Iranian regime. However, the Trump administration will continue to provide logistical support, intelligence, and weapons shipments to Riyadh—despite bipartisan opposition in the U.S. Congress.

Both sides are already deeply involved in the Yemeni civil war, and their respective interests are seemingly intractable. That being said, the leader of both parties understand the devastating costs a full-blown war would have. As a result, the conflict in Yemen will persist for the foreseeable future, fueled by a regional quasi-hybrid proxy war between the U.S.and the Islamic Republic that shows no sign of deescalating. 

Yemen is a Battleground in Iran’s Proxy War Against the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Up until the Libyan National Army (LNA) reached the southern outskirts of Tripoli, the campaign somewhat resembled a sneak attack. The LNA is lead by General Khalifa Haftar, an ex-Libyan Army officer who served under Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. From 1990 to 2011, Haftar lived in exile in the United States, returning to Libya in 2011 during the country’s revolution, holding a senior position in the group that overthrew Gaddafi’s regime.

In Haftar’s rhetoric, the assault is described merely as a campaign to liberate the capital from the extremist Islamic groups governing it. These assertions do have some logic to them, apart from the fact that the purported extremist groups aren’t overtly specified. Nevertheless, attempting to capture the capital—let alone effectively administering the country after a victory—may prove to be a bridge too far.

General Haftar Gains Ground

Ever since the chaotic events of 2011, Haftar has nearly continuously fought against jihadists, managing to achieve significant territorial gains. In earlier campaigns, some of his troops are known to have committed war crimes, but it would be a fallacy to assume no such crimes were committed by extremist groups on the opposing side.

Since the fall from power and subsequent death of Muammar al-Gaddafi in late 2011, Libya has lacked an effective central government. After a transition period, elections were held in 2012, which resulted in violence and left the country without functioning state organs. Concurrently, as an interim governing authority was established in Tripoli, Haftar struck an alliance with the rival governing body, the House of Representatives in Tobruk, Libya.

The legitimacy of the Tobruk-based government is itself disputed. Initially, it was recognized by the West, most likely in the hope that it would ultimately unite with the Tripoli-based government. This optimism could be deemed naïve, especially after Haftar quickly managed to mobilize an army (the Libyan National Army) primarily from Gaddafi-era officers and soldiers, with support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The LNA succeeded in capturing various cities in Eastern Libya, including Benghazi, after defeating ISIS and Shura Council forces in 2017.

After gaining power over Libya’s vital oil production areas in 2016, Haftar temporarily lost the key export ports of Brega, Es Sidr, and Ras Lanuf, but was able to reestablish control over them shortly after that. In contrast to their successes in eastern Libya, Haftar and his allies lost control over Tripoli’s international airport in 2014. However, heavy fighting damaged the airport’s facilities—if not even ruined them—rendering the airport inoperable.

In the wake of these clashes, Misrata-led armed groups and their allies formed the “Libya Dawn” coalition and took over the capital. In December 2015, Libya’s two main rivals—the House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based Libya Dawn coalition—reached an agreement over the formation of a UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), which was formed in Spring 2016.

Clashing Congressmen in the Capital

The supreme authority in Tripoli is the Presidential Council (PC), made up of nine members and chaired by the prime minister. Some members of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives never accepted the idea of a GNA, leaving little chance for any future cooperation. This is unsurprising, however, given that in any merger, members of both power centers would lose standing relative to their current positions.

Notably, the head of the GNA—Fayez Al-Sarraj—was a member of the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Regardless, this detail never fostered trust between the rival factions, nor did it prevent Haftar from seizing valuable oil installations in southern Libya.  Initially occupied by armed clans and militant groups, the GNA had to send troops to protect these facilities from Haftar’s advancing forces.

On the other hand, Haftar isn’t the only one causing gray hairs for Libya’s newly formed state institutions. Basing its mandate on the General National Congress elections of 2012, the Government of National Salvation of Khalifa Ghwell was also founded in Tripoli, though without any real governing structures. In 2016, Ghwell again tried to reassert his position but failed. The following year, he and his troops were finally ousted from the capital. Even though Ghwell’s possibilities were limited, the intra-Tripoli clashes 2016–2017 challenged Al-Sarraj’s regime, and in turn, provided momentum for Haftar to slowly approach the capital.

It is likely that internal rivalries existed amongst decision-makers in Tobruk, and that Al-Sarraj was expected to loyally support the aims of the eastern Libya-based House of Representatives. Instead, in the eyes of his former colleagues, he became too independent and powerful through his apparatus in Tripoli, which led to open confrontation between rival factions.

Despite any doubts held concerning Al-Sarraj’s loyalty, not all parliamentarians in Tobruk supported Haftar’s final push towards Tripoli. Dozens pledged their support for the general, but a number rejected the use of force and urged their colleagues to convene and elect a new chairperson. Those dissenting viewed the incumbent as a close ally of Haftar, but failed to gather the necessary quorum to hold a vote until later, but were unable to effectuate any meaningful action.

Foreign Friends & Funding

Despite sharp divisions between those allied with him, Haftar had no problem commencing his campaign to seize Tripoli. When Haftar ordered his troops to “liberate” Tripoli on April 4, 2019, he had already secured Saudi-Arabian backing as well as support from Egypt and the UAE. GNA forces shot down UAVs that were reported to be of Emirati origin, even though the UAE was not officially involved. Furthermore, it is likely that Saudi funding financed the Tripoli campaign, including pay for soldiers.

On the surface, it would seem paradoxical that Haftar—a man whose stated purpose is combating extremism—is funded by Saudi Arabia’s Wahabbi monarchy. However, considering that Libyan extremists mainly subscribe to a different strain of Islamic fundamentalism than the Saudis, the paradox is not so striking. Turkey, a major regional rival of the Saudis, has provided support and backing to Al-Sarraj and wasted no time in denouncing Haftar’s move against Tripoli. Ankara has also been accused of transporting fundamentalist militants to Libya from areas that were formerly controlled by ISIS, and more recently, of arming GNA forces.

Fervent Egyptian support for Haftar is similarly complex. President Al-Sisi has taken a hard line against Islamist movements—notably the Muslim Brotherhood—but such predilections have yet to deter Egyptian participation in a Saudi-funded operation. From Cairo’s perspective, ensuring extremist groups stay away from Egypt and its vicinity is a goal that justifies even minor procedural deviations.

Similarly, French decision-making is heavily guided by security concerns. France’s strategy of ambiguity, however, merits some explanation. In 2011, airstrikes carried out by French fighter jets, alongside British and U.S. planes, were instrumental in ousting Gaddafi. Shortly after that, however, Paris began to support Haftar’s campaign against militant fundamentalists in Libya. France vetoed a UN Security Council resolution over Libya’s current situation, which was perceived as too unilaterally condemning of Haftar, illustrating France’s pragmatic approach.

More recently and in a logical continuation of its strategic ambiguity, France called on the UN Security Council to facilitate a settlement in Libya. After Al-Sarraj threatened western energy companies operating in Libya over the status of their operating licenses, France relaxed its seemingly supportive stance towards Haftar’s LNA. While exhibiting sympathy for the endangered GNA in Tripoli, as well as a willingness to serve as an intermediary, Paris is increasingly aware that it’s unlikely a negotiated settlement will be reached.

Al-Sarraj’s threat similarly applies to Italian firms. While the Italian government has held meetings with representatives of both sides, it has mostly limited itself to rhetorically highlighting the need for a political solution to the conflict. While Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s position as the head of a populist left- and right-wing populist governing coalition is a question in-and-of-itself, the primary reason for the Italian government’s intransigence is likely the ongoing refugee crisis. Italy has been a prime destination for migrants setting off from the Libyan coast, and is, rather cynically, weighing which of the warring parties is best-positioned to stem (if not stop entirely) the substantial influx.

In contrast, Libya’s neighbor Tunisia is not so concerned about possible refugees, not least because Haftar controls most of the Libyan side of the Libyan-Tunisian border. If allegations of Tunisian arms sent to Tripoli and fighters joining GNA are true, Tunis may have lost one income source. Still, a humanitarian catastrophe next door would cause significant economic and social problems for Tunisia as well.

For its part, Russia denies involvement in the escalation in Libya. In the past, Moscow has provided Haftar’s forces with arms, and Russian private security firms have reportedly been engaged in operations within Libya. The Kremlin, however, is more focused on the international legal precedents that would be established in the event of a UN-brokered settlement, so as to be able to later refer to it as a model for resolving internal conflicts. If Western powers—mainly the U.S., France, Britain, and Germany—agree to a UN-brokered settlement, the precedent established in Libya could be used by Moscow to settle, on its own terms, internal conflicts it has provoked through the creation of quasi-states like Transnistria, Abkhazia, and the Donetsk People’s Republic, to name a few.

Haftar advances towards Tripoli

As the UN voiced its concern over impending hostilities— in vain—Haftar’s forces closed in on the capital along the two main roads that run parallel to one another into Tripoli. The initial phase was rather quick, and Haftar’s troops succeeded in advancing to the Tunisian border in the west and Janzur on the western outskirts of Tripoli, essentially cutting the city off from any supplies or reinforcements, leaving just two small GNA-loyal pockets along the coast. In the opposite direction, this also prevents possible refugees from crossing over to Tunisia.

Shortly after that, the LNA lost one airplane, reportedly due to technical failures. The LNA bombed the city’s only functioning airport, Mitiga, which was closed for several days. Once again, the heaviest fighting has been concentrated in and around the old airport, located roughly 30 kilometers south of the city center. For now, Haftar is in control the airport itself, with enemy forces just yards away.

Situated between the two main roads leading to Tripoli from the south, the airport serves as a crucial foothold to block access to the city, as well as a forward base from which to conduct further operations. Together with Janzur (had its capture succeeded—instead, around 140 of Haftar’s men were besieged and captured) and a strategic intersection close to the suburb of Tajoura, these gains would offer optimal positions from which to lay siege to the city. Or, if the LNA manages to establish a hold on the old airport, Janzur isn’t even needed, since the LNA already controls Surman, which blockades the area west of Al-Zawiyah.

As of this article’s publication, the LNA’s main base of operations remains in Gharyan, some 60 kilometers from Tripoli, whereas the frontline goes from the Qaser Bin Ghashir suburb adjacent to the old airport. Gharyan itself closes a counterattack route via Kilka—the corner of the vast GNA-loyal enclave situated behind the LNA—just southwest of Tripoli. The LNA’s loss of Al-Aziziyah was a setback, and fierce fighting continues around it and the old airport. The LNA has managed to achieve minor territorial gains around Al-Aziziyah, and for a short period, were able to progress to the Tripoli Medical Center, roughly 10 kilometers from the city center.

Overall, the LNA has been unable to break through the Tripoli defense lines, which have been reinforced by fighters from Misrata. If Haftar were to concentrate all his forces in Tripoli, it would weaken his flanks, leaving his positions open to a possible counterattack from Misrata—towards Bani Walid or from along the eastern coast. Conversely, by drawing in and binding as many Misrata-based armed groups as possible to the Tripoli trenches, Haftar diminishes the likelihood of a counterattack from Misrata.

Launching an assault on a new front along the coast by Sirte is another tactic Haftar could employ to prevent any attacks on his forces from the rear. On the other hand, however, it implies that breaking through Tripoli’s southern defenses proved harder than initially expected. Thus, clashes remain sporadic, but increasingly heavy shelling has inflicted large amounts of damage on the southern Tripoli suburbs, as thousands have fled amidst a death toll that has risen into the hundreds. Even if the fighting remains localized, the situation could worsen quickly. With deteriorating living conditions, there is a risk of a far greater humanitarian crisis.

No easy solution

Escalation into a full-scale civil war cannot be excluded, given the aspirations of the involved parties. As the capital plays a strategic role, capturing it would solidify—to an extent—Haftar’s control over Libya. Nevertheless, maintaining control over crossroad towns such as Tarhouna, Bani Walid, Waddan, and a small village east of Sirte remains vital for LNA operations in the northwest of Libya.

On the other hand, Al-Sarraj’s most effective (and likely only) way to remain in power is to defeat Haftar’s LNA at Tripoli’s gates. A counterattack from Misrata or anywhere else would bog down forces plus weaken the capital’s southern defenses. Thus, the GNA’s primary objective is ensuring that the main routes into Tripoli remain closed to the LNA to preclude the possibility of a siege on the city.

In the event of an all-out civil war, there would be no victors. First and foremost, the death toll would likely rise into the tens of thousands, and it would take substantial time and resources to rebuild Libya after another civil war. Hafter can’t afford to lose the battle for Tripoli, as it would mean the end of his career. If Haftar is victorious, the population of Tripoli isn’t likely to welcome him as a liberator, thus forcing him into a long campaign to win their hearts and minds.

Likewise, if the GNA prevails, it cannot be sure whether the various armed groups backing it now would subsequently submit to its authority. This would be particularly so if the decisive factor delivering the victory were troops from Misrata, who might seek a more significant share of power, encouraged by their successes and perceived leverage. In this scenario, the intra-Tripoli situation from 2016-2017 would likely repeat itself. Furthermore, several armed groups remain, among whom are former ISIS militants, who could take advantage of factional infighting. Such groups are unlikely to submit to the rule of a central governing authority, and whoever should prevail in Tripoli must effectively deal with these factions—or else the next conflict is already looming.

Haftar Ante Portas Tripoli was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is therefore unsurprising that in recent months, the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have ramped up efforts to consolidate and expand their trade and investment ties with the republics of Central Asia. In January, Saudi Arabia expressed its intent to invest heavily in Uzbekistan’s textile industry as part of a broader commitment to expand economic cooperation. On March 20^th, 2019, Tajikistan secured a loan worth $25.5 million (USD) from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development for infrastructural repair in its impoverished southeast. 

Leading the Gulf’s charge into Central Asia is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A flurry of diplomatic activity has taken place so far this year, culminating in March with the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan visiting Abu Dhabi. Bilateral economic ties have been strengthened, mainly through the Mubadala Development Company, the sovereign wealth fund of the UAE. Mubadala secured extensive investments in Kazakhstan’s polyethylene and polypropylene production and aerospace industries in 2018. In March of 2019, the company announced its intention to invest $10 billion (USD) in Uzbekistan’s manufacturing, agricultural, and energy sectors. 

While economic links such as these have existed between the two regions since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the recent acceleration of GCC overtures toward Central Asia is driven by a conflation of geopolitical and economic developments. The persistence of low oil prices, coupled with continued volatility of the global market, has crystallized the need for both regions to diversify their economies. The prosperous Gulf States see in the likes of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sizeable investment opportunities in industries beyond energy, such as agriculture and manufacturing. 

In turn, the cash-strapped countries of Central Asia rely on outside investment to fuel national economic development and the GCC make for particularly attractive partners. Not merely do they offer seemingly endless capital, but until recently they have appeared to transcend the predatory geopolitical maneuvering that has tended to follow investment in the region from the likes of local powers—namely China and Russia. Both have approached investment in Central Asia as a means through which to secure political interests. China, for example, has recently purchased vast tracts of arable land in Tajikistan, arousing government fears of monopolization.  

How long the perception of GCC neutrality can be maintained, however, is uncertain. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been driven to Central Asia in recent months in-part by a desire to pre-emptively combat further incursions into the region by a rival power: Iran. The country has deep historic cultural and political links with the area and is increasingly expressing an interest in expanding its economic presence.

Tehran has been probing investment opportunities in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan amid an improved diplomatic atmosphere following the signing of the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea in August of 2018.  There is scope for Central Asia to become a zone of contestation between the Gulf and Iran, as an extension of the competition that defines their conduct in the Middle East.  Though this development won’t be to the taste of Central Asian governments, it is unlikely to deter the highly profitable trajectory of their expanding ties with the GCC. 

The Geopolitical Implications of Expanding Ties Between the Gulf and Central Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions subsided with a rapprochement between the two sides, ultimately culminating in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Those days are gone—now, the remaining “adult in the room” is the walrus-mustached U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, who has publicly threatened Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei may not have many more anniversaries to celebrate.

Michael Morford, a former U.S. Army captain, and a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project has warned that it appears the so-called neoconservatives in Washington are attempting to steer the U.S. towards another war in the Middle East—this time with Iran. If this assumption is valid, the Trump administration will need to garner public support by presenting a case ostensibly justifying the use of military force. The Trump administration could follow a strategy similar to the one employed by the Bush administration before the U.S. invasion of Iraq: forcefully presenting a narrative that Iran constitutes a significant threat to U.S. national security.

In 2003, members of the Bush administration were pushing the narrative that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. In creating a pretext for military action against Iran, the Trump administration could argue that kinetic military action is warranted in response to an Iranian cyber attack. Such a scenario would set a dangerous precedent but would be a fitting pretext for a major U.S. military operation in the Middle East. Some recent incidents have made such an outcome all the more likely and should, therefore, be addressed.

Missile sabotage claims answered by drone hack footage release

After two unsuccessful satellite lunches—the first on January 15 and then on February 5—assumptions were made by U.S. media outlets that a secret satellite-launch sabotage operation started in the second Bush administration had been revived.

However, Iranian officials have rejected these claims, and Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency released footage of what it claimed were U.S. drones in Iraq that were hacked by Iranian proxies, ostensibly in response to the allegedly sabotaged satellite launches. Iranian officials declared the rocket suffered a third-stage failure, and the U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) declined to comment on the alleged drone hack.

The Citrix breach

Recently, an Iranian-linked hacking group known as Iridium was reported to have targeted one of the largest U.S. government software contractors and stole anywhere from six to ten terabytes of data. Iridium is also believed to have been behind hacks into the Australian and British Parliaments in 2017.

Particularly concerning is the recent Citrix cyber attack could be the first in a series of operations. “It’s possible that adversaries could gain insights into the company’s network configuration and the defenses of the government agencies,” said Suzanne Spaulding, a former senior official at the Department of Homeland Security, “and that would make hacking those government agencies easier.”

A history no one wants to repeat

As he was making a case for war against Iraq at the UN Security Council in 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell held up a model vial of anthrax. Shortly after that, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” began, initiating a series of events that would leave hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead, trillions of dollars wasted, the destruction of much Iraq’s infrastructure, and the eventual formation of ISIS (Daesh).  History can repeat itself; however, rather than citing the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the next Middle East conflict could originate in cyberspace.

In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the U.S. states that it will consider a nuclear strike in response to a major non-nuclear strategic attack. The NPR defines a “major non-nuclear strategic attack” as including—but not limited to—”attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”

Infrastructure, command and control capabilities, along with warning and attack assessment capabilities, could all be hampered through cyber attacks. Although it is a highly remote possibility that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber attack—given the strength of its conventional forces—a cyber attack could be used by the White House as justification for the use of force against Iran, with a U.S. diplomat referring to a flash memory drive instead of anthrax.

Even if a major Iranian cyber attack (real or imagined) isn’t enough to initiate a major conflict, there is always the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation between the two countries, and between Iran and its regional rivals. Furthermore, when one takes into account the proliferating social media disinformation and misinformation campaigns throughout the Middle East that fan the flames of war, the highly risky cyber game currently being played by the U.S. and Iran can’t be overestimated.

The Next Middle East Conflict Could Emerge Out of a Cyber Clash was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the threat from the extremist Sunni group dwindled, Iran-backed militias have been strengthening their foothold in the region. In Iraq, Tehran is working to integrate Shia militia forces into the Iraqi military, cementing its influence over Baghdad. In Syria, the Iranians are reinforcing militia groups as they attempt to cement their presence in the country as a deterrent to Israel. Additionally, Iran is supplying Hezbollah with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and precision-guided missiles.

However, Iran is not without internal complication. Over the past year, the value of the Iranian Rial has decreased substantially and the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and its unilateral re-imposition of sanctions have only exacerbated Iran’s economic troubles. Furthermore, there is a tug-of-war brewing in Tehran between members of the ruling class aligned with President Hassan Rouhani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the reformation of the Iranian economy. In short, domestic affairs and declining revenues will constrain Iranian efforts to strengthen its regional influence in 2019.

Tehran’s Problems Are Washington’s Opportunity

For some countries, however, Iran’s troubles could be perceived as a strategic opportunity. As 2019 progresses, the U.S. will enlist existing allies and forge new partnerships to contain Tehran’s expansionist aims. One such coalition, albeit still in the making, is the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), also known as the “Arab NATO.” Another group of partners is the Kurdish militias in Northwest Iran, with whom the U.S. has cultivated solid ties. Washington could also encourage insurgencies in the Iranian regions of Khuzestan and Baluchistan.

To effectively push back against Iran, however, the U.S. must work alongside allies with which its interests are closely aligned. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates will all readily endorse activities designed to constrain Iranian influence, but will first have to overcome decades of mistrust and hostility.

For the time being, each state will have its own issues to deal with. For Saudi Arabia, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi will cast a long shadow over the ruling House of Saud. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has come under increasing international scrutiny, but any major change in the status quo is unlikely. Beyond the Crown Prince, Riyadh will strive to make progress on its Saudi Vision 2030 initiative, which the government expects will enable it to ease up on austerity measures and promote economic activity in the non-oil sectors.

An End to the War in Yemen?

To the south of Saudi Arabia is the ongoing civil war in Yemen. The conflict has proved increasingly costly for the involved powers, not to mention the millions of civilians who lack access to food, shelter, and medicine. In November 2018, the U.S. Senate voted to move ahead with a bill that, if passed, would end Washington’s involvement in the Yemen War.

Now that the Democratic Party has assumed control of the House of Representatives, the pressure to end the conflict will only increase. In Tehran, there are calls for the country to negotiate with the United States for sanctions relief in exchange for a scaling-down of Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen.

2019 could present an opportunity for the U.S. and Iran to de-escalate tensions, should the interests of both countries align enough—especially when it comes to Yemen. Should a successful agreement be implemented regarding Iranian involvement in Yemen’s civil war, it could serve as a jumping-off point for further engagement.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

In the Levant, Hezbollah has acquired precision-guided munitions from Iran and manufactures them in Lebanon.  For Israel, this presents a strategic threat. Many Israeli policymakers believe a preventive strike against Hezbollah while the group remains preoccupied with the conflict in Syria is necessary.

As such, there is the possibility that, at some point in 2019, Israel conducts one or more offensives against Iranian-Hezbollah supply lines in Syria and Lebanon. Such a strike would likely target storage and manufacturing facilities for guided munitions. In doing so, however, Israel will have to ensure it avoids inadvertently targeting Russian or Turkish assets in an increasingly crowded battle space in Syria.

Setting aside the fact that such a preventive offensive against targets in Lebanon would be a violation of international law, airstrikes alone would likely fail to achieve any meaningful objectives. In the last war with Hezbollah, Israel inflicted enormous damage in Lebanon but ultimately failed to achieve its objective. A similar outcome is likely for a coming air offensive unless Israel is willing to commit ground forces as well.

U.S. Troops to Withdraw from Syria?

In Syria, the war appears to be entering its final phases. In December of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria. However, no deadline or timeline was given for the departure, which will ultimately grant a strategic advantage to Russia and Iran, as well as possibly allow for a reemergence of ISIS or a similar Sunni extremist group.

In the Syrian province of Idlib, the situation will remain particularly volatile throughout 2019. Turkey has pledged to increase its engagement in the region and commit troops. However, there is little agreement between individual Turkish-backed groups which has resulted in growing infighting. At the same time, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has vowed to retake the province, even as Russian, Iranian, Syrian, Kurdish, French, and American forces are situated nearby. Given the number of opposing forces in such a congested area, there is a risk for a rapid and inadvertent escalation.

Managing Tensions Between Turkey and the U.S.

With regards to tensions between Turkey and the United States, the two will likely come to some sort of agreement over how best to proceed in Syria. Although Ankara and Washington are both hostile to Assad, the two disagree over the next phase of the conflict. Washington sees combating ISIS as the top priority; the closest partner for the U.S in this effort mission is the YPG, a Kurdish militant group currently in control of Northeast Syria. Turkey, which sees the YPG as a terrorist group and a threat to Turkish national security, seeks to deny the YPG a safe haven in Syria.

To settle these differences, Turkey and the United States will have to negotiate an agreement. Washington is unlikely to turn its back on the Syrian Kurds as long as ISIS remains a credible threat. Rather, it will likely make minor territorial concessions to Turkey without undermining the security of the Syrian Kurdish militias. President Erdogan’s proposal for a “safe zone” along the Turkish border and in territories controlled by the YPG is one arrangement being considered.

Regardless, Turkey can’t simply walk away from the United States. It depends on the U.S. to balance against Russia. Likewise, the United States needs to maintain its relationship with Turkey, a NATO ally, to counter Russia in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, especially since tensions between Moscow and Washington will likely worsen throughout 2019.

The Middle East will remain susceptible to foreign influence and prone to conflict throughout 2019. The primary catalyst being heightened competition between great powers, along with competition between regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran. Furthermore,  an increasing propensity for unilateral action by a number of players in the region increases the chance for a substantial escalation.

Conflict and Competition in the Middle East Will Persist Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

These localization capabilities are evident in the manipulated designs and the partial or complete renaming of domestically assembled French cars, mobile apps, computer games, and even the dubbing and redubbing of the DreamWorks film trilogy, Shrek. Iranian drone production, a sign of the country’s military independence, is no exception; in fact, the term drone itself is rarely used in Iranian military jargon. Instead, the Farsi acronym “پهپاد” [pahpad], the translation of which stands for “Remotely Piloted Flying Object” is frequently used.

Closely linked to the Iranian strategic interests in the Middle East region are religious and ideological interests, to which the names of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and therefore capabilities and types of use, could be closely attached. Iranian drones’ names speak volumes about the impression they want to create among Iranian officers and the message they want to send to adversaries.

Iranian drones are more loaded with ideology than weapons

The Iranians have designed, engineered, and reverse-engineered a range of drones, ranging from the Saeqeh (Thunderbolt), a reverse-engineered version of the RQ-170 Sentinel (bellingcat), shot down by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the Golan Heights, to the duct-taped Ra’ad 85 (Thunder 85) suicide drone.

Here, however, the argument is not the technical and engagement capabilities of these drones but rather how they are named and to what effect? Since the list of Iranian drones’ Perso-Arabic names is not short. In this analysis, five drones—Ababil, Fotros, Karrar, Mohajer, and Yaser—are analyzed in more detail through their connotative meanings. These names fall into three categories: The Prophet’s Sahaba (companions of the prophet Mohammed), The Destroyer of the Jewish Fortress, and The Defenders of the Holy Sites.

The Prophet’s Sahaba

Mohajer is a medium sized surveillance drone which was in service during the Iran-Iraq War and was one of the earliest weaponized drones. Version 4 of the Mohajer is still in use. Yasir is also a surveillance drone, which is a modified copy of the Boeing ScanEagle.

Apart from the literal meaning of the name Mohajer (immigrant), the name refers to Prophet Mohammed’s sahaba (early companions) who emigrated from Mecca to Medina.

Another surveillance drone is the Yasir. Yasir was one of the most loyal companions of the prophet Mohammed who accompanied the prophet also during his migration from Mecca to Medina. By referencing historical efforts to further a sacred Islamic cause, the selection of these two names recalls the hardships of early Islam along with its ultimate triumph over the region.

The Jewish hero slayer

The next drone is the Karrar, which is a turbojet propelled drone capable of carrying a single bomb and a flying range of almost 600 miles.

Karrar is a title of Imam Ali, the first imam of the twelve Shiites, the sect of Islam to which the Iranian leadership belongs. As the conqueror of Kheibar (Fateh Kheibar) the title was given to Ali during a battle of the same name, after he defeated a legendary hero of a Jewish army, Marhab.

The name Karrar means frequent and repeated attacker and is therefore given to Ali for having the characteristics of a strong warrior. Apart from suggesting that this drone could be used in a conflict with Israel and its allies, the name conveys Tehran’s conviction that the Israeli Defense Forces (and Israel itself) will be ultimately defeated by the warriors, drones, and the army of Islam.

The defenders of the holy sites

The drones in this category are the Ababil and the Fotros. The Ababil is considered to be the first operational Iranian drone. It was initially used during the Iran-Iraq War and is still in production. The Fotros is claimed to be the biggest Iranian UAV to date, armed and 30-hour flight endurance.

In Iran, the term Ababil refers to the name of a bird or a group of birds, similar to the sparrow in the Quran that appeared miraculously to save the Kabah—the center of the Sacred Mosque in Mecca—from an attack.

The Quranic verse reads وَأَرْسَلَ عَلَيْهِمْ طَيْرًا أَبَابِيلَ (And He sent against them birds in flocks), telling the story of an army of elephant riders who were defeated by small birds that threw hard clay at them. The birds, being small, were able to outmaneuver and overpower the comparatively giant elephants and fend off their army. The choice of the name Ababil for this UAV could also be read as a reference to the drone swarm technology.

Farzad Esmaili, the commander of the Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense Base, once referred to all the Iranian drones as “Ababil’s carrying fiery lava for the enemy’s eyes and enemy’s heart.”

Fotros was an angel whose wings were taken after disregarding God’s order and was advised by prophet Mohammed to touch the body of the newborn Hussein (the prophet’s grandson) and regain the wings. Upon doing so, Fotros’ wings regrow and she can fly back to heaven with the rest of the angels. S/he then vows to be the guardian of the holy site of the third Imam of the Shiites, Hussein, and his messenger.

The two drones’ names, one inspired by a Koranic verse and the other by Shiite tradition, suggest the responsibility of defending the holy sites, both Sunni and Shiite. They also very well fit the recent narrative of fighting a holy war against ISIS in Syria as the “Defenders of the Holy Shrine”. Hence, no matter how far away from Tehran the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors fly their drones, their mission remains one of defending holy Islamic sites.

What’s in an Iranian Drone’s Name? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eighteen candidates have registered themselves for what is ultimately expected to be a tight race between the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani and his charismatic former National Security Advisor, Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has assembled a strong team of political heavyweights. Both known for their strong credentials as visionaries and leaders, they have embraced a progressive agenda for Afghanistan are anti-corruption advocates.

However, the two men have different approaches to governance; President Ghani is known to be short-tempered, impatient, and a results-based micromanager while Haneef Atmar has a reputation as a patient, strategic thinker and as a unifying figure who calls for moderation, inclusivity, and a broad-based government. Many political analysts predict that they might unite in the event of a second round given the complementary nature of their respective qualities, a fact which made them win the first presidential election of the post-Hamid Karzai era.

Afghan elections have always been chaotic but are a manifestation of how far the country has come.  Former archrivals are now settling scores at the ballot box, not with bullets. One of the highlights of the upcoming election is the candidacy of the infamous warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who once fought a bloody civil war against his rivals over the control of capital Kabul and until recently considered the Afghan government to be an illegitimate puppet. He later reconsidered and now seeks the Afghan presidency.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s current Chief Executive Officer and former foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, known to be a chronic campaigner, is a candidate for the fourth time. Out of five elections, Abdullah’s name has been on the ballot in four of them. This election is a clash between political titans who have different visions for a post-U.S. Afghanistan that is more self-reliant. This narrative is already present in the rhetoric used by the candidates; terms such as “Afghanization”. “ownership,” “standing on our own feet,” and “taking responsibility” are some of the buzzwords used by the candidates to signal preparation for a post-American future in Afghanistan.

What is on the Ballot?

The 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be a referendum on the devolution of power from the presidency to provincial units versus further centralization of power in the administration. With no constitutional justification, President Ghani has removed the Chief Executive Office, which created on the basis of the National Unity Government agreement mediated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and has called for a strong, centralized, and united presidency. Ghani’s his main rival, Mohammad Haneef Atmar,  has pledged to further devolve the powers of the presidency by creating a third vice president position and an Executive Prime Minister office after the approval of an Afghan Loya Jirga.

Many fear that, if left unchecked, both cases pose a real danger to the governance structures and overall unity of the country. On the one hand, there is concern that a centralized state in the hands of President Ghani, given his temperament and impatience, could descend into authoritarianism. On the other side, further devolution of power and the creation of a Prime Minister’s office could pave the way for federalism and the subsequent disintegration of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the 2019 elections represent a contest between two generations of Afghan politicians and political activists, and between two different visions of the country’s future. The first is the old generation, a mixture of jihadi-communists and royalists. The second group is the new generation of post-9/11 Afghans, mostly educated in the West and adhere to western values of democracy, freedom of speech, and fundamental human rights. The standard bearer of each of these visions will set the tone of the Afghan political landscape for many years to come.

Whoever takes the helm will have the tough job of providing security and developing a stagnant Afghan economy in light of dwindling U.S. resources and interest in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a divided and chaotic region is resulting in geopolitical spillover effects on the security and political situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace, security, the economy, and a balanced foreign policy will be critical priorities for the next Afghan presidential administration.

The Tyranny of Duality: Elections or Peace Process.

A new class of Afghan elites, politicians, and former officials have joined the Taliban in calling for an interim administration and the postponing the presidential election to a later date to accommodate the ongoing peace talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Many others don’t see the peace talks and the election as mutually exclusive. Instead, they see them as complementary and parallel to one another.

Both the peace talks and presidential elections can proceed concurrently for three purposes. The first is to put pressure on the Taliban to participate in the elections. The second purpose is to demonstrate the realities of a new Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the third being that the candidates can use peace as a rallying point to boost public opinion for the peace and reconciliation process. The choice should not be between either the election or peace talks, but rather both the peace process and the Afghan presidential elections can be mutually inclusive, complementing one another.

The Crisis of Afghan Electoral Bodies

The ineffectiveness, incompetence, and politicization of Afghanistan’s electoral bodies are primarily rooted in two areas. The first is a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government to build strong, impartial, and competent bodies. The second is the failure of the United Nations and the international community at-large to efficiently invest donor money and resources in electoral bodies to build capacity and systems.  These two factors are the key drivers of many of the problems within Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) today.

Successive Afghan governments and UN mission chiefs vowed to address these problems but to no avail; dozens of roadmaps and electoral reform programs were drawn up to overhaul the electoral bodies’ legal and policy frameworks significantly, but many of those plans remained on paper. Successive Afghan governments saw it as being to their benefit to keep Afghan electoral bodies weak to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities will give a government the opportunity to machinate and engineer the results of elections.

Afghan elections are considered to be one of the costliest elections per capita in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the logistical and security arrangements for elections in the country. Generous donations from various donor countries provide these funds. For Afghans to be able to afford elections in future, they will have to fundamentally change the economics of their electoral system and switch to more affordable technologies. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s electoral bodies require a significant legal, policy, and operational overhaul. At present, however, it seems impossible to carry out such a process given the limited timeframe, the risks of the election being engineered, and a lack of trust. Many in Afghanistan question the legitimacy of any election held under the current legal, policy, and institutional structures.

The Role of Kingmakers

The Afghan kingmakers are three distinct groups which play an essential role in shaping and paving the way for any potential candidate to win the seat of the presidency in the country. The first group depend of personalities such as former President Hamid Karzai, Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Atta Noor, among others. The second group is made up of influential families such as legendary former commander Masood’s family, former Vice President Marshal Fahim’s family, the Mojaddidi family, the Gilani family, and others. The third and final group are foreign powers in the region, the broader Islamic world, and the United States..

As of now, the majority of these factors favor the incumbent’s main rival, former National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has garnered the support of many of these personalities, families, and countries. However, unseating an incumbent president remains a difficult task given the state of the resources at his disposal.

The Role of the United States and the Region in the Afghan Elections

Regional and global politics have always played out in the Afghan elections with rival countries supporting one or several Afghan candidates to win favors with the Afghan political elites.  The support of external actors in the Afghan election scene has mainly been through three mediums: campaign money, propaganda through their state media outlets, and by leveraging their influence through proxies in favor or against one candidate or the other.

Unfortunately, these bitter realities still have not changed and play out in the Afghan electoral scene. It is increasingly evident that this time there will be three types of candidates from a geopolitical viewpoint which will face off in the Afghan presidential race: a candidate of the region, a candidate of the West, and others. In previous races, one or two of the candidates have been favored by both the region and the west, but in this race, it is clear that the preferred candidate(s) of regional powers differs from the candidate(s) favored by the United States and the West.

Afghan Elections: Unifiers or Dividers?

Elections are double-edged swords in post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. Elections can be both a unifying entity and a divisive power. In Libya. an election drove a large divide in a country where there are two administrations in two capitals. The last presidential election in Afghanistan could have resulted similarly, sending Afghanistan into disarray and a bloody civil if not for the wisdom and farsightedness of the candidates and the diplomatic skills of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

This time around, the threat of a disputed or drawn-out election remains. The legitimacy and acceptability of the presidential race depends upon the conduct of the electoral bodies and on the incumbent not to use government resources for campaign purposes. In fact, there is a high risk of a “non-government” this time if we the election is disputed.

Afghanistan’s presidential elections are set for July 2019, typically the peak of the Taliban’s summer offensive which will detrimentally impact the security and accessibility of electoral sites, which will be highly vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban attacks. Thus, certain population centers and pockets of Afghan towns and cities will be prevented from voting in the presidential elections. Such an outcome could lead to questions about the credibility and viability of the elections.

What to Expect: Winners and Losers

Many experts believe that due to the high number of candidates and a divided electoral landscape, the Afghan elections will go to a second round between the two candidates who manage to secure the most votes. In this case, many experts believe a runoff would be between the incumbent and his former National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar. Success will be contingent upon the coalition building and negotiation skills of both candidates. There is also the chance of a coalition government to avoid a deadlock.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the election won’t be held in the event of a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban, or if U.S. President Donald Trump makes an abrupt decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Of course, nobody can predict the future, but if history is any indicator, it seems highly likely that the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be tightly contested and will result in a runoff vote, followed by drawn-out negotiation period until the formation of the next Afghan government.

The Politics of Ballots over Bullets: Afghan Elections and Peace Process was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hasn’t provided any details of the meeting, the visit is indicative of an Iranian effort to maintain relations with the Afghan government as the government negotiates with the Taliban. Furthermore, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has confirmed that Tehran and the Taliban were previously engaged in direct talks. On December 31, the Iranian government confirmed that a Taliban delegation had visited Iran for another round of negotiations.

Tehran is not only hedging by maintaining a dialogue with the radical extremist group; it’s assuming the role of a disruptor in the peace process to ensure its interests are secured in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and a select group of regional stakeholders. While the U.S. includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in its deliberations, it is excluding key stakeholders—Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

The Iranian government justifies its disruptive involvement by citing “legitimate concerns” regarding the rise of militant extremist groups in Afghanistan. Tehran previously adopted a similar approach in its engagements with Islamabad, which provides aid and haven to the Taliban. Iran’s willingness to engage with the Taliban is not unprecedented—the relationship dates back to 1994 when the Taliban was under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Relations continued under Omar’s successor, Akhtar Mansoor, who was killed in May of 2016 while returning to Pakistan after visiting Iran. According to his Pakistani passport, Mansoor spent two months in Iran before being targeted by a U.S. drone strike on the highway leading into Pakistan from the country’s Iranian border. 

Tehran does not want to sever ties with the Afghan Government while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with a resurgent Taliban, which is in control of more territory than at any time since 2001. Tehran considers the rise of militant Islamic extremist groups to be a key “legitimate concern,” along with the threat of a Taliban takeover of the Afghan government and the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran, and ensures a steady stream of black market U.S. dollars into the Iranian economy.

Ensuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.

In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.). 

Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow. 

The rise of Salafi extremist groups—facilitated with support from Gulf states—is another phenomenon motivating Iran to engage with the Taliban. Iranian overtures to the Taliban are an effort to ensure militant Islamist ideology imported into Afghanistan does not flow to Iran. Russia exhibited similar concerns when the Kremlin claimed that “Daesh [Islamic State] imported into Afghanistan” had expanded over Northern Faryab and Jawzjan provinces along the Afghan border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia reportedly met with Taliban representatives to negotiate a settlement agreement, as well as coordinate efforts to block and topple any Daesh activity in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. 

Beyond fomenting ongoing insecurity within Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been training Afghan refugees as Fatemiyoun mercenaries to fight against Daesh in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Thousands of vulnerable refugees who are devout Shias have joined the Fatemiyoun ranks to change their families’ legal status as refugees in Iran. They had reportedly returned to Afghanistan to counter Salafi extremism activity alongside the Taliban and combat militant Islamist activity in the western region of Afghanistan on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard.

Iran’s cooperation with a hardline Sunni extremist group like the Taliban group to counter threats to its interests in Afghanistan is a dangerous strategy. Going forward, Iran must act strategically; history has proven that engagement with the Taliban along with the selective use of terrorism will not achieve the end-result Tehran is expecting. The Iranian government must respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, recognize the Afghan state, and develop a bilateral relationship based on culture, trade, and legitimate interests for Tehran within a stable Afghanistan. 

In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.

Iran must play the role of a good neighbor to Afghanistan; the latter has never posited a threat to Iranian national security.  Iranian concern over the activities of Salafi extremist groups in Afghanistan is a legitimate one, however bypassing the Afghan Government in favor of non-state actors will not alleviate this concern, however justified. 

An Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies research finding shows that a majority of the Afghan elite (between 57 and 66.4 percent) has expressed satisfaction with Iran’s social, religious, and economic policies. However, the same survey findings show that 55 percent of the Afghan elite have expressed dissatisfaction towards the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political and security policies as they relate to Afghanistan. Iran has a role in the Afghan peace process, but it must act in good faith. 

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The summit occurred at a notably significant time because the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council may be at stake for the first time since its founding in 1981. The blockade of Qatar, the ongoing war in Yemen, and the diplomatic fallout over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi are a few of the major issues that have overshadowed the summit in Riyadh.

One notable absentee in Saudi Arabia was the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamid bin Hamad Al Thani. One reason for his non-attendance is the ongoing blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Due to the summit’s location in Riyadh, rather than in a more impartial state like Oman or Kuwait, it is possible the Emir opted not to attend to avoid an incident similar to the purported kidnapping of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017.

The GCC has been under significant strain since the blockade of Qatar was initiated in June 2017. Before the sharp downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the land border between the two countries was heavily trafficked. Now, however, Qatar’s single land border (the country is surrounded by water on three sides) has been entirely blockaded by three GCC members.

More recently, Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC has further inflamed tensions within the GCC. The Qatari decision to withdraw was due in large part to the country wanting increase gas exports, thus diversifying an economy that remains heavily reliant on oil. For now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait all seem to believe the GCC can survive the rift in regional relations. However, this remains to be seen.

The GCC was established in 1981 as a multinational organization intended to provide a collective defense mechanism against threats from post-revolutionary Iran. Today, members like Qatar are facing threats from other GCC members within the same bloc. Given the level of discord between the different members of the GCC, the organization may have little relevance remaining. The member countries are vying for different interests and maintain different threat perceptions. The GCC is currently comprised of three different groups. One group is Qatar and Oman (although Oman maintains that is politically neutral), another is Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with Kuwait attempting to play the role of mediator.

A core reason for the success of the GCC has been its provision of the free movement of people and goods between member states, but the future of the organization is in question. The GCC could eventually return to relevancy, but it will remain largely irrelevant for the foreseeable future, given the current state of the current crisis with Qatar. Very little will change as a result of the Riyadh Summit, but the aspirations of a single currency, a joint defense capability, and improved transportation links between member states remain distant ambitions.

The United States wants to see a unified GCC to act as a counter to Iran in the region, but the current Gulf crisis seems to have no end in sight. Since the ascendance of Mohammad bin Salman as Saudi Crown Prince, Saudi policy in the region has become increasingly aggressive. While the Saudis want to hedge against an expansionist Iran, Saudi actions in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon have only served to divide the GCC.

Saudi policies in the Middle East have arguably increased Iran’s influence in the region; Qatar’s increasingly close political and economic ties with Iran being a notable example. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have a close economic and military partnership. Oman or Kuwait could align closer with Qatar, or Qatar could form security and economic alliances with Iran and Turkey. To effectively counter Tehran, Riyadh needs to rethink its foreign policy. Failure to do so could result in a lasting rift within the GCC that would upend the already volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

2018 GCC Summit in Riyadh: An Uneasy Gathering was originally published on Global Security Review.

Approximately twenty-two million civilians require immediate aid, 1.2 million cases of cholera have been reported, and 8.4 million are experiencing severe food insecurity.  The conflict in Yemen, which has become a battleground for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis in existence today.

United States policy regarding the Arabian Peninsula has failed to address this tragedy. The U.S. has remained silent as its allies have contributed to increasing levels of human suffering. As peace talks start in Stockholm, the United States must call on Saudi Arabia to join the conversation for a peaceful resolution with the immediate goal being ensuring the security of Yemeni civilians.

For three years, the Saudis have been at war with the Houthis—a Shia rebel group that seized power in Yemen that has received support from Iran.  Saudi Arabia views the relationship between the Houthis and Iran as a threat, seeing the Houthis as Iranian proxies. Their response to the possibility of Iran expanding its influence on the Arabian Peninsula has been severe. The Kingdom has carried out air strikes and blockaded Yemen’s borders and ports, preventing essential food and supplies from reaching Yemen’s civilian population.

The United States has supported Saudi Arabia by providing the Kingdom with intelligence, weapons, and logistical support. Now, however, the U.S. needs to take an active role in paving a path to peace and security.

First, the United States must accept accountability. In August, the Saudi-led coalition used bombs purchased from the U.S. to carry out an air strike in Yemen.  The bombs hit a school bus and killed forty children.  The international community placed the blame on both Saudi Arabia and the United States.  The U.S. needs to acknowledge its role in the ongoing humanitarian crisis—failure to do so will damage the moral authority of the United States.

Second, the United States must assist Yemen in the road to recovery.  Washington must induce Riyadh to lift the blockades and halt air strikes. USAID could provide immediate life-saving assistance such as nutrition, clean drinking water, safe shelter, and treatment to those suffering from cholera. Doing so would prevent further spread of disease by administering vaccines to citizens in high-risk regions. Humanitarian intervention by a U.S.-led coalition may also alleviate some of the reputational damage that resulted from the Saudi air strikes.

Third—and most important—the United States needs to encourage and facilitate constructive dialogue between the opposing parties.  In November, the Houthis offered to agree to talks if the Saudis would agree to a cease-fire.  This was a sudden and surprising development.  On December 3rd, U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, traveled to the capital city of Sana’a to work with the Houthis to set the stage to move negotiations forward.  The United States must exert substantial pressure on Saudi Arabia de-escalate and take concrete steps toward a ceasefire.

The Khashoggi murder will no doubt complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, but the United States also has pressing interests in Yemen: a lasting peace settlement and a resumption of humanitarian aid to Yemen’s suffering civilian population. Failure to do so will only lead to greater regional insecurity for years to come.

Time for the U.S. to Act on Yemen as Negotiations Begin in Sweden was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Both powers are vying for regional hegemony as Iran seeks a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, while Saudi Arabia works to remain at the top of the region’s hierarchy and protect its national security.

The people of Yemen continue to languish in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as the conflict persists. The situation has been aggravated by violent attacks against cities alongside growing food insecurity perpetuated by closed ports and embattled infrastructure. The proxy war has fomented widespread instability in Yemen, creating a breeding ground for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

While most Al-Qaeda offshoots have died out or reduced their presence, the AQAP branch has remained intact by taking advantage of Yemen’s instability while continuing to make threats against Saudi Arabia and the West.

Today, a large proportion of U.S. security experts believe that AQAP is the largest terrorist threat to the United States—more so than the Islamic State, the strength of which is consistently sensationalized by the media. Experts believe AQAP is capable of building bombs without metal, making them easy to transfer across international borders and nearly impossible to detect.

As the Saudi Arabian-led coalition—backed U.S. weapons, equipment, and intelligence—fights Iranian-backed Houthi forces in the northern Yemen, it is also combating AQAP militants in the country’s south.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia escalated operations against AQAP, using drone strikes in Yemen to target the group’s leaders. Unfortunately, these counter-terrorism efforts have actually made the situation worse.

Saudi Arabia pursues its national security interests on the Peninsula.

The deterioration of Yemen’s internal security has allowed AQAP to gain a strong foothold in a relatively lawless and unstable state.

The terrorist group’s close vicinity to Saudi Arabia has made the monarchy uneasy due to its hatred of the Saudi monarchy for its relationship with the United States.

Saudi Arabia’s shared border with Yemen allows AQAP members to easily enter Saudi Arabia, allowing the group to destabilize the Kingdom.

With Iranian-backed forces in northern Yemen and AQAP militants in Yemen’s south, the situation is increasingly precarious for Saudi Arabia.

To prevent the two aggressors from advancing, Saudi Arabia seems likely to continue carrying out airstrikes and ground assaults as the two groups gain ground and threaten not only Saudi Arabia’s regional interests and its national security.

The U.S. moves to stop the spread of AQAP.

U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over the past few years have not only supported the country’s fight against Houthi rebels in Yemen. They have also been intended to eliminate the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and limit its potential expansion.

Prior to the Houthi rebellion, the U.S. and Yemeni President Hadi maintained built a strong alliance, with U.S. officials touting Hadi as a leader in counterterrorism.

Once Hadi’s regime collapsed, however, U.S. policymakers had to depend more heavily on the alliance with the Saudi monarchy to target AQAP.

In 2017, the White House stated that its recent arms deal with Saudi Arabia was struck not only to protect Saudi Arabia’s national security, but to assist in counter-terrorism operations in the Peninsula.

Reportedly, the sale would reduce the need for the U.S. military to participate in combat operations. However, U.S. special forces were deployed to assist Saudi troops in Yemen later that year.

As of 2018, anti-AQAP efforts have targeted over 3,000 Al-Qaeda members, forcing them into Yemen’s interior. However, the group continues to benefit from the lack of stable leadership in Sana’a, continuing its attempts to fill the power vacuum despite U.S. and Saudi efforts to eliminate it.

AQAP is easily exploiting the situation in Yemen.

Despite U.S. and Saudi efforts, experts have argued that the campaign against AQAP in Yemen may have actually helped the group prosper by destabilizing the region and providing new gaps for the terrorist group to exploit.

Al Qaeda has been able to further capitalize on the fact that many Yemeni civilians are turning against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as they watch the actions of the two countries deepen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

Despite this, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have continued their strikes upon AQAP, though their imprecision has resulted in numerous civilian deaths.

Over the course of just two days in January 2017, the U.S. military performed a ground operation in Al Bayda Province that resulted in the death of 24 civilians.

Just a few months later, 30 U.S. airstrikes against AQAP killed a few dozen more. The U.S. declared these actions a success—but to Yemeni civilians, these events were further proof that the U.S. is not a benevolent actor, but would continue to steer the fate of the Middle East to ensure its own national security interests.

Naturally, the number of civilian casualties has brewed distaste for the U.S. in the Yemeni psyche, a feeling that is rapidly replacing their once pro-U.S. attitudes.

As stated by Dafna H. Rand, a representative of the U.S. State Department, the continuity of the war and U.S. involvement in Yemen will potentially foster anger against the U.S. that could encourage radicalization and increase AQAP membership.

AQAP’s anti-Saudi Arabia and anti-Western stance has resonated with some Yemeni civilians who feel that the Saudi-U.S. partnership has devastated their country and deteriorated their quality of life. Eventually, larger numbers of Yemeni civilians may see AQAP as the only secure and stable option for their country.

U.S. soft power is the key to countering AQAP.

Ultimately, the strength of AQAP may grow as more civilians begin to support its cause against the Saudi monarchy and the West.

While both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have entered the fray with AQAP on grounds of preserving their own respective national securities, their biggest accomplishment thus far has been to foment hatred within Yemen, all while plunging more cities into crisis.

If Yemeni civilians continues to perceive the U.S. as a threat, AQAP’s anti-U.S. sentiments will gain steam. Instead, the U.S. needs to reduce involvement in airstrikes and ground assaults and take on a more humanitarian role—ensuring food security, providing medical aid and access to education, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.

Facilitating reconstruction in Yemen would benefit all parties. Yemeni civilians will benefit from increased humanitarian aid, the U.S.’s assistance would hopefully engender more positive feelings in Yemeni civilians and slow the acceptance and spread of AQAP.

Is the U.S.-Saudi Partnership in Yemen Strengthening Al-Qaeda? was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to reports in the French newspaper Le Monde, Saudi Arabia has asked the government of France to assist it in preventing Qatar from buying the S-400 system from Russia.

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced air defense missile system, and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements to purchase the S-400 system.

The report states that King Salman of Saudi Arabia expressed his “deep concerns” concerning Qatar’s intentions to purchase the air defense system.

Furthermore, the King specifically threated to take military action against Qatar if the S-400 sale goes forward and the missile system is deployed.

King Salman reportedly stated in the letter that “the kingdom [Saudi Arabia] would be ready to take all necessary measures to eliminate this defense system, including military action.

Qatar and Russia signed a military and technical cooperation agreement on military in 2017.

In January of 2018, the Qatari ambassador to Russia was quoted saying that Qatar’s government was in talks at the “advanced stage” to acquire the Russian S-400 missile air defense system.

Despite Saudi Threats, Russia Indicates S-400 Deal Will Go Forward

A senior Russian politician has said that Russia will supply Qatar with an anti-aircraft missile system despite Saudi Arabia’s reported threats.

Russian Lawmaker Aleksei Kondratyev, a member of the Russian upper house and the deputy chairman of the committee on Defence and Security, said Russia would pursue its own objectives in determining the countries that it allows to purchase its S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

“Russia seeks its own interest, supplying S-400 to Qatar and earning money for the state budget. Saudi Arabia’s position has nothing to do with it, Russia’s plans will not change,” Kondratyev said in remarks to Russian state media, adding that “it is clear that Riyadh plays a dominant role in the region, but Qatar gets an advantage by enhancing its armed forces due to the acquisition of Russian S-400 systems.”

No End in Sight

Saudi Arabia, backed by other regional powers including Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, broke off relations with Qatar in June last year, after harshly criticizing Qatar’s deepening ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s strategic rival in the region, and accusing the Gulf state of funding terrorism throughout the region.

In April of 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir warned Qatar that it faced “imminent demise” unless it provided funding and support for a U.S.-led military presence in Syria.

Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa said in a May interview with a Saudi-owned newspaper that there was no “glimmer of hope” for an end to the crisis.

Saudi Arabia Threatens Military Action if Qatar Purchases Russian S-400 Air Defense System was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is often said, perhaps with some hyperbole, that Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers was the best hope for conflict resolution in the Middle East. Its architect John Kerry argues instead that the 2015 deal’s limited parameter of closing Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon is sufficient on the merits. The Trump administration is taking a different view, focusing on Iran’s escalating threats to U.S. allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Those threats, which have included missile, drone, and cyberattacks on Saudi oil facilities, are looming large over the global economy because they are squarely influencing the volatility of the price of oil. One could argue that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Iranian deal, referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has injected an even higher degree of risk into oil markets, where traders now feel that the chances of Mideast conflict resolution are lower.

But, the Trump administration could argue otherwise. From its perspective, the United States extended to Iran $6 billion in frozen funds, opened the door for a flood of spare parts to be shipped into Iran’s suffering oil and petrochemical sector, and looked the other way while European companies rushed in for commercial deals. In exchange, it’s true, Iran began to implement the terms of JCPOA, but as Secretary of State Pompeo laid out in a major speech on the subject, the nuclear deal has failed to turn down the heat on the wide range of conflicts plaguing the Mideast region.

Rather, Secretary Pompeo explained, Iran’s proxies have raised the stakes for U.S. allies, and regional conflicts have been dangerously escalating. U.S.-Iranian exchanges in Syria are also on the rise. The deal could still move forward, according to Secretary Pompeo, but not until Tehran addresses a laundry list of U.S. demands. Washington expects its action and rhetoric to spur more productive negotiations that would allow the United States to link restoring the nuclear deal with political negotiations to de-escalate conflicts. Since re-imposition of renewed oil sanctions doesn’t take hold for several months, wiggle room still exists for such diplomacy. But markets reflect doubt about those chances, reflecting the view of many respected commentators. Oil prices hit $80 a barrel and even the five-year forward oil price rose above $60 for the first time since the end of 2015. Speculators are still holding substantial long positions and industry has been slower to hedge, lest oil prices go higher still.

In the world of oil, it’s hard to compartmentalize complex geopolitical conflicts. In condemning the Trump administration’s move, Iran’s hardliners actually accused the United States of withdrawing from the JCPOA to raise the price of oil and called on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise its production to resist the United States. In a tweet from the Iranian Oil ministry via @VezaratNaft on May 11, Iranian oil minister Bijan Namdar Zangemeh is quoted as saying “President Trump playing double game in oil market. Some OPEC members playing into U.S. hands. U.S. seeking to boost shale oil production.” Simultaneously, Iranian media promulgated a spurious rumor that Saudi leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had been assassinated. The context for both was dialogue between the United States and its regional Arab allies (kicked off by a Trumpian tweet on OPEC) on the need to cool off the overheated oil market with higher oil production to ensure that the re-imposition of sanctions did not destabilize markets further.

In seeking “better terms” for the Iranian nuclear deal, the Trump administration is counting on the fact that the Iranian government faces more internal opposition from its population than it did when the deal was negotiated back in 2015. That popular discontent is palpable and explains why the Iranian rhetorical response to the U.S. withdrawal announcement has been relatively mild compared to historical precedents. But this is no cakewalk, since Iran is counting on Europe and other major trading partners to resist U.S. sanction efforts.

In recent years, China has established its own networks of financial channels and institutions that could be used to allow Chinese companies to pay Iran in its currency, the yuan, in a manner that avoids the Brussels-based SWIFT financial messaging system, which can be subject to U.S. tracking and intervention. China has already tested using the yuan to pay for imports from Russia and Iran via China National Petroleum Corporation’s Bank of Kunlun. The Tehran-based business daily The Financial Tribune suggested that other countries, including Europe, could tap “alternative Chinese financial networks.” But the practicalities of China taking the lead on behalf of Tehran when other U.S.-China bilateral trade issues loom large is more complicated now than it was back in 2012. In 2012, China agreed to meet the Obama administration’s request that it cut its Iranian imports by the minimum 20 percent. As robust a response as the United States may now say it wants from Beijing on Iran, Washington similarly has to consider other priorities on the table with China right now, including negotiations regarding North Korea.

Iran has been exporting roughly two million barrels a day (b/d) of crude oil. Europe purchases over a quarter of that volume and is—if push comes to shove—likely to go along with U.S. policy if no diplomatic progress can be made. For now, European leaders are trying diplomacy to keep the nuclear deal alive separately from the United States and to press Iran to address some of the common concerns on Secretary Pompeo’s list. Back in 2012, Europe cut virtually all of its oil imports from Iran. Japan had already conservatively lowered its purchases from Iran in March and even India’s oil giant IOC is now saying publicly that it is looking for alternative barrels to replace its 140,000 b/d of purchases from Iran, suggesting the oil will be made available to India from Saudi Arabia. South Korea is also expected to wind down its purchases from Iran given the imperative to display common ground with the United States; Seoul has already reduced purchases from 360,000 b/d last year to 300,000 b/d more recently. In sum, although Iran can conduct oil for goods barters with Russia and Turkey, it could potentially lose one million b/d of sales or more, if it the current geopolitical stalemate stands.

But more is at stake for Iran than short run oil sales since Tehran has learned it can get those back eventually if the political will towards sanctions wears off over time. The curtailment again of international investment in its natural gas industry is a bigger setback for Tehran, which needs natural gas not only to inject into its oil fields to drive production but also for residential and commercial use. If the United States manages to drive French firm Total back out of the important South Pars natural gas venture, the chances of Iran reestablishing itself as a major liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter dissipates once again, possibly this time for decades given potential U.S. exports and other market conditions. China, which is also an investor in South Pars, does not have experience developing LNG exporting projects. Unfortunately, the global natural gas stakes could make it harder to draw Russia along with any U.S.-led conflict resolution effort. Even if Tehran was willing to cooperate in Syria or Yemen, Russia—a major natural gas exporter to Europe and Asia—benefits from U.S. sanctions that block competition from Iranian exports. Motivating the Kremlin into any diplomatic deal that restores U.S.-Iranian cooperation could be a heavy lift.

Russia is expected to begin supplying natural gas by pipeline to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline by late 2019 but Russia’s Gazprom has had difficulty locking down sales to China from additional pipeline routes. Successful negotiations on the Korean peninsula could help in that regard, since one potential fix to North Korea’s energy needs could be a Russian gas peace pipe. But the availability of direct natural gas exports to China and South Korea from the United States muddies the waters further.

Beyond holding Iran out of the long run natural gas market, Russia could similarly be unwilling to agree to conflict resolution in Yemen and Syria because of the benefit it enjoys from keeping Saudi Arabia under financial and political pressure. Riyadh’s economic pressures, driven in part from its high military spending in Yemen, have made Saudi Arabia all the more willing to collaborate with Moscow on managing oil markets—a geopolitical reality that has strengthened Russia’s global standing significantly. It’s hard to see what would motivate the Kremlin to let Saudi Arabia off the hook given that a resumption of a tight alliance with Washington and Qatar is a material danger to Russia’s geopolitical and economic well-being, as demonstrated when the three countries collaborated in the early 2010s to weaken Moscow’s grip on European energy markets.

Russia’s posture is not the only barrier, however, to conditions that would allow progress on U.S.-Iranian conflict resolution. Even if the economic penalty of the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions were sufficient to motivate Iran back to the negotiating table, it remains unclear to what extent Tehran can influence its own proxies who have independent goals that could not align fully with any conflict resolution deal Iran could strike with the United States and its allies. Moreover, it is similarly unclear whether the United States could draw Saudi Arabia into a workable political settlement for Yemen. Thus, while the United States could have a strategy in mind that could improve upon the status quo in the Middle East, a deeper dive into the energy realpolitik of the matter shows the complexities that stand in the way of progress. With so much at stake, an incredibly disciplined and patient hand will be necessary to work through the wide host of internecine, interconnected issues.

The Complicated Geopolitics of U.S. Oil Sanctions on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reportedly informed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he must support the Israeli-Palestinian peace deal put forth by the Trump administration or resign.

According to Israeli media broadcasts, Abbas was given the ultimatum after he was summoned to Riyadh in October 2017 for a meeting with Bin Salman days after Senior U.S. Presidential Advisor Jared Kushner made an unannounced visit to the Saudi capital to meet the young crown prince.

Riyadh had offered to normalize relations with Israel in 2002 on the condition that it agreed to the two-state formula, which more and more Israeli’s, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have rejected.

While the details of any peace deal remain unclear, there is growing concern among Palestinians about Bin Salman’s readiness to support a U.S. president described as the most overtly pro-Israel president in years.

The Trump administration, at the time, was reportedly drafting a deal allegedly arranged by Jared Kushner, himself a staunch advocate of Israel. Kushner has given money to Israeli settlement charities, and his family is reportedly friendly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli media reports also stated that Abbas was directed to prevent increased rapprochement with Hamas—an ultimatum that could jeopardize the reconciliation process between the two rival Palestinian factions.

On the surface, the warning given by Bin Salman seems to be identical to the one made by Netanyahu who is strongly opposed to the Palestinian unity government.

While Abbas has disputed the claims made on Israeli news Channel 10, details of the meeting seem to be in line with the Saudi, UAE, Israeli and U.S. vision for the region agreed before Trump’s inauguration.

Since the Trump administration has taken power, the U.S. has backed the unpredictable Crown Prince and seems to be endorsing a regional plan that will see full U.S. support for the Gulf monarchies, revisions to the Iran nuclear deal, and a new Israel-Palestine peace plan.

The Saudis appear to be entirely behind this agreement whose blueprint is being drawn up by senior members of the Trump administration.

Since his election, Trump has gone on to describe Saudi Arabia as a “magnificent country” while taking the unprecedented step of visiting the Gulf state in his first official visit, having condemned the rulers during his election campaign. Trump also struck a multibillion-dollar deal with the Saudi royals in May.

Trump’s fondness for the Saudi’s saw him backing the anti-Qatar media campaign directed by the Saudi and Emirati governments and the November announcement that he was decertifying the Iran nuclear accord.

When Saudi Arabia arrested scores of princes and businessmen in an “anti-corruption” purge, Trump tweeted his support for the move.

Saudi Arabia Pressured Palestinian Authority to Accept Saudi-backed Israel-Palestine Peace Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

On one level this is a story about changes in relative costs. The costs of solar and wind have plunged while nuclear has become almost astoundingly expensive. But this raises the question of why this came about. As I argue in my new book, Low Carbon Politics, it helps to dip into cultural theory.

Culture wars

The seminal text in this field, Risk and Culture (1982), by the British anthropologist Mary Douglas and American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, argues the behavior of individuals and institutions can be explained by four different biases:

1. Individualists: people biased towards outcomes that result from competitive arrangements;
2. Hierarchists: those who prefer ordered decisions being made by leaders and followed by others;
3. Egalitarians: people who favor equality and grassroots decision-making and pursue a common cause;
4. Fatalists: those who see decision-making as capricious and feel unable to influence outcomes.

The first three categories help explain different actors in the electricity industry. For governments and centralized monopolies often owned by the state, read hierarchists. For green campaigning organizations, read egalitarians, while free-market-minded private companies fit the individualist bias.

The priorities of these groups have not greatly changed in recent years. Hierarchists tend to favor nuclear power, since big power stations make for more straightforward grid planning, and nuclear power complements nuclear weapons capabilities considered important for national security.

Egalitarians like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth usually oppose new nuclear power plant and favor renewables. Traditionally they have worried about radioactive environmental damage and nuclear proliferation. Individualists, meanwhile, favor whichever technologies reduce costs.

These cultural realities lie behind the problems experienced by nuclear power. To compound green opposition, many of nuclear power’s strongest supporters are conservative hierarchists who are either skeptical about the need to reduce carbon emissions or treat it as a low priority. Hence they are often unable or unwilling to mobilize climate change arguments to support nuclear, which has made it harder to persuade egalitarians to get on board.

This has had several consequences. Green groups won subsidies for renewable technologies by persuading more liberal hierarchists that they had to address climate change – witness the big push by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth for the feed-in tariffs that drove solar uptake in the late 2000s, for example. In turn, both wind and solar have been optimized, and their costs have come down.

Nuclear largely missed out on these carbon-reducing subsidies. Worse, greens groups persuaded governments as far back as the 1970s that safety standards around nuclear power stations needed to improve. This more than anything drove up costs.

As for the individualists, they used to be generally unconvinced by renewable energy and skeptical of environmental opposition to nuclear. But as relative costs have changed, they have increasingly switched positions.

The hierarchists are still able to use monopoly electricity organizations to support nuclear power, but individualists are increasingly pressuring them to make these markets more competitive so that they can invest in renewables more easily. In effect, we are now seeing an egalitarian-individualist alliance against the conservative hierarchists.

Both sides of the pond

Donald Trump’s administration in the US, for example, has sought subsidies to keep existing coal and nuclear power stations running. This is both out of concern for national security and to support traditional centralized industrial corporations – classic hierarchist thinking.

Yet this has played out badly with individualist corporations pushing renewables. Trump’s plans have even been rejected by some of his own appointments on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

In similarly hierarchist fashion, electricity supply monopolies in Georgia and South Carolina started building new nuclear power stations after regulatory agencies allowed them to collect mandatory payments from electricity consumers to cover costs at the same time.

Yet even hierarchists cannot ignore economic reality entirely. The South Carolina project has been abandoned, and the Georgia project only survives through a very large federal loan bailout.

Contrast this with casino complexes in Nevada like MGM Resorts not only installing their own solar photovoltaic arrays but paying many millions of dollars to opt out from the local monopoly electricity supplier. They have campaigned successfully to win a state referendum supporting electricity liberalization.

The UK, meanwhile, is an example of how different biases can compete. Policy has traditionally been formed in hierarchical style, with big companies producing policy proposals which go out to wider consultation. It’s a cultural bias that favors nuclear power, but this conflicts with a key priority dating back to Thatcher that technological winners are chosen by the market.

This has led policymakers in Whitehall to favor both renewables and nuclear, but the private electricity companies have mostly refused to invest in nuclear, seeing it as too risky and expensive. The only companies prepared to plug the gap have been more hierarchists – EDF, which is majority-owned by France, and Chinese state nuclear corporations.

Even then, getting Hinkley C in south-west England underway – the first new nuclear plant since the 1990s – required an extensive commitment by the UK Treasury to underwrite bank loans. There is also an embarrassingly high price to be paid for the electricity over a very long 35-year period. Such has been the bad publicity that it’s hard to imagine a politician agreeing to more plant on such terms.

Where does this reality leave hierarchists? Increasingly having to explain prohibitive nuclear costs to their electorates – at least in democracies. The alternative, as renewable energy becomes the new orthodoxy, is to embrace it.

In Australia, for example, a big utility company called AGL is trying to seduce homeowners to agree to link their solar panels to the company’s systems to centralize power dispatch in a so-called a “virtual power plant.”

When the facts change, to misquote John Maynard Keynes, you can always change your mind.

The Unholy Alliance That Explains Why Renewable Energy is Trouncing Nuclear was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under the administration of Donald Trump, the United States has been attempting to rebalance its priorities, giving the appearance that it is stepping back from its traditional role as guarantor of international security, trade, and diplomacy. However, the rhetoric from the executive branch is hardly news.

Prior U.S. presidential administrations—recently the Obama and Bush administrations—repeatedly stressed the need for NATO allies in Europe to increase defense spending. U.S. Presidents and politicians from both political parties have long made the argument that, for decades, American taxpayers have underwritten European security and defense.

U.S. Allies in Europe

The European Union—and its two largest economies, France and Germany are facing growing uncertainty in their electorates regarding the role of the Union. The bloc remains comprised of vastly contrarian points-of-view, and it remains to be seen how the E.U. will handle Brexit negotiations with the United Kingdom. At present, it is possible the U.K. and E.U. will agree to some degree of security and defense cooperation.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as leaders of the two most influential European Union member states, will need to alleviate the concerns of their respective electorates, which are increasingly concerned with issues such as terrorism and mass immigration—both of which pose severe challenges to European security and social cohesion. Additionally, they will need to effectively communicate the purpose and value of the bloc, in economic, security, and social terms.

On the surface, the European Union would seem to be in a better position than China (oft-touted as the successor to U.S. global hegemony) to serve as a guarantor of global security.

However, the capability of any future E.U. military would pale in comparison to those of the United States. While they compare regarding the number of citizens under arms, American military spending and technological capability far outweigh those of the EU, meaning that the United States remains the only country capable of projecting force on a truly global scale.

Germany became acutely aware of the strategic consequences the European Union would face should Marine Le Pen ascend to the French presidency and follow through with her promises to withdraw France from the both European Union and the NATO Joint Military Command Structure. After the U.S. and Russia, France possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was notably concerned about the prospect of France withdrawing from the European Union, as such an act would leave the E.U. without a nuclear deterrent. In this scenario, Germany would likely become the bloc’s de-facto military and economic leader and would have to consider leading the development of a European Union nuclear weapons program to deter an increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Russia.

U.S. Allies in the Middle East

Iran’s continued military and political involvement in Syria is viewed as a strategic national security threat to Israel, and continued encroachment towards Israeli territory heightens the risk of a large-scale conflict between Iran and Israel, with a remote possibility of Sunni Gulf Monarchies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supporting Israel in an effort to check Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.

The U.S. seems to have, at the least, tacitly approved of heightened Israeli aggression against Iranian targets in Syria, although it remains to be seen the level of involvement the U.S. will take on following the appointment of noted hawk John Bolton as U.S. National Security Advisor, and the pending Secretary of State nomination of the similarly hawkish Mike Pompeo, both of whom have long argued for preemptive U.S. action against Iran.

U.S. Allies in Asia

Key American allies in East Asia, notably Japan, are also reacting to the “America First” Japan’s military capabilities are restricted by its post-World War II constitution. Japan is limited in its ability to deploy troops overseas and is forbidden from developing or possessing aircraft carriers. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated for constitutional reforms that would allow for expanded military and defense capabilities.

Japan’s push to increase its military capabilities isn’t a reaction to the rhetoric currently emanating from the White House. Instead, Japan’s decades-long reluctance to demonstrate its “hard power” capabilities is increasingly outweighed by China’s increasing expansionism and North Korea’s nuclear program.

2018 will likely reveal the limits of China’s influence over the “hermit kingdom.” While China recognizes the security threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea with increased intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, Beijing is more concerned with the prospect of a U.S.-aligned, unified Korea. As such, it likely intends to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

U.S. Allies More Likely to Take Unilateral Action in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Saudi-backed proposal for a peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians would see the town of Abu Dis as the future capital of Palestine—instead of East Jerusalem. The proposed initiative would give the Palestinian Authority only limited sovereignty over Palestinian territory which has stirred widespread anger in the region.

The New York Times reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman presented the proposal during Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Riyadh last month. It was during that visit that Bin Salman reportedly gave an ultimatum to Abbas that he was to either accept the proposed peace plan or resign. Activists are responding to the Saudi proposal on Twitter using the hashtag #JerusalemIsOurCapital.

Abu Dis is a Palestinian town located to the east of East Jerusalem, which is occupied and administered by Israel. Situated within Area B, Abu Dis is currently administered by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Palestinians Would Have Partial Sovereignty Over a Non-Contiguous State

Under the Saudi-proposed peace plan, the Palestinians would have partial sovereignty over a non-contiguous state located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank would remain. The Palestinian diaspora—Palestinian refugees and their descendants living in other countries—would not receive the right of return to Israel. Saudi Arabia reportedly gave Abbas two months to respond to the offer.

US President Donald Trump has recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and has begun the process of relocation the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a decision that lies in contrast to several decades of U.S. policy in the Middle East and risks fuelling violence across the region. Regional leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and Jordan’s King Abdullah have publicly criticized the decision but were careful not to condemn the U.S. President’s decision too forcefully.

Palestinians Would Get Limited Sovereignty in Saudi-Proposed Peace Plan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The terrorist threat is likely to increase as the means and the motivations of states, groups, and people to impose harm diversify. Prolonged conflicts and the info age allow terrorists to recruit and operate on a large scale, demonstrating the evolving nature of the threat.

Terrorism kills fewer people globally than crime or disease, but the potential for new capabilities reaching the hands of people bent on apocalyptic destruction is all too real. This ultimate low-probability, high-impact event underscores the imperative of international cooperation and state attention to the issue.

Terrorists will continue to justify their violence by their very own interpretations of religion, but several underlying drivers are also in play. Within nations, the breakdown of state structures in much of the Middle East carries on to create space for extremists.

The Sunni-Shia Divide Will Fuel Ongoing Sectarianism

The ongoing proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia also is fueling Shia-Sunni sectarianism—with a few militant groups further fracturing over religious differences. Additionally, perceptions of “Western hegemony” remains a potent rallying cry for some groups, mobilized around striking the “far enemy.”

Even though the location of religiously driven terrorism will fluctuate, the rise of violent religious nationalism and the schism between Shia and Sunni are likely to worsen in the short term and may not abate by 2035.

A combination of ideologies such as Salafi-jihadism (like ISIL’s or al-Qaeda’s), in a region undergoing vast and rapid political change—against the backdrop of generations of autocratic government and economic disparities—create an ideological nexus where the likelihood of violence only increases. Militant Christianity and Islam in central Africa, militant Buddhism in Burma, and violent Hindutva in India will all continue to fuel terror and conflict.

Extremists will exploit anger and link perceived injustices with the collective identity of deepening religious affiliation in some areas of the world. Religion will become a more important source of meaning and continuity because of increasing info connectedness, the extent of state weakness in much of the developing world, and the rise of alienation due to the dislocation from traditional work in the industrialized world. Rapid change and conditions of political and economic uncertainty, if not insecurity, will encourage many individuals to embrace ideologies and identities for meaning and continuity.

The vast majority of believers will be peaceful, but those with extreme views will find like-minded followers and vulnerable recruits through info technology. Most world religions—including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—have exclusionary aspects of doctrine that may be exploited in this way.

Beyond religion, psychological and social factors will drive individual participation in terrorism, as well as help terrorist groups attract recruits and resources and maintain cohesion. Groups will exploit ethnic and kinship bonds, peer, social or familial networks, as well as a desire for adventure, fame, and belonging, to swell their ranks.

They will also exploit feelings of alienation that are spreading across the world as young people feel increasingly disconnected from the socio-cultural mainstream, that they are unable to take part from the political process, or lacking in certain economic or social advantages.

Advances in information technology—whether with the printing press and Gutenberg Bible in the fifteenth century or with the invention of the World Wide Web in 1989—allow religious content to spread widely, in part because religions are ideas that transcend borders and are usually more influential in daily lives than state authority.

Technology may be a double-edged sword.

On the one hand, it is going to facilitate communications, recruitment, logistics, and lethality. On the other hand, it is going to provide governments with strategies to identify and describe threats, if their publics let them. Technology will continue to enable non-state actors to mask their action and identity. The use of cyber tools to get down electric systems, for example, has possible mass disruption effects, a few with deadly consequences.

Communication technology also will be critical to non-state actors capability to recruit new members, fund operations, and disseminate messages. Advancements in technology will lower technological barriers to high impact, low likelihood terrorist WMD situations, and enable the proliferation of deadly, conventional weapons to terrorist groups.

Technology will further decentralize terrorist threats. Centrally controlled and hierarchical organizations like Al Qaeda could shift into widespread jihadist militancy, for example. This tendency will pose barriers to counterterrorism efforts and adjust the nature of future terrorist plots and approaches.

Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may have to resign by the beginning of 2018. A report published by the New York Times comes at a time when the relationship between Tillerson and U.S. President Donald Trump is increasingly strained.  White House officials were cited in a report detailing that a plan is being discussed to replace the current Secretary of State.

According to the New York Times, “The White House has developed a plan to force out Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, whose relationship with President Trump has been strained, and replace him with Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, perhaps within the next several weeks, senior administration officials said on Thursday.” The report added,  “John F. Kelly, the White House chief of staff, developed the transition plan and has discussed it with other officials.”

On Thursday, President Trump responded to questions from reporters by saying, “He’s here. Rex is here.” White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders later rejected the reports in a statement: “There are no personnel announcements at this time.” Sanders added, “Secretary Tillerson continues to lead the State Department, and the entire cabinet is focused on completing this incredibly successful first year of President Trump’s administration.”

In response to media reports, Senator Bob Corker (R, Tennessee), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. Tillerson was “unaware of anything changing.”

What’s the Potential Cause of Tillerson’s Ouster?

Tillerson and Trump diverge sharply when it comes to foreign policy.  The BBC’s Barbara Plett compared the two to ‘chalk and cheese in temperament and the way they work…Mr. Trump is also said to have complained that his secretary of state is too ‘establishment.’”

Their differences in foreign policy have repeatedly come to light. The Secretary of State has sought diplomatic engagement with North Korea but has repeatedly been rebuked by the President.  When Tillerson stated that back-channel engagements with the North Korean regimes had been established, Trump tweeted, “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”

During the GCC crisis, President Trump apparently supported the Saudi-led bloc and said that the blockade against Qatar was “the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism.” Conversely, Tillerson has issued statements warning about the humanitarian impact of the blockade and warned that the embargo against Qatar might adversely affect the fight against terrorism.

The New York Times later reported that “President Trump tweeted on Friday that reports he would soon fire Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson were ‘fake news,’ and that ‘I call the final shots.’ The tweet came just hours after Mr. Tillerson called reports that the White House wants him to resign ‘laughable,’ even as one of his closest aides planned to leave the department.”

White House Signals Secretary of State Rex Tillerson May Be Replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The territory in eastern Syria that will be freed of Islamic State control now constitutes the focus of the struggle between the United States and Iran in Syria, as both are striving to seize the area.
• Early June marked the onset of the final phase of the US-led coalition’s offensive to conquer the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, with a combined Kurdish-Arab (though predominantly Kurdish) ground force – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – and air support provided by the international coalition, including the United States, other Western countries, and Arab states.
• At the same time, Iran and its proxies have also started intensifying efforts aimed at shaping Syria the day after the fall of the Islamic State.
• Forces of the pro-Assad coalition are currently trying to expand their control in the Deir ez-Zor region and improve their access to Raqqa and the surrounding area, and also seize critical positions along the Syrian-Iraqi border

Geopolitically, Syria Sits in the Middle of Two Axes of Influence

The race to shape the Syrian arena, which is currently focused on the campaign to conquer Raqqa and defeat the Islamic State, encompasses two main strategic efforts. One, led by Iran, aims at laying the foundation for a Shiite axis land bridge from Iran in the east, via Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon in the west. Its primary mode of operation is the seizure, by Iranian proxies, of significant passage points between Iraq and Syria – with Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the People’s Mobilization Forces) on the Iraqi side of the border and forces of the pro-Assad coalition, including the remnants of the Syrian army under the authority of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias on the Syrian side of the border.

According to Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “a relationship has been forged between the popular forces, the forces of the Iraqi government and military, and the allied forces in Syria. In practice, this is a strategic victory for Iran’s allies and for the ring of resistance to Zionism that begins in Tehran and reaches Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

In a rival strategic effort, the US-led coalition has been operating to create a wedge running north-south to sever the Iranian land bridge and cut off Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and west of the Persian Gulf. This effort is aimed at creating a buffer zone-security strip controlled by US allies, extending from Turkey in the north, via eastern Syria, southward to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Over the past weeks, some attacks have been carried out by US air forces against forces of the pro-Assad coalition along with the southeastern segment of the Syrian-Iraqi border, in the region of the Syrian city of al-Tanf, located near the tripartite border between Jordan-Syria-Iraq.

The United States has declared this area to be a “de-confliction” zone under its influence and will therefore not allow the deployment of forces belonging to Assad or Iranian proxies in the region. On June 18, a Syrian fighter plane was shot down in the Raqqa region of eastern Syria as part of the air cover that the United States is providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting to liberate Raqqa.

Iranian parties have explained that the deployment of forces loyal to Iran along the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border is meant to thwart the US plan to divide Syria. According to the Iranians, the United States seeks to link the northeastern part of Syria that is under Kurdish control to the southeastern section of the country, up to the Jordanian border and has therefore increased its activities and attacks in the Tanf region.

The voices from Iran indicate that their forces aim: (a) to defend Iran’s dominance in Iraq, the survival of the Assad regime, and Iranian strategic depth by means of a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut; (b) to destroy the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi border; (c) to neutralize the US plan to dismantle Syria; and (d) to prevent US-supported forces from establishing control over eastern Syria.

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Iran chose to respond to the Islamic State attack in Tehran by launching six surface-to-surface missiles from Iranian territory at an Islamic State target in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria. In doing so, it demonstrated its potential in the field of ballistic missiles and leveraged its message that it is at war with the Islamic State and is unafraid of operating in a sector in which the United States is working to establish its influence.

Russia’s position in this context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, both the Assad regime and sources in Moscow report that Russia is a partner in the Assad regime’s efforts in eastern Syria, aided by Iran and Hezbollah, to derail the American plan. On May 8, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan, which has close relations with the regime, reported that “massive reinforcements of Syrian and Russian military forces have arrived in the Syrian desert, in addition to the forces of friends, in preparation for an operation to take control of Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border.”

At the same time, there have been reports of coordination efforts in Jordan between US and Russian representatives. There have also been reports that Russia is working to prevent friction between forces of the Syrian regime and its allies and US forces, and strives to reach understandings with the United States and Jordan regarding a de-confliction zone, a de-escalation zone, and mutual attacks in southern Syria.

In response to the intercepting of the Syrian plane in the Deir ez-Zor region, Russia announced that “all aircraft, manned and unmanned, of the international coalition operating west of the Euphrates River, will be identified as targets by Russian air defense systems,” appearing to create a Russian-controlled no-fly zone west of the Euphrates. As part of the struggle for control of southeastern Syria, the United States has deployed two HIMARS multiple launch rocket batteries to the American special forces base near al-Tanf.

In response, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that every entry of a foreign weapon system into Syria requires authorization by the central government in Damascus and that the deployment indicates that the United States is not focused on fighting the Islamic State as its claims to be. The United States was then charged with failing to prevent Islamic State fighters from fleeing Raqqa toward Deir ez-Zor.

The pro-Assad coalition led by Russia and Iran appears to be following the American activity in southern and eastern Syria with great concern. In addition to the establishment of an exclusive security zone north of the Jordanian-Syrian border and attacks on forces supporting the Assad regime, this activity has included use of a training infrastructure for troops of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of US special forces reinforced by artillery support, and an air umbrella provided by the Western coalition.

From an Iranian perspective, and perhaps also from a Russian point of view, this marks a new phase in the US campaign to shape Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State, which is aimed at neutralizing the Iranian presence and influence in Syria.

The Potential for Escalation between the US and Iran in Syria and Iraq

The Trump administration includes elements that are extremely hostile to Iran and are pushing to expand the war in Syria as an opportunity to clash with Iran on a “comfortable” playing field. These elements have apparently suggested the idea of establishing an American-dominated north-to-south running strip through eastern Syria with the aim of blocking and containing Iran’s regional aspirations.

At the same time, Secretary of State James Mattis and US military leaders oppose the opening of a broad front against Iran and its proxies in Syria and regard it as endangering the capacity for a focused effort to advance the primary goal: the dismantling and defeat of the Islamic State. Therefore, at least at this stage, the US military leadership is seeking to avoid friction with the Iranians and Russians.

In the meantime, Iran is resolutely striving to progress toward its goals – i.e., more than other actors in the Middle East. It is checking the limits of US intervention, without any capacity to estimate the intensity of the United States commitment in the race to achieve control over eastern Syria. As a result, there is currently a potential for US-Iranian escalation in Syria that could spread to Iraq – either intentionally or as a result of miscalculated assessments.

Conclusion: The current race for control of territory in Syria appears as if it’s between Iran and the United States

The current race for control of territory in Syria now seems to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes –with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. Thus far, the Syrian arena could be viewed as a game board with multiple squares, with the move of pieces in each square having an impact on the state of affairs in the others.

First, Russia set up its pieces on the board’s central-western sector, between Aleppo and Damascus, including the coastal region. Turkey followed suit, arranging its forces in the board’s northern sector along the Syrian-Turkish border, including an effort to safeguard its interests in the Kurdish region. The United States focused its warfare against the Islamic State primarily in northeastern Syria and is now trying to reorganize its pieces in the southeastern square of the Syria game board.

As a result, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influenced by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late. Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern square of the Syrian game board. Israel and Jordan must also prepare themselves for the possibility that Islamic State fighters fleeing northeastern Syria could move southward and link up with the Islamic State branch at the border in the Golan Heights.

Moreover, Israel must not forget Russia’s influence in Syria and the need to reach understandings with Moscow, at least on a clandestine level, regarding every move in this direction. Syria may have understood as much, which would explain the increased intensity of the pro-Assad coalition’s attacks in the Daraa region over the past few weeks, primarily from the air. Still, Russia understands that Israel possesses the capacity to cause significant damage in Syria, and therefore prefers to maintain understandings with Israel and take Israel’s concerns seriously.

The Race for Syria after the Islamic State was originally published on Global Security Review.

The impact of the Arab Spring, the retraction of the U.S. military, and diminishing economic influence on the Arab world—as displayed during the Obama Administration—are facts. The first visit of a Saudi king to Russia shows the growing power of Russia in the Middle East. It also shows that not only Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also Egypt and Libya, are more likely to consider Moscow as a strategic ally.

King Salman’s visit to Moscow could herald not only several multi-billion business deals but could be the first real step towards a new regional geopolitical and military alliance between OPEC leader Saudi Arabia and Russia. This cooperation will not only have severe consequences for Western interests but also could partly undermine or reshape the position of OPEC at the same time.

In 2017, Russian president Vladimir Putin hosted a sizeable Saudi delegation, led by King Salman and supported by Saudi minister of energy Khalid Al Falih. Moscow’s open attitude to Saudi Arabia—a lifetime Washington ally and a staunch opponent of the growing Iran power projections in the Arab world—show that Putin understands the current pivotal changes in the Middle East.

U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and even the UAE, have shown an increased eagerness to develop military and economic relations with Moscow, even if this means dealing with a global power currently supporting their archenemy Iran. Analysts wonder where the current visit of King Salman will lead to, but all signs are on green for a straightforward Arab-Saudi support for a more prominent Russian role in the region, and more in-depth cooperation in oil and gas markets.

In stark contrast to the problematic relationship of the West with the Arab world, Moscow seems to be playing the regional power game at a higher level. It can become an ally or friend to regional adversaries, such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt and now Saudi Arabia. Arab regimes are also willing to discuss cooperation with Russia, even though the country is supporting adversaries in the Syrian and Yemen conflicts and continues to supply arms to the Shi’a regime in Iran.

What Investors Can Expect from a Moscow-Riyadh Rapprochement

Investors can expect Russia and Saudi Arabia to sign a multitude of business deals, some of which have already been presented. Moscow and Riyadh will also discuss the still fledgling oil and gas markets, as both nations still heavily depend on hydrocarbon revenues. Arab analysts expect both sides to choose a bilateral strategy to keep oil prices from falling lower. Riyadh and Moscow have the same end goal: a stable oil and gas market, in which demand and supply keep each other in check to push price levels up, but without leaving enough breathing space for new market entrants such as U.S. shale.

Putin and Salman will also discuss the security situation in the Middle East, especially the ongoing Syrian civil war, Iran’s emerging power, and the Libya situation. Until now, the two have supported opposite sides, but Riyadh has realized that its ultimate goal, the removal of Syrian president Assad, is out of reach. To prevent a full-scale Shi’a triangle (Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon), other options are now being sought to quell Tehran’s power surge. Moscow is vital in this.

Putin’s unconditional support of the Iranian military onslaught in Iraq and Syria, combined with its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon or Houthis in Yemen, will be discussed and maybe tweaked to give Riyadh room to maneuver into the Russian influence sphere. The verdict on this isn’t yet out, but Riyadh’s move must be seen in the light of ongoing Moscow discussions with Egypt, Libya, Jordan and the UAE.

A growing positive Putin vibe in the Arab world is now evident. The strong leadership of Russia’s new Tsar has become a central point of interest for the (former pro-Western) Arab regimes. The U.S. and its European allies have only shown a diffuse political-military approach to the threats in the MENA region, while even destabilizing historically pro-Western Arab royalties and presidents. Putin’s friendship, however, is being presented as unconditional and long-lasting.

Even though geopolitics and military operations in the Middle East now are making up most headlines, the Saudi-Russian rapprochement will also have economic consequences. Riyadh’s leadership of OPEC is still undisputed, as it has shown over the last several years. Saudi Arabia’s eagerness to counter the free-fall of oil prices has been successful, but a much more significant effort is required to bring prices back to a level of between $60-75 per barrel. Russia’s role—as the largest of non-OPEC producers—has been substantial, bringing in not only several emerging producers, but also by putting pressure on its allies Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria.

The historically important Moscow-Riyadh cooperation in oil and gas is unprecedented.

Without Russia’s support, overall compliance with the OPEC production cut agreement would have been very low, leading to even lower oil prices. The Saudi-Russian rapprochement could, however, be seen as a threat by the West and OPEC itself. Western influence in the region has waned since the end of the 1990s, not only due to the peace dividend of NATO but especially because OECD countries are moving away from oil. Saudi Arabia had to find new markets, which happened with China and India.

The Saudi future is no longer based on Western customers or support but lies in Asia and other emerging regions. The FSU region has also popped up on Saudi screens. Investment opportunities, combined with geopolitical backing and military interests, are readily available in Russia and its satellite states.

For OPEC, the Moscow-Riyadh love affair could also mean a threat. Throughout OPEC’s history, Riyadh has been the central power broker in the oil cartel, pushing forward price and production strategies; most of the time this was done in close cooperation with all the other members, most of them being Arab allies. This changed dramatically after Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to cooperate in global oil markets. Through the emergence of this OPEC/ non-OPEC cooperation, Moscow and Riyadh have grown closer than expected. The two countries now decide the future of global oil markets before they discuss it with some of the other main players like UAE, Iran, Algeria, and Nigeria. King Salman’s visit is seen as another step toward a more in-depth cooperation in oil and gas related issues.

Besides global oil market cooperation, Saudi Arabia is and will become more interested in investing in natural gas development, not only to have an interest in Russia’s gas future but also to bring in Russian technology, investment, and LNG to the Kingdom.

At the same time, media sources are stating that Saudi Arabia is NOT asking Russia to take part in the long-awaited Aramco IPO in 2018. Russian individual investors and financial institutions, however, are expected to take an interest.

Putin understands not only Russian chess tactics but also the Arab “Tawila” approach. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman already will prepare his Tawila strategy, putting enough stones on the table to ensure his successful end game. MBS, currently de-facto ruler of the Kingdom, is targeting a full house—Russian cooperation in energy, defense, and investments—while softening Moscow’s 100% percent support of the Shi’a archenemy Iran.

For both sides, Moscow and Riyadh, the current constellation presents a win-win situation. Moscow can reach its ultimate goal in the Middle East: to become the leading power broker and knock the U.S. off the pedestal. For Riyadh, the option to counter the Iranian threat, while also bolstering its economy and hydrocarbon future, is now within reach.

King Salman’s trip could go down in history as the point of no return for the West. Pictures of Russian President Vladimir Putin and King Salman of Saudi Arabia could replace historic images of King Saud and U.S. President Roosevelt (Bitter Lake, 1945). In a few years, King-to-be Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman might tell his children that this was one of the pillars that changed not only the Middle East but also supported his Vision 2030 plan of becoming a bridge between the old (West) and the new (Russia-Asia).

Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report comes from Twitter user Mujtahidd, an account which is believed to be reporting from inside the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, wrote: “Arrangement among the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is wider than our expectations. Israel and American bodies linked to Trump are involved.”

“The plan is complete. It is based on unifying the bases of security, media, culture, and education, including religion, in Egypt and all the Gulf States except Oman.”

[bs-quote quote=”Bin Salman was enthusiastic about the implementation of the plan due to Israel’s pledge to get Trump’s help to support his bid to become King of Saudi Arabia.” style=”default” align=”left”][/bs-quote]

The plan, according to Mujtahid, was drawn in Egypt which is the “supplier of cadres who will deal with the issues of media, security, Islamic movements, education syllabuses and religious institutions.”

The Crown Prince’s plan is based on unifying the bases of security, media, culture, and education, including religion.

According to Mujtahidd, it aims to “distance any political, cultural, educational, financial, religious effect on the people of Egypt and the Gulf States to reach a state of full and eternal normalization with Israel.”

It also said that the arrangement for this plan started in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Israel before US President Donald Trump was inaugurated, noting that former American President Barack Obama did not join the plan because he feared these states and the recklessness of Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman.

Trump, Mujtahidd tweeted, supported the plan and this encouraged Bin Salman and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed Bin Zayed to kick-start its implementation earlier than planned. The project includes hiring hundreds of Egyptian officials and officers in the Gulf States to supervise security, armies, media, religion, and education.

Mujtahidd added that the plan includes arresting hundreds of religious scholars, stressing that Bin Salman was enthusiastic about the implementation of the plan due to Israel’s pledge to get Trump’s help to support his bid to become King of Saudi Arabia.

The Twitter user added the plan was implemented and included the “use of social media to turn the public opinion against Islam in general and specifically political Islam and accepting Israel as a brotherly state.”

Saudi Arabia’s Grand Plan for Modernization—and better ties with Israel was originally published on Global Security Review.

The self-proclaimed Islamic State, once estimated to have occupied a third of Iraqi and Syrian territory, has been reduced to a handful of enclaves, bringing a complicated endgame into focus. In July 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory in Mosul, as his troops, with U.S. backing, recaptured Iraq’s second city.

In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recaptured the Islamic State’s self-styled capital of Raqqa in October, and the SDF and forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are both closing in on the Islamic State in its final eastern redoubt.

Introduction

The rapidly receding footprint of the Islamic State has raised the risks for new confrontations as various armed groups in Iraq and Syria, and in some cases, their foreign backers, vie for influence in the newly liberated areas. Meanwhile, experts warn that if the victors in both countries fail to make political arrangements that accommodate civilians and facilitate the return of refugees, the hard-fought military campaigns may only lay the groundwork for future cycles of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The following is a sketch of security, displacement, and reconstruction concerns in both countries.

Iraq

Security. Iraqi forces’ entry into Hawija in October marked the Islamic State’s loss of the last remaining city under its control. Three major armed groups remain in territory formerly held by the Islamic State: the Iraqi military, mostly Shia quasi-state militias, and the Kurdish peshmerga. They are cooperating with each other in some instances and competing in others.

The Islamic State’s sweep through Iraq in 2014 highlighted how the Iraqi military had been hollowed out by corruption, but recent advances showed how the force had been reconstituted; it is now regarded by many Iraqis as a professional force. Even so, the counterterrorism forces have been exhausted by the pace of the campaign for Mosul and other major cities, and both Iraqi forces and predominantly Shia militias have faced accusations of abuses, including extrajudicial executions of people suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State and collective punishment of their families.

A U.S.-led international coalition has backed Iraqi forces, primarily through air power. Most U.S. forces are advising the Iraqi military, though special forces have served on the front lines. The White House has set a cap on U.S. troops in Iraq of 5,262, but the number actually deployed at any particular time may be higher.

Also on the battlefield are Kurdish peshmerga, whose ranks may exceed 150,000, and Popular Mobilization Fronts (PMFs), predominantly Shia, numbering more than sixty thousand. Many are loyal to Iran, while others are loyal to the Iraqi clerics Moqtada al-Sadr or Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. A significant challenge for the state will be incorporating them into the conventional security apparatus. Another will be accommodating local armed Sunni Arab tribal groups. These various armed groups are jockeying to control territory abandoned by the Islamic State.

Iraqi Kurds are contesting oil-rich, ethnically mixed territories adjacent to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s three provinces, where they have had autonomy since 1991. But these territorial claims have highlighted tensions between Kurdish factions, as well as between the Kurds and others. At the center of the dispute is Kirkuk, a city occupied by Kurds since their initial advance against the Islamic State in 2014. Iraqi forces raised the national flag there once again in October 2017, apparently welcomed by the local ruling Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK has been uneasy with the drive for independence led by the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules from the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil.

The Islamic State’s last Iraqi enclave lies in western Anbar Governorate, along the Syrian border. Having lost the vast majority of its territories, analysts expect Islamic State militants who have fled the Iraqi military and militias to shift to guerrilla tactics.

Displacement. More than three million Iraqis are internally displaced. A third of them [PDF] are displaced within Nineveh Governorate, of which Mosul is the capital; some eight hundred thousand people are displaced from the city. Another fifth are in the Kurdish provinces of Erbil and Dohuk, In areas where there was little destruction, such as Mosul’s eastern half or Tal Afar, the displaced have been quick to return home, but elsewhere housing stock and infrastructure have been destroyed, and public services remain minimal, and many residents remain in makeshift camps. Tribal leaders in some cases have blocked the family members of suspected militants from returning home.

Reconstruction. Much of Mosul, particularly the western Old City, was destroyed, mostly by air strikes carried out by the U.S.-led coalition against entrenched Islamic State fighters. The United Nations estimates a third of the housing stock there has been destroyed; so too has much of the public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and water and electrical supply. Islamic State militants blew up the landmark al-Nuri Mosque and left behind mines and booby traps that have killed hundreds and could take more than a decade to clear. Also in urgent need of repair is the Mosul Dam, whose failure could jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of Iraqis.

Repairing basic infrastructure in Mosul alone could cost more than $1 billion, according to a UN official, and altogether, the Iraqi government has estimated that rebuilding the country will cost in the realm of $100 billion. Particularly given the decline in oil prices, which has left the state running a deficit, Iraq will depend on foreign assistance. But corruption is endemic [PDF], so countries and multilateral institutions may be reluctant to extend funding. The United Nations’ 2017 appeal for humanitarian funding was just shy of 50 percent met as of August.

Syria

Security. The Islamic State’s remaining presence is more substantial in Syria than Iraq, but with U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led forces declaring victory in Raqqa, territory in Deir ez-Zour Province remains its last stronghold. Islamic State fighters there are under fire from both Bashar al-Assad’s forces, backed by Russian air power, and Kurdish-led ones supported by the U.S.-led coalition.

U.S. officials are in northern Syria laying groundwork for the administration of Raqqa. The SDF backs civilian governance structures there, and U.S. forces are training a militia to police the city. It is unclear how much control the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian Kurdish political party, will have in these areas; in other Arab-majority areas the SDF liberated from the Islamic State, such as Manbij, PYD cadres are the ultimate authorities, and some suspect that Kurdish fighters will claim the territories they liberate for their de facto autonomous region known as Rojava.

Circumstances will grow even more complicated in Deir ez-Zour Province. New tensions might arise if the Sunni Arab majority there sees Kurds administering their territory as occupiers. Meanwhile, other nearby armed groups may enter the melee as their foreign backers—primarily Iran and Turkey—vie to secure influence in territories that are unlikely to return to Damascus’s centralized control. Among those groups are Iran-backed PMFs crossing over from Iraq and Sunni Arab rebel forcesthat had been backed by Jordan and the United States. Some observers believe Syrian Kurds are grabbing up territory in the oil-rich province as leverage to press for autonomy under a future settlement. The U.S. military has outposts across this region, and as the Islamic State’s footprint is diminished, clashes between these various forces will grow more likely, analysts say.

Displacement. With both the campaign against the Islamic State and the broader civil war winding down, some internally displaced Syrians are returning home. The International Organization for Migration reports that more than six hundred thousand did so in the first seven months of 2017, out of more than six million in all, though it cautions that not all returns were voluntary.

An additional five million Syrians are refugees in countries bordering Syria, and about a million have applied for asylum in the European Union. As war wanes, countries hosting refugees may face popular pressure to declare Syria safe for refugees’ return, as some have for Afghanistan. (Jordan has reportedly already deported registered refugees.) But while Syria is likely to remain divided among various spheres of influence, Assad’s continued rule from Damascus appears assured, and would-be returnees fear conscription or arrest, if not open fighting.

Reconstruction. The campaign against the Islamic State, as well as the broader civil war, has ravaged Syria. Some 7 percent of its housing stock has been destroyed, and another 20 percent damaged, the World Bank found. Likewise its educational and health-care systems have been largely destroyed, as well as much of its physical infrastructure. Rebuilding the destroyed physical capital could cost between $100 and $200 billion, according to an IMF study [PDF], but the damage to intangibles—destroyed institutions and networks that facilitate economic activity—may have exacted an even higher cost, according to a World Bank study.

The scale of the destruction is so great that reconstruction could not be done without a massive infusion of international aid and loans, but analysts warn that any such funds would likely end up in the coffers of Assad’s cronies or local power brokers loyal to him, and be used to reward loyal communities at the expense of others.

An April conference in Brussels sought to muster international support for reconstruction, but concluded that it could not successfully be done without a “genuine and inclusive transition that benefits all the Syrians.” The participants intended the prospect of international financing to incentivize the warring parties to return to what has been a fruitless UN-sponsored peace process years in the making. Assad, however, appears disinclined to compromise his authority, and he could instead turn to China, Iran, and Russia for financing.

What to Watch For in Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions are increasing between the Shia-minority and the Kingdom’s Sunni ruling class in the aftermath of the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr. Regional jihadists are attempting to foment sectarian conflict in the kingdom by exploiting the unrest post-execution. In hopes of diluting attention focused on al Nimr, Saudi Arabia decided he’d be executed alongside 46 others, the majority of which were Sunnis accused of having links with Al Qaeda.

Per sentencing protocols, Saudi authorities would not have to give prior notice of the execution.  Security forces were able to suppress low-level actions by activists, but a worrying concern has been the rising number of jihadist suicide strikes taking place not just in the Sunni portions of the country, but in Shiite populated areas.

Shiite extremists are bombing Shiite mosques

Suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques are designed to goad Shiites into retaliating, creating an even more significant security issue for elites, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed a leadership role in Saudi counterterrorism and defense efforts.

Jihadist exploitation of the al Nimr execution would involve strikes on religious targets and security forces, given the difficulties in targeting and disrupting petroleum infrastructure with such attacks. The killing of al Nimr will complicate negotiations for a political settlement in Syria.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to sit down in December when the region’s foreign ministers meet to negotiate on Syria. The two sides disagree over the groups that should be party to a post-Al Assad political solution, assuming all parties can even create the necessary battlefield conditions to engage in a political transition in Syria.

The proxy conflict in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ongoing in Lebanon, where a political agreement on the presidency is contingent on improved Iran-Saudi dialogue.

Saudi Arabia is Fostering a Sunni Coalition

Saudi Arabia isn’t the only Sunni power experiencing tensions with Tehran. As Turkey grows more assertive in the area, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria will be crucial arenas for competition between the old opponents.

Saudi Arabia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Tehran is a test for the Sunni regional coalition that Riyadh has painstakingly tried to gather in the past few years.

Thus far, the states that have followed Riyadh’s lead to Iran protests are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Bahrain, at the heart of the Saudi camp, has already reminded his ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian charge d’affaires in October.

Saudi Arabia has been attempting to foster a tighter relationship with Cairo to underpin its Arab coalition and will be signing grants and loans worth $3 billion for Egypt on Jan. 5 to make apparent the priority Saudi Arabia is giving the relationship.

Egypt will gladly accept the monetary support, but Cairo can be expected to maintain a more balanced approach with regards to contentious cultural disputes in the region. The execution of Al Nimr is a piece of a much more significant regional game.

The United Arab Emirates, which was in close military coordination with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Libya and Syria, downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran by recalling its ambassador and ordered a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats stationed at the Emirates. Sudan that has seen its alliance with Riyadh reinforced while distancing itself from Iran—expelling the Iranian ambassador—has received increased Saudi monetary assistance.

Kuwait, conscious of its Shiite minority, condemned Iran after the attack on the Saudis Embassy but stopped short of severing diplomatic relations. Egypt chose to be more cautious, condemning Iran and avoiding any mention of Mohamed Fathi Abdel Ati, an Egyptian national who had been one of the Sunnis executed in the same group as al Nimr.

Analysis: Saudi Arabia will look abroad for support after lackluster support from Sunni neighbors

Saudi Arabia will focus on securing its oil facilities while dealing with sporadic bouts of unrest and jihadist attacks. While managing these domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia will look overseas for allies at the time of need.

The response will be mixed from its Sunni neighbors, based on how much they rely on security and assistance. The United States and others in the West will meanwhile do their best to maintain their distance from the proxy conflicts which are part and parcel of the changing regional balance of power between Iran and its adversaries.

Increased Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East as the Saudi-Iran Proxy War Heats Up was originally published on Global Security Review.