In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

AI has improved intelligence operations in developing nations, but it has also created a new intelligence gap due to disjointed technological implementation, political exploitation of surveillance, reliance on foreign suppliers, and insufficient integration between HUMINT and AI-driven systems. Pakistan and India have large human resources and developing technological ecosystems, but institutional fragmentation and political agendas prevent the development of integrated, modern intelligence frameworks.

The problems that South Asian intelligence services are having are part of a larger global transformation. AI is now a segment of intelligence operation in the US, China, Israel, and some European countries. This includes automated translation, pattern-of-life analysis, algorithmic triage of intercepted data, commercial satellite imagery analytics, and cyber-enabled anomaly detection. China’s surveillance state uses AI-powered facial recognition, behavior prediction, and nationwide data fusion to show what a fully integrated intelligence model looks like. The U.S. is pushing for automated signals intelligence (SIGINT) processing and predictive analysis in all its intelligence agencies in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). As shown in studies of its military AI systems, Israel uses AI in real-time targeting and ISR fusion.

Developing countries are just as vulnerable to cyber-attacks, terrorism, and false information, but they do not have the institutional frameworks that let AI grow. This global gap is what makes the changes in intelligence in Pakistan and India so important for strategy. Pakistan and India have both spent resources on AI-enabled surveillance systems like ID databases, CCTV networks, predictive policing tools, interception systems, and cyber technologies that come from other countries. The NADRA database and Safe City projects in Pakistan give a lot of biometric and real-time data. India has made the Central Monitoring System (CMS) and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) to connect databases between state agencies. The ministry, military, police, and intelligence systems are separate. Legacy bureaucracies promote compartmentalization over integration. AI needs centralized databases, clean data, agency cooperation, and agreed analysis criteria. These requirements are missing; hence, AI systems exhibit limited and inconsistent intelligence. Agencies are collecting more data than ever but lack the framework to analyze it.

Pakistan and India still value HUMINT for intelligence. It is crucial for counterterrorism, political spying, and regional operations. HUMINT alone can’t compete with hybrid enemies who use AI-driven processing. Strategically, China’s integrated military and civilian AI ecosystem is advantageous. Developing states are stuck between two sources of intelligence: First is a legacy HUMINT system with deep networks and second is an AI ecosystem that is fragmented and not fully developed, so it cannot support strategic analysis. In cross-border threat assessments, cyber invasions, and emerging non-traditional security issues like information warfare, this mismatch causes delays, blind spots, and analytical distortions.

In both Pakistan and India, AI-enabled surveillance has been used more for political purposes than for improving strategic intelligence. Amnesty International reported that India’s use of Pegasus spyware targeted journalists, activists, and political opponents. Pakistan has been criticized for using automated social media monitoring and political profiling, which often focuses on threats from within the country rather than threats from other countries. When surveillance tools are used to control political competition within a party, two things happen. First, institutional resources prioritize domestic control over strategic analysis. Second, technology investments strengthen policing instead of updating intelligence. This challenges national security by making it harder for the intelligence system to predict cyberattacks, regional crises, and threats from outside the country.

South Asia has a lot of foreign AI and cyber infrastructure. Pakistan employs Chinese surveillance equipment (Hikvision, Huawei), while India uses Israeli, US, and European and American forensics platforms. This increases structural risks, including data exfiltration and espionage due to entrenched vulnerabilities, strategic reliance on foreign updates, and weakened sovereignty over vital intelligence activities.

Two traditional rivals, nuclear-weapon states, are weakened by this reliance. AI-powered surveillance systems increase digital access points for assault. Big national data repositories attract attackers. Pakistan has had multiple government system hacks, and India has had large breaches that compromised critical infrastructure and government information.  Failures in the past were largely caused by human error, but in the AI era, bias in algorithms, data manipulation, hostile and automated cyberattacks, and misclassification can lead to erroneous operational decisions. These dangers make the strategy unstable.

Increasing intelligence gaps between Pakistan and India jeopardize national and regional security. More likely to misjudge opponents: In fast-moving crises, agencies may miss signals, misjudge threats, or misread trends without AI–HUMINT fusion. Cross-border escalation risks rise; poor intelligence integration in nuclearized environments may aggravate misperceptions during crises like the 2019 Pulwama–Balakot incident or the May 2025 standoff. Cyber attacks expose national secrets. Easy-to-get digital network intelligence can have fatal repercussions. China-asymmetric strategic competition: China is decades ahead in intelligence upgrading, and Pakistan and India may fall further. Domestic AI reduces institutional capacity: political survival trumps strategic intelligence.

In summary, countries that do not update their intelligence risk being caught off guard, making mistakes, and becoming more vulnerable. The myths of shadows, secrecy, and huge people networks that fueled emerging country intelligence organizations are gone. AI has highlighted bureaucratic opacity’s long-hidden structural flaws: dysfunctional systems, politicized surveillance, reliance on foreign technology, and a lack of HUMINT-AI integration. Thus, Pakistan and India’s new intelligence divide is not about data or resources. It is about institutions’ failure to transition from analogue intelligence to AI-connected ecosystems. State and non-state adversaries that accelerate this transformation will benefit.

In nuclearized, crisis-prone South Asia, small misunderstandings could lead to massive wars. Pakistan and India need more than AI tools to stay competitive strategically. They need data architectures that work together, technical specialists, protocols to prevent politicians from abusing their authority, and strategic AI–HUMINT fusion.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Intelligence Illusion: How AI is Exposing Strategic Vulnerabilities in the Developing World was originally published on Global Security Review.

In May 2025, Pakistan shot down seven Indian warplanes, a claim backed by later credible reports. U.S. sources confirmed Chinese-built J-10C fighters shot down Indian Rafales, and Pakistan’s Air Chief Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu publicly tallied the Indian fighters destroyed in combat. Multiple reports also identified wreckage of an Indian Rafale and Mirage-2000 at Pakistani strike sites, reinforcing Pakistan’s account. India provided no evidence to dispute these claims.

India’s response to those losses has been to extensively enlarge its LR-ASM arsenal. In the May war, the Indian Air Force (IAF) used its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, French SCALP/Storm Shadow, and Rampage missiles to strike targets from its own territory. Now India openly seeks even longer reach. Reports say India is in talks to procure the Air-LORA long-range missiles from Israel and is also field-testing an 800 kilometer (km) range BrahMos. Almost two years ago, India contractually signed its largest-ever BrahMos procurement (220 missiles, approximately $2 billion) and approved 110 more air-launched BrahMos.

Longer-range missiles enable Indian jets strike “from safe distances,” beyond Pakistan’s air defence zones, including advanced Pakistani air-to-air weapons like PL-15. Each new LR-ASM thus allows India to hit targets deep from its own soil. After the May war, India is changing its tactics: attack Pakistan without risking aircraft losses. Thus, in the next conflict, Pakistan will also retaliate equally, and this might take the crisis up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Every extra kilometer of range brings Pakistan’s “red lines” closer. For Islamabad, even a strike from hundreds of kilometers away could look indistinguishable from a major attack. Analysts note that with 800 km range missiles, all Pakistani cities, from Islamabad to Karachi, lie within reach of Indian jets flying entirely from Indian territory. Some analysts warn there is now almost no conventional buffer: any use of these missiles could be conflated with a strategic attack.

Pakistan’s doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence” is designed to deter threats “at all rungs” of that ladder. In practice, using LR-ASM will make any deep Indian conventional counterforce strike against Pakistan more feasible, and this will be treated in Pakistan as an existential threat. These novel weapons will also cause an illusion of security in India since they will feel that they can launch attacks with no major reprisal by the Pakistani side, or if there is any, then it will be countered. Due to this expansion, India has made limited strikes a more attractive coercive instrument and bargaining an increasingly risky game of brinkmanship. LR-ASM enables an attacker to impose rapid, precision costs on an adversary (targeting runways, command-nodes, air-defences, logistics) without risking pilots, so political leaders can credibly threaten or carry out deep strikes short of general war. This kind of weapon also compresses the decision-making time windows through which India can compel Pakistan’s actions and shift the onus of responsibility of escalation onto Pakistan.

The consequences for deterrence are also stark: a limited conflict in future may have a much higher probability of escalation. Modernization and high-alert postures already leave “little margin for error” in South Asia. When India can hit sensitive targets from 800 km away, and Pakistan retaliate back via its quid-pro-quo-plus (QPQP) strategy, multiple rungs can be skipped, potentially leading to a full-scale war. In such a scenario, Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command and the Pakistan Air Force’s long-range unmanned systems would form part of Islamabad’s broader retaliatory and signalling toolkit. Indian strategists may view a layered mix of BrahMos, Rampage, and Air-LORA as a route to “escalation dominance” by pressuring Pakistan while minimising their own vulnerabilities. Yet the May 2025 losses only deepen this appetite for so-called risk-reducing stand-off capabilities, even though classic Kahn and Schelling deterrence theories warn that such confidence in controllable escalation is often an illusion.

LR-ASM expansion after the May 2025 war will generate an illusion of dominating the escalation ladder in the Indian psyche. This increases the possibility of a conventional strike, which would compel both states to skip multiple rungs of the escalation ladder and risk a more dangerous crisis. The May 2025 war demonstrated exactly how LR-ASM capabilities increased the dangers of escalation. In the absence of force posture transparency, plausible restraint signalling, and a solid mechanism of crisis handling, the deterrence equilibrium will be more fragile in the region with major consequences of potential nuclear involvement.

Abdul Wassay is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, Lahore. He can be reached at info@casslhr.com. The views expressed are those of the author.

India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.

These capabilities are considered key to a state’s escalation dominance strategy. However, India’s escalation dominance in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.

In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.

Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named Cold Start, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.

On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its operational capability and survivability, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.

The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.

India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a bunker-buster. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.

These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.

It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.

Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its military capabilities and technological strides.

On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, Trump’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high tariffs was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.

India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.

India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

Signed in July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. Article VI of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article VI serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.

The latest SIPRI report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.

In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).

This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.

Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.

Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is the third trilateral meeting between these countries this year. The issue of terrorism in Pakistan was a top agenda in all three conferences. Apart from trade cooperation and CPEC, it matters most. The truth is that terrorism-related threats have their sources in Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus not only contended with internal insurgents but also with non-state actors based in Afghanistan. These players are aided by regional instability, ideological havens, and a rushed Western departure.

In the Global War on Terror, Pakistan was at the receiving end of a conflict it never initiated, yet it paid with blood and billions of dollars over the past two decades. This involvement led to the deaths of over 70,000 Pakistanis and resulted in losses exceeding $150 billion to Pakistan’s economy, post-9/11. The trauma is deep and the cost staggering, whether it was the school massacre in Peshawar, terror attacks on urban centers, or assaults on security forces. Even today, Pakistan continues to grapple with terrorism, a remnant of the Global War on Terror.

A 2024 report noted that more than 1,600 civilians and security personnel were killed in terror bombings and gun attacks. 2024 appeared to be the deadliest year, as more than 685 servicemen were killed in 444 terrorist incidents. In March of 2025, Pakistan ranked second in the Global Terrorism Index, as terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.

A new phase in Pakistan’s war on terror began with the launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024, a multi-faceted counterterrorism initiative aimed at breaking the chain of terrorism-related violence. A distinguishing feature of this operation is its full acknowledgment of cross-border terrorism, particularly that originating from Afghanistan. The operation focuses on improving intelligence capabilities, strengthening diplomatic ties with the Taliban government in Kabul, and aligning border management with broader security measures.

Operation Azm-e-Istehkam could potentially mark a systematic reform in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, built on a structure centered on intelligence-driven operations, regional cooperation, and social and economic reforms. However, for the operation to be implemented successfully, it must be accompanied by progress across the Durand Line. External sanctuaries in Afghanistan will continue to undermine the internal security gains achieved by Pakistan as long as the country remains a permissive environment for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.

As far as China is concerned, its interest in the Pak-Afghan rapprochement is twofold. One is that it aims to prevent any spillover of terror into Xinjiang province through radical networks. China wants to counter any strategic threat to CPEC, particularly since their officials have already been attacked by insurgents in Baluchistan. China also seeks to hamper the increasing influence of India in Kabul.

Furthermore, the economic presence of China can be used to influence the Taliban to tone down their attitude towards Pakistan. Beijing can contribute to creating integrated security architecture by offering aid, developing infrastructure, and offering trade incentives, especially the prospect of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. This might include collective management of the border and repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as coordinating intelligence.

In July, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Tianjin, China, emphasized the need for Afghan stability and greater cooperation among regional states. Beijing’s message was more than mere diplomacy. It signaled a strategic recalibration. This stance was echoed by Pakistan Foreign Minister Dar and was followed by a series of high-level talks between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing.

Previously, in May 2025, a trilateral dialogue was held in China between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The meeting produced a symbolic willingness to reinstate diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul at the ambassadorial level. More importantly, it opened an avenue for future regional security cooperation, not only against TTP terror but also against threats such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which have also drawn Beijing’s attention.

These trilateral engagements offer Pakistan two opportunities to internationalize its concerns over cross-border terrorism and the chance to tie those concerns to broader regional stability and economic growth.

China’s mediation introduces a new variable into the equation, shifting the dynamic from a binary of conflict and impunity to a triangle of pressure, cooperation, and mutual interest. Provided it is adequately utilized, the trilateral effort between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has the potential to evolve from a symbol into a solid plan—and out of weak diplomacy into stable security.

Qurat-UL-Ain Shabbir is a research officer at CISS.

Can Trilateral Diplomacy Secure Pakistan from Terrorism? was originally published on Global Security Review.

One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite India’s conventional superiority, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) shot down five Indian fighter jets, including its three French Rafales, one Russian MiG-29 and one Su-30, and a Heron surveillance drone. The interception and neutralization of the drone, and the shooting down of the fighters about 17 miles from the line of control (LOC), highlighted the Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) expeditious response to Indian missile strikes.

The Rafale, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet, which is capable of performing interdiction and aerial reconnaissance, is one of the reasons for India’s muscle flexing in the region. Although the Rafale is not a stealth aircraft, it does have a smaller radar cross section. The Rafale was also touted as a game-changer for the Indian Air Force (IAF), boosting the country’s technological edge over its regional adversaries especially Pakistan.

However, the successful shoot down revealed New Delhi’s low operational efficacy and false perception of Indian air superiority. The MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter jet designed for air combat, was also believed to be shot down. With features like advanced avionics and radar systems, the loss of such aircraft was unexpected.

Likewise, the downing of India’s primary frontline fighter, the Russian SU-30, which is known for its maneuverability, indicates weaknesses in Indian operational tactics and a clear vulnerability to Pakistani air defense forces. Contrary to common belief, the PAF historically outperforms the IAF aerial engagements. The excellence of PAF was first made evident when it defeated the IAF on the ground and in the air during the first full-scale war with India (1965). In 2019, the IAF conducted airstrikes in Balakot in response to the Pulwama incident, accusing Pakistan of involvement in the terrorist attack. The following day, the PAF retaliated with an airstrike in the Rajouri sector of Jammu, downing an Indian MIG-21 and capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman in the process.

In the latest example of conflict between the two countries, Pakistan responded with its best fighters, the Chinese-made J-10C, which is a multirole fighter and was unproven in combat until these events. With the shoot down of Rafale fighter jets, shares of Dassault Aviation declined by 6 percent. The PAF response to Indian airstrikes displays its enhanced air combat capabilities.

According to the Indian Ministry of Defense, Operation Sindoor was India’s effort to punish the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. However, Pakistan, which has denied any involvement in Pahalgam, deemed these strikes “unprovoked.” Beginning on May 6, 2025, Indian officials undertook drills and exercises in preparation for their attack. This “show of strength” was designed to send a clear message to the international community that India can employ conventional force under a nuclear shadow. However, the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the dispute served as a concern for the Trump administration, which ultimately aided in ending military clashes.

On May 9, 2025, India fired air-to-surface missiles at three air bases in Rawalpindi, Chakwal, and Shorkot, as well as Rahim Yar Khan airport, normalizing escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan deemed these missile strikes an “act of war,”  authorizing the military to take corresponding military action against India.

In response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos after four days of Indian strikes. These strikes targeted wide swaths of Indian territory, including military bases in Udhampur, Pathankot, Drangyari, Nagrota, Adampur, and Buj Air Base. As the escalation veered from the disputed state of Kashmir towards the brink of nuclear escalation, the United States, shifting from its previous stance of non-interference, brokered a ceasefire between Pakistan and India.

Vice President JD Vance initially remarked on May 8, 2025, that the latest escalation between Pakistan and India is not the United States’ business. The situation changed after Indian missile strikes hit Pakistan’s Nur Khan Airbase in Rawalpindi, fearing potential nuclear escalation. Nur Khan serves as a key transport and refueling hub for the PAF, lying just kilometers from the strategic plans division, which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Before the situation expanded into widespread conflict, the United States announced an immediate ceasefire between the two states, offering assistance for resolving the Kashmir issue. The efforts of President Trump, an advocate of peace, led to the 2025 ceasefire and are a notable diplomatic achievement for the US. However, the success of this ceasefire rests upon a fragile equilibrium. In absence of institutions and channels of communication for resolution of key disputes between Pakistan and India, peace and stability of South Asia will remain uncertain. Without addressing structural issues like the dispute over Kashmir, the region will remain locked in cyclical deterrence failures, with the future of peace less likely than escalation.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest round of sanctions showed the Biden administration’s disregard for Pakistan’s long history of cooperation with Washington. Islamabad always sought to engage diplomatically with the White House in a constructive manner—aspiring to nurture its relationship with the United States. However, the sanctions imposed on Pakistan’s missile program by the US, grounded in doubts and assumptions, do not bode well for the overall stability of the relationship.

When Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the 1950s and supported American strategy in the region, especially during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan took significant risk both domestically and with often unfriendly neighbors. Pakistan valued the relationship and made significant strides in fostering a partnership. However, it still struggles to preserve peace and stability in the region after a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The recent spate of American allegations against Pakistan not only increase mistrust between the two states but also undermine the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current sanctions tend to create an imbalance in the strategic calculus of South Asia, shifting the balance of power towards Pakistan’s adversary, India. New Delhi’s military and nuclear modernization is already destabilizing South Asia.

            Washington’s favoring of New Delhi furthers the augment that there is an increasing gap between India and Pakistan, which could reignite an arms race. Historically, the US played a constructive third-party role in easing tensions between Pakistan and India. However, growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US could limit its leverage to act as neutral mediator in any future crisis. Such a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan could undermine regional stability in South Asia.

With New Delhi’s evolving missile capabilities, Pakistan considers its strategic capabilities crucial for deterrence. This ensures that the country does not face an existential threat from across its border. Islamabad maintains that its missile and nuclear program are intended to counterbalance India’s growing conventional and nuclear superiority.

According to the former US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Jon Finer, Pakistan has pursued “increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” If that continues, Finer said, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further said that the advancement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile systems could pose a direct threat to global security, enabling Pakistan to target countries far beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In response Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MOFA) commented on Finer’s statement and said that the perception of an alleged threat was “unfortunate.” These sanctions which are imposed under Executive Order 13382, are based on mere doubts and suspicions devoid of any substantial evidence. In its statement, the MOFA said that “Pakistan has also made it abundantly clear that our strategic program and allied capabilities are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.” With such clarity in Pakistan’s strategic approach, the American sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program are nothing more than misplaced concerns.

The US is turning a blind eye towards Indian nuclear expansion and is strengthening its strategic partnership so that it can serve as a counterweight to China. Because of this strategic cooperation, the US aids India with the transfer of high-end defense technologies. Agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and the Communications Capability and Security Agreement (COMCASA) are critical to Indian development. Under the framework of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), India also benefits.

In 2008, the United States pampered India with a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions, exempting it from obligations that apply to nuclear export controls for states outside the scope of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).This mutual defense cooperation between the US and India augments Indian military capabilities, accentuating military asymmetries in South Asia.

While maintaining silence on India’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, with a manifest range of above 5,000 kilometers, American officials raised misleading concerns regarding Pakistan’s capabilities. In reality, the longest-range ballistic missile of Pakistan, the Shaheen III, demonstrated a range of 2,750 kilometers, explicitly designed to deter only India. The country’s ballistic missile program has no intention of endangering the sovereignty of any other state, including allies of its long-standing partner, the United States.

To overcome this trust deficit, Pakistan and the US must take the initiative and forge a comprehensive security dialogue that aligns their strategic interests. This security dialogue would provide an avenue to discuss common security objectives, including regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and transnational threats. Furthermore, mutual collaboration in intelligence-sharing will augment the effectiveness of both nations’ security apparatus. Constructive communication between Pakistan and the US is crucial to building a more stable and cooperative future, which would not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also contribute to peace and security in South Asia and beyond.

While the Biden administration expressed concerns about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, Islamabad maintained, then and now, that these measures are purely defensive in nature. They are designed to safeguard national security amidst evolving regional tensions. It would be fruitful for both nations for President Donald Trump to correct the mistake of the Biden administration, acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and engaging with a willing ally. Collaboration rather than coercion is necessary for Pakistan and the US to address shared challenges.

Nawal Nawaz is a research assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

A decade ago, Paul Bracken warned of such possibilities in his book, The Second Nuclear Age. Because deterrence theory went out of vogue for so long in the West, analysts are now woefully unprepared to think about these challenges and their implications. Today, all possible threats to our Western notions of peace and stability have been jumbled into one giant intellectual recycling bin of deterrence theory. It is time to talk much more seriously about (1) the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and (2) the role of nuclear deterrence in a new era of nuclear disorder in the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear weapons play a unique and unprecedented role in how nations think about geopolitical order. They have fundamentally altered how countries think about alliances and the nature of international order. William Walker wrote about the establishment, in the late 1960s, of a nuclear order based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system “whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound,” and in which there was a degree of familiarity in essentially dyadic deterrence relationships.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system “whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits,” concomitantly with the provision of nuclear umbrellas and a stable Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession, but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems would provide the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for states to rely on the US for their national survival.

There are several elements that gradually developed after the second world war that characterized this nuclear order—dissuading countries from developing nuclear weapons. First, the number of nuclear weapon states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered merely bigger and better conventional weapons. Third, there are strong norms against possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no direct and immediate military threats to US allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely.

This and the prospects for nuclear proliferation are relatively limited. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) proposed in the late 1960s eventually attract more and more states, thus contributing to a norm against nuclear proliferation. It also contributed to nuclear and conventional arms control as concepts and policies in the international community. The world was able to more easily navigate crises and confrontations as thinking evolved about strategic theory and concepts and their application to real world politics and diplomacy.

The international (nuclear) order held together. It is now slowly eroding. China is modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces, all while growing increasingly bellicose and regularly threatening to invade Taiwan.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The West did nothing and never imagined this would be followed by a full-scale invasion eight years later—with regular Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Now, Australian academic Peter Layton is writing about “this nuclear threat business.” Until recently, this behavior was reserved for rogue states like North Korea. Such behavior was beneath great powers such as Russia and the United States. Not only does the West have to think about deterrence in a multipolar setting, but it must face nuclear dictators.

Nuclear arsenals in Asia are also expanding. From China’s rapid nuclear expansion to questions about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, the future is uncertain. There are renewed questions about the future of South Korea and nuclear weapons.

Arms control is also breaking down. Much to the chagrin of arms control careerists, who argue for unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral nuclear arms control as a public good sui generis, arms control is not carrying the day. Bereft of the intellectual foundations of deterrence that guided impressive negotiations in SALT I and II, and even START I, discussing nuclear strategy is now taboo in the West.

The nuclear order that existed during the Cold War and the post–Cold War peace dividend, especially in the Asia-Pacific, is eroding rapidly. For many nuclear historians, this trend is not new. Now is the time to grieve the loss of the utopian dream and think seriously about how to navigate this new era of disorder and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and promoting peace.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Order and Disorder in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

These states are modernizing their naval deterrence capabilities, thus weaponizing the waters of the IOR. The growing competition between US-led alliances, China and India, as well as India and Pakistan intensified, particularly with US support for India to counter China’s influence in the IOR.

Pakistan views these developments as a security threat, as they challenge its maritime mobility and increase the risk of entanglement between Indian and Pakistani forces at sea. The escalating tensions between India and Pakistan underscore the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid conflict. What are the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan in the IOR and how can maritime CBMs be realized and institutionalized to prevent prospects for any dangers?

Maritime Entanglement in the IOR

Maritime entanglement refers to the complex and potentially dangerous situations where naval forces from different states, often adversaries, come into proximity or engage in activities that can lead to unintended confrontations, miscalculations, or escalations. The IOR is a center point for states’ contestation where forces of India and Pakistan can interface anytime.

India is modernizing its naval capabilities to assert its regional dominance through advanced technologies such as Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers, uncrewed systems, and sensors, thereby expanding its naval presence.

India has also approved the purchase of MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance drones, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of its armed forces in the IOR.

India is also inclined to procure high endurance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to further enhance its ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine-counter measures (MCM). India is using China’s looming threat as leverage to procure 26 Rafale-M fighters to serve as the new carrier, Vikrant’s, air wing, and three additional Kalvari-class submarines.

Pakistan, in turn, is also improving its deterrence survivability. Pakistan’s capability is mainly based on conventional platforms with heavy reliance on cruise missiles. Its sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, deployed on Agosta-class submarines or on-surface ships.

India’s acquisition of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) adds new complexities to Indian Ocean security. These stealthy, autonomous systems enhance India’s naval capabilities in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare and increase the risk of unintended encounters with other countries’ forces, especially Pakistan, as the autonomous nature of AUVs makes them less predictable and harder to monitor.

Furthermore, a cyberattack on surveillance or intelligence systems can create monitoring “blind spots,” leading to potential misinterpretations of naval activities. If one country’s radar is disabled, it might incorrectly assess the other’s movements, prompting a more aggressive stance. This risk escalates if command and control communications are also affected, as either side could misinterpret a blackout as a threat, potentially deploying additional naval assets and leading to unintended confrontations.

The presence of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine near another state’s naval assets might be perceived as a prelude to an act of aggression, especially during times of heightened tensions. A stark example of this occurred during the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis between India and Pakistan. In the milieu of the Pulwama crisis, the Indian Navy declared that its carrier battle group, including the Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was on a deterrence patrol, which was “swiftly shifted from exercise to operational disposition” amid the crisis.

After the crisis, Pakistan reportedly detected an Indian submarine, suspected of being armed with nuclear weapons, within its maritime zone. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine movements makes it difficult for states to distinguish between routine operations and potential threats, increasing the risk of miscalculation.

This is particularly noteworthy in the IOR where numerous states assert their interests in strategically significant areas as well as crucial chokepoints for trade routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Thus, misinterpretation of naval maneuvers, especially involving nuclear-armed submarines, heightens the risk of maritime entanglement between India and Pakistan, which will create challenges for all the players involved and disrupt the SLOCs and transportation. These developments demand the opening of effective CBMs between India and Pakistan to prevent any risks in the maritime domain. 

Proposed Confidence-Building Measures

In the context of India and Pakistan, several CBMs are applicable. First, establishing a mutual notification and data-sharing mechanism on cybersecurity threats between India and Pakistan is essential, given the growing reliance on digital systems for naval and maritime operations. This mechanism would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent the misattribution of cyber incidents to state actors.

Second, an agreement on prior notifications of naval activities such as naval exercises or critical movements of submarines is needed. This will enhance transparency and trust by ensuring that routine movements, such as those involving nuclear submarines, are not misinterpreted as hostile actions.

Third, an agreement on managing incidents at sea can also be formalized by setting up clear protocols for their behavior during unintended or unexpected encounters at sea. This would help both countries to turn dangerous eventualities into normal situations. The two states can create standardized rules of engagement for naval forces operating nearby and develop crisis-management protocols to handle maritime incidents.

Fourth, another risk-reduction initiative could be a submarine rescue agreement, enabling cooperation in case of climate-prone or any natural crisis-led accidents involving rescuing crew and sunk submarines, and sheltering the survivors on board.

Fifth, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deployment notification and safety protocol CBM proposes that India notify Pakistan, via a neutral third party or direct hotline, about routine SSBN deployments near Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arabian Sea. It includes communication protocols to prevent accidental encounters from escalating, with India providing limited, non-sensitive information on SSBN timing and location near shared maritime boundaries.

Sixth, an agreement on the non-deployment of AUVs between India and Pakistan is essential to mitigate risks associated with autonomous systems in sensitive maritime areas. Establishing no-deployment zones, particularly near nuclear sites, disputed areas, and key naval bases, would reduce the chances of misinterpretation and accidental confrontations, offering a safety buffer in shared waters.

Seventh, India and Pakistan could establish a code of conduct (CoC) for the Arabian Sea to manage maritime interactions, reduce confrontation risks, and promote peaceful sea use amid regional tensions. Modeled after the South China Sea CoC. This CBM would provide a framework of rules for behavior in contested areas, particularly near disputed zones like Sir Creek and along shared maritime boundaries.

Eighth, direct bilateral maritime cooperation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would ideally be the most effective approach. Given the current state of relations between the two countries, this option remains politically challenging.

Therefore, a more feasible path to promote bilateral trust would come through multilateral forums. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association can be a valuable avenue to which both nations are already members. This forum provides a platform for indirect cooperation on shared maritime issues such as security, trade, and disaster-related risk management.

Expanding their collaboration within this multilateral forum, particularly on non-sensitive issues like anti-piracy efforts and environmental protection, could help build trust between them. As multilateral engagement deepens, it could serve as a steppingstone toward more focused and issue-specific dialogues between India and Pakistan at a bilateral level.

Implementation of the above agreements would provide a structured approach to promote a more secure and stable maritime environment in the IOR preventing miscommunication or misunderstandings and ensuring safety during maritime operations, contributing to greater stability in the IOR.

Rizwana Abbasi is an associate professor of security studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University of Austria. 

Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer and Associate Editor at CISS and an M. Phil Scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.

Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The brainwashing of youths, monopoly over illicit drug production, sheltering and supporting global terrorist groups, weaponization of poverty, and recruitment of refugees has brought Afghanistan to the verge of an imminent explosion, with consequences that may prove more consequential than those of September 11, 2001. Understanding what the Taliban is doing deserves further explanation.

Brainwashing the Youth

The Taliban’s focus on educating Afghan youth in religious schools (madrasa), which serve as training centers for militants and suicide bombers, poses an immediate and long-term threat to the region and the West. Through relentless brainwashing, these madrasas create a generation of children and teenagers steeped in radicalism. Young recruits are taught that martyrdom and suicide attacks are not only honorable but also necessary.

What makes this particularly worrisome is the sheer scale. Tens of thousands of young minds are being primed for violence, and this army of youths will be deployed somewhere. The consequences for neighboring countries and the West, which are already struggling with radicalization, could be catastrophic. As Roza Otenbayeva, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said to the UN Security Council, “The Taliban do not allow any monitoring of these schools and we don’t know what they teach there.”

According to the Taliban Ministry of Education, at least 17,300 madrasas are officially active across Afghanistan. Meanwhile, according to an order issued by the Taliban on June 20, 2022, three to 10 jihadi schools, with a capacity of 500–1,000 students each, are being built in every district of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has 408 districts, and the construction of three to 10 new jihadi schools per district could quickly turn the country into the center of global terrorism.

Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is once again a haven for international terrorist groups. The Taliban’s victory emboldened and empowered extremist groups, providing them with the space to reorganize, train, and plan. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now operate freely inside Afghanistan. Taliban ties with these terrorist groups are not superficial. They are rooted in common ideology, long-term political interests, and, most importantly, many Taliban leaders have long-standing family ties with the leaders of these groups.

According to a report in Hasht-e-Subh, the Taliban are building well-equipped bases with residential houses for the Al-Qaeda network and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni province. Likewise, UN reports, especially the July 2024 report, are proof of this claim. The United Nations says Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is a “safe haven” for groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This network of relationships ensures that the Taliban will continue to cooperate with these groups in their collective efforts to destabilize the region, expand influence, and export terror globally, creating a security disaster with devastating global consequences.

Drug Monopoly

Although the Taliban officially banned the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, it has monopolized the industry. By limiting the supply, the Taliban is driving up the price of drugs, making the trade more profitable for themselves and their affiliates. As noted in the July 2024 UN Security Council report, it is still too early to assess the full impact of the poppy cultivation ban. However, senior Taliban officials oppose the ban. Poppy farmers lose while the Taliban profits. The report states, “Due to poppy stockpiles, the drug trade in Afghanistan remains significant.”

The world’s lack of attention to this development risks creating an underground drug economy, further empowering the Taliban and their allied terrorist groups—undermining security and stability in Afghanistan and the region. As the Taliban’s drug empire expands, terrorist groups will increasingly benefit.

Weaponization of Poverty

One of the most dangerous strategies used by the Taliban is the deliberate impoverishment of the Afghan people. By doing this, they pursue two goals.

First, they plunge a large portion of the population into extreme poverty and eliminate opportunities for education, employment, and basic survival. This makes it easier to recruit people into their ranks and allied terrorist groups.

Second, the Taliban’s control over local resources and their monopoly on illicit trade provides ample financial incentives for those willing to fight for them. In this way, poverty becomes a weapon and fuels rebellion and radicalism.

Recruitment of Deported Asylum Seekers

The Taliban encourages the deportation of Afghan refugees by secretly cooperating with some countries, particularly those in the region. This is a policy that is of strategic importance to the regime.

Many deported Afghans, returning to the land where they find no means of survival, are easily recruited by the Taliban and allied terrorist groups. Deportation is vital for the Taliban, as it ensures a steady stream of disillusioned and frustrated individuals who become pawns in their larger scheme.

Many countries fail to grasp the significance of this issue and view it superficially. Deporting immigrants, especially from Western countries, fuels anti-Western sentiments among the population, making them susceptible to serving terrorist groups.

Time Is Running Out

If the world continues to ignore the dire situation in Afghanistan, the consequences will soon prove irreparable. The brainwashing of the nation’s youth, Taliban drug running, safe havens for terrorists, the weaponization of poverty, and the recruitment of refugees will soon impact Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and India, will suffer the most, but the impact will not be limited to the region. Countries far beyond, especially in the West, will be in the crosshairs of these repercussions.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The Biden administration, particularly Jake Sullivan, believes that drones and aerial surveillance can control the situation. This reflects a strategic mistake reminiscent of America’s approach during the Cold War. Ultimately, that mistaken view contributed to the rise of international terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abandoning the Afghan people once again will prove catastrophic, especially the West.

As an Afghan, I urge the West to pay attention and ensure that the Afghanistan that led to 9/11 does not become the same Afghanistan of the near future. It may be a landlocked country in Central Asia, but Afghanistan has already proved that it can cause great harm when left to its own devises.

The author is an Afghan who, for reasons of safety, is unnamed.

The Coming Disaster in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.

In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.

Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare

The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a tailored message, for specific individuals, is possible.

Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. Generative AI is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.

Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises

Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating misperceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, stated that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.

He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s reports on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.

Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia

Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a web across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become ultimate escalation within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are unlikely to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.

Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems

While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is dual-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was blamed for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.

False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation

India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.

The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI

There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.

Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation

It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.

Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.

India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”

Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”

India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.

Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.

Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Several months ago, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an article by Zak Kallenborn in which he defended nuclear weapons and their utility. Rebuttal articles published made two fundamental arguments. First, realism predicts the unavoidability of war, which requires the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is unreliable because previous close calls predict future failure.

The authors believe that reducing nuclear weapons to [near] zero limits the danger in inevitable future wars because future cheating or proliferation would only take place in small numbers, thereby limiting the damage of nuclear use. History and game theory prove this argument dangerously flawed.

For two millennia, major power wars occurred several times per century. Oxford’s Max Roser charts this bloody cost over the past 600 years. In that time 5–10 people per 100,000 population died in these wars, most of them civilians. In the past century deaths topped 100–200 deaths per 100,000 population.

Then after World War II something happened. Over the past seven decades this death rate has plummeted 99 percent to near zero (0.1/100,000 population). This is in spite of small spikes, which are attributable primarily to ethnic genocide in the (non-nuclear) global South. The world did not magically become more pacific. It built nuclear weapons.

The same abolitionists who criticize Kallenborn are horrified by the scale of the slaughter in Gaza and Ukraine. Over 315,000 Russian and 31,000 Ukraine troops are dead in Ukraine and 12,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza. Nuclear abolitionists fail to grasp, this is a mere drop in the bucket compared to great power war.

For example, during World War I, there were 480,000 casualties in 7 days at the Battle of the Marne. There were 848,614 casualties at Passendaele and another 946,000 at Verdun. During World War II, more than 61,000 British civilians died in the Battle of Britain. Over 83,000 British and American airmen died over Germany

European deaths during World War II are estimated at 28.7 million people. Great-power war gave rise to Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler, who exterminated over 30 million people between them. Stalin’s genocide of  3.5 to 7 million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 is the historical context for Ukrainian resistance today.

When it comes to killing civilians, the Japanese beat Stalin and Hitler combined. They killed over 300,000 Chinese during the “Rape of Nanjing.” China suffered over 35 million casualties during the Japanese occupation. When atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese army was still killing an estimated 250,000 Chinese every month.

During World War II, conventional bombing raids killed more civilians in a single night than both atomic bombs. In the Dresden firestorm, caused by allied conventional bombing, 135,000 Germans were incinerated. The ability of today’s conventional weapons is even greater.

The only answer to the horror of war is to keep the peace through effective deterrence.  To do this, those who would wage war must know the reward does not justify the risk. Deterrence does this at every level of conflict.

Arms control treaty regimes, the source of stability for nuclear disarmament advocates, are largely a failure. Despite the existence of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa all sought or obtained the bomb. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also failed to stop nuclear testing, with the violations of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States have either not signed or ratified the treaty.

Russia breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during the Obama administration and then suspended participation in New START in 2023. As a result, for the first time in five decades, there is no nuclear arms limitation treaty between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union. Russia already maintained a policy of escalate to de-escalate during New START negotiations and, in fact, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military doctrines all contemplate nuclear warfighting across the spectrum of conflict.

Deterrence is working every day and is not reserved for discussions of nuclear war. As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia coalesce in an authoritarian coalition, deterrence remains the last best hope for averting war. It works along the entire continuum of conflict, reducing the likelihood of war. In short, nuclear weapons save lives.

Colonel Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Nuclear Weapons Abolition Will Kill Millions (Again) was originally published on Global Security Review.

The escalating tensions with Iran present a serious problem that cannot be ignored. The continued attacks on American troops by Iranian proxies underscores the urgent need for the Biden administration to define and communicate clear red lines to prevent further acts of aggression and protect the lives of American military personnel in the region.

 The Need for Red Lines

 Firstly, the absence of a defined red lines allows Iran to push the boundaries of acceptable behavior without facing substantial consequences. Currently the Biden administration is “weighing responses” to the attack. However, red lines were required once the administration entered office. Iran needed a clear picture of aggression’s consequences, especially aggression causing American casualties. This continued lack of clarity from the administration not only undermines the safety of American soldiers but also weakens the credibility of the United States on the international stage. Without a clear stance, there is a risk of further attacks and a wider regional conflict.

Secondly, defined red lines serve as a deterrent, signaling to Iran that the United States will not tolerate attacks on its military personnel. Establishing such boundaries is essential to maintaining stability in the region and preventing an escalation that can have far-reaching consequences. This sends a powerful message that acts of violence will not go unanswered, fostering a more secure and predictable relationship.

Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding American responses can embolden other hostile actors in the region and elsewhere to test the waters. Clear red lines are not only about dealing with Iran but also about deterring other potential aggressors and ensuring that the United States is perceived as steadfast and resolute in defending its interests. The Biden administration must follow through on any violations of red lines to solidify credibility.

 The American Response

 To address this critical issue, the Biden administration must take decisive action. First, it is imperative to communicate clear and non-negotiable red lines to Iran, making it unequivocally clear that attacks on American soldiers will trigger severe consequences. Simultaneously, diplomatic engagement with Iran is needed to convey the seriousness of the American position, emphasizing the importance of de-escalation and constructive dialogue—but always backed by the threat of overwhelming violence.

However, to fortify its position and respond effectively to the heightened tensions with Iran, the United States must go beyond diplomatic initiatives and reinforce its military capabilities in the region. The US should bolster its military presence, which serves as both a deterrent and a tangible demonstration of the nation’s commitment to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its troops and allies. A visible and formidable American military presence sends a powerful signal, not only to Iran but to the entire region. The United States is prepared to defend its interests and respond decisively to any acts of aggression.

Additionally, the US must respond forcibly to the recent attack. As William Wechsler recently argued, it should be done in ways to avoid a wider regional war from occurring. Matthew Kroenig, however, suggests the United States can incapacitate the Iranian navy. It could conduct strikes on Iranian naval bases or even emulate former President Donald Trump’s approach by targeting Iranian leadership, as demonstrated in the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. Additionally, the Biden administration should consider the option of striking and dismantling Iran’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons, especially considering American officials believe Iran can build a bomb in roughly twelve days.

Lastly, strengthening alliances with regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, etc.) is another pivotal aspect of a comprehensive strategy that the Biden administration should pursue. Solidifying a unified front with its allies and friends in the Middle East fosters a collaborative approach to regional security. Collective efforts enable the sharing of intelligence, joint military exercises, and coordinated responses to potential threats. Such partnerships not only enhance the effectiveness of American actions but also contribute to regional stability by creating a cohesive and united response to aggression from Iran and its proxies.

Ultimately, well-defined red lines, coupled with a robust response to aggression, is essential for safeguarding American lives and maintaining stability in the Middle East. President Biden must seize the opportunity to demonstrate strength, resilience, and a commitment to protecting American interests in the face of escalating threats. If he fails to do so, deterrence will continue to falter, and attacks on American troops will continue to escalate. The stakes are high and clear red lines coupled with strict enforcement is the first step toward ensuring the US protects its interests within the region and enhances the credibility to deter further aggression.

 Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts by the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to apply Cold War strategies to new age threats and non-state actors have largely failed, leading to adaptations and evolutions within the IC to understand and address new threats in new ways. The Soviet Union and the Islamic State terror organization pose very different problems for intelligence professionals to solve. As the world moves further into the information age, the IC as a whole is evolving to meet new threats with analytical, technical, and ideological developments designed to foster the flow of information, rather than compartmentalize it into Cold War-era boxes and stovepipes.

This article outlines the differences between nation-states and non-state actors, including their structures, threats posed by them, and IC adaptations necessary for global social progress. The first step in this process is to define and differentiate nation-states and non-state actors, followed by an outline of IC approaches to each type of threat, intelligence paradigm developments, and potential enhancements to future U.S. intelligence operations.

Nation-States vs. Non-State Actors

Nation-states need structure to function in the world, while non-state actors do not. Foreign intelligence organizations of nation-states are designed to function as parts of their nation’s governmental structure in some form or way, which makes identifying them and addressing potential threats from them a verifiable process. Nation-states are also generally held accountable for the actions taken by government associated organizations and departments, which in part dictates the field of activity that any given nation-state can and will be willing to conduct at any time. International repercussions from the global community—including sanctions and/or military retaliation—are a strong deterrent for most national governments that prevents them from taking certain courses of action and from many forms of conduct.

The Russian Federation, for instance, took control of Crimea in a deception-based maneuver that resulted in virtually no combat, intentionally avoiding any conventional military retaliation from the West.¹ Chinese military expansion into the South China Sea, while creating tension in the region, does not involve war or international conflict either.² Still, when faced with being charged with cyber-attacks on the United States, the Chinese Government remains unwilling to admit that it was even conducting cyber operations,³ for fear of international repercussions—including the potential for conventional war. These examples show that while nations are willing to act, they are generally unwilling to engage in major conflict or start a war. Non-state actors do not have this problem. Instead, many thrive on the prospects of international conflict and warfare.

Non-state actors are generally defined by their lack of structure, asymmetric tactics, and unique operational procedures. Any entity not acting on behalf of or directed by a nation-state is a non-state actor, including drug cartels, terrorist organizations, hackers, sex trafficking organizations, international corporations, vigilantes, bounty hunters, and even basic criminals and individual citizens of the world. They can, therefore, only be defined in the category of not being a nation-state or directed by a nation-state, and not defined in respect to what they actually are.⁴ Some non-state actors have an organizational structure, such as corporations, and can be addressed like that of a nation-state, or targeted similarly for espionage or protection purposes. However, most non-state actors that pose threats to nation-states do not have a structure that is easily identifiable, definable, or targetable.

Operational procedures and tactics of non-state actor threats also tend to be less symmetrical than nation-states, and almost every non-state actor is unique in its specific operational procedures and techniques. Each threat must be evaluated and addressed individually for threat mitigation and/or intelligence operations because of this uniqueness. Conducting counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, for example, cannot be based on counterterrorism operations against Hezbollah, simply due to the differences in each organization’s unique strategies, culture, location, and patterns, despite both of them being terrorist organizations. Non-state actors require a higher degree of analysis to understand each threat completely before actions are taken, unlike nation-states where threats posed are understood, partly based on comparable historical analyses, international law, the economic prosperity of the nation, and regional stability.

Nation-States and Non-State Actors: Similarities and Differences

Nation-states and non-state actors are similar in the respect that they are mainly people led by other people, so understanding the behavioral psychology of people is a useful approach to understanding either type of threat. Both require resources, including people, to present a threat. Terrorist organizations like the Islamic State rely primarily on weapons and recruiting to grow in numbers and capabilities—the larger they are, and the more weapons they have, the more significant of a threat they can potentially pose. Nation-states like Russia and China rely heavily on other resources, such as energy, food, water, and other types of wealth-creating capital. Organizational utilization of those resources also differs, as a nation-state’s resources are used mostly for ensuring economic stability for its citizens and creating capital wealth to raise international prestige and rapport. At the same time, terrorist organizations have somewhat different concerns.

Terrorist organizations’ primary concern for resource utilization is being able to kill as many people as possible with as much media attention as possible, to boost recruiting efforts, and spread their ideology across the world for purposes of regional or global domination.⁵ Public support matters to both nation-states and non-state actors as well, since increasing one’s reputation, both locally and around the world, can increase the range of actions that are acceptable to conduct. Russia’s invasion of Crimea was not retaliated against, mainly because of the way the issue was presented to the public,⁶ just as media manipulation by the Islamic State was primarily responsible for its swift expansion and success in recruiting.⁷ Both of these entities swayed public support in their favor to help achieve their goals.

Despite several similarities between nation-states and non-state actors, there are many factors that simply only apply to one or the other. International law does not regulate or affect non-state actors or their actions since they inherently cannot be a party to any international agreement or treaty for any reason. Nation-states, on the other hand, face severe repercussions by openly violating any international laws or signed treaties, or if they are caught violating either of these clandestinely. Nation-states also have massive infrastructures for large scale weaponry and economic operations as well. In contrast, hostile non-state actors do not have access to the required materials and/or facilities needed to establish such features. There are no terrorist organizations with a space program, for example.

This means that any satellite operations conducted by terrorists, be it for cell phone communications or cyber operations, must go through a nation-state’s infrastructure. Nation-states like Iran who are state sponsors of terrorism and also have a space program, therefore, create a very unique problem.⁸ Non-state actors cannot by definition have a ballistic missile program either, since this also requires an infrastructure that only a Nation-State can achieve, but they can still acquire and use such weapons through allies, theft, or the black market. If the Pakistani Taliban or the Haqqani Network, for instance, were to seize Pakistan’s missile facilities, they would immediately become the world’s first terrorist organization with nuclear Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles,⁹ which makes potential instability within the Pakistani Government of paramount international concern.¹⁰

Technological innovations generally also require a Nation-State’s infrastructure with research facilities, scientific education programs, and a lot of money, limiting this combat multiplying factor to nation-states as well. Just as with missiles, however, non-state actors may still acquire technological innovations, including medical devices, weapons, computer hardware/software, communications equipment, or espionage devices by other means. In free societies like the United States, this problem is multiplied by readily available technological innovations to the public. It has resulted in the evolution of technologically based non-state actors like the hacktivist collective, Anonymous, presenting new and unique threats to nation-states and the world.¹¹

Free societies have also provided other non-state actors, like terrorist organizations, with technological infrastructures that can be used for cyber operations and tactical social media coordination for paramilitary operations, including terrorist attacks, such as happened in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Paris, France. The fact remains that non-state actors, while very different in nature from nation-states, have overlapping features, and unique features, and each threat must be approached by intelligence professionals uniquely and individually to achieve success. Intelligence methods and operational tactics must evolve continuously in the face of perpetual technological and ideological evolutions around the world to maintain global stability and human freedom, and the American intelligence infrastructure represents the best hope for achieving this goal in today’s world.

Intelligence Community Adaptations: Killing the Cold War Mindset

Intelligence operations and focuses throughout the Cold War were primarily concerned with threats posed by nation-states, and in particular, the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. The intelligence infrastructure of the United States that was created and grown during this era of Nation-State threat priorities stimulated the creation of extensive analytical techniques and operations explicitly designed to counter threats from foreign nations and their organizations. While terrorism and other non-state actors existed, they were not prevalent and did not receive enough attention to warrant extensive development of Non-State Actor threat mitigation techniques until relatively recently.

Intelligence representatives developing the intelligence infrastructure that exists today can target specific organizations within specific Governments for intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The ability to understand a structured organization made this possible and facilitated expansive espionage operations, including penetration operations and counterintelligence missions, to deceive the enemy and/or deny them information. The ability to identify the enemy and define it is the primary reason this type of analysis and intelligence operation targeting nation-states is so successful. The Soviet Union was an obvious target. Its intelligence, political, economic, and military organs also were definable, and therefore targetable. Even the tactics and procedures used by the Soviet Union could be documented over time, providing a standard analytical framework to base decisions on, with known variables regarding how specific parts of the Soviet Union’s organizations function and operate. Traditional threats posed by nation-states and individuals, before the onset of the information age, pale in comparison to the threats that exist today, threats that cannot be defined, controlled, and some that simply cannot be defeated, only mitigated.

Moving from the Cold War era into the information age has changed everything and created a large number of asymmetrical threats, not just from asymmetrical non-state actors, but from nation-states as well, transforming the entire global threat landscape forever. Intelligence professionals in today’s world must deal with issues and threats that have never existed, and therefore without historical data to reference when attempting to analyze them. Technological proliferation is the primary cause of this new threat landscape, technology in nearly every area of human life that is causing third world threats to be armed with first world weapons and technologies to aid their cause.

Transnational terrorist networks conducting cyberspace operations and coordinated paramilitary attacks on civilian populations have created global fear in addition to the physical threats that exist in the world, multiplying the overall effect of any attack they conduct. Many nation-states have also adopted non-traditional techniques and weapons, creating entirely new potential combat zones in space and cyberspace. The United States IC in today’s world must address a more significant number of potential and real threats, simultaneously, than have ever existed at one time in human history, and the freedom of the entire human race is at risk.

Intelligence professionals in the information age are no longer only trying to discover the number of tanks or missiles that an adversarial foreign nation has operational at a given time. They are instead assessing a multitude of threats without historical precedence that change the entire analysis and many which act as force multipliers, including but not limited to:

• The number of supercomputers any potential adversary has access to
• The speed of an adversary’s most advanced processor
• Whether or not terrorist organizations have access to weapons of mass destruction, how they might use them, and where they could turn to get them
• Regional and global economic stability
• Human rights violations by nation-states and non-state actors
• Weaponized space assets, potential and known, and their impact(s)
• Prospects for human expansion into space, including colonization, celestial militarization, and planetary resource exploitation
• Robotics technology proliferation
• Military and intelligence-related nano-science applications
• Global and regional drug and sex trafficking operations
• Human impacts on the Earth’s natural cycles
• The radicalization of violent homicidal terrorists who gain a foothold in failed states and spread their ideology throughout cyberspace

These are just some of the things that occupy the focus of the IC today, and each one has its own unique properties and operational requirements. Individual entities and organizations within each classification also contain their own unique features and operational tactics. The evolution apparent in the IC is as complex and expansive as the evolution from a paper letter to a personal computer hard drive with a terabyte of data storage. Growth does not make something inherently more effective; however, so another focus—on intelligence procedures themselves—is also necessary for the IC to appropriately adapt to current and future threats in the world.

Intelligence Evolution in the Information Age

Many of the challenges of today have not been addressed before in history and must be analyzed and understood before they can be addressed. Some threats are similar to threats of the past, however, and understanding history can help analysts learn to analyze more effectively, through the study of human nature, warfare, and intelligence operations throughout history. Communism is an ideology, and the Kharijite ideology that spurs the majority of radical Islamic terrorists into action is also an ideology. While there are few similarities between the ideologies themselves, the practice of combating an ideology on a global scale is not new to the United States or the IC. The Soviet Union eventually collapsed from economic and social disparity. The Communist ideology lost popularity, however, due to disillusionment within its believers, not the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Even Communist China does not follow the original Marxist philosophies of early communism. It has adapted to a Capitalistic type of communism in the face of widespread disillusionment with the Communist ideology. The Kharijite ideology can be fought the same way – through intentional and extensive operations aimed at disillusioning the believers and potential believers of radical Islamism. Cyberspace and economically challenged regions in the world are the primary recruiting grounds for radical terrorist organizations, which means the IC can target these same areas to eliminate the potential for recruitment, with aggressive, offensive counterintelligence operations in cyberspace in addition to economic interventions to educate and elevate the populations of regions with economic and social disparity. Ironically, eliminating social and economic inequality in critical areas of the world could collapse radical Islamic terrorist ideologies in much the same way that increasing economic and social disparity collapsed the Soviet Union and led to the disillusionment of Communism.

Lack of education and the censorship of information are significant factors that contribute to social disparities in the world, and therefore need to be countered with information proliferation and education. Part of this requires technological proliferation to increase the ease of access for societies to information through the internet, and potentially even Government sponsorship of satellite communications and internet capabilities for nation-states that lack the potential for such a technological infrastructure by themselves. Because this increases the risk of these technological assets being used by non-state actors for other purposes, increased intelligence operations, specifically in cyberspace, must accompany these information expansions.

In addition to these longer-term strategic economic and social methods to tear down the radical Kharijite ideology that fuels the majority of global Islamic terror, enhanced paramilitary operations and covert actions are needed to simultaneously combat physical terrorist elements already established around the world. With combined international cybersecurity efforts to ensure cyberspace as a place for global information proliferation and education, along with robust offensive counterintelligence, covert action, and paramilitary efforts to combat global terrorism and other physical Non-State Actor threats, world peace has its first opportunity in recorded history to be achievable and maintained. The challenge now is for Governments and people to realize this, and act accordingly to secure the future for humanity and the world.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

¹ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Crimea and Russia’s Strategic Overhaul,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (2014): 81-90.

² Miroslaw Przygoda, “China – Russia, a Strategic Political and Economic Axis of the Contemporary World,” Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency (VADEA) (2015).

³ Cuihong Cai and Diego Dati, “Words Mightier than Hacks: Narratives of Cyberwar in the United States and China,” Asian Perspective 39, no. 3 (2015): 541-553.

⁴ David Moore, Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution, (Washington D.C.: NDIC Press, 2011).

⁵ Andrew Terrill, “Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of ISIS.” Parameters 44, no. 3 (2014): 13-23.

⁶ Thomas Grant, “International Dispute Settlement in Response to an Unlawful Seizure of Territory: Three Mechanisms,” Chicago Journal of International Law 16, no. 1 (2015): 1-42.

⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “A New Threat Landscape in 2015,” UNISCI Discussion Papers 37 (2015): 9-13.

⁸ Dan Dickerson, “Iran Would Strike First,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International 16, no. 3 (2010): 30-36.

⁹ Paul Kerr and Mary Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East3, no. 2 (2012): 313-351.

¹⁰ Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.”

¹¹ Brian Kelly, “Investing in a Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Why “Hacktivism” Can and Should Influence Cybersecurity Reform,” Boston University Law Review 92, no. 5 (2012): 1663-1711.

From Missiles to Microchips was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States provides substantial diplomatic and economic support to Pakistan. Unfortunately, this policy inadvertently enables Pakistan’s economic, political, and military support for the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups. The U.S. should move from its dubious relationship with Pakistan to a more compatible alliance: India should become America’s premier South Asian ally.

Pakistan is an unreliable and untrustworthy ally. From the Taliban’s inception in the 1990s, The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has supported them with money, training, and supplying weapons. It continues to be a significant source of financial and logistical support. In addition, the Taliban own real estate in Pakistan and receive large donations from private Pakistani citizens. The Taliban also teach their brand of Islam in numerous madrassas (Islamic Schools) all over Pakistan, a valuable tool to influence and recruit new members.

Since 2009, the U.S. government has committed over $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion in emergency humanitarian response. U.S. assistance includes projects supporting economic growth and bilateral trade; refugees and refugee-housing communities; law enforcement; civil society; and countering infectious diseases. In addition, the U.S. is Pakistan’s largest export destination country and has been one of Pakistan’s top investors. Examples of U.S. investments include consumer goods, energy, chemicals, agriculture, transportation, and communications. Yet, despite all the resources the U.S. has invested in helping Pakistan, Pakistan still harbors and supports the Taliban.

The U.S. should shift attention and priority to India as the premier South Asian U.S. ally. This new policy would keep economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan but lessen them over time as the U.S. builds closer ties to India. It makes more sense for the U.S. to focus on India as the essential South Asian relationship. Both countries share a commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights, and the rule of law.

India also shares a commitment to counterterrorism. India actively opposes the Taliban. Unlike Pakistan, India is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups.

Lastly, adopting this new policy instead of a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan would prevent a more powerful Taliban. Economic sanctions on Pakistani military and government officials with ties to the Taliban would likely be counterproductive and cause a backlash. Pakistan might even increase monetary and arms support for the Taliban. However, a growing and ever-closer U.S. relationship with India would send Pakistani officials a powerful message.

Critics argue that the U.S. neglect of Pakistan in favor of India will increase tensions in South Asia. However, tensions are already growing because of a Taliban-leaning Pakistani government. India’s relations with Pakistan are always tense. The difference is that a more robust U.S.- India relationship can bring more regional stability than keeping things status quo or pushing towards a more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. India is a more reliable partner.

Current U.S. -Pakistan policy has enabled Pakistan to support and assist the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups for the past two decades. Pakistani intelligence officials deliberately lie to CIA officials regarding Taliban whereabouts, yet still claim they are committed to fighting the War on Terror alongside the U.S. Continuing down this path with Pakistan is a dead end. It is time to chart a new course with India. A U.S. alliance with India would protect U.S. strategic interests and contribute to regional stability and peace.

India Should Become The United States Premier South Asian ally was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue came to the forefront of debate when the RAND Corporation’s peace plan began circulating in Kabul as early as January 2019. Entitled “Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan,” the draft document proposed a joint interim government with the Taliban as the first essential step towards a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Adding to the controversy and fueling speculations was a statement by the Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting new governing arrangements in Afghanistan to facilitate and speed up the ongoing Afghan peace talks.

The idea of an interim administration also has supporters among Afghan politicians and power brokers who most probably see it as their ticket for returning to the center of Afghan power politics.

However, lost in the noise are the consequences of going down the road of a joint interim administration with the hardliner Taliban who isn’t compromising on their regressive demands at all, and the likelihood of its success, especially when the international community is wrapping up its Afghanistan adventure and are preparing to leave the country altogether?

Jeopardizing the Peace Process and Achievements

Proponents of the idea of an interim government forget, and the new Biden administration must know, that any discussion of an interim administration with the highly infamous Taliban—more than 80 percent of Afghans have no sympathy for the group—further boosts the insurgents’ morale and feeds into their narrative.

In other words, talks of an interim government with the Taliban inadvertently acknowledges the insurgent groups false rhetoric and blatant propaganda that paints the U.S.-led international community’s retaliatory intervention (in response to 9/11 attacks) as an invasion, degrades the UN-sanctioned multinational security forces presence in Afghanistan to occupation, and justifies their own bloody campaign as freedom fighting and just war for some delusional salvation of Afghanistan.

An interim administration would also tip the balance of power further in favor of the Taliban, especially after their diplomatic victory of discussing troop pullout with the Trump administration, and provide them with an opportunity to take on the scattered Afghan parties and groups and squeeze them to the extent of reversing the gains and rewriting everything.

Existing democratic institutions, freedom of speech and free press, women’s rights and advancements, and above all, the Afghan Constitution that guarantees all of the above would be in great jeopardy.

Although some claim that the Taliban have changed and are now open to discussing previously taboo and highly sensitive issues, including women’s rights and freedom of expression and press, ground realities indicate otherwise.

The recent rise in violence across the country coupled with targeted killings of any and every Afghan who might speak against or could potentially challenge the Taliban’s narrative and worldview cast severe doubt on the insurgents’ intentions. The Taliban’s vague verbal commitments wrapped up with Islamic suffixes about women, the press, and the inclusive government just adds to the suspicion.

Furthermore, the interim government’s volatile environment coupled with the Taliban leadership’s highly negative view of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) could cause panic among the ANDSF rank and file. Fear of the unknown future plus inclination to survive could easily force the ANDSF to vie for political and even ethnic support, causing the ANDSF disintegration.

And this is not an exaggeration; Afghanistan’s defense and security establishment has previously experienced overnight breakdown and integration into ethnolinguistic factions after the dramatic fall of the Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullahs government in the early 1990s.

Funding And Oversight Challenges

It is important to note that this is not the year 2001. Thus, the international community is not as enthusiastic about prolonged engagement with and rebuilding Afghanistan as they were back then in the first Bonn Conference held nearly two decades ago.

A lot has changed over the last twenty years, and Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the international community. The world is facing new challenges, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, and its grave impact on the world economy cannot be overlooked.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the donor countries, already on the verge of leaving Afghanistan, to embark on a new state-building mission in the war-torn country. Even if some of these donor countries would like to contribute generously, they will have a tough time selling the idea of engaging with and sponsoring a Taliban-dominated government to their respective citizens, many of whom have lost their sons and daughters in the fight against insurgents over the last two decades.

The United States’ principal partners in Afghanistan, European Union, and India are highly skeptical about an interim administration with the Taliban. India has clearly stated that it doesn’t like the idea.

And this isn’t the only issue. The U.S.-led international community has also drastically reduced its military presence in Afghanistan. As part of the Trump administration’s peace deal with the Taliban, the international coalition has already reduced itself to just a few thousand troops scheduled to leave the country in the next few months, pending the new Biden administration’s review.

Even if the remaining foreign troops stay in Afghanistan, their tiny footprint is not enough to ensure the country’s political stability. In the absence of a sizable security assistance force coupled with no disarmament program for the insurgents, the probability of interim government success between two opposing poles, the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, is zero.

Rather than acting as a catalyst for lasting peace, an interim administration at present would further exacerbate the already uncertain environment in favor of the militant Taliban, fuels infighting among democratic forces currently serving and supporting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and result in chaos for the country, which could be costly to the international community down the road.

Therefore, to minimize the probability of an apocalyptic scenario in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international community must look up and push for other options such as convincing the Taliban (with the help of their main patron, Pakistan) to share power with the current Afghan government or participate in UN-supervised early presidential as well as parliamentary elections in the country.

A militant group changed for the good and willing to share power and respect the will of the people as has been claimed about the Taliban, and a critical external player, Pakistan, satisfied with the Taliban’s return to power should have no problem with alternative governing and power-sharing arrangements.

An Interim Government Could Cause Chaos in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In order to gain attention and to distinguish itself from the Taliban, IS-K is employing new tactics like targeted killing, as well as complex attacks designed to instill as much fear as they can. Targeted killings has increased in major cities, especially in Kabul. IS-K has been capable of launching heart-wrenching, high-profile complex assults, killing hundreds of people.

Last May, IS-K militants stormed a maternity hospital in Kabul, killing newborn babies, mothers, nurses, and a police officer. On the same day, they targeted a funeral gathering in Nangarhar through a suicide attack, killing dozens of people. Similarly, they conducted a complex attack on a Sikh temple in March, killing 25 worshippers, in a ruthless targeting of the Hazara minority. The group also claimed responsibility for an attack on the U.S. military Bagram airbase in Parwan province.

With the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, IS-K stands ready to inherit the role of violent spoiler. It poses a serious danger as it attracts fighters from across the region. IS-K, with its global agenda has been able to recruit fighters from more than a dozen countries. Militants from the Middle East under pressure in the Syria war have joined IS-K in Afghanistan. Foreign fighters from India, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined their ranks in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the suicide attacks on Sikh minorities was attributed to one of their Indian fighters, who hailed from Kerala. Battle hardened, educated, and professional fighters in the thousands are skillful in attracting foot soldiers and brainwashing the poverty-stricken illiterate population of the country.

In addition to ideological propaganda, IS-K has been using coercion, force, intimidation, and empty promises of finances to recruit local fighters. One major challenge for IS-K has been the xenophobic nature of Afghans and hate among local residents regarding their brutal tactics they used from the outset of their operations in the country. Moreover, extortion, taxation, and mineral resources exploitation, which are major sources of revenue for IS-K has also caused concerns among local Afghans.

With their fighters coming from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, IS-K has the capacity to destabilize Central Asia, once it gets a firm foothold in Afghanistan. This remains one of the major concerns of Russia and Iran who view IS-K as a group driven by Salafi ideology, working to destabilize Central Asia. Most of IS-K fighters come from the middle class and are operative in far flung areas. They have been successful in getting safe havens in the capital, Kabul.

IS-K has been active in nine provinces from Nangarhar and Kunar in the east, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Badakhshan in the north and Ghor in the center west. IS-K is viewed sympathetically by some ethnicities in the north. Key Tajik and Uzbek commanders like Mawlawi Satar and Mawlawi Abdullah Majid have already joined IS-K. Who are actively involved in the recruitment of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek fighters in their ranks. When their regional leader Aslam Farooqi was captured in Kandahar along with 12 Pakistani nationals—including 4 women, a Bangladeshi man, and 2 Russian speaking women—it is believed Farooqi was engaged in an effort to contact groups in the South in order to bring  them to their ranks.

Some security experts believe that IS-K lacks the capability to launch complex attacks on its own. Taliban’s hardline wing, the Haqqani network, is suspected of providing technical assistance to IS-K in conducting complex attacks. IS-K and Haqqani network share a mutual interest—to undermine the Kabul government control and credibility by conducting attacks in major cities. Thus, on one hand, the Taliban takes the blame out of itself while, on the other hand, they portray the weakness of the government, meanwhile, IS-K relevance is served better. Afghan Government calls IS-K as the new face of the Haqqani network.

IS-K is an emerging threat, which represents itself as a replacement of the Taliban. It seeks to establish a Caliphate beginning in South and Central Asia, which will expand as Muslims across the globe join. This will be horrendous not only for U.S. national security interests but can destabilize the whole region. With their recent brutal attacks, IS-K has proved the fact that we are faced with a renewed threat, a new reign of terror, limited but far more complex and violent.

With the U.S.-Taliban Deal in place, IS-K seeks to build a reign of terror in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Point of Order

Payment comes in many forms, not just money, and over time violence has always been paid for by the cheapest means possible, sometimes even just by allowing life to continue or through advancing promises of ideological or moral philosophies. Jihad, for example, is a direct bounty from Allah on the heads of all infidels, the reward being not financial at all, but promises of luxurious life after death. The most common form of payment is, of course, money and has been used widely for thousands of years to incentivize the public into helping catch or kill criminals or declared criminals of various forms. From wanted posters in the wild west to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted list, American law enforcement has continuously been a significant end-user of various types of bounty systems. Technically, all modern military forces are also a party to the payment-for-violence system as well, as the primary function of all militaries is either offensive or defensive killing operations, and they all receive payment from participating. Assassins, since humanity’s early days, have often performed their art for a variety of forms of payment, including revenge, land, influence, or positions in leadership, and of course, money. Some assassins and mercenaries have proven this point to the extreme by conducting operations for opposing factions of a single conflict, sometimes even simultaneously working for both. No matter which way the issue is framed, payment for death is a long-standing human tradition, and it is here to stay until the concept of violent conflict is eliminated.

Assassins

Assassination has commonly been used as a form of political terrorism. From a historical context, assassinations have been used to instigate larger movements, such as insurrections, rebellions, revolutions, and other events over time designed to conquer a social system or ideology of an era or region on Earth. In 1933, the attack on President-elect Roosevelt by an Italian immigrant, Giuseppe Zangara, was an attack on the concept of leadership itself. Zangara professed that it didn’t matter who held the office and that his target was the symbol of the Head of State—any Head of State—as he admitted to considering other U.S. Presidents and the King of Italy as targets as well.¹ The modern term ‘character assassination’ is based on this historical and persistent type of motivation for actual assassinations, where the ultimate goal is to target a public figure in a way that moves the public ideology surrounding the target in the desired way, which has become common in today’s political environment.

More to the point of payment for death, assassinations have been one of the most effective and persistent tools of ruling bodies, always. The first known writing describing methods of assassination is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (1915), an ancient text from India dated to somewhere between 300 BC and 300 AD. The text encompasses many areas of governing, including chapters concerning war strategy, poisons, spy techniques, and strategies for assassination-style killings.² While payment is not explicitly discussed, the text is clear that the persons used in these operations are employed as a form of combatants. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (1910), believed to be written in the 5th century BC, also briefly mentions assassination as a type of mission assigned to paid spies.³ Echoing the ancient Indian Arthashastra(1915), a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) file, A Study of Assassination (1953), that was declassified in 1997, likewise details modern versions of assassination techniques, potential weapon ideas, and methods to be used for killing,⁴ and presumably was used as a training doctrine for paid employees of the Agency from its estimated publication in 1953 until the assassination ban encompassed in Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Impacts achieved from assassinations, or other forms of paid-for violence, can vary from insignificant, like the Italian who failed to assassinate President-elect Roosevelt, to toppling governments or starting a major war. World War I, for example, was initiated by just such an act. Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and leader of The Black Hand organization, Dragutin Dimitrijević, was the head of the snake that took a bite out of the Habsburg Monarchy by orchestrating the assassination of the heir presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914. The same Dragutin Dimitrijević had led an overthrow of the Serbian Monarchy just a decade prior, in 1903, to install a puppet on the throne to enhance his power and political relations with Russia.⁵ The Black Hand, a unified “Serbian nationalist organization,” also known as “Unification or Death,”⁶ was recognized as an arm of the Serbian military, acting as an early twentieth-century clandestine organization much like modern Private Military Companies (PMC), with civilian members who could offer plausible deniability to the government when necessary.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand was an advocate for peace,⁷ and at the time, most Serbians wanted to retaliate against Austria-Hungary for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The Archduke was; therefore, the primary obstacle preventing a war that Dimitrijević and many Serbians wanted to start. Ferdinand was also the heir to the throne, and the Emperor was dying, which provided Russia an opportunity to eliminate a Monarchy standing in the way of Russian expansionist ideas as well. This opportunity incentivized Russian approval of the assassination, even if it meant going to war as Serbia’s ally. War could not be achieved with the Archduke constantly advocating for peace and preventing any Austro-Hungarian aggression, so The Black Hand assassins, controlled by Dimitrijević, launched their operation. Ferdinand was attacked in his motorcade on his way to give a speech in Sarajevo, but the attack did not go as planned. The first assassin shot at Franz from a distance and missed; the second threw an explosive that ricocheted off the Archduke’s car and exploded under the vehicle following behind.⁸ This first attack failed, and the Archduke survived to give his speech, only to be targeted on the next leg of his journey through the city by the remaining assassins. As the motorcade came to a halt, Gavrilo Princip walked up to the vehicle and shot Franz in the neck, and his wife in the gut.⁹ Both died of their wounds shortly thereafter.

After the assassination of the Archduke, there was a military escalation of forces between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and all of their allies. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, one month after the assassination of the Archduke, after Serbia refused extraordinary terms offered by Austria-Hungary, which were not expected to be met anyway. Russia, allied with Serbia, mobilized its military upon this declaration of war, and Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, which caused Russia’s ally, France, to declare war on Germany. Then Germany invaded Belgium to get to Paris, instigating Britain, allied to Belgium and France, to declare war on Germany, followed a few weeks later by Japan, bound by a military treaty with Britain – Voila, World War I.¹⁰ While this is a unique assassination in the history of assassination because the goal was achieved, this is not an unprecedented success in the theme of payment for death, or of payment for death in war, as the history of mercenaries changing the tides of battle clearly shows.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries have been participating in violence for likely the same amount of time as assassins, though generally on a more public and destructive scale, without much in the ways of stealth and treachery. Before countries began fielding standing armies, mercenaries were the primary method of large-scale combat. Being a mercenary was a regular job. Groups of mercenaries would sell their services to the highest bidder, always aware that nations would continue to find reasons to use their services. When problems became scarce, and nobody wanted to pay them, they would create problems of their own, extorting their hosts in the process. Throughout most of history up to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648, which were the origin of the modern-day nation-state with recognized national borders, mercenaries were the primary forces used for war.¹¹ Mercenaries grew primarily to fill a skill void in the area of combat expertise. Before the creation of standing armies, the duties of war were rotated among individuals too often to retain the necessary experience and skill to achieve efficiency, which led to the rise of experienced warriors willing to sell their services to the highest bidder.

Eventually, mercenaries became a global industry, attracting violent, greedy people with the sole motive of money as their driving purpose. The only logical outcome of this scenario is chaos and tyranny, if for no other reason than that the existence of a large permanent mercenary population creates a strong incentive for constant war. In peace, mercenaries posed a threat to the general population, often resorting to extortion for protection to continue their livelihood when their services were not required, as happened in France in the late 15th century following the end of the Hundred Years War.¹² Despite the drawbacks associated with mercenaries, the industry itself survived long after the Peace of Westphalia, and even into the modern world, as supplemental forces to a standing national army have often been seen as desirable for several reasons, from bolstering force size to match an enemy force to bending the rules of national militaries to provide plausible deniability.

Force size has been a constant issue in war, often leading to hiring mercenaries to supplement militaries. This method is not always successful, however, as Great Britain learned during the American Revolutionary War. Unable to maintain security throughout the British Empire around the world and quell the American uprising simultaneously with available military forces, Britain hired approximately 10,000 Native Americans and 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the American Continental Army.¹³ The Revolutionary War highlights the fact that mercenaries are only as good as the money they are paid, illustrated by the fact that the American Congress instigated the distribution of “leaflets offering the Germans land and livestock” to switch sides.¹⁴ The nature of the Revolutionary war itself also highlights a more general flaw in the use of mercenaries, in that the Revolutionary war, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, had “no cause but malice against liberty.”¹⁵ This stance points out that the cause of a war, if not properly sold to the participants, can cause a severe undermining within the ranks of the combatants, in turn hurting morale, fostering dissent, and decreasing efficiency, which was experienced significantly on the side of the British. Ultimately, the British use of mercenaries failed to win the war; however, the resulting Constitutional debate was greatly informed by the use of paid actors in warfare, strengthening the Constitutional guidelines for military force regulation in America.

As America grew throughout the transition of the world from mercenary warfare to national militaries, mercenaries became less and less acceptable to the international community. Mercenaries became used primarily to provide plausible deniability to governments and avoid regulations, in much the same way assassins have been used to further objectives of leaders over time. The controversy over the use of mercenaries in warfare grew so extensively that the United Nations decided to institute a new international law, in the form of a treaty titled the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, signed in 1989.¹⁶ The treaty is interesting in that while signed by many countries, neither the United States nor Russia, the two primary superpowers at the time, has signed onto it since its creation, and the language used in the treaty leaves significant room for interpretation, specifically with regards to the treaty’s definition of a mercenary.¹⁷ These flaws have led to the continuation of non-military payment for violence, both with the continued use of bounties and bounty hunters and in the case of carefully labeled paramilitary forces that don’t fit within the legal parameters of the treaty definition for mercenaries.

Bounty Systems

In the late 19th century, after the American civil war, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a precursor to the American FBI, established what amounts to the first criminal database in history, with mug shots, wanted posters, and descriptions of criminals and their crimes, all circulating in newspapers across the country and filed with the agency until the death of the criminal.¹⁸ Bounties have also been used extensively since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty as an incentive for individual citizens to assist law enforcement and governments in capturing or killing wanted persons, from criminals to terrorists. The most widely known examples of this in America are the FBI’s most-wanted lists, which are updated regularly, and put price tags on fugitives at large in the United States and around the world. Among the lists, the FBI provides a top ten list of fugitives and a top ten list of terrorists, with price tags ranging from thousands to millions of dollars in rewards for information leading to capture.¹⁹ While the FBI’s bounty lists today are generally for capture, not killing, some infamous outlaws in American history, like Frank and Jesse James, were the targets of wanted posters that promised a reward whether the criminals were brought in dead or alive.²⁰

The American justice system outlined in the U.S. Constitution eventually eliminated the use of dead or alive wanted posters, as they are illegal under the Constitutional Bill of Rights that provides for a fair trial before sentencing. Still, the bounty system remained intact for capture. During the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, another bounty-style system was used to target the most important members of the Iraqi forces and government, in the form of a deck of cards. The Defense Intelligence Agency, after years of research, developed a target/value identification system based on the standard value system assigned to a deck of cards in poker games to assist ground forces in identifying targets of value in Iraq.²¹ Saddam Hussein occupied the highest value position, the ace of spades, with consecutively lower-valued individuals identified in succession throughout the deck, aces first, then kings down to twos. While money was not directly associated with this example, prestige was undoubtedly a motivating factor for ground forces capturing high-value targets, and the system set the stage for non-government paramilitary forces to participate directly in ongoing military operations during an active war.

Private Military Companies (PMC)

Blackwater quickly emerged as one of the first major controversies of the 21st century, as a PMC working for the United States government in active military combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, without oversight from Congress equal to that of U.S. military forces, but with missions encompassing the same areas as the American military.²² Acting independently of the military, the organization participated in defensive and offensive combat operations to help accomplish military missions of the United States. Without military oversight, and acting directly on behalf of the Executive Branch of government, PMCs like Blackwater are nearly identical to historical mercenary organizations working for pay in combat environments. The United States is not the only country with PMCs. The practice has become widespread since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty banning mercenaries and includes the Russian PMC, The Wagner Group, which is essentially the Russian version of Blackwater. The authoritarian government of Russia, however, has resulted in a much more dangerous version of a PMC than Blackwater and has included domestic operations within Russia as well as foreign operations.²³

Iranian governing practices have given rise to a very different type of PMC. Iran’s military, paramilitary, and intelligence organs are all essentially PMCs in the way that they operate due to the nature of Iran’s government structure, and they are all directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. The primary arms of these enterprises are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These organizations work together in directing and supporting the PMC-like Quds Force operatives around the world in support of collection efforts, intelligence operations, paramilitary operations, assassinations, and terrorist activities. While the Quds Force advances Iranian efforts to export revolution around the world, their local PMC-like organization, known as the Basij, works to subvert independence within Iran, assisting in tyrannical oppression of free speech and liberty within the country and violently suppressing any attempt to cause disturbances against the Supreme Leader. Iran targets enemies abroad using a decentralized system of third-party actions and efforts, combining the principles of the bounty system and PMC architecture instead of engaging directly in combat efforts. In 2006, for example, when the Islamic State terror organization was still called Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I),²⁴ the MOIS provided “financial, material, technological, and other support” to their leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directly supporting the terrorist’s war against U.S. personnel in Iraq.²⁵

The contrast between Blackwater and the Iranian Quds Force is extreme, but the core issue inherent in their existence is nearly identical. With the rise in popularity of PMCs around the world after their successful use by the United States in the War on Terror, the core issue of their existence needs attention from the world. The international community recognized that even though Blackwater was targeted for their deeds, their success in achieving mission goals was undeniable. China, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia, India, and many other countries have worked to develop similar types of organizations in their countries to take advantage of the gray area of contractor combat operations. These organizations are primarily in the employ of the Executive Branch of government or its national equivalent. They are generally not under the structure of the national military for legal purposes or oversight. They are mercenaries, being used in the modern-day to bolster force size that otherwise cannot grow and to skirt existing national and international laws with regards to combat operations and security. While the attention drawn to Blackwater caused them to change their name to Academi, the core issue of the existence of PMCs, in general, has not been significantly addressed in the international community.

Conclusion

The practice of paying people to kill has been around for a long time and is likely to stay, absent total world peace. The question that comes to mind isn’t whether or not this process exists, or even how to eliminate it, but rather, what the best way forward is for the United States and the international community, knowing that this process is an inherent part of world politics and international relationships. Attention, publicization, and regulation are likely the most effective weapons against barbarity in warfare, as has been shown throughout history. Attention drawn to assassins led to a ban on the practice of assassination. Attention drawn to mercenaries led to a ban on mercenaries. Attention drawn to the American Constitutional justice system led to the elimination of dead or alive bounties. Attention drawn to PMCs led to a restructuring of the relationship between the United States government and third-party contractors and continues to shape the potential future of PMCs. When the people of the world pay attention, publicize rights and wrongs perpetrated by governments and leaders, and work to create effective regulations to ensure that human dignity and individual liberty are the primary goals of such regulations, freedom succeeds, and tyranny fails.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

References

¹ William Crotty, “Presidential Assassinations,” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 102-103.

² Kautilya, Arthashastra, Translated by R. Shamasastry, (Bangalore: Government Press, 1915), 461-474.

³ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Lionel Giles, (London, UK: Luzac and Co., 1910), 34.

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “A Study of Assassination,” Central Intelligence Agency (1953), Accessed on July 2, 2020, https://archive.org/details/CIAAStudyOfAssassination1953/mode/2up.

⁵ Donald Yerxa, “July 1914: An Interview with Sean McMeekin,” Historically Speaking 14, no. 3 (2013): 12-16.

⁶ Elena Kosmach, “Serbs and Russians,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 43, no. 1 (2001): 109-114.

⁷ Ian Beckett, “Franz Ferdinand,” Historian no. 120 (2014): 18-22.

⁸ Geoffrey Wawro, Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, (Boulder, CO, USA: Basic Books, 2014), 104-106.

⁹ Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 106.

¹⁰ Martin Levinson, “Mapping the Causes of World War I to Avoid Armageddon Today,” Et Cetera 62, no. 2 (2005): 157-164.

¹¹ Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army: The Use of Mercenaries in the American Revolution and its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private Military Firms,” Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 317-349.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Benjamin Franklin, The Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin, (Eau Claire: E.M. Hale & Company, nd), 253.

¹⁶ United Nations, “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” United Nations (1989).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Pinkerton, “Our History,” Pinkerton (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.Pinkerton.com/our-story/history.

¹⁹ FBI, “Most Wanted,” FBI (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.FBI.gov/wanted.

²⁰ Sophie Tanno, “$5,000 for Jesse James ‘Dead or Alive’ and $100,000 for Lincoln’s Three Killers: The Fascinating Wanted Posters for America’s Biggest 19th Century Criminals,” Daily Mail (2019), Accessed on July 8, 2020, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7280265/the-fascinating-wanted-posters-americas-biggest-19th-century-criminals.html.

²¹ Doug Sample, “The Faces Behind the Faces on the ‘Most Wanted’ Deck,” American Forces Press Service (2003), Accessed on July 6, 2020, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29017.

²² Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army.”

²³ Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.

²⁴ Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 5, no. 4 (2014): 415-476.

²⁵ Library of Congress, “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,” Federal Research Division (2012), 37.

Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January of this year, General Secretary Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Myanmar, where he laid the foundations of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Xi signed dozens of bilateral agreements while lauding the Burmese leadership for its efforts to combat terrorism while bypassing entirely the internationally condemned treatment of Myanmar’s Rohingya ethnic minority.

Beijing has been steadily encircling India since 2013 when General Secretary Xi announced the start of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its constituent projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the CMEC (China-Malaysia Economic Corridor), or the China-Sri Lanka Economic Corridor, to name a few.

India Encircled by a String of Pearls

Thus far, India has followed a sheepish approach to Beijing’s voracious appetite for geopolitical influence, as exhibited by its much-publicized “String of Pearls” strategy to exercise geo-economic and military domination across the globe by making massive infrastructure and trade investments.

Strategic Chinese acquisitions in its “String of Pearls” include the purchase of a port in the West African state of Djibouti, the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, and more recently, a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu, Myanmar. Bejing is already on track to exert the regional dominance reminiscent of Chinese hegemony in the 5^th century AD.

India is involved a geopolitical quagmire with China, an adversarial power, yet an important strategic partner. While China is India’s second-largest bilateral trade partner, it is also rapidly consolidating its influence throughout South Asia. India, therefore, is at risk of encirclement, restricting its ability to exert its still-considerable influence in the world, particularly in Africa, and, to an extent, in South Asia.

How Should India Respond?

India has consistently rejected the idea of participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, citing concerns over sovereignty. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Baluchistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, has been a point of contention for New Delhi, albeit one that has been mildly expressed. Despite economic and strategic conditions that are seemingly in Beijing’s favor, there are several steps that New Delhi can take to counter China’s expanding influence in India’s backyard.

First, it’s clear that India cannot match China in terms of economic strength, at least not in bilateral terms. However, India can use its regional influence to strengthen multilateral geo-economic organizations of which it is a member, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) by embarking on multilateral economic projects in the iron and steel, oil and petroleum, and textile sectors, as well as leveraging its considerable expertise in the information technology sector.

Second, New Delhi must double-down on a carrot-and-stick approach to managing geo-economic competition with China. India has massive market potential, with a population of over 1.3 billion people. The country is one of the world’s largest markets for electronics, IT, logistics, and, more recently, defense. At the same time, India must intensify scrutiny of Chinese goods by strengthening the Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) and by cracking down on imported products of substandard quality—a critical step to take considering that 45% of India’s imported goods are of Chinese origin.

Third, India must take further steps to bolster its exports to countries increasingly wary of China’s growing influence, particularly as global scrutiny of the sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative gains traction. At the same time, New Delhi should facilitate Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements with other countries in sectors where India is traditionally strong, such as logistics, defense, agriculture, and dairy. India must increase its use of its soft power by undertaking proactive cultural, economic, and political diplomacy in key BRI participant-countries, including Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Brunei, while simultaneously bolstering defense ties through bilateral and multilateral military exercises and training programs.

Finally, India must strengthen its economic relations with ASEAN member-states, particularly with the Vietnam-South Korea-Japan trilateral grouping. More robust economic ties between the ASEAN group and India will be an essential component in countering China’s hegemonic trade practices. Thus, India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was an unfortunate setback in the efforts to build a healthier and more equitable multilateral economic partnership.

New Delhi must move rapidly to boost India-ASEAN trade and investment levels. The slower India is in responding to China’s aggressive economic moves; the more India will end up losing in the era of great power competition.

A study conducted by the Research Bureau of the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry has predicted that Indian trade with ASEAN economies will double by 2025, from the current level of $142 billion (2018) to $300 billion. Measures the Indian government can take include enhancing incentives for Indian exporters, implementing policies to significantly boost the international presence of India’s service sector, undertaking a continuous review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, simplifying customs procedures, bolstering private sector engagement, and improving access to financial and banking services.

Is India at Risk of Losing the Game of Great Power Competition? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yet, even a cursory glance at the project’s participants unveils the complex, if not confounding, geopolitical, and security ramifications that await the pipeline. Negotiations over the Afghan portion have been particularly contentious, with the Taliban taking a capricious approach toward the initiative, vowing once to defend, and once to destroy, the integral project.

Transnational efforts, led by the Asian Development Bank, the project’s promoter and adviser, renewed the dormant dream, pushing forth a narrative that ancillary benefits await each of the stakeholders involved.

For Turkmenistan, TAPI offers an opportunity to diversify the country’s export markets for its’ natural gas. Although global demand for natural gas persists, particularly in neighboring South Asia, the number of customers able to tap into the abundant supply in landlocked Turkmenistan has been limited due to a shortage of supply routes.

Sales to Russia, once the biggest customer of Turkmen gas, have waned due to pricing disputes, making China the current top importer. Nevertheless, as lucrative as the Chinese markets are, fear of overdependence on a handful of powerful hegemons has compelled Ashgabat to make pipeline projects like TAPI a foreign policy priority.

However, perhaps no country stands to gain, or lose, more from TAPI than Afghanistan. As a necessary transit point, initiatives like TAPI demonstrate Afghanistan’s potential to boost badly needed government revenues as a regional energy transit hub. With nearly $400 million (USD) in transit fees at stake, Afghanistan simultaneously serves as the project’s greatest benefactor and its’s biggest bottleneck as fears mount regarding the Afghan government’s ability to protect the pipeline.

For both India and Pakistan, participation in TAPI is driven by a need to satiate local demand for natural gas. Both countries are expected to purchase over 40% of the gas pumped through TAPI. Such access would likely alleviate acute supply shortages in Pakistan. Shortages have spurred a major energy crisis in the volatile southern provinces of Balochistan and Sindh, where chronic power outages have decimated local industry and hindered the growth outlook for both provinces.

In response to security risks, observers have suggested that Pakistan’s dire energy crisis would dissuade temptation to “weaponize” the pipeline in the event of armed conflict with India, as well as ensure that the Taliban, which Pakistan retains a considerable amount of influence over, not interfere in the operation of the pipeline.

Yet, it is this very concern that has informed India’s stance on the viability of the project, which has been idyllically dubbed the ‘peace pipeline.’ Estimates suggest that India could satisfy up to one-third of its gas needs via TAPI, but such exposure would likely foster dependence on dangerous overland routes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, ambivalence on the part of the Modi government has generated speculation that India prefers Turkmen gas to be routed via Iran. Although this route would likely incur a higher cost than present estimate for the TAPI pipeline of $10 billion, India’s justification of any premium would be reflected in the reliability of such a pipeline.

Thus, New Delhi’s lack of confidence in Islamabad to securitize TAPI remains an impediment, if not a deal-breaker. Threats emanating from within Pakistan and from the Taliban have coerced India to seek insurance by forging regional projects with neighboring Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh for its’ energy needs.

Furthermore, current events in the region have complicated the pipeline’s progression. Tensions in the region have seldom been higher with India’s repeal of Kashmir’s autonomous status, followed by the abrupt cancellation of U.S.-Taliban peace talks. Both events could forestall any concrete steps toward operationalizing the TAPI pipeline.

Construction, which first commenced on the Turkmenistan portion in 2015, has been relatively opaque, with little information regarding progress on the Afghan or Pakistani sections of the pipeline. Several delays have imperiled earlier estimates that suggested the pipeline could be operational by 2020.

With an estimated 12,000 jobs and lucrative transit fees for Afghanistan, and energy access on the line for India and Pakistan, TAPI, in theory, could have satiated each stakeholder’s needs. Such conditions suggest that before its’ lofty ambitions can be realized, TAPI will have to contend with the inconvenient whims of mistrust and suspicion in the neighborhood of South Asia.

TAPI Pipeline Puts South Asia’s Prosperity in Peril was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a strong likelihood, however, that it will guarantee the opposite—an enduring condition of violence and unrest that can spill over into South Asia and beyond.

The Indian Government has repealed Article 370—the article in the Indian Constitution that guaranteed Jammu & Kashmir’s status as an autonomous territory, rather than a union state of India—greatly angering Kashmiris, who have been protesting since the announcement on August 5th, stunning observers worldwide. The move also violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 38.

Kashmiris knew something was wrong as the announcement was foreshadowed by widespread Indian state activity in Indian-administered Kashmir. Curfews along with a media and communications blackout were imposed, former Kashmiri Chief Ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti were put under house arrest, and additional troops were deployed, bringing the total up to 46,000. 

The Indian Government gave no warning ahead of the lockdown, announcing the article’s repeal the next day.  Mass protests have rocked the streets of Kashmir since the announcement, the region’s biggest demonstrations thus far. In the town of Soura alone, at least 10,000 demonstrators protested the repeal of Article 370. Despite the relaxing of travel restrictions, protests are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Indian security forces resorted to using pellet guns to disperse protesters. The use of pellets has been the subject of a great deal of international scrutiny and condemnation, as it violates international law and has left thousands of Kashmiris permanently blinded. Between July 10th and 12th of 2016, SMHS Hospital in Srinagar received 570 patients for eye treatments and surgeries after they had been fired upon with birdshot pellets. Pellet blindings, along with other human rights violations by Indian security forces,  lead some Kashmiris to join and participate in a homegrown insurgency.

There is a case to be made that repealing Article 370 was a response to American offers to mediate the Kashmir Issue. India has long tried to keep the issue bilateral, rather than internationalize it. When Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the U.S. at the end of July, President Donald Trump said in an Oval Office press conference that India had asked him to mediate the Kashmir Issue—something Indian authorities robustly denied, in keeping with their line of keeping the issue bilateral and off the international agenda. All of this has been on the tail of worsening Indian-U.S. relations, following a dispute regarding increased Indian tariffs on American goods, and India’s exclusion from the Afghan Peace Process in favor of Pakistan.  

What does repealing Article 370 mean?

Article 370 guaranteed that the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh would be governed autonomously rather than from New Delhi. A sub-article, Article 35A, ensured that non-Kashmiri Indians would not be able to buy land or vote within Indian Kashmir, meaning that Kashmiris would remain in control of their territory as well as their governance.

Repealing Article 370 means that sub-Article 35A will be reversed as well, meaning Hindus and other non-Kashmiris can purchase property, settle, and participate in politics within Kashmir. Native Kashmiri Muslims are fearful this may be the first step in a campaign of ethnic cleansing by majoritarian Hindus. Indeed, such concerns were voiced by former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti in response to the decision, saying that the reason behind repealing Article 370 was to change the demographics of Indian-controlled Kashmir and render India’s only Muslim-majority state ethnically homogenous.

By purchasing land in Kashmir and settling, they would eventually be able to force the native Muslim population out or replace it by marrying Kashmiri women. Such fears are reinforced by the vitriolic nationalist rhetoric espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government in Delhi, as well as by a swath of the Indian media. As a result of New Delhi’s decision to repeal Article 370, Kashmir faces a higher risk of sub-state violence and the potential for a mass-emigration of Kashmiris.

Increased Militancy and Violence

The Kashmiri population will lash out more violently against the Indian state than before, having already been on the receiving end of state violence and repressive policies. The potential for violence is likely the underpinning factor in the logic behind the pre-announcement media blackout and troop deployments. 

Repealing Article 370 could end up inciting increased violence in Kashmir due to the end of the autonomy that has been highly-valued by Kashmiris for the past seven decades. A violent response to the repeal could beget even more violence and heavy-handed action from Indian authorities, threatening regional peace. Pulwama was the deadliest attack against Indian forces in Kashmir, and the response threatened global security and turned more Kashmiris against the Indian state.

Established movements like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) could re-emerge, alongside a range of newer actors fighting the Indian state. In either case, a violent uprising would lead to an enduring and far more ferocious condition of insurgent violence, with more frequent and intense attacks adding to the nearly 50,000 casualties resulting from the 30-year-long dispute. The prolonged enactment of humiliating and repressive policies by the Indian government against Kashmiris has, for decades, arguably fostered a condition of hatred and a loss of allegiance to India, leaving an endless pool of potential recruits for an insurgent movement. Repealing Article 370 could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. 

While the Indian government’s decision has profound ramifications for Kashmiris, who will be targeted by security forces in retaliation, a renewed Kashmiri insurgency would impact regional security as well, depending on how New Delhi responds.

In the aftermath of the February 2019 Pulwama bomb attack, India immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack (with minimal evidence), before launching airstrikes against Pakistani territory (this author previously published a two-part article covering the Pulwama Incident for Global Security Review). While neither side escalated to full-scale war, there was a genuine potential for nuclear conflict.

Simply blaming Pakistan is not an effective strategy for India, nor is baiting Pakistan into military adventurism. Given the sensitive nature of the Article 370 issue, a heavy-handed response to militancy in Kashmir would detrimentally impact regional security.

A mass-movement of Kashmiri refugees

As mentioned earlier, the settlement of non-Kashmiris will have a profound impact on the area’s demographic make-up. Rampant Islamophobia emanating from New Delhi raises fears that native Kashmiris will be forced out of their territory, either into India or over the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. 

Kashmiris are already one of the most marginalized communities in India, being the targets of pogroms and Islamophobic violence by Hindu extremists and repressive policies enforced by security forces in Kashmir itself. Following the Pulwama attack, Kashmiri students across India were targeted in acts of violence and harassed at school. Increasingly alienated by India, Kashmiris who can leave, will. 

Kashmiris have previously crossed the LoC into Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since the 1990s, 38,000 refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir fled the fighting and escaped across the LoC, with some leaving their families on the other side. Like many in Indian-administered Kashmir, the refugees were subject to repressive policies enforced by Indian security forces.

Due to their shared religion and history of mass migration, Kashmiri refugees will head for Pakistan, despite its economy being unable to cope with an influx of refugees. A Kashmiri exodus would be the last nail in the coffin, compounding other problems like overpopulation and mismanaged funds. Additionally, should Pakistan be blacklisted at the Financial Action Task Force meeting in October, it will be precluded from receiving the loans it so desperately needs to keep itself going. 

Pakistan is still reeling from the influx of refugees from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion, along with internecine civil unrest in cities like Karachi during the 1990s. According to UNHCR, there are 1.4 million registered Afghans living in Pakistan. The mass movement of refugees has had a detrimental impact on Pakistan’s resources, and security through Afghan involvement in crime and terrorism. 

India’s BJP government will achieve the opposite of what was intended if it believed that Indian security would be enhanced by bringing Kashmir into the Indian Union. To Kashmiris, it seems that the government has written them off entirely, which more radical elements see as a green light to conduct acts of violence against India. 

Pakistan has successfully been able to lobby the UN Security Council to discuss the current Kashmir Crisis in a meeting on the 16th of August. Whatever the outcome, Kashmiris have the most to lose as a result of the BJP’s political adventurism.

Ending Kashmir’s autonomy will mean wide-ranging implications for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ever since the commencement of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, India has struggled to play an influential role in Afghanistan. Despite being one of Afghanistan’s most valuable strategic partners, India remains a mute spectator of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks as well as intra-Afghan negotiations. As India finds itself increasingly ignored in Afghan affairs, the time has come for Delhi to make its presence felt in the landlocked country and ensure that it’s not excluded from negotiations going forward.

India in Afghanistan: a Proactive Economic Partner

India has played a critical role in supplying economic aid to Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2002, India has provided humanitarian aid and invested in major infrastructure projects as well as smaller developmental initiatives which have provided Afghanistan with a much-needed lifeline amidst ongoing war, sectarian divisions, and terrorism.

Major projects that have benefited from Indian investment include the construction of the Parliament Building in the country’s capital, Kabul, where India committed $178 million (USD), spending approximately $28 million thus far, the $150 million Zaranj Delaram highway project connecting western Afghanistan with the strategic Chabahar port in Iran, and the $42 million Salma Dam Project on the Hari Rud river in the province of Herat province—which includes the construction of a power transmission line connecting the city of Pul-e-Khumri with Kabul. India has also signed a trilateral preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and Iran.

Inspired by India’s history of successful community engagement programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal, hundreds of social development programs were launched in Afghanistan in conjunction with 250,000 tons of wheat to be provided to primary schools as food assistance. Furthermore, India provides technical advisers to Afghan public institutions, offers training for Afghan civil servants and policemen, and contributes funds to an Afghan Red Crescent Society program which provides free medicine and healthcare consultations in its medical missions in five Afghan cities.

India’s Role in the Afghan Taliban Peace Talks

Historically, India has been staunchly anti-Taliban. When the Afghanistan government led by President Mohammed Najibullah collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah’s subsequent assassination in 1996, Delhi grew increasingly alarmed by the Taliban’s rise to power. On the other hand, the Taliban has historically maintained a neutral position when it comes to India, even expressing a willingness to engage with India—provided that India abstained from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Today, India has adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the Taliban. Delhi understands the potential consequences of a resurgent Taliban, but it must face the geopolitical reality that the Taliban controls over half of the territory of Afghanistan. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 229 districts were controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan government as of January 31, 2018—approximately 56.3 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. On the other hand, 59 districts—approximately 14.5 percent—were controlled by the Taliban.

India is concerned that a return to power by the Taliban will undermine the fragile government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—which is struggling to provide basic necessities and security to the Afghan people as it continues to battle the Taliban for its very existence. In a sign of its changing position towards the Taliban, the Modi government dispatched two former highly-decorated diplomats in November 2018 on a “non-official visit” to Russia to participate in negotiations with the Taliban that were being held there.

Former diplomat and secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Vivek Katju—  known for his hardline stance against the Taliban—has adopted somewhat different take on the Taliban issue. Writing in an editorial for The Indian Express, Katju argued that it is in India’s strategic interests to engage with the Taliban to not only maintain its influence in Afghanistan but to better understand the power dynamics of the broader South Asian region.

India must increase and sustain engagement in Afghanistan, particularly after not being invited to participate in quadrilateral talks between the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China after talks between U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar. China subsequently issued a statement saying that India was not intentionally excluded from the quadrilateral talks and that India would be included in future regional discussions involving the Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan.

While India has put forth clearly defined red-lines concerning its dealings with the Taliban, its willingness to engage in discussions with the battle-hardened militants is evidence that Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic stance.

India’s Expectations for the Taliban

India’s first expectation is that “all initiatives and processes must include all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” Historically, the Afghan government has often been sidelined by international interlocutors in their engagements with the Taliban. Furthermore, this expectation indicates a degree of acceptability in Delhi over negotiating with the Taliban, as the group represents a “section of the Afghan society.”

Delhi’s second expectation is that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate,” meaning that democratic processes and human rights—including women’s rights—should be respected.

Thirdly, India expects that any process “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” This expectation is crucial for India, as it highlights the threat posed by terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State. Furthermore, this expectation implies that Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be permitted to expand their operations into Afghanistan.

India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of the peace process in Afghanistan. The country is an important partner and is of great strategic value for India—especially with India’s control over the Iranian port of Chabahar, which has been granted a sanctions waiver by the U.S. government. India must up the ante in Afghanistan by initiating track II diplomacy, engaging with tribal elders, and convincing the Taliban to adopt and maintain a favorable stance towards India while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for foreign terrorist groups. Furthermore, should the Taliban return to power with backing from Pakistan, India will be in a challenging position concerning the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in South Asia.

Is India’s Influence in Afghanistan Declining? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proxy wars and great power politics have returned to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is once again at the center stage of regional and global rivalries over influence for a variety of geostrategic interests and the quest for resources. This time unlike the past, there are many players including nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, the most prominent being Pakistan, Iran, China, and India.

Afghanistan, as observed by Lord George N. Curzon, was an empty space on the map which was neither Persian nor Russian nor British. It was purely a geographical space which emerged and was used as a buffer zone during an era of great power politics between the former British Empire and Russian Tsar. Some scholars and historians describe Afghanistan as an accidental nation.

The nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled ethnic groups living in this rugged but vitally strategic land were used as tools to extend the influence and interests of one Empire against the other. The monarchies and militia groups trained and funded by these two empires emerged as a result of these great rivalries used to take turns in preparing the ground for government collapse and capturing Kabul centric power through assassinating monarchs, waging coups, and rebellions to further the interests of their imperial paymasters.

In recent times, the Afghan government and its allies are complaining about enemy sanctuaries and safe-havens across the border in Pakistan and Iran for the growing insurgency in the country, but this phenomenon is nothing new. Afghan monarchies and the Afghan communist regime were toppled by rebel leaders, dethroned Kings, and disgruntled tribal and religious leaders who enjoyed financial and military support in the courts of British Raj, the Persian Empire, and the Russian Tsar. In recent times, the Pakistani military and intelligence services have provided safe havens and training grounds for militant groups like the Taliban.

This time around the stakes are higher, and the game is much more complicated. Various countries are furthering their interests within the country through their proxy—oftentimes with ethnic, racial, and sectarian ties to their sponsors.

Understanding the depth of this problem, the incumbent President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, has been consistently warned Afghanistan’s neighbors in various forums including the recent SAARC leaders summit in Nepal, Heart of Asia conference in Beijing, and other multilateral and bilateral meetings that he will not tolerate proxy wars in his country and will not allow Afghan territory to be used against its neighbors from any party involved in the country. However, the reality of the situation is different, as the Afghan state’s influence is limited beyond major urban centers. This makes it difficult to ensure and deliver on Dr. Ghani’s promises.

Today, Pakistan claims that India is using Afghan territory to support Baloch separatists and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whereas India has been over the years warning and complaining to the international community over Pakistan’s duplicity and complicity in various terrorist attacks within and outside India. The recent bombings of Indian Embassy and consulate in Afghanistan are in no doubt the handiwork of the various extremist groups supported and trained by the powerful Pakistani military intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for influence to promote or protect the Shiite and Sunni domination within the power structure in Afghanistan. Russia and China, respectively, are concerned about Chechens and Uyghurs in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan that is infested with proxy groups presents a great threat to Central Asian states, the security of the Russian Federation, as well as China’s commercial and economic interests in Central Asia.

It seems that history is repeating itself once again in Afghanistan. With the development of technology and advancements in land, sea, and, air transport it seemed that countries such as Afghanistan which were pivotal geo-strategic land bridges lost some of their strategic importance. Conversely, however, these new developments have not done much to diminish the geopolitical importance of the Afghanistan. Geography is still a significant factor in deciding the political and economic fate of a state.

The Rise and Fall of Regimes in Afghanistan: Proxy Wars and Regime Collapse in Afghanistan

By several estimates, the average lifespan of republican regimes in Afghanistan is 3.5 years with significant statistical outliers in Afghan monarchies. These are normally regimes which normally lasted over a decade. The reasons for such rapid regimes changes, coup d’états and state collapse in Afghanistan are many chief among them exclusive politics and rebellions supported by outside actors. 

One of the effective instruments for toppling various Afghan regimes has been proxy warfare exploiting ethnic and/or religious sensitivities. Historically and with few exceptions, nearly every rebellion in Afghanistan was organized, trained and funded by outside actors and regional players. The British Raj gave refuge and sanctuary to various toppled Afghan kings and statesmen and eventually paved the way for their return whereas the same tactic was used by the Russian Tsar.

The Russian Tsar hosted Afghan emirs like Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir Shir Ali Khan, along with several other Afghan monarchs in the former “Bukhara” and later on assisted them in their return to power. The last Afghan King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, by several accounts is born in British India and completed his education in France and occupied the throne after his father who also came to power with considerable British support and was later assassinated in a school shooting also enjoyed significant regional support by remaining neutral in regional rivalries.

Furthermore, the Afghan communists, Mujahiddins, and more recently, the Afghan Taliban, were all groups which were actively supported, trained and assisted in their rise to power by regional powers. Therefore, external powers always play a pivotal role in the rise and fall of various regimes in Afghanistan.

Old Game, New Players: Proxy Wars and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been at the epicenter of the “Great Game” and later on the cold war rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States in the lead. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was abandoned to Pakistan and the proxies of other countries—chief among them Iran, India, Russia, and Central Asian states—each of whom supported a particular ethnic faction. It led to a bloody civil war which lasted for almost a decade resulting in the hundreds of thousands of death of civilians.

Today, this old game is returning with new players. These new proxy wars are more localized with regional players (i.e., Pakistan and India playing the lead role, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard their interests). This time, the stakes are higher—as are the costs of inaction for Afghanistan.

Absence of Indigenous Economy: Financial and Economic Dependence

The absence of an indigenous economy and source of financial revenue has made the political sovereignty and military independence of Afghanistan vulnerable to various regional players. For years, Afghan political elites and parties have been dependent on regional funding and support to pursue its political goals inside Afghanistan. The Afghan communist party factions—PDA Khalq (People) and Parcham (Flag)— were heavily reliant on Moscow while various Mujahiddin factions benefitted from Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Western support. The current Afghan government is heavily dependent upon Western military and financial support.

During his tenure as former President Hamid Karzai acknowledged that his office is receiving millions of dollars from western and regional intelligence agencies for various payments. This implies that, just like the British Raj and Russian Tsar buying loyalty in the Afghan royal court, the same financial manipulation in exchange for loyalty is happening in the corridors of Afghan presidential palace today.

This dependence has made Afghanistan and its multiethnic mosaic social structure vulnerable to political manipulation and the biggest threat to its national security and long term stability. Almost all of the ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan are in various ways politically and economically supported by regional countries.

For Afghanistan to preserve its political sovereignty in the true sense of the word, it has to find a sustainable source of financial revenue and a comparative advantage. Political sovereignty without financial independence have no meaning. So long as Afghanistan remains a financially dependent state, it will remain unstable and vulnerable to regional proxy wars.

The Vicious Cycle of Traps: The Crisis of Governance and Statesmanship

Afghanistan since its establishments as an independent state has been consistently tangled in four traps of poverty, poor governance, geographical limitation and internal conflicts. Each of these traps have been reinforcing each other.

Throughout history, Afghan statesmen have either completely monopolized power or wealth or been struggling for the control of the country through quelling internal rebellions under various banners and causes. This has given the little time to think strategically about their country and its vision and future.

The first Afghan statesmen who rose to fame due to his 5 year plans and presenting the first vision of governance, economic development in addition to addressing internal conflicts and the geographic limitations of the country was Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, who fell out with his communist allies and was brutally murdered inside the presidential palace in Kabul. Most other governments have either been too preoccupied with preserving their power or fighting for control of the rest of the country.

In essence, the country has been in some sort of war since its establishment as an independent state. It has suffered from a crisis of governance and leadership and the traps have only been pushing Afghanistan deeper and deeper into a state of crisis.

From Vicious Cycle to Virtuous Cycle: Hard Decisions to Make for Afghanistan

In order to reverse this historical trend and address the four traps of poverty, bad governance, geographical limitation, and internal conflicts, Afghan statesmen and policymakers will have to make some very hard choices and bring Afghanistan out of this vicious cycle and put into a virtuous cycle of stability and peace. Some of these hard decision require statesmanship, courage combined with a vision and farsight for the country.

To address these four traps, Afghan statesmen and policy makers will have to take the following three vital steps:

1. Forge a national agenda and broad based consensus across all political parties and ethnic groups on key national interests, priorities and threats of the country. Afghanistan should start a national movement of internal rejuvenation and national awakening. Afghanistan will only prosper at a time when its leadership and commoners understand that the only way to stability is through the hardwork and unity of Afghans and its neighbors. Nobody else can hand in peace and stability to Afghanistan but the Afghans themselves with their neighbors.
2. Afghanistan will have to reach a fundamental agreement with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran. In return for safeguarding their legitimate interests in Afghanistan, they will stop engaging in interference and proxy warfare in the country. This can be done through a long process of honest and direct diplomatic and bilateral negotiations.
3. Finally, without a sustainable indigenous economy and financial self-reliance, Afghanistan cannot become a truly sovereign state. Financial dependence and economic vulnerabilities will continue to make Afghanistan and various Afghan ethnic groups prone to political manipulation and military sabotage by regional players and criminal networks.

A Framework for Managing Regional and Global Interests

When it comes to the management of regional interests in Afghanistan, there are three schools of thought which, in some cases, pursue complementary as well as contradictory views.

The proponents of the first view opine that Afghanistan like many other countries with a vital geostrategic location, should take advantage of these rivalries to build itself. This means that through wise leadership and smart diplomacy just like Pakistan, Afghanistan can exploit the geopolitical vulnerabilities of its allies and neighbors and in return get the required economic and military assistance to build its economy and military capabilities. This is very hard under the current circumstances

The proponents of the second view are supporting that Afghanistan should remain a neutral state and give vital guarantees to its neighbors and other major powers that its soil will not be used against one or several of its neighbors. This policy has been pursued time and again by Afghan statesmen and policy makers, but it has not paid much dividend except it kept the country weakened and divided.

Lastly, proponents of the third view advocate that Afghanistan should ally itself with one of the major global powers (the United States, China, or Russia). Therefore, by obtaining the required security and economic guarantees, Afghanistan can serve as the frontline state in ensuring its interests through the pursuit of the interests of the allied power.

All of the above options require a broadly-based, strong government in Kabul with a long-term view of its interests. Afghanistan will sooner or later have to make some tough decisions when it comes to its survival and long term interests or get dumped as it often does into the dark pages of history.

Throughout history, Afghan political leaders and monarchs have fallen prey to great power politics and regional proxy wars due to their failure to manage the geopolitical and strategic interests of various regional and global powers in its soil. But this time the stakes are higher and involves the survival of the Afghan state. A combination of smart leadership, active diplomacy and strong governance will enable Afghanistan to swim the tides.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Return of Proxy Wars in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Essentially, the Afghan national security apparatus requires a significant reorganization. Afghanistan’s existing military and security architecture must be reconfigured and restructured to accommodate former Taliban fighters and commanders, given the drastic changes that will come to the country’s threat environment once the Taliban give up the fight and agree to a peace deal. This could be either vertical or horizontal integration of individuals, groups, or units of Taliban commanders and fighters within Afghanistan’s existing military, civilian, and political institutions.

Many senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would want to join leadership roles in the Afghan army and police whereas their foot soldiers would like to join the Afghan security forces en masse. This will require a detailed roadmap outlining the ways and means of military integration. More importantly, such an integration roadmap should serve as a guarantor and accelerator for the long-term sustainability and resilience of any peace deal.

The Afghan Taliban is estimated to have between 60,000 and 100,000 fighters under the leadership of mutually exclusive operational commanders, along with mutually dependent political factions within the group, and a highly centralized chain of command but decentralized control and decision-making systems, which gives considerable levy and authority to local commanders to decide routine day-to-day operations in consultation with Taliban shadow administration officials (i.e. governors). This number fluctuates, peaking during the summer months, with seasonal fighters and volunteers coming from Pakistani madrasas to fight in Afghanistan. Numbers are at their lowest during the winter months, due to harsh weather conditions and logistical hurdles.

The Afghan government estimates that one-third of these fighters are foreign terrorist fighters who fight under the Taliban umbrella—these are global, regional and Pakistani terror outfits such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, ETIM, IMU and LeT among others. These fighters are vital for Taliban finances, logistics and provide sophisticated explosive making expertise. Therefore, any peace deal at the outset should require the Taliban to break ties with these terror outfits and foreign terrorist fighters. A challenging task which Taliban are yet to show the resolve and determination to undertake.

The integration of over 100,000 fighters and commanders into military and civilian life is going to be a daunting and fragile task, which would require delicate management and sharp political negotiation skills with both Afghan ownership alongside third-party foreign oversight—preferably from the United Nations.

Afghanistan is no stranger to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants into military and civilian life. Back in 2004, the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP) administered through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of thousands of former mujahidin and combatants but with mixed results. It was followed by the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group (DIAG) program which again had mixed results given lack of Afghan ownership and a strong presence of warlords within the Afghan security and military institutions.

Any military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the ranks of the Afghan military and security institutions would have to be defined within the limits of the type and structure of the new state and subsequently what kind of a security structure and organization would be agreed upon by all sides of the conflict. Furthermore, international experience especially in Africa and South Asia shows that after a peace deal certain countries have opted to downsize the number of their security forces given the new threat environment and have opened up space through reservation and quota within the shrinked security structure for the combatants and their commanders to become apart of the new security and military apparatus.

Military integration of the Taliban fighters and commanders within any new or existing military and security architecture would require a multi-year phased linear approach under the ownership and management of Afghans with the technical assistance of a third party ie the United Nations (UN) with political plus financial support of the United States and its NATO allies as they draw down their troops and redirect a fraction of that cost towards financing the budget required to reintegrate Taliban combatants and commanders in the Afghan military and civilian life.

The Approach

International experience shows that there are mainly three approaches to military integration. Albeit, Afghan history can also guide us in this regard and has its own versions of military integration after the fall of the communist regime in the 1990s and later in early 2000 during the fall of the Taliban regime – both of which were more institutional cleansing than military integration. 

The three military integration models are: 

1. A consent-based approach, where a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict is reached between the warring parties and the government forces absorb the combatants within its ranks and/or the two forces from the different warring parties merge and constitute a brand new single national security force. 
2. A complete demobilization model, where the government downsizes its forces but does not integrate combatants into the national security forces.
3. A coercive model of peace building, where forced disarmament and demobilization of the armed rebels takes places with external assistance (i.e., UN mandated forces).

In all these models—the most feasible one for the Afghan case is the consent based model whereas the ANDSF is resized based on the new threat environment and security landscape and the Taliban commanders and fighters are accommodation across all the level of ANDSF through a quota and reservation system.

The Prospects

In the event of a comprehensive deal with the Afghan Taliban – military integration will inevitably be part and parcel of any peace deal. The foundational questions which needs to be tackled at the outset of any peace deal will be: what will be the size and shape of the new security and military architecture of Afghanistan in view of the new security environment and based on what model (i.e. NATO or non-NATO military model) as well as the future relationship of the Taliban with the United States and its allies. These foundational questions will determine the size, scope and sustainability of the future Afghan military and security forces of which the newly demobilized Taliban fighters and commanders will be an integral part of it. 

Subsequently, the Taliban can be integrated at three levels, with senior commanders at the top, mid-level commanders in the middle, with foot soldiers making up the base. Integration can be done individually, in groups, or unit integration at the field level. Senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would expect positions of influence within or outside of the Afghan military and security services. This can be approached through a bottom–up field level integration at the division or corp level or be undertaken through individual negotiations with Taliban military leaders through a screening and filtering mechanism.

Much will also depend on the size of the new Afghan military and their operational priorities in view of the rise of Daesh and emergence of Taliban splinter groups and criminal outfits post Taliban peace deal who would split from the Taliban chain of command and carry on the fight in pursuit of their own political and business agendas.

Under such such circumstances—in the interim—the Afghan government and its allies will have to integrate Taliban rank and file within the existing ANDSF size and structure and then through a roadmap transform and downsize ANDSF into a more affordable and sustainable force. This interim integration could be done through center and field level integration (i.e., integrating Taliban units to various geographical army corps across the country and integrate senior Taliban commanders in Kabul HQ).

In the long run – the Afghan government together with its allies, will also have to decide how many professional armed forces and how many auxiliary local forces they need for securing the country. This could provide an opportunity for Afghans and their NATO allies where the existing army could be kept as a professional force, albeit significantly downsized, whereas the Taliban forces with some exception could be added as auxiliary local forces given their vast presence in the country side to complement the security work of the newly reorganized Afghan army.

Furthermore, the Taliban commanders and fighters will need to go through sensitization programs as well as short and long-term training courses plus attend joint exercises with the Afghan forces to promote unity in the force. This will help cohesiveness and efficiency within the command and control structure of the newly reorganized and reconfigured Afghan military.

The Challenges

Naturally, with the military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the security infrastructure of Afghanistan comes many sets of political, military, institutional, cultural, financial and budgetary challenges. In fragile countries such as Afghanistan, the biggest of them all will be the political challenge – wherein both sides of the conflict remain committed and resilient regardless of the change in personalities and leaders to the agreed terms of the peace deal and do not use military force as a means of political leverage on each other.

Most of the peace deals and military integration plans fail because one side renege on their commitments and start using military force as a political leverage. Second, comes the institutional absorption capacity to accept change and not to resist the integration of the Taliban commanders and fighters within their ranks.

This is followed by the management and financial requirements which is the least of our worries since a third party (i.e. the UN with the help of the international community) will assist in providing the technical expertise and raise funds to finance the budgetary requirements of the peace deal and military integration plan.

In the case of Afghanistan, the two top challenges will be political resilience and institutional capacity to transform and accommodate the newly integrated Taliban commanders and fighters. The rest can be managed.

The Mechanism

Based on international best practices, there are normally two internationally recognized mechanisms through which Taliban fighters and commanders can be integrated within the rank and file of Afghan forces: (a) a temporary parallel co-existence mechanism until full integration happens which is normally referred to as interim security arrangement; and (b) immediate reintegration whereas forces are immediately disarmed and demobilized by individuals, groups and units sometimes keeping the entire command and control structure intact.

Both mechanisms have their pros and cons, under the interim security arrangement both forces co-exist within their geographies under their control but in a cooperative manner (i.e. ceasing hostilities providing security and law enforcement services to their respective areas eventually merged into one force). This mechanism is a recent phenomenon due to size and institutional absorption capacity issues. Many military integration and DDR processes have failed because it has stalled due to institutional capacity issues and political infightings. Therefore, an interim period is envisioned whereas the forces are integrated in instalments over a period of time while both forces co-exist with each other in a cooperative manner conducting joint patrols, joint trainings and exercises. This will assist in better integration and merger of the two forces.

The immediate mobilization mechanism is doable only when the size of the opposing warring parties are small and the institutional absorption capacity in the military apparatus of the country is high with a firm political will and adequate financial resources at hand. This is normally the classic method of military integration whereas the armed rebels are disarmed and demobilized immediately and reintegrated within the government security forces through an elaborate screening, training and professionalization process.

The Way Forward

For any peace deal to succeed in a complex case environment such as Afghanistan, it is imperative that it has to have a robust military integration roadmap for integrating Taliban fighters and commanders within the existing or a new Afghan military and security apparatus. This means Afghans together with their international partners will need to reassess their force size, posture, composition and operational readiness in view of the new challenges that would emerge in the event of a post peace deal with the Taliban.

The Taliban leadership will also have to evaluate and make certain key decisions such as what kind of an army and police they envision for Afghanistan? How do they intend to break their ties and fight foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, LeT, and others, as well as to define their long-term relations with the United States and its allies?

Finally, the United States and its allies must define what, when, how, and under what circumstances they will continue assisting post-peace deal Afghan security forces reconstituted and reorganized with Taliban commanders within its ranks?

All of the above decisions will have a significant bearing over the success and failure of any potential military integration plan for the Taliban commanders and fighters within the ranks of the Afghan security forces.

Frenemies: Prospects and Challenges for the Military Integration of the Taliban into the Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.  

In the early days of U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, there were three schools of thought over the future of the Afghan armed forces. In the first, there were those who believed that Afghanistan does not need a full-fledged army and police but a small defense force to quell local revolts and maintain border security. This was based on the rationale that international security forces would remain for the long run in the country and also due to objections from former Pakistani dictator, General Pervez Musharraf,  who opposed the establishment of a large army for Afghanistan for geopolitical reasons. The second school of thought advocated for an Afghan army and security forces in the scale and size of the pre-civil war era (i.e. 250,000 strong with an airforce). Third, was a group of Afghan monarchists and former mujahidin who believed in the mobilization and transformation of the existing mujahidin and militias into an army and police. Of course, none of those options prevailed. Instead, Afghans together with their NATO allies raised, trained and deployed a completely new army based on their threat perception and needs assessment for the country.

In 2014, during the transition of the security responsibilities from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan forces led by Gen. Patreaus and the then chairman of the transition commission and now President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, there was a golden opportunity to reconfigure and redesign a financially sustainable Afghan security forces but this chance was lost. Although steps were taken, other priorities took over, and the task remained unfinished. While the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) under the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with the United States, alongside the NATO Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) ensures long-term funding, training, and mentoring to Afghan forces, the election of President Trump and increasing war fatigue in the United States has put the long-term future of bilateral security cooperation on uncertain and shaky ground.

Almost for a hundred years, Afghanistan owned a military despite many periods of instability and political anarchy, which it funded through a mixture of traditional and non-traditional sources. The traditional sources of funding included a quota based national conscription mechanism through tribal elders and maliks to fill in the ranks of the army and police; imposition of local taxation and food rations to feed the army and security forces, and finally reliance on local transport for logistics and sustenance. The non-traditional aid came largely from the British Raj and the Russians (later the Soviets).

The Raj, the Russians, Germany,  Turkey, and others provided military equipment and training. Amir Sher Ali Khan established the first Afghan army with some auxiliary tribal militias with the financial and technical support of the British Raj and Russian czar. This army was trained, equipped and funded over the years with a mixture of British tributaries, equipment from British Raj and local taxation and quota conscription system on local tribal elders across the country.  conscription became a controversial matter much later on during the communist regime when many Afghan youths were pushed into the frontlines to fight against the mujahidin, many of whom never returned home, which led to massive migration of Afghan youth to neighboring countries for safety and work. But the culture, practice, and acceptability of conscription as a system existed during the reign of various Afghan rulers. Afghan kings, historically, used a national quota conscription system to fill the ranks of the army and security forces.

Today, Afghanistan has a paid volunteer army and security forces, which is almost entirely funded by the United States and NATO allies. Any experienced military expert will tell you that raising, maintaining, and sustaining a voluntary force is extremely expensive and complicated for poor and aid-dependent economies. Turkey, Israel, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and a dozen other states, in the Afghan neighborhood and beyond, who are in a much better economic and financial state run a national conscription system to sustain its armed forces.

Afghanistan can use the revenue from its vast mineral wealth, sale of its abundant water resources to neighbors, transit fees as a land and air bridge to South and Central Asia and export of high-value agriculture crops to fund its security forces. The Afghan leadership and its international partners can rethink, reconfigure, and redesign affordable and financially sustainable Afghan forces through reinstating a carefully designed national conscription system, build up of local defense industries to drive cost down and saving on essential defense budget items to pave the way for medium to long-term financial sustainability of the Afghan security forces.

The time has come for the Afghan military leaders and its international partners to make some hard choices and decisions for the long-term financial sustainability and viability of the Afghan security forces. They will have to rethink, reconfigure, and build a fiscally sustainable, operationally efficient and capable military increasingly funded from the domestic revenues of Afghanistan.  This can be done through a combined four-track financial sustainability strategy: a. Force management and national conscription; b. Fiscal austerity and budgetary savings; c. Building local defense industries; and d. Establishing localized defense and militias.

The first significant decision to make is whether the Afghan military and political leadership would like to have a NATO or non-NATO regular army and security forces. Some military experts argue that a NATO standard Afghan army and security forces can only be viable if Afghanistan remains a long-term ally of NATO and the west with a functioning self-sustaining economy while others advocate for a hybrid standard (i.e. a mixture of NATO and non-NATO standard force based on the agility, mobility and needs assessment of the various units with the Afghan armed forces.

The second major decision is to implement a national, local quota-based conscription mechanism combined with better force management, salary, and remuneration rationalization and anti-corruption drive which could significantly drive down the personnel costs within the Afghan armed forces. 

The idea of enacting drafting or conscription is a politically charged subject in Afghanistan, especially if you have a politically fragile government in Kabul, which lacks broad-based political support. This is primarily due to bad memories of the population from the communist era conscription drive, which led to the deaths of thousands and migration of much more Afghan youth from the country. The Afghan mujahidin and even Taliban to this day impose local conscription in their areas of control.

If the local elder does not generate the required quota of able-bodied men to fight, he will have to offer money, cattle, or agricultural products as a replacement. This exact practice has been in place since the rule of the Afghan Iron Amir, Amir Abdulrahman Khan, in the late eighteenth century who for the first time used this method as a systematic way to fill in the ranks of the Afghan military. The current Afghan government will have to enact a carefully designed quota-based local, national draft or conscriptions system. This will assist in significantly driving down the costs of the Afghan armed forces; foster patriotism and shift much needed budgetary resources to other priorities within the security sector.

Furthermore, the Afghan government can save significant amount of money from the existing budgetary expenditures through taking a couple of bold austerity measures: a. domestic purchase as compared to import of food items for Afghan forces. b. saving on fuel,  oil and energy costs. c. better maintenance and inventory management of weapons, ammunitions and armored vehicles among others. Such austerity measures could assist in saving millions of dollars within the budget of Afghan security forces. Additionally, the time has come for Afghanistan to produce and manufacture its own basic defense items such as bullets, weaponry and other basic defense items.

While the initial capital investment cost of such an undertaking will be high but over time this will significantly drive down defense expenditure and increase self-reliance. Moreover, Afghanistan could redesign its defense forces to a more mobile and highly equipped small professional army meant to fight terrorism and local insurgency designed for irregular warfare augmented with an auxiliary local militia. This means we could significantly reduce the number of the existing Afghan army and police while augment the gap with local tribal forces to fight local insurgencies and terrorism. This will also assist in the long-term financial sustainability and operational effectiveness of the Afghan security forces.

Such a fundamental reorganization of the Afghan security forces followed by austerity measures will leave Afghanistan with three options for the shape and size of any future army and security forces: a. A modern professional army which will be costly and unsustainable unless Afghanistan finds alternative sources of revenue to fund it. b. A small professional army at the core augmented with auxiliary local militias across the country to fight insurgencies and do counter-terrorism. c. A hybrid force—a combination of a professional army, localized defense forces and militias at different levels.

Regardless of the choice of standard, size, and format of the Afghan security forces; the Afghan government and its international partners – principally the United States and NATO member states will need to fund this force for years to come until Afghanistan builds an indigenous self-sustaining economy from two sources: The first being traditional sources such as a national tax scheme, a saving and austerity regime, and national conscription. The second is non-traditional sources—a long-term trust fund but with significantly less contribution in terms of dollar amount as compared to the current rates to help sustain the force along with scholarships and training programs for its officers corp.

In the words of former Afghan Defense Minister, General Tariq Shah Bahrami, Afghans will eat grass but will fund Afghan forces and defend their country even if NATO and U.S. forces leave the country. While this may be true, Afghans will have to fundamentally rethink and redesign Afghanistan’s military into financially viable, economically sustainable, and professionally agile armed forces.

Economizing Defense: A Roadmap for Building Sustainable Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban consider direct negotiations with the United States in Qatar and elsewhere as a platform for national and international recognition rather than a true path to a peaceful end to the Afghan conflict. President Trump’s anti-war stance, the reconciliatory tone of the establishment in Washington, deteriorating relations between President Ghani and the U.S. administration, and an increased regional and global engagement with the Taliban leadership have made the group firm believers in a military victory and the return of an Islamic Emirate based on sharia law.

This engagement is a tactic taken from the playbook of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and isn’t a sound strategy to pursue peace—rather, it complements their military strategy on the battlefield. This reality was made clear in the recent congratulatory message of the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhund, where he reiterated: “No one should expect us to pour cold water on the heated battlefronts of Jihad or forget our forty-year sacrifices before reaching our objectives.”

In another part of the same statement, he stated that “with this initiative, the Islamic Emirate is conducting victorious operations on the Jihadi battlefronts and leading negotiations with the Americans about ending the occupation of Afghanistan, the objectives and goals of both being bringing an end to the occupation and establishment of an Islamic system.” Both sections of the statement make it abundantly clear that the Afghan Taliban firmly believe in a military victory and consider the on-going peace talks as a mere political addition to their battlefield military strategy and not a genuine effort to end the Afghan war.

Shortly after the release of the Taliban Eid statement, the U.S. Special Envoy for Peace—veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad—termed the Taliban statement as “bombastic” and “ serves to complicate & disrupt” the Afghan peace process. He called on the Taliban to reduce the level of violence and continue negotiations to end the war. This statement and the ones before with a reconciliatory tone from Washington has not only emboldened the Taliban but has made them firm believers in the United States and allies defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the U.S. envoy sees his mandate to negotiate with the Taliban and the Afghan government, respectively on four inter-related items: Joint counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, a U.S. troop drawdown, a ceasefire; and Intra-Afghan dialogue along with discussions over the future of U.S.-Afghan relations. After several unsuccessful attempts to mediate and forge unity among a divided political elite in Kabul , Zalmay Khalilzad views the government in Kabul as politically divided and unable to form a united political front and high powered national negotiation team to engage with the Taliban as apart of the intra-Afghan dialogue. This has been primarily due to increased electoral politics and factional infighting combined with a lack of a coherent understanding of war and peace among the political and military elites in Afghanistan.

In turn, Zalmay Khalilzad, under pressure from Trump administration to show results on the peace talks is in a rush to conclude the first two items of his mandate i.e. counter-terrorism and troop withdrawal timetable in his new round of negotiations with the Taliban in Doha which is dangerous and goes against his stated negotiation approach, saying that  “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”

The Afghan government has criticized this negotiation approach of U.S. envoy to the extent of accusing him of “acting like a viceroy” and of legitimizing the Taliban as an alternative to the incumbent government in Kabul for political expediency in Washington. Zalmay Khalilzad has in turn denied these allegations and has expressed that he always consults with President Ghani before and after his lengthy negotiation sessions with the Taliban.

The Afghan peace process has presented an intriguing platform for all sorts of domestic and regional interests to play out: the Taliban see a divided house in Kabul and believe that rocky relations between Washington and Kabul are an opportunity to be exploited so as to present themselves as an alternative government; the region uses the Afghan peace talks as a card to gain favors and make geopolitical score points against the United States. For instance, Pakistan uses it to extract economic benefits to improve its fragile economy, Iran and Russia use as a platform it to discredit NATO and U.S. efforts in the country while the Arab world uses its to advance their proxy and sectarian agendas.

To exploit this opportunity further, the Afghan Taliban is pursuing a three-pronged interconnected pol-mil strategy: negotiations with the United States, pitting the region against the United States and exploiting great power political faultlines, and dividing the Afghan political elite from the Afghan government. For the Americans, the Taliban assure them that they are no longer affiliated with Al Qaeda and other affiliated foreign terrorist organisations. They are an insurgency with a domestic agenda and do not subscribe to global jihad. The Taliban also assure the Americans that they will never let the Afghan territory to be used against the United States and its allies.

On the contrary, in their negotiations with regional powers such as Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, the Taliban provides guarantees that they will never let regional terrorist groups threaten Afghanistan’s neighbors. Additionally, they and call on the country’s neighbors to join hands to expel the Americans from Afghanistan who they view as both a threat to the region and the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban pursue a policy of “divide and rule” when it comes to intra-Afghan talks. They use Afghan political elites against the government and the Afghan government against the elites to erode the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan public and present themselves as a unified alternative political entity.

This three-pronged strategy that the Afghan Taliban pursue has four primary goals: to gain national and international political legitimacy at the cost of an elected government in Kabul, to negotiate with the United States on behalf of themselves and their regional sponsors on a timetable for troop withdrawal, secure the release of prisoners, restore the restoration of the Islamic emirate; and finally, to isolate, delegitimize, and divide the government from the political elites in Kabul.

This calculus of the Afghan Taliban is based on three assumptions: political anarchy and disunity in Kabul, war fatigue on the part of the U.S. and its allies, and heightened regional tensions over U.S. presence in Afghanistan specifically with regards to Iran and Russia. This is a perfect recipe for Taliban to garner political legitimacy and military victory.

The calculus and strategy of the Taliban and its sponsors can be countered with an equivalent three-pronged strategy of the Taliban and their sponsors through an equivalent three-pronged strategy: sustained military pressure, sustained diplomatic and non-military pressure on the Taliban’s foreign sponsors, as well as clearly conveying to the Taliban that pursuing a military victory for them is only a recipe for another war. The post-9/11 generation of Afghans and jihadist groups who have been thus far absent from the theater of war would inevitably join the fight, which would only prolong the misery and complexities of the on-going conflict.

Thus far, the Taliban have not shown any concessions in their talks with the Americans and Afghans. They have proven themselves to be tough negotiators. Many expected that the U.S. envoy and the Taliban would reach an agreement within six months or less, but negotiations currently seem to be deadlocked. Many believe the Afghan Taliban negotiators are playing the long game with U.S. envoy to fail him in his mission and eventually discredit him in the eyes of Trump administration officials and pave the way for his ouster from his job.

Moreover, The Afghan Taliban, together with their foreign terrorist affiliates, have increased attacks on Afghan cities and the countryside battlefields, causing an unprecedented level of civilian and military casualties as compared to yesteryears. During the holy month of Ramadan, Kabul has seen at least seven bomb attacks resulting in over 200 dead and injured. Many of them attributed to the Taliban. They are leveraging military power for incentives on the negotiation table with the Americans and Afghan political elites.

The first intra-Afghan talks held in Moscow was a scene to behold. Taliban negotiators and former officials were in tears while sitting down on a prayer mat hailing their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, for his predictions of an American defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan and proclaiming that they have come true. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses living in the suburbs of the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar tell a telltale of how Taliban preachers go from corner to corner of various quarters and refugee camps reciting the verse “Nasr-u-men Allah e Fath ul Qareeb” which translates into “with God’s help victory is near.” and delivering fiery speeches on U.S. defeat; an echo and déjà vu from the Afghan jihad times when the communist regime in Kabul was on the verge of collapse due to Moscow’s rising domestic issues and war fatigue.

Both Washington and Kabul need to change their approach to negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The current talks have only encouraged them in their quest for the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan along with their foreign terrorist affiliates. We owe it to the many American and non-American men and women who laid our their lives for our security to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven and launching pad for international terrorism, enabled and empowered by a host regime.

The Taliban Peace Calculus was originally published on Global Security Review.

This article is a continuation of a previous analysis of the Pulwama attack that examined how the attack and the way in which India responded threatened South Asian security. 

Following a terrorist attack on an Indian security forces convoy in Pulwama, Kashmir, India and Pakistan engaged in airstrikes, dogfights and cross-border shelling along the Line of Control (LoC). Since their independence and partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought several wars and low-intensity conflicts.

There was, however, an aspect of this latest incident that changed the game and had potentially catastrophic consequences: both states are nuclear powers. Excluding the 1999 Kargil War, this is the only time in history that nuclear powers have attacked each other. Possibly more significant is that India displayed a willingness to strike targets in mainland Pakistani territory—outside of Kashmir.

Overview

It started when the Indian Air Force (IAF) struck what it claimed to be a Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) terrorist camp in the town of Balakot in Pakistan—the first time an Indian aircraft violated Pakistani airspace since the War of 1971. Pakistan, in response, shot down an Indian jet and captured its pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.

To de-escalate, Pakistan released the pilot within forty-eight hours of detaining him. India’s response was to unleash a barrage of shelling across the LoC. All the while, an aggressively jingoistic Indian media apparatus was disseminating information that was inconsistent, confusing or outrightly false. In some reports, details would be altered within just a few hours.

At the time of writing, both countries seem to have stood down and ceased hostilities. Many would call this a stroke of luck, considering the cataclysmic ramifications of further escalation. Lessons must be learned by both sides to prevent a situation like this happening again. Such a crisis could spin wildly out of control, threatening the security of Southeast Asia—and the world.

Lessons for India

Arguably, India has the most to learn. Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a significant gamble ordering the initial strikes in Balakot. Driven by revenge for the Pulwama Attack, Modi assumed that appearing tough on Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, while securitizing the province of Kashmir, would win him votes in April’s Indian elections, a dangerous gamble considering both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers.

That assumption has since been shattered, as 21 opposition parties, led by Rahul Gandhi’s Congress Party, have banded together to oppose Indian military action in Pakistan. Alongside this twenty one-party alliance, prominent Indians have taken to social media to express their dissatisfaction at the ongoing military operation, criticizing the Indian government and mass media for acting irrationally and fostering a vitriolic nationalism throughout the country and broader Indian diaspora. 

Another lesson to learn is how the Indian media covers Pakistan, and by extension counter-terrorism operations like the Balakot strike. News coverage was inconsistent at best and toxic at its worst. Information disseminated was either debunked within hours or fabricated completely, the most prominent example being Indian coverage of the initial Balakot strike.

Indian media outlets declared that over 300 JeM militants had been killed. Within a few hours, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)—the Pakistani military’s media wing—had posted images of the bomb site on Twitter. Later confirmed by satellite, the images showed that Indian ordnance fell on a mostly uninhabited forest far from the intended target.

A debate has sparked whether Indian ordnance hit uninhabited territory with the purpose of provoking a Pakistani response, or if there was indeed a camp and the weapons simply missed; odd considering they were state-of-the-art Israeli SPICE bombs. Other dubious claims include those regarding Pakistani F-16 fighter jets being shot down by Indian MiGs, which were disproven by Indian experts in television studios. Even the release of Abhinandan was treated as the result of Pakistani weakness rather than a genuine attempt to de-escalate the crisis.

By this point, it became clear that the Indian narrative—and indeed Modi’s government—had lost credibility within a matter of hours. What had started as a pre-emptive response to terrorist groups in Pakistan had quickly descended into a military operation within the sovereign airspace of another state. It also became evident that India had overlooked the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons, so de-escalation was in the interest of both countries.

The BJP government stands to learn a great deal from the events of that week. Given the lack of conclusive evidence of Pakistani involvement in the Pulwama attack, it is clear that the focus must be on terrorist networks within Kashmir rather than fomenting nationalistic fervor and attacking another country. Pulwama showed that Kashmir is experiencing a homegrown terrorist movement and that India must shift its focus to performing counterinsurgency (COIN) rather than blaming its neighbor for each incident as a knee-jerk response.

COIN, however, can only work with the support of the Kashmiris. Achieving this means giving Kashmiris a forum to air grievances and express any desire for self-determination. Making concessions of this nature will reduce terrorism and consequently stabilize the region—even at the expense of Indian prestige.

Lessons for Pakistan

Modi’s Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Imran Khan, took a far more reasonable and—according to some commentators—“mature” approach to the conflict, prioritizing peace and de-escalation over victory. This, coupled with the release of the Indian pilot, earned him praise from within Pakistan and from the wider international community. Some have gone as far as advocating that Khan be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his handling of the issue.

Restraint and sensibility are conducive to effective Pakistani state policy, as opposed than the nationalistic belligerence exhibited by the Indian government. Thus, Khan should adopt sensible approaches to future policy initiatives outside of security.

However, Khan needs to seriously address the elephant in the room: the presence of terrorist groups like JeM operating or based within Pakistan. The presence of JeM and other Kashmiri militant and terrorist groups within Pakistan has been a key issue in Indian-Pakistani Relations since the 1980s. These groups have been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on Indian soil, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

Though Pakistan has had no direct involvement in these events, their inability to target and apprehend these groups and their leadership, or hand them over to India, has contributed to poor relations and the modus operandi of India blaming Pakistan for any Jihadist terrorist attack in its territory. This cannot continue, and something must be done.

Since 2014, Pakistan’s counterterrorism apparatus has proven effective, having managed the defeat, split, and expulsion of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and established a condition of security nationwide. Monitoring or tracking terrorist groups like JeM is entirely feasible and an intuitive approach to ensuring Pakistan’s national security.

As of April 2019, Khan has implemented wide-ranging crackdowns to limit the ability of these groups to operate, both within Kashmir and Pakistan. Should this harder-line policy prove effective, it could lead to a reduction in the capability of armed groups to carry out acts of terrorism on either side of the LoC. Only time will tell if these initiatives are successful.

Read Part One of The Pulwama Incident: The Razor’s Edge

The Pulwama Incident Part Two: Pakistan and India Have Much to Learn was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Pulwama bombings in Kashmir on February 14^th, 2019 sent shockwaves throughout South Asia. An unstable and tense region, to begin with, the bombing brought about greater instability and tension between the region’s two leading powers: India and Pakistan. The terrorist attack nearly brought about a catastrophically destructive event.

What happened?

On February 14th, a car laden with explosives was driven into a Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) convoy near the town of Pulwama in Kashmir. The bomber, later identified as 20-year-old Aadil Dar, had recently joined the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), who claimed responsibility for the attack, and the deaths of 40 Indian policemen—the deadliest terrorist attack in Kashmir to date. Kashmir is no stranger to terrorism, nor Pakistan and India struggling over it, as control of the mountainous province has been a key bone of contention between the two nuclear-armed states since their independence in 1947.

Within hours of the attack, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi leveled blame for the attack on Pakistan and declared them responsible for the bombing. Pakistan denied any involvement, even though JeM is based in the Pakistani city of Bahawalpur. The international community has since weighed in, condemning Pakistan and its involvement in supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. In the week following the raid, Indian security forces conducted raids on JeM cells and operatives in Kashmir, resulting in the death of the attack’s alleged mastermind, known as Kamran.

Despite finding and killing those behind the attacks, the accusations set in motion a chain of events that raised tensions between the two states to their highest in recent times, even resulting in military action. On February 26^th, Indian Air Force (IAF) planes violated Pakistani airspace to conduct air raids, bombing what it claimed to be a JeM camp in the Pakistani-Kashmir town of Balakot. 

This was the first time an Indian aircraft violated Pakistan’s airspace since 1971, and the first instance in which nuclear-armed nations have bombed each other. From that day, conflict and tensions between the two escalated, to the point where Pakistan shot down and captured an IAF pilot, Wing Commander Abhinanadan Varthaman, who was subsequently released on March 1^st. Since that week, there has been mutual shelling from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).

This is incredibly problematic for maintaining South Asian Security at large, mostly because there is little conclusive evidence that Pakistan was directly involved in the Pulwama Bombing, but more so because of the presence of nuclear weapons and a history of interstate warfare in the region. The risk this poses cannot be understated, as if both states were to use their nuclear weapons, it would bring about the end of modern civilization through famine and the spread of radioactive fallout. 

Instability and its Effects

There is an element of truth to the accusations laid unto Pakistan supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. Since the 1980s, the Pakistani security apparatus has funded mujahideen and Jihadist insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Initially, this was to counteract the Soviet Union when they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Once they withdrew in 1989, these mujahideen had no conflict left to fight, until they declared jihad on India, and went to fight them in Kashmir.

Groups responsible for attacks in India, such as JeM, have been banned within Pakistan and their membership and leaders arrested, more intensely since Khan announced a recent string of crackdowns in response to almost being put on the Financial Action Task Force “grey list”, a list of countries that have engaged in money laundering and terrorist financing, which India has accused Pakistan of doing. To be put on the list would lead to increased costs for money transfers and running businesses, severely damaging Pakistan’s already weak economy.

However, India has also contributed to the condition of insecurity experienced since February 14^th, through blaming Pakistan for the attacks without providing evidence or intelligence, and more recently the use of air raids. Arguably, this posture is due to General Elections in April, with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government aiming to use harsh action on Pakistan and Kashmir to secure votes.

In the week following the bombing, media focus on blaming Pakistan ended up mainly ignoring that the attack was a textbook case of homegrown terrorism. Dar was a Kashmiri who was radicalized by other groups before he joined JeM, and according to officials in the Indian Military, the explosives were locally sourced. The vehicle used to attack the Indian convoy was Indian and had changed hands several times within Indian territory. This shows that a Kashmiri insurgency is now self-sufficient, and no longer needs Pakistani support to conduct operations. 

It also shows that India needs to enact a more nuanced counterinsurgency strategy to deal with the issue, rather than dragnet crackdowns and mass arrests. Mistreatment and human rights violations have led to Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s mutating into the more homegrown insurgent campaign today. To blame Pakistan and subsequently conduct strikes on targets on their soil is an extremely dangerous and counterintuitive tactic, considering the minuscule margins for error associated with nuclear weaponry.

The attack has had the most significant impact on Kashmiri Muslims throughout India, however. Kashmiri students have been forced to leave their universities, and others have been victims of Islamophobic abuse or forced into hiding following wide-scale government-led crackdowns across the country.

Kashmiri militants have used violence in response to repressive measures taken out by Indian security forces and police against Kashmiri protesters, such as the use of pellet rifles to disperse protests, which happens to be a violation of human rights and international law. This latest incident has not made life any easier for them, who have been protesting for independence since 1948, though these became far more violent in 2016. It also creates an environment ideal to radicalize disenfranchised Kashmiris, giving Kashmiri militant and Jihadist groups more fighters. It is a vicious cycle, one that can be closed through India entertaining the Kashmiri desire for self-determination and giving them a forum to air their grievances.

Lessons to be Learned

Pakistan and India stood at the precipice and stared down the barrel of a nuclear war. Thankfully, neither side escalated further, and both appear to have stood down for the most part, except for drone flights and air patrols of the LoC and the international border. There are lessons that both sides need to learn though, especially considering the Kashmir crisis.

Read Part Two of the Pulwama Incident: Pakistan and India Have Much to Learn

The Pulwama Incident Part One: The Razor’s Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Periodic skirmishes and tensions between Pakistani and Afghan security personnel along the disputed border greatly aggravate an already-deteriorating bilateral relationship, with each side accusing the other of insincerity when it comes to counter-terrorism. On April 15, 2018, Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanged fire in Afghanistan’s Khost province at a border post handled by the Pakistani army in the Laka Tigga area of the Lower Khurram Agency. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Pakistani soldiers, with five others being injured.

Kabul continuously blames Islamabad for the ongoing violence and the resiliency of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Afghan officials claim that Pakistan is doing nothing to address the presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Pakistan vehemently denies these claims.

The Durand Line has complicated relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since the founding of Pakistan in 1947. More recently, conditions in Afghanistan have considerably deteriorated. Levels of insecurity, lawlessness, and drug trafficking are all increasing, and Afghan warlords are gaining increasing amounts of influence. The opium trade, along with that of other drugs currently account for nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP, according to some estimates. According to one study, the Afghan border with Pakistan has become a hub for illicit drug exports.

In an effort to address the cross-border flow of militants and drugs, Pakistan initiated construction on a border fence in 2018 along the Durand Line—the roughly 1,622 mile-long border (2,611 kilometers) shared with Afghanistan. Pakistan believes the barrier would improve the security environment in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. A senior officer in the Pakistani army stated that “[the fence] would greatly help to stop cross-border movements of militants.” Afghanistan resolutely opposes the fence’s construction.

Pakistan considers the Durand Line to be the established international border between itself and Afghanistan. The Afghan government rejects Islamabad’s claim and sees the Durand Line as an artificial border that was created by the British and agreed to by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. The demarcation subsequently resulted in the separation of members of the Pashtun ethnic group.

The Afghan government views the Durand Line border as an artificial border between two countries which was signed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. In the final days of British colonial rule—before the founding of Pakistan—Pashtuns residing on the Indian side of the Durand Line, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (known as the “Frontier Gandhi”) were opposed the creation of Pakistan. At the time, the Pashtun identity was based on nationalism rather than religion; thus Pashtuns were opposed to the formation of an Islamic Pakistan.

When it became clear that the British were intent on partitioning India into two sovereign states, the Pashtuns demanded their own territory, Pashtunistan, which would either be an independent state or incorporated into Afghanistan. Instead, the British were intent on establishing a stable Pakistan and it was decided that the Pashtun-dominated North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was to become part of Pakistan.

Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, Islamabad has routinely attempted to refute the Afghan argument that the Durand Line is an “artificial border.” Pakistan regularly dismisses Afghan claims as invalid.

During a recent visit to Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, both countries agreed to take series of deescalatory steps, one of which being minimizing cross-border clashes. including fire exchange in borders. In this meeting, Islamabad accused Kabul of taking action against militant groups who continue to attack Pakistani soldiers across the borders in Afghanistan. The Pakistani statement says that “Pakistan urges Afghanistan to focus on taking effective counterterrorism actions, including plugging in of large gaps existing along the Afghan side of Pakistan-Afghanistan border,” adding that “it is also important that the Afghan government refrain from playing the blame game.”

Pakistan, however, will remain committed to destabilizing Afghanistan. Pakistan continues to utilize terrorist groups in Afghanistan as proxies, ensuring Afghanistan remains preoccupied with internal affairs. Both countries must—in good faith—move to address the issues caused by the colonial-era border. Balochistan and portions of the Pashtun tribal areas currently under Pakistani administration should be restored as Afghanistan’s sovereign territory.

Kabul, for its part, should be mindful of its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is landlocked and relies on Pakistani ports. Marvin G. Weinbaum, a former Pakistan and Afghanistan analyst at the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, estimates that Pakistan’s wide-ranging exports to Afghanistan amount to roughly $1.2 billion per year, while it imports over $700 million worth of Afghan goods.

The United States and the European Union need to review their respective policies for Afghanistan in order to foster long-term regional peace, rather than pouring billions of dollars into a war that can’t be won. The disagreement over the Durand Line will continue for the foreseeable future and will present a significant challenge to the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to view the border dispute as a settled matter, as it defines the matter as a matter of national security. On the other hand, Afghanistan will continue to highlight the unsettled and disputed nature of the border as the root cause of the deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relationship.

Durand Line Border Dispute Remains Point of Contention for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why is the United States there, what does it intend to achieve, what is the desired end-state, and what is the theory of victory? Nobody expected the U.S. and its NATO allies to turn Afghanistan into another Switzerland—nor did Afghans and the international community foresee the prevailing political deadlock and military stalemate.

The Afghan war has increasingly become one of dignity for U.S. and NATO forces. A defeat at the hands of a ragtag, AK-47-wielding force calling itself the Taliban, with safe-havens across the border in Pakistan, will only refresh the memories of Vietnam in the Pentagon and the broader security establishment in the United States.

The United States and its NATO allies cannot afford the stain of another Vietnam on their track record—especially when their Russian counterparts, albeit with questionable military tactics, are increasingly successful against a more complex enemy in Syria. However, every liberating army eventually becomes an occupying force in the eyes of the local population if it does not deliver on its initially-stated mission objectives. This is especially so in Afghanistan. The problem has been that U.S. and NATO forces kept jumping from one mission statement to another, from one NATO summit to another, continuously promising a consolidation of gains and the ultimate defeat of the Taliban and their terrorist allies, but to no avail.

When assuming command of multinational forces in Afghanistan, each subsequent U.S. four-star general has called for a mission review, made some changes, presented a report to the U.S. Department of Defense asking for more resources and political support, assured NATO allies in various forums of success around the corner, but ended up leaving a more unstable Afghanistan for the next commander.

Here we are eighteen years later with a resurgent Taliban and U.S.-NATO achievements not only consolidated but more fragile than ever. The Afghan state has been left weaker, not to mention an unpredictable president in the White House, growing war fatigue in the West, and a divided Washington over the fate of its military engagement in Afghanistan.

It is in this context that the United States, Afghanistan, and the broader region need to think long and hard over the decisions that have been made and consider the potential consequences of those decisions for security and geopolitical interests—within Afghanistan and beyond. An increasingly unstable Afghanistan will adversely affect the security and stability of its neighbors, in addition to having substantial implications for security in the West.

In this context, it would seem surprising that Afghanistan’s neighbors—chief among them Pakistan, Iran, and the Russian Federation—are using the Taliban as a proxy force to destabilize the country to bloody the nose of the U.S. and its coalition allies.

This may, in the short term, serve the geopolitical interests of Iran and Russia but the absence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will eventually present a severe threat to the security of these countries. A U.S. withdrawal will mean the Pakistanis, Iranians, and Russians will have to become increasingly involved in Afghanistan to counter terrorist activity and safeguard their respective political interests.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former chief strategist, was a staunch advocate of withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan because he believed that an unstable and violent Afghanistan would threaten the security of China, Russia, and Iran, thus serving U.S. national security interests. Bannon argued that by destabilizing Afghanistan further, Russia, China, and Iran would be forced to divert resources to stabilizing Afghanistan for the sake of their respective national security interests. Such a scenario, at present, is very much conceivable under the current Trump administration in Washington.

In such a world full of uncertainties and geopolitical flashpoints, Afghanistan, the U.S., NATO, and the world need to move from a narrative of success to one of compromise, whereas the interests of all sides are served through a cooperative approach for achieving stability in Afghanistan, one with an accommodation for a Taliban that is neither at war with itself nor a threat to regional and global security. The western infatuations with military victory and the regional narrative of using Afghanistan as a geopolitical chokepoint for the United States may yield short-term benefits to one side or another, but in the long-term, it will work against the security interests of all involved parties.

The outcome of the Afghan war will primarily depend on the behavior of the sponsors and proxies involved. The war in Afghanistan can subside, intensify, change in nature, or become contained to particular localities depending on stakeholders’ political farsightedness and their stated military objectives. It is the Afghan people who will lose the most in terms of life, treasure, and infrastructure.

To turn this situation into a strategy that is beneficial to the interests of all, involved parties need to fundamentally recalculate their strategy and move towards a cooperative, mutually-beneficial approach. There is potential for U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Iran, and U.S.-Pakistan cooperation to address this credible geopolitical challenge, which could pose real threats to each party’s national security interests.

Nobody can predict the future course of events in Afghanistan—particularly given President Trump’s deep reservations about continued U.S. military engagement in the country. Other factors, such as a resurgent Taliban, a return to “great game” power politics, and an exhausted Afghan populace who question the presence of foreign forces despite an absence of real security in the country further increase the complexity of any predictive exercise. However, one of three scenarios—good, bad, or ugly—is likely to play out in Afghanistan to some degree.

Scenario 1: The Good—A Negotiated Settlement

The ideal situation, a negotiated settlement, would be beneficial for all parties to the Afghan conflict. The agreement would be negotiated between the Afghan government and the Taliban, brokered by the U.S., China, and Russia, and guaranteed by Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. There are numerous blueprints and roadmaps in existence that outline the details for such an agreement. It would take into account the interests and demands of both the Taliban and the Afghan government while addressing the security concerns of the U.S. and its NATO allies, as well as taking into account regional concerns and interests.

In such a scenario, the shape, form, and nature of the Afghan constitution and government will be negotiated with the Taliban and a grand Jirga—together with a high ulema council that will give its blessing to the new constitution and the formation of a new government. On the other hand, Taliban be required to break its ties with regional and global terrorist groups, take action against foreign fighters who are currently fighting with the group, and subsequently disarm, demobilize its fighters and integrate them into the Afghan national security forces. Such a scenario would be beneficial to the geopolitical and security interests of all internal and external players of the Afghan conflict. Therefore, all parties should strive to ensure such an end state is achieved.

Scenario 2: The Bad—U.S. Withdrawal and an Afghan Government on Borrowed Time

In this scenario, President Trump rejects the advice of his military and national security advisors, proceeds with a complete withdrawal, and accepts responsibility for the decision to do so, to win favor with the U.S. electorate ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections and ultimately win a second term in office. The U.S. could announce a timetable for withdrawal but continue to financially support the government in Kabul while exerting diplomatic leverage over regional powers to take up the mantle of ensuring stability in Afghanistan.

If the United States were to pull out its military personnel, which would also entail the withdrawal of NATO forces, the Afghan government would be put on life support. Such a move would embolden the Taliban and other international terrorist organizations with the feeling of having beaten the world’s greatest military power in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul would become increasingly fragile, and eventually disintegrate and collapse.

Scenario 3: The Ugly—Proxy Conflict and Fully-Fledged Civil War

The worst case scenario is that the United States declares to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and cuts or redirects financial resources from the Afghan security forces and the Government in Kabul to another part of the world. Alternatively, such a scenario could come to pass if the U.S. becomes embroiled in a conflict with China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, and must rapidly divert large quantities of resources towards a more urgent priority.

Should such a scenario play out, the Afghan government would collapse, and the Afghan security forces would divide along ethnic lines. Each of Afghanistan’s neighbor will move to secure their security interests and political influence in the country, which will inevitably push the country into a proxy conflict or a fully-fledged civil war. This scenario would be a complete and utter disaster and must be avoided at all costs. Such a descent into chaos will not only inflict harm throughout Afghanistan but will substantially threaten regional security.

Afghanistan is the responsibility of the Afghan people. Nobody expects the United States and its NATO allies to remain in the country forever. However, the least the U.S., its partners, and regional actors can do is ensure the Afghan people have a stable government and professional, well-equipped security and military forces who cannot only secure Afghanistan but serve as the first line of defense to the region and the West against international terrorist groups intent on inflicting harm.

Tailoring Expectations: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Scenarios for Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

As part of a renewed pushback against Chinese influence, India announced in February that it would allocate $361 million for aid to the Maldives, a fourfold increase from 2018-19.

Key Insights

• Beijing and New Delhi are competing for influence throughout the Indian Ocean, an area which has traditionally been a part of India’s sphere of influence but has recently seen a surge of Chinese economic and military activity.
• Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives owe a substantial debt to China; New Delhi worries that debt-trap diplomacy could lead to Chinese military bases in the region.
• India will bolster its economic and military efforts in its near abroad while continuing to call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese influence in the region.

The Maldives: Trouble in Paradise an Opportunity for India

Dispensing foreign aid is hardly the primary concern of Indian policymakers. Faced with debilitating poverty levels, the South Asian nation still receives aid from a number of countries such as the UK and the US. Yet the announcement of a new foreign aid component for the 2019-2020 budget has triggered the interest of Indian foreign policy pundits because of one notable outlier. Compared to 2018-2019, aid to the Maldives has seen a 460% increase, with $361 million being allocated to the island nation. The budget boost follows New Delhi’s declaration in December 2018 that it would provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to Malé, after a meeting between Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recent political upheaval in the Maldives provides the backdrop for these decisions. The newly elected Solih defeated pro-China authoritarian leader Abdulla Yameen in a surprise election result in October 2018. Solih’s victory was clearly a welcome relief for politicians in New Delhi who described the victory as a ‘triumph of democratic forces’.

During Yameen’s five-year rule, the Maldives strengthened ties with China, solidifying a free trade deal and welcoming considerable investment while sidelining Indian concerns over the relationship. Yet the spending spree was no free lunch. The Maldives accumulated between $1.5 billion and $3 billion in debt to Chinese lenders due to an infrastructure construction boom. Solih is now actively trying to reduce this debt. India’s financial assistance will go a long way towards alleviating Malé’s financial distress. It also represents New Delhi’s intention to forge closer ties with neighboring countries and signals a broader pivot back to the Indian Ocean.

The Red Dragon in the Indian Ocean

Rather than being India’s canary in the coal mine, the Maldives represents just one aspect of China’s increasing presence across the Indian Ocean. Through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which India vehemently opposes – Beijing has sought to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with Indian Ocean nations. China sees this as a ‘win-win’ opportunity for all parties involved to enhance development and connectivity and denies any form of nefarious motive behind the sprawling scheme. Yet India doesn’t see the BRI as wholeheartedly benign. Instead, New Delhi believes that Beijing is putting some countries in significant debt stress to gain leverage for the ultimate purpose of pursuing its own strategic aims, a concept known as  ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.

Perhaps the best-known example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is in Sri Lanka. Colombo built Hambantota port on the southern coast using Chinese loans that it ultimately couldn’t repay, resulting in a debt-equity swap that left the port under the control of state-owned enterprise China Merchants Group on a 99-year lease. The fear for Indian policymakers is that this port will eventually be used as a military facility for Chinese naval vessels, as part of a scheme to ultimately establish a ‘String of Pearls’ – a series of Chinese military bases across the Indian Ocean – that would threaten India’s lines of communication and ability to project force in the event of a military crisis.

China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, its operation of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and its increased naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean to protect sea lines of communication and enhance anti-piracy efforts are perceived by India to be a threatening combination. Coupled with reports that the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are all facing high BRI-related debt distress, India is extremely concerned that these countries could become beholden to China’s will in the future.

Battles for Influence, Calls for Allies

Perceptions of China have soured in the Maldives since Solih came to power. The cheap loan binge by former president Yameen has come to an end and the hangover is starting to set in. Solih has already pledged to pull out of the free trade deal with China, claiming that deal was ‘very one-sided’.

The competition for influence is unlikely to be confined to the Maldives, with Sri Lanka on the radar for both nations. Rival bailout bids have been tabled for the debt-stressed country: the Reserve Bank of India agreed to a $400 million currency swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 2019, while the Bank of China allegedly offered a $300 million loan. In this respect, Sri Lanka presumably welcomes competition from the bigger powers if it results in a better outcome for debt reduction, and will more than likely hedge between the two nations rather than simply picking sides.

India will increasingly call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The French naval destroyer FNS Cassardrecently docked into a military port in Mumbai after India and France solidified a Joint Strategic Vision deal to increase co-operation between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne also reminded audiences at the Raisina Dialogue – a multilateral geopolitical conference held in New Delhi – that Australia remained committed to securing the Indian Ocean through close collaboration with joint naval exercises and support for regional institutions.

Expect this kind of diplomatic signaling to continue and strengthen in the future, with the possibility of a revival in more military exercises within the ‘Quad’ group, a security cooperation arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Extra funding may also be dedicated to promoting and implementing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a sea corridor promoting development across the Indian Ocean and into Africa that India has developed with Japan to rival BRI.

On the flip side, China will double down somewhere that India can’t compete: Pakistan. The $62 billion China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), with the Gwadar port as the flagship project, has come under increased scrutiny due to concerns among the new Pakistani leadership about the country’s debt levels. As other countries across the Indian Ocean begin to doubt the viability of some BRI projects, China can’t afford for its close strategic relationship with Pakistan to sour. Expect Beijing to continue pouring investments into the country. The addition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in CPEC allows China to diversify its risks whilst also strengthening its relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. More partners could join that align with China’s strategic goals, with Iran pointing out that it too had ambitions to take part.

India’s renewed influence in the Maldives shows that foreign policymakers in New Delhi are aware that for the country to remain a significant force in the Indian Ocean, they need to focus on a few key objectives. These include maintaining close ties to nearby countries by offering incentives and assistance, calling on powerful allies to support its efforts across the Indian Ocean, and also displaying independent expressions of force projection. The ensuing competition with China over influence in the Indian Ocean will likely only intensify over the coming months and years.

New Delhi’s Foreign Policy in the Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

These young men, who live in severe poverty and are without much in terms of economic prospects, are at the forefront of the fight between various ideologies and regional proxy powers. Afghanistan’s urban elites, however, reside comfortably in barricaded homes in city centers, often forgetting there is a broader Afghanistan.

This fact highlights one of the underlying causes of successive regime changes in Afghanistan; inequality and a dangerous rural-urban divide come with a heavy price for any political authority in Afghanistan. The staggering (and growing) levels of inequality in Afghanistan—in terms of wealth, income, political status, and socio-economic conditions—increases the likelihood of regime change.

It was this exploitation of inequality—under the banner of social equality—by the Afghan communist movement that led to the overthrow of King Zahir Shah in 1973 and, subsequently, his cousin the first President of Afghanistan Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978. This was followed by the rise of the Afghan Mujahideen, which fought against the communist regime from 1979 to 1989. The Mujahideen stayed in power from 1992 to 1996, when it was overthrown by the Taliban—a group of rural young men who were tired of the prevailing warlordism and insecurity in the country. These examples of the dangers of rural-urban divide and its consequences for stability in the country.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon remains more accurate today than ever due to the easy flow of foreign aid money and military contracts over the past decade, and a half has created a wealthy urban elite often oblivious of the rural Afghanistan, which in turn has widened the inequality gap in the country.

Today, Afghanistan exists as two countries: the Afghanistan of the haves and the Afghanistan of the have-nots; one of the urban elites and one of the rural tribal chiefs; of conservative rural values and liberal, urban values.

According to the recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey, more than 70% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas, the country’s Gini coefficient is 38.5%, and almost 40% of the population live in poverty—a majority of whom live in rural areas. Only 23.4% of Afghans inhabit urban areas, with the rate of urbanization standing at 5.4%, with income inequality between rural and urban Afghans only increasing.

If history is a lesson to Afghan political leaders and politicians, it is that a succession of Afghan regimes has been toppled by a rebellion that originated in rural Afghanistan as a result of neglect or rapidly-imposed reforms. Furthermore, Afghan politicians, policymakers, and public officials—along with their international allies and partners—forget this divide and mistakenly think of Afghanistan in the narrow sense of its the six major cities.

The real Afghanistan is the remaining 28 out of 34 provinces—which have, over the years, been consistently neglected by successive Afghan regimes. In fact, in multiple instances when a particular administration has come to power with the help of disaffected, rural young men, those in power forget the roots of their plight and end up living relatively comfortable lives in urban Afghanistan. At times, the Afghan urban elite is so oblivious to the conditions of rural Afghanistan that they forget the broader Afghan polity consists of not only the country’s six major cities of Kabul, Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kandahar, but the remaining 28 provinces, as well.

The rural population of Afghanistan makes up the majority (over 70%) of the population and is more conservative, traditional, and mainly lives in absolute or near-absolute poverty. Afghan urbanites, in contrast, are more liberal, are connected to the internet, and enjoy high levels of disposable income thanks to an aid-dependent bubble economy which has provided cash and other unaccounted wealth.
Early on, the Afghan government understood this issue and tried to address it with a rigorous rural development agenda, but lost focus along the way.

Afghanistan’s interim-presidential administration led by Hamid Karzai recognized this threat and designed several comprehensive national rural development programs under the initiative of the then-Finance Minister and current President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani. These initiatives, such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Rural Access Program (NRAP), National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) amongst others, were intended to provide block grants to self-organized, democratic and self-governed community councils around the country.

These grants would be used to fund the priorities identified by the local councils to improve their communities and improve accessibility to urban centers by building rural roads and providing micro-loans for their household and business needs. However, after almost a decade, none of these programs are sustainable and are heavily dependent on foreign aid and management.

Additionally, these programs were community development projects rather than projects designed to drive nationwide productivity and growth to provide mass employment and serve as important drivers of the rural Afghan economy. More often than not, they have been essential elements of an unsustainable subsistence economy in the rural parts of the country.

The Politics of Inequality: Access to Public Office, Rampant Poverty, Collateral Damage, Discrimination, and Ethnic Politics

Family politics is returning to Afghanistan. Once-thriving under the former King Zahir Shah, years of communist rule and war weakened this institution. One of the main reasons why people sympathized with the two communist factions of Khalq (The People) and Parcham (The Flag) was due to growing frustrations over the increasing monopoly on power and resources by many of the families close to the then-king and his court. Today—by several estimates—the politics, economics, and finances of Afghanistan are in the hands of a few families which enriched themselves through holding high public office, receiving millions of dollars of foreign military contracts, and through exercising a tight grip over the Afghan private sector.

The vast majority of Afghanistan’s wealth is in the hands of a few hundred individuals with strong political ties to the Afghan government. Today, 10% of the wealthiest Afghans control the economy and politics of a country where the majority of the population cannot meet their daily basic needs. Additionally, the social and economic upward and sideways mobility—which is expected in a dynamic economy—is absent in the Afghan context. The Afghan economic and political landscape is increasingly monopolized by a few families, individuals, and political parties with whom one must have a relationship with to enter into public office.

The Economics of Inequality: Foreign Aid and the Dilemma of Balanced Development versus Unbalanced Development

The flow of foreign aid and easy money through foreign military contracts have created a new economic and business elite in Afghanistan. Thus, political and economic power has been concentrated in the hands of the few powerful individuals who maintain links to the Afghan government with substantial control over the Afghan private sector. Meanwhile, the fixed geography of the war in the southern and eastern regions of the country has created huge income, wealth, and economic disparities between the south and north of Afghanistan.

According to the World Bank’s provincial briefs of Afghanistan, the poverty and inequality indicators (poverty rate, depth of poverty, the average consumption of the poor, per capita monthly total consumption and the Gini coefficient) of southern Afghanistan are almost several times higher than those in the northern sectors of the country. In addition, due to persistent insecurity in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report (2012-3013) shows that the percentage of vulnerable population groups at high risk of poverty, malnutrition, and disease (female-headed households, children, women, addicts, and the elderly) are almost double those in northern and western Afghanistan. This intra-regional and provincial inequality, coupled with a lack of access to essential services and economic opportunities, is cause for serious alarm.

Afghanistan’s economy is increasingly moving towards a narco-mafia model where a few families throughout the country control the private sector and public offices both at the national and subnational level. According to a recent report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), nearly all major contracts are won by a few wealthy and well-connected business with ties to senior government officials (ministers, governors, deputy ministers, amongst others). When a senior official then enters a line of business, small businesses tend to voluntarily opt out of the market, be intimidated, or are otherwise forced to quit.

The perception that competing against a political “strongman” is a futile effort is quite common among those who run smaller and medium‐sized businesses. Monopolization also indicates the exclusivity of markets. The market in Afghanistan is run by a limited number of actors, making the Afghan market an oligopoly wherein a few sellers or providers of services dominate the entire market, evidencing the extent of market failure and capture by criminal, mafia, and other corrupt networks.

This evidence points to shrinking business opportunities for both medium and small enterprises in the Afghan economy and the growing monopoly of a few dominant business players over the Afghan private sector.

The Military Consequences of Inequality: The Geography of War and the Mafia Economy

The monopoly on political power, financial resources, and economic opportunities—combined with the developmental imbalances of the country provides an optimal recruitment environment from which insurgents can draw. Insurgents can attract many unemployed and disgruntled youth who believe a few corrupt officials monopolize the country in the top echelons of the country’s political and economic establishments.

Today, the majority of the Taliban’s foot soldiers are unemployed youth from the most impoverished and underdeveloped areas of Afghanistan. Many of these youth are seasonal fighters who work in the fields during harvest season and fight for the rest of the year precisely due to lack of descent employment opportunities and a grudge against the country’s so-called “overnight millionaires” who are seen as American collaborators and incredibly corrupt.

Further marginalizing and encouraging people to distance themselves from the current government is the concentration of power at the subnational level in the hands of rural elites and tribal chiefs with connections to the presidential administration.

Inclusive Institutions, Politics, and Balanced Development: The Difficult Road Ahead

Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards being an oligopoly, with extractive political and economic institutions. The increasing amount of wealth and political power under the control of a small minority of Afghans is increasingly marginalizing the vast majority of the country’s population—largely in rural Afghanistan. Particularly within the country’s historical context, this is cause for alarm. Rural Afghans have often initiated regimes changes due to the negligence of political leaders, policymakers, and politicians in Kabul and other cities who often lose touch with the realities of rural life.

The new Afghan president should make Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) the driver of the Afghan economy and break the tight grip of the few families and individuals have over the country’s economy and the private sector. Balanced development of the country and equitable allocation of financial resources and business opportunities is essential for an inclusive and secure Afghanistan.

The Price of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January 2019—in a landmark turn of events—the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted and ordered the immediate release of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy and placed on death row in 2010. While her release was cause for celebration among Pakistan’s political liberals, it greatly angered religious conservatives and those on the extreme right-wing of Pakistan’s political spectrum. 

Clerics like Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) party started demonstrating by blocking roads in Pakistan’s major cities and paralyzing the country, as well as making calls to extremist elements in government and the country’s Armed Forces to mutiny and overthrow or kill judges involved in the verdict, Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa – essentially an open call for sedition. Party workers were also responsible for vandalizing and burning vehicles across the country’s urban areas.

Aasia had been jailed since 2010, on death row for violating Pakistan’s ambiguous blasphemy laws. Anyone who spoke out in support of her, who violated blasphemy laws, or simply spoke out against the laws themselves found themselves under attack from religious conservatives and right-wing extremists. Nobody was safe; in 2011 Salman Taseer, the sitting Punjab governor, was gunned in Islamabad by his bodyguard for speaking out against the court’s verdict. His assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, was hailed by the religious right as a hero. 

The laws themselves are subject to intense criticism by human rights organizations and Pakistan’s Supreme Courts. The laws are ambiguously written and open to interpretation, thus undermining the rule of law. Accusations of blasphemy are enough to warrant mob violence and vigilantism. Indeed, there is a precedent for such violence taking place, especially against minorities. 

Negotiating From a Position of Weakness

These recent events and the protests forced Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government to enter negotiations with the protesters to end the demonstrations— a counterintuitive approach to ending the crisis while maintaining Pakistan’s internal sovereignty and security.

Khan’s government announced plans were to place Aasia on the ECL and for her case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, all to appease the TLP while undermining the judiciary and putting her life in danger. Since those negotiations were conducted, the government denied her exit from the country, despite talks for asylum with the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Recently, however, the petition to have the case reviewed was overturned, meaning that Aasia was (and is at the time of writing) a free woman.

The denial of safe passage for Aasia greatly angered Pakistani liberals while also putting the relatively new PTI government in a precarious position, stripping it of support and legitimacy. Concessions to extremists—let alone the mere act of entering into negotiations—are detrimental to not only the survival of the Khan’s government but to Pakistan’s national security, as well.

There is at least a decade of precedent that evidences the counterintuitive nature of negotiating with extremists. Doing so weakens the state and empowers extremists and militants. To fulfill the demands of extremists is to invite further challenge, which, in turn, requires further concessions to resolve. 

Khan entered into negotiations on the back foot; he approached the TLP to convince them to cease demonstrations, as the blocking of major roads in Karachi and other big cities had paralyzed the country and would adversely impact Pakistan’s already weak economy. Khan was negotiating from a position of weakness, as he perceived the deal as a political necessity instead of restoring social order.

Militant Groups Rarely, if Ever, Uphold Their End of the Deal

This is not the first time the state has attempted negotiation out of necessity. The Swat Agreement is probably the most notable instance of state capitulation in Pakistan’s history. The agreement, signed in April 2009, essentially handed control of the Swat Valley over to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to induce the group to cease hostilities and terrorist attacks. 

The terms of the agreement allowed the TTP, led by Maulana Fazlullah, to set up Sharia courts within the areas of Swat and Malakand, from where the state had agreed to withdraw its troops. Both sides got what they wanted, and a short cessation of hostilities was observed, with emphasis on the word “short.” By mid-April (the same month the agreement was signed), the TTP had forcibly taken over a police station in Swat, breaking the terms of the deal.

The issue with negotiating with non-state actors in Pakistan merely is that it is not possible to bind the militants to the terms of an agreement. They are not a state agency, nor is there any overarching authority governing their actions. Though the TLP are not militants or terrorists, they violate the function of the state by blocking major roads, therefore obstructing commerce, policing, and the public’s general movement. 

Alongside their blockade, TLP followers and workers were seen vandalizing cars and public transport, a clear violation of the Pakistan Penal Code. Given this behavior and based on the TLP’s historical failure to follow through on promises, Khan shouldn’t have entered into negotiations in the first place. 

Negotiation, in this instance, is a poor strategy given the nature of the TLP as an organization. To understand why, one must look at the ideology of the TLP and the teachings of Barelvi Islam. Like Deobandism, Barelviism was developed in India in the 19^th Century. However, unlike Deobandism, there is little to no influence from Salafism or Wahabbism.

The TLP and other Barelvi groups do not share the aims of Deobandi extremist groups like the TTP, such as implementing Sharia Law or creation of a new Islamic state. Barelvis instead preach the prophethood and finality of Muhammad (PBUH). This is a problem.

The Influence of Barelvi Islam on Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan

The TLP and extremist Barelvi preachers can reach and influence more people than their Deobandi counterparts. The TTP’s goal of implementing Sharia law doesn’t resonate with all Muslims in Pakistan, whereas merely preaching about the Prophet will resonate with the core beliefs of a much larger segment of Muslims in Pakistan. This, coupled with the TLP’s hardline anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy-related rhetoric has created a situation where increasing numbers of people are influenced to hold negative views towards Ahmadis and engage in vigilantism against accused blasphemers.

The Barelvi ideology resonates with a large proportion of Muslims and reaches a large population throughout the Indian subcontinent. Because of this, religious minorities are more likely to be subjected to violence, harassment, and discrimination. From a strategic communications perspective, the immense size of the target audience presents a high risk to security in Southeast Asia, as there are more Muslims in the Indian subcontinent than in the Middle East and North Africa.

Negotiation with extremists, violent or otherwise, empowers such groups and harms national security. By negotiating with the TLP, Khan is enabling it and similar groups to engage in extrajudicial murder, terrorism, and a wide range of other criminal activity. Because of the scale of audience that could potentially be influenced by extremist messaging, such groups pose a threat to the long-term security of Pakistan and the broader region.

Negotiating With Extremists Threatens Pakistan’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban held its fourth round of direct talks with the United States in January of 2019. This month the group revealed it will participate in a fifth meeting with the aim of agreeing on a set of issues and to craft a framework for ending the war that began with the U.S. invasion in 2001. The widely-lauded meeting between more than fifty Taliban and Afghan political figures in Moscow this month was simply unprecedented, and an important step forward to ending years of stalemate and creating the conditions for direct inter-Afghan dialogue.

The significance of these meetings can be discerned from their venues, timing, participants, and the progressive nature of the discussions. The presence, involvement and engagement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati representatives—countries with significant influence on the Taliban—have undoubtedly raised the stakes of the events.

The Afghan government, an essential factor in the process, has been left out of any meetings with Taliban on the latter’s insistence. However, if both the U.S. and Taliban proceed with good faith and achieve mutually-agreeable progress, the meetings could ultimately pave the way for direct talks between Taliban and Afghan officials—with increased engagement and support from Afghan political elites.

The U.S. and its coalition partners appear to believe they have exhausted almost all military options that would effectuate an end to the Afghan conflict and thus have come to the conclusion that to withdraw forces—something the Trump administration is seriously considering,—political and diplomatic options that would entail some combination of restraint, compromise, and incentives must be considered.

The United States’ demands of the Taliban are clear: the Taliban must abandon support for global terrorist groups, it must not use Afghanistan as a base from which to stage attacks against the United States or its interests, and it must cease using violence and enter into talks with the Afghan government. There is a greater realization on the part of the Taliban as well that it cannot achieve a decisive victory—let alone overtake the state—despite years of inflicting heavy losses on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and expanding the territory it controls.

The Taliban has every reason to maximize its return from the talks. The resilience of its forces, a strict adherence to a battlefield chain of command, increasingly diversified foreign support, and—most importantly—its operational advantage in the harsh conditions of rural Afghanistan make it simply insurmountable. Yet, the Taliban also has its own calculations and realizes that no matter its leverage in peace talks, the return of the Islamic Emirate is beyond reach. Afghans, including Taliban sympathizers in most rural parts of the country, simply demand better lives than they had under the Taliban for the price they have paid to endure the last eighteen years of conflict and misery. However, the Taliban continues to hold onto its traditional demands which include withdrawal of foreign forces, release of prisoners, lifting of sanctions, changes to the constitution with greater provision for sharia law, and a practical roadmap for its inclusion in power sharing and governance. Furthermore, the Taliban recently asked for a permanent end to U.S./NATO air strikes targeting its fighters.

Then there is the matter of Pakistan, another essential element of the Afghan conflict. Some, including the U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, have stated that Kabul is where the subject of peace in Afghanistan will be decided. Others argue that Islamabad is the ultimate decider. The question isn’t so much about where the key to peace in Afghanistan is, but rather, it is fundamentally one of whether now is the time to use that key.

The reality is that peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan. If Pakistan has genuinely succumbed to U.S. pressure and is ready to end its rigorously institutionalized support for the Taliban insurgency, and is genuinely willing to cooperate in the peace and reconciliation process, the possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict is more real now than at anytime previously.

As it stands, as agreed in Doha, both the U.S. and the Taliban officials are expected to meet again this month. Assuming that the Taliban and U.S. reach an agreement that includes a timetable for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces— a non-negotiable precondition for the Taliban—the next step will be an effective inter-Afghan dialogue. Are the two sides ready and able to make peace? Will the Taliban agree to talk with the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG)? Is NUG prepared to reach and implement a settlement that would entail substantial concessions, including significant legislative amendments and political accommodation? More importantly, does President Ghani have the domestic political backing essential to enter into a durable peace treaty with the Taliban and honor certain demands? To consider this and other key questions, a review of the reality on the ground in Afghanistan is necessary.

Is Peace Within Reach?

The Taliban has thus far refused to directly negotiate with Ghani’s National Unity Government, which it views as a puppet of the West with no authority or legitimacy to make decisions or to represent the will of the nation. Instead, it has insisted on first talking only to the U.S. To date, the Taliban has had one meeting with Afghan political leaders, and it is likely they will meet again.

At a conference in Geneva in November of 2018, Ghani presented a five-phase approach for the negotiating process. First, the Afghan government will hold direct talks with the Taliban, followed by discussions with Pakistan and the United States. Then, regional actors and the Arab-Islamic world will be included, and finally, NATO and non-NATO countries. At the moment, what has been happening is precisely the opposite of what Ghani envisioned. The U.S. and the Taliban have had four direct meetings. In between which, U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad visited Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., India, and Qatar to consult with their officials. Ghani’s government is, so far, not even in the game despite the president’s recent attempts to soften his tone.

According to recent projections by military experts and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)¹ the Taliban controls nearly fifty percent of the territory in Afghanistan. While this figure is contested, the Taliban has an active presence in seventy percent of the country. Afghanistan remains a largely rural country with less than twenty eight percent of its population living in the cities.²

Even though the government predominantly controls the cities and urban areas, the rural territory is either under Taliban control or at best is contested.³ This leaves the Taliban at a distinct advantage as only a small proportion of the rural territory effectively remains in control of the government. In case of a peace settlement, it is highly unlikely the group would be willing to cede any control it has thus far gained and power to a government it ultimately considers to be illegitimate. Unsurprisingly, in response to Ghani’s offer of a Kabul office for the Taliban made during a recent visit to Nangarhar province, the Taliban restated its position that it will not, under any circumstances, talk with Ghani’s government.

It is an open secret that a significant portion of the Taliban’s income that used to run its war machine is generated from illegal taxation, opium, extortion, and ransoms, among other means. Drugs make up at least sixty percent of the Taliban’s income, a figure estimated at between $300 and $400 million each year.⁴ Furthermore, militia groups make more than $50 million annually from the mining industry, which is harvesting talc, chromite, marble and precious stones.

Foreign funding is another significant source of revenue for the Taliban. Although not easy to measure as these transactions are primarily carried out in unofficial and unregulated ways, including the hawala system, most experts estimate this funding to be between $200 to $300 million a year—coming mostly from the Gulf states. The fundamental question is what incentives will the NUG offer to the Taliban? Will the peace dividend for a local Taliban commander match what he currently makes each month as the result of the group’s drug trafficking and criminal activity, it’s myriad of other business ventures, and foreign funding?

Despite describing its direct talks with the United States as highly agenda-driven and articulate, the Taliban seems to lack a clear political objective. Unlike Hizbi Islami, which, at the time of its negotiations with the NUG⁵ had a clearer picture of how it might govern from Kabul, articulating what an end-state might look like and how some of its conditions could be feasibly implemented in a settlement has been a challenge for the Taliban. This is partly because the group realizes the limited degree of its acceptability within mainstream Afghan society.⁶

What is clear though is that the Taliban will demand a clear, comprehensive, and guaranteed plan from the Afghan government for its social, economic, and political needs—even if the group itself is lacking one. At almost every meeting, the Taliban has articulated its now-familiar demands, but beyond that, it struggles with how it sees itself back in the country. What form of a government will work? What specific laws would need to be changed? Will it respect the democratic processes and elections or will it only seek a share power with the existing government? In response to a question in Moscow related to power sharing, the Taliban’s chief envoy Sher Mohammad Abas Stanekzai said, “the Taliban has a clear roadmap for how to work with all political groups in the country to form a government based on the Sharia law.” Obviously, this isn’t enough even if the group had such a plan.

For its part, Ghani’s government is fraught with numerous problems. It might even be incorrect to call it a full and functioning government given that it has never had a full cabinet. For over fourteen months (May 2017 – July 2018), Ghani’s first Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum was in exile; currently, he is dispossessed of his authority and denied permission to attend cabinet and National Security Council meetings. More than half of the government’s twenty-five ministries and dozens of independent bodies have remained without legal heads since his presidency.

Ghani’s closest and top policy-making team is, at its best, made up of many junior, inexperienced individuals with no authority to make decisions. Despite Ghani’s obsession with bringing the country’s younger generation to the government, he has failed to find a practical balance in government recruitment. His administration has had a penchant for disregarding necessary qualifications for some of the most senior positions and has made hasty appointments. This is partly because he is deeply insecure and has a severe trust deficit. Moreover, a textbook micromanager, Ghani involves himself in every detail of the country’s business. This situation has caused serious problems for both the government and the state as a whole.

The security situation within Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Since the NUG was formed in 2015, More than one million Afghans have fled the country due to a lack of jobs and increasing insecurity and uncertainty. According to UNAMA, from 2015 to 2018, civilian casualties caused by both Taliban attacks and ANDSF operations reached nearly 35,000—the highest number since the civil war in the 1990s—almost half of whom are women, children and elderly.⁷

In a recent interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Ghani admitted that the ANDSF had lost up to 45,000 personnel since he took power.⁸ a figure that still seems modest when one consider the average casualties on a daily basis. Despite massive support from the U.S. and other NATO nations to strengthen the ANDSF, its institutions remain weak, disorganized, corrupt, and void of morale. Most importantly, political stability, the most critical indicator of a nation’s prosperity, is seriously crumbling. Afghanistan’s history has shown that when any leader ignored this element of polity, his demise and destruction was certain.

King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), President Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978), and Mullah Mohammad Omar Hotak (1994-1998) are only few examples of leaders whose individualistic, hasty, and poorly conceived approach to changing the country overnight put the country on the verge of destruction. To their credit, perhaps none of these leaders had any ill intent, rather it was their respective individual characters that led to their downfall. Regrettably, we are seeing similar trends today. While the mainstream political elites may be highly divided, when it comes to their relations with NUG, they have never been so united.⁹

The Afghan government’s foreign diplomacy is in shambles. Ghani’s day-to-day business with some of the most powerful and complicated countries in the region— Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—appears to be guided by books he has read. It has become commonplace these days that when Ghani or his policy team makes a statement on any issue, they then change their minds shortly thereafter. This shows a lack of strategic thinking and experience in the presidential palace. At a time when the future of the country is being debated on the world stage, the NUG’s diplomacy is seriously faltering. The government needs to demonstrate creative diplomacy, statecraft, and political ingenuity now, more than ever.

Recommendations for Policymaking

In light of the above and assuming that the Taliban will ultimately enter into an inter-Afghan dialogue, the following six points may help to guide participants in the Afghan peace process toward a successful and lasting outcome:

1. The government must go beyond a mere plan on paper and demonstrate its readiness to provide concessions based on the fundamental demands of the Taliban. President Ghani has spoken about roadmaps, plans or strategy, but has offered no details or evidence to indicate that a plan is in place. Any peace talks would require a plan that has immediate results and is based on, at a minimum, national consensus building, recognition of the Taliban as a political party, transitional confidence-building measures, a lifting of sanctions, release of prisoners, the reintegration of Taliban fighters and relocation of senior Taliban members along with their families. Ghani’s recent call for a possible Loya Jira (Grand Council) to discuss peace is a welcome step to engage in dialogues with Taliban, although that doesn’t seem to change the Taliban’s calculation about him.
2. At the moment, the biggest challenge for Ghani is securing a strong national support base for peace with the Taliban in Kabul, let alone in the rest of the country. The current situation, beset by a highly fragile political environment and pervasive security threats, calls for thinking beyond daily business. It is time to begin a meaningful national dialogue. Ghani must reprioritize his time and demonstrate leadership by facing reality. Afghans are frustrated with empty promises and by a lack of measurable progress. Every peace has a price, and strong leadership is needed to convince the majority of the country that it is in their interest to shoulder this cost. As such, if the Taliban continue to deny talking with the NUG, but is willing to talk to other Afghans, Ghani must not block it, let the process begin and must instead help a council of prominent Afghan leaders and politicians who can advance the talks. The government can serve as a coordinator of the process and can gradually take a more substantive role as was the case in negotiations with Hizb Islami successfully led by former National Security Advisor, Haneef Atmar, who is now a contender for the country’s presidency.
3. If the Taliban continues its rejection of talks with the Afghan government as a legitimate and trustworthy party with the authority to make a peace settlement work, the upcoming presidential elections may be a perfect opportunity for the group to talk to the new government. The current talks will take time and can be advanced by a future government. The period between now and the formation of the new government will be critical for both parties, however. It will also provide an opportunity for Taliban representatives to reach out to political leaders and, most importantly, potential presidential candidates to understand their visions and plans for peace. For its part, the Taliban can begin to explore its own future reconciliation and reintegration in Afghan society and the resolution of grievances. They must not forget that this war has affected millions of Afghans. Perhaps the biggest challenge for any future government will be to heal the wounds, pains, and suffering of the nation.
4. While Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is unlikely to completely cease in the near future, recent developments give cause for cautious optimism. These developments include the death of Maulana Samiul Haq, known as the father of Taliban, the release of key Taliban leaders including Mullah Berader, former Deputy to the Taliban leader who was recently named by Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhund as head of the Taliban political office in Doha; security reinforcement measures by Pakistani military along the Durand Line and the role Pakistan played in encouraging Taliban to meet with U.S. in Abu Dhabi and Doha. If Pakistan is truly committed to resolve the Afghan conflict, there is every reason to expect a settlement, even if talks take a longer amount of time. However, Pakistan needs to do much more in order to gain the confidence of the U.S. and the Afghans. For years, Pakistan has been playing a double game in which it does just enough on the surface to get incentives from the U.S., while still supporting the Taliban in the shadows.
5. There have been talks about forming an interim government with the Taliban to facilitate its full participation in future political activities. The Taliban has, however, denied that it has made such a proposition as many Afghans reacted negatively to the idea calling it a return to the country’s dark times after enduring tremendous sacrifices for so long. While holding timely and successful elections planned for July this year may be a challenging task for the Afghan government and its current weak and incompetent electoral bodies, it still can be the best possible option to show the country is moving ahead. Given the urgency of peace, if the current talks between the U.S. and the Taliban produce results, many Afghans will most likely be ready to accept another delay in elections or continue the talks with a newly elected government rather than having an interim government. Given the country’s history and the widening fractures within the Afghan political elites, it will be a mistake to expect a smooth transition beyond an interim government just like early 1990s. However, if talks do not yield results beyond March, elections will be the only and best way to go in July, yet the current momentum for achieving peace must not be lost.
6. Since President Ghani is running for a second term, he must respect the independence of the electoral bodies and avoid using state resources to manipulate the electoral timeline and process. The international community that supports and observes the Afghan elections must ensure that between now and July both the IEC and the NUG undertake the necessary measures to address the key technical and security concerns. Moreover, to increase confidence and public trust in the outcome of the election, Ghani and Abdullah’s term must officially end by April 20. During the period between April 20 to July 20, 2019, both the NUG and the international partners can focus on issues that can strengthen the capacity of the electoral bodies, in order to ensure they have sufficient technical resources and most importantly improve security and confidence in the country. Meanwhile, the most crucial issue will be to continue supporting peace initiatives—including aiming to achieve and maintain a ceasefire.

¹ SIGAR, Quarterly Reports, October 30, 2018
² World Population Review: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan-population/
cities/
³ There are areas in rural Afghanistan where no one has control. In some of these areas, the government operates for certain hours of the daylight and then Taliban emerge at night or vis versa.
⁴ Interview with Afghan Security Officials, September 2018.
⁵ Afghan government signed a peace accord with the Afghan insurgent group – Hizbi Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in September 2016 after nearly 18 months of negotiations.
⁶ While Taliban will undoubtedly continue to enjoy support of local communities in rural areas, which can be significant in case it enters talks and competes in politics, it will be viewed as the least favourable in the mainstream political scene.
⁷ UNAMA civilian casualty Report, 2018
⁸ CNN Anchor, Fareed Zakaria’s Conversation With President Ghani during World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting (2019) In Davos, Switzerland, January 25, 2019
⁹ Their recent rejection of Ghani’s call for joining the Peace Consultation Board was a clear sign of their distaste of the NUG. Following a presidential decree that formed a peace consultative board comprising of the majority of the influential political and Jehadi leaders, a majority of them rejected the offer or simply ignored it. The leaders who did not attend the board’s first meeting included former President Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, First Vice President Dustom, Professor Sayaf, Hazrat Mujaddadi, Mohammad Asif Muhsini, Mohamamd Younus Qanooni, Ismail Khan, Atta Noor, Sayed Mansoor Naderi and Sayed Hamed Gailani.

The Twin Goals of Peace and Elections in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many countries, both regional and global powers, are working in Afghanistan to secure their interests in Southeast Asia. Afghanistan’s strategic location is of substantial value for India; increased and ongoing engagement in the country by India is likely.   India’s foreign policy goals are centered on enhancing India’s economic and political influence in Asia and around the world.  For instance, India’s long-term economic development will be assured if trade corridors are opened to connect India with Central Asian countries, and ultimately Europe through Afghanistan. This economic growth, in turn, will support increased Indian political influence throughout Southeast and Central Asia. Ensuring pro-Indian governments and sustained internal stability in Afghanistan are critical factors in cementing Indian regional hegemony.

India has been aggressively investing in the Middle East and Central Asia, with some of the more prominent initiatives being the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the acquisition and development of the Chabahar port in Iran. Both examples illustrate India’s substantial economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. Ensuring the flow of oil from oil-rich Central Asian states is crucial for India’s continued economic growth. According to the Economic Times, India is the third-largest importer of crude oil in the world. Some Indian officials have categorized India’s dependency on oil imports as an economic crisis. India has been urgently seeking alternative sources of crude oil in the region, in an effort to diversify in light of sanctions imposed by the United States on the Iranian oil industry, and Saudi Arabia’s close alignment with India’s arch-rival Pakistan.

India seeks to expand commerce and trade throughout Central Asia and Eurasia. India’s growing economy requires access to substantial energy resources like those found throughout the Eurasian landmass. Indian companies see tremendous opportunity for growth, as they are well-positioned to provide Central Asian states with technology and services. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Lapis Lazuli transit corridor in the region are competing to India’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that they can marginalize India’s trade in the region. The INSTC connects India to Russia, central Asian countries, Baltic, Nordic and Arctic regions. It is an Indian version of Chinese One belt One Road Initiative.

Should the United States lose a substantial amount of influence in Afghanistan, India’s goals of regional hegemony will be difficult to achieve. The U.S. expects India to play an increasingly major role in the region—particularly in Afghanistan.  India is connected with Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. Given that Iran is presently sanctioned by the U.S., Afghanistan is seen as a more viable option. While there are certainly discouraging factors—such as a lack of security—for heightened engagement in Afghanistan, there are a number of factors which could induce expanded regional cooperation. India is not only a major energy market for Central Asian energy, but it is also a way for smaller states to balance against China. Those countries who supply India with energy through Afghanistan could, theoretically, play a part in ensuring Afghanistan’s stabilization to facilitate efficient energy trade.

Neither Pakistan nor China is in favor of a substantive Indian presence in Afghanistan. Both countries have their own historical issues with India. From a strictly economic perspective, India’s activities in the region are seen by China as a threat to its ambitious BRI. For instance, Iran supports the INSTC as it would facilitate the export of Iranian natural gas and oil to Europe. India has also invested in port infrastructure in Iran in an apparent effort to disconnect Afghanistan from Pakistan. Additionally, India’s efforts to build hydropower dams along rivers in Afghanistan that flow into Pakistan and Iran is evidence of India’s strategic interests in the country, and will be hard-pressed to relinquish influence—even after a U.S. withdrawal.

India must extend assistance and support to the Afghan government in a way that benefits both countries to ensure India’s interests in the region. U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan are in alignment, as are both powers’ respective strategic goals. Therefore, it would be pragmatic for India to take advantage of the opportunities being provided by the U.S. One such opportunity being the exemption to specific Iranian sanctions granted to India by the U.S. State Department. The exemption will allow for the Indian-led development of a port in Iran as part of a transportation corridor designed to boost Afghanistan’s economy. India will have a harder time achieving its goals without support from the U.S and NATO, as Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan, coupled with China’s growing influence in Central Asia are major obstacles to India’s dreams of hegemony.

India’s Strategy for Regional Hegemony Depends on Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eighteen candidates have registered themselves for what is ultimately expected to be a tight race between the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani and his charismatic former National Security Advisor, Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has assembled a strong team of political heavyweights. Both known for their strong credentials as visionaries and leaders, they have embraced a progressive agenda for Afghanistan are anti-corruption advocates.

However, the two men have different approaches to governance; President Ghani is known to be short-tempered, impatient, and a results-based micromanager while Haneef Atmar has a reputation as a patient, strategic thinker and as a unifying figure who calls for moderation, inclusivity, and a broad-based government. Many political analysts predict that they might unite in the event of a second round given the complementary nature of their respective qualities, a fact which made them win the first presidential election of the post-Hamid Karzai era.

Afghan elections have always been chaotic but are a manifestation of how far the country has come.  Former archrivals are now settling scores at the ballot box, not with bullets. One of the highlights of the upcoming election is the candidacy of the infamous warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who once fought a bloody civil war against his rivals over the control of capital Kabul and until recently considered the Afghan government to be an illegitimate puppet. He later reconsidered and now seeks the Afghan presidency.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s current Chief Executive Officer and former foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, known to be a chronic campaigner, is a candidate for the fourth time. Out of five elections, Abdullah’s name has been on the ballot in four of them. This election is a clash between political titans who have different visions for a post-U.S. Afghanistan that is more self-reliant. This narrative is already present in the rhetoric used by the candidates; terms such as “Afghanization”. “ownership,” “standing on our own feet,” and “taking responsibility” are some of the buzzwords used by the candidates to signal preparation for a post-American future in Afghanistan.

What is on the Ballot?

The 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be a referendum on the devolution of power from the presidency to provincial units versus further centralization of power in the administration. With no constitutional justification, President Ghani has removed the Chief Executive Office, which created on the basis of the National Unity Government agreement mediated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and has called for a strong, centralized, and united presidency. Ghani’s his main rival, Mohammad Haneef Atmar,  has pledged to further devolve the powers of the presidency by creating a third vice president position and an Executive Prime Minister office after the approval of an Afghan Loya Jirga.

Many fear that, if left unchecked, both cases pose a real danger to the governance structures and overall unity of the country. On the one hand, there is concern that a centralized state in the hands of President Ghani, given his temperament and impatience, could descend into authoritarianism. On the other side, further devolution of power and the creation of a Prime Minister’s office could pave the way for federalism and the subsequent disintegration of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the 2019 elections represent a contest between two generations of Afghan politicians and political activists, and between two different visions of the country’s future. The first is the old generation, a mixture of jihadi-communists and royalists. The second group is the new generation of post-9/11 Afghans, mostly educated in the West and adhere to western values of democracy, freedom of speech, and fundamental human rights. The standard bearer of each of these visions will set the tone of the Afghan political landscape for many years to come.

Whoever takes the helm will have the tough job of providing security and developing a stagnant Afghan economy in light of dwindling U.S. resources and interest in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a divided and chaotic region is resulting in geopolitical spillover effects on the security and political situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace, security, the economy, and a balanced foreign policy will be critical priorities for the next Afghan presidential administration.

The Tyranny of Duality: Elections or Peace Process.

A new class of Afghan elites, politicians, and former officials have joined the Taliban in calling for an interim administration and the postponing the presidential election to a later date to accommodate the ongoing peace talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Many others don’t see the peace talks and the election as mutually exclusive. Instead, they see them as complementary and parallel to one another.

Both the peace talks and presidential elections can proceed concurrently for three purposes. The first is to put pressure on the Taliban to participate in the elections. The second purpose is to demonstrate the realities of a new Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the third being that the candidates can use peace as a rallying point to boost public opinion for the peace and reconciliation process. The choice should not be between either the election or peace talks, but rather both the peace process and the Afghan presidential elections can be mutually inclusive, complementing one another.

The Crisis of Afghan Electoral Bodies

The ineffectiveness, incompetence, and politicization of Afghanistan’s electoral bodies are primarily rooted in two areas. The first is a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government to build strong, impartial, and competent bodies. The second is the failure of the United Nations and the international community at-large to efficiently invest donor money and resources in electoral bodies to build capacity and systems.  These two factors are the key drivers of many of the problems within Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) today.

Successive Afghan governments and UN mission chiefs vowed to address these problems but to no avail; dozens of roadmaps and electoral reform programs were drawn up to overhaul the electoral bodies’ legal and policy frameworks significantly, but many of those plans remained on paper. Successive Afghan governments saw it as being to their benefit to keep Afghan electoral bodies weak to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities will give a government the opportunity to machinate and engineer the results of elections.

Afghan elections are considered to be one of the costliest elections per capita in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the logistical and security arrangements for elections in the country. Generous donations from various donor countries provide these funds. For Afghans to be able to afford elections in future, they will have to fundamentally change the economics of their electoral system and switch to more affordable technologies. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s electoral bodies require a significant legal, policy, and operational overhaul. At present, however, it seems impossible to carry out such a process given the limited timeframe, the risks of the election being engineered, and a lack of trust. Many in Afghanistan question the legitimacy of any election held under the current legal, policy, and institutional structures.

The Role of Kingmakers

The Afghan kingmakers are three distinct groups which play an essential role in shaping and paving the way for any potential candidate to win the seat of the presidency in the country. The first group depend of personalities such as former President Hamid Karzai, Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Atta Noor, among others. The second group is made up of influential families such as legendary former commander Masood’s family, former Vice President Marshal Fahim’s family, the Mojaddidi family, the Gilani family, and others. The third and final group are foreign powers in the region, the broader Islamic world, and the United States..

As of now, the majority of these factors favor the incumbent’s main rival, former National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has garnered the support of many of these personalities, families, and countries. However, unseating an incumbent president remains a difficult task given the state of the resources at his disposal.

The Role of the United States and the Region in the Afghan Elections

Regional and global politics have always played out in the Afghan elections with rival countries supporting one or several Afghan candidates to win favors with the Afghan political elites.  The support of external actors in the Afghan election scene has mainly been through three mediums: campaign money, propaganda through their state media outlets, and by leveraging their influence through proxies in favor or against one candidate or the other.

Unfortunately, these bitter realities still have not changed and play out in the Afghan electoral scene. It is increasingly evident that this time there will be three types of candidates from a geopolitical viewpoint which will face off in the Afghan presidential race: a candidate of the region, a candidate of the West, and others. In previous races, one or two of the candidates have been favored by both the region and the west, but in this race, it is clear that the preferred candidate(s) of regional powers differs from the candidate(s) favored by the United States and the West.

Afghan Elections: Unifiers or Dividers?

Elections are double-edged swords in post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. Elections can be both a unifying entity and a divisive power. In Libya. an election drove a large divide in a country where there are two administrations in two capitals. The last presidential election in Afghanistan could have resulted similarly, sending Afghanistan into disarray and a bloody civil if not for the wisdom and farsightedness of the candidates and the diplomatic skills of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

This time around, the threat of a disputed or drawn-out election remains. The legitimacy and acceptability of the presidential race depends upon the conduct of the electoral bodies and on the incumbent not to use government resources for campaign purposes. In fact, there is a high risk of a “non-government” this time if we the election is disputed.

Afghanistan’s presidential elections are set for July 2019, typically the peak of the Taliban’s summer offensive which will detrimentally impact the security and accessibility of electoral sites, which will be highly vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban attacks. Thus, certain population centers and pockets of Afghan towns and cities will be prevented from voting in the presidential elections. Such an outcome could lead to questions about the credibility and viability of the elections.

What to Expect: Winners and Losers

Many experts believe that due to the high number of candidates and a divided electoral landscape, the Afghan elections will go to a second round between the two candidates who manage to secure the most votes. In this case, many experts believe a runoff would be between the incumbent and his former National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar. Success will be contingent upon the coalition building and negotiation skills of both candidates. There is also the chance of a coalition government to avoid a deadlock.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the election won’t be held in the event of a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban, or if U.S. President Donald Trump makes an abrupt decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Of course, nobody can predict the future, but if history is any indicator, it seems highly likely that the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be tightly contested and will result in a runoff vote, followed by drawn-out negotiation period until the formation of the next Afghan government.

The Politics of Ballots over Bullets: Afghan Elections and Peace Process was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies have deployed cutting-edge aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. What is missing, however, is good human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities. Afghans have been entrusted with the task of HUMINT collection, but multiple Taliban infiltration and sabotage operations illustrate the need for comprehensive reform of Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

The Afghan intelligence community requires a robust overhaul. This includes investment in both human and technical capabilities alongside a comprehensive reform program. Afghanistan’s intelligence community is comprised of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Police Intelligence (PI) and Military Intelligence (MI). Some coordination centers, including Tawheed, NASRAT, and the Presidential Information Coordination Center (PICC) connect and share strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence between the individual agencies.

Regarding organizational hierarchy, the Afghan intelligence community is structured like a pyramid, with the powerful National Directorate of Security at the top. The NDS oversees Afghanistan’s overall intelligence machinery as it pertains to both internal and external security.

Though vested with substantial powers, the Afghan intelligence community has become heavily politicized and suffers from a lack of investment coupled with an old and inefficient bureaucracy. Afghanistan’s intelligence collection efforts are primarily focused on gathering HUMINT through long-standing networks of tribes, local commanders, traders, and government employees. This HUMINT is augmented with basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities.

The Five Eyes countries (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have done much to transform the Afghan intelligence community. However, more needs to be done to create professional, disciplined, and adequately equipped intelligence services. At present, arbitrary political appointments, a lack of professional intelligence schools, and the ongoing politicization of Afghanistan’s intelligence agencies have profoundly undermined their institutional integrity and credibility.

The Institutional History of Afghan Intelligence

Intelligence collection and analysis as organized tradecraft is a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan. It started with the creation of the Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat of the 18^th century King Abdul Rahman Khan. The founding father of modern Afghan intelligence is former Prime Minister and President Sardar Dawood Khan; he transformed Edara Zabt Ahwalaat Sedarat to establish the first-ever State Intelligence Services—Edara Estikhabarat Dawlati. This agency was later ideologically refined as communist governments took power with the help of the Soviet KGB, and renamed as KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD.

Today, a significant number of Afghan intelligence agents and officers are graduates of KGB training centers in Russia and former Soviet republics or satellite states such as Uzbekistan, East Germany, and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, police and military intelligence agencies were established during the communist period to conduct surveillance on political opponents, conduct counterintelligence operations and gather intelligence on criminals and crime syndicates in major urban centers.

The institutional history of the Afghan intelligence community has created legal and policy frameworks that are in dire need of reform. Updating and revising these frameworks to define and clarify the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the various intelligence agencies is essential to safeguard their legitimacy, integrity, and professionalism. At present, there is considerable overlap between the mandates and activities of Afghanistan’s military and civilian intelligence, especially in the areas of intelligence on criminal or terrorist activities, tactical-level intelligence, and strategic intelligence. These overlaps need to be clarified through a comprehensive, cross-agency review, which will serve as a road map for subsequent updates and revisions to the legal and policy frameworks used by the Afghan intelligence services.

Furthermore, robust investment is required to upgrade and equip intelligence training schools in the military and civilian sectors. These schools should be the Afghan intelligence community’s sole supplier of human capital to ensure job security, professionalism, and discipline while avoiding any politicization of the intelligence services. The only political appointees in positions of authority in the Afghan intelligence community should be the Director of the NDS and his first deputy; both should have a term limit of two to three years. The career professionals in the services must be immune from political appointments, while service chiefs and NDS personnel who have been discharged from service should be prohibited from engaging in any political or business activity for ten years. This will ensure that sensitive information they may have had access to will not be used for political or financial gain.

There is also the fact that the NDS is spread too thin. As such, there is a dire need to establish three new intelligence agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a counter-intelligence agency, and a joint intelligence committee consisting of the various intelligence service chiefs chaired by the President of Afghanistan. This improved institutional arrangement will clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency, improve oversight, increase inter-agency coordination, and enable each agency to better focus on its core mission.

The Intelligence Cycle and Modus Operandi

Afghanistan’s intelligence services currently lack a coherent methodology governing the collection and analysis of intelligence, and the delivery of final intelligence products. Little attention is paid to analyzing and corroborating raw intelligence, which is often presented as a final product. These shortcomings are primarily due to a lack of a coherent institutional culture and the absence of a system of intelligence development. The modus operandi of the three existing services needs to be upgraded with the right systems, procedures, and personnel. This process can start with the implementation of a robust intelligence development cycle, and clarification as to the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, and of departments within each agency.

Furthermore, the Afghan intelligence community would benefit from higher numbers of western-trained intelligence officers. Retirement incentives should be offered to older, KGB-trained officers. At the same time, existing intelligence training schools in Afghanistan need to update their curricula and increase their enrollment as older officers retire and demand for new officers rises.

Information Sharing and Coordination

While secrecy and information compartmentalization are fundamental aspects of the intelligence tradecraft, timely and effective sharing and coordination of information is an ongoing challenge for any intelligence service. While many improvements have been made with the establishment of coordination centers such as TAWHEED, PICC, and NASRAT, more needs to be done at the tactical and operational levels.

The fall of the provinces of Kunduz and Ghazni are examples of intelligence sharing failures in Afghanistan. Agencies were unable to coordinate and share intelligence regarding imminent Taliban attacks promptly. Information needs to be distributed in an efficient and timely manner to those with the proper capabilities to address the issue. Optimized inter- and intra-agency information sharing capabilities will change the face of the Afghan war.

Foreign Partnerships

Partnerships with external intelligence services are essential. Given Afghanistan’s geopolitical circumstances, the Afghan intelligence community can not afford to rely on a single partnership. Instead, it should diversify its foreign partnerships while distinguishing between strategic and non-strategic partners. The United States and the other Five Eye countries are examples of strategic partners.

The Afghan intelligence services should structure its foreign partnerships in three tiers. The first tier would be Afghanistan’s principal partners, such as the U.S. and the Five Eyes countries. The second tier should be comprised of the intelligence services of India, Russia, China, and neighboring countries. The third tier would include the rest of the world.

Paramilitary Forces

Like all intelligence agencies, Afghanistan retains a paramilitary force that is tasked with carrying out quick and effective counter-terrorism operations. These forces have been essential for actions taken against the Taliban, foreign terrorists, and Daesh (Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL). In the event of a reorganization or restructuring of the Afghan intelligence community, these forces and their operational capabilities should be maintained due to their critical role in counter-terrorism.

There is a critical need to improve inter-agency coordination when it comes to operational targeting, planning, and execution with other branches of Afghanistan’s security services. Due to the sensitive nature of operations carried out by paramilitary forces, there are often duplicate or overlapping operations. However, structures such as the Joint Services Operations Command (JSOC) can play an essential role in avoiding redundancies regarding efforts and resources.

SIGINT vs. HUMINT in Hybrid Warfare

The Afghan conflict has changed from insurgenct-proxy warfare to a hybrid war much like the ongoing conflict in the Donetsk and Donbass regions of Ukraine. Alongside covert involvement by Russia and Iran, Pakistan has employed a combination of proxy groups, psychological warfare operations (PsyOps), and economic blockades against Afghan forces, while simultaneously discrediting U.S. and NATO operations in the country. Much of the SIGINT Afghanistan has access to is provided by the U.S.-led coalition forces.

Afghanistan’s intelligence services primarily focus on developing intelligence products utilizing HUMINT capabilities and assets, albeit without much success given the significant number of attacks in major cities and military installations. A robust overhaul is needed to reform and develop full-spectrum capabilities that will enable Afghan government forces to counter hybrid warfare tactics employed by the Taliban and their foreign backers. Integrating HUMINT and SIGINT is a critical step that will improve the efficacy of intelligence products on the battlefield. The Afghan war won’t be won by drones, PC-12s, and other aerial capabilities alone; ground-based networks and sources can have a significant impact when coupled with the proper capabilities and resources.

Oversight and Control

During the eighties and nineties, the Afghan intelligence services—KAM, AGSA, and KHAD—were notorious for atrocities such as arbitrary arrests, mass executions, and forced disappearances. The predecessor of these agencies, Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat Sedarat, was a tool used for domestic surveillance of political opponents and dissidents of Afghanistan’s kings. Accordingly, intelligence and spycraft are looked at with suspicion by the Afghan people, as it brings back memories of KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD. Thus far, the NDS has been successful, to an extent, in its efforts to improve its reputation, but much more needs to be done.

The Afghan intelligence community’s budget is in need of a robust legal and policy framework to ensure accountability, both operationally and fiscally. In a democratic state, intelligence agencies are required to operate within the rule of law and uphold values like human rights. To their credit, the National Directorate of Security and its sister agencies have done much in this area, but more is required to improve their reputational standing. Measures such as quarterly reports to the parliamentary intelligence committee, ensuring access to detainees by domestic and international human rights organizations, and robust oversight by and reporting to the presidency and the National Security Council are all measures that would contribute to an increase in public and international confidence in Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

Information Trade and Budget Controls

Information is an asset, and if corroborated and verifiable, can be a game changer for Afghanistan. However, there is much more disinformation and rumors than solid, actionable intelligence. Raw data that is not put through a proper intelligence cycle before being included in a final intelligence product is virtually useless. In the intelligence tradecraft, most of the raw information turns out to be rumors and uncorroborated hearsay.

Meanwhile, large sums of money are spent to develop sources and produce intelligence products with little parliamentary or presidential oversight. The operational budgets of all three existing services under parliamentary and presidential oversight need to be assessed using a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the value of final intelligence products against the costs required to develop those products. While a degree of secrecy surrounding the budgets of intelligence services is warranted, there must be proper oversight to provide a check-and-balance mechanism to monitor corruption, inefficiency, and ensure a positive return on investment.

Intelligence in War: Fixing and Fitting Intelligence in the Afghan War was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hasn’t provided any details of the meeting, the visit is indicative of an Iranian effort to maintain relations with the Afghan government as the government negotiates with the Taliban. Furthermore, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has confirmed that Tehran and the Taliban were previously engaged in direct talks. On December 31, the Iranian government confirmed that a Taliban delegation had visited Iran for another round of negotiations.

Tehran is not only hedging by maintaining a dialogue with the radical extremist group; it’s assuming the role of a disruptor in the peace process to ensure its interests are secured in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and a select group of regional stakeholders. While the U.S. includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in its deliberations, it is excluding key stakeholders—Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

The Iranian government justifies its disruptive involvement by citing “legitimate concerns” regarding the rise of militant extremist groups in Afghanistan. Tehran previously adopted a similar approach in its engagements with Islamabad, which provides aid and haven to the Taliban. Iran’s willingness to engage with the Taliban is not unprecedented—the relationship dates back to 1994 when the Taliban was under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Relations continued under Omar’s successor, Akhtar Mansoor, who was killed in May of 2016 while returning to Pakistan after visiting Iran. According to his Pakistani passport, Mansoor spent two months in Iran before being targeted by a U.S. drone strike on the highway leading into Pakistan from the country’s Iranian border. 

Tehran does not want to sever ties with the Afghan Government while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with a resurgent Taliban, which is in control of more territory than at any time since 2001. Tehran considers the rise of militant Islamic extremist groups to be a key “legitimate concern,” along with the threat of a Taliban takeover of the Afghan government and the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran, and ensures a steady stream of black market U.S. dollars into the Iranian economy.

Ensuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.

In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.). 

Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow. 

The rise of Salafi extremist groups—facilitated with support from Gulf states—is another phenomenon motivating Iran to engage with the Taliban. Iranian overtures to the Taliban are an effort to ensure militant Islamist ideology imported into Afghanistan does not flow to Iran. Russia exhibited similar concerns when the Kremlin claimed that “Daesh [Islamic State] imported into Afghanistan” had expanded over Northern Faryab and Jawzjan provinces along the Afghan border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia reportedly met with Taliban representatives to negotiate a settlement agreement, as well as coordinate efforts to block and topple any Daesh activity in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. 

Beyond fomenting ongoing insecurity within Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been training Afghan refugees as Fatemiyoun mercenaries to fight against Daesh in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Thousands of vulnerable refugees who are devout Shias have joined the Fatemiyoun ranks to change their families’ legal status as refugees in Iran. They had reportedly returned to Afghanistan to counter Salafi extremism activity alongside the Taliban and combat militant Islamist activity in the western region of Afghanistan on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard.

Iran’s cooperation with a hardline Sunni extremist group like the Taliban group to counter threats to its interests in Afghanistan is a dangerous strategy. Going forward, Iran must act strategically; history has proven that engagement with the Taliban along with the selective use of terrorism will not achieve the end-result Tehran is expecting. The Iranian government must respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, recognize the Afghan state, and develop a bilateral relationship based on culture, trade, and legitimate interests for Tehran within a stable Afghanistan. 

In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.

Iran must play the role of a good neighbor to Afghanistan; the latter has never posited a threat to Iranian national security.  Iranian concern over the activities of Salafi extremist groups in Afghanistan is a legitimate one, however bypassing the Afghan Government in favor of non-state actors will not alleviate this concern, however justified. 

An Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies research finding shows that a majority of the Afghan elite (between 57 and 66.4 percent) has expressed satisfaction with Iran’s social, religious, and economic policies. However, the same survey findings show that 55 percent of the Afghan elite have expressed dissatisfaction towards the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political and security policies as they relate to Afghanistan. Iran has a role in the Afghan peace process, but it must act in good faith. 

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, a mineral-based economy is one of the few options available when it comes to establishing a solid foundation on which to develop Afghanistan’s economy. The development of the country’s mineral sector has been hampered by insecurity, political instability, poor policy direction, the absence of a basic legal framework, and a lack of necessary infrastructure and transit agreements with neighboring countries. However, Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present an alternative to the country’s increasing over-reliance on an economy dependent on foreign aid.

Afghanistan’s mineral deposits consist of metals and non-metals. Many strategically essential minerals can be found in the country, including beryllium (used in airplanes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and spacecraft), uranium, lithium, and niobium (a rare soft-metal use in semiconductor production). According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is estimated at around (US) $1 trillion. This figure is based on previously conducted Swedish, British, and Soviet geological surveys, in addition to more recent studies performed by the USGS. In total, however, only about 30% of Afghanistan’s territory was covered by previous geological surveys. Even though the earlier Swedish, British, and Soviet studies have been updated with more recent aerial geophysical and geochemical studies, a complete geological survey is required to understand the full potential of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits.

Existing data only accounts for 30% of the country, and isn’t comprehensive enough to confidently estimate the value and depth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. Furthermore, a complete geological study of Afghanistan would enable for a more accurate determination of the economic feasibility of developing the country’s mineral extraction and distribution capabilities. In other words, all that is known from existing geological surveys is that there are signs of what could be a substantial presence of minerals elsewhere in the country, but the details of specific deposits remain unknown. Already, doubts have been raised that Afghan mineral deposits could be economically unviable to develop resource extraction capabilities around. While these doubts may sway potential investors, the country’s known mineral deposits remain attractive from an investor’s standpoint.

There is a near-unanimous consensus in Afghanistan that the country must develop its mineral sector. When it comes to the pace of such development, however, there are three primary schools of thought within Afghan policy-making circles and the country’s political establishment. In the first camp are those who believe that the mineral sector development should be pursued without delay. They argue that Afghanistan must supplement declining foreign aid with revenues drawn from mineral extraction. Those in the second group posit that mineral sector development should be prioritized based on the revenue-generating potential of individual deposits. The third group opposes any progress until the political and security situation in the country stabilizes so that Afghans can explore any development in a more secure environment. Given the economic circumstances, combined with the urgent need to build a domestic economy that isn’t dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan has no choice but to move aggressively to develop its nascent mining industry.

Fast-paced development requires up-to-date and complete geological information concerning mineral deposits. However, such data is unavailable. Providing access to a comprehensive geological survey is a significant challenge, and undertaking such a study is a costly exercise. A complete study will be impossible without the outside investment, legal reform, and decisive political action that is needed to build a strong and apolitical Afghanistan Geological Survey, an agency which currently is deeply politicized and has a limited functional role, having been monopolized by a generation of Soviet-trained geologists.

Traditionally, it is the responsibility of the state to provide potential investors with the necessary geological survey data. Geological studies are essential when it comes to soliciting both private and public sector investment, at home and abroad. Complete geological surveys are expensive, costing millions of dollars the Afghan government cannot afford. This is where Afghanistan’s foreign aid donor community can play a crucial role.

To date, the Afghan government has received eight tenders and awarded two significant contracts with support from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.K. Department for International Development (DfID), and the World Bank. These include tenders for developing the Aynak copper mine, the Hajigak iron ore deposit, the Badakhshan gold mine, the Shaida copper mine, and the Ghazni gold and copper deposits. Almost all have their flaws, but the initiation of bidding processes and the awarding of contracts nevertheless sends a strong signal to the global investor community that the Afghan mining industry is open for business.

Recently, however, the National Unity Government (NUG) has announced its decision to review all received bids and awarded contracts. This announcement sends the wrong signal to investors, on the top of Afghanistan’s myriad of security, political, and infrastructure problems. It is well within the Afghan government’s right to review or even revise existing contracts and bids, however, halting the process altogether will be disastrous for the development of Afghanistan’s mining industry. All face shortcomings or obstacles concerning feasibility clauses, energy and water shortages, human capital challenges, and an absence of transit agreements, to name a few. The best way to address these shortcomings, however, is through bilateral negotiations and contract revision mechanisms, rather than canceling bids outright and effectively shutting down the bidding process.

On the other hand, artisanal and small-scale mining (for construction materials and precious stones, for example) remain a source of financial revenue for the Afghan government but, at the same time, are a significant driver of instability in regions of the country where government presence is little-to-nonexistent. The black market economy from these mines fuels the conflict within the country, particularly in the northern and eastern provinces. Today, part of the unrest in regions in the country’s north and east—such as the Logar province—is due to local rivalries over mineral revenues from small mineral deposits. In the short-term, the best way to tackle these issues is through the gradual incorporation of smaller-scale mining operations into the country’s overall strategy, as the rule of law and the reach of the country’s security forces extend to all parts of the country.

The Afghan government institutions responsible for the development of the country’s mineral sector (i.e. the MOMP and AGS) have little-to-no experience with managing the tendering process and the awarding of large mining contracts. The eight existing tenders, along with many of the awarded contracts represent are Afghanistan’s first experiences awarding substantial mineral rights contracts. They were solicited or awarded with technical expertise and assistance provided by foreign partners including the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force for Business Stability Operation (TFBSO), the World Bank, and DfID, amongst others. Many contracts have been awarded in a mostly noncompetitive environment where global mining corporations such as MCC or CNPCI, with years of experience negotiating large-scale mineral rights contracts, are entering into negotiations with Afghan officials lacking the necessary negotiating skills or expertise.

On the other hand, certain circles within the Afghan public and private sectors oppose awarding mining contracts to foreign firms and are advocating for the establishment of large state-owned oil and gas, iron, and copper corporations—possibly employing a public-private partnership model. However, this view loses sight of the fact that the Afghan labor force lacks the necessary technical expertise, and Afghanistan itself lacks the necessary financial capital to pursue a state-owned industrial model. The necessary technical knowledge, skilled human capital, and financial resources can only come from foreign firms for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan’s existing state-owned enterprises—such as the Afghan Gas Enterprise (AGE) and the Afghan Fertilizer Factory in the country’s north—are struggling financially and operationally, suffering from antiquated machinery and incompetent management resulting from years of conflict and instability.

The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) has been primarily occupied in recent years with the management and awarding of small-scale constructing material and precious stone extraction contracts through the MOMP Cadastre department. However, the role of such an vital institution shouldn’t be confined to the awarding of minor contracts. Instead, the MOMP should be empowered to oversee the proper implementation, oversight and control, audit, and financial revenue management, and technical oversight of all large and small mineral extraction rights contracts. The ministry is in desperate need of a severe overhaul if there is to be any substantive, long-term development in the Afghan mineral sector.

The Afghan tax and royalty regimes are further obstacles to the development of the country’s mining industry. The country’s tax structure is burdensome for investors and is internationally non-competitive—the country’s taxes are much higher than those in South American or African states. Royalty payments for the Aynak Copper Mine are set at nearly twelve percent, and rates for the Hajigak Iron Ore mine are around eight percent, far higher than international norms—which are between four and six percent. Simply put, the financial and economic regime presently governing the Afghan mineral economy is not attractive to potential investors. These factors must be changed if any long-term, sustainable development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector are to be seriously considered.

Another major obstacle to the development of the Afghan mineral sector is a lack a lack of necessary infrastructure to facilitate the export of minerals. Afghanistan is poorly connected to regional ports, both due to the country’s geography and the current security situation. An integrated infrastructure development strategy for the establishment of resource corridors to ports in the region as well as the construction of energy pipelines to power the plants for processing minerals before export. Such an integrated infrastructure development program would require billions of dollars in capital and technical expertise that is presently lacking in the country. The Afghan government should aggressively engage in resource diplomacy with its neighbors to gain access to ports to export commodities to international markets.

Despite these challenges, the Afghan mineral sector remains an attractive opportunity for both domestic and foreign investors. None of the difficulties mentioned above are formidable enough that they cannot be addressed by measures gradually enacted by the Afghan government. In the immediate-term, Afghanistan must present a strategic framework for the development of its nascent mineral sector—one that attracts both domestic and international investment. This framework must include reform of the country’s legal system, in addition to providing policy direction to attract foreign investors.

While Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present a tremendous economic opportunity for the country, the government must prioritize the mineral deposits it intends to put to domestic and international tender. Just a few successful bids and their successful implementation would serve as a pilot project, paving the way for further investment—a necessary step for the development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector.

Are Afghanistan’s Mineral Deposits the Answer to the Country’s Economic Woes? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan’s dream for a sustainable peace remains unmet since the country’s establishment. Amir Habibullah—son of Amir Abdur Rahman, the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan—recognized the need for national reform and reconciliation before his assassination nearly a century ago.

Since then, however, Afghanistan has experienced neither sustainable nor long-lasting peace. At present, the Taliban primary challenge to peace and stability in Afghanistan. All efforts at resolving the current conflict through negotiations have ended without success. These initiatives of the past seventeen years include high-level talks with the Taliban, reintegration programs, track-2, and track-1.5 diplomatic interactions, and local peace agreements. However, the fact remains that the policies mentioned above have not been implemented in a unified, continuous, and integrated manner sufficient enough to be called a process. Instead, efforts have been undertaken in isolation from one another.

My recent study on the peace process includes a nation-wide survey on the peace process for the first time in Afghanistan and indicates that all prior attempts at a negotiated peace have been failures. One might argue that judging the results of the peace process might be premature at this stage, given how the efforts are still ongoing. However, to diagnose the current status, it is important to understand public sentiment towards past efforts. More than 63.3% of the respondents opined that previous attempts at a peace settlement all failed. In this context, female respondents demonstrated a higher tendency (65.6%) than male respondents (61.6%).

Similarly, Uzbeks (73.3%), Tajiks (70.7%), and Hazaras (73.5%) demonstrated a higher tendency to say that peace efforts have failed, when compared to Pashtuns (49.3%). Multivariate analysis also shows that this association was robust and held after controlling for demographic and attitudinal factors. The curve of perception about the failure of the peace process goes up as the level of education increases. Additionally, respondents who said peace is possible were less likely (61.5%) to assess the peace process as a failure, compared to those who said peace is impossible (75.0%).

Similarly, the historical cases of peace agreements in Pakistan involving the Taliban’s sister organization, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), indicates that peace agreements with TTP are failed. The negotiations in Pakistan have some characteristics in common with the efforts made in Afghanistan. First, only a few peace agreements with TTP lasted longer than a few months. Second, after every agreement, TTP demanded further concessions. Third, the agreements led to further empowerment of the Pakistani Taliban. Bushra Gohar, a former Pakistani MP, said that Afghanistan must learn lessons from the failed agreements with Pakistani Taliban during the seventh Herat Security Dialogue. Gohar reiterated that these agreements in Pakistan only resulted in furthering the Talibanization (radicalization) of Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has become increasingly aggressive and has been demanding more concessions. Besides the withdrawal of international forces, the end goal of the Taliban is the replacement of the current political system of Afghanistan with a theocratic regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In contrast to the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States have taken a softer approach, and have given in to many of the Taliban’s demands. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban leadership sought amnesty for their terrorist activities. However, just a few years later the group demanded that it be recognized as a party to the conflict in Afghanistan as a legitimate actor, similar to how the PLO is regarded by the international community, rather than as a terrorist organization. Presently, the Taliban’s demands are indicative of the group’s re-radicalization. If the Taliban’s demands are agreed to, it will mean the restructuring of the entire Afghan political order that has been painstakingly constructed post-9/11.

On the contrary, the Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. have experienced setbacks regarding their negotiating position. The first setback was the violation of Afghanistan-owned and led peace process. This principle was violated with the initiation of direct talks between the U.S. and the Taliban alongside the last Moscow Format.

The violation of the three conditions for peace talks with the Taliban was the second setback. Before recent direct U.S. overtures to the Taliban, the international community and the Afghan government had three fundamental conditions for peace with the Taliban. The group must end all relations with terrorist groups; Taliban militants must lay down their arms; and the group must accept the constitutional order of Afghanistan, which has been the basis of political developments over the last several years.

While President Ashraf Ghani made an unconditional peace offer to the Taliban, the proposal highlighted four points: (a) Ensuring rights and duties of all citizens, particularly those of women, based on the constitution; (b) Accepting Afghanistan’s constitution, including its own provisions for amendments; (c) Ensuring activities of the civil services and the security and defense forces based on the law and; (d) Dismantling any armed group which is linked with foreign terrorist networks and transnational criminal organizations. However, it is unclear whether the points discussed above are preconditions or end conditions for the peace talks.

The current talks between the Taliban and the United States were initiated under circumstances where the Taliban has not accepted the legitimacy of the Afghan constitution. Furthermore, the group has failed to denounced terrorism. Similarly, the Government of Afghanistan has announced a 12-member negotiating team and a High Advisory Board for Peace. Both of these bodies substantially lack representation from civil society, women, youth, and academia. Unfortunately, the current scenario will not lead to sustainable peace.

The Peace Process in Afghanistan is a Failure was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ISI Directorate in Pakistan has enjoyed unparalleled power since its creation in 1948. As the ISI Director-General is selected by the Military Branch, the agency has remained steeped in army and military affairs for seventy years. From its outset, the ISI has backed terrorist organizations that provide strategic depth within India and greater influence in Afghanistan.

These efforts are designed to promote Pakistan’s regional hegemony—all while wreaking havoc on the national security interests of both India and Afghanistan. ISI support and aid for several terrorist organizations, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, have resulted in international condemnation of the ISI’s failures to prevent “systematic and persistent human rights violations,” albeit with little effect.

The ISI Regularly Fails to Implement Counter-Terrorism Policy

Within Pakistan, terrorist attacks have declined in recent years following legislation and ISI counter-terrorism policies enacted between 2013 and 2016. However, the ISI’s continued covert support for extremists has fostered a growing radical community and new splinter groups that have spread throughout the region.

After former President Musharraf’s pledge to join the War on Terror, the ISI vacillated between continued sponsorship of extremist groups in support of its interests and cracking down on radical anti-ISI groups within Pakistan. Ultimately, due to inconsistencies in its counter-terrorism campaign, Pakistan’s intelligence agency was quietly listed as a terrorist organization in U.S. military documents, instructing that ISI officers be treated the same as terrorists.

The ISI is plagued by a persistent hesitancy to destroy terrorist groups, instead hoping to nurture them and use them in the future against Pakistan’s regional rival, India. According to Pakistan’s police officials, ISI officers regularly halt investigations involving terrorist groups they support, further perpetuating violent extremism so long as it serves to enhance Pakistan’s regional influence.

What This Means for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan

Why does Pakistan, through the ISI, support terrorist groups? Following the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s leaders became almost fanatical about one thing: the idea that India sought to destroy the Pakistani state. While this claim has been repeatedly disputed by India and has overall been assessed as unfounded, Pakistan and its ISI have worked to limit India’s regional influence as much as possible.

Often, this has come in the form of support for anti-India terrorist groups—even at the expense of Pakistan’s security and internal radicalization. These terrorist groups have been released to carry out attacks in both India and Jammu and Kashmir while providing protections to the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan—using the state as a proxy in its perceived conflict with India.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s primary goal is to prevent India from gaining ground and obtaining too much influence. As the Taliban vies for more control, the ISI has provided it with military aid to ensure Afghanistan remains in a state of perpetual instability. Should the Taliban gain power, Pakistan will have bought itself a staunch ally in the region, with the potential to form a strategic partnership against India. Should the Taliban fail to gain power, Pakistan will have done its best to destabilize the country and prevent a potential strong governmental alliance with India. Pakistan is effectively hedging its bets on radical groups to foment insecurity within Afghanistan, as a more stable neighbor that decides to align itself with India is perceived as a threat to Pakistan’s national security, at least from the Pakistani perspective.

On December 11, 2018, in a surprising turn of events, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, acknowledged that the establishment of an Afghan peace is a “shared responsibility” of Pakistan and its neighbors. A “solution through dialogue” would be a step in the right direction for the region, despite the ISI’s recent subversive actions in Jammu and Kashmir. Currently, the words of Pakistan’s intelligence agency and senior government officials seem contradictory. While the state allegedly seeks peace in the region, the ISI remains committed to subversive activities that will foment ongoing regional insecurity.

The Future of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

If the attempts at an Afghan peace and a combined effort towards normalization in relations between India and Pakistan are to be successful, the ISI and the Pakistani state must renounce support for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other militant groups to be taken seriously. Such a declaration must occur before terrorism, and interstate conflicts further destabilize the region. According to the International Crisis Group, counter-terrorism in the region will be ineffective as long as the ISI continues to make distinctions between “good” and “bad” terrorist groups.

With is decades-long support for terrorist organizations targeting India, it will be difficult for the agency to break from this pattern any time soon. Instead, it will be up to the state to align its intelligence agency with the government’s regional goals. Without the ISI’s confrontation of extremist ideologies and a reassessment of its alliances, radicalization will continue to threaten regional security and inflame its perceived conflict with India. Until the “threat of India” has been recognized as a falsehood, it’s likely that the ISI will continue to build a haven for extremism.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Contributes to Regional Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. At the same time, violent extremism and extreme ideology-based terrorism continue to spread throughout South Asia.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Disaster in South Asia: Nuclear Deployments & Violent Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

China does not engage in alliance structures targeted against third countries. This was to allow for China to retain an independent foreign policy stance while avoiding international entanglements due to its alliances with others.

The collapse of the Cold War system and the rise of China’s economic and military influence have brought this policy under scrutiny as well. Beijing has watched cautiously as NATO has expanded eastward and as the United States has strengthened its military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing’s no-alliance policy leaves China potentially facing these groups alone, something it has neither the military nor the economic strength to effectively counter.

The current semi-alliance structure employed by Beijing is designed to counter its weaknesses while ensuring China isn’t beholden to its partners.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s push for strategic bilateral partnerships (even with its ostensible rivals), and increased military and humanitarian disaster drills with other nations are part of this strategy.

The strategy is less about building an alliance structure against the United States than it is about breaking down the alliance structures that could be built against China by getting closer to traditional U.S. partners, making them less willing to take strong actions against China.

In its maritime strategy, Beijing is working with India, Japan and Korea in counter-piracy operations and engaging in more naval exchanges and offers of joint exercises and drills.

Multilateral security agreements support U.S. naval dominance in Asia.

Beijing’s strategy, however, is falling short as the United States begins to more openly embrace China as a potential entity to be countered against, and is courting allies and partners like India to play critical functions in bolstering a rules-based order throughout Southeast and East Asia.

China and India have similarly-sized populations, and by 2050 India may overtake China as the world’s largest and most populous economy. China’s one-child policy, exclusionary immigration policies, and population management efforts have wreaked havoc on the country’s demographic profile. China, in the coming decades, will play host to a much older population than other rising or developing powers like India or Vietnam.

Furthermore, an English-speaking democracy like India posits an ideal strategic partner for Washington, as it endeavors to strengthen its foothold in Southeast Asia, particularly as China begins to flex its newly-minted naval muscles around the South China Sea.

India has a competent green-water navy that can be significantly bolstered if provided with training and equipment by the United States. Traditional U.S.-allies like Australia and Japan were regularly participating in multi-lateral war games with the United States and India throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

The U.S. strategic plan for the Indo-Pacific.

In a 2017 speech, then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson laid out part of the Trump administration’s Asia strategy: re-orienting towards India and applying pressure to China.

The secretary said that the administration is “determined to dramatically deepen” the U.S.-India partnership at diplomatic, economic, and military levels.  Tillerson added, “President Trump and Prime Minister Modi are committed—more than any of our leaders before them—to building an ambitious partnership not only between our two great democracies but other sovereign nations working towards greater peace and stability.”

The secretary’s remarks on relations between the world’s largest democratic states emphasized the concept of an Indo-U.S. strategic partnership as “the eastern and western beacons” for a global, rules-based order that is currently—and increasingly—under strain. China responded with a statement saying it “contributes to and defends the rules-based world order” and seeks to advance international cooperation through the United Nations. It also hopes for a “healthy and sound” China-U.S. relationship.

State Department officials have indicated that this speech was designed to map out a strategy for a U.S.-India alliance or quasi-alliance over the next century. In this model, East Asia’s leading democratic states—namely Australia and Japan—would balance with the United States against China’s growing challenges to and influence over the international rules-based order.

With regards to the impact a re-positioning to India would have on U.S.-China relations, Tillerson stated that the United States continues to seek constructive relations with China, but “won’t shrink” from challenges posed by China when it “subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries, and disadvantages the United States and our friends.”

Balancing China: The Foundations of an Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. The quality of India’s development depends on addressing general poor public health, sanitation, and infrastructure conditions.

The rate of malnourished kids, for instance, is higher in India than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

Human health, food security, infrastructure, and livelihoods will deteriorate from pollution, earthquakes and the effects of climate change, including shifting monsoon patterns and increasing glacier melt.

South Asia’s openness to the private sector, community groups, and non-governmental organizations, however, should position it well for an era of empowered individuals, mainly if governments curb their support for chauvinistic groups that divide societies.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India, by contrast, will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

South Asia: India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.