The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The simulated conflict ended without regime change in Pyongyang, allowing Kim Jong Un to claim a political victory. While avoiding nuclear escalation may seem prudent, such an outcome could deal a lasting blow to the credibility of America’s extended deterrence in East Asia.

The Guardian Tiger scenario should not be dismissed as an academic exercise. It reveals a critical vulnerability in the psychological foundation of deterrence: the perception among adversaries and allies of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of its partners. If allies conclude that Washington will not cross the nuclear threshold even after a nuclear attack, they may question the value of the nuclear umbrella. Adversaries, meanwhile, may learn that nuclear coercion, carefully calibrated, can succeed.

In the simulation, North Korea escalated to a tactical nuclear strike against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the East Sea (Guardian Tiger I) and later against the Chinhae naval base (Guardian Tiger II), home to the Republic of Korea Navy’s Submarine Force Command and occasionally used for allied submarine visits. According to the report, American leaders debated nuclear retaliation but settled on conventional “pulsed” strikes.

In a real-world scenario, such strikes could plausibly involve precision-guided munitions from long-range bombers like the B1-B and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aimed at targets such as missile transporter-erector launchers, hardened artillery positions along the DMZ, and command-and-control facilities near Pyongyang. In the exercise, the US stopped short of regime change, seeking to avoid further nuclear escalation and prevent a direct war with China—a decision that would have allowed Pyongyang to absorb the damage, count the survival of its regime as a strategic win, and enter negotiations from a stronger position.

Extended deterrence depends on more than military capability. It is rooted in the belief, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that the United States is willing to defend its partners by all means necessary, including nuclear weapons. An American failure to respond in kind to North Korean nuclear use would plant seeds of doubt. Japanese and South Korean leaders could begin to question whether Washington would truly “trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul” if the stakes involved limited nuclear use rather than an existential threat to the United States.

That doubt could trigger cascading effects. Calls in Seoul’s National Assembly for indigenous nuclear weapons, expanded production of the Hyunmoo‑4 ballistic missile, and pressure on Tokyo to more seriously pursue nuclear sharing arrangements have already entered the political debate.

This concern is amplified by North Korea’s 2022 nuclear weapons law, which openly authorizes preemptive nuclear strikes in scenarios ranging from an imminent attack on leadership to undefined overwhelming crisis situations. Analysts note that the law’s language effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use, implying tactical employment to repel invasion and seize the initiative in war. Rather than viewing nuclear use as a desperate last resort, Pyongyang now appears willing to employ such weapons early. For example, a low‑yield detonation against South Korean or American forward-deployed forces to shock Washington and Seoul into political concessions.

The challenge grows sharper in the event of a dual contingency: simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Guardian Tiger II simulated such a scenario, with China launching a multi-domain assault on Taiwan while North Korea escalated on the peninsula. In such a real-world situation, US Indo-Pacific Command could be forced to divert the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from Yokosuka to the waters east of Taiwan, deploy B‑52H bombers to deter Chinese operations, and even consider repositioning some Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile defense batteries from South Korea to protect American assets in Okinawa and Guam.

Such shifts illustrate how a stretched American posture could reduce missile interception capacity on the peninsula and temporarily remove some nuclear-capable platforms from immediate Korean defense. North Korea could calculate that Washington, already balancing a larger confrontation with China, would avoid nuclear escalation in Korea to conserve resources and limit the risk of an all-out US-China war.

The political and strategic consequences would ripple across the region. In Seoul, public and elite opinion could shift sharply toward developing an independent nuclear arsenal—something 71 percent of South Koreans already support. South Korea’s nuclear latency, widely assessed by proliferation experts, suggests it could potentially produce a weapon in as little as 6 months if political consensus formed.

In Tokyo, the debate over counterstrike capabilities, missile defense expansion, and potential nuclear sharing with the United States would intensify, potentially accelerating deployment of Tomahawk missiles and further integration of F‑35A fighters, which, in the US fleet, are being certified for B61‑12 nuclear bombs, into allied defense planning. Beijing, meanwhile, could seize the opportunity to position itself as a stabilizing broker, offering to mediate between Seoul and Pyongyang while shielding the latter from full international accountability, further eroding American influence.

Avoiding nuclear escalation in a limited-strike scenario is understandable, but Washington cannot afford such a decision to be interpreted as weakness. Strengthening deterrence credibility in Northeast Asia will require more than declaratory statements. Clear and credible red lines for nuclear use must be communicated both publicly and privately. Integrated nuclear-conventional planning with allies should ensure that flexible response options, from proportionate nuclear strikes to overwhelming conventional retaliation, are executable on short notice. Contingency planning must explicitly account for simultaneous conflicts in Korea and Taiwan, with pre-positioned munitions, dispersed basing arrangements for nuclear-capable aircraft, and rotational deployments of dual-capable ships and submarines to maintain strategic presence even under force diversion.

Equally important is sustained alliance signaling. These include high-visibility joint exercises like the US-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, regular port visits by nuclear-capable submarines, and trilateral missile tracking drills with Japan. These measures reassure allies, complicate adversary calculations, and demonstrate that any nuclear use will incur unacceptable costs.

The Guardian Tiger exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how quickly deterrence can fray in the fog of crisis. A single decision to refrain from nuclear retaliation, however understandable at the time, could reverberate for decades and reshape the strategic balance in East Asia. In the nuclear age, preserving deterrence means guarding against both uncontrolled escalation and the perceptions of hesitation that could invite it.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

A Nuclear Umbrella in Peril: Lessons from North Korea’s Escalation Scenarios was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.

A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.

Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization

Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.

Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s

Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.

By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.

The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.

Developing Supporting Infrastructure

To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for

forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.

Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.

Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises

Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.

Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.

Conclusion

Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.

These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.

William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.

Bolstering Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The use of atomic weapons on Japan by the United States was the culmination of the Manhattan Project’s extraordinary technological achievements. The decision to use these weapons came after US Army and Navy estimates of a protracted invasion of the Japanese home islands (Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaidō) offered casualty ranges from the tens to hundreds of thousands. If the Japanese fought as hard on their own home territory as they fought for Okinawa, for example, there was real concern that the loss of American life would eclipse that seen in Europe.

Additionally, the estimated losses on the Japanese side were five to ten times that of the United States. Japanese tenacity and refusal to surrender in the face of certain defeat was both hated and admired by American troops.

At the time of Germany’s defeat on May 7, 1945, the United States was five weeks into one of the bloodiest fights of the entire war, the battle for Okinawa, which cost more than 50,000 American casualties before the island was taken in late June. Only after the war did it come to light that more than 110,000 Japanese soldiers and 150,000 Okinawan civilians died in the battle. About half of Okinawa’s pre-war population was killed during the battle, sometimes at the hands of Japanese soldiers.

For the military commanders of the war in the Pacific, Okinawa demonstrated a stark example of the Japanese resolve and willingness to fight and die. It should come as no surprise that President Harry Truman, a World War I veteran, understood the difficult decision required to take provocative actions to save American lives. While this was not a war the Americans started; it was a war we had to win—without conditions.

Scholars and non-scholars alike may continue to debate the moral, ethical, and legal justifications of the use of the atomic bomb, but there is little doubt that the men assigned to military units waiting for the invasion to begin were happy to know that the atomic bomb made the loss of their own lives unnecessary. Their families were certainly happy as well. In the articles that often appear on the anniversary of Hiroshima, there is often a lack of understanding of the American lives (and Japanese) that were saved by the use of the atomic bomb.

The Manhattan Project began because the United States feared Nazi Germany would successfully develop the bomb first. With Germany falling to the allies in May 1945, just months before the bomb was ready, it was a logical transition for the target of the A-bomb to shift from Europe to Japan. The weapon, originally designed to counter a German threat, became the best option to quickly end the war in the Pacific.

Often, the articles commemorating the use of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima repeat inaccuracies and leave out important facts. For example, it is common to suggest that the detonation of Little Boy directly caused all of the devastation experienced in Hiroshima. However, approximately 80 percent of the death and devastation in Hiroshima was caused by the fire that began with the detonation and spread far beyond the area directly affected by the bomb. This same level of damage would have been realized with one of Curtis LeMay’s conventional fire-bombing raids because Japanese buildings were in close proximity to one another and made of highly flammable wood and paper. The blast effects of the bomb, while dramatic, were not the leading cause of destruction and loss of life—as is normal with a nuclear detonation.

In retrospect, the American firebombing of Tokyo was far more destructive of life and property than either atomic bomb. Little Boy was detonated at such a high altitude, about 1,400 feet above ground zero, that its damage was limited.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a sound military decision that took the best military advice, applied casualty estimates for a future fight to the equation, and reached a sound decision. The atomic bomb did exactly what President Truman and General Marshall desired—end the war as quickly as possible with the least loss of American (and Japanese) life.

The loss of an estimated 150,000 Japanese lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was tragic, but more than justified by the American lives saved. This number, however, in comparison to the estimates of over a million Japanese and American lives that were projected to be lost in an invasion drives a different conclusion and deeper reflection than numbers alone.

The benefit of hindsight to those who challenge the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima often forget that there were real American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines (as well as Japanese military and civilians) who would have died by the hundreds of thousands had the war continued. War is a terrible thing, and, paradoxically, the dramatic use of the atomic bomb, while taken as a single event appears horrific, in contrast to the larger landscape of lives saved demonstrates a justified use that saved lives in the end. Because of this, American warfighters returned home to start lives, get married, raise children, and pursue lives that may very well have ended with a bullet or bomb in Japan.

USAF Col (Ret) Paul Hendrickson, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Reflections on Hiroshima: August 6, 1945 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is some debate, however, as to their continued utility in modern times. They are costly to build, at least $13 billion, require a large complement of personnel, require an escort, and are vulnerable to attack from ballistic missiles and now hypersonic weapons. Disabling an American aircraft carrier would be a priority for enemy nations, as it would be a symbolic victory with great propaganda value for them. An aircraft carrier is simply a very attractive target that, depending upon the analyst, is more or less of an easy target. A missile strike that causes even a listing of a few degrees or propulsion damage can prevent them from being used by air assets.

While on paper supercarriers can carry up to 130 aircraft, they typically have about 70 aircraft of varying types at any given time. Some are under maintenance, some allocated to fleet protection, with the rest able to conduct offensive operations. Using rough math and averaging air wings, at any given time a carrier may have an estimated 15 aircraft in the air for offensive operations. Thus, in a large-scale conflict, it would be best for multiple carriers to work in concert, and for the navy to “surge” personnel and aircraft to deployed carriers.

The most dangerous threat to this strategy is the potential for an adversary, like China, to employ nuclear weapons against a carrier strike group. China, for example, could claim American naval assets are violating its sovereign waters, constituting an invasion, and employ nuclear weapons against the carrier strike group, hundreds of miles from land.

Such a scenario is certainly not a high probability but is a reasonable concern with an uncertain outcome. The ability of fleet defenses to prevent such a strike is uncertain. However, this risk does not negate the utility of carriers, in general. In fact, there may be some utility in building at least two supercarriers with even longer flight decks than the Gerald R. Ford class.

There are two areas where carriers have a possible future: carrying large swarms of long-legged drones and serving as mid-point logistical platforms. Such supercarriers could also host anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile interceptors, changing the boundaries and layers of continental missile defense, as needed.

Ostensibly, a drone-focused carrier can serve as a waystation for land-based drones and even host drone operators. With advancements in remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUV), it would make sense to redesign a new class of assault ships that can launch them. These can also be built cheaper and crewed by fewer personnel, with the goal of having more. In fact, they can be designed to be mostly unmanned and operate within the protection of a carrier strike group.

For supercarriers, their use behind the main lines of combat, between strike groups and mainland bases, has the potential to make them mobile bases for the purposes described above. Should a peer conflict begin in the Indo-Pacific, their use would be between Japan or Australia, and Hawaii, or as an alternative to American bases in the Pacific should China, for example, strike these bases.

The future use of aircraft carriers may be by American allies, whom, if trained, could deploy their own aircraft from American ships. South Korea and Japan, for example, have airfields in the region but, if struck by North Korea or China, may need an alternative hub to refuel and rearm. If land-based aircraft and airfields are at risk, it makes sense to have alternatives.

Contemplating and integrating the capabilities described is certainly well outside the US Navy’s current operational concept. American naval strategy is well established and slow to change, but, if former Indo-PACOM commander Admiral (Ret.) John Aquilino’s “hellscape” concept of a future asymmetric battlefield in the Indo-Pacific were to ever become a reality, rethinking the use of aircraft carriers may become a necessity.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Rethinking Aircraft Carriers was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since June 2023, there is increasing attention on space security, with a particular focus on collaboration with private-sector space businesses. In situations like the Ukraine conflict, private companies’ satellite imagery and satellite communication services are utilized. It is therefore crucial for the Japanese government to leverage the technology and innovation of private companies, and for the private sector to integrate space security into their business. Close collaboration between the two, advancing public-private partnerships, is a key factor.

The event opened and closed with Kenji Minami, Director, Business Planning Division 2 of the Defense Department, Air Staff Office, at the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The first keynote session, “The Forefront of Public-Private Collaboration in the Security Domain: The Case of the United States,” was delivered by Yasuhito Fukushima, Senior Researcher at the Global Security Laboratory of the Policy Research Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. The session reviewed the current American model of space development. It took a close look at several programs (SpaceWERX), US efforts at connecting industries with government, and expanding the industrial base of space innovation, along the motto: “Exploit What We Have, Buy What We Can, and Build Only What We Must.” Kenji Minami moderated the ensuing panel discussion, “Expectations for Private Companies to Strengthen Space Security,” which gathered participants from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Keio University, at senior researcher, director, and professor level, respectively.

Masayasu Ishida, CEO of SPACETIDE, moderated the second part of the event, with a session called, “Opportunities and Challenges in Space Security from the Perspective of private companies.” It featured the C-Suite representatives of three Japanese space Businesses: Shunji Izutsu, Vice President of Astroscale Co., Ltd., Akiko Kitahara, Executive Vice President and CFO of Warp Space Co., Ltd., and Yoshihiro Ota, Executive Officer and CSO of Axel Space Holdings Co., Ltd. Astroscale is dedicated to on-orbit servicing, such as active debris removal, refueling, and space situational awareness. Warp Space is focused on solving the problem of communication via optical link. Axel Space is a global leader in micro-satellite technology with a strong Earth-observation focus.

The session discussed the potential for public-private cooperation. The three representatives spoke about the potential and challenges of space security–oriented business from the perspective of commercial companies, taking examples from current conflicts and issues. The discussion covered the importance of community building through regular events, and the use of study contracts to demonstrate and introduce new private-sector technologies.

Topics such as legal, financial, commercial, and technical development challenges related to dual-use technologies, and managing risk when involving commercial entities as services providers in relation with a conflict zone, were also reviewed.

On the same day this Space Security and Business event took place, SPACETIDE, the co-organizer of the event, announced that it had been awarded the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Award at the 6th Space Development and Utilization Grand Prize for its significant contributions to the advancement of the space business and the formation of the industrial ecosystem. The selection committee commended SPACETIDE for its significant contributions to the formation of the space industry community in Japan, comprehensive research on the space industry, promotion of networking among entrepreneurs and businesses, and facilitation of talent mobility—thereby contributing to the promotion of the space business and the formation of the space industry ecosystem, fostering national awareness and understanding, while promoting sustainable space utilization.

The conference was a clear demontration that Japan is on the right track to develop a strong industrial base that sustains the nation’s space power development course for both civilian and defense purposes. The Japanese government and its Ministry of Defense are dedicated to advancing close collaboration with the private sector in the field of space security. And as its defense strategy aims at deploying a more credible space deterrent, the nation of Japan further positions itself as a reliable ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense: Opening Space Security to the Commercial Sector was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea continues to increase its weapons production while advancing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nascent submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) legs of an emerging nuclear dyad. At the same time, China increased its numbers and types of nuclear weapons and dual-capable delivery systems. It has built multiple fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce and separate plutonium. Moreover, China’s fielding of a dual-capable fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and hypersonic glide vehicle raises questions about its commitment to its long-standing policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

As Matthew Kroenig notes, the more nuclear weapons a state has, the more assertive and coercive it tends to become to achieve its goals. This fits China’s pattern of behavior and is consistent with North Korea’s modus operandi. These developments threaten vital American security interests by undermining extended deterrence—placing the United States and mutual defense treaty allies at increased risk.

To counter this situation, while preserving strategic options for use during periods of acute crisis, “nuclear castling” would involve the restationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea. In chess, castling involves the simultaneous moving of the king and rook in a protective maneuver that preserves capabilities and opens new possibilities across the board.

Repositioning American nuclear weapons to South Korea would help close an emergent theater deterrence gap and modernize extended deterrence for all Indo-Pacific allies. The following proposal addresses how these weapons would serve an even greater imperative than in the past, even if only to provide the president of the United States options for use in extremis.

The United States should restation B61-3, 4, and/or 12 nuclear gravity bomb variants in South Korea for delivery of low-yield weapons by dual-capable F-35A, F-15E, or F16C/D. New START Treaty limitations only apply to heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, as opposed to these lower yield warheads and fighter aircraft. Additionally, the South Korean Air Force should train to perform conventional support for nuclear operations (CSNO), similar to how the air forces of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe operate. The United States should also use this opportunity to invite the Japanese Air Force to participate in CSNO training and operations.

Skeptics will likely say the April 2023 Washington Declaration between the United States and South Korea should have a chance to strengthen deterrence and assurance. Part of the agreement commits America to reintroducing periodic ballistic missile submarine patrols in the vicinity of South Korea. In addition to South Korea reaffirming its pledge not to seek its own nuclear weapons and commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Washington Declaration clears the way for America and South Korea to establish a nuclear consultative group modeled on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

In fact, within six months of the Washington Declaration, the USS Kentucky made the first visit of an American ballistic missile submarine to South Korea since the 1980s. The visible gesture of deterrence accompanied the inaugural meeting of the American and South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group meeting on the same day in July 2023.

In parallel, an April 2024 display of combined air operations with the South Korean and Japanese Air Forces further contributes to theater deterrence. But, while the Washington Declaration is an important step in the right direction, more is needed to deter North Korea or China and to assure our regional allies.

Others will also argue that reintroducing small numbers of nuclear weapons to South Korea will not make an appreciable difference in North Korea or China’s perception of risk or the credibility of America’s nuclear deterrent. However, repositioning weapons within the theater to deter two nuclear arms–racing aggressors and assure allies creates options for the United States that do not require employment of strategic weapons. For allies that rely on extended deterrence, reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea would renew confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella.

While some observers may also view any reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea in this manner as a contravention of the NPT, the United States would rely on custodial control to align with the NPT. Though fundamentally different than long-standing NATO arrangements that pre-date the NPT, restationing nuclear weapons in South Korea is a comparable approach that involves a treaty ally of the United States. Most importantly, there is a historic precedent between both countries.

At a relatively low cost and risk, restationing nuclear gravity bombs in South Korea has a high return on investment if agreed to by the South Korean government. Additionally, considering production delays for the American Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the current Ohio-class submarines and the similarly lengthy timeline for fielding a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, this recommendation is a timely option for strengthening overall American nuclear deterrence.

The Indo-Pacific chess board has strategically shifted since the United States last stationed weapons there. The longer America maintains a regional nuclear status quo in the face of egregious North Korean and Chinese nuclear arms racing, the less credible and more overstretched America’s nuclear deterrent may appear. Nuclear castling offers an approach to close the emergent deterrence gap and to provide a forceful example of interoperability for treaty allies, complementing bold integrated deterrence moves and magnifying a new sense of integrated assurance.

COL Michael R. DeMarco serves in the United States Army Reserve. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

Nuclear Castling in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a security climate where problems must be tackled in weeks, months, or a year rather than decades or centuries, decision-makers need to prioritize and focus on end-states that are delivered in a finite time horizon with a limited budget and achievable outcomes. A Sum Greater Than Its Parts: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition, a recent report by MITRE and the Aspen Strategy Group, addresses this issue.

The abstract is promising, claiming that integrated deterrence offers a strategy for “managing strategic competition, maintaining peace, and, if necessary, prevailing in conflict” during competition with China. The report also promises “actionable recommendations for policymakers, military leaders and private sector stakeholders” and delivers a laundry list of 31 major initiatives to enhance deterrence.

While a few of the recommended initiatives are sensible and would be useful for deterring China, like modernizing military capabilities to provide assurance and demonstrate resolve, several others are unproven and their implementation could distract from a laser-focused deterrence strategy needed for China. Indo-Pacific nations are acutely affected on a regular basis, either by economic coercion or the looming possibility of conflict over Taiwan or other contested territory. As a result, effective deterrence of China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior must initially rely upon regional solutions to limit China’s most dangerous ambitions.

For a document proposing a China strategy, there is a strange obsession with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European issues. The term NATO appears nine times in the report, including a recommendation to consider internal dynamics in the alliance, while front-line allies in the Indo-Pacific that are key to deterrence (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) are mentioned as mere afterthoughts.

While there are good reasons to consider NATO, as part of any global strategy that includes deterring Russia, the emphasis on NATO seems misplaced given likely targets of Chinese aggression. The report also focused a large set of recommendations on developing public-private partnerships for deterrence, going as far as to “encourage all companies from allied nations to actively participate in strategic initiatives.” While portions of the private sector play a critical role in national security initiatives, it is unclear how a restaurant owner in Latvia could actively contribute to deterring Chinese aggression, for example.

Another group of recommendations suggests the broader use of economic levers including the use of “economic warfare” to undermine an adversary’s willingness to wage war. This ignores the fact that a broad range of economic measures aimed at isolating Russia had a limited impact on the Russian economy and proved to be an abject failure in deterring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The utility of economic sanctions in deterring adversaries has historically proven to be questionable. One study shows the use of sanctions leads to a higher probability of future conflict for democracies, as sanctions tend to signal weakness rather than strength. The utility of economic sanctions and other types of economic warfare to deter remains unproven.

The final grouping of recommendations in the report proved the most useful, suggesting that we must understand the adversary, define clear objectives, and build a grand strategy to win a strategic competition with China. MITRE needed to lead with clear objectives and an understanding of China’s goals and decision calculus. Instead, a long list of potential actions that might deter China is presented without sufficient links to China’s objectives. Rather than utilizing a strategy-to-task framework that links ways and means to the ends in a logical fashion, the report presents a broad range of ways and means primarily focused on integration.

Allies and diplomatic measures should play a crucial role in the realization of integrated deterrence, but policymakers must have clear and pragmatic options available. Prioritization of resources and initiatives to maximize deterrence requires a strong appreciation for the Indo-Pacific region, its unique dynamics, and China’s role in the region. Allies and partners must work bi-laterally and multi-laterally to operationalize deterrence in the region.

China is a significant and well-resourced adversary. To compete with and deter China effectively, the United States and its allies must be thoughtful about what initiatives are pursued and what resources are expended. Integration can improve outcomes, but only when it improves outcomes as part of a unified deterrence strategy. In a world where deterrence of China is urgently required, proven and effective measures that deliver deterrence must be brought together under a unifying strategy. This is the type of integration which should be implemented.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

 Leigh Ramsay is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

The views of the authors are their own.

Integrated Deterrence: Which of These Two Words Is More Important? was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Americans, there must be a greater sense of urgency and realization of critical vulnerabilities that can include one or both potential realities. First, consider that a 2024 Chinese attack on Taiwan is feasible. Second, plan for the defense of Taiwan without the benefit of assets in Okinawa and Guam. There is a significant possibility both may prove true.

China has the confidence and believes it can control both conventional and nuclear escalation. China’s “no first-use” policy only exists in name only. China made it very clear, in state-run television, that it would use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Japan. That is, if Japan became involved in the domestic affairs of China during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (which the Chinese Communist Party sees as a domestic affair), then China may strike Japan with nuclear weapons. This would include Okinawa.

China has the capability and will to gain the advantage in the Asia-Pacific and Taiwan relatively quickly. It is said that amateurs think strategy and generals think logistics. If this is true, understanding China’s perspective is instructive.

First, China will not let Taiwan become the operational center of attention because that is where American attention is focused in wargaming and tabletop exercises (TTX) played in the United States. China, if it acts as expected, will not strike Taiwan, but elsewhere—only later taking Taiwan.

Imagine Taiwan as held between the thumb and finger of the US. Struggle to pry it loose and fail. Cut off the thumb and finger and Taiwan is released. The thumb is American forces on Okinawa and the finger is the US presence on Guam.

Okinawa is home to Kadena Air Base which hosts the 18th Wing, the Air Force’s largest combat air wing. The Kadena’s strategic importance is underscored by its array of advanced fighter aircraft, aerial refueling capabilities, and reconnaissance aircraft. It serves as a critical hub for air operations in the Pacific, offering rapid response capabilities for various regional contingencies. Okinawa is also home to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The US Navy has several facilities in Okinawa, including White Beach Naval Facility, which supports naval operations in the region.

Guam hosts significant American military assets, including Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base. With Guam and Okinawa out, the US still has assets in Tokyo, the Philippines, Australia, and, further out, is Diego Garcia, and even further away is Hawaii.

To operationally execute a surprise attack on Okinawa and Guam, China could employ a stratagem beginning with a deliberate maritime provocation: a scenario where a less costly Chinese asset, such as a $20 million LY-132 warship, engages provocatively with a more valuable US asset, akin to a $2 billion Aegis destroyer. This mirrors past incidents in the South China Sea involving near-collisions, notably between a Chinese LY132 and the USS Chung-Hoon on June 4, 2023. In such a scenario, the Chinese vessel could aggressively maneuver across the bow of the US destroyer in internationally disputed waters, compelling the US ship to decelerate.

In the event of an actual collision, China could construe this as a hostile action by the US in what it claims as its sovereign territory. Leveraging this pretext for a counterstrike, China’s arsenal includes advanced military capabilities for rapid engagement against Okinawa and Guam. In September 2015, the DF-26 nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” which can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, was publicly revealed. Eight years later, China has added the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF-27 missile, and 094-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), capable of delivering a nuclear strike.

The DF-27, a medium-range ballistic missile, augments China’s offensive reach, particularly in regional conflicts. Its range, speed, and accuracy render it a formidable threat to critical American positions in the Indo-Pacific, including military bases and naval forces. The DF-27 is designed to enhance China’s ability to hold targets at risk beyond the second island chain and possesses a high probability of penetrating American ballistic missile defenses. The newest weapon in the Chinese hypersonic inventory, the DF-27, with its range, speed, and ability to maneuver in flight, is a potent “carrier killer.” Additionally, it can hit targets as far as Hawaii.

Using these capabilities China has the option to hit American forces in the first two island chains fast and furiously.

Some may argue that Japan tried something similar in 1941—only to fail. Then, the United States had industrial capacity to quickly build and overpower Japan. Today, the industrial and labor capacity exists in China, not the US. Most importantly, after years of neglecting American nuclear capabilities while China worked toward perfecting their own, the Chinese now have greater regional nuclear capability than the United States. Retaliating for nuclear strikes on Okinawa and/or Guam would prove pyric because the only option is to strike the Chinese mainland. That would put American cities and populations at risk of annihilation.

Returning to the point of this article, 2024 is a good year to attack American forces in the Indo-Pacific for five reasons. First, the US is distracted by the upcoming presidential election. Second, the US is stretched thin with contingencies in Europe and the Middle East. Third, experts and leaders are myopically looking for a cross-strait conflict, rather than the conflict discussed above. Fourth, the US is busy trying to play catch up and strengthen its integrated deterrence with allies. China has the advantage and would prove unwise to give the United States time to prepare. Fifth, the US has more to lose than China in a nuclear conflict. The risk/reward calculation looks better for China than the US in 2024 and beyond.

Thus, 2024 is a good year for a Chinese attack on American military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It is time Americans wake up to the fact that the threat is already here and not somewhere in the future.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived two decades in Taiwan and China.

Why 2024 Is a Good Year for China to Attack American Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The concept of a successful deterrence strategy in any domain boils down to three key requirements: a credible threat (capability to support such a threat), the will to carry out the threat, and effective communications. Part of the problem for Japan is that it failed to develop a credible capability. Furthermore, the three non-nuclear principles (not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Japanese territory) leave Japan fully dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.

For Japan’s effective deterrence in all domains, mere rhetoric about threats is insufficient. As an island nation entirely dependent on maritime access, Japan needs a military capability and clear communication of its determination to achieve domain superiority and escalation dominance over adversaries.

Credibility is based on a nation’s past behavior and its demonstrated willingness to respond to aggression. Clearly, Japan has baggage in its history of aggression and colonization in the Indo-Pacific. Both North Korea and China consistently frame a pacified post-war Japan as the aggressor every time Japan makes a move to survive and claim its right to defend itself in a hostile neighborhood. Japan, however, is now rearming itself.

Space, as a domain, is no exception to deterrence principles. The 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test by China triggered Japan’s review of its passive approach to space infrastructure defense. Japanese spacecraft are at risk of attack through such means as jamming, close approaches by anti-satellite vehicles, and kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that are designed to disrupt or destroy satellites. China has further demonstrated its ability to capture uncooperative spacecraft in geosynchronous Earth orbit, posing a significant concern to Japanese assets in space—and to any critical space infrastructure.

Japan’s transition to a militarily sovereign posture is a protracted process. Japan began by cutting the Gordian knot of post–World War II pacifism in 2014 when it “reinterpreted” Article 9 of its constitution, rather than revising or adjusting it. That sea change operationalized Article 14 of Japan’s 2008 Basic Space Law, Ensuring International Peace and Security as well as the National Security Strategy of Japan, which stipulates, “The State shall take necessary measures to promote space development and use to ensure international peace and security as well as to contribute to the national security of Japan.”

Over the next decade, Japan’s posture evolved from a non-military use of outer space to a deterrence-oriented military capability in space. In 2018, Japan’s defense policy introduced the concept of multi-domain operations, emphasizing national security space capabilities as a central aspect of Japanese strategy. And in 2022, Japan expanded its Space Operations Squadron into a Space Operations Group, responsible for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) space domain awareness operations.

For too long Japan’s space sector development was constrained to civilian aims only. Faced with existential threats, Japanese policymakers realized how vital it was to foster civilian and military cooperation in space for economic gain and furthering national security. Japan’s strategy is to develop an Earth-orbital-cislunar ecosystem.

In the same vein as Japan relies on free sea lanes for communications across the Indo-Pacific, at sea and in space, Japanese-American security cooperation is paramount. The threat of attacks on commercial satellite constellations and spacecraft in orbit and cislunar space is all too certain a reality, in view of already occurring daily threats and attacks on space and cyber assets.

As space continues to be a domain of strategic importance and increasing economic value for Japan, its Space Operations Group must strengthen its space situational awareness capabilities to track and identify hostile objects in space. However, while space situational awareness is essential, Japan must ultimately develop a war-winning space force to effectively deter attacks and win conflicts in space.

The JASDF should be given the policy direction and resources to develop agile, responsive, and lethal capabilities to ensure the protection of Japanese and allied commercial and military assets in space. For that matter, so should the US Space Force.

Challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and globally resemble a gathering storm. Yet, Europe, in part due to its quasi-irreversible techno-economic entanglement with China, remains unclear on what it will do in case of a Taiwan or Japan contingency. An informal yet functional partnership between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) is already established. Yet, France, furthering its relationship with China, recently opposed the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.

On November 11, 1983, Ronald Reagan addressed the Diet in Tokyo, “I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region but throughout the world. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen? My answer is without hesitation: Yes we do, and yes we will.” Forty years later, the Gipper’s words have not aged a bit.

In space, as on Earth, the mutual commitment of Japan and the US, as staunch allies, should ensure the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open, all the way to orbit, cislunar space, and beyond.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States and its allies need to engage in multi-pronged, asymmetric strategies that exploit the existing geostrategic circumstances. The chessboard of the East and South China Seas includes Japan’s Yaeyama Islands (YI) (Ishigaki, Taketomi, Iriomote, Yonaguni, Hateruma) and the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal (TS2). The geography of the YI and the TS2 is central to the strategic equation in the East and South China Seas, particularly in relation to preventing China from taking Taiwan. These locales are not merely dots on a map but multi-dimensional air, land, and maritime pieces on the chessboard or, more aptly, a Go board.

Yonaguni Island is close enough to Taiwan to serve as a forward post for both surveillance and military operations. Yonaguni serves as a forward listening post for activities around the East China Sea and the Miyako Strait, also known as the Kerama Gap. The Second Thomas Shoal, while far removed from the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan and even further from Mainland China, is emblematic of the contested multipolarity of the South China Sea and a source of Chinese aggression toward the Philippines.

The geography of these places interlocks with larger strategic aims, especially vis-a-vis Taiwan. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan it will need to see these islands and shoals incorporated into its defense strategy. If the US chooses not to defend Taiwan against China, it will need to see these areas incorporated into its defense strategy for the sake of a Japan and Philippines that now face a Communist China that has taken control of Taiwan.

The Yaeyama Islands, part of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, are located 200 kilometers from Taiwan. This proximity serves as a critical buffer zone in the event of Chinese military activity aimed at Taiwan. It provides a forward-basing opportunity for surveillance, rapid deployment, and potentially disruptive activities against Chinese assets moving toward Taiwan.

The undisputed Japanese sovereignty over the Yaeyama Islands (excluding Senkaku) offers a unique opportunity. The Japanese, and by extension their allies, have unequivocal authority to militarize the islands without violating international norms.

The same is true of the Philippine islands of Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait. These islands would prove to be especially critical in the event of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan.

Along with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade stationed on Yonaguni Island, a defense network aligning the islands appears to be taking shape. Looking to future military configurations, the US Marine Corps’ restructuring to establish marine littoral regiments points to a rapid adaptability aimed at responding to China’s growing presence. Such forces are particularly effective in island-hopping campaigns, enabling the US to project power in a more flexible and responsive manner.

The expanded regiment, previously the 12th Marine Regiment, was agreed upon by the United States and Japan following the 2023 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in January, according to the US Naval Institute, and is expected to be formed by 2025. Recently the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s commander, Lt. Gen. James Bierman Jr., visited Ishigaki, an island 160 miles east of Taiwan during the Resolute Dragon exercises.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines might consider more subtle and incremental actions. Deploying civilian fleets for research or fisheries, augmented by American and Philippine coast guard vessels, is a mechanism to assert a de facto presence without triggering a full-scale military response. By embracing the Chinese strategy of incrementalism, these nations can turn the tables without risking immediate reprisals or violating international law. Furthermore, the Philippines already established a legal precedent through its 2016 victory at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration.

A presence at TS2 sends a strong signal to China about the range and mobility of American and allied forces. This geographic stretching of the theatre can dilute Chinese focus and assets.  Recently, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels rammed Philippine Coast Guard and resupply ships carrying supplies to troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre. Considering the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Representative Mike Gallagher was emphatic that American support would include assisting the Philippines in establishing a more secure and permanent foothold in the TS2. If, for the sake of argument, Taiwan was part of China, the PRC is already encroaching on the space of two American allies—Japan and the Philippines.

Preventing further Chinese intrusion and hardening the outer islands and shoals of the Philippines and Japan can form a potential encirclement that limits the operational freedom of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in a Taiwan scenario. This Go strategy forces the PLAN into a multi-front conflict, complicating naval strategy. Exploiting these advantages requires an overlapping understanding of both the physical and symbolic dimensions of geography, intertwined with the complexities of military strategy, international law, and multi-dimensional warfare.

On November 9, in a Foreign Policy and the Quincy Institute jointly sponsored panel, Zack Cooper and Lyle J. Goldstein addressed the strategic value of the Senkaku Islands, which is just north of the Yaeyama Islands and the TS2. According to Goldstein, the US is not “going to defend shoals (TS2) or islands with goats (the Senkaku Islands).” He added, the need to “draw reasonable lines and do things that are affordable” is “a more realistic approach and that is consistent with realism and restraint.”

Cooper expressed concern about giving up TS2 or the Senkaku islands. He argued that conceding defeat on either front will cause American allies to ask, “You know, our alliance is backed by nuclear deterrence. What’s the red line on the nuclear deterrence?” By giving up on TS2 and the Senkaku Islands he said, “I worry that is what walks us into a very serious strategic crisis.” He added, “If we’re very sure that we can fight and defend Japan and the Philippines then why can’t we also protect Taiwan in the same way?”

Barely visible shoals and islands with goats will not retain their bucolic simplicity if the Chinese take control of them. In due time they will become fortified threats at the doorsteps of America’s allies. If the United States refuses to fight, it is a reasonable expectation that China will continue its aggression and claim historical ownership of Okinawa as well.

Absent a strong military response, an expansionist China may desire to limit Japan to the home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido. Chinese aggression toward the Philippines could see the country lose its islands north of Luzon. This may seem farfetched, but so, too, is believing that Chinese expansion is satiated with the Scarborough shoals and islands with nothing more than goats.

US Maneuvering in the Yaeyama Islands and the Second Thomas Shoal to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

This tough stance may seem puzzling. For one thing, Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), having a Taiwan-centered orientation, has historically been far less keen than the Kuomintang (KMT) to press on issues of ROC territorial claims outside of Taiwan proper, as these are widely seen as a holdover from the era of Republican China. For this same reason, Tsai has been perceived as being more amenable to developing deeper Taiwan-Japan ties, especially in such areas as security cooperation and trade relations—this latter would help both countries avoid keeping too many eggs in the China basket.

Likewise, from the Japanese perspective, there has been an embrace of—and high hopes for—the Tsai administration, as it promised an end to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-friendly policies.

In short: Taiwan and Japan make natural allies in a region and an era marked by an increasingly aggressive China. Why, then, Taiwan’s tough talk on the Senkakus, an issue which few Taiwanese people care about?

Earlier this month, the Executive Yuan—the executive branch of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—promulgated the island’s first-ever marine policy white paper on June 4, 2020. This move came at a time when the maritime security environment in the East and South China seas is becoming increasingly volatile as a result of China aggressively pressing its territorial claims in these bodies of water. The document has as its primary goal to provide consistent guidelines to government departments for implementing the sustainable development of ocean-related policies. According to the head of the ROC Ocean Affairs Council, the idea behind the white paper is to transform Taiwan into a “marine country,” and one that is “ecological, safe, and prosperous.”

The white paper is the result of the framework for the country’s ocean management, as approved by the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s Congress) in November 2019. The “basic act for ocean affairs,” as it is called, is another attempt to integrate all government agencies that are stakeholders in marine and maritime issues.

The efforts of the administration of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen to implement more coherent and coordinated ocean policies could not be timelier. Taiwan is an island, and it is surrounded by waters that are especially turbulent, from a geopolitical perspective. Moreover, for too long, the ROC government has paid short shrift to its littoral holdings, being reticent to conceive of itself as a maritime power. But an island nation it is, and it is about time that the DPP administration acknowledges this with its actions.

The paper U.S. Strategic Mobility in Deployment to Ensure Regional Security, written by Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a senior researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, affirmed Taiwan’s status as a nation with a stake in the events that transpire in the East and South China seas. Su pointed out that the PRC has been effective in leveraging the COVID-19 global pandemic to beef up Chinese power-projection capabilities, in the South China Sea and surrounding maritime areas, due in part to the reduced presence of the U.S. Navy. He also asserted that the instability has had a deleterious effect on key navigation channels such as the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, as well as the East China Sea.

What Su did not take into account was domestic inertia and party rivalry: That the task of coordinating and integrating the many national and local marine agencies in Taiwan, and overcoming the inter-party conflicts over maritime ideologies, may be more daunting than facing the geopolitical maritime perils that await them offshore. These two elements have long been roadblocks preventing Taiwan from being able to respond adequately to its urgent marine and maritime challenges.

In terms of coordination, the ocean-related matters in Taiwan involve at least 15 different agencies—some of whose jurisdictions overlap—ranging from technical departments to a general ministry, and from agencies that are directly involved with maritime issues to those for which ocean-related matters are only peripheral.

The main consequence of the difference in scope, focus, and structure of these government agencies—as well as the destructive yet inevitable inter-agency rivalries that tend to emerge in bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities—has been an inability to coordinate actions effectively. This makes it difficult to build up the momentum for the kind of change that is needed in order to remedy the above problems, making the proper administration of maritime affairs a difficult task.

Until now, nothing related to the marine or maritime policies in Taiwan has been integrated. Instead, there has been a patchwork of policies promulgated by a plethora of departments, each with its own marine-related area of oversight. Fishery issues are dealt with by the fishery agency, for example, and shipping issues, with the shipping agencies, and so on, until the proverbial right-hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.

Part of the reason for the different governing paradigms in Taiwan is that some sectors within the Pan-Blue camp (to wit: the KMT) still possess an outdated terrestrial or land-oriented mentality, inherited from the Chinese tradition from which this party evolved. This terrestrial mentality, however, also tends to make the KMT more assertive in terms of territory, as they see it essentially from the sovereignty perspective. It was under KMT leadership that the ROC laid the foundation for the modern Chinese maritime claims (adopted almost entirely by the PRC, interestingly). Thus, the PRC’s adherence to the U-shaped nine-dash line, originally published by the ROC in December of 1947. In this view, defense of the territorial claims in the area encompassed by this line is a natural position, and anything otherwise would be politically impracticable and ideologically contradictory.

On the other hand, the Pan-Green Camp, led by the DPP, tends to take the opposite tack. First, it prefers to focus on environmental questions, as this fits well with the DPP’s idea of being a friendly stakeholder in the disputes, given that the environmental protection discourse tends to have few opponents among the other claimants due to its nature as an issue of collective interests.

Finally, in diverting from the territorial-sovereignty discourse, the DPP intends to bring Western powers onside, by positioning its claims under the UNCLOS umbrella. Moreover, it will try to keep its distance from any mention of the U-shaped line map for two reasons: First, this presupposes a Chinese territorial centered view of the disputes, adoption of which would make the DPP undistinguishable from the KMT (and the PRC, for that matter). Second, the nine-dashed line map defense is not feasible under the UNCLOS perspective and would be perceived as extremely aggressive by the international community. These do not contribute to the way the DPP must position itself.

Therefore, the challenge of integrating ROC government departments and coordinating a coherent maritime policy is not a simple one. Whatever the effectiveness of the white paper presented by the Executive Yuan this year might bring in terms of day-to-day maritime and marine operations, a modus vivendi must be found between the Blues and the Greens. From this perspective, the Tsai administration’s tough talk on the Japanese redesignation of the Senkaku Islands may be interpreted as an olive branch to the Pan-Blue coalition—both politically, and to the many civil servants serving in the relevant ministries and departments who are known to have blue-leaning sympathies—in order to secure buy-in for this project.

If Tsai fails to find such common ground, then any of the eventual gains accrued from the current administration will be thrown away, just as both parties have done to each other every other time that a transition of power has taken place. The stakes are too high for the Taiwanese people to accept this outcome.

Confronting Japan to Defend Against China: Senkaku as a Case Study in Taiwan’s Politics was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

China’s military expansion is occurring at a time when Taiwan is becoming more resistant to cross-strait reunification, and the U.S. is altering its commitment to Taiwan, suggesting an increasingly dangerous decade ahead in the Taiwan Strait.

Key Insights

• Taiwan’s democratic consolidation means any future reunification with the mainland will be exceedingly difficult.
• China’s confidence in its ability to use force might mislead it into preparing for an invasion
• Misperceptions over shifts in U.S. commitment towards Taiwan could encourage an aggrieved China to use force in the future

The Taiwan Strait is reaching a critical juncture of heightened instability. Heading into the 2020s and 2030s, the struggle for independence, status quo, or reunification will be increasingly felt as each of the key actors—Taiwan, Washington, and Beijing—begin to unravel the twenty-five years of relative stability that has endured since the 1995-6 crisis. Since then, the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy has become the greatest challenge to China’s quest for reunification. Taiwan continues to oppose any possibility of reunification on Beijing’s terms even if its future leaders do not seek formal independence. Indeed, the public majority and leaders of the traditionally pro-China pan-Blue coalition and independence-minded pan-Green coalitions, including next year’s election candidates, have opposed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reintroduction of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework for reunification.

Although peaceful reunification is frustrated, mainland China is becoming more powerful and impatient under Xi’s leadership. This is not to suggest that the economic problems China faces are not acute. But the People’s Liberation Army is growing more confident in its ability to match the Taiwanese and U.S. armed forces in a contest of strength. If Xi fails to deliver the prosperity promises of his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” he could very well resort to speeding up his other more revisionist ambitions of developing a world-class military and reunifying the territories lost during the “Century of Humiliation.”

Costs of Invasion

During the 1995-6 crisis, there was no doubt about the credibility of U.S. deterrent capabilities buttressing the might of the Taiwanese armed forces, which were then considered to be more advanced and powerful than the PLA. Decades later, China’s “military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages in deterring PLA aggression,” including “the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense,” the U.S. Department of Defense noted in its 2017 report on Chinese military power. These shifts have purportedly led Xi to believe that the “tide of history”—that is, reunification with Taiwan—favors the mainland.

Assessing the cross-strait military balance generates doubts about the PLA’s capacity to subjugate Taiwan. Beijing lacks the amphibious and lift capabilities to land an invasion, and Taiwan possesses submarines and sea mines that could seriously damage any invasion fleet. Climatic conditions and the gradual build-up of Chinese forces also complicate any surprise offensive. The possibility of staging an urban, counterinsurgency warfare against a resilient Taiwanese society while simultaneously holding off U.S. forces in the Western Pacific also diminishes the success of a Chinese invasion. But with China’s continued acquisition of the relevant capabilities, these disadvantages will gradually erode in the coming decade.

Furthermore, the PLA does not need to be fully equipped to fight a war of reunification. Whether to wage war is not a decision based solely on military calculations, and having confidence in the PLA may mislead the Chinese Politburo into taking an aggressive posture. Given Beijing’s routinization of ‘island encirclement patrols’ and the creation of cross-strait military-civilian flight paths to familiarise the PLA with the terrain and conditions of airlift, an invasion may no longer require a gradual military build-up. By engineering a heightened state of military readiness, it is difficult for Taiwan to gauge when China decides to launch a surprise offensive.

It would be naive to assume that Xi does not have the political resolve to bear the responsibility of a post-invasion war-torn economy, whose share of trade to mainland China has declined to a mere 2% of total Chinese exports. Nor should it be assumed the fear of an anti-China international coalition and the repercussions to its “peaceful rise” image will restrain Beijing from using force. Since 2016, China has been engaging in a multi-faceted pressure campaign to reinforce an alternate reality of Taiwan as a “local affair” to curtail potential foreign criticisms of its cross-strait activities. This has included not just usual diplomatic isolation, but more recently a whole-of-society approach to bring the pressure to bear on the private individuals, commercial airlines and retail businesses of other countries. To a large extent, this has worked. Even the U.S., the primary security guarantor for Taiwan, quietly removed the Taiwanese flag from two of its government websites, suggesting an implicit yielding to Chinese pressure.

Potential U.S. Gradual Retreat

In the coming decade, the costs of invasion will have likely declined, while frustration with Taiwan’s democracy and impatience regarding delays to reunification will have increased. Taiwan will then have to rely not on itself but on U.S. resolve to deter a potential Chinese invasion. Although Washington has entered a period of “strategic competition” with Beijing, growing resource strain — especially with sustained budget sequestration — will force American administrations to reassess U.S. commitment overseas. However, U.S. policymakers, having witnessed President Donald Trump’s damage to U.S. international standing, are unlikely to retreat into isolation. But subsequent occupants of the White House will be forced to weigh the country’s commitments more carefully between vital and peripheral interests.

In this regard, U.S. interest in Taiwan has remained ambiguous since the post-World War II aftermath. While Taiwan sympathizers continue to uphold Taiwan as a vital U.S. interest, the stakes pale in comparison to other more pressing U.S. interests in Asia, such as support for Japan and maintaining the rule of law in the South China Sea. But the issues of prestige and reliability as the region’s primary security guarantor, the fear of China construing U.S. retreat as a sign of weakness, and the domestic sensitivities toward Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy” could conflate Washington’s priorities to stay committed in the face of aggression. Thus, while its ability and willingness to deter China from invading Taiwan is likely to decline over time, it will not retreat without putting up resistance. To make up for resource strain, Washington will demonstrate its symbolic gestures to Taiwan to caution China about the prospect of U.S. military intervention. This included the recent passing of the Taiwan Travel Act to allow two-way senior official exchanges, stationing U.S. military personnel to the new American Institute in Taiwan for the first time since 2005, potential port visits and new arms sales. But in doing so, Beijing could misread the gestures as signs of a growing commitment to Taiwan and be provoked into threatening the U.S. not to interfere in its “local affairs.”

Misreading of Signals

The Taiwan Strait has resumed its status as a dangerous flashpoint. In arranging for a politically viable way to reduce its commitment to Taiwan, Washington could find itself unwittingly confronting an aggrieved and more confident China while trying to preserve its domestic and regional reputation as best as possible. U.S. sales of 60 F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan demonstrated this challenge: the sale was praised as symbolically important but was perceived as an act of provocation by Beijing, resulting in the PLA’s intentional crossing of the ‘median line’ in the Taiwan Strait for the first time in twenty years.

While this has not escalated into further U.S.-China confrontation, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s decision to automatize the forceful expulsion of Chinese forces suggests that future transgressions of the ‘median line’ will no longer be safe from unprofessional encounters and shoot down incidents. The U.S. will then be pressured to respond with a stronger deterrent posture. But with little to no confidence-building mechanisms to manage cross-strait instability, the mutual signaling of threats between Washington and Beijing could turn into ever-more aggressive shows of force, entrapping both countries into a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis and with consequences they are not prepared to face.

The New Taiwan Strait Crisis: a Dangerous Decade Ahead was originally published on Global Security Review.

In contrast to its predecessors, the Trump administration has brought about some relevant changes to U.S. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “inter-state strategic competition” has reappeared as the principal threat to U.S. national security.

Similarly, the 2017 National Security Strategy contends that China—together with Russia—threatens to challenge “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” In short, China must be considered a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power” as it is promoting a worldview utterly “antithetical” to U.S. values and interests.

Each subsequent strategic and operational document released by the Trump administration since the National Security Strategy (2018 Nuclear Posture Review; 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0; 2019 Missile Defense Review) has chorused those conclusions. After unveiling the 2017 NSS, the White House imposed tariffs on China in response to allegedly unfair trade practices.

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The United States first imposed tariffs on $3 billion worth of goods and then enacted measures on another $50 billion. In September of 2018, the U.S. imposed a 10% tariff on approximately $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, with a possibility of a rise to 25% in January 2019. The U.S. and China negotiated a temporary truce over further protectionist escalation at the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires in December 2018, averting an increase in tariffs on Chinese exports. Nevertheless, competition between the U.S. and China is expected to endure, primarily in the economic and technological realms, forcing Washington and Beijing into an uneasy peace.

After four decades of economic growth, China today is a great power, eager to pursue its strategic interests. On a global level, however, China is bound by structures, institutions, procedures, and rules that have been promoted by the United States since 1945, and ultimately standardized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Regionally, Chinese expansionism is constrained by the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke security system that binds the United States with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region (primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand). Policymakers should keep the following four points in mind when developing China policies—these four “nots” are essential for understanding Chinese behavior, goals, and interests.

1. The center of political authority in China is NOT Xi Jinping; it’s the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to downplay the role Xi has played in fueling China’s global ambitions—rather, since 1978, it has been the Party that ultimately drives China’s foreign policy and grand strategic goals. It has always been since 1978. If Xi wants to implement a new vision or global agenda, he nevertheless needs the Party’s approval. Additionally, as Rush Doshi contends, concepts usually attributed to Xi such as “national rejuvenation,” “strategic opportunity,” and “China’s great power status,” were laid down before Xi rose to the apex of the CCP in November 2012.
2. China’s revisionist behavior is NOT revolutionary; It’s incremental and selective. As Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory states, there are two plausible paths of systemic revisionism: incremental and revolutionary. Incrementalism aims to implement “continuous adjustments within the framework of the existing system,” while revolution occurs with “intermittent abrupt changes.” Empowered by forty-years of unprecedented economic growth, Beijing eventually became more assertive and demanding of what it perceives is a more accommodating and beneficial international order, but stopped short of attempting a sweeping and radical restructuring of the global order. Thus, as Evan Feigenbaum states, China is carrying out revisionist policies through an incremental and selective approach rather than a revolutionary one.
3. China is NOT a peer competitor to the U.S. at present, but it could be in the future. Today, Chinese economic growth has run aground as Xi Jinping pursues structural reforms to shepherd the country into a more sustainable and domestic-consumption-driven path, a move which will inevitably stimy economic growth. Furthermore, a formidable strand of literature (see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Michael Beckley and Andrea and Mauro Gilli) has flourished in recent years stressing China’s deficiencies while outlining obstacles to reaching parity with the United States. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth accurately identify national military, economic and technological capabilities that are “tailored for superpower status,” but conclude that “the one-superpower [the U.S.] system is not on the cusp of structural change” and that “there has been no transformation in its fundamental operating dynamics,” despite Chinese advances.
4. China is NOT out-of-the-way; it’s in-the-way. Globalization and forty years of normalized diplomatic relations have intertwined Beijing and Washington on multiple fronts: currency reserves, trade, investments, industrial complementarity, cultural exchanges, international security matters in which both parties have interests, and more. As Michael Swaine appraised, disentangling—or decoupling—a relationship of such complexity, while addressing critical nodes, will require more than labeling China as an existential threat and discarding China’s contribution to global security and prosperity.

Beijing is a revisionist power, but it is not necessarily a subversive actor on the global stage. Indeed, as the U.K. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee recently assessed, “China is a force for order, but not liberal order.” For its part, the Trump Administration is advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that, despite promoting strong global cohesion in the face of China’s rise, displays a proclivity for unilateralism. Policymakers should consider the four “nots” as a starting point for developing a long-term strategy for countering Chinese revisionism.

The Four “Nots” to Correctly Interpreting China’s Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

As part of a renewed pushback against Chinese influence, India announced in February that it would allocate $361 million for aid to the Maldives, a fourfold increase from 2018-19.

Key Insights

• Beijing and New Delhi are competing for influence throughout the Indian Ocean, an area which has traditionally been a part of India’s sphere of influence but has recently seen a surge of Chinese economic and military activity.
• Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives owe a substantial debt to China; New Delhi worries that debt-trap diplomacy could lead to Chinese military bases in the region.
• India will bolster its economic and military efforts in its near abroad while continuing to call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese influence in the region.

The Maldives: Trouble in Paradise an Opportunity for India

Dispensing foreign aid is hardly the primary concern of Indian policymakers. Faced with debilitating poverty levels, the South Asian nation still receives aid from a number of countries such as the UK and the US. Yet the announcement of a new foreign aid component for the 2019-2020 budget has triggered the interest of Indian foreign policy pundits because of one notable outlier. Compared to 2018-2019, aid to the Maldives has seen a 460% increase, with $361 million being allocated to the island nation. The budget boost follows New Delhi’s declaration in December 2018 that it would provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to Malé, after a meeting between Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recent political upheaval in the Maldives provides the backdrop for these decisions. The newly elected Solih defeated pro-China authoritarian leader Abdulla Yameen in a surprise election result in October 2018. Solih’s victory was clearly a welcome relief for politicians in New Delhi who described the victory as a ‘triumph of democratic forces’.

During Yameen’s five-year rule, the Maldives strengthened ties with China, solidifying a free trade deal and welcoming considerable investment while sidelining Indian concerns over the relationship. Yet the spending spree was no free lunch. The Maldives accumulated between $1.5 billion and $3 billion in debt to Chinese lenders due to an infrastructure construction boom. Solih is now actively trying to reduce this debt. India’s financial assistance will go a long way towards alleviating Malé’s financial distress. It also represents New Delhi’s intention to forge closer ties with neighboring countries and signals a broader pivot back to the Indian Ocean.

The Red Dragon in the Indian Ocean

Rather than being India’s canary in the coal mine, the Maldives represents just one aspect of China’s increasing presence across the Indian Ocean. Through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which India vehemently opposes – Beijing has sought to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with Indian Ocean nations. China sees this as a ‘win-win’ opportunity for all parties involved to enhance development and connectivity and denies any form of nefarious motive behind the sprawling scheme. Yet India doesn’t see the BRI as wholeheartedly benign. Instead, New Delhi believes that Beijing is putting some countries in significant debt stress to gain leverage for the ultimate purpose of pursuing its own strategic aims, a concept known as  ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.

Perhaps the best-known example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is in Sri Lanka. Colombo built Hambantota port on the southern coast using Chinese loans that it ultimately couldn’t repay, resulting in a debt-equity swap that left the port under the control of state-owned enterprise China Merchants Group on a 99-year lease. The fear for Indian policymakers is that this port will eventually be used as a military facility for Chinese naval vessels, as part of a scheme to ultimately establish a ‘String of Pearls’ – a series of Chinese military bases across the Indian Ocean – that would threaten India’s lines of communication and ability to project force in the event of a military crisis.

China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, its operation of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and its increased naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean to protect sea lines of communication and enhance anti-piracy efforts are perceived by India to be a threatening combination. Coupled with reports that the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are all facing high BRI-related debt distress, India is extremely concerned that these countries could become beholden to China’s will in the future.

Battles for Influence, Calls for Allies

Perceptions of China have soured in the Maldives since Solih came to power. The cheap loan binge by former president Yameen has come to an end and the hangover is starting to set in. Solih has already pledged to pull out of the free trade deal with China, claiming that deal was ‘very one-sided’.

The competition for influence is unlikely to be confined to the Maldives, with Sri Lanka on the radar for both nations. Rival bailout bids have been tabled for the debt-stressed country: the Reserve Bank of India agreed to a $400 million currency swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 2019, while the Bank of China allegedly offered a $300 million loan. In this respect, Sri Lanka presumably welcomes competition from the bigger powers if it results in a better outcome for debt reduction, and will more than likely hedge between the two nations rather than simply picking sides.

India will increasingly call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The French naval destroyer FNS Cassardrecently docked into a military port in Mumbai after India and France solidified a Joint Strategic Vision deal to increase co-operation between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne also reminded audiences at the Raisina Dialogue – a multilateral geopolitical conference held in New Delhi – that Australia remained committed to securing the Indian Ocean through close collaboration with joint naval exercises and support for regional institutions.

Expect this kind of diplomatic signaling to continue and strengthen in the future, with the possibility of a revival in more military exercises within the ‘Quad’ group, a security cooperation arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Extra funding may also be dedicated to promoting and implementing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a sea corridor promoting development across the Indian Ocean and into Africa that India has developed with Japan to rival BRI.

On the flip side, China will double down somewhere that India can’t compete: Pakistan. The $62 billion China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), with the Gwadar port as the flagship project, has come under increased scrutiny due to concerns among the new Pakistani leadership about the country’s debt levels. As other countries across the Indian Ocean begin to doubt the viability of some BRI projects, China can’t afford for its close strategic relationship with Pakistan to sour. Expect Beijing to continue pouring investments into the country. The addition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in CPEC allows China to diversify its risks whilst also strengthening its relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. More partners could join that align with China’s strategic goals, with Iran pointing out that it too had ambitions to take part.

India’s renewed influence in the Maldives shows that foreign policymakers in New Delhi are aware that for the country to remain a significant force in the Indian Ocean, they need to focus on a few key objectives. These include maintaining close ties to nearby countries by offering incentives and assistance, calling on powerful allies to support its efforts across the Indian Ocean, and also displaying independent expressions of force projection. The ensuing competition with China over influence in the Indian Ocean will likely only intensify over the coming months and years.

New Delhi’s Foreign Policy in the Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific region will see a fundamental shift in the geopolitical status quo throughout 2019. This shift is the result of many factors, but the most prominent is China’s rise as a political, economic, and military great power. China’s rapid economic growth has provided the foundation for an expansion of the People’s Liberation Army and has dramatically increased the country’s international political clout. 

For nearly three decades, China’s economy greatly expanded due to low wages, a large workforce, substantial demand for raw materials, and investment by multinational corporations. In the U.S., many industries suffered as production was increasingly outsourced to Chinese factories. Furthermore, Chinese companies have enjoyed easy access to the U.S. market for decades, whereas U.S. firms are forced to hand over intellectual property and make other concessions to be granted access to Chinese markets. 

Washington has embarked on a campaign to induce Beijing to implement meaningful economic reforms. By imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods, the U.S. has effectively made it more difficult for Chinese products to enter U.S. markets. In doing so, the U.S. is attempting to force China to open its markets to U.S. goods and services and to eliminate harmful policies such as forced technology-sharing and joint-investment agreements.  

The challenge for China is that submitting to Washington’s demands would profoundly weaken China’s economy, which could seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.  China is stuck between a rock and a hard place; even if Beijing were to offer to purchase more U.S. goods while gradually reducing barriers to foreign investment, it would take years for China to prove that it has been making good on its end of the bargain.

What’s Next for the U.S.-China Trade War?

It’s unlikely an immediate resolution will be found for the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute. Instead, it’s likely that both countries will continue down the path of economic decoupling. The Trump Administration is encouraging multinational firms to reorient their supply-chains outside of China and is erecting barriers to Chinese investment in the United States. This year, U.S. policymakers will have to consider imposing another round of tariffs on the remaining $267 billion worth of Chinese goods imported into the U.S. each year, on top of the duties already imposed on some $250 billion worth of Chinese products. Furthermore, there is the possibility that lawmakers in Washington could introduce sanctions on Beijing in response to China’s mass-detention of Uyghurs in the western Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Ningxia.

Due to China’s reliance on the U.S. consumer market, it will have difficulty retaliating on an equal scale. China’s wealthier coastal provinces, which host the bulk of the country’s export production capacity, are especially vulnerable to an extended trade dispute with the U.S. it will be difficult to respond due to its reliance on the U.S consumer market. That being said, Beijing has several cards left to play. The government can reduce taxes, offer subsidies, invest in infrastructure projects, and ease regulations to promote domestic consumption and economic growth in the private sector.

Beijing is also likely to use leverage the value of its currency to mitigate the damage inflicted by U.S. tariffs. As Chinese access to U.S markets is increasingly impeded, Beijing will seek new markets along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and pursue bilateral trade agreements to secure access to them.

Reorienting Global Supply-Chains

The United States will likely adopt an increasingly aggressive posture when it comes to the development and investment in strategic technological sectors. Tech firms in the U.S.—particularly those that work with dual-use (civil-military) technology—will come under increasing government supervision in 2019. Competition between China and the United States. Much like in Germany and France, the United States has been setting up barriers to Chinese investment in strategic sectors.

U.S. tech firms that work with dual-use civil-military technology will come under increasing government supervision in 2019. Such dual-use technology falls into categories such as aerospace, 5G networking, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and high-performance semiconductors. As it has done with Canada and European allies, the U.S. is likely to lobby its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to implement expert controls on similar emerging technologies. Such measures will be detrimental to the operations of Chinese firms, some of which have already been branded as national security threats by governments around the world.

As multinational corporations move to reorient their supply-chains to decrease reliance on China, there are Asian states that will be in a position to benefit from the economic decoupling of the world’s two largest economies. Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Phillippines all offer attractive alternatives to manufacturing in China. Additionally, many of these countries specialize in the production of certain goods. Vietnam, for instance, produces high-quality electronics and textiles, and Thailand and Malaysia both have formidable automobile manufacturing sectors.

According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, around one-third of American firms in China are considering moving their operations abroad due to the ongoing trade standoff. Regardless if they relocate or not, the ASEAN markets will emerge as attractive alternatives for global supply chains as foreign direct investment begins to rise throughout the region. These changes will not happen immediately. Firms will need time to find regional partners, navigate legal systems, and draft new agreements. It’s likely that the full effects of the U.S.-China trade dispute won’t be realized for three to five years, but there will be a lasting impact nevertheless.

Worsening Tensions in the South China Sea

Trade and technology aside, tensions in the South China Sea will continue to deteriorate. Beijing will likely take a more aggressive stance as it continues to militarize existing and reclaimed islands—bolstering its naval, missile, and air power capabilities in an apparent Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. China’s expanding presence will complicate matters for powers like the U.S. and Japan who regularly conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in disputed waters.

China’s expansionary behavior and an increased presence by the United States and its allies increase the probability for accidents or a rapid escalation. Despite this, the U.S. Navy and its partners will continue to conduct FONOPS in the South and East China Seas. Furthermore, the U.S. may sell more advanced arms and technology to Taiwan and increase the number of FONOPS it conducts in the Taiwan Strait.

United States-China Rivalry Will Dominate Geopolitics in East Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Kuril Islands were annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Japan, however, still refers to the islands as its Northern Territories, and doesn’t accept their current status. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently discussed the future of the disputed islands, but according to official statements, they still haven’t reached a compromise. However, the very fact that the Kremlin is ready to discuss the return of its own sovereign territory to Japan is a sign of Russian weakness.

In a statement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the two leaders discussed the status of three of the disputed islands. The Kurils are made up of four islands, and some initial reports suggested that Moscow and Tokyo initially negotiated the fate of just two islands. Japan appears to be putting pressure on Russia, as Tokyo is increasing its demands.

Japan seeks the restoration of its sovereignty over all four of the Kuril Islands. Russia’s concern is that once Japanese sovereignty is restored, Tokyo might permit the United States to establish military bases on the Kuril Islands.  The Kremlin remains quite aware of this possibility but is negotiating the status of the territory nevertheless. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the primary goal of the bilateral talks is “signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan,” decades after the end of World War II. Is Lavrov’s conflation of the Kuril Islands matter with the fact that Russia and Japan have yet to formally declare an end to World War II hostilities a signal that the Kremlin is willing to cede territory in exchange for a formal treaty?

At the official level, the Kremlin is denying that it ever intends to return the Kuril Islands to its “dear Japanese partners,” as Putin refers to Abe and his government. Putin and Abe couldn’t reach an agreement, so they agreed to create conditions for eventually achieving mutually acceptable solutions. Once progress is made, the two countries could sign a peace treaty that would be mutually acceptable to both the Japanese and Russian people. This, however, is next-to-impossible as a large majority of Russians oppose returning the Kuril Islands to Japan. Similarly, even after seventy years, a majority of Japanese regards the islands as Russian-occupied Japanese territory. Thus, to find a solution, Japan, Russia, or both will have to compromise.

Japan, for instance, could reduce its demands from all four islands to two or three islands. However, the Kremlin fears that if it cedes even a single square meter of any of the four islands, it would be a sign of weakness, signaling a willingness to make further concessions. Tokyo would then increase pressure on the Kremlin to return more and more territory. What’s more, Moscow fears any agreement over the Kuril Islands could set a precedent it would rather not set. If the Kremlin was willing to enter into negotiations over the Kuril Islands, what’s to stop Berlin from seeking the return of Kaliningrad (formerly Konigsberg) to Germany?

Japan has waited over seventy years for a resolution to the Kuril Islands dispute, and it very well might keep waiting for a serious political crisis that could effectuate the breakup or splintering of the Russian Federation. If such a crisis occurs, Japan may seize the opportunity to restore sovereignty over its Northern Territories. In the meantime, however, Tokyo will maintain a dialogue in the hopes that Moscow will make a compromise. Such a scenario is unlikely, however, as the Kremlin fears such a compromise could open a Pandora’s box.

Will Russia Return the Kuril Islands to Japan? was originally published on Global Security Review.

A report recently released by the Henry Jackson Society’s Global Britain program offers a more comprehensive view of what this new role for the U.K. should look like. The authors, James Rogers, and Bob Seeley, MP, argue that a Global Britain approach should be centered around three fundamental freedoms: Freedom for Trade, Freedom from Oppression, and Freedom of Thought.

Arguing that these three key freedoms are essential for liberal democratic states to succeed in a more competitive world order, the report confirms several significant recent developments regarding the current world order which have already seen successful policy-driven implementations over the last two years.

The first development is the return to a competitive state-based international order. Though the United States retains its global supremacy as the world’s sole superpower, and alongside NATO’s success in ensuring trans-Atlantic peace for 70 years, various regions in the world have recently become more competitive and unpredictable, which has led to a greater risk of conflict.

This shift from a unipolar world order at the onset of the 21st Century to one of multipolarity in 2019 was outlined in the National Security and Capability Review in 2018, which highlighted both a revisionist Russia across Eurasia and an expansionist China, particularly in the South China Sea and wider Indo-Pacific region.

This development has led to the U.K. increasing its diplomatic capabilities and defense engagement across East Asia and the Pacific, establishing nine new diplomatic missions in Pacific island states whilst increasing cooperation with allies such as Singapore and Japan. The new strategic alliance forged with Japan, in particular, is an example of how increased bilateral defense engagement with strategic partners should be a cornerstone of a Global Britain approach.

As part of the U.K.’s activity in East Asia, it has increased significantly the Royal Naval presence transiting through these crucial waters. Conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations both in 2018 and early 2019, the Royal Navy missions in Chinese-disputed international waters affirms the report written by James Rogers and Bob Seeley, MP citing the centrality of both Freedom for Trade and Freedom from Oppression within a Global Britain vision. Britain’s presence will soon be increased, as the U.K. Defense Secretary announced earlier in February that the Royal Navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, will likely be making its first operational mission to the Indo-Pacific.

The second recent development in the international system which this report addresses are the attempted erosion of the rules-based global order by states employing increasingly sophisticated and criminal methods of subversion. From the state-sponsored terrorist attack in Salisbury, U.K. in 2018, to the unrelenting hybrid warfare being conducted against Ukraine since 2014, to the increased military and diplomatic assistance provided to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Russia has sought to systematically undermine liberal democratic states and institutions. Specifically, the Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to divide NATO and the E.U., for at least the past decade. Thus, Freedom from Oppression and Freedom of Thought are two essential strategies the UK should seek to further pressure the Russian regime into ceasing its malign activities.

China seeks to reshape both international law and existing institutions across the Indo-Pacific region, in an attempt to establish hegemony in a less overtly aggressive, though potentially more unpredictable and dangerous manner compared with Moscow’s approach. Maintaining international shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean is not just a UK security concern, but a global one. China has sought to project its influence across the region through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as the One Belt, One Road program). Additionally, Beijing has continued to militarize port facilities in Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. A heightened Royal Naval presence across the Indo-Pacific, building on its successes in 2018, should form a central pillar in a strategy to manage possible bullish Chinese maritime behavior undermining the rules-based order.

This report seeks to address the growing concern as to what precisely the U.K.’s role should be in the world, especially in the light of the U.K.’s imminent withdrawal from the European Union (E.U.). By strengthening alliances with global partners including the so-called CANZUK group (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as Japan and Singapore, and by promoting the three universal freedoms, the U.K. can contribute to upholding and maintaining the liberal norms and values which have ensured global peace and security.

Global Britain: A New Vision was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the U.K. attempts to redefine its role on the international stage once it withdraws from the European Union, London will move to embrace old allies and new partners in an attempt to forge stronger ties to emerging markets in the East.

The relationship between Japan and the United Kingdom has the potential to be of enormous mutual benefit to both parties. The two are both fiercely proud island nations with considerable geopolitical clout.  In a recently published audit of global geopolitical capability by the Henry Jackson Society, the U.K. was ranked second only to the United States, with Japan being ranked sixth. The study defined the U.K. as a global power, and Japan, despite being the third-largest economy worldwide, is described as a “hemispheric power,” meaning that it has the geopolitical capability to wield influence within the northern hemisphere.

The U.K.-Japan Relationship is Built on Security and Trade

Relations between the Japanese and British began over 400 years ago. The Anglo-Japanese partnership was solidified in 1854 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. The treaty defined the relationship between the two countries as one centered around mutually beneficial commerce and security. After relations improved following the end of World War II, trade and security once again became the foundation blocks upon which the Anglo-Japanese relationship was built.

Abe’s visit was, by no means, coincidental in timing. Abe intended to provide reassurances to both British businesses and undecided politicians over British Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit deal. Specifically, Abe made the case that May’s deal is the best option for Japanese businesses who rely on the United Kingdom’s access to the European single market. Japanese investment in the U.K. reached £46.5 billion in 2016, with over 1,000 Japanese businesses employing over 150,000 people.

The Japanese automobile manufacturers Nissan, Honda, and Toyota produce nearly half of the 1.67 million cars assembled every year in the U.K., of which the vast majority are exported. As the British auto industry employs just-in-time manufacturing processes, any future E.U. tariffs and border delays will have a negative impact on the industry.

Japan has long-relied on the U.K. as its gateway to Europe. While access to the single market may be reduced once Britain leaves the Union, there are still advantages for businesses operating in the U.K. A growing labor market and a highly skilled manufacturing base, technological prowess in research and development (ranked second in the world after the U.S.), stable trade relations, and the status of the English language as a lingua franca for international business and diplomacy are all significant factors in attracting and maintaining Japanese interest and investment.

Prime Minister Abe’s other key message for the U.K. is one intended to convey Japan’s desire for increased defense and security cooperation. Abe stated that the two nations are “partners as we strive to uphold rules-based international order and to promote global and regional security.” Abe’s statement follows significant developments in bilateral defense cooperation over the past 18 months.

British Prime Minister Theresa May sought to expand defense cooperation on her visit to Japan in August 2017. May highlighted that the two nations common global interests are underpinned by a strong defense relationship centered on a commitment to the “rules-based international system, free and open international trade and the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

This meeting between the two heads of government resulted in the Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, an agreement which seeks to further bilateral engagement on security issues including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and cybersecurity. Securing international sea lanes throughout the Indo-Pacific region from foreign aggression is another key objective, as is increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations. The declaration established the conditions for Japan, which has been reluctant to develop offensive military capabilities after the Second World War, to increase its regional military engagement.

A “Global Britain” Approach to Foreign Policy

Furthermore, the agreement set the stage for unprecedented levels of Anglo-Japanese defense cooperation throughout 2018. In a demonstration of a “Global Britain” approach to foreign policy, the Royal Navy deployed three ships to Japan: the HMS Albion, Sutherland, and Argyll.

The deployed ships supported a variety of missions, including enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and participating in joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The deployment significantly improved interoperability between the Royal Navy and the U.K.’s closest ally in Asia. Additionally, British Army personnel from the Honorable Artillery Company participated in exercises on Japanese soil alongside their Japanese counterparts for the first time, the only foreign military forces to do so alongside the U.S.

At a strategic level, these actions demonstrated the U.K.’s commitment to regional stability, international law, and the United Nations Law of the Sea; crucial components to the maintenance of a rules-based global system and essential to countering Chinese subversion and expansion across the region. Growing bilateral defense cooperation between the U.K. and Japan demonstrates that the relationship is more than one based solely on national interests, instead, it is one of a higher strategic significance.

As the U.K. prepares to leave the European Union, it is evident that trade is foremost amongst Japanese concerns. Considering the level of Japanese investment into British industry over the last forty years, this is understandable. However, once the U.K. has formally left the Union, engagement with allies like Japan should be the highest priority.

A Global Britain approach to foreign policy seeks to maximize the United Kingdom’s geopolitical capabilities as a global power. To do this, the U.K. must be seen as upholding the core values and standards of the rules-based global order. The U.K. can sustain its geopolitical capabilities while strengthening British influence around the world by reinforcing strategic partnerships with powerful allies like Japan while seeking out new opportunities for cooperation and engagement. Failure to do so would be detrimental to both British economic interests and overall global security.

U.K. and Japan Heighten Defense Cooperation Ahead of Brexit was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s vast amounts of territory are inhabited by diverse groups of people—each with distinct cultural, political, economic, and religious traditions. Today, the Chinese Communist Party aims to forge a single, homogeneous “Chinese” national identity. Beijing is implementing policies designed to effectuate the forced ethnic and cultural assimilation of minorities like the Tibetans and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.

This lack of a singular national identity was further compounded by a geographical landscape that impeded the establishment of a multipolar regional order like that of Europe. Europe’s plains and uplands are divided by rivers and mountain ranges—a vast swath of territory that enabled the rise of multiple, sovereign nation-states.

Eventually, European imperialist ambitions would extend this competition to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. As competing sovereign entities, European nation-states were actors an evolving political system that would eventually become known as the balance of power. This system upended the universalist status quo following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The term balance of power gained significance in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

China’s topography isn’t conducive to balance of power politics. Where the Europeans had space to expand and develop distinct national identities, China’s various competing groups had competed with one another for supremacy in the absence of a strong central authority. Each ruling dynasty followed a similar path to power, with minor exceptions.

Controlling the Chinese heartland allows for the control over all of China.

Until the tenth century, the Guanzhong Plain was the primary center of political power. Eventually, this concentration of wealth and power shifted to the North China Plain, which took on increased economic and cultural significance. The North China Plain then connected to the fertile Yangtze Plain. The importance of the North China Plain only increased as the Chinese empire expanded further to the north and the east.

The Yangtze Plain, by contrast, generated dynasties that instantly succumbed either to their weaknesses, like the Southern Song in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or to their northerly competitors like the short-lived nationalist government did in the twentieth century.

The North China Plain’s political importance is primarily due to its geography. Unlike areas to the south, the North China Plain expands mostly uninterrupted by mountains and has fewer rivers. This facilitated rapid communication by horseback. This resulted in a mostly homogeneous linguistic makeup, relative to the many different languages and dialects that are found throughout southern China. The ability to communicate rapidly across a significant distance allowed political and economic power to be concentrated along the North China Plain.

While the North China Plain was primarily the political center of China after the tenth century, it was control over Zhongyuan (中原)—the Central Plains—that was central to the survival of any ruling dynasty. Each understood that control over the Central Plains—the Chinese heartland—would enable for the control over all of China. This principle, the “Heartland Theory” was laid out by British economic theorist Halford Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History.

Historically, China’s international relations were based on suzerainty rather than sovereignty.

The area that comprises the Chinese heartland is less than one-third the size of the European plains, albeit with a substantially higher population. These demographic and geographic variables inhibit the development of a system of competing sovereign states. As such, the concept of sovereignty was nonexistent in imperial China.

Whereas the great powers of Europe looked upon rival powers as peers and understood the concept of sovereignty, China held no such outlook. Up until the nineteenth century, China’s international relations were based on the idea of suzerainty. China considered itself to be without equal, seeing itself as the world’s cultural and political center. It managed its international relations through a tributary system.

The Mandarin word for China is Zhongguo (中国), which translates literally as the “Middle Kingdom.” This Sinocentric perception can be primarily be attributed to China’s geographical reality and the fact that it possessed no notion of national sovereignty. Political scientist Suzanne Ogden has discussed Chinese international relations as being fundamentally based on the concept of universal morality, one that is developed, implemented, and imposed on others by a single entity. This belief of “moral persuasion and cultural superiority” as Ogden puts it, is a significant driver of the narrative of Chinese exceptionalism.

The Chinese emperor was identified as the single “supreme authority under heaven.” The area “under heaven” was, therefore, subject to the emperor’s authority. The sole “supreme authority” was the emperor of the Middle Kingdom. During China’s imperial period, no word akin to “Chinese emperor” existed. In relations with other rulers, even those of European states, the Chinese viewed the emperor as a patriarchal figure to which there was no equal.

East Asia expert Alan M. Wachman explains that the Chinese emperor’s sovereignty or rule over the imperial Chinese state was “potential, not actual, control.” As such, the degree to which the emperor’s authority was accepted depended on the period and location in question. This belief guided the nation through generations of unification, expansion, fragmentation, and decline, prescribing an approach for handling each phase in the cycle.

At times of dynastic corrosion and rebellion, for example, defense and military strategy had been the answer for aspiring leaders. Furthermore, major infrastructure development projects like the Grand Canal and military incursions in the broader region helped a dynasty secure the “mandate of heaven”—thereby legitimizing its hold on power.

The bureaucracy was and is essential to central government’s exercise of political power. Auxiliary tiers of bureaucratic authorities within the central government’s control extended from the heartland to the rest of China, and beyond. Utilizing a tributary system of appointed officials and in rare circumstances, military forces, China’s leaders were able to diffuse their power within Central Asia, into the Korean Peninsula, and throughout Southeast Asia, consolidating their control over the heartland, China, and the world as they saw it.

Chinese notions of geopolitics failed to account for the importance of maritime power.

During the seventeenth century, however, the onset of the maritime era would interrupt China’s illusions of being a separate realm. Naval invaders began arriving on the nation’s shore, where the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty, would eventually meet them.

Although the Manchu Qing possessed what Mackinder called the “superior mobility of horsemen and camelmen,” their approach to repelling invasions was no different from that of the previous ethnically Han Ming dynasty. Where the Han Ming dynasty constructed the Great Wall to protect against the Manchu, the Qing erected fortifications along the shoreline to keep foreign invaders at bay.

At that point, China hadn’t developed significant naval assets of its own, and its conceptualization of geopolitics wouldn’t include maritime power for three centuries. Even then, the geostrategic implications of robust naval power would garner little notice within China before Japan used its superior naval power to achieve victory over China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895.

China’s defeat marked the beginning of another era of decline and the demise of the Sinocentric view of international relations. It took the so-called “century of humiliation” for China to comprehend that this worldview was no longer compatible with the rest of the world.

The broader geopolitical strategy which prevailed in the West did not serve the European powers far better. After fighting for control of the Eurasian landmass, what Mackinder dubbed the World Island, they emerged from two world wars and innumerable smaller conflicts only to see that the center of international power had moved across the Atlantic Ocean to the United States.

Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is rooted in the successes and failures of the past.

As maritime and land-based powers (the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively) expanded their spheres of influence across the globe, the combination of territory on the border of the Eurasian landmass and a shoreline seemed to sentence China to be on the margins of the international system.

Nevertheless, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, China overcame its geographical circumstances, and in the process, its reasoning has evolved. The trials and tribulations it suffered through in the second half of the twentieth century, including the wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, a U.S. naval quarantine, and concurrent pressure from the Soviet Union, encouraged China to realize its capabilities. The geography that once seemed a curse to Chinese theorists now brimmed with possibility.

The country’s location, in the end, provides it access to developed economies overseas and overland access to precious energy assets in Central Asia and the Middle East, an edge that economic theorist Nicholas Spykman identified in the early 1940s. China’s geopolitical goal was now to tap into wealth in the east, and technological advancement in the west, as stated by Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu.

China’s ascendancy to great power status in the twenty-first century was primarily enabled by a combination of geographic, political, and economic factors. It’s economic growth allowed in this century an unprecedented concentration on naval development. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has grown substantially over the previous two decades, enabling the overseas projection of Chinese military power.

As it has done throughout history, China is embarking on an expansionary course more out of necessity than out of ambition. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, aims to ease the country’s economic and logistical dependence on its eastern coast while developing its less-developed interior regions.

Similarly, Beijing’s increasingly assertive maritime policy is another attempt to secure its access to overseas markets and preclude a challenger from presenting a threat to its multiplying global interests. There are consequences, however, for China’s increasingly aggressive expansionism.

China will attempt to outmaneuver these consequences wherever possible, as it strives to revise the terms of the international order. Chinese expansionism is a policy that will yield unpredictable results after centuries of a Sinocentrist approach to international relations. However, if the U.S. and its allies fail to provide and sustain a viable alternative to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions, Beijing will find it increasingly easier to rewrite the rules of global trade and security.

How Chinese Exceptionalism Fuels an Expansionist Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be facing off against his political opponent, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership election on September 20. Already, five of the seven intra-party factions of the LDP have endorsed Abe over Ishiba.

The support of the LDP members will practically guarantee his reelection as their party leader and, by extension, another term as Prime Minister due to the LDP’s significant majority in the Diet.

Despite this likely political victory, one of Abe’s top priorities for his upcoming term will almost certainly remain unfulfilled. Abe has long desired to revise the 1947 Japanese constitution in order to extend Japan’s military defense capabilities.

The threat of North Korea, despite its claim to denuclearize; China’s rising aggression; as well as the uncertainty of the United States-Japan security alliance under President Trump, are all strong reasons for Japan to take a stronger stance on national security.

However, the lack of public support and trust in Abe, from cronyism scandals, neo-nationalist ideology, and an unaccommodating 2020 deadline he set for the revision, will ultimately hinder Abe’s ability to advance such a divisive political initiative.

Abe is pushing for the revision of Article 9 of the constitution, which would officially recognize Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) as the country’s military. The proposal would first have to obtain a two-thirds supermajority in the Diet, and then a simple majority in a national referendum to become law.

Although Abe has the supermajority in both chambers of the Diet, gaining the necessary support from the public in a national referendum remains unlikely. A Kyodo News survey, conducted before Japan’s Constitution Day on May 3, 2018, found that 61 percent of voters oppose constitutional revision under the Abe administration. However, 58 percent believe that amending the constitution sometime in the future is “necessary” or “somewhat necessary.”

A year of scandals has damaged public opinion towards Abe’s government.

Public wariness towards Abe and his administration will make constitutional reform extremely difficult to achieve during his premiership. Cronyism scandals throughout the past year have also diverted attention away from Abe’s proposal and damaged public trust in his administration.

The Moritomo Scandal made headlines when Abe and his wife, Akie, were tied to a suspicious government land deal for an ultraconservative kindergarten. This scandal was amplified when it was revealed that the Finance Ministry falsified documents related to the deal and erased dozens of references to both Shinzo and Akie Abe.

The prime minister was also accused of favoritism for approving Kake Gakuen, a veterinarian school run by a close friend, for a special deregulation project. A Mainichi Shimbun poll found that 75 percent of respondents were not convinced by Abe’s explanations concerning both cases.

Abe’s political affiliations and neo-nationalist ideologies also give pause to potential supporters. Abe is a special advisor to the ultra-nationalist group Nippon Kaigi, a parliamentary league that advances the restoration of imperial values through historical revisionism, remilitarization, and veneration of the emperor.

Abe’s association with this ideology reinforces the public’s concern with possessing a military, as it glorifies a more belligerent form of statecraft and could incite conflict with China and South Korea over historical wounds.

Abe’s self-imposed deadline underestimates the time needed to win over a wary public.

In the end, Abe’s unrealistic timeline might be the most damaging aspect of his campaign for constitutional revisionism. At a Nippon Kaigi affiliated gathering in 2017, Abe called for 2020 to mark a “significant rebirth of Japan” in the ratification of a revised Constitution.

However, the distractions of an upcoming imperial transition, as well as the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo limits the window of opportunity to implement such a divisive and time-consuming campaign. Ultimately, the relatively short time frame Abe has to start the revision process underestimates the time needed to win over the public.

Ishiba, his rival for LDP leadership, is also a proponent of constitutional revision. He goes even further than Abe’s proposal, advocating for Japan to have the right to use its military outside of merely defensive measures, including the right to go to war.

However, during an August news conference, Ishiba argued, “We should ask the public to vote for or against something only after they fully understand the issue.” Instead of instilling a sense of urgency into revising the constitution, he highlights the importance of patience, transparency, and information to win over a reluctant public.

Ultimately, the public is not ready for such a dramatic change.

An Asahi Shimbun public survey from earlier this month found that only 5 percent of respondents who are in support of Abe want to see a debate on constitutional revisionism during the campaign. Instead, economic policy and social security remain the public’s biggest concerns.

It is imperative that Abe first addresses public unease and awareness with the revision process before moving forward. Without public accommodation, he will not garner enough support to win in a national referendum.

Prime Minister Abe is considered ‘teflon’ for surviving numerous setbacks and unpopular policies with both the public and his political party. Currently, 65 percent of LDP supporters prefer Abe over Ishiba in the election.

Yet, Ishiba’s realistic perception of public wariness and historical sensitivities surrounding the revision should not be discounted. Abe would be wise to advance Ishiba’s more accommodating timeline rather than attempting a last ditch effort to score a political victory under his administration.

Winning the LDP Election Won’t Win Shinzo Abe Constitutional Revision was originally published on Global Security Review.

On April 27, 2018, Kim Jong Un became the first North Korean leader to step foot in South Korea – where he was welcomed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

A few days later, the South Korean government reported that Kim had promised to give up his nuclear arsenal under certain conditions.

While some viewed the summit with skepticism and issued reminders about Kim’s villainous past, others began talking of a unified Korea – a reasonable reaction considering that the leaders signed a document called the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula.

The intentions of these two leaders are key. While Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin may tweet and hold meetings, it is the nearly 80 million Koreans who will determine the future of how they will share their peninsula.

As scholars who study Japan, Korea, and East Asia, we know that the “Cold War” has always been “hot” in Asia. That’s why we suggest the focus now should be on forging new ties with North Korea. The question of how South Korea and North Korea will merge can be left for the future.

To understand why it’s helpful to remember why Korea was split into two countries in the first place.

Creating two Koreas

In August 1945, in the basement of the State Department in Washington, D.C., two American army officers traced a line across a National Geographic map and divided the Korean peninsula – at the time colonized by Japan – at the 38th parallel.

This division was part of an Allied vision of Japan’s impending defeat.

Many – especially the Russians – had anticipated that Japan would be divided like Germany.

After all, it was Japan, not occupied Korea, who was the enemy combatant. Yet the Soviets acquiesced to the American idea.

Ideological camps among Koreans that had taken root under Japanese oppression challenged one another for expression in the following months. Eventually, the communists gained leadership in the North and their challengers in the South.

Five years later the Korean War erupted to claim the lives of one in eight Koreans. Tens of thousands of international participants would also die in what history books flatly name the first major conflict of the Cold War.

The 1953 armistice ending the fighting in Korea more or less followed the 1945 line. Under this agreement, Koreans who had collaborated, resisted or simply endured Japanese rule prior to the Korean War (1950-1953) now found themselves assigned entirely new identities: “North Korean” and “South Korean.” The meaning of these names has diverged and morphed into new realities on both sides since then.

The view from South Korea

In South Korea, people often refer to the Korean War as yugio – literally 6.25 – referring to June 25, 1950, when the grandfather of today’s North Korean leader ordered his troops to cross the border and attack the South. This state-sanctioned narrative reinforces an antagonistic relationship. The North is framed as the aggressor, the South as an innocent victim, and the U.S. and the West as the savior of South Korea. Not unimportantly, North Koreans call the same history “The Fatherland Liberation War.”

While the 2015 Asan Report finds that more than 80 percent of South Koreans “dutifully” answer that Korea should be reunified, fewer than 20 percent support immediate reunification. Their sense of an ethnic bond is decreasing, and reunification is mostly seen as an economic burden.

In 2010, former president Lee Myung-bak proposed a “reunification tax” to support the costs of reunification, whenever it came. The tax proposal received little support from the public or among politicians, especially after the North’s attack on a South Korean warship Cheonan and the shelling of the South’s Yeonpyeong Island later that year. Speaking in 2014, former President Park Geun-hye also tried to promote a positive image of reunification, calling it a “jackpot” (daebak).

She claimed that reunification – a combination of North Korean labor and South Korean technological advancements – would create jobs and strengthen the Korean economy.

Despite government’s effort to reposition the reunification issue, public opinion data show that South Korean youth are only increasing their detachment from North Korea.

An easier path

So, if an older generation’s understanding of reunification is a hard sell, what is the path forward?

South Korea could instead seek a peaceful coexistence of two Koreas with free trade, free exchange of people and no military threats. Perhaps public support for reunification may reemerge and strengthen as ties are strengthened through increased exchanges at the civil level and greater economic independence in the North, thereby lowering the “costs of reunification.”

One of the main reasons there has not yet been a resolution to the “North Korea problem” has been persistent, divergent dreams of reunification. For the U.S. and South Korea, a reunified Korea would be a liberal, capitalist democracy. For North Korea, China, and Russia, a reunified Korea would not be a close ally of the United States and certainly would not host U.S. troops.

Over the last 30 years, the benefits of a divided Korea have only increased for those outside the peninsula. Initially, North Korea served as an important “buffer state” between the communist China and Russia to the north and the democratic and capitalist countries of South Korea, Japan – and their ally, the United States. Even after the Cold War ended, ideological differences among these important geopolitical players has continued, reinforcing the benefits of North Korea’s liminal status.

If we can follow public opinion in South Korea and temporarily abandon the dream of a single Korea, it is possible to see that everyone would benefit from a peaceful, prosperous, nonnuclear North Korea. China’s economic success has demonstrated that a country can take advantage of markets without becoming a capitalist democracy. It can offer North Korea guidance on how to develop using the Chinese model.

If neighboring countries opened up their markets to trade and offered targeted foreign direct investment, North Korea can experience the kind of economic miracle that Japan, South Korea, and China have already enjoyed.

If the United States and its allies can offer security guarantees to North Korea, it should not need to hold onto its deadly nuclear weapons.

If North Korea can recognize that it is in everyone’s interest that North Korea not only continues to exist but becomes more prosperous, then perhaps Kim Jung Un will make good on his promise to let go of his nuclear ambitions.

Once North Korea is more economically independent, maybe reunification can be conducted as a joyful reunion between equals. That day is far in the future, however. In the present, powerful negotiators must find the skill to chart a path toward peace and prosperity for North Korea. If they can manage it, they will have left a great legacy to the world.

The Goal in Korea Should be Peace and Trade—Not Unification was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul
• The Ukrainian government could likely escalate the conflict within the next year.
• Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots
• Russian foreign policy has fed domestic nationalism and pride has become a source of power for the Kremlin.

Russia attempts to make inroads to the east as tensions persist with the West.

As relations with the West remain tense for the foreseeable future, Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul, playing them off each other, and off Beijing, to its benefit.

Despite talks between Russia and Japan in November 2017, the two countries are still at odds over a contested set of islands, and China remains Moscow’s most important partner in the region.

Russia’s proposal to send U.N. Peacekeeping forces to Donbas will gain traction, despite discussions between Russia and Ukraine, together with its Western supporters, over the installation’s parameters.

Expect Continued Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine

The plan likely will not come to fruition by the end of the year. However, there is a small chance it may reduce the violence in eastern Ukraine in the short-term.

In the medium- to long-term,  recent developments in Ukraine may mean an escalation of hostilities in the country’s east, as the Ukrainian military takes command over operations in the region.

A recently passed bill by the Ukrainian parliament outright labels Russia as a foreign aggressor. The law gives the President increased over Ukraine’s armed forces and eliminated the requirement for parliamentary support before ordering military action. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict in eastern Ukraine joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence, like the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict within the next year.

Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots

Two other post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan), and the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, will remain prone to internal instability and vulnerable to political, cyber, military, or other hybrid interference from Russia.

The long-term standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially flare up again. The joint border shared by Moldova and Ukraine will potentially result in an increased Russian security presence in the region, either by conduction more frequent military exercises or shipping more weapons to separatist groups.

While it is unlikely that either of these territories will result in a regional conflict, it remains to be seen whether Russia will seek to exploit ongoing political and social divisions in the West to advance its interests in either region.

Both lie within what the Kremlin considers its traditional “sphere of influence,” and maintaining this sphere is an essential component of its national security strategy

Russia: the aspiring—but declining–great power?

Russia aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber-rattling, and foreign engagements overseas. Russian foreign policy is centered on regaining and retaining the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, at home, it faces increasing constraints from a poorly-diversified economy and crippling U.S. and E.U. sanctions, levied in the aftermath of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin (and above all, Putin) prizes internal stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and political expression.

Moscow’s ability, through its foreign policy, to regain what it views as its traditional role on the world stage—even through aggressive expansionism and disruption abroad—has fed domestic nationalism and pride which has further legitimized the Kremlin and has become a source of regime power.

Russian nationalism features strongly in the Kremlin’s national narrative, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism.

Putin is personally popular, but recent protests driven by economic and administrative mismanagement reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power by government officials and those close to them.

However, Putin’s recent re-election has been used by the Kremlin as a referendum to buttress his continued rule. Domestically, authoritarianism and decreased rule-of-law are likely to be expected.

Foreign policy will be dictated by heightening tensions with the west due to the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and foreign interference operations will dictate Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Russian Foreign Policy: Expansionism Feeds Domestic Nationalism was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea’s nuclear program began in the early 1990s, and in its first decade or so was often thought to be a means of extorting financial and material support. The Agreed Framework, established in 1994 to manage the crisis, looks in hindsight like a reward for stopping the country from misbehaving.

North Korea got the world’s attention – and Donald Trump’s – when it said on July 4 that it had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time. The weapon, potentially equipped with a nuclear warhead, could reach Alaska.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to almost any target located within the United States—continental or otherwise. This test was conducted after a hiatus of more than 70 days and has served to escalate tensions.

There are few options for dealing with North Korea—and none are good.

Leaders around the world agree that North Korea should be a top priority, but given the reclusive nation’s belligerence, options are scarce. Furthermore, ties between North Korea and its traditional ally China are growing increasingly fraught, as China reduces coal exports to the “hermit kingdom.” As China withdraws, Russia steps in to exploit the crisis by propping up the North Korean regime with energy and technology.

The U.S. has three options for managing the North Korea crisis. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities, it could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons, or the U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Recently Published in this Series

Sleepwalking Into War: The North Korean Quagmire

The escalating war of words between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jung-Un has effectively created a situation in which the U.S. Government has three strategic options for dealing with a crisis that continues to escalate further as each day passes.

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Don’t Rely On China: North Korea Won’t Kowtow To Beijing

Those who want to end North Korea’s nuclear threats often point to China as the sole actor who could save the day by making Kim Jong-Un and his regime stand down. Beijing provides about 90 percent of imports that North Koreans rely on, mainly food and oil. Many academics and policy analysts in the United States, South Korea, and Japan agree that China holds the magic key to making North Korea cease its nuclear activities. It is a view based on the assumption of a “patron-client” relationship between China and North Korea. I have studied such lopsided alliances and I’ve learned that no matter how in sync the national security goals of the two countries may be or how much the stronger power may have helped the weaker, the weaker never merely rolls over and obeys.

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What Are North Korea’s Military Capabilities?

North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. The U.S. and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat. It has one of the world’s most substantial conventional military forces, which, combined with its escalating missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons.

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North Korea Launches ICMB Capable of Hitting Targets in the Continental States

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile after over 70 days without any such activity. This is the third ICBM test launch of 2017.  U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that this missile “went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.”

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Explore the analysis, assessments, forecasts, and commentary in our series: “Geopolitics and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions.“

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Kim Jong Un is consolidating his grip on power through a combination of patronage and dread and is doubling down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history of warfare and occupation along with current distrust makes cooperation difficult.

Continued North Korean provocations, such as additional nuclear and missile tests, may worsen equilibrium in the region and immediate nations to take actions, sometimes unilaterally, to defend their security interests.

Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear-nation, for safety, prestige, and political legitimacy. With the news from U.S. President Donald Trump that he would be willing to engage in a meeting with the North Korean dictator, it now seems that Kim is on track to securing that status which he so deeply craves.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he has previously signaled little interest in participating in talks on denuclearization.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Now, that seems to have changed, as well. North Korea is reportedly willing to discuss the possibility of their relinquishing their nuclear weapons in exchange for a security guarantee, according to statements made by South Korean officials.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence—or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer. Now, with North Korea seeming to be on track to engage in direct talks with the U.S., China has been summarily cut out of the process.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening US alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military and Security Capabilities

Having come out of a particularly disruptive year in terms of domestic politics and subsequently securing another term as Prime Minister,  Shinzo Abe, has the political mandate to pursue his agenda of reforming the Japanese constitution.

The snap election in October 2017 was seen as a referendum on Abe’s ambitious proposal to revise the Japanese Constitution to pave the way for the normalization of the country’s military and to pass an enormous economic reform package.

North Korea’s persistent weapons tests, particularly the ones which involve launching missiles on Japanese territory, undoubtedly helped to drum up support for the Prime Minister and his party.

Japan will likely pursue increased spending on its military and become a more significant presence in the region, particularly as China has begun flexing its maritime muscles in the East China Sea and the heavily contested South China Sea.

If China continues to escalate its island-building and militarization programs in the South China Sea, Japan will likely join the U.S. in performing “freedom of navigation” exercises in an attempt to de-normalize Chinese encroachment in the region.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military Posture to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

As global trade has flourished in recent decades, so have trade disputes. Trading nations have created various forums to adjudicate conflicts, but they are increasingly the subject of controversy. U.S. President Donald J. Trump has long criticized trade dispute resolution panels as unfair and ineffective, particularly those the United States is party to via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). While some critics say dispute panels undermine national sovereignty, proponents argue they offer much-needed protections that boost confidence in global investment and prevent trade wars.

Why did dispute panels emerge?

As cross-border trade and investment increased rapidly through the 1990s, individual states as well as public and private investors sought ways to adjudicate conflicts or alleged violations of trade agreements. Over time, the international trading system has developed a number of mechanisms to do this, depending on the type of dispute and the parties involved.

The authority of these supranational bodies is established by agreements such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs), or by membership in an international organization such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Parties agree to accept rulings, though enforcement authority and appeals processes vary.

What types of disputes do they handle?

These bodies broadly deal with two types of disputes: state-state, in which governments challenge the trade policies of other governments; and investor-state, in which individual investors file complaints against governments.

State-State. Most state-state disputes are handled by the WTO system, the primary body governing international trade. Each of its 164 members have agreed to rules about trade policy, such as limiting tariffs and restricting subsidies. A member can appeal to the WTO if it believes another member is violating those rules. The United States, for instance, has repeatedly brought WTO cases against China over its support for various export industries, including one in early 2017 alleging that Beijing unfairly subsidizes aluminum producers. That case has not been decided yet, though the Trump administration has already retaliated by unilaterally imposing tariffs on some Chinese aluminum producers.

Investor-State. Known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, these disputes typically involve foreign businesses claiming that a host government abused them by expropriating their assets, discriminating against them, or otherwise treating them unfairly. For example, a Canadian gold mining company claimed that Venezuela’s nationalization of the gold industry in 2011 violated an investment treaty between the two countries. A tribunal found that while Venezuela had the legal right to nationalize private sector industries, it failed to properly compensate the company for the expropriated assets.

How does the WTO adjudicate cases?

The WTO’s forum for arbitration is called the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). The DSM is run by a rotating staff of judges, as well as a permanent staff of lawyers and administrators. The WTO appoints a panel to hear a case if the opposing parties are unable to resolve the issue through negotiations. A panel’s rulings, if not overturned on appeal, are binding on the respondent country. If guilty, it has the choice to cease the offending practice or provide compensation. If the country fails to respond, the plaintiff country can take targeted measures to offset any harm caused, such as blocking imports or raising tariffs.

Member states have filed more than five hundred disputes since the WTO’s creation in 1995, but most of these cases have been settled prior to litigation.

A number of multilateral institutions adjudicate investor-state disputes, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands, or the London Court of International Arbitration, but one of the most important is the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Created in 1965 as part of the World Bank, the ICSID has 162 member states, all of whom have agreed to recognize the legitimacy of its arbitration system.

Unlike the WTO, the ICSID has no permanent tribunals and does not directly rule on cases. Rather, it administers the process by which disputants choose an independent, ad hoc panel of arbitrators to hear their case. The arbitrators are generally legal experts, including professors, practicing lawyers, and former judges. The specifics on the sorts of conflicts that can be referred to an ICSID panel are set out in individual trade or investment agreements.

There are some 2,500 treaties with investment dispute provisions in force around the world, and the ISCID has administered more than six hundred disputes in its half-century existence. The number of cases accelerated through the 1990s and 2000s with the proliferation of investment agreements, reaching a peak of fifty-two in 2015. About a third of the cases are settled or withdrawn before concluding; a third are dismissed in favor of the defendant; and a third favor the investor in full or in part. An investor’s award generally holds the full force of domestic law in the country being sued.

What are the criticisms of the WTO’s system?

Most trade experts see the WTO’s arbitration forum as one of its most successful efforts, helping to institutionalize rules and reduce the threat of trade wars. However, critics, including the Trump administration, have criticized the WTO system on several grounds. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer has argued the WTO has an anti-U.S. bias because 134 complaints have been brought against the United States, more than any other country, and it has lost most of those cases.

Most trade experts see the WTO’s arbitration forum as one of its most successful efforts.

But many economists argue this is misguided, noting that complainant countries, including the United States, usually win cases they bring to the WTO because they tend to bring only the strongest cases. As former USTR Michael Froman points out, the United States under President Barack Obama brought more cases to the WTO than any other country during that time, including sixteen against China. It won all that have been decided.

Trump and Lighthizer have also said the WTO is incapable of policing China. The USTR’s 2018 report on China asserted for the first time that Beijing’s state-led economic policy is so inimical to global free trade rules that it renders the WTO effectively irrelevant. “No amount of enforcement activities by other WTO members would be sufficient to remedy this type of behavior,” it states.

Other analysts argue that the WTO has been increasingly undermined by its most powerful members, including the United States. For instance, the Obama administration ignored a series of unfavorable rulings and blocked the appointment of a WTO judge for the first time.

What is the debate over investor-state dispute tribunals?

Investor-state dispute tribunals have become a flash point in the debates over multilateral trade deals such as NAFTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the proposed U.S.-Europe Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Opponents say that these tribunals erode national sovereignty by allowing foreign corporations to bypass domestic legal systems. In 2017, a group of more than two hundred lawyers and economists warned that such provisions [PDF] give corporations “alarming power” to override domestic legislation, based on the secret deliberations of unaccountable tribunals that have no appeals process. Before the U.S.-Europe trade negotiations were put on hold in 2016, this worry was especially acute among the European public, which feared that ISDS would allow U.S. companies to challenge EU rules on labor and environmental protections, food safety guidelines, and other public interest legislation.

The Trump administration, too, is skeptical of the provision, which Lighthizer has called “offensive” for giving non-Americans a veto over U.S. law. The administration has proposed changing NAFTA’s ISDS provision to be “opt-in” rather than automatic, which Canada and Mexico have strenuously opposed.

Supporters say these concerns are overblown, pointing out that the United States has never lost an ISDS case to a foreign investor, and that investors tend to lose more cases than they win. Furthermore, they argue that ISDS protects foreign investments made by U.S. businesses, and generally boosts cross-border investment.

What are the options for reforming these systems?

At the WTO, reform discussions have focused on process, as the number of disputes and appeals, as well as the complexity of cases, have increased in recent decades. Reform proposals include expanding the pool of experts on panels, digitizing paperwork, and other tactics to streamline operations. Some have suggested the WTO’s dispute body take decisions based on majority vote rather than consensus, as it does now, though such a move would likely be opposed by the United States and others. Currently, a single member can delay proceedings.

Meanwhile, the public controversy over ISDS has led governments around the world to experiment with other approaches to investor protection. One option is to remove ISDS from some agreements altogether, as countries such as Australia have done, pushing businesses to first pursue challenges through the domestic legal system and then, if unsuccessful, allowing for state-state dispute settlement.

In another alternative, the European Union is developing an investment court that will operate more like the WTO tribunal system, with a permanent roster of judges, strict conflict-of-interest rules, public proceedings, and an appeals process. The European Union and Canada included a version of this in their 2016 trade agreement.

Are there other mechanisms to resolve disputes?

Individual trade deals have also created separate state-state arbitration mechanisms. This was the case with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), the precursor to NAFTA. CUSTA’s Chapter 19, which was continued in NAFTA, allows for one government to challenge the trade policies of another via an independent, bi-national panel, which bypasses domestic court systems.

NAFTA’s Chapter 19 has proven controversial. Canada insisted on its inclusion in CUSTA because of what it saw as a long history of unfair U.S. trade policies. Ottawa has brought dozens of cases before these panels, many relating to U.S. duties on Canadian lumber. The Trump administration has called for the removal of Chapter 19 from NAFTA as part of the renegotiations that opened in 2017.

Some trade experts argue that Chapter 19 reduced trade disputes between NAFTA members because it made it likely that any trade barriers would be overturned by the panels. Removing it, some say, could lead to an increase in duties, especially by a U.S. administration that has seemed eager to apply them. This, in turn, could lead to retaliatory trade measures from Canada and Mexico.

How Are International Trade Disputes Resolved? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This signal was sent in 2013 when four Asian states were admitted into the Arctic Council as observers: China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

The council is the Arctic region’s preeminent regional discussion forum, focused on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. Of these four Asian states, China receives the most media attention, for a number of obvious reasons, such as the size of the country’s growing economy and its expanding Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers.

All eyes on the Chinese dragon

The Arctic states are aware of China’s strength and its willingness to push forward with its international agenda, including in the Arctic. This has been met with a combination of fear and pragmatic openness.

The Kingdom of Denmark, to name one example, has expressed weariness over China’s intentions in the Arctic. In 2017, Denmark turned down an offer received in 2016 from a Chinese mining company, General Nice Group, to purchase an abandoned naval base in Greenland, citing security concerns as the justification.

Simultaneously, China has been developing business links in the region. It has been working with Russia to develop shipping along the Northern Sea Route and it reached an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline project in Alaska.

In January, China published its first Arctic policy paper. Not publishing a policy paper was interpreted by some as China’s effort to downplay its menacing image as a threat to Arctic state interests. Though the paper articulates many commonly held assumptions about China’s views of the Arctic region, including its belief that Arctic waterways, such as the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are international straits, it generated much discussion about China’s reach into the Arctic.

‘Near-Arctic state’

One statement in particular stood out.

China has labelled itself a “near-Arctic state.” This signals China’s intent to push against Arctic state hegemony and the common term “non-Arctic state” in order to insist on having a say in how the region is used.

Even before the Arctic policy paper, however, coverage of China’s motivations for its Arctic involvement have been commonplace, such as discussions about its mining interests in Iceland and its investment in the modernization of the Northern Sea Route.

At the same time, however, all the focus on China means that the actions of other Asian states on the Arctic often go unreported. Singapore is an interesting case in point.

Singapore in the Arctic

Unlike China, Singapore has successfully cultivated the image of a benign state. As such, Singapore’s Arctic interests and how it’s pursuing them have received much less attention. As a micro-state, Singapore is more limited in how it can assert itself internationally. Rather than see this as a weakness, Singapore has made this a strength.

Singapore is only 719 square kilometres in area. The country is dependent on its neighbour, Malaysia, for its fresh water since it has minimal natural resources of its own. Though Singapore invests a lot in its military defence — more than 18 per cent of its budget in 2018 — it does not have a history of using military force.

Singapore also has positive relations with both Western and Eastern countries. Singapore’s fostering of positive defence relations with multiple states is strategic.

Singapore’s defence and foreign policy is driven by its pragmatic approach toward politics. Singapore is keenly aware that its prime position in the current global shipping network is critical to both its economy and its survival.

The anticipated development of Arctic shipping routes are a potential threat to Singapore as they will redirect some maritime traffic away from it, undercutting its economy. Recognizing this, Singapore aims to be involved in Arctic development.

One area where Singapore might be of assistance is ship-building and other maritime technology. As part of its strategy, for example, Singapore is fostering bilateral relations with Russia. Economic development and modernization in Russia is the focus.

Cultural and linguistic differences have slowed the pace of bilateral relations, but both parties are open to pursuing the relationship, with the persistence of Western sanctions making relations with Singapore more immediately appealing for Russia.

Additionally, Singapore has committed itself to being a cooperative ally to the Arctic states and peoples in the Arctic Council. It has been heavily involved in the CAFF Arctic Council working group project on migratory birds, hosting a workshop in Singapore in January.

It has also created the Singapore-Arctic Council Permanent Participant Cooperation Package to give free education opportunities in Singapore to Indigenous peoples from the Arctic region.

Singapore’s deepening ties with Russia, its involvement in Arctic cooperation and the implications of both are overshadowed by discussion about China’s Arctic ambitions and investments.

It’s time for us to broaden our view of Asian involvement in the Arctic region. Otherwise, all the focus on China will blind us to the intentions, actions and involvement of other actors.

With all eyes on China, Singapore makes its own Arctic moves was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under the administration of Donald Trump, the United States has been attempting to rebalance its priorities, giving the appearance that it is stepping back from its traditional role as guarantor of international security, trade, and diplomacy. However, the rhetoric from the executive branch is hardly news.

Prior U.S. presidential administrations—recently the Obama and Bush administrations—repeatedly stressed the need for NATO allies in Europe to increase defense spending. U.S. Presidents and politicians from both political parties have long made the argument that, for decades, American taxpayers have underwritten European security and defense.

U.S. Allies in Europe

The European Union—and its two largest economies, France and Germany are facing growing uncertainty in their electorates regarding the role of the Union. The bloc remains comprised of vastly contrarian points-of-view, and it remains to be seen how the E.U. will handle Brexit negotiations with the United Kingdom. At present, it is possible the U.K. and E.U. will agree to some degree of security and defense cooperation.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as leaders of the two most influential European Union member states, will need to alleviate the concerns of their respective electorates, which are increasingly concerned with issues such as terrorism and mass immigration—both of which pose severe challenges to European security and social cohesion. Additionally, they will need to effectively communicate the purpose and value of the bloc, in economic, security, and social terms.

On the surface, the European Union would seem to be in a better position than China (oft-touted as the successor to U.S. global hegemony) to serve as a guarantor of global security.

However, the capability of any future E.U. military would pale in comparison to those of the United States. While they compare regarding the number of citizens under arms, American military spending and technological capability far outweigh those of the EU, meaning that the United States remains the only country capable of projecting force on a truly global scale.

Germany became acutely aware of the strategic consequences the European Union would face should Marine Le Pen ascend to the French presidency and follow through with her promises to withdraw France from the both European Union and the NATO Joint Military Command Structure. After the U.S. and Russia, France possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was notably concerned about the prospect of France withdrawing from the European Union, as such an act would leave the E.U. without a nuclear deterrent. In this scenario, Germany would likely become the bloc’s de-facto military and economic leader and would have to consider leading the development of a European Union nuclear weapons program to deter an increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Russia.

U.S. Allies in the Middle East

Iran’s continued military and political involvement in Syria is viewed as a strategic national security threat to Israel, and continued encroachment towards Israeli territory heightens the risk of a large-scale conflict between Iran and Israel, with a remote possibility of Sunni Gulf Monarchies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supporting Israel in an effort to check Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.

The U.S. seems to have, at the least, tacitly approved of heightened Israeli aggression against Iranian targets in Syria, although it remains to be seen the level of involvement the U.S. will take on following the appointment of noted hawk John Bolton as U.S. National Security Advisor, and the pending Secretary of State nomination of the similarly hawkish Mike Pompeo, both of whom have long argued for preemptive U.S. action against Iran.

U.S. Allies in Asia

Key American allies in East Asia, notably Japan, are also reacting to the “America First” Japan’s military capabilities are restricted by its post-World War II constitution. Japan is limited in its ability to deploy troops overseas and is forbidden from developing or possessing aircraft carriers. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated for constitutional reforms that would allow for expanded military and defense capabilities.

Japan’s push to increase its military capabilities isn’t a reaction to the rhetoric currently emanating from the White House. Instead, Japan’s decades-long reluctance to demonstrate its “hard power” capabilities is increasingly outweighed by China’s increasing expansionism and North Korea’s nuclear program.

2018 will likely reveal the limits of China’s influence over the “hermit kingdom.” While China recognizes the security threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea with increased intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, Beijing is more concerned with the prospect of a U.S.-aligned, unified Korea. As such, it likely intends to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

U.S. Allies More Likely to Take Unilateral Action in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities.
2. The U.S. could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons.
3. The U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Accepting a Nuclear North Korea?

The Trump administration could execute a complete policy reversal and accept North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in negotiations. This would undermine American foreign policy in that it would be seen as the capitulation of the United States to the rogue state of North Korea.

The North Korean government will, in no way, sign a nuclear weapons agreement with the Trump administration that sees them left without a nuclear arsenal. The concept of nuclear deterrence is fundamental to not only North Korea’s national security strategy but to the survival of the Kim family itself.

Military Options for North Korea

Based on the stated end-goal of “denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula, it is unlikely that the U.S. would submit to demands like talks without preconditions, or agree on a framework for future negotiations. Such an action would look as if the U.S. was weak in upholding a stated national security objective.

[bs-quote quote=”The president is likely to make this decision (to attack), and we need to be ready.” style=”style-1″ align=”center” author_name=”Tammy Duckworth” author_job=”U.S. Senator (D, IL)” author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/220px-Tammy_Duckworth_official_portrait_113th_Congress.jpg”][/bs-quote]

It would also be seen as a sign of weakness by countries like Iran, Russia, and China. The alternative would be to use military force—something that seems increasingly likely to occur.

Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), an Iraq War veteran and Purple Heart recipient, said: “we are far closer to actual conflict over North Korea than the American people realize. Everything we’re doing shows a military that, in my personal opinion, has turned the corner.” Senator Duckworth added, “the president is likely to make this decision [to attack], and we need to be ready.”

Launching a Pre-Emptive Strike on North Korea

A conflict in North Korea could erupt with an overwhelming pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korean government, nuclear, artillery, and military targets. This would involve strategic planning to ensure all necessary assets are in the region at the right time.

Despite the outdated nature of North Korea’s military forces, they remain a formidable adversary. North Korea ranks fourth among the world’s largest militaries with more than 1.1 million personnel in the country’s armed forces, accounting for nearly 5 percent of its total population.

Article 86 of the North Korean constitution states “National defense is the supreme duty and honor of citizens,” and it requires all citizens to serve in the military. The regime spent an average of $3.5 billion annually on military expenditures between 2004 and 2014, according to a U.S. State Department report.

Although its neighbors and adversaries outspend Pyongyang in dollar-to-dollar comparisons and defense experts, say it operates with aging equipment and technology, the regime’s forward-deployed military position and missiles aimed at Seoul ensure that Pyongyang’s conventional capabilities remain a constant threat to its southern neighbor. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has cautioned that war on the Korean peninsula would be “catastrophic” and he has described North Korea as “the most urgent and dangerous threat  to peace and security.”

“Sleepwalking” the path to war with North Korea

The alternate route to war is more subtle than an overwhelming pre-emptive strike. As the U.S. military steps up its air surveillance and show-of-force flights along North Korean borders, the risk of an incident occurring grows by the day. North Korean forces may perceive a show-of-force flight by a U.S. bomber as a critical threat and shoot it down, or they may believe it to be within North Korean airspace (even if it isn’t) and shoot it down just the same.

If an event such as this were to take place, there is little debate that the U.S. President would order a counterattack. North Korea has a significant number of artillery and short-range missile batteries within range of Seoul. There is little doubt that, in the event of an escalation to conflict, these would be used immediately to inflict as much damage as possible on South Korean and American positions (both military and civilian).

In contrast to Syria, where American destroyers launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at a target within Syrian territory from the safety of the Mediterranean and without much of a risk for a counterattack, U.S. forces engaged in a counterstrike against North Korea in such a scenario would be land, air, and sea forces of overwhelming capability. There would be very limited time to secure critical military assets and positions before they could be used against U.S.-allied forces.

The U.S., South Korean, and (presumably) Japanese forces would need to concentrate initial efforts on disabling North Korea’s artillery batteries and missile installations that are within range of Seoul, eliminating the regime’s command-and-control capabilities over their troops, and securing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal before it can be used.  It would be nearly impossible to execute a pre-emptive strike that minimized civilian and military casualties. Any war, conflict, or use of force on the Korean peninsula will risk a resulting death toll of a size not seen since the last Korean War.

Sleepwalking into War: The North Korean Quagmire was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile after over 70 days without any such activity. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, this is the third ICBM test launch of 2017.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the missile most recently launched by the North Koreans “went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.”

[bs-quote quote=”North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. It went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.
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The ICBM was launched from an area north of Pyongyang in Sain Ni, North Korea. The missile traveled east for about 620 miles (1000 kilometers) before splashing down into the Sea of Japan. The missile landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone which extends 200 nautical miles from the Japanese coastline.

This latest test launch by the North Koreans occurred just months after North Korea launched ballistic missiles over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido on two separate occasions.

The missile was launched in a near-vertical trajectory, meaning that if it were fired for distance in a more horizontal trajectory, it would be capable of reaching Washington D.C. and other cities on the east coast of the United States.

The Pentagon has stated that it is working with its interagency partners in the Intelligence Community, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Energy to develop a more detailed assessment of the launch.

Pentagon spokesman Army Colonel Robert Manning said: “We [the United States] remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation.”

The Response from South Korea

In response to the North Korean missile launch, the South Korean military demonstrated the capabilities of its precision-targeted missiles by firing a number of them off the coast of South Korea.

The latest provocation from North Korea comes at a time of division in the trilateral relationship between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. While the South Korean government, cautious about provoking hostilities with the North, has encouraged restraint and dialogue, the United States (backed up by Japan) has increased its threats of military intervention against North Korea if it continues to conduct testing to further its nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile programs.

North Korea Launches ICBM Capable of Reaching Continental U.S. was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. nuclear forces, operated by the Air Force and Navy, have entered a years-long period that will see the modernization of warheads, bombs, and delivery systems. Many of these land-, air-, and sea-based systems, which constitute the so-called nuclear triad, entered service during the Cold War and will reach the end of their life cycles in the coming decades.

The ballistic missiles, submarines, bombers, fighters, and air-launched cruise missiles in operation today will be gradually phased out for newer systems. The United States will also develop new nuclear warheads and upgrade facilities that produce and maintain nuclear weapons. However, while some modernization efforts are already underway, debate persists in Washington over their direction and extent, especially given the massive investments they will require. The Congressional Budget Office estimates [PDF] that maintaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces will cost $400 billion between 2017 and 2026.

How did the nuclear triad emerge?

The triad emerged and evolved, more by accident than design, over the four decades of the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union responded to each other’s advances. “No one set out to create the triad,” says Stephen Schwartz, editor and co-author of Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. “It arose out of interservice rivalry, pork barrel congressional politics, competition between defense contractors, fear of the Soviet Union, and highly redundant nuclear targeting.”

What are the legs of the U.S. nuclear triad?

Ground. The ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, managed by the U.S. Air Force, is the largest of the three regarding the number of delivery platforms. It comprises four hundred Minuteman III intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were first deployed in 1970. ICBMs are missiles capable of striking targets more than 5,500 kilometers away. Each Minuteman III can deliver one warhead, though the missile originally designed to carry three to multiple targets. The United States keeps ICBMs on nearly constant alert. They are in underground silos spread out across thousands of acres of farmland in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming.

Sea. The sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, by far the largest in terms of total deployed warheads, comprises more than two hundred Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can be launched from fourteen Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) based in Washington State, on the west coast, and Georgia, on the east coast. Twelve of the fourteen SSBNs are at sea at all times, with five each in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans always on “hard alert” in designated patrol areas, ready to launch their missiles within minutes of receiving an order from the president. Each Trident II SLBM can deliver four to five independently targetable nuclear warheads, although the missile is capable of carrying up to eight warheads.

Air. The air-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad comprises two types of heavy bombers, which are based in Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota: forty-four B-52H Stratofortresses and sixteen stealth B-2A Spirits. The B-52H, which has been modified extensively over its fifty years of service, carries nuclear-tipped, air-launched cruise missiles. The B-2A, which became operational in 1997, can be armed with three different nuclear bombs. The Air Force used another aircraft, the B-1B Lancer, for nuclear missions until 1997, but has since modified it to carry only conventional weapons.

What other nuclear weapons does the U.S. have?

The United States also has approximately five hundred nuclear bombs adapted for tactical use with various fighter aircraft. About 150 of these are located at bases in five NATO ally states, but modernization plans may include reducing the total number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Though they have no fixed definition [PDF], tactical nuclear weapons are generally distinguished from strategic ones by their shorter delivery ranges, and they are designed for battlefield scenarios in which conventional weapons might otherwise be used. (Tactical nuclear weapons have never been used in battle.)

What modernization is planned for each leg of the triad?

Ground. The planned replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM, known for now as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), is still in the design phase. In the meantime, the Air Force is continuing to upgrade the Minuteman III.

Sea. First deployed in 1981, Ohio-class submarines will be replaced beginning in the early 2030s with Columbia-class submarines, which are expected to operate through the 2080s. Assuming current requirements and cost projections hold, the Navy will likely operate between ten and twelve Columbia-class SSBNs, which will feature sixteen missile launch tubes, four fewer than the Ohio-class SSBNs have. The submarine-launched Trident II is undergoing improvements to extend its service life through the early 2040s. The Navy will likely reduce the number of deployed SLBM warheads as well.

Air. The U.S. Air Force is developing a new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, which will be capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads. Meanwhile, the Air Force is expected to upgrade and keep the B-2A Spirit in service through 2058[PDF] and the nuclear-capable B-52H through 2040.

The Air Force has put out contracts to develop a new weapons system, known as the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, which may be capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads and be interoperable across the U.S. nuclear bomber force. It is not expected to be operational until 2030.

What arms control agreements cap the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

Russia is the only other nuclear weapon state with an arsenal comparable to that of the United States. The New START Treaty [PDF] entered into force in February 2011 and limits U.S.- and Russian-deployed warheads to 1,550 and deployed delivery vehicles—individual ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—to 700. The United States and Russia report their strategic warhead and delivery vehicle counts to each other on a biannual basis.

Why is nuclear modernization debated?

Shortly into his tenure, President Obama declared “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Despite this, most of the ongoing triad modernization began under his administration, and fewer U.S. nuclear weapons were eliminated under him than under any other post–Cold War president. President Donald J. Trump declared shortly after his election in 2017 that he would seek to “greatly strengthen and expand [U.S.] nuclear capability,” and he ordered the Department of Defense to conduct a review of the U.S. nuclear posture, which is expected to be completed by early 2018.

Some aspects of nuclear modernization face political opposition, with critics noting that the triad itself is an artifact of Cold War-era strategic thinking. In 2017, a group of Democratic senators sought to slow development of the LRSO, citing strategic concerns and high costs. Others, including former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, have recommended abolishing the ICBM force, arguing that the other two legs of the triad would be sufficient for deterrence.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea remains committed to obtaining a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. The closer it gets to its end-goal, there is less time for the United States and its allies to put a stop to Pyongyang’s ambitions.

Based on factors like the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the advancement of North Korean missile and nuclear technology, and the degree of risk that Washington and its allies are prepared to tolerate, the U.S. might have already missed its opportunity for preventative military action.

Estimates show that, at most, Washington would have 18 months before the window closing, after which, the United States and its allies would have no choice but to adopt some form of deterrence policy toward North Korea. Most indications that a pre-emptive attack on North Korea by the United States is in the works have yet to materialize, implying that military action is not likely this year. Others, however, have already appeared.

These deployments do not necessarily mean the U.S. is preparing for war. They do, however, elevate the risk of conflict in East Asia.

The U.S. is enhancing its forward position in and around North Korea. Three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups are en route to the Western Pacific, where they’ll conduct a combined exercise in middle November. Such a concentration of force is rare. The last time three U.S. carrier strike groups convened for a combined deployment was in 2007. This forward deployment will give the U.S. force projection capabilities within striking distance of North Korea.

The U.S. Air Force, meanwhile, has declared that, for the very first time, it is going to send a squadron of a dozen F-35A stealth fighter jets to Kadena Air Base in Japan in early November for a six month deployment. Stealth fighters would be prominent fixtures in any U.S. attack on North Korea.

The US has also dispatched nuclear-powered submarines to the waters around the Korean peninsula. It is likely that at least one submarine is carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Furthermore, the U.S. Military recently increased its stockpile of munitions in Guam by approximately 10 percent between late August and late September.

Analysis: the U.S. is keeping its options open with regards to North Korea

Analyzed together, these developments imply that the US is currently preparing for a confrontation. However, this does not necessarily mean that Washington is gearing up to start a war with Pyongyang. The US and it allies are in a standoff with North Korea. In a standoff, it is necessary to make preparations for conflict, even if one does not intend for a conflict to arise.

Military deployments, exercises, and preparations—such as the ones underway in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula—may just be part of the US attempt to keep its options open with regards to dealing with North Korea. Nevertheless, these developments give some indication of what a military campaign would look like—while raising the risk of conflict in the region.

North Korea, after all, will be watching out for these types of military deployments and preparations by the United States. If North Korea concludes that a strike is imminent, Pyongyang will be more prone to attempt some form of pre-emptive action of their own. Furthermore, even if both parties manage to avoid war, large-scale build-ups and military exercises intended to contain and discourage North Korea might be the new normal.

U.S. Deploys Three Carrier Strike Groups to Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.

There seems to have been a de-escalation between India and China in the border dispute over the Doklam Plateau, but the dormant battle across the Himalayas continues.

The Himalayas form a powerful barrier. But, there are areas where the boundary is contested, producing constant tension. The long frontier between India and China is disrupted by two nations south of the Himalayas primary variety and open to India’s heartland: Bhutan and Nepal.

As Bhutan and Nepal are strategically vital to India’s interests, New Delhi yields considerable influence on them, and can, at times, overstep.

India has exercised influence on their internal policies, including by enforcing trade restrictions. The Himalayas are still an efficient line of defense for India against potential Chinese aggression, since traversing them is very difficult. However stronger Chinese influence on Bhutan and Nepal might be strategically lethal for India.

India and China are both emerging world powers with ambitions of regional hegemony. India has numerous concerns aside from its Himalayan border. China became a close commercial and strategic partner of its longtime adversary, Pakistan. Furthermore, the Chinese navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean as part of its One Belt, One Road initiative.

China’s Growing Influence in the Southern Hemisphere

Chinese influence is climbing in Africa, on the other side of the Indian Ocean, and its influence is growing in neighboring Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. And on the other hand, India firmly supports Vietnam, that has repeating disputes with China over the South China Sea and works in close cooperation with the United States.

In the 1950s, China annexed Tibet, which is poorly populated because of its elevation and climate. It is located just north of the primary section of the Himalayas. It isn’t just strategically significant, but it’s a source of water to vast portions of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China.

China has brought infrastructure such as improved railroads to Tibet. It’s now working on similar projects to connect China to neighboring states in the Himalayas. China has been improving access to the region with contemporary railroads and highways. It’s also increasing its presence in the area with major road and railway projects through the Himalayas, connecting it with Pakistan, and plans to construct comparable links to Nepal.

Improved rail infrastructure in the Himalayas would connect these states to China’s entire transportation network, which continues to be further developed and modernized. Additionally, China might use its control over the region’s water as a means of exerting influence.

Analysis: China is Unprepared for a Conflict with India

A big issue for China is the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which is scheduled for October 19. A blunder in Doklam could, in the worst case, cause a power struggle that forces Chinese President Xi Jinping to step down. Xi might still face criticism in the Congress for having to back down in Doklam, but not as far as in other situations. China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea and elsewhere have won praise throughout China.

Xi’s expansionist policies leave analysts with many questions about where he is leading China. Relations between China and neighboring states like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, are tense.

Lastly, it is becoming more and more clear that there is a decreasing chance of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. More pressingly, the ongoing North Korea nuclear weapons crisis presents extreme risks to China in the short term.

Asian Hegemony: Ongoing Tensions Between China and India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Following this past week’s second firing of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japanese territory, remarks were made in a joint press conference held by U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley, and National Security Advisor Lt. General H.R. McMaster.

Ambassador Haley said that she’d “hand over” the North Korean issue to Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis for him to solve—if diplomatic efforts continued to fail. The Ambassador’s delivery indicated some exasperation with the lack of diplomatic progress.

China will resist any effort to further intervene until, at least, the conclusion of this year’s Communist Party Conference, where President Xi Jinping is expected to further consolidate his power. China has been promoting itself as an official “global power.” Resolving such a crisis as the North Korean nuclear threat, particularly as the Kim regime is a growing thorn in Beijing’s side, would lend credibility to that claim.

Furthermore, proactive engagement by China could mitigate some of the Government’s concerns, such as a U.S. aligned, unified Korean Peninsula, or a mass-exodus of North Korean refugees across the Chinese border.

If this most recent provocation by North Korea against Japan does not cross the line issued by Secretary Mattis, it will be clear as North Korea will continue to test the limits of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with increasingly aggressive ballistic missile provocations.

U.S. Defense Secretary Outlines Scope of Any Military Action in North Korea

In a statement released outside of the White House following a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, Secretary of Defense James Mattis sent a clear warning to North Korea:

“Any threat to the United States or its territories including Guam or our allies will be met with a massive military response, a response both effective and overwhelming.” The Secretary continued, saying, “Kim Jong Un should heed the United Nations Security Council’s unified voice. All members unanimously agreed on the threat North Korea poses. And they remain unanimous in their commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Because we are not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely, North Korea.”

U.S. military action would be a sudden and massive attack on North Korean nuclear and military assets, for which no prior warning would be given.

Mattis issued his statement while flanked by Marine General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In contrast to the off-the-cuff “fire-and-fury” rhetoric employed by Trump on August 8, Mattis read from a prepared statement and avoided using opaque language, with one exception.

What Constitutes a Threat?

After stating “Any threat to the United States or its territories including Guam or our allies,” Mattis did not provide context for his use of the words “any threat.”   Accordingly, it leaves both the White House and the military wiggle room for interpretation.

Mattis’ language could have been intended to justify for the U.S. to use force as a means of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Action taken under Article 51 requires there be an imminent threat of “armed attack” if the assault has not yet begun, but does not require prior authorization by the U.N. Security Council.

Conditions for Military Action

Mattis’ use of “will be” in setting the conditions for military action against North Korea is critical. He did not say “might” or “would.” In contrast, on August 8, Trump stated that threats “to the United States” would trigger a military response. It was after this that North Korea threatened to target the area surrounding Guam with ballistic missiles.

By including U.S. allies (South Korea and Japan), U.S. territories (like Guam), and the continental United States in his statement, Mattis provided a clear definition as to what would merit a military strike by the U.S.

What Would a U.S. Military Strike on North Korea Look Like?

The Defense Secretary also described what military action by the U.S. against North Korea would look like. In stating that “we [the U.S.] are not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely, North Korea,” Mattis implied that any military action by the U.S. would likely not be a massive invasion. U.S. military action, rather, would be a sudden and massive attack on North Korean nuclear and military assets, for which no prior warning would be given.

In ending his statement referencing the “unified voice” of the U.N. Security Council, Mattis implied his preference for resolving the situation peacefully. Primarily, Mattis views a diplomatic solution as preferable but has made sure that the United States is ready to use force if necessary.

U.S. issues “red line” on North Korea, but leaves room for interpretation. was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is a direct response to the two  missiles launched by North Korea that have flown over the north of the country, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

North Korea, which recently threatened Japan by saying it would “sink its territory” with a nuclear bomb, for its support of US-sponsored sanctions, also launched another missile that flew over northern Japan on August 29.

The defense spokesman said today that “the country watches over North Korea’s movements” for a possible new launch.

Japan’s anti-missile operations use Navy Aegis destroyers to shoot down airborne missiles and PAC-3 to resist projectiles.

Tokyo, which does not confirm the number of launchers installed in the country due to security concerns, has already extended its anti-missile system in several prefectures in the west of the country in mid-August after the North Korean government threatened to launch four missiles around the area surrounding the American island-territory of Guam.

The North Korean regime launched the most recent ballistic missile towards Japan on September 19, raising alarms across Japan and drawing criticism from the international community over its persistent weapons tests.

Japan installs anti-missile systems in north of country due to North Korean threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

On August 19, 2017, President Donald Trump gave his first speech to the UN General Assembly. In his speech, he stated that if the Pyongyang regime does not give up its nuclear program, the United States will have no choice but to “destroy North Korea. We have patience, but we have another option.”

Trump called the regime of Kim Jong-Un “depraved and responsible for the death, oppression, torture, and imprisonment of many citizens of the country.” He said North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is irresponsible and threatens the entire world with an “unthinkable loss of human life.” He said the North Korean leader is on a suicide mission for himself and his regime.

Trump tells UN: North Korea “Will be Destroyed” if Threats Persist was originally published on Global Security Review.