Ideology matters, as I learned from surviving 18 years under the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The United States pretended otherwise for three decades, clinging to the “end of history” and similar dreams. Today, with ideologically driven conflicts simmering around the world, it is time for America to integrate deterrence, defense, and a theory of victory across the so-called gray zone of geopolitics. Doing so will require policymakers to start listening to what America’s enemies have been saying for years about their ideological designs.

In 2004, when questioned about whether a Venezuela-Cuba alliance was exporting communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States averred: “It is a thing outdated in time and it is not understanding the relationships that exist between the countries.” That was a backhanded ‘yes,’ if there ever was one. The message was meant to assuage the busy, post-9/11 national security community, diverting attention away from the problems brewing south of the U.S. border. More than two decades later, the annual warnings of USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commanders before Congress have finally been heeded by the White House.

Ideology has been slapping America in the face since the late 1990s. For this era of refocusing on state-based threats, it comes in these forms and many others: Beijing’s obsession with employing “united front” organizations to silence dissidents overseas; Moscow’s obsession with Ukraine, kicking off a murky war in 2014 that is now sustained conventionally; Tehran’s obsession with aiding and abetting proxy martyrs of the Islamic Revolution; Havana’s and Caracas’ shared obsession with waging “asymmetric war” on Western powers (which included flooding the American homeland with illicit narcotics); and Pyongyang’s obsession with subverting Seoul’s political processes and civic life. All these gray-zone efforts have an ideology at the heart. Their ideologies, variously rooted in Marxism, religion, and revanchism, drive the leaders of these states to employ irregular warfare tactics without any remorse and at any cost to civilians in the West or anywhere else. You will not find high degrees of intellectual coherence between these constructs; shared hatreds and collectivist doctrines and dogmas are cohesive enough for what now amounts to an anti-Western coalition.

Anti-Western adversaries became sneakier when strategizing and aligning with those espousing similar worldviews. They also became more convinced of their moral superiority. The U.S. national security community makes arbitrary distinctions between geopolitics and ideology. These distinctions obfuscate reality, which is already tough to comprehend, and lead to poor policymaking. Nowhere is this weakness more prominent than in the domain of irregular warfare. How did ISIS carve out its domain between Iraq and Syria, for instance, if not through the aid of its ideology?

Discussing rival-state ideology in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security seems to generate discomfort despite some strides to understand strategic cultures. It started with the spectacular triumphs of 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations’ ideological variables have been marginalized in the Federal Government. The American bureaucrat could finally put ‘Sovietology’ to rest, and, with it, anything to do with alternatives to liberal internationalism. The term ‘Great-Power Competition’ continues the delusion; ‘strategic-ideological struggle’ captures reality much better.

Disclaimer: Ideologies are messy. Their study requires incredible levels of nuance, subtlety, cultural awareness, philosophical skill, and extensive interpretive room. It is not a field of expertise attuned nor prone to engineering solutions or linear responses, making it politically dangerous to confront ideological challengers. Bringing up ideology always risks alienating a group and hurting its feelings. Hence, American political leaders and senior officials have scarcely breathed a word about state-centric ideological conflict since the demise of the USSR.

This problematic approach is a vestige of America’s long-gone “unipolar moment.” Through mirror imaging, it takes our attention away from elements that the Western world’s rivals thrive on. Several foes of the West have developed highly complex irregular warfare doctrines, intelligently focusing on the types of operations that some of these actors can excel in, and backing off from the type of war that they know they cannot win. Because illegality is the common denominator to all irregular warfare activities coming from any type of challenger, ideological zeal and fervor are absolute strategic imperatives to the leaders of these revanchist entities. Indeed, during the Global War on Terror, we recognized it as an essential enemy warfighting capability. Ideology is the glue that authoritarians, totalitarians, and other extremists apply to bind together the domestic constituencies that they rely on for control and aggression. In ideology, those leaders find the corpus of thought and the narratives required to morally justify atrocities committed in pursuit of greed, territorial expansion, or a simple clinging to power.

Acknowledgement is growing that defeating mere symptoms of its rivals’ irregular warfare campaigns cannot bring American strategic victory or even achieve deterrence in the “gray zone.” Looking back at the U.S.-led quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, more observers have called for defeating root ideologies, rather than just crushing the fighters who currently espouse a certain ideology’s flavor-of-the-moment (e.g., Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, FARC, ELN, etc.).

Defeating our enemies must include defeating their ideologies. This no longer demands global wars in the traditional (conventional) military sense. To defeat regime ideologies, whole-of-government efforts require dusting off forgotten or atrophied competencies that America used to cultivate, including the ‘dark arts’ of U.S. foreign policy. Washington needs to articulate once again what it believes in, beyond vague notions of stability, and bring like-minded allies to our side.

David Guenni is completing his doctorate with Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense & Strategic Studies. His research focuses on nation-states’ employment of narcotrafficking as an irregular warfare modality. He is a Venezuelan political asylum seeker in the United States, having spent many years in the struggle against the Chavista regime in Caracas. His opinions are his own and no one else’s.

Why Ideology Matters in Irregular Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is the third trilateral meeting between these countries this year. The issue of terrorism in Pakistan was a top agenda in all three conferences. Apart from trade cooperation and CPEC, it matters most. The truth is that terrorism-related threats have their sources in Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus not only contended with internal insurgents but also with non-state actors based in Afghanistan. These players are aided by regional instability, ideological havens, and a rushed Western departure.

In the Global War on Terror, Pakistan was at the receiving end of a conflict it never initiated, yet it paid with blood and billions of dollars over the past two decades. This involvement led to the deaths of over 70,000 Pakistanis and resulted in losses exceeding $150 billion to Pakistan’s economy, post-9/11. The trauma is deep and the cost staggering, whether it was the school massacre in Peshawar, terror attacks on urban centers, or assaults on security forces. Even today, Pakistan continues to grapple with terrorism, a remnant of the Global War on Terror.

A 2024 report noted that more than 1,600 civilians and security personnel were killed in terror bombings and gun attacks. 2024 appeared to be the deadliest year, as more than 685 servicemen were killed in 444 terrorist incidents. In March of 2025, Pakistan ranked second in the Global Terrorism Index, as terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.

A new phase in Pakistan’s war on terror began with the launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024, a multi-faceted counterterrorism initiative aimed at breaking the chain of terrorism-related violence. A distinguishing feature of this operation is its full acknowledgment of cross-border terrorism, particularly that originating from Afghanistan. The operation focuses on improving intelligence capabilities, strengthening diplomatic ties with the Taliban government in Kabul, and aligning border management with broader security measures.

Operation Azm-e-Istehkam could potentially mark a systematic reform in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, built on a structure centered on intelligence-driven operations, regional cooperation, and social and economic reforms. However, for the operation to be implemented successfully, it must be accompanied by progress across the Durand Line. External sanctuaries in Afghanistan will continue to undermine the internal security gains achieved by Pakistan as long as the country remains a permissive environment for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.

As far as China is concerned, its interest in the Pak-Afghan rapprochement is twofold. One is that it aims to prevent any spillover of terror into Xinjiang province through radical networks. China wants to counter any strategic threat to CPEC, particularly since their officials have already been attacked by insurgents in Baluchistan. China also seeks to hamper the increasing influence of India in Kabul.

Furthermore, the economic presence of China can be used to influence the Taliban to tone down their attitude towards Pakistan. Beijing can contribute to creating integrated security architecture by offering aid, developing infrastructure, and offering trade incentives, especially the prospect of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. This might include collective management of the border and repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as coordinating intelligence.

In July, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Tianjin, China, emphasized the need for Afghan stability and greater cooperation among regional states. Beijing’s message was more than mere diplomacy. It signaled a strategic recalibration. This stance was echoed by Pakistan Foreign Minister Dar and was followed by a series of high-level talks between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing.

Previously, in May 2025, a trilateral dialogue was held in China between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The meeting produced a symbolic willingness to reinstate diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul at the ambassadorial level. More importantly, it opened an avenue for future regional security cooperation, not only against TTP terror but also against threats such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which have also drawn Beijing’s attention.

These trilateral engagements offer Pakistan two opportunities to internationalize its concerns over cross-border terrorism and the chance to tie those concerns to broader regional stability and economic growth.

China’s mediation introduces a new variable into the equation, shifting the dynamic from a binary of conflict and impunity to a triangle of pressure, cooperation, and mutual interest. Provided it is adequately utilized, the trilateral effort between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has the potential to evolve from a symbol into a solid plan—and out of weak diplomacy into stable security.

Qurat-UL-Ain Shabbir is a research officer at CISS.

Can Trilateral Diplomacy Secure Pakistan from Terrorism? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, when looking deeper, combining field developments, the Taliban’s contradictory conduct, and shifting regional dynamics, reveals a more complex reality. This enmity may not be as absolute as it seems. Instead, it could present a multi-layered game in which the Taliban leverages the ISIS-K threat to justify internal repression, gain regional legitimacy, and position itself as the “lesser evil.” In this light, ISIS-K might serve both as a tactical threat and a strategic asset for the Taliban—a manufactured crisis that enables the group to tighten its grip on power at home and increase its geopolitical leverage abroad.

Open Hostility or Controlled Competition?

Since appearing in Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched brutal attacks on civilians, from deadly bombings against religious minorities to assaults on hotels housing Chinese and Russian citizens. These incidents were widely publicized, framing ISIS-K as a dangerous destabilizing force in the public mind.

Yet, a closer look reveals an intriguing pattern: the majority of ISIS-K attacks occurred in provinces like Nangarhar and Kunduz, the very areas where the Taliban launched “anti-ISIS” operations to consolidate their own authority. The Taliban consistently portray their campaigns against ISIS-K as “heroic battles” against terrorism. Yet beneath this narrative lies a troubling question: could the Taliban be managing or even facilitating ISIS-K’s presence as a pretext to justify their own rule, gain international support, and ruthlessly crush opposition?

It appears ISIS-K never posed an existential threat to the Taliban. On the contrary, its existence allows the Taliban to brand themselves as “terrorism fighters” while targeting domestic opponents, civil society activists, former security personnel of the previous republic, and even ethnic groups like Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Nangarhar, for example, hundreds were detained on allegations of ties to ISIS-K, though many were once affiliated with the republican government.

For the Taliban, ISIS-K represents a “manageable threat,” dangerous enough to draw local and international backing, but not so strong as to undermine their own power. In fact, it provides an opportunity for the Taliban to further entrench themselves.

The Haqqani Network and Crisis Management

At the heart of this theory lies the Haqqani Network, a sophisticated and shadowy branch of the Taliban known for its long-standing ties with Pakistani intelligence services and transnational jihadist networks. Field patterns suggest that in eastern Afghanistan, there is a kind of covert coexistence between the Haqqanis and elements of ISIS-K. Major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul, including assaults on hotels frequented by Chinese and Russian diplomats, raise suspicions that these incidents may have occurred with either Haqqani facilitation or their tacit approval. There are also reports indicating that some mid-level ISIS-K leaders once cooperated with the Haqqanis.

This relationship can be analyzed through three possible scenarios. First, there is the direct management scenario. Here, the Haqqani Network actively directs parts of ISIS-K to operate within controlled limits.

Second, there is the limited influence scenario. In this scenario, the Taliban and the Haqqanis have some influence over ISIS-K and use it for political purposes.

Third, there is the independent ISIS scenario. In this case, ISIS-K acts independently, but the Taliban opportunistically exploit its existence for political gains.

Although there is no definitive evidence of full collusion between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the Taliban’s selective responses to ISIS-K’s activities suggest we are witnessing “crisis management” rather than an all-out war. Even if we dismiss the first scenario, there is sufficient evidence to support the second. While the Taliban may not entirely control ISIS-K, they at least seek to manage it, benefiting from its existence while preventing it from becoming a genuine threat to their dominance.

A Regional and International Bargaining Chip

For the Taliban, ISIS-K is not merely a domestic issue, it is also a key “bargaining card” in dealings with regional powers. By presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against ISIS-K, the Taliban have transformed from international pariahs into reluctant but necessary security partners for neighboring countries.

To China and Russia, they say, “Without us, ISIS-K will spread into Central Asia and Xinjiang.” To Iran, they warn, “Weakening the Taliban will empower ISIS-K on Afghanistan’s western borders.” To Pakistan, they remind, “Uncontained ISIS-K activity could jeopardize economic security and projects like CPEC.” By managing the ISIS-K threat, the Taliban position themselves as the lesser evil and draw financial and political support from regional actors.

Crisis Engineering: A Familiar Tactic

What the Taliban is doing today is not unlike Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s, when Islamabad exaggerated the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to extract financial and political concessions from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban have now reproduced this model, creating and managing a more extreme enemy to bolster their own position. This tactic aligns with the theory of a “constructed crisis,” in which security actors inflate or even control threats to use them as tools for pressure and legitimacy.

It is likely, then, that the Taliban never intend to fully destroy ISIS-K. Its continued existence forms an essential part of their political and security survival strategy.

Targeted Attacks: Eliminating Opponents in Terror’s Shadow

In this geopolitical chess game, the Afghan people remain the primary victims. The Taliban’s “anti-ISIS” operations increasingly target civil activists, former security forces, and even ethnic minorities. Some ISIS-K attacks, like the one on the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, fueled suspicions about the Taliban’s role, or at least their prior knowledge, of such incidents. Some reports even suggest that the Taliban warned their personnel in advance of certain attacks.

These operations may act as a tool for the “targeted elimination” of internal opponents, allowing the Taliban to avoid direct responsibility. Rather than weakening the group, this tactic reinforces the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan’s security equations.

Taliban and ISIS-K: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

At first glance, the Taliban and ISIS-K seem like sworn ideological enemies. But on closer inspection, field evidence and geopolitical logic suggest their relationship is far more complex than a simple rivalry. The Taliban leveraged ISIS-K’s presence to crack down on internal dissent, bolster their regional legitimacy, and present themselves as a defensive shield against terrorism and global threats emanating from Afghan soil.

As long as this intricate game continues, the Taliban can maintain their role as a “necessary but unpleasant” player in regional and global affairs, while Afghanistan remains trapped in a security quagmire with no easy way out.

For reasons of personal safety, the author has used a pseudonym.

The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan: A Real Rivalry or a Strategic Game to Engineer Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since January 20, Trump administration officials have announced an end to US participation in NATO military exercises; floated plans to relinquish NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander post (held by an American since NATO’s founding); proposed withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe; threatened the sovereignty of NATO ally Canada; raised the prospect of using force to seize Greenland (a territory of NATO ally Denmark); derided “freeloading” Europeans; said of Vladimir Putin that America “should take him at his word”; torpedoed NATO’s unanimous declaration to “never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea”; and suggested America’s NATO allies would not “come and protect us” in a time of crisis. This follows Trump’s 2024 invitation to Putin’s henchmen to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies failing to meet NATO’s defense-spending requirements; 2018 threat to withdraw from NATO; and a 2016 declaration that he would defend NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us.” Add it all up, and Trump’s view of NATO diverges dramatically from that of what was once known as the “Grand Old Party.”

For instance, as he took the reins as NATO’s first military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower—a future Republican president—called NATO “the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.” President Richard Nixon viewed NATO as “a moral force.” President Gerald Ford believed NATO “protected the free world from the threat of aggression.”

President George H. W. Bush called NATO “an insurance policy.” Indeed, for America, NATO insures against the worst scenario: another European conflict triggering another global war. For the rest of NATO, the alliance is a security guarantee backed by the United States. Without that guarantee, there is no security in Europe, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in, from Cold War Hungary to post–Cold War Ukraine.

President George W. Bush called NATO “the essential foundation of transatlantic security.” This essay did not forget President Ronald Reagan. However, many of those who claim Reagan’s mantle forget that he was an unwavering NATO advocate—during and after the Cold War. Rather than dismissing NATO as “obsolete,” Reagan called NATO “the core of America’s foreign policy and of America’s own security.” Rather than alarming NATO allies, Reagan reassured them by echoing the words of the North Atlantic Treaty: “If you are threatened, we’re threatened…. An attack on you is an attack on us.”

Rather than distorting NATO into a transactional protection racket, Reagan championed NATO as a “community of democratic states” and “a bond which has served us so well.”

Reagan never questioned NATO’s relevance, never browbeat NATO laggards, never threatened withdrawing from NATO, and never raised doubts about America’s commitment to NATO. Instead, Reagan championed NATO as “an antidote to chaos,” “a living commitment of the nations of the West to the defense of democracy and individual liberty.”

Importantly, Reagan did not think NATO’s mission was over when the Berlin Wall fell. In fact, he endorsed NATO’s continued growth. “Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” he declared after the Cold War thawed. And even after Moscow began walking the path of reform, Reagan cautioned, “We cannot afford to forget that we are dealing with a political system, a political culture and a political history going back many decades, even centuries…. We must stick with the strategy of strength.” In short, Reagan shrewdly saw NATO as a hedge against a Russia that might revert to revanchism—which is exactly what has happened.

Putin’s Russia violated nuclear treaties, conventional-weapons treaties, and its own pledge to “respect the independence…sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine”; warned NATO member Poland that its western territories were “a gift from Stalin”; dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine; countenanced and/or conducted cyberattacks against American energy infrastructure; interfered in elections throughout NATO’s membership roster; conducted sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint (including American targets); threatened use of nuclear weapons; aided and funded attacks against American forces; provided targeting data to support Houthi attacks against allied ships; and made “massive investments in its defense sector” (according to Trump’s own intelligence officials). In light of all of that—and the Kremlin’s long history of deceit—Reagan would never “take Putin at his word.”

GOP presidents, and their democrat counterparts, supported NATO because they recognized that NATO serves America’s interests. For 40 years, NATO helped deter Moscow and prevent the Cold War from turning hot. But that is just a fraction of how NATO has served America’s interests.

Thirteen current NATO allies deployed troops to assist America in defending South Korea. NATO militaries, infrastructure, and decades of interoperability served as the nucleus for the coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait, with NATO allies deploying thousands of troops to assist America.

The only time NATO’s all-for-one collective-defense clause was invoked was after September 11, 2001, when NATO allies rushed aircraft and personnel to this side of the Atlantic to guard America’s skies. NATO then bled with America in the Sisyphean campaign that followed, with 455 Brits, 158 Canadians, 86 French, 54 Germans, 48 Italians, 43 Danes, and 40 Poles dying in Afghanistan. When America withdrew from Afghanistan—20 years after the attacks on America’s capital, America’s military headquarters, America’s largest city—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not Americans. The vast majority were NATO allies. Trump is apparently unaware of this history.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 16 NATO allies sent troops when America asked for help. Hundreds of NATO troops—Brits, Italians, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Danes, Dutch, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs—died in Iraq, as did 18 soldiers from Ukraine, a country that is not a NATO ally but certainly acts like one.

In the post Iraqi freedom years, seven NATO members conducted airstrikes against the ISIS caliphate. Again, NATO was there.

Far from “freeloading,” NATO allies Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are supporting operations in the Red Sea. Likewise, British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Canadian assets are promoting freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

European nations sent more aid to Ukraine than the US. Britain and France are organizing a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine.

NATO has eight battlegroups defending its most at-risk members along the eastern flank. Only one is American-led.

Britain leads the battlegroup in Estonia, supported by Denmark, France, and Iceland. Britain is committing resources to defend NATO’s northern flank. And the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales just commenced a globe-spanning mission—the largest deployment of British naval airpower in a quarter-century.

Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, backed by Belgium, Czechia, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Germany is building permanent bases in Lithuania for 4,800 German troops. Germany is spearheading a continentwide missile shield. And Germany’s parliament recently approved a massive defense-infrastructure fund.

Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, supported by 10 other NATO allies. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania. Pouring almost 5 percent of GDP into defense, Poland fields NATO’s third-largest military. Sweden is quadrupling production of anti-tank weapons.

What NATO is doing and deterring underscores something General James Mattis observed almost a decade ago, “If we did not have NATO today, we would need to create it.”

This begs the questions: what if we did not have NATO? What if these first hundred days mark the last days of history’s greatest alliance for peace?

NATO is designed not to wage war, but to deter war. If there is any doubt about NATO’s collective-defense guarantee—and these first hundred days have created enormous doubts—Putin could be tempted to do in the Baltics what he has done in Ukraine. That would force NATO to blink or fire back. And that would lead to terrible outcomes. The former means the collapse of NATO—and with it, the entire US-led alliance system. The latter means great power war.

The best way to prevent such dire outcomes is through deterrent military strength, clarity of intent, and certainty of cause and effect. Trump’s words and actions have undermined all of these.

What the transactional Trump administration fails to recognize is that by undermining NATO, it is undermining America’s security. If a cyberattack or EMP blast or bioweapon paralyzes America; if ISIS or al Qaeda or some other terror group unleashes something worse than 9/11 or 10/7; if Moscow blinds America’s constellation of satellites; if Beijing moves against Taiwan; or if Pyongyang restarts the long-paused Korean War, America will call for help.

A post-NATO Europe may be unable or unwilling to answer.

Alan Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

FYI to the GOP on NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

The brainwashing of youths, monopoly over illicit drug production, sheltering and supporting global terrorist groups, weaponization of poverty, and recruitment of refugees has brought Afghanistan to the verge of an imminent explosion, with consequences that may prove more consequential than those of September 11, 2001. Understanding what the Taliban is doing deserves further explanation.

Brainwashing the Youth

The Taliban’s focus on educating Afghan youth in religious schools (madrasa), which serve as training centers for militants and suicide bombers, poses an immediate and long-term threat to the region and the West. Through relentless brainwashing, these madrasas create a generation of children and teenagers steeped in radicalism. Young recruits are taught that martyrdom and suicide attacks are not only honorable but also necessary.

What makes this particularly worrisome is the sheer scale. Tens of thousands of young minds are being primed for violence, and this army of youths will be deployed somewhere. The consequences for neighboring countries and the West, which are already struggling with radicalization, could be catastrophic. As Roza Otenbayeva, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said to the UN Security Council, “The Taliban do not allow any monitoring of these schools and we don’t know what they teach there.”

According to the Taliban Ministry of Education, at least 17,300 madrasas are officially active across Afghanistan. Meanwhile, according to an order issued by the Taliban on June 20, 2022, three to 10 jihadi schools, with a capacity of 500–1,000 students each, are being built in every district of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has 408 districts, and the construction of three to 10 new jihadi schools per district could quickly turn the country into the center of global terrorism.

Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is once again a haven for international terrorist groups. The Taliban’s victory emboldened and empowered extremist groups, providing them with the space to reorganize, train, and plan. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now operate freely inside Afghanistan. Taliban ties with these terrorist groups are not superficial. They are rooted in common ideology, long-term political interests, and, most importantly, many Taliban leaders have long-standing family ties with the leaders of these groups.

According to a report in Hasht-e-Subh, the Taliban are building well-equipped bases with residential houses for the Al-Qaeda network and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni province. Likewise, UN reports, especially the July 2024 report, are proof of this claim. The United Nations says Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is a “safe haven” for groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This network of relationships ensures that the Taliban will continue to cooperate with these groups in their collective efforts to destabilize the region, expand influence, and export terror globally, creating a security disaster with devastating global consequences.

Drug Monopoly

Although the Taliban officially banned the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, it has monopolized the industry. By limiting the supply, the Taliban is driving up the price of drugs, making the trade more profitable for themselves and their affiliates. As noted in the July 2024 UN Security Council report, it is still too early to assess the full impact of the poppy cultivation ban. However, senior Taliban officials oppose the ban. Poppy farmers lose while the Taliban profits. The report states, “Due to poppy stockpiles, the drug trade in Afghanistan remains significant.”

The world’s lack of attention to this development risks creating an underground drug economy, further empowering the Taliban and their allied terrorist groups—undermining security and stability in Afghanistan and the region. As the Taliban’s drug empire expands, terrorist groups will increasingly benefit.

Weaponization of Poverty

One of the most dangerous strategies used by the Taliban is the deliberate impoverishment of the Afghan people. By doing this, they pursue two goals.

First, they plunge a large portion of the population into extreme poverty and eliminate opportunities for education, employment, and basic survival. This makes it easier to recruit people into their ranks and allied terrorist groups.

Second, the Taliban’s control over local resources and their monopoly on illicit trade provides ample financial incentives for those willing to fight for them. In this way, poverty becomes a weapon and fuels rebellion and radicalism.

Recruitment of Deported Asylum Seekers

The Taliban encourages the deportation of Afghan refugees by secretly cooperating with some countries, particularly those in the region. This is a policy that is of strategic importance to the regime.

Many deported Afghans, returning to the land where they find no means of survival, are easily recruited by the Taliban and allied terrorist groups. Deportation is vital for the Taliban, as it ensures a steady stream of disillusioned and frustrated individuals who become pawns in their larger scheme.

Many countries fail to grasp the significance of this issue and view it superficially. Deporting immigrants, especially from Western countries, fuels anti-Western sentiments among the population, making them susceptible to serving terrorist groups.

Time Is Running Out

If the world continues to ignore the dire situation in Afghanistan, the consequences will soon prove irreparable. The brainwashing of the nation’s youth, Taliban drug running, safe havens for terrorists, the weaponization of poverty, and the recruitment of refugees will soon impact Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and India, will suffer the most, but the impact will not be limited to the region. Countries far beyond, especially in the West, will be in the crosshairs of these repercussions.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The Biden administration, particularly Jake Sullivan, believes that drones and aerial surveillance can control the situation. This reflects a strategic mistake reminiscent of America’s approach during the Cold War. Ultimately, that mistaken view contributed to the rise of international terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abandoning the Afghan people once again will prove catastrophic, especially the West.

As an Afghan, I urge the West to pay attention and ensure that the Afghanistan that led to 9/11 does not become the same Afghanistan of the near future. It may be a landlocked country in Central Asia, but Afghanistan has already proved that it can cause great harm when left to its own devises.

The author is an Afghan who, for reasons of safety, is unnamed.

The Coming Disaster in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the Taliban’s spokesman in Qatar said that the Taliban now has “a policy of not having any kind of discrimination against the Shia people,” the Hazaras have been continually attacked at schools, weddings, and mosques for their support of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as well as their involvement with Iran to fight against Sunni Muslim forces in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.  

The Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Brigade recruits Hazara and Shia Afghan refugees, offering them payment, citizenship, and other legal protections in return for serving in the brigade. As persecution and targeting of the Hazaras continues, relations between Tehran and the Taliban regime will sour. In response, the brigade may look to recruit more Hazaras, who may be more willing to fight due to intense political and social isolation. 

Once the largest of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, Hazaras now make up only 9 percent of Afghanistan’s population of 36 million, and Genocide Watch has declared this a “genocide emergency.” Offering protection for the Hazara people is more than an international security interest for the United States, but an urgent moral responsibility. Their support for the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has deepened Taliban antipathy towards the Hazaras, and now that the United States has withdrawn troops, the Hazara community is more vulnerable than ever to Taliban violence. As a key stakeholder in Afghanistan that waged a war for two decades, the failure to protect the Hazaras is an acute human rights failure on part of the United States.   

While UN Donors, including the United States, pledged $1.2 billion in September to provide emergency assistance to Afghanistan in response to the economic and humanitarian crisis enveloping the country, the absence of significant international pressure on human rights issues leaves the Hazaras in a vulnerable position. To prevent a genocide of the Hazaras and further abuses against other minority groups, the United States needs to channel humanitarian assistance through independent organizations and condition longer-term development aid on respect for the human rights of the Afghan population.   

When the Taliban was last in power in the late 1990s, they were an international pariah due to their strict form of Islamic rule in which they forced women to stay home, banned girls from going to school, banned television and music, and held public executions. The Taliban’s initial public statements demonstrated willingness to moderate some of their past harsh policies; however, actions on the ground have not always matched their statements. There is the potential that coordinated pressure from the United States and other countries could encourage the Taliban leadership to follow through with their stated commitments on respecting human rights, especially those of women and minorities. 

Although President Joe Biden withdrew from Afghanistan to focus on foreign policy priorities in the Indo-Pacific, protecting minorities like the Hazaras is important for demonstrating global leadership on human rights issues, as well as preventing terrorism and deeper civil conflict in Afghanistan. This effort should be a shared responsibility. For the United States to effectively pressure the Taliban to protect the Afghan population it needs to have other international partners on board. 

As a condition of long-term development aid, the US and its partners should request the Taliban allow independent human-rights observers into the country to monitor and catalog abuses and make public the human rights violations of the Hazara people and other minorities. By conditioning development aid on respect for human rights, the Taliban will be less likely to commit serious abuses against these groups. This strategy allows the United States to continue to support the Afghan population without supporting the Taliban’s actions. 

 The UN Human Rights Commission must also begin to investigate the killing of Hazaras as genocide or as a crime against humanity. Publicizing the situation of the Hazara people would hopefully lead to international reckoning and urgency to help the situation before it becomes worse. The United States needs to take early preventative measures given these warning signs so the administration is not complacent in genocide as it has been in the past.

Protecting the Hazara People of Afghanistan is a Moral Obligation the World is Failing to Meet was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the looming humanitarian threats should be the first order of business for U.S. policy there, another kind of ever-present crisis threatens to make the situation markedly worse in the longer term. If the Biden administration is serious about preventing Afghanistan from becoming an even bigger security threat, they must construct a strategy that better addresses the effects of climate change—not only there but across other flashpoints like Syria and Yemen where intractable conflicts have been exacerbated by environmental stress.

80% of conflicts in Afghanistan are linked to natural resources, and with 60% of Afghans deriving their income from agriculture, the unpredictable and infertile conditions will continue to multiply internal strife and result in greater security threats. Northern regions of Afghanistan, like Kabul, now see snow and glaciers melt earlier and more quickly, flooding fields and irrigation systems, and yielding snowmelt-related droughts in the winter. Northern, central, and southern areas of Afghanistan also experience the impacts of floods, caused by the heavy spring rainfall. Areas where agriculture and pastoralism determine livelihoods have seen precipitation events increase by 10 to 25% since 1990. Both extremes yield poor harvests and spike wheat prices.

For years, the Taliban has taken advantage of this agricultural stress.  The increasingly poor farming conditions and economic pressure had pushed farmers into difficult situations. Thousands relocated to urban areas and left families behind, who became more vulnerable to Taliban influence. The Taliban also recruited farmers as fighters and paid them $5-$10 a day, more than they could earn from farming.

Other intractable conflicts in the Middle East have also been fueled, or even caused, by climate change.

The dual crises in Syria and Yemen show how water insecurity instigates and exacerbates regional instability and humanitarian crises. Between 2006 and 2010, Syria suffered its worst drought in over 900 years. 800,000 Syrians lost their source of income, 1.5 million moved into cities to find work, and the price of bread nearly doubled. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad subsequently reduced fuel and water subsidies, which aggravated ethnic tensions, increased the prices of water and food, and ultimately created the conditions for a devastating civil war.

The conflict had national security implications for the United States, creating the conditions in which ISIS thrived and ultimately resulted in American military intervention in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. More than a decade has passed since the devastating drought and onset of the Syrian Civil War and, today, 60% of the population faces food insecurity, over 600,000 people have been killed, and more than 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country.

As the war dragged on in Syria, the crisis in Yemen simultaneously gained international attention. Before the conflict erupted in 2014, much of the country’s violence was rooted in disputes over resources, especially water. Seven years after its onset, approximately 20.5 million Yemeni people urgently need water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance. As one of the world’s most water-stressed countries, scarce resources have severely compounded the political, economic, and social conflict in Yemen. In conjunction with intensified climate conditions, state and non-state actors continued weaponization of water in Yemen will further inflame the ongoing crisis.

There is no perfect solution to any of these intractable conflicts, but it is clear that climate change has only exacerbated them—and it will continue to do so. The future U.S. strategy to address these conflicts needs to consider the role that climate change has and continues to play. Mitigation of environmental stressors should be considered a security imperative.  At the same time, America’s climate change policies themselves must also recognize and address its impact on these conflicts.

The United States should learn from these humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria and seek to prevent similar security and humanitarian crises in Afghanistan. First, the United States must facilitate a global response to the growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan that addresses across the country. However, over the longer term, US programs must invest in climate mitigation practices across Afghanistan and the Middle East to prepare for the intensified and frequent consequences of climate change – namely conflict and humanitarian disaster. In addition to providing urgent humanitarian aid to protect citizens’ most basic needs, USAID should work with local stakeholders, including farmers, to build more resilient infrastructures that can support citizens in the face of climate change.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates President Biden’s mission to redefine U.S. security policy and pursue new strategic opportunities. However, increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters will fuel intractable conflicts, and the U.S. cannot simply turn away from the instability nor disengage from the region.

The United States needs an approach in the Middle East and Afghanistan that elevates and addresses the implications of climate change through a security lens. This is necessary to both mitigate future conflict and prevent humanitarian crises.

When it Comes to Security in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Climate Change is a Looming Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue came to the forefront of debate when the RAND Corporation’s peace plan began circulating in Kabul as early as January 2019. Entitled “Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan,” the draft document proposed a joint interim government with the Taliban as the first essential step towards a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Adding to the controversy and fueling speculations was a statement by the Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting new governing arrangements in Afghanistan to facilitate and speed up the ongoing Afghan peace talks.

The idea of an interim administration also has supporters among Afghan politicians and power brokers who most probably see it as their ticket for returning to the center of Afghan power politics.

However, lost in the noise are the consequences of going down the road of a joint interim administration with the hardliner Taliban who isn’t compromising on their regressive demands at all, and the likelihood of its success, especially when the international community is wrapping up its Afghanistan adventure and are preparing to leave the country altogether?

Jeopardizing the Peace Process and Achievements

Proponents of the idea of an interim government forget, and the new Biden administration must know, that any discussion of an interim administration with the highly infamous Taliban—more than 80 percent of Afghans have no sympathy for the group—further boosts the insurgents’ morale and feeds into their narrative.

In other words, talks of an interim government with the Taliban inadvertently acknowledges the insurgent groups false rhetoric and blatant propaganda that paints the U.S.-led international community’s retaliatory intervention (in response to 9/11 attacks) as an invasion, degrades the UN-sanctioned multinational security forces presence in Afghanistan to occupation, and justifies their own bloody campaign as freedom fighting and just war for some delusional salvation of Afghanistan.

An interim administration would also tip the balance of power further in favor of the Taliban, especially after their diplomatic victory of discussing troop pullout with the Trump administration, and provide them with an opportunity to take on the scattered Afghan parties and groups and squeeze them to the extent of reversing the gains and rewriting everything.

Existing democratic institutions, freedom of speech and free press, women’s rights and advancements, and above all, the Afghan Constitution that guarantees all of the above would be in great jeopardy.

Although some claim that the Taliban have changed and are now open to discussing previously taboo and highly sensitive issues, including women’s rights and freedom of expression and press, ground realities indicate otherwise.

The recent rise in violence across the country coupled with targeted killings of any and every Afghan who might speak against or could potentially challenge the Taliban’s narrative and worldview cast severe doubt on the insurgents’ intentions. The Taliban’s vague verbal commitments wrapped up with Islamic suffixes about women, the press, and the inclusive government just adds to the suspicion.

Furthermore, the interim government’s volatile environment coupled with the Taliban leadership’s highly negative view of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) could cause panic among the ANDSF rank and file. Fear of the unknown future plus inclination to survive could easily force the ANDSF to vie for political and even ethnic support, causing the ANDSF disintegration.

And this is not an exaggeration; Afghanistan’s defense and security establishment has previously experienced overnight breakdown and integration into ethnolinguistic factions after the dramatic fall of the Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullahs government in the early 1990s.

Funding And Oversight Challenges

It is important to note that this is not the year 2001. Thus, the international community is not as enthusiastic about prolonged engagement with and rebuilding Afghanistan as they were back then in the first Bonn Conference held nearly two decades ago.

A lot has changed over the last twenty years, and Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the international community. The world is facing new challenges, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, and its grave impact on the world economy cannot be overlooked.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the donor countries, already on the verge of leaving Afghanistan, to embark on a new state-building mission in the war-torn country. Even if some of these donor countries would like to contribute generously, they will have a tough time selling the idea of engaging with and sponsoring a Taliban-dominated government to their respective citizens, many of whom have lost their sons and daughters in the fight against insurgents over the last two decades.

The United States’ principal partners in Afghanistan, European Union, and India are highly skeptical about an interim administration with the Taliban. India has clearly stated that it doesn’t like the idea.

And this isn’t the only issue. The U.S.-led international community has also drastically reduced its military presence in Afghanistan. As part of the Trump administration’s peace deal with the Taliban, the international coalition has already reduced itself to just a few thousand troops scheduled to leave the country in the next few months, pending the new Biden administration’s review.

Even if the remaining foreign troops stay in Afghanistan, their tiny footprint is not enough to ensure the country’s political stability. In the absence of a sizable security assistance force coupled with no disarmament program for the insurgents, the probability of interim government success between two opposing poles, the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, is zero.

Rather than acting as a catalyst for lasting peace, an interim administration at present would further exacerbate the already uncertain environment in favor of the militant Taliban, fuels infighting among democratic forces currently serving and supporting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and result in chaos for the country, which could be costly to the international community down the road.

Therefore, to minimize the probability of an apocalyptic scenario in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international community must look up and push for other options such as convincing the Taliban (with the help of their main patron, Pakistan) to share power with the current Afghan government or participate in UN-supervised early presidential as well as parliamentary elections in the country.

A militant group changed for the good and willing to share power and respect the will of the people as has been claimed about the Taliban, and a critical external player, Pakistan, satisfied with the Taliban’s return to power should have no problem with alternative governing and power-sharing arrangements.

An Interim Government Could Cause Chaos in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In order to gain attention and to distinguish itself from the Taliban, IS-K is employing new tactics like targeted killing, as well as complex attacks designed to instill as much fear as they can. Targeted killings has increased in major cities, especially in Kabul. IS-K has been capable of launching heart-wrenching, high-profile complex assults, killing hundreds of people.

Last May, IS-K militants stormed a maternity hospital in Kabul, killing newborn babies, mothers, nurses, and a police officer. On the same day, they targeted a funeral gathering in Nangarhar through a suicide attack, killing dozens of people. Similarly, they conducted a complex attack on a Sikh temple in March, killing 25 worshippers, in a ruthless targeting of the Hazara minority. The group also claimed responsibility for an attack on the U.S. military Bagram airbase in Parwan province.

With the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, IS-K stands ready to inherit the role of violent spoiler. It poses a serious danger as it attracts fighters from across the region. IS-K, with its global agenda has been able to recruit fighters from more than a dozen countries. Militants from the Middle East under pressure in the Syria war have joined IS-K in Afghanistan. Foreign fighters from India, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined their ranks in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the suicide attacks on Sikh minorities was attributed to one of their Indian fighters, who hailed from Kerala. Battle hardened, educated, and professional fighters in the thousands are skillful in attracting foot soldiers and brainwashing the poverty-stricken illiterate population of the country.

In addition to ideological propaganda, IS-K has been using coercion, force, intimidation, and empty promises of finances to recruit local fighters. One major challenge for IS-K has been the xenophobic nature of Afghans and hate among local residents regarding their brutal tactics they used from the outset of their operations in the country. Moreover, extortion, taxation, and mineral resources exploitation, which are major sources of revenue for IS-K has also caused concerns among local Afghans.

With their fighters coming from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, IS-K has the capacity to destabilize Central Asia, once it gets a firm foothold in Afghanistan. This remains one of the major concerns of Russia and Iran who view IS-K as a group driven by Salafi ideology, working to destabilize Central Asia. Most of IS-K fighters come from the middle class and are operative in far flung areas. They have been successful in getting safe havens in the capital, Kabul.

IS-K has been active in nine provinces from Nangarhar and Kunar in the east, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Badakhshan in the north and Ghor in the center west. IS-K is viewed sympathetically by some ethnicities in the north. Key Tajik and Uzbek commanders like Mawlawi Satar and Mawlawi Abdullah Majid have already joined IS-K. Who are actively involved in the recruitment of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek fighters in their ranks. When their regional leader Aslam Farooqi was captured in Kandahar along with 12 Pakistani nationals—including 4 women, a Bangladeshi man, and 2 Russian speaking women—it is believed Farooqi was engaged in an effort to contact groups in the South in order to bring  them to their ranks.

Some security experts believe that IS-K lacks the capability to launch complex attacks on its own. Taliban’s hardline wing, the Haqqani network, is suspected of providing technical assistance to IS-K in conducting complex attacks. IS-K and Haqqani network share a mutual interest—to undermine the Kabul government control and credibility by conducting attacks in major cities. Thus, on one hand, the Taliban takes the blame out of itself while, on the other hand, they portray the weakness of the government, meanwhile, IS-K relevance is served better. Afghan Government calls IS-K as the new face of the Haqqani network.

IS-K is an emerging threat, which represents itself as a replacement of the Taliban. It seeks to establish a Caliphate beginning in South and Central Asia, which will expand as Muslims across the globe join. This will be horrendous not only for U.S. national security interests but can destabilize the whole region. With their recent brutal attacks, IS-K has proved the fact that we are faced with a renewed threat, a new reign of terror, limited but far more complex and violent.

With the U.S.-Taliban Deal in place, IS-K seeks to build a reign of terror in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Point of Order

Payment comes in many forms, not just money, and over time violence has always been paid for by the cheapest means possible, sometimes even just by allowing life to continue or through advancing promises of ideological or moral philosophies. Jihad, for example, is a direct bounty from Allah on the heads of all infidels, the reward being not financial at all, but promises of luxurious life after death. The most common form of payment is, of course, money and has been used widely for thousands of years to incentivize the public into helping catch or kill criminals or declared criminals of various forms. From wanted posters in the wild west to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted list, American law enforcement has continuously been a significant end-user of various types of bounty systems. Technically, all modern military forces are also a party to the payment-for-violence system as well, as the primary function of all militaries is either offensive or defensive killing operations, and they all receive payment from participating. Assassins, since humanity’s early days, have often performed their art for a variety of forms of payment, including revenge, land, influence, or positions in leadership, and of course, money. Some assassins and mercenaries have proven this point to the extreme by conducting operations for opposing factions of a single conflict, sometimes even simultaneously working for both. No matter which way the issue is framed, payment for death is a long-standing human tradition, and it is here to stay until the concept of violent conflict is eliminated.

Assassins

Assassination has commonly been used as a form of political terrorism. From a historical context, assassinations have been used to instigate larger movements, such as insurrections, rebellions, revolutions, and other events over time designed to conquer a social system or ideology of an era or region on Earth. In 1933, the attack on President-elect Roosevelt by an Italian immigrant, Giuseppe Zangara, was an attack on the concept of leadership itself. Zangara professed that it didn’t matter who held the office and that his target was the symbol of the Head of State—any Head of State—as he admitted to considering other U.S. Presidents and the King of Italy as targets as well.¹ The modern term ‘character assassination’ is based on this historical and persistent type of motivation for actual assassinations, where the ultimate goal is to target a public figure in a way that moves the public ideology surrounding the target in the desired way, which has become common in today’s political environment.

More to the point of payment for death, assassinations have been one of the most effective and persistent tools of ruling bodies, always. The first known writing describing methods of assassination is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (1915), an ancient text from India dated to somewhere between 300 BC and 300 AD. The text encompasses many areas of governing, including chapters concerning war strategy, poisons, spy techniques, and strategies for assassination-style killings.² While payment is not explicitly discussed, the text is clear that the persons used in these operations are employed as a form of combatants. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (1910), believed to be written in the 5th century BC, also briefly mentions assassination as a type of mission assigned to paid spies.³ Echoing the ancient Indian Arthashastra(1915), a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) file, A Study of Assassination (1953), that was declassified in 1997, likewise details modern versions of assassination techniques, potential weapon ideas, and methods to be used for killing,⁴ and presumably was used as a training doctrine for paid employees of the Agency from its estimated publication in 1953 until the assassination ban encompassed in Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Impacts achieved from assassinations, or other forms of paid-for violence, can vary from insignificant, like the Italian who failed to assassinate President-elect Roosevelt, to toppling governments or starting a major war. World War I, for example, was initiated by just such an act. Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and leader of The Black Hand organization, Dragutin Dimitrijević, was the head of the snake that took a bite out of the Habsburg Monarchy by orchestrating the assassination of the heir presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914. The same Dragutin Dimitrijević had led an overthrow of the Serbian Monarchy just a decade prior, in 1903, to install a puppet on the throne to enhance his power and political relations with Russia.⁵ The Black Hand, a unified “Serbian nationalist organization,” also known as “Unification or Death,”⁶ was recognized as an arm of the Serbian military, acting as an early twentieth-century clandestine organization much like modern Private Military Companies (PMC), with civilian members who could offer plausible deniability to the government when necessary.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand was an advocate for peace,⁷ and at the time, most Serbians wanted to retaliate against Austria-Hungary for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The Archduke was; therefore, the primary obstacle preventing a war that Dimitrijević and many Serbians wanted to start. Ferdinand was also the heir to the throne, and the Emperor was dying, which provided Russia an opportunity to eliminate a Monarchy standing in the way of Russian expansionist ideas as well. This opportunity incentivized Russian approval of the assassination, even if it meant going to war as Serbia’s ally. War could not be achieved with the Archduke constantly advocating for peace and preventing any Austro-Hungarian aggression, so The Black Hand assassins, controlled by Dimitrijević, launched their operation. Ferdinand was attacked in his motorcade on his way to give a speech in Sarajevo, but the attack did not go as planned. The first assassin shot at Franz from a distance and missed; the second threw an explosive that ricocheted off the Archduke’s car and exploded under the vehicle following behind.⁸ This first attack failed, and the Archduke survived to give his speech, only to be targeted on the next leg of his journey through the city by the remaining assassins. As the motorcade came to a halt, Gavrilo Princip walked up to the vehicle and shot Franz in the neck, and his wife in the gut.⁹ Both died of their wounds shortly thereafter.

After the assassination of the Archduke, there was a military escalation of forces between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and all of their allies. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, one month after the assassination of the Archduke, after Serbia refused extraordinary terms offered by Austria-Hungary, which were not expected to be met anyway. Russia, allied with Serbia, mobilized its military upon this declaration of war, and Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, which caused Russia’s ally, France, to declare war on Germany. Then Germany invaded Belgium to get to Paris, instigating Britain, allied to Belgium and France, to declare war on Germany, followed a few weeks later by Japan, bound by a military treaty with Britain – Voila, World War I.¹⁰ While this is a unique assassination in the history of assassination because the goal was achieved, this is not an unprecedented success in the theme of payment for death, or of payment for death in war, as the history of mercenaries changing the tides of battle clearly shows.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries have been participating in violence for likely the same amount of time as assassins, though generally on a more public and destructive scale, without much in the ways of stealth and treachery. Before countries began fielding standing armies, mercenaries were the primary method of large-scale combat. Being a mercenary was a regular job. Groups of mercenaries would sell their services to the highest bidder, always aware that nations would continue to find reasons to use their services. When problems became scarce, and nobody wanted to pay them, they would create problems of their own, extorting their hosts in the process. Throughout most of history up to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648, which were the origin of the modern-day nation-state with recognized national borders, mercenaries were the primary forces used for war.¹¹ Mercenaries grew primarily to fill a skill void in the area of combat expertise. Before the creation of standing armies, the duties of war were rotated among individuals too often to retain the necessary experience and skill to achieve efficiency, which led to the rise of experienced warriors willing to sell their services to the highest bidder.

Eventually, mercenaries became a global industry, attracting violent, greedy people with the sole motive of money as their driving purpose. The only logical outcome of this scenario is chaos and tyranny, if for no other reason than that the existence of a large permanent mercenary population creates a strong incentive for constant war. In peace, mercenaries posed a threat to the general population, often resorting to extortion for protection to continue their livelihood when their services were not required, as happened in France in the late 15th century following the end of the Hundred Years War.¹² Despite the drawbacks associated with mercenaries, the industry itself survived long after the Peace of Westphalia, and even into the modern world, as supplemental forces to a standing national army have often been seen as desirable for several reasons, from bolstering force size to match an enemy force to bending the rules of national militaries to provide plausible deniability.

Force size has been a constant issue in war, often leading to hiring mercenaries to supplement militaries. This method is not always successful, however, as Great Britain learned during the American Revolutionary War. Unable to maintain security throughout the British Empire around the world and quell the American uprising simultaneously with available military forces, Britain hired approximately 10,000 Native Americans and 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the American Continental Army.¹³ The Revolutionary War highlights the fact that mercenaries are only as good as the money they are paid, illustrated by the fact that the American Congress instigated the distribution of “leaflets offering the Germans land and livestock” to switch sides.¹⁴ The nature of the Revolutionary war itself also highlights a more general flaw in the use of mercenaries, in that the Revolutionary war, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, had “no cause but malice against liberty.”¹⁵ This stance points out that the cause of a war, if not properly sold to the participants, can cause a severe undermining within the ranks of the combatants, in turn hurting morale, fostering dissent, and decreasing efficiency, which was experienced significantly on the side of the British. Ultimately, the British use of mercenaries failed to win the war; however, the resulting Constitutional debate was greatly informed by the use of paid actors in warfare, strengthening the Constitutional guidelines for military force regulation in America.

As America grew throughout the transition of the world from mercenary warfare to national militaries, mercenaries became less and less acceptable to the international community. Mercenaries became used primarily to provide plausible deniability to governments and avoid regulations, in much the same way assassins have been used to further objectives of leaders over time. The controversy over the use of mercenaries in warfare grew so extensively that the United Nations decided to institute a new international law, in the form of a treaty titled the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, signed in 1989.¹⁶ The treaty is interesting in that while signed by many countries, neither the United States nor Russia, the two primary superpowers at the time, has signed onto it since its creation, and the language used in the treaty leaves significant room for interpretation, specifically with regards to the treaty’s definition of a mercenary.¹⁷ These flaws have led to the continuation of non-military payment for violence, both with the continued use of bounties and bounty hunters and in the case of carefully labeled paramilitary forces that don’t fit within the legal parameters of the treaty definition for mercenaries.

Bounty Systems

In the late 19th century, after the American civil war, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a precursor to the American FBI, established what amounts to the first criminal database in history, with mug shots, wanted posters, and descriptions of criminals and their crimes, all circulating in newspapers across the country and filed with the agency until the death of the criminal.¹⁸ Bounties have also been used extensively since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty as an incentive for individual citizens to assist law enforcement and governments in capturing or killing wanted persons, from criminals to terrorists. The most widely known examples of this in America are the FBI’s most-wanted lists, which are updated regularly, and put price tags on fugitives at large in the United States and around the world. Among the lists, the FBI provides a top ten list of fugitives and a top ten list of terrorists, with price tags ranging from thousands to millions of dollars in rewards for information leading to capture.¹⁹ While the FBI’s bounty lists today are generally for capture, not killing, some infamous outlaws in American history, like Frank and Jesse James, were the targets of wanted posters that promised a reward whether the criminals were brought in dead or alive.²⁰

The American justice system outlined in the U.S. Constitution eventually eliminated the use of dead or alive wanted posters, as they are illegal under the Constitutional Bill of Rights that provides for a fair trial before sentencing. Still, the bounty system remained intact for capture. During the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, another bounty-style system was used to target the most important members of the Iraqi forces and government, in the form of a deck of cards. The Defense Intelligence Agency, after years of research, developed a target/value identification system based on the standard value system assigned to a deck of cards in poker games to assist ground forces in identifying targets of value in Iraq.²¹ Saddam Hussein occupied the highest value position, the ace of spades, with consecutively lower-valued individuals identified in succession throughout the deck, aces first, then kings down to twos. While money was not directly associated with this example, prestige was undoubtedly a motivating factor for ground forces capturing high-value targets, and the system set the stage for non-government paramilitary forces to participate directly in ongoing military operations during an active war.

Private Military Companies (PMC)

Blackwater quickly emerged as one of the first major controversies of the 21st century, as a PMC working for the United States government in active military combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, without oversight from Congress equal to that of U.S. military forces, but with missions encompassing the same areas as the American military.²² Acting independently of the military, the organization participated in defensive and offensive combat operations to help accomplish military missions of the United States. Without military oversight, and acting directly on behalf of the Executive Branch of government, PMCs like Blackwater are nearly identical to historical mercenary organizations working for pay in combat environments. The United States is not the only country with PMCs. The practice has become widespread since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty banning mercenaries and includes the Russian PMC, The Wagner Group, which is essentially the Russian version of Blackwater. The authoritarian government of Russia, however, has resulted in a much more dangerous version of a PMC than Blackwater and has included domestic operations within Russia as well as foreign operations.²³

Iranian governing practices have given rise to a very different type of PMC. Iran’s military, paramilitary, and intelligence organs are all essentially PMCs in the way that they operate due to the nature of Iran’s government structure, and they are all directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. The primary arms of these enterprises are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These organizations work together in directing and supporting the PMC-like Quds Force operatives around the world in support of collection efforts, intelligence operations, paramilitary operations, assassinations, and terrorist activities. While the Quds Force advances Iranian efforts to export revolution around the world, their local PMC-like organization, known as the Basij, works to subvert independence within Iran, assisting in tyrannical oppression of free speech and liberty within the country and violently suppressing any attempt to cause disturbances against the Supreme Leader. Iran targets enemies abroad using a decentralized system of third-party actions and efforts, combining the principles of the bounty system and PMC architecture instead of engaging directly in combat efforts. In 2006, for example, when the Islamic State terror organization was still called Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I),²⁴ the MOIS provided “financial, material, technological, and other support” to their leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directly supporting the terrorist’s war against U.S. personnel in Iraq.²⁵

The contrast between Blackwater and the Iranian Quds Force is extreme, but the core issue inherent in their existence is nearly identical. With the rise in popularity of PMCs around the world after their successful use by the United States in the War on Terror, the core issue of their existence needs attention from the world. The international community recognized that even though Blackwater was targeted for their deeds, their success in achieving mission goals was undeniable. China, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia, India, and many other countries have worked to develop similar types of organizations in their countries to take advantage of the gray area of contractor combat operations. These organizations are primarily in the employ of the Executive Branch of government or its national equivalent. They are generally not under the structure of the national military for legal purposes or oversight. They are mercenaries, being used in the modern-day to bolster force size that otherwise cannot grow and to skirt existing national and international laws with regards to combat operations and security. While the attention drawn to Blackwater caused them to change their name to Academi, the core issue of the existence of PMCs, in general, has not been significantly addressed in the international community.

Conclusion

The practice of paying people to kill has been around for a long time and is likely to stay, absent total world peace. The question that comes to mind isn’t whether or not this process exists, or even how to eliminate it, but rather, what the best way forward is for the United States and the international community, knowing that this process is an inherent part of world politics and international relationships. Attention, publicization, and regulation are likely the most effective weapons against barbarity in warfare, as has been shown throughout history. Attention drawn to assassins led to a ban on the practice of assassination. Attention drawn to mercenaries led to a ban on mercenaries. Attention drawn to the American Constitutional justice system led to the elimination of dead or alive bounties. Attention drawn to PMCs led to a restructuring of the relationship between the United States government and third-party contractors and continues to shape the potential future of PMCs. When the people of the world pay attention, publicize rights and wrongs perpetrated by governments and leaders, and work to create effective regulations to ensure that human dignity and individual liberty are the primary goals of such regulations, freedom succeeds, and tyranny fails.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

References

¹ William Crotty, “Presidential Assassinations,” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 102-103.

² Kautilya, Arthashastra, Translated by R. Shamasastry, (Bangalore: Government Press, 1915), 461-474.

³ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Lionel Giles, (London, UK: Luzac and Co., 1910), 34.

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “A Study of Assassination,” Central Intelligence Agency (1953), Accessed on July 2, 2020, https://archive.org/details/CIAAStudyOfAssassination1953/mode/2up.

⁵ Donald Yerxa, “July 1914: An Interview with Sean McMeekin,” Historically Speaking 14, no. 3 (2013): 12-16.

⁶ Elena Kosmach, “Serbs and Russians,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 43, no. 1 (2001): 109-114.

⁷ Ian Beckett, “Franz Ferdinand,” Historian no. 120 (2014): 18-22.

⁸ Geoffrey Wawro, Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, (Boulder, CO, USA: Basic Books, 2014), 104-106.

⁹ Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 106.

¹⁰ Martin Levinson, “Mapping the Causes of World War I to Avoid Armageddon Today,” Et Cetera 62, no. 2 (2005): 157-164.

¹¹ Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army: The Use of Mercenaries in the American Revolution and its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private Military Firms,” Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 317-349.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Benjamin Franklin, The Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin, (Eau Claire: E.M. Hale & Company, nd), 253.

¹⁶ United Nations, “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” United Nations (1989).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Pinkerton, “Our History,” Pinkerton (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.Pinkerton.com/our-story/history.

¹⁹ FBI, “Most Wanted,” FBI (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.FBI.gov/wanted.

²⁰ Sophie Tanno, “$5,000 for Jesse James ‘Dead or Alive’ and $100,000 for Lincoln’s Three Killers: The Fascinating Wanted Posters for America’s Biggest 19th Century Criminals,” Daily Mail (2019), Accessed on July 8, 2020, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7280265/the-fascinating-wanted-posters-americas-biggest-19th-century-criminals.html.

²¹ Doug Sample, “The Faces Behind the Faces on the ‘Most Wanted’ Deck,” American Forces Press Service (2003), Accessed on July 6, 2020, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29017.

²² Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army.”

²³ Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.

²⁴ Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 5, no. 4 (2014): 415-476.

²⁵ Library of Congress, “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,” Federal Research Division (2012), 37.

Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Finite Strategy

In game theory, there are finite and infinite games. In a finite game, the objective of the game is to win, thereby ending the game. In the infinite game, the goal is the perpetuation of the game. Since 9/11, the U.S. has implemented a finite approach to fighting terrorism. The “War on Terrorism (WoT)” archetype highlights this finite approach.

Three premises underpinned the WoT archetype: the theoretical idea that terrorism can be completely defeated, the militarization of the response to terrorism, and by extension, the overzealousness to targeted killing, especially of leaders.

As a rhetorical tactic, framing terrorism as a defeatable concept certainly helped galvanize the U.S. population and international community in the wake of the attacks. But as a theoretical approach, it is at best ill-conceived and, at worst futile. First, there is little sense to the idea of defeating terrorism completely. As scholars Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman have argued, terrorism is merely a tool.¹ As a tool, terrorism has and is used by most non-state actors²across the political violence spectrum to achieve their goals.

Therefore, conceptualizing terrorism as something that can be defeated is as illogical as declaring war on a hammer. Second, and as alluded to earlier, the WoT archetype ignores the longevity of terrorism. In other words, it frames or at least creates the perception of terrorism as a sudden and unique phenomenon that rose to prominence only after 9/11. But one can look to terrorism’s history and longevity to dismiss this claim. During the Roman Empire, the Sicarii³ used terrorism to reject Roman rule over Judea, and the etymology of the word takes us as far back to the French revolution. Moreover, David Rapport, a scholar, demonstrated how terrorism has evolved in different waves through different geopolitical contexts since the late 1800s.⁴ The point is that terrorism has been used throughout history and will almost certainly continue to be used by groups around the world for generations to come.

Because the concept has erroneously been conceived as something defeatable, the U.S. foreign policy blob assumed militarizing the response would inherently resolve the problem by overwhelming the adversary. It is not hard to see why they assumed this. The U.S military has demonstrated an ability to fight and win in multiple theatres against a variety of opponents. The U.S has been most comfortable fighting finite games such as in the Second World War, and Korea. And even, erroneously, framing infinite wars like Vietnam into finite approaches.

As such and in response to 9/11, Congress quickly enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Three Presidents since Mr. Bush have used the AUMF to start, perpetuate, and expand military-led counterterrorism (CT) operations around the world. In a closer analysis, the AUMF⁵ has been loosely interpreted to include almost any terrorist organization. And true to form, today the U.S. leads or is a partner to military-led CT operations in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan⁶, and Pakistan. The operations are as global as they are diverse in targets. The U.S. prosecutes a wide range of terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda core, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS, and affiliates in North and East Africa, Al Shabab, and others. This expansion and continuation of operations have cost the U.S. approximately 6.4 trillion dollars,⁷ according to Brown University estimates. This militarization has led in turn to overzealousness in disrupting terrorist networks through the targeted killing of leaders.

This, by extension has transformed the premise of military-led operations into statically focused campaigns. Since 2004, the U.S. military has conducted approximately 14,040 strikes in various countries, according to Bureau of Investigative Journalism data,⁸ and has formed at least two coalitions⁹ of countries to fight terrorist groups.

But as it will be demonstrated next, the finite approach has severe limitations that, at a minimum, raise the important question of why it is still the de facto strategy after almost 20 years.

A Not-So-Effective Finite Strategy

The finite framework, one built on the premise of completely defeating terrorism, has not worked. The failure of this finite strategy is not an inherent weakness of the U.S. CT capabilities. Thanks to fast innovation, competent intelligence agencies, and superior technology, the U.S. has become overtly good at finding and fixing targets. The most recent example the death of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January of this year¹⁰.

Instead, the failure is symptomatic of a finite player competing with finite methods and goals against infinite players in what is an infinite game. ISIS is the best example of this clash.¹¹ Since 2003, the U.S. and its allies have led on and off military-led CT operations against ISIS, fervently focusing on killing its top leaders. It is important to note that the U.S also led counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in 2006–2007 and from 2014–2017 — often in parallel to the CT operations — against ISIS in a response to their evolution from terrorist group to insurgency. These were narrowly successful in territorially defeating ISIS but fell short in “defeating” the group altogether. Even during COIN operations, where finite goals such as defeating ISIS territorially were achieved, the infinite strategy of the group was not sufficiently considered. This led to the continued finite approach of killing ISIS leaders. As such, in June 2006, U.S. forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,¹² the founder of AQI. Subsequent leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi met the same fate in April 2010¹³, and on 27 October 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northern Syria.¹⁴

While there should be no sympathy for dead terrorist leaders, the merit of this aspect of the finite approach is questionable when one looks at the resiliency of ISIS’s operational behavior after the death of its leaders. The decapitation approach claims to deal calamitous blows to organizations, ultimately leading to their demise by dismantling the figurehead that holds the organization together. But Audrey Kurth Cronin’s findings raise questions about this premise. Kronin found that the decapitation approach seldom works and arresting rather than killing leaders tends to be more effective in ending terrorist campaigns.¹⁵

Kronin’s findings can certainly be demonstrated when one looks at ISIS after the death of its leaders. Despite their deaths, the killings never achieved their finite goal of dismantling or ending the terrorist group. After the death of its overall founder Zarqawi and despite heavy territorial losses in, during the U.S.-led surge in 2007, ISI¹⁶ rebounded and was able to inflict extraordinary terrorist attacks throughout Iraq. From 2008–2010, the three years after the COIN operations (or Surge), over 200 people were killed per month by terrorism in Iraq.¹⁷ Before and after the death of Omar Al Baghdadi, ISI assassinated over 1345 Awakening leaders according to one estimate, ¹⁸ and launched its infamous “Breaking the Walls” campaign where it carried out 24 bombings and eight prison breaks.¹⁹ By the same extension, and since the death of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, ISIS has conducted approximately 285 attacks in Iraq, according to a review of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Even after the death of its top leader and U.S. claims that it had dealt catastrophic and “final” blows to the organization, the organization mustered the necessary capabilities to continue their terror campaigns, remain relevant, and at times outdo what it had done in previous years. This resiliency demonstrates that the finite approach of targeted killings has been futile in its efforts to “defeat” terrorism.

The ISIS example also highlights terrorist organizations’ infinite doctrine. Part of the ability, in this case of ISIS, to continue despite the endless cycle of dead leaders is the infinite framing of its goals. While external factors helped ISIS ²⁰, the “infiniteness” of ISIS goals allowed it to turn defeats to victories as part of a longer “infinite” struggle. In the aftermath of its Iraqi territorial defeat, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi stated,

“For the Mujahideen holy warriors, the scale of victory or defeat is not dependent on a city or town being stolen or subject to that who has aerial superiority, intercontinental missiles or smart bombs…… “Oh, Caliphate soldiers… trust in God’s promise and His victory… for with hardship comes relief and a way out.”²¹

If one strips away the religiosity, what is evident in Baghdadi’s rhetoric is that deaths and loss of territory do not amount to detrimental finite loses, instead they represent loses as part of a predetermined plan (in this case formulated by God according to Baghdadi) that will “ultimately” lead them to victory. The “ultimately” is worthy of closer analysis. It is this word that represents the infinite mentality ingrained in groups like ISIS. Stated differently, it does not matter how much they lose, insofar as they continue their path, “they will ultimately” be rewarded. In this regard, ISIS is not seeking to achieve finite metrics or goals, they seek an almost abstract infinite goal that might never materialize. By this logic, the U.S. inability to recognize this, and continue with a finite military-led CT approach of maiming and bombing ISIS leaders, only played to what ISIS expected and was/is “comfortable” dealing with.

Towards an Infinite Approach

However, insufficient the finite strategy has proven to be, some argue that it has and will continue to work. They point to the lack of 9/11 like attacks, something they attribute to sustained military-led CT pressure in countries that offered haven to terrorist groups.

Indeed, the U.S. has not suffered 9/11-like attacks. But the role of military-led CT operations is surely overestimated while the vast changes to airport security, intelligence capabilities, international law enforcement cooperation, and other safety mechanisms, are underestimated.

Proponents have also not sufficiently explained why the threat of attacks, or attacks that have not materialized continue to exist. In December 2019, an al-Qaeda operative shot eleven people at a U.S. military base in Florida.²² The December 2019 al-Qaeda attack is just one of many attacks since 9/11 that have been at the lower end of the extraordinary scale, failed to materialize, or were foiled before they occurred. Moreover, al-Qaeda media continues to call for attacks against the United States, including in statements from regional al-Qaeda leaders, reflecting the network’s enduring efforts to pursue or inspire attacks in the West.²³

This is to say that if the premise of the finite approach was to “defeat terrorism,” the evidence in the sheer number of intended attacks since 9/11 dismisses this. The threat is well and alive, and the finite approach has not been sufficient in quelling or even stopping it. The recent statements by the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Nathan Sales, effectively kills any debate.

When asked by the BBC, “whether this war — as originally conceived by the Bush administration — about the War on Terrorism is over?” He said, “No, the fight is very much ongoing, we’re winning the fight, but we’re continuing to fight against a determined enemy, or I should say a determined group of enemies.”²⁴

Calls to change how the U.S. conceptualizes and fights terrorism are not new. Analysts, policymakers, and the public generally recognize that a continuation of the finite approach will prolong military-led CT operations with little or no long-term solution to the threat of terrorism. What is new, however, is the shifting tectonic plates of geopolitics. And as the U.S. foreign policy blob construes a grand strategy to answer this shift, the choice presented would be at best to leave the current CT approach intact and at worst drop CT; neither are viable options for U.S. long term security interest.

Despite changing geostrategic priorities, developing and implementing an infinite CT strategy is easier said than done. Terrorism is poorly understood. This leads to criminal acts being incorrectly labeled as terrorism, effectively politicizing it. For example, in late March, the U.S. Department of Justice warned that “people who intentionally spread COVID-19 could be charged with terrorism,” arguably a stretch of interpretation.²⁵ Moreover, the political clime is such that politicians look strong in supporting military-led CT policies, and weak when they do not. When coupled with the fear terrorism generates, it is easy to see why change will be difficult.

Notwithstanding, the time to course-correct is now. An infinite strategy emphasizes a whole-of-government approach that folds finite metrics within an infinite or abstract vision. It starts with accepting terrorism can never be completely defeated; acknowledging its relatively low threat level; and it particularly means employing all aspects of national power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, economic, military, and others.

It also means using those elements of national powers towards what the research points to as most effective in ending terrorist campaigns. Research shows that terrorist groups and their terrorism campaigns most often end when they implode from within or when splinter groups challenge the main group’s narrative. They are also particularly weak during generational shifts and when non-violent alternatives are created that facilitate underlying social movement to express their political grievances.²⁶

As such, an infinite strategy calls for a sustained and prolonged multifaceted approach. It focuses on a strong role for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID) to fund and work with marginalized groups in politically unstable countries. Their work should focus on alternative non-violent social movements. Likewise, the U.S. should increase efforts to bolster intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and create international law enforcement and intelligence task forces that are not under military purview, using military-led CT operations as complementary elements. Equally important is the need to build alternative narratives to the religious interpretations used by religious terrorist groups. An alternative narrative seeks to implode groups from within, loosening the bolts of religious interpretation these groups use to justify their actions. None of these few examples are short-term or finite, easily measured, and tangible. But this is the nature of truly fighting terrorism through an infinite strategy — the actions are not easy to measure and there are no fast wins. Instead, it’s a long, slow, and prolonged approach that will challenge groups’ infinite mentality.

In all, the time is now to change how the U.S fights terrorism. An infinite strategy will ensure the U.S. reduces its dependency on military-led CT operations and starts leveraging all realms of its national power to effectively suppress the threat. If the U.S does not correct course now, then its surely proximus to insanity: continuing to do the same thing, expecting different results.

¹ Arie W. Kruglanski & Shira Fishman (2006) The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:2, 193–215, DOI: 10.1080/09546550600570119 ;

² Scholars in the Critical Studies of Terrorism field have argued that States can also and do use terrorism. I take the majority view and focus primarily on non-state actors who employ terrorism.

³ It’s been widely cited that the Sicarii were considered the first political violent group that used terrorism. See Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg in (1990) Sicarii and the Rise of Terrorism, Terrorism, 13:4–5, 329–335, DOI: 10.1080/10576109008435840; as well as Donathan Taylor, Yannick Gautron. 02 Apr 2015, Pre-Modern Terrorism from The Routledge History of Terrorism Routledge

⁴ See David Rapport’s Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (2001)

⁵ The original text of the AUMF authorized the U.S. military to “ that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” It was always mostly focused against those responsible for 9/11 i.e. AQ. It has since been broadly interpreted to mean almost any terrorist organization.

⁶ The U.S. CT operations against ISIS-K and Taliban leaders are different than the NATO-led mission that emulates elements of a counterinsurgency strategy and also of other U.S.-led missions training the ISF.

⁷ This number includes appropriated and obligated money towards 2020. Afghanistan, which as mentioned above, has three different mission sets. While the article focuses on the CT operations, the numbers account for the COIN, and broader missions.

⁸ The BIJ started to collect data since 2004, and it includes a wide range of U.S military activity, not just targeted killings. See the full methodology at thebureauinvestigates.com; the numbers are estimative and cannot be independently confirmed.

⁹ This again accounts for coalitions that were formed to defeat ISIS when it was an insurgency from 2014–2017

¹⁰ Iranian General Qasem Soleimani was the leader of Iran’s Quds forces, considered by the U.S. to be a terrorist organization. The designation might be more political than true to what terrorist groups are. Still, the Quds forces do support groups that commit acts of terrorism in line with Iran’s foreign policy objectives.

¹¹ ISIS is the most contemporary example, but the finite vs. infinite clash can also be demonstrated with AQ core and other terrorist groups.

¹² https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html

¹³ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaedas-two-top-iraq-leaders-killed-in-raid-idU.S.TRE63I3CL20100419

¹⁴ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-death-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/

¹⁵ See How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns

¹⁶ AQI became ISIS in 2007.

¹⁷ See Brian H. Fishman in The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory

¹⁸ This estimate is from retired LTC, Craig Whiteside, cited in # 17.

¹⁹ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

²⁰ U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003, the subsequent withdrawal in 2011, etc.

²¹ The audio was released in August 2018 before the https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45277322

²² https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/justice-department-al-qaeda-florida-naval-base-shooting.html

²³ https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf

²⁴ Frank Gardner — BBC- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53156096

²⁵ https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/25/politics/coronavirus-terrorism-justice-department/index.html

²⁶ See Martha Crenshaw, Audrey Kurth Kronin, and others.

After Almost Twenty Years, America’s “War on Terrorism” Resembles Insanity was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and NATO forces observed mutual truce for three days over the Eid ul-Fitr holiday in June. In an earnest statement, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that his government was ready for “comprehensive peace and talks” and that he would be willing to discuss all Taliban concerns, including “the future role of international forces” in the country. President Ghani’s historic speech aimed to build on the extraordinary success of the truce’s first day Friday, in which pictures of thousands of Taliban members, government troops, and civilians celebrating the Eid holiday together across the country flooded social media.

A remarkable shift in U.S. policy on peace negotiations with the Taliban also formed new momentum after Washington came to the predictable conclusion that it must give up on a military solution and embrace negotiations with the Taliban. Having decided to accelerate peace talks, and speak directly with the Taliban during a new round of peace negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appointed veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018 aimed at eventually winding down America’s longest war. The United States and the Taliban have since held several rounds of negotiations in Doha. Khalilzad’s stated position at the commencement of the talks was that there were four topics to discuss and that these topics were tied into a package. The principle was reflected in the phrase “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

The four topics were:

• Withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Afghanistan
• Anti-terrorism guarantees by the Taliban
• Inclusion of the Afghan government in the negotiations, and
• Permanent, Afghanistan-wide ceasefire

The Taliban declined to talk directly to the Afghan government until an agreement on U.S. forces withdrawal is secured, although Taliban leaders met with Afghan warlords and ex-government officials in nonofficial talks to marginalize the Afghan government. The U.S. negotiating team, led by Khalilzad and the Taliban team have reportedly made significant progress in nine rounds of negotiations. U.S. peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that Washington and the Taliban had reached an “agreement in principle” with regards to the withdrawal of American troops from the war in Afghanistan. In exchange, the Taliban would accept to enter immediate peace negotiations with the Afghan government and stop ISIS, al-Qaida, or any other terrorist organizations from operating out of their territory. But just days prior to the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks which led to America’s protracted war in Afghanistan, President Trump disclosed in a series of tweets that he had canceled a secret Sunday summit with Taliban and President Ghani at Camp David and he also stated that the peace negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban were “dead” after Taliban militants claimed responsibility for a car bombing that killed 12 people including an American soldier in Kabul. The reason, he claimed, was that the Taliban insurgents had confessed to killing an American soldier in order “to build false leverage” in its peace talks with the U.S. In a statement to Al Jazeera, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said Washington would regret canceling negotiations led by high-level officials from both sides. “We had two approaches to put an end to the occupation in Afghanistan, one was jihad and fighting, the other was negotiations,” Mujahid said. “If Trump wants to stop negotiations, we will take the first approach, and they will soon regret it, ” he said.

Trump’s abrupt announcement left in doubt the future of the deal agreed in principle by Zalmay Khalilzad, for the withdrawal of thousands of American troops over the coming months.

The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee subpoenaed Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump’s top negotiator for Afghanistan, demanding him testify before lawmakers about his talks with the insurgents. Congressman, Eliot Engel, accused the Trump administration of keeping Congress and the American people “in the dark” about the talks. President Ghani formerly had spoken of the risks of moving too quickly to reach an agreement with the Taliban and warned Trump’s administration not to marginalize his government in the negotiations. But National Security Adviser to President Ghani Hamdullah Mohibbroadside went a step further, accusing Khalilzad of selling out Afghanistan, betraying the trust of a strategic ally, and questioning the intentions of Trump’s Afghan-born emissary.

Resumption of Talks

Following a three-month-long impasse of the US-Taliban negotiations, President Trump paid a surprise Thanksgiving visit to Afghanistan to meet with both U.S. troops and President Ghani on November 28, 2019. He told reporters that he had resumed peace talks with the Taliban and claimed they are eager to ink a deal, less than three months after he abruptly called off official talks. “The Taliban wants to make a deal, and we’re meeting with them, and we’re saying it has to be a cease-fire, and they didn’t want to do a cease-fire, and now they want to do a cease-fire, ” President Trump said during a meeting with Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. “We’re going to stay until such time as we have a deal, or we have total victory, and they want to make a deal very badly, “Mr. Trump added. The statement came on an unexpected journey as the president sought to highlight a record of achievement while he campaigns for re-election. Reacting to Trump’s statement, the Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, welcomed Trump’s announcement and he said, “We are ready to recommence negotiations from the stage that had been stopped. However, it will take some time to formally commence the peace talks with the U.S.”

[bs-quote quote=”Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

Zalmay Khalilzad launched a new chapter of the Afghan peace process in October 2019 by meeting with Pakistani leadership, the Chinese, Russians, European, and NATO, and Mullah Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group’s top political leader in Qatar, and Khalilzad resurrected peace negotiations with the Taliban on December 7, 2019, in Doha. The talks were held behind closed doors since both sides had agreed on confidentiality.

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a landmark agreement in Doha that could result in the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan within 14 months. The U.S.-Taliban comprehensive accord predetermined a series of commitments from both sides relating to withdrawal mechanisms for U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan, counterterrorism, intra-Afghan negotiations, and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Afghanistan. The Taliban also agreed not to assault American and coalition forces provided they were withdrawing their troops from the country, while in return as 5,000 prisoners would be released from Afghanistan’s prisons. But the militant group has kept attacking Afghan forces. While claiming they will only conduct operations on rural bases. It is correct that this landmark accord offered a golden opportunity to end one of the longest-running conflicts in the world if the intra-Afghan negotiations were to commence. But finalizing the end of an almost two-decade war is not like finishing the production of a television-show season.

The wider consequences of the agreement between the U.S.-Taliban remain ambiguous. Plenty of Afghans believe that bringing the world’s superpower to the humbling point of withdrawal has been a great triumph for the Taliban, giving that there are no clear pledges in the agreement to secure the achievements made since 2001, including the constitutions, women’s rights, human rights, civil and political rights for all citizens, and the culture of tolerance.

Khalilzad became a biased party to the conflict with vivid interests and intentions. More precisely, he played the role of viceroy whereby he took over command from his superiors of the procedural homework and reframing the issues. It appeared that the U.S. envoy neglected western sacrifices and betrayed Afghans by dropping the “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” principle and have delegated two of the four original topics of the negotiations to any future “intra-Afghan negotiations” including the all-comprehensive cease-fire. Khalilzad also suggested the Taliban that the “intra-Afghan negotiations should not be conducted by a team of the Afghan government alone but by an “inclusive and efficient national team. This team would encompass government, warlords, civil society, and women’s emissaries. The shift in Khalilzad’s approach further marginalized and undermined the position of the internationally recognized Afghan government.

Engaging in bilateral talks was perhaps the only diplomatic approach to get around the Taliban obstruction on direct negations with the Afghan government. But as a means to encourage the Taliban to hold actual peace talks, it seems, for now, to have faced a deadlock. In lieu of taking more time and inducing for engagement on the full four-point package agreement, addressing the root causes of terrorism, and putting pressure on sponsors of the Taliban, especially Pakistan, which is a major sponsor of terrorism in the region and utilizes proxy war as a foreign policy tool. Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.

Does the U.S.-Taliban Deal Devalue American Sacrifices and Betray the Afghan People? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The two leading candidates are the incumbent President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, who serves as de-facto prime minister of the country.

President Ghani has studied and lived abroad. Before returning to Afghanistan, he worked as an anthropologist at the World Bank. In 2001, Ghani served as Special Adviser to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary General’s special envoy to Afghanistan.  He then went on to advise interim-President Hamid Karzai and served as Finance Minister in the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan until December of 2004.

After a stint as Chancellor of Kabul University, Ghani announced his nomination for the 2009 presidential election. Keen to bolster his credentials as the favorite candidate of the international community, Ghani hired Clinton-campaign chief strategist James Carville as his campaign advisor. In the end, however, he secured a minuscule 2.94% of the vote, against Abdullah securing about 40% and incumbent Karzai controversially securing around 49% of the votes.

Ghani ran for president again in 2014, trailing second behind the leading candidate Abdullah Abdullah. However, since neither candidate could secure 50-plus one percent of the vote, a majority, the election went into a runoff which became controversial due to widespread allegations of ‘industrial scale’ fraud. The United States Government intervened and brokered a power-sharing agreement between the two leading candidates, where Abdullah compromised to settle for the position of Chief Executive, and Ghani became President.  

Abdullah’s career has been both colorful and reflective of Afghanistan’s tumultuous recent past. Trained as an ophthalmologist but perturbed by the repressive political environment in the wake of the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979, Abdullah opted to join the anti-Soviet resistance in the early 1980s. From the early days of the resistance up to the U.S.-led War on Terror and the campaign for the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, Abdullah’s relentless efforts for promotion of a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan have earned him both national and international recognition.

Following the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001, Abdullah played a crucial role in establishing the new Interim Administration where he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2006. He reinvigorated Afghanistan’s international relations, engaging in active foreign diplomacy to reestablish not only old ties but also to open new embassies as the country reeled from years of international isolation under Taliban’s rule and factional conflicts.

In 2009, Abdullah ran a highly impressive and dynamic campaign under the slogan of “Hope and Change” and a national agenda to institute needed reform and change Afghanistan’s system of governance from an over-centralized one to power devolved into local governance. Abdullah was the runner up against the incumbent Karzai who drew on all the resources and benefits of his incumbency could accrue to him.

A runoff election between the Karzai and Abdullah was called after the Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission decided through a rigorous verification process to invalidate a large number of questionable ballots, with the majority of those votes being in favor of Karzai. Having seen his efforts for reforms of the electoral bodies frustrated by the incumbent, Abdullah declined to participate in the runoff. 

After the United States brokered the National Unity Government accord, Abdullah brought a much-needed sense of sobriety and moderation to a beleaguered government as the Chief Executive, with a president known for his irritability. Abdullah’s credibility is further strengthened by his secure political connections with grassroots level politics, having worked in different roles during the resistance against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the resistance against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the 1990s.

Ghani and Abdullah are widely considered the top two candidates in the presidential election scheduled for 28 September. However, Ghani’s ranks are increasingly depleted with the departure of influential erstwhile allies like General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Karim Khalili, Anwarul Haq Ahadi, Hanif Atmar, Sayed Mansoor Naderi, and many others who felt alienated with the president’s highhanded governance.

Abdullah Abdullah has built a strong and multiethnic team under the banner of “Stability and Partnership” with leading politicians from across Afghanistan, including those who defected from Ghani’s camp as well as others. Abdullah is known as a trustworthy candidate with robust political networks and substantial public support.

The 2019 Afghan presidential election remains a serious matter for not only Afghanistan, but the international community, as well—especially at a time when the United States is in negotiations with the Taliban. It is essential to avoid political deadlock and crisis of the sort that afflicted the 2014 presidential election, requiring a tremendous effort to prevent any possible vote-rigging.

Amid the presidential campaign, the peace process is still a priority for the people of Afghanistan and the international community. Considering the fragility of the situation in Afghanistan, a domestic consensus over the peace process is a must, which is only possible with a strong leadership playing a unifying role.

The country’s combustive internal identity politics could become worse if not controlled through a rational approach. One of the significant upcoming challenges for Afghanistan and its allies, particularly the United States, will be the question of how to handle the likely political deadlock as well as manage the peace process. 

This could be done through backing a unifying national leader who has genuine popular support many regions of the country and can bring political leaders and ethnic groups together under one umbrella through a consensus. In such critical times, Afghanistan needs strong and reliable leadership that can position itself as a central player in the Afghan peace process by striking a delicate balance between engaging with the Taliban and maintaining strong relations with the international community.

Afghanistan’s 2019 Presidential Election: Leading Contenders was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ever since the commencement of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, India has struggled to play an influential role in Afghanistan. Despite being one of Afghanistan’s most valuable strategic partners, India remains a mute spectator of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks as well as intra-Afghan negotiations. As India finds itself increasingly ignored in Afghan affairs, the time has come for Delhi to make its presence felt in the landlocked country and ensure that it’s not excluded from negotiations going forward.

India in Afghanistan: a Proactive Economic Partner

India has played a critical role in supplying economic aid to Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2002, India has provided humanitarian aid and invested in major infrastructure projects as well as smaller developmental initiatives which have provided Afghanistan with a much-needed lifeline amidst ongoing war, sectarian divisions, and terrorism.

Major projects that have benefited from Indian investment include the construction of the Parliament Building in the country’s capital, Kabul, where India committed $178 million (USD), spending approximately $28 million thus far, the $150 million Zaranj Delaram highway project connecting western Afghanistan with the strategic Chabahar port in Iran, and the $42 million Salma Dam Project on the Hari Rud river in the province of Herat province—which includes the construction of a power transmission line connecting the city of Pul-e-Khumri with Kabul. India has also signed a trilateral preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and Iran.

Inspired by India’s history of successful community engagement programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal, hundreds of social development programs were launched in Afghanistan in conjunction with 250,000 tons of wheat to be provided to primary schools as food assistance. Furthermore, India provides technical advisers to Afghan public institutions, offers training for Afghan civil servants and policemen, and contributes funds to an Afghan Red Crescent Society program which provides free medicine and healthcare consultations in its medical missions in five Afghan cities.

India’s Role in the Afghan Taliban Peace Talks

Historically, India has been staunchly anti-Taliban. When the Afghanistan government led by President Mohammed Najibullah collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah’s subsequent assassination in 1996, Delhi grew increasingly alarmed by the Taliban’s rise to power. On the other hand, the Taliban has historically maintained a neutral position when it comes to India, even expressing a willingness to engage with India—provided that India abstained from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Today, India has adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the Taliban. Delhi understands the potential consequences of a resurgent Taliban, but it must face the geopolitical reality that the Taliban controls over half of the territory of Afghanistan. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 229 districts were controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan government as of January 31, 2018—approximately 56.3 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. On the other hand, 59 districts—approximately 14.5 percent—were controlled by the Taliban.

India is concerned that a return to power by the Taliban will undermine the fragile government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—which is struggling to provide basic necessities and security to the Afghan people as it continues to battle the Taliban for its very existence. In a sign of its changing position towards the Taliban, the Modi government dispatched two former highly-decorated diplomats in November 2018 on a “non-official visit” to Russia to participate in negotiations with the Taliban that were being held there.

Former diplomat and secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Vivek Katju—  known for his hardline stance against the Taliban—has adopted somewhat different take on the Taliban issue. Writing in an editorial for The Indian Express, Katju argued that it is in India’s strategic interests to engage with the Taliban to not only maintain its influence in Afghanistan but to better understand the power dynamics of the broader South Asian region.

India must increase and sustain engagement in Afghanistan, particularly after not being invited to participate in quadrilateral talks between the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China after talks between U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar. China subsequently issued a statement saying that India was not intentionally excluded from the quadrilateral talks and that India would be included in future regional discussions involving the Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan.

While India has put forth clearly defined red-lines concerning its dealings with the Taliban, its willingness to engage in discussions with the battle-hardened militants is evidence that Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic stance.

India’s Expectations for the Taliban

India’s first expectation is that “all initiatives and processes must include all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” Historically, the Afghan government has often been sidelined by international interlocutors in their engagements with the Taliban. Furthermore, this expectation indicates a degree of acceptability in Delhi over negotiating with the Taliban, as the group represents a “section of the Afghan society.”

Delhi’s second expectation is that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate,” meaning that democratic processes and human rights—including women’s rights—should be respected.

Thirdly, India expects that any process “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” This expectation is crucial for India, as it highlights the threat posed by terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State. Furthermore, this expectation implies that Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be permitted to expand their operations into Afghanistan.

India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of the peace process in Afghanistan. The country is an important partner and is of great strategic value for India—especially with India’s control over the Iranian port of Chabahar, which has been granted a sanctions waiver by the U.S. government. India must up the ante in Afghanistan by initiating track II diplomacy, engaging with tribal elders, and convincing the Taliban to adopt and maintain a favorable stance towards India while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for foreign terrorist groups. Furthermore, should the Taliban return to power with backing from Pakistan, India will be in a challenging position concerning the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in South Asia.

Is India’s Influence in Afghanistan Declining? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proxy wars and great power politics have returned to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is once again at the center stage of regional and global rivalries over influence for a variety of geostrategic interests and the quest for resources. This time unlike the past, there are many players including nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, the most prominent being Pakistan, Iran, China, and India.

Afghanistan, as observed by Lord George N. Curzon, was an empty space on the map which was neither Persian nor Russian nor British. It was purely a geographical space which emerged and was used as a buffer zone during an era of great power politics between the former British Empire and Russian Tsar. Some scholars and historians describe Afghanistan as an accidental nation.

The nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled ethnic groups living in this rugged but vitally strategic land were used as tools to extend the influence and interests of one Empire against the other. The monarchies and militia groups trained and funded by these two empires emerged as a result of these great rivalries used to take turns in preparing the ground for government collapse and capturing Kabul centric power through assassinating monarchs, waging coups, and rebellions to further the interests of their imperial paymasters.

In recent times, the Afghan government and its allies are complaining about enemy sanctuaries and safe-havens across the border in Pakistan and Iran for the growing insurgency in the country, but this phenomenon is nothing new. Afghan monarchies and the Afghan communist regime were toppled by rebel leaders, dethroned Kings, and disgruntled tribal and religious leaders who enjoyed financial and military support in the courts of British Raj, the Persian Empire, and the Russian Tsar. In recent times, the Pakistani military and intelligence services have provided safe havens and training grounds for militant groups like the Taliban.

This time around the stakes are higher, and the game is much more complicated. Various countries are furthering their interests within the country through their proxy—oftentimes with ethnic, racial, and sectarian ties to their sponsors.

Understanding the depth of this problem, the incumbent President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, has been consistently warned Afghanistan’s neighbors in various forums including the recent SAARC leaders summit in Nepal, Heart of Asia conference in Beijing, and other multilateral and bilateral meetings that he will not tolerate proxy wars in his country and will not allow Afghan territory to be used against its neighbors from any party involved in the country. However, the reality of the situation is different, as the Afghan state’s influence is limited beyond major urban centers. This makes it difficult to ensure and deliver on Dr. Ghani’s promises.

Today, Pakistan claims that India is using Afghan territory to support Baloch separatists and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whereas India has been over the years warning and complaining to the international community over Pakistan’s duplicity and complicity in various terrorist attacks within and outside India. The recent bombings of Indian Embassy and consulate in Afghanistan are in no doubt the handiwork of the various extremist groups supported and trained by the powerful Pakistani military intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for influence to promote or protect the Shiite and Sunni domination within the power structure in Afghanistan. Russia and China, respectively, are concerned about Chechens and Uyghurs in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan that is infested with proxy groups presents a great threat to Central Asian states, the security of the Russian Federation, as well as China’s commercial and economic interests in Central Asia.

It seems that history is repeating itself once again in Afghanistan. With the development of technology and advancements in land, sea, and, air transport it seemed that countries such as Afghanistan which were pivotal geo-strategic land bridges lost some of their strategic importance. Conversely, however, these new developments have not done much to diminish the geopolitical importance of the Afghanistan. Geography is still a significant factor in deciding the political and economic fate of a state.

The Rise and Fall of Regimes in Afghanistan: Proxy Wars and Regime Collapse in Afghanistan

By several estimates, the average lifespan of republican regimes in Afghanistan is 3.5 years with significant statistical outliers in Afghan monarchies. These are normally regimes which normally lasted over a decade. The reasons for such rapid regimes changes, coup d’états and state collapse in Afghanistan are many chief among them exclusive politics and rebellions supported by outside actors. 

One of the effective instruments for toppling various Afghan regimes has been proxy warfare exploiting ethnic and/or religious sensitivities. Historically and with few exceptions, nearly every rebellion in Afghanistan was organized, trained and funded by outside actors and regional players. The British Raj gave refuge and sanctuary to various toppled Afghan kings and statesmen and eventually paved the way for their return whereas the same tactic was used by the Russian Tsar.

The Russian Tsar hosted Afghan emirs like Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir Shir Ali Khan, along with several other Afghan monarchs in the former “Bukhara” and later on assisted them in their return to power. The last Afghan King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, by several accounts is born in British India and completed his education in France and occupied the throne after his father who also came to power with considerable British support and was later assassinated in a school shooting also enjoyed significant regional support by remaining neutral in regional rivalries.

Furthermore, the Afghan communists, Mujahiddins, and more recently, the Afghan Taliban, were all groups which were actively supported, trained and assisted in their rise to power by regional powers. Therefore, external powers always play a pivotal role in the rise and fall of various regimes in Afghanistan.

Old Game, New Players: Proxy Wars and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been at the epicenter of the “Great Game” and later on the cold war rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States in the lead. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was abandoned to Pakistan and the proxies of other countries—chief among them Iran, India, Russia, and Central Asian states—each of whom supported a particular ethnic faction. It led to a bloody civil war which lasted for almost a decade resulting in the hundreds of thousands of death of civilians.

Today, this old game is returning with new players. These new proxy wars are more localized with regional players (i.e., Pakistan and India playing the lead role, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard their interests). This time, the stakes are higher—as are the costs of inaction for Afghanistan.

Absence of Indigenous Economy: Financial and Economic Dependence

The absence of an indigenous economy and source of financial revenue has made the political sovereignty and military independence of Afghanistan vulnerable to various regional players. For years, Afghan political elites and parties have been dependent on regional funding and support to pursue its political goals inside Afghanistan. The Afghan communist party factions—PDA Khalq (People) and Parcham (Flag)— were heavily reliant on Moscow while various Mujahiddin factions benefitted from Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Western support. The current Afghan government is heavily dependent upon Western military and financial support.

During his tenure as former President Hamid Karzai acknowledged that his office is receiving millions of dollars from western and regional intelligence agencies for various payments. This implies that, just like the British Raj and Russian Tsar buying loyalty in the Afghan royal court, the same financial manipulation in exchange for loyalty is happening in the corridors of Afghan presidential palace today.

This dependence has made Afghanistan and its multiethnic mosaic social structure vulnerable to political manipulation and the biggest threat to its national security and long term stability. Almost all of the ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan are in various ways politically and economically supported by regional countries.

For Afghanistan to preserve its political sovereignty in the true sense of the word, it has to find a sustainable source of financial revenue and a comparative advantage. Political sovereignty without financial independence have no meaning. So long as Afghanistan remains a financially dependent state, it will remain unstable and vulnerable to regional proxy wars.

The Vicious Cycle of Traps: The Crisis of Governance and Statesmanship

Afghanistan since its establishments as an independent state has been consistently tangled in four traps of poverty, poor governance, geographical limitation and internal conflicts. Each of these traps have been reinforcing each other.

Throughout history, Afghan statesmen have either completely monopolized power or wealth or been struggling for the control of the country through quelling internal rebellions under various banners and causes. This has given the little time to think strategically about their country and its vision and future.

The first Afghan statesmen who rose to fame due to his 5 year plans and presenting the first vision of governance, economic development in addition to addressing internal conflicts and the geographic limitations of the country was Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, who fell out with his communist allies and was brutally murdered inside the presidential palace in Kabul. Most other governments have either been too preoccupied with preserving their power or fighting for control of the rest of the country.

In essence, the country has been in some sort of war since its establishment as an independent state. It has suffered from a crisis of governance and leadership and the traps have only been pushing Afghanistan deeper and deeper into a state of crisis.

From Vicious Cycle to Virtuous Cycle: Hard Decisions to Make for Afghanistan

In order to reverse this historical trend and address the four traps of poverty, bad governance, geographical limitation, and internal conflicts, Afghan statesmen and policymakers will have to make some very hard choices and bring Afghanistan out of this vicious cycle and put into a virtuous cycle of stability and peace. Some of these hard decision require statesmanship, courage combined with a vision and farsight for the country.

To address these four traps, Afghan statesmen and policy makers will have to take the following three vital steps:

1. Forge a national agenda and broad based consensus across all political parties and ethnic groups on key national interests, priorities and threats of the country. Afghanistan should start a national movement of internal rejuvenation and national awakening. Afghanistan will only prosper at a time when its leadership and commoners understand that the only way to stability is through the hardwork and unity of Afghans and its neighbors. Nobody else can hand in peace and stability to Afghanistan but the Afghans themselves with their neighbors.
2. Afghanistan will have to reach a fundamental agreement with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran. In return for safeguarding their legitimate interests in Afghanistan, they will stop engaging in interference and proxy warfare in the country. This can be done through a long process of honest and direct diplomatic and bilateral negotiations.
3. Finally, without a sustainable indigenous economy and financial self-reliance, Afghanistan cannot become a truly sovereign state. Financial dependence and economic vulnerabilities will continue to make Afghanistan and various Afghan ethnic groups prone to political manipulation and military sabotage by regional players and criminal networks.

A Framework for Managing Regional and Global Interests

When it comes to the management of regional interests in Afghanistan, there are three schools of thought which, in some cases, pursue complementary as well as contradictory views.

The proponents of the first view opine that Afghanistan like many other countries with a vital geostrategic location, should take advantage of these rivalries to build itself. This means that through wise leadership and smart diplomacy just like Pakistan, Afghanistan can exploit the geopolitical vulnerabilities of its allies and neighbors and in return get the required economic and military assistance to build its economy and military capabilities. This is very hard under the current circumstances

The proponents of the second view are supporting that Afghanistan should remain a neutral state and give vital guarantees to its neighbors and other major powers that its soil will not be used against one or several of its neighbors. This policy has been pursued time and again by Afghan statesmen and policy makers, but it has not paid much dividend except it kept the country weakened and divided.

Lastly, proponents of the third view advocate that Afghanistan should ally itself with one of the major global powers (the United States, China, or Russia). Therefore, by obtaining the required security and economic guarantees, Afghanistan can serve as the frontline state in ensuring its interests through the pursuit of the interests of the allied power.

All of the above options require a broadly-based, strong government in Kabul with a long-term view of its interests. Afghanistan will sooner or later have to make some tough decisions when it comes to its survival and long term interests or get dumped as it often does into the dark pages of history.

Throughout history, Afghan political leaders and monarchs have fallen prey to great power politics and regional proxy wars due to their failure to manage the geopolitical and strategic interests of various regional and global powers in its soil. But this time the stakes are higher and involves the survival of the Afghan state. A combination of smart leadership, active diplomacy and strong governance will enable Afghanistan to swim the tides.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Return of Proxy Wars in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Essentially, the Afghan national security apparatus requires a significant reorganization. Afghanistan’s existing military and security architecture must be reconfigured and restructured to accommodate former Taliban fighters and commanders, given the drastic changes that will come to the country’s threat environment once the Taliban give up the fight and agree to a peace deal. This could be either vertical or horizontal integration of individuals, groups, or units of Taliban commanders and fighters within Afghanistan’s existing military, civilian, and political institutions.

Many senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would want to join leadership roles in the Afghan army and police whereas their foot soldiers would like to join the Afghan security forces en masse. This will require a detailed roadmap outlining the ways and means of military integration. More importantly, such an integration roadmap should serve as a guarantor and accelerator for the long-term sustainability and resilience of any peace deal.

The Afghan Taliban is estimated to have between 60,000 and 100,000 fighters under the leadership of mutually exclusive operational commanders, along with mutually dependent political factions within the group, and a highly centralized chain of command but decentralized control and decision-making systems, which gives considerable levy and authority to local commanders to decide routine day-to-day operations in consultation with Taliban shadow administration officials (i.e. governors). This number fluctuates, peaking during the summer months, with seasonal fighters and volunteers coming from Pakistani madrasas to fight in Afghanistan. Numbers are at their lowest during the winter months, due to harsh weather conditions and logistical hurdles.

The Afghan government estimates that one-third of these fighters are foreign terrorist fighters who fight under the Taliban umbrella—these are global, regional and Pakistani terror outfits such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, ETIM, IMU and LeT among others. These fighters are vital for Taliban finances, logistics and provide sophisticated explosive making expertise. Therefore, any peace deal at the outset should require the Taliban to break ties with these terror outfits and foreign terrorist fighters. A challenging task which Taliban are yet to show the resolve and determination to undertake.

The integration of over 100,000 fighters and commanders into military and civilian life is going to be a daunting and fragile task, which would require delicate management and sharp political negotiation skills with both Afghan ownership alongside third-party foreign oversight—preferably from the United Nations.

Afghanistan is no stranger to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants into military and civilian life. Back in 2004, the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP) administered through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of thousands of former mujahidin and combatants but with mixed results. It was followed by the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group (DIAG) program which again had mixed results given lack of Afghan ownership and a strong presence of warlords within the Afghan security and military institutions.

Any military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the ranks of the Afghan military and security institutions would have to be defined within the limits of the type and structure of the new state and subsequently what kind of a security structure and organization would be agreed upon by all sides of the conflict. Furthermore, international experience especially in Africa and South Asia shows that after a peace deal certain countries have opted to downsize the number of their security forces given the new threat environment and have opened up space through reservation and quota within the shrinked security structure for the combatants and their commanders to become apart of the new security and military apparatus.

Military integration of the Taliban fighters and commanders within any new or existing military and security architecture would require a multi-year phased linear approach under the ownership and management of Afghans with the technical assistance of a third party ie the United Nations (UN) with political plus financial support of the United States and its NATO allies as they draw down their troops and redirect a fraction of that cost towards financing the budget required to reintegrate Taliban combatants and commanders in the Afghan military and civilian life.

The Approach

International experience shows that there are mainly three approaches to military integration. Albeit, Afghan history can also guide us in this regard and has its own versions of military integration after the fall of the communist regime in the 1990s and later in early 2000 during the fall of the Taliban regime – both of which were more institutional cleansing than military integration. 

The three military integration models are: 

1. A consent-based approach, where a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict is reached between the warring parties and the government forces absorb the combatants within its ranks and/or the two forces from the different warring parties merge and constitute a brand new single national security force. 
2. A complete demobilization model, where the government downsizes its forces but does not integrate combatants into the national security forces.
3. A coercive model of peace building, where forced disarmament and demobilization of the armed rebels takes places with external assistance (i.e., UN mandated forces).

In all these models—the most feasible one for the Afghan case is the consent based model whereas the ANDSF is resized based on the new threat environment and security landscape and the Taliban commanders and fighters are accommodation across all the level of ANDSF through a quota and reservation system.

The Prospects

In the event of a comprehensive deal with the Afghan Taliban – military integration will inevitably be part and parcel of any peace deal. The foundational questions which needs to be tackled at the outset of any peace deal will be: what will be the size and shape of the new security and military architecture of Afghanistan in view of the new security environment and based on what model (i.e. NATO or non-NATO military model) as well as the future relationship of the Taliban with the United States and its allies. These foundational questions will determine the size, scope and sustainability of the future Afghan military and security forces of which the newly demobilized Taliban fighters and commanders will be an integral part of it. 

Subsequently, the Taliban can be integrated at three levels, with senior commanders at the top, mid-level commanders in the middle, with foot soldiers making up the base. Integration can be done individually, in groups, or unit integration at the field level. Senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would expect positions of influence within or outside of the Afghan military and security services. This can be approached through a bottom–up field level integration at the division or corp level or be undertaken through individual negotiations with Taliban military leaders through a screening and filtering mechanism.

Much will also depend on the size of the new Afghan military and their operational priorities in view of the rise of Daesh and emergence of Taliban splinter groups and criminal outfits post Taliban peace deal who would split from the Taliban chain of command and carry on the fight in pursuit of their own political and business agendas.

Under such such circumstances—in the interim—the Afghan government and its allies will have to integrate Taliban rank and file within the existing ANDSF size and structure and then through a roadmap transform and downsize ANDSF into a more affordable and sustainable force. This interim integration could be done through center and field level integration (i.e., integrating Taliban units to various geographical army corps across the country and integrate senior Taliban commanders in Kabul HQ).

In the long run – the Afghan government together with its allies, will also have to decide how many professional armed forces and how many auxiliary local forces they need for securing the country. This could provide an opportunity for Afghans and their NATO allies where the existing army could be kept as a professional force, albeit significantly downsized, whereas the Taliban forces with some exception could be added as auxiliary local forces given their vast presence in the country side to complement the security work of the newly reorganized Afghan army.

Furthermore, the Taliban commanders and fighters will need to go through sensitization programs as well as short and long-term training courses plus attend joint exercises with the Afghan forces to promote unity in the force. This will help cohesiveness and efficiency within the command and control structure of the newly reorganized and reconfigured Afghan military.

The Challenges

Naturally, with the military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the security infrastructure of Afghanistan comes many sets of political, military, institutional, cultural, financial and budgetary challenges. In fragile countries such as Afghanistan, the biggest of them all will be the political challenge – wherein both sides of the conflict remain committed and resilient regardless of the change in personalities and leaders to the agreed terms of the peace deal and do not use military force as a means of political leverage on each other.

Most of the peace deals and military integration plans fail because one side renege on their commitments and start using military force as a political leverage. Second, comes the institutional absorption capacity to accept change and not to resist the integration of the Taliban commanders and fighters within their ranks.

This is followed by the management and financial requirements which is the least of our worries since a third party (i.e. the UN with the help of the international community) will assist in providing the technical expertise and raise funds to finance the budgetary requirements of the peace deal and military integration plan.

In the case of Afghanistan, the two top challenges will be political resilience and institutional capacity to transform and accommodate the newly integrated Taliban commanders and fighters. The rest can be managed.

The Mechanism

Based on international best practices, there are normally two internationally recognized mechanisms through which Taliban fighters and commanders can be integrated within the rank and file of Afghan forces: (a) a temporary parallel co-existence mechanism until full integration happens which is normally referred to as interim security arrangement; and (b) immediate reintegration whereas forces are immediately disarmed and demobilized by individuals, groups and units sometimes keeping the entire command and control structure intact.

Both mechanisms have their pros and cons, under the interim security arrangement both forces co-exist within their geographies under their control but in a cooperative manner (i.e. ceasing hostilities providing security and law enforcement services to their respective areas eventually merged into one force). This mechanism is a recent phenomenon due to size and institutional absorption capacity issues. Many military integration and DDR processes have failed because it has stalled due to institutional capacity issues and political infightings. Therefore, an interim period is envisioned whereas the forces are integrated in instalments over a period of time while both forces co-exist with each other in a cooperative manner conducting joint patrols, joint trainings and exercises. This will assist in better integration and merger of the two forces.

The immediate mobilization mechanism is doable only when the size of the opposing warring parties are small and the institutional absorption capacity in the military apparatus of the country is high with a firm political will and adequate financial resources at hand. This is normally the classic method of military integration whereas the armed rebels are disarmed and demobilized immediately and reintegrated within the government security forces through an elaborate screening, training and professionalization process.

The Way Forward

For any peace deal to succeed in a complex case environment such as Afghanistan, it is imperative that it has to have a robust military integration roadmap for integrating Taliban fighters and commanders within the existing or a new Afghan military and security apparatus. This means Afghans together with their international partners will need to reassess their force size, posture, composition and operational readiness in view of the new challenges that would emerge in the event of a post peace deal with the Taliban.

The Taliban leadership will also have to evaluate and make certain key decisions such as what kind of an army and police they envision for Afghanistan? How do they intend to break their ties and fight foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, LeT, and others, as well as to define their long-term relations with the United States and its allies?

Finally, the United States and its allies must define what, when, how, and under what circumstances they will continue assisting post-peace deal Afghan security forces reconstituted and reorganized with Taliban commanders within its ranks?

All of the above decisions will have a significant bearing over the success and failure of any potential military integration plan for the Taliban commanders and fighters within the ranks of the Afghan security forces.

Frenemies: Prospects and Challenges for the Military Integration of the Taliban into the Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.  

In the early days of U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, there were three schools of thought over the future of the Afghan armed forces. In the first, there were those who believed that Afghanistan does not need a full-fledged army and police but a small defense force to quell local revolts and maintain border security. This was based on the rationale that international security forces would remain for the long run in the country and also due to objections from former Pakistani dictator, General Pervez Musharraf,  who opposed the establishment of a large army for Afghanistan for geopolitical reasons. The second school of thought advocated for an Afghan army and security forces in the scale and size of the pre-civil war era (i.e. 250,000 strong with an airforce). Third, was a group of Afghan monarchists and former mujahidin who believed in the mobilization and transformation of the existing mujahidin and militias into an army and police. Of course, none of those options prevailed. Instead, Afghans together with their NATO allies raised, trained and deployed a completely new army based on their threat perception and needs assessment for the country.

In 2014, during the transition of the security responsibilities from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan forces led by Gen. Patreaus and the then chairman of the transition commission and now President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, there was a golden opportunity to reconfigure and redesign a financially sustainable Afghan security forces but this chance was lost. Although steps were taken, other priorities took over, and the task remained unfinished. While the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) under the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with the United States, alongside the NATO Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) ensures long-term funding, training, and mentoring to Afghan forces, the election of President Trump and increasing war fatigue in the United States has put the long-term future of bilateral security cooperation on uncertain and shaky ground.

Almost for a hundred years, Afghanistan owned a military despite many periods of instability and political anarchy, which it funded through a mixture of traditional and non-traditional sources. The traditional sources of funding included a quota based national conscription mechanism through tribal elders and maliks to fill in the ranks of the army and police; imposition of local taxation and food rations to feed the army and security forces, and finally reliance on local transport for logistics and sustenance. The non-traditional aid came largely from the British Raj and the Russians (later the Soviets).

The Raj, the Russians, Germany,  Turkey, and others provided military equipment and training. Amir Sher Ali Khan established the first Afghan army with some auxiliary tribal militias with the financial and technical support of the British Raj and Russian czar. This army was trained, equipped and funded over the years with a mixture of British tributaries, equipment from British Raj and local taxation and quota conscription system on local tribal elders across the country.  conscription became a controversial matter much later on during the communist regime when many Afghan youths were pushed into the frontlines to fight against the mujahidin, many of whom never returned home, which led to massive migration of Afghan youth to neighboring countries for safety and work. But the culture, practice, and acceptability of conscription as a system existed during the reign of various Afghan rulers. Afghan kings, historically, used a national quota conscription system to fill the ranks of the army and security forces.

Today, Afghanistan has a paid volunteer army and security forces, which is almost entirely funded by the United States and NATO allies. Any experienced military expert will tell you that raising, maintaining, and sustaining a voluntary force is extremely expensive and complicated for poor and aid-dependent economies. Turkey, Israel, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and a dozen other states, in the Afghan neighborhood and beyond, who are in a much better economic and financial state run a national conscription system to sustain its armed forces.

Afghanistan can use the revenue from its vast mineral wealth, sale of its abundant water resources to neighbors, transit fees as a land and air bridge to South and Central Asia and export of high-value agriculture crops to fund its security forces. The Afghan leadership and its international partners can rethink, reconfigure, and redesign affordable and financially sustainable Afghan forces through reinstating a carefully designed national conscription system, build up of local defense industries to drive cost down and saving on essential defense budget items to pave the way for medium to long-term financial sustainability of the Afghan security forces.

The time has come for the Afghan military leaders and its international partners to make some hard choices and decisions for the long-term financial sustainability and viability of the Afghan security forces. They will have to rethink, reconfigure, and build a fiscally sustainable, operationally efficient and capable military increasingly funded from the domestic revenues of Afghanistan.  This can be done through a combined four-track financial sustainability strategy: a. Force management and national conscription; b. Fiscal austerity and budgetary savings; c. Building local defense industries; and d. Establishing localized defense and militias.

The first significant decision to make is whether the Afghan military and political leadership would like to have a NATO or non-NATO regular army and security forces. Some military experts argue that a NATO standard Afghan army and security forces can only be viable if Afghanistan remains a long-term ally of NATO and the west with a functioning self-sustaining economy while others advocate for a hybrid standard (i.e. a mixture of NATO and non-NATO standard force based on the agility, mobility and needs assessment of the various units with the Afghan armed forces.

The second major decision is to implement a national, local quota-based conscription mechanism combined with better force management, salary, and remuneration rationalization and anti-corruption drive which could significantly drive down the personnel costs within the Afghan armed forces. 

The idea of enacting drafting or conscription is a politically charged subject in Afghanistan, especially if you have a politically fragile government in Kabul, which lacks broad-based political support. This is primarily due to bad memories of the population from the communist era conscription drive, which led to the deaths of thousands and migration of much more Afghan youth from the country. The Afghan mujahidin and even Taliban to this day impose local conscription in their areas of control.

If the local elder does not generate the required quota of able-bodied men to fight, he will have to offer money, cattle, or agricultural products as a replacement. This exact practice has been in place since the rule of the Afghan Iron Amir, Amir Abdulrahman Khan, in the late eighteenth century who for the first time used this method as a systematic way to fill in the ranks of the Afghan military. The current Afghan government will have to enact a carefully designed quota-based local, national draft or conscriptions system. This will assist in significantly driving down the costs of the Afghan armed forces; foster patriotism and shift much needed budgetary resources to other priorities within the security sector.

Furthermore, the Afghan government can save significant amount of money from the existing budgetary expenditures through taking a couple of bold austerity measures: a. domestic purchase as compared to import of food items for Afghan forces. b. saving on fuel,  oil and energy costs. c. better maintenance and inventory management of weapons, ammunitions and armored vehicles among others. Such austerity measures could assist in saving millions of dollars within the budget of Afghan security forces. Additionally, the time has come for Afghanistan to produce and manufacture its own basic defense items such as bullets, weaponry and other basic defense items.

While the initial capital investment cost of such an undertaking will be high but over time this will significantly drive down defense expenditure and increase self-reliance. Moreover, Afghanistan could redesign its defense forces to a more mobile and highly equipped small professional army meant to fight terrorism and local insurgency designed for irregular warfare augmented with an auxiliary local militia. This means we could significantly reduce the number of the existing Afghan army and police while augment the gap with local tribal forces to fight local insurgencies and terrorism. This will also assist in the long-term financial sustainability and operational effectiveness of the Afghan security forces.

Such a fundamental reorganization of the Afghan security forces followed by austerity measures will leave Afghanistan with three options for the shape and size of any future army and security forces: a. A modern professional army which will be costly and unsustainable unless Afghanistan finds alternative sources of revenue to fund it. b. A small professional army at the core augmented with auxiliary local militias across the country to fight insurgencies and do counter-terrorism. c. A hybrid force—a combination of a professional army, localized defense forces and militias at different levels.

Regardless of the choice of standard, size, and format of the Afghan security forces; the Afghan government and its international partners – principally the United States and NATO member states will need to fund this force for years to come until Afghanistan builds an indigenous self-sustaining economy from two sources: The first being traditional sources such as a national tax scheme, a saving and austerity regime, and national conscription. The second is non-traditional sources—a long-term trust fund but with significantly less contribution in terms of dollar amount as compared to the current rates to help sustain the force along with scholarships and training programs for its officers corp.

In the words of former Afghan Defense Minister, General Tariq Shah Bahrami, Afghans will eat grass but will fund Afghan forces and defend their country even if NATO and U.S. forces leave the country. While this may be true, Afghans will have to fundamentally rethink and redesign Afghanistan’s military into financially viable, economically sustainable, and professionally agile armed forces.

Economizing Defense: A Roadmap for Building Sustainable Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban consider direct negotiations with the United States in Qatar and elsewhere as a platform for national and international recognition rather than a true path to a peaceful end to the Afghan conflict. President Trump’s anti-war stance, the reconciliatory tone of the establishment in Washington, deteriorating relations between President Ghani and the U.S. administration, and an increased regional and global engagement with the Taliban leadership have made the group firm believers in a military victory and the return of an Islamic Emirate based on sharia law.

This engagement is a tactic taken from the playbook of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and isn’t a sound strategy to pursue peace—rather, it complements their military strategy on the battlefield. This reality was made clear in the recent congratulatory message of the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhund, where he reiterated: “No one should expect us to pour cold water on the heated battlefronts of Jihad or forget our forty-year sacrifices before reaching our objectives.”

In another part of the same statement, he stated that “with this initiative, the Islamic Emirate is conducting victorious operations on the Jihadi battlefronts and leading negotiations with the Americans about ending the occupation of Afghanistan, the objectives and goals of both being bringing an end to the occupation and establishment of an Islamic system.” Both sections of the statement make it abundantly clear that the Afghan Taliban firmly believe in a military victory and consider the on-going peace talks as a mere political addition to their battlefield military strategy and not a genuine effort to end the Afghan war.

Shortly after the release of the Taliban Eid statement, the U.S. Special Envoy for Peace—veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad—termed the Taliban statement as “bombastic” and “ serves to complicate & disrupt” the Afghan peace process. He called on the Taliban to reduce the level of violence and continue negotiations to end the war. This statement and the ones before with a reconciliatory tone from Washington has not only emboldened the Taliban but has made them firm believers in the United States and allies defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the U.S. envoy sees his mandate to negotiate with the Taliban and the Afghan government, respectively on four inter-related items: Joint counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, a U.S. troop drawdown, a ceasefire; and Intra-Afghan dialogue along with discussions over the future of U.S.-Afghan relations. After several unsuccessful attempts to mediate and forge unity among a divided political elite in Kabul , Zalmay Khalilzad views the government in Kabul as politically divided and unable to form a united political front and high powered national negotiation team to engage with the Taliban as apart of the intra-Afghan dialogue. This has been primarily due to increased electoral politics and factional infighting combined with a lack of a coherent understanding of war and peace among the political and military elites in Afghanistan.

In turn, Zalmay Khalilzad, under pressure from Trump administration to show results on the peace talks is in a rush to conclude the first two items of his mandate i.e. counter-terrorism and troop withdrawal timetable in his new round of negotiations with the Taliban in Doha which is dangerous and goes against his stated negotiation approach, saying that  “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”

The Afghan government has criticized this negotiation approach of U.S. envoy to the extent of accusing him of “acting like a viceroy” and of legitimizing the Taliban as an alternative to the incumbent government in Kabul for political expediency in Washington. Zalmay Khalilzad has in turn denied these allegations and has expressed that he always consults with President Ghani before and after his lengthy negotiation sessions with the Taliban.

The Afghan peace process has presented an intriguing platform for all sorts of domestic and regional interests to play out: the Taliban see a divided house in Kabul and believe that rocky relations between Washington and Kabul are an opportunity to be exploited so as to present themselves as an alternative government; the region uses the Afghan peace talks as a card to gain favors and make geopolitical score points against the United States. For instance, Pakistan uses it to extract economic benefits to improve its fragile economy, Iran and Russia use as a platform it to discredit NATO and U.S. efforts in the country while the Arab world uses its to advance their proxy and sectarian agendas.

To exploit this opportunity further, the Afghan Taliban is pursuing a three-pronged interconnected pol-mil strategy: negotiations with the United States, pitting the region against the United States and exploiting great power political faultlines, and dividing the Afghan political elite from the Afghan government. For the Americans, the Taliban assure them that they are no longer affiliated with Al Qaeda and other affiliated foreign terrorist organisations. They are an insurgency with a domestic agenda and do not subscribe to global jihad. The Taliban also assure the Americans that they will never let the Afghan territory to be used against the United States and its allies.

On the contrary, in their negotiations with regional powers such as Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, the Taliban provides guarantees that they will never let regional terrorist groups threaten Afghanistan’s neighbors. Additionally, they and call on the country’s neighbors to join hands to expel the Americans from Afghanistan who they view as both a threat to the region and the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban pursue a policy of “divide and rule” when it comes to intra-Afghan talks. They use Afghan political elites against the government and the Afghan government against the elites to erode the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan public and present themselves as a unified alternative political entity.

This three-pronged strategy that the Afghan Taliban pursue has four primary goals: to gain national and international political legitimacy at the cost of an elected government in Kabul, to negotiate with the United States on behalf of themselves and their regional sponsors on a timetable for troop withdrawal, secure the release of prisoners, restore the restoration of the Islamic emirate; and finally, to isolate, delegitimize, and divide the government from the political elites in Kabul.

This calculus of the Afghan Taliban is based on three assumptions: political anarchy and disunity in Kabul, war fatigue on the part of the U.S. and its allies, and heightened regional tensions over U.S. presence in Afghanistan specifically with regards to Iran and Russia. This is a perfect recipe for Taliban to garner political legitimacy and military victory.

The calculus and strategy of the Taliban and its sponsors can be countered with an equivalent three-pronged strategy of the Taliban and their sponsors through an equivalent three-pronged strategy: sustained military pressure, sustained diplomatic and non-military pressure on the Taliban’s foreign sponsors, as well as clearly conveying to the Taliban that pursuing a military victory for them is only a recipe for another war. The post-9/11 generation of Afghans and jihadist groups who have been thus far absent from the theater of war would inevitably join the fight, which would only prolong the misery and complexities of the on-going conflict.

Thus far, the Taliban have not shown any concessions in their talks with the Americans and Afghans. They have proven themselves to be tough negotiators. Many expected that the U.S. envoy and the Taliban would reach an agreement within six months or less, but negotiations currently seem to be deadlocked. Many believe the Afghan Taliban negotiators are playing the long game with U.S. envoy to fail him in his mission and eventually discredit him in the eyes of Trump administration officials and pave the way for his ouster from his job.

Moreover, The Afghan Taliban, together with their foreign terrorist affiliates, have increased attacks on Afghan cities and the countryside battlefields, causing an unprecedented level of civilian and military casualties as compared to yesteryears. During the holy month of Ramadan, Kabul has seen at least seven bomb attacks resulting in over 200 dead and injured. Many of them attributed to the Taliban. They are leveraging military power for incentives on the negotiation table with the Americans and Afghan political elites.

The first intra-Afghan talks held in Moscow was a scene to behold. Taliban negotiators and former officials were in tears while sitting down on a prayer mat hailing their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, for his predictions of an American defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan and proclaiming that they have come true. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses living in the suburbs of the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar tell a telltale of how Taliban preachers go from corner to corner of various quarters and refugee camps reciting the verse “Nasr-u-men Allah e Fath ul Qareeb” which translates into “with God’s help victory is near.” and delivering fiery speeches on U.S. defeat; an echo and déjà vu from the Afghan jihad times when the communist regime in Kabul was on the verge of collapse due to Moscow’s rising domestic issues and war fatigue.

Both Washington and Kabul need to change their approach to negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The current talks have only encouraged them in their quest for the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan along with their foreign terrorist affiliates. We owe it to the many American and non-American men and women who laid our their lives for our security to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven and launching pad for international terrorism, enabled and empowered by a host regime.

The Taliban Peace Calculus was originally published on Global Security Review.

Periodic skirmishes and tensions between Pakistani and Afghan security personnel along the disputed border greatly aggravate an already-deteriorating bilateral relationship, with each side accusing the other of insincerity when it comes to counter-terrorism. On April 15, 2018, Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanged fire in Afghanistan’s Khost province at a border post handled by the Pakistani army in the Laka Tigga area of the Lower Khurram Agency. The clash resulted in the deaths of two Pakistani soldiers, with five others being injured.

Kabul continuously blames Islamabad for the ongoing violence and the resiliency of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Afghan officials claim that Pakistan is doing nothing to address the presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Pakistan vehemently denies these claims.

The Durand Line has complicated relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan ever since the founding of Pakistan in 1947. More recently, conditions in Afghanistan have considerably deteriorated. Levels of insecurity, lawlessness, and drug trafficking are all increasing, and Afghan warlords are gaining increasing amounts of influence. The opium trade, along with that of other drugs currently account for nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP, according to some estimates. According to one study, the Afghan border with Pakistan has become a hub for illicit drug exports.

In an effort to address the cross-border flow of militants and drugs, Pakistan initiated construction on a border fence in 2018 along the Durand Line—the roughly 1,622 mile-long border (2,611 kilometers) shared with Afghanistan. Pakistan believes the barrier would improve the security environment in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. A senior officer in the Pakistani army stated that “[the fence] would greatly help to stop cross-border movements of militants.” Afghanistan resolutely opposes the fence’s construction.

Pakistan considers the Durand Line to be the established international border between itself and Afghanistan. The Afghan government rejects Islamabad’s claim and sees the Durand Line as an artificial border that was created by the British and agreed to by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. The demarcation subsequently resulted in the separation of members of the Pashtun ethnic group.

The Afghan government views the Durand Line border as an artificial border between two countries which was signed by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. In the final days of British colonial rule—before the founding of Pakistan—Pashtuns residing on the Indian side of the Durand Line, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (known as the “Frontier Gandhi”) were opposed the creation of Pakistan. At the time, the Pashtun identity was based on nationalism rather than religion; thus Pashtuns were opposed to the formation of an Islamic Pakistan.

When it became clear that the British were intent on partitioning India into two sovereign states, the Pashtuns demanded their own territory, Pashtunistan, which would either be an independent state or incorporated into Afghanistan. Instead, the British were intent on establishing a stable Pakistan and it was decided that the Pashtun-dominated North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was to become part of Pakistan.

Since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, Islamabad has routinely attempted to refute the Afghan argument that the Durand Line is an “artificial border.” Pakistan regularly dismisses Afghan claims as invalid.

During a recent visit to Kabul by Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, both countries agreed to take series of deescalatory steps, one of which being minimizing cross-border clashes. including fire exchange in borders. In this meeting, Islamabad accused Kabul of taking action against militant groups who continue to attack Pakistani soldiers across the borders in Afghanistan. The Pakistani statement says that “Pakistan urges Afghanistan to focus on taking effective counterterrorism actions, including plugging in of large gaps existing along the Afghan side of Pakistan-Afghanistan border,” adding that “it is also important that the Afghan government refrain from playing the blame game.”

Pakistan, however, will remain committed to destabilizing Afghanistan. Pakistan continues to utilize terrorist groups in Afghanistan as proxies, ensuring Afghanistan remains preoccupied with internal affairs. Both countries must—in good faith—move to address the issues caused by the colonial-era border. Balochistan and portions of the Pashtun tribal areas currently under Pakistani administration should be restored as Afghanistan’s sovereign territory.

Kabul, for its part, should be mindful of its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is landlocked and relies on Pakistani ports. Marvin G. Weinbaum, a former Pakistan and Afghanistan analyst at the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, estimates that Pakistan’s wide-ranging exports to Afghanistan amount to roughly $1.2 billion per year, while it imports over $700 million worth of Afghan goods.

The United States and the European Union need to review their respective policies for Afghanistan in order to foster long-term regional peace, rather than pouring billions of dollars into a war that can’t be won. The disagreement over the Durand Line will continue for the foreseeable future and will present a significant challenge to the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to view the border dispute as a settled matter, as it defines the matter as a matter of national security. On the other hand, Afghanistan will continue to highlight the unsettled and disputed nature of the border as the root cause of the deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relationship.

Durand Line Border Dispute Remains Point of Contention for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why is the United States there, what does it intend to achieve, what is the desired end-state, and what is the theory of victory? Nobody expected the U.S. and its NATO allies to turn Afghanistan into another Switzerland—nor did Afghans and the international community foresee the prevailing political deadlock and military stalemate.

The Afghan war has increasingly become one of dignity for U.S. and NATO forces. A defeat at the hands of a ragtag, AK-47-wielding force calling itself the Taliban, with safe-havens across the border in Pakistan, will only refresh the memories of Vietnam in the Pentagon and the broader security establishment in the United States.

The United States and its NATO allies cannot afford the stain of another Vietnam on their track record—especially when their Russian counterparts, albeit with questionable military tactics, are increasingly successful against a more complex enemy in Syria. However, every liberating army eventually becomes an occupying force in the eyes of the local population if it does not deliver on its initially-stated mission objectives. This is especially so in Afghanistan. The problem has been that U.S. and NATO forces kept jumping from one mission statement to another, from one NATO summit to another, continuously promising a consolidation of gains and the ultimate defeat of the Taliban and their terrorist allies, but to no avail.

When assuming command of multinational forces in Afghanistan, each subsequent U.S. four-star general has called for a mission review, made some changes, presented a report to the U.S. Department of Defense asking for more resources and political support, assured NATO allies in various forums of success around the corner, but ended up leaving a more unstable Afghanistan for the next commander.

Here we are eighteen years later with a resurgent Taliban and U.S.-NATO achievements not only consolidated but more fragile than ever. The Afghan state has been left weaker, not to mention an unpredictable president in the White House, growing war fatigue in the West, and a divided Washington over the fate of its military engagement in Afghanistan.

It is in this context that the United States, Afghanistan, and the broader region need to think long and hard over the decisions that have been made and consider the potential consequences of those decisions for security and geopolitical interests—within Afghanistan and beyond. An increasingly unstable Afghanistan will adversely affect the security and stability of its neighbors, in addition to having substantial implications for security in the West.

In this context, it would seem surprising that Afghanistan’s neighbors—chief among them Pakistan, Iran, and the Russian Federation—are using the Taliban as a proxy force to destabilize the country to bloody the nose of the U.S. and its coalition allies.

This may, in the short term, serve the geopolitical interests of Iran and Russia but the absence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will eventually present a severe threat to the security of these countries. A U.S. withdrawal will mean the Pakistanis, Iranians, and Russians will have to become increasingly involved in Afghanistan to counter terrorist activity and safeguard their respective political interests.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former chief strategist, was a staunch advocate of withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan because he believed that an unstable and violent Afghanistan would threaten the security of China, Russia, and Iran, thus serving U.S. national security interests. Bannon argued that by destabilizing Afghanistan further, Russia, China, and Iran would be forced to divert resources to stabilizing Afghanistan for the sake of their respective national security interests. Such a scenario, at present, is very much conceivable under the current Trump administration in Washington.

In such a world full of uncertainties and geopolitical flashpoints, Afghanistan, the U.S., NATO, and the world need to move from a narrative of success to one of compromise, whereas the interests of all sides are served through a cooperative approach for achieving stability in Afghanistan, one with an accommodation for a Taliban that is neither at war with itself nor a threat to regional and global security. The western infatuations with military victory and the regional narrative of using Afghanistan as a geopolitical chokepoint for the United States may yield short-term benefits to one side or another, but in the long-term, it will work against the security interests of all involved parties.

The outcome of the Afghan war will primarily depend on the behavior of the sponsors and proxies involved. The war in Afghanistan can subside, intensify, change in nature, or become contained to particular localities depending on stakeholders’ political farsightedness and their stated military objectives. It is the Afghan people who will lose the most in terms of life, treasure, and infrastructure.

To turn this situation into a strategy that is beneficial to the interests of all, involved parties need to fundamentally recalculate their strategy and move towards a cooperative, mutually-beneficial approach. There is potential for U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Iran, and U.S.-Pakistan cooperation to address this credible geopolitical challenge, which could pose real threats to each party’s national security interests.

Nobody can predict the future course of events in Afghanistan—particularly given President Trump’s deep reservations about continued U.S. military engagement in the country. Other factors, such as a resurgent Taliban, a return to “great game” power politics, and an exhausted Afghan populace who question the presence of foreign forces despite an absence of real security in the country further increase the complexity of any predictive exercise. However, one of three scenarios—good, bad, or ugly—is likely to play out in Afghanistan to some degree.

Scenario 1: The Good—A Negotiated Settlement

The ideal situation, a negotiated settlement, would be beneficial for all parties to the Afghan conflict. The agreement would be negotiated between the Afghan government and the Taliban, brokered by the U.S., China, and Russia, and guaranteed by Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. There are numerous blueprints and roadmaps in existence that outline the details for such an agreement. It would take into account the interests and demands of both the Taliban and the Afghan government while addressing the security concerns of the U.S. and its NATO allies, as well as taking into account regional concerns and interests.

In such a scenario, the shape, form, and nature of the Afghan constitution and government will be negotiated with the Taliban and a grand Jirga—together with a high ulema council that will give its blessing to the new constitution and the formation of a new government. On the other hand, Taliban be required to break its ties with regional and global terrorist groups, take action against foreign fighters who are currently fighting with the group, and subsequently disarm, demobilize its fighters and integrate them into the Afghan national security forces. Such a scenario would be beneficial to the geopolitical and security interests of all internal and external players of the Afghan conflict. Therefore, all parties should strive to ensure such an end state is achieved.

Scenario 2: The Bad—U.S. Withdrawal and an Afghan Government on Borrowed Time

In this scenario, President Trump rejects the advice of his military and national security advisors, proceeds with a complete withdrawal, and accepts responsibility for the decision to do so, to win favor with the U.S. electorate ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections and ultimately win a second term in office. The U.S. could announce a timetable for withdrawal but continue to financially support the government in Kabul while exerting diplomatic leverage over regional powers to take up the mantle of ensuring stability in Afghanistan.

If the United States were to pull out its military personnel, which would also entail the withdrawal of NATO forces, the Afghan government would be put on life support. Such a move would embolden the Taliban and other international terrorist organizations with the feeling of having beaten the world’s greatest military power in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul would become increasingly fragile, and eventually disintegrate and collapse.

Scenario 3: The Ugly—Proxy Conflict and Fully-Fledged Civil War

The worst case scenario is that the United States declares to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and cuts or redirects financial resources from the Afghan security forces and the Government in Kabul to another part of the world. Alternatively, such a scenario could come to pass if the U.S. becomes embroiled in a conflict with China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, and must rapidly divert large quantities of resources towards a more urgent priority.

Should such a scenario play out, the Afghan government would collapse, and the Afghan security forces would divide along ethnic lines. Each of Afghanistan’s neighbor will move to secure their security interests and political influence in the country, which will inevitably push the country into a proxy conflict or a fully-fledged civil war. This scenario would be a complete and utter disaster and must be avoided at all costs. Such a descent into chaos will not only inflict harm throughout Afghanistan but will substantially threaten regional security.

Afghanistan is the responsibility of the Afghan people. Nobody expects the United States and its NATO allies to remain in the country forever. However, the least the U.S., its partners, and regional actors can do is ensure the Afghan people have a stable government and professional, well-equipped security and military forces who cannot only secure Afghanistan but serve as the first line of defense to the region and the West against international terrorist groups intent on inflicting harm.

Tailoring Expectations: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Scenarios for Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

These young men, who live in severe poverty and are without much in terms of economic prospects, are at the forefront of the fight between various ideologies and regional proxy powers. Afghanistan’s urban elites, however, reside comfortably in barricaded homes in city centers, often forgetting there is a broader Afghanistan.

This fact highlights one of the underlying causes of successive regime changes in Afghanistan; inequality and a dangerous rural-urban divide come with a heavy price for any political authority in Afghanistan. The staggering (and growing) levels of inequality in Afghanistan—in terms of wealth, income, political status, and socio-economic conditions—increases the likelihood of regime change.

It was this exploitation of inequality—under the banner of social equality—by the Afghan communist movement that led to the overthrow of King Zahir Shah in 1973 and, subsequently, his cousin the first President of Afghanistan Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978. This was followed by the rise of the Afghan Mujahideen, which fought against the communist regime from 1979 to 1989. The Mujahideen stayed in power from 1992 to 1996, when it was overthrown by the Taliban—a group of rural young men who were tired of the prevailing warlordism and insecurity in the country. These examples of the dangers of rural-urban divide and its consequences for stability in the country.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon remains more accurate today than ever due to the easy flow of foreign aid money and military contracts over the past decade, and a half has created a wealthy urban elite often oblivious of the rural Afghanistan, which in turn has widened the inequality gap in the country.

Today, Afghanistan exists as two countries: the Afghanistan of the haves and the Afghanistan of the have-nots; one of the urban elites and one of the rural tribal chiefs; of conservative rural values and liberal, urban values.

According to the recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey, more than 70% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas, the country’s Gini coefficient is 38.5%, and almost 40% of the population live in poverty—a majority of whom live in rural areas. Only 23.4% of Afghans inhabit urban areas, with the rate of urbanization standing at 5.4%, with income inequality between rural and urban Afghans only increasing.

If history is a lesson to Afghan political leaders and politicians, it is that a succession of Afghan regimes has been toppled by a rebellion that originated in rural Afghanistan as a result of neglect or rapidly-imposed reforms. Furthermore, Afghan politicians, policymakers, and public officials—along with their international allies and partners—forget this divide and mistakenly think of Afghanistan in the narrow sense of its the six major cities.

The real Afghanistan is the remaining 28 out of 34 provinces—which have, over the years, been consistently neglected by successive Afghan regimes. In fact, in multiple instances when a particular administration has come to power with the help of disaffected, rural young men, those in power forget the roots of their plight and end up living relatively comfortable lives in urban Afghanistan. At times, the Afghan urban elite is so oblivious to the conditions of rural Afghanistan that they forget the broader Afghan polity consists of not only the country’s six major cities of Kabul, Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kandahar, but the remaining 28 provinces, as well.

The rural population of Afghanistan makes up the majority (over 70%) of the population and is more conservative, traditional, and mainly lives in absolute or near-absolute poverty. Afghan urbanites, in contrast, are more liberal, are connected to the internet, and enjoy high levels of disposable income thanks to an aid-dependent bubble economy which has provided cash and other unaccounted wealth.
Early on, the Afghan government understood this issue and tried to address it with a rigorous rural development agenda, but lost focus along the way.

Afghanistan’s interim-presidential administration led by Hamid Karzai recognized this threat and designed several comprehensive national rural development programs under the initiative of the then-Finance Minister and current President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani. These initiatives, such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Rural Access Program (NRAP), National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) amongst others, were intended to provide block grants to self-organized, democratic and self-governed community councils around the country.

These grants would be used to fund the priorities identified by the local councils to improve their communities and improve accessibility to urban centers by building rural roads and providing micro-loans for their household and business needs. However, after almost a decade, none of these programs are sustainable and are heavily dependent on foreign aid and management.

Additionally, these programs were community development projects rather than projects designed to drive nationwide productivity and growth to provide mass employment and serve as important drivers of the rural Afghan economy. More often than not, they have been essential elements of an unsustainable subsistence economy in the rural parts of the country.

The Politics of Inequality: Access to Public Office, Rampant Poverty, Collateral Damage, Discrimination, and Ethnic Politics

Family politics is returning to Afghanistan. Once-thriving under the former King Zahir Shah, years of communist rule and war weakened this institution. One of the main reasons why people sympathized with the two communist factions of Khalq (The People) and Parcham (The Flag) was due to growing frustrations over the increasing monopoly on power and resources by many of the families close to the then-king and his court. Today—by several estimates—the politics, economics, and finances of Afghanistan are in the hands of a few families which enriched themselves through holding high public office, receiving millions of dollars of foreign military contracts, and through exercising a tight grip over the Afghan private sector.

The vast majority of Afghanistan’s wealth is in the hands of a few hundred individuals with strong political ties to the Afghan government. Today, 10% of the wealthiest Afghans control the economy and politics of a country where the majority of the population cannot meet their daily basic needs. Additionally, the social and economic upward and sideways mobility—which is expected in a dynamic economy—is absent in the Afghan context. The Afghan economic and political landscape is increasingly monopolized by a few families, individuals, and political parties with whom one must have a relationship with to enter into public office.

The Economics of Inequality: Foreign Aid and the Dilemma of Balanced Development versus Unbalanced Development

The flow of foreign aid and easy money through foreign military contracts have created a new economic and business elite in Afghanistan. Thus, political and economic power has been concentrated in the hands of the few powerful individuals who maintain links to the Afghan government with substantial control over the Afghan private sector. Meanwhile, the fixed geography of the war in the southern and eastern regions of the country has created huge income, wealth, and economic disparities between the south and north of Afghanistan.

According to the World Bank’s provincial briefs of Afghanistan, the poverty and inequality indicators (poverty rate, depth of poverty, the average consumption of the poor, per capita monthly total consumption and the Gini coefficient) of southern Afghanistan are almost several times higher than those in the northern sectors of the country. In addition, due to persistent insecurity in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report (2012-3013) shows that the percentage of vulnerable population groups at high risk of poverty, malnutrition, and disease (female-headed households, children, women, addicts, and the elderly) are almost double those in northern and western Afghanistan. This intra-regional and provincial inequality, coupled with a lack of access to essential services and economic opportunities, is cause for serious alarm.

Afghanistan’s economy is increasingly moving towards a narco-mafia model where a few families throughout the country control the private sector and public offices both at the national and subnational level. According to a recent report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), nearly all major contracts are won by a few wealthy and well-connected business with ties to senior government officials (ministers, governors, deputy ministers, amongst others). When a senior official then enters a line of business, small businesses tend to voluntarily opt out of the market, be intimidated, or are otherwise forced to quit.

The perception that competing against a political “strongman” is a futile effort is quite common among those who run smaller and medium‐sized businesses. Monopolization also indicates the exclusivity of markets. The market in Afghanistan is run by a limited number of actors, making the Afghan market an oligopoly wherein a few sellers or providers of services dominate the entire market, evidencing the extent of market failure and capture by criminal, mafia, and other corrupt networks.

This evidence points to shrinking business opportunities for both medium and small enterprises in the Afghan economy and the growing monopoly of a few dominant business players over the Afghan private sector.

The Military Consequences of Inequality: The Geography of War and the Mafia Economy

The monopoly on political power, financial resources, and economic opportunities—combined with the developmental imbalances of the country provides an optimal recruitment environment from which insurgents can draw. Insurgents can attract many unemployed and disgruntled youth who believe a few corrupt officials monopolize the country in the top echelons of the country’s political and economic establishments.

Today, the majority of the Taliban’s foot soldiers are unemployed youth from the most impoverished and underdeveloped areas of Afghanistan. Many of these youth are seasonal fighters who work in the fields during harvest season and fight for the rest of the year precisely due to lack of descent employment opportunities and a grudge against the country’s so-called “overnight millionaires” who are seen as American collaborators and incredibly corrupt.

Further marginalizing and encouraging people to distance themselves from the current government is the concentration of power at the subnational level in the hands of rural elites and tribal chiefs with connections to the presidential administration.

Inclusive Institutions, Politics, and Balanced Development: The Difficult Road Ahead

Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards being an oligopoly, with extractive political and economic institutions. The increasing amount of wealth and political power under the control of a small minority of Afghans is increasingly marginalizing the vast majority of the country’s population—largely in rural Afghanistan. Particularly within the country’s historical context, this is cause for alarm. Rural Afghans have often initiated regimes changes due to the negligence of political leaders, policymakers, and politicians in Kabul and other cities who often lose touch with the realities of rural life.

The new Afghan president should make Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) the driver of the Afghan economy and break the tight grip of the few families and individuals have over the country’s economy and the private sector. Balanced development of the country and equitable allocation of financial resources and business opportunities is essential for an inclusive and secure Afghanistan.

The Price of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Negotiations in Doha, Qatar—the location of the Taliban’s political office—were followed by a conference in Moscow where members of the Afghan opposition were met by a Taliban delegation for peace-related consultations. Though the Afghan government was left out of the Doha negotiations and refused to participate in the Moscow conference, the two events—coupled with a new round of talks at the highest level on both the U.S. and the Taliban sides—have essentially rendered a negotiated settlement of the “war on terror” in Afghanistan irreversible.   

However, noticeably absent from the peace talks is any consideration for a post-deal mechanism that can bring the opinions of ordinary Afghans to the table when it comes to finalizing an agreement that will undoubtedly impact them the most. 

Peace negotiations in other countries held in a similar context to those in Afghanistan have included some measure of public engagement—typically in the form of a national referendum. In Colombia, a recently negotiated deal between the Colombian government and the rebel FARC movement, along with the Good Friday Agreement that brought an end to the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland conflict both involved such a step—twice, in some cases.  

Although a referendum may not yield credible results in Afghanistan due to a range of obstacles—a record of rigged elections being one—other mechanisms can be applied to make the peace process more participatory. 

The Loya Jirga

One such mechanism, the Grand Assembly or Loya Jirga, is well known in Afghanistan. The term is a combination of the Pashtu Loya meaning “grand” and the Farsi or Turkic Jirga meaning “assembly.” Enshrined in the 2004 Afghan Constitution, a presidential decree can convene the assembly. Members consist of the presidents of the district and provincial councils in addition to members of the Parliament. District councils, however, have yet to be formed in Afghanistan due to seventeen years of technical drawbacks. This deficit in membership can be rectified by including more women and members of civil society in the event such an assembly is convened. 

In the 2004 Constitution, the Loya Jirga is referred to as “the highest manifestation of the will of the people.”  A Loya Jirga is responsible for decisions on matters such as presidential impeachment or constitutional amendments. The first Loya Jirga in modern Afghan history was convened from 1914-1915 by then-Afghan King Amir Habibullah to decide if Afghanistan should join any of the warring camps in World War I. The 540 delegates opted for neutrality. A Loya Jirga has ratified seven out of eight of Afghanistan’s 20th-century constitutions. 

The election of the first post-Bonn Conference president, Hamid Karzai, went through a Grand Assembly, as did the 2004 ratification of the country’s most recent constitution. There is no reason why an exception should be made for an eventual peace deal that is likely to entail significant constitutional amendments and significantly disrupt the country’s institutions. 

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has suggested a consultative Loya Jirga be convened to discuss the nature of a peace deal which falls well short of an assembly with a binding decision-making power. 

A Loya Jirga should include under its mandate, at the very least, putting individual items in the peace deal under scrutiny by members who are representative of a diverse range of stakeholders—particularly those whose views may be left out in the high politics of negotiations. Specifically, women and members of civil society would be able to steer the fate of a post-deal Afghanistan through such a platform, guaranteeing their continued role in shaping the country’s future. 

The Religious Justification for a Loya Jirga

The idea of a Loya Jirga might find strong support in Islamic politics as well, in that it may help to convince the Taliban to cooperate to some degree—given that the group may not agree to a Colombia-style referendum. The group does not believe in people’s choice as the basis of political authority – a realm reserved strictly for religion and its commandments according to the radical interpretation of Islam the Taliban espouse. 

The notion of Shura or council, however, has been promulgated by the Quran and is the legitimizing basis for deliberative decision-making in politics and society. The Quranic verse calling for holding council adorns the wall above the seat of the Speaker of the House of the People in Afghanistan’s Parliament. Agreeing to a Loya Jirga could be politically beneficial for the Taliban, as the group would demonstrate it is unafraid of views representing a broader perspective from the population, and that it can demonstrate its intentions to adhere to a time-honored national tradition. 

Forgoing a wider participatory process will leave the playing field mostly to a few well-known figures from among the former Mujahidin parties, some new faces (mostly men) who’ve risen in prominence in recent years, and previous members of the Taliban who have joined the peace process. Barring a few, such individuals who mostly made up the attendees at the Moscow conference to meet the Taliban delegation, are closer in terms of ideology and tribal-thinking to the Taliban than Afghanistan’s civic-minded population. These individuals can be persuaded to compromise on important post-Bonn values if a quick peace deal guarantees an end to the ongoing bloody stalemate and brings them recognition.   

Ultimately, the two sides currently engaged in talks have their own priorities. The Taliban insists on a timeline for a withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition from Afghanistan as the main precondition for peace—a demand they have made ever since reemerging as an insurgency in the mid-2000s. The U.S. demands guarantees that Afghanistan will not become a launch-pad for international terrorism following complete withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops. 

U.S. President Donald Trump has noted that he considers military campaigns in the Greater Middle East to be  “dumb wars,” continuing a trend initiated by Barack Obama of shifting attention to more important strategic theaters. In the United States’ own hemisphere, the situation in Venezuela seems ripe for intervention—possibly militarily if the situation deteriorates considerably if one were to believe Trump’s rhetoric.

The many influential voices calling for complete pull-out from Afghanistan, either cautiously or persuasively, easily outnumber the few who believe the ongoing talks with the Taliban is but a means to negotiate the terms of surrender for the U.S.—a Vietnam-style capitulation. Patience for delaying the exit, therefore, may be in serious shortage in Washington. 

U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad hasn’t acknowledged any discussions with the Taliban about a future political system. So far, both sides have acknowledged progress resulting in an agreement in principle for a peace framework, which will require further talks in Doha and subsequent negotiations in Kabul with the Afghan government—should the Taliban eventually agree to such talks that they have thus far rejected, calling the government in Kabul a puppet regime.  

Historical Precedent for Negotiated Settlements in Afghanistan

Amidst the hustle to strike a deal, ordinary Afghans might become victims of a pervasive ostrich effect due to the fatigue of a long conflict. Ironically, this same approach has tragic precedence not long ago in Afghanistan.

Negotiated settlements between the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the Mujahidin in early 1990s sidelined the ordinary population. Later, similar agreements between the many Mujahidin parties excluded any participation by the people. This resulted in political accords that tethered their durability to factional and partisan interests. In the absence of a broader popular base to guarantee them, these agreements lost currency the moment one faction’s interests were threatened, leading to renewed hostilities. 

Absence of genuine belief in public participation in power might be one reason behind a widespread disillusionment among Afghans that they don’t really matter even if the international community make the claim of having brought democracy to the country. It’s either a US-led conspiracy (aided by the British), a dirty gimmick by the Pakistani ISI or political machinations among the elite in or out of the government that runs the country. 

Excluding ordinary people again might hasten the peace process, but it will likely result in the age-old adage of history repeating itself—first as tragedy, then as farce. To ensure that today’s peace won’t result in future instability due to grievances originating in opposition to a deal that undermines aspirations of ordinary Afghans, convening a Loya Jirga with binding authority is necessary. 

In case the Taliban returns to power unilaterally or as part of a coalition and is faced with a popular resistance as it did in the late 1990s and thus fail to assert full authority on the country’s territory, the group’s guarantees regarding preventing Afghanistan from becoming a jihadist hub will carry little weight. The proliferation of power vacuums can provide terrorist groups with much-needed training grounds, including ISIS-affiliated militants who are already present in the country and in loggerheads with the Taliban. 

Give Ordinary Afghans a Voice in Any Peace Deal With the Taliban was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban held its fourth round of direct talks with the United States in January of 2019. This month the group revealed it will participate in a fifth meeting with the aim of agreeing on a set of issues and to craft a framework for ending the war that began with the U.S. invasion in 2001. The widely-lauded meeting between more than fifty Taliban and Afghan political figures in Moscow this month was simply unprecedented, and an important step forward to ending years of stalemate and creating the conditions for direct inter-Afghan dialogue.

The significance of these meetings can be discerned from their venues, timing, participants, and the progressive nature of the discussions. The presence, involvement and engagement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati representatives—countries with significant influence on the Taliban—have undoubtedly raised the stakes of the events.

The Afghan government, an essential factor in the process, has been left out of any meetings with Taliban on the latter’s insistence. However, if both the U.S. and Taliban proceed with good faith and achieve mutually-agreeable progress, the meetings could ultimately pave the way for direct talks between Taliban and Afghan officials—with increased engagement and support from Afghan political elites.

The U.S. and its coalition partners appear to believe they have exhausted almost all military options that would effectuate an end to the Afghan conflict and thus have come to the conclusion that to withdraw forces—something the Trump administration is seriously considering,—political and diplomatic options that would entail some combination of restraint, compromise, and incentives must be considered.

The United States’ demands of the Taliban are clear: the Taliban must abandon support for global terrorist groups, it must not use Afghanistan as a base from which to stage attacks against the United States or its interests, and it must cease using violence and enter into talks with the Afghan government. There is a greater realization on the part of the Taliban as well that it cannot achieve a decisive victory—let alone overtake the state—despite years of inflicting heavy losses on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and expanding the territory it controls.

The Taliban has every reason to maximize its return from the talks. The resilience of its forces, a strict adherence to a battlefield chain of command, increasingly diversified foreign support, and—most importantly—its operational advantage in the harsh conditions of rural Afghanistan make it simply insurmountable. Yet, the Taliban also has its own calculations and realizes that no matter its leverage in peace talks, the return of the Islamic Emirate is beyond reach. Afghans, including Taliban sympathizers in most rural parts of the country, simply demand better lives than they had under the Taliban for the price they have paid to endure the last eighteen years of conflict and misery. However, the Taliban continues to hold onto its traditional demands which include withdrawal of foreign forces, release of prisoners, lifting of sanctions, changes to the constitution with greater provision for sharia law, and a practical roadmap for its inclusion in power sharing and governance. Furthermore, the Taliban recently asked for a permanent end to U.S./NATO air strikes targeting its fighters.

Then there is the matter of Pakistan, another essential element of the Afghan conflict. Some, including the U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, have stated that Kabul is where the subject of peace in Afghanistan will be decided. Others argue that Islamabad is the ultimate decider. The question isn’t so much about where the key to peace in Afghanistan is, but rather, it is fundamentally one of whether now is the time to use that key.

The reality is that peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan. If Pakistan has genuinely succumbed to U.S. pressure and is ready to end its rigorously institutionalized support for the Taliban insurgency, and is genuinely willing to cooperate in the peace and reconciliation process, the possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict is more real now than at anytime previously.

As it stands, as agreed in Doha, both the U.S. and the Taliban officials are expected to meet again this month. Assuming that the Taliban and U.S. reach an agreement that includes a timetable for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces— a non-negotiable precondition for the Taliban—the next step will be an effective inter-Afghan dialogue. Are the two sides ready and able to make peace? Will the Taliban agree to talk with the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG)? Is NUG prepared to reach and implement a settlement that would entail substantial concessions, including significant legislative amendments and political accommodation? More importantly, does President Ghani have the domestic political backing essential to enter into a durable peace treaty with the Taliban and honor certain demands? To consider this and other key questions, a review of the reality on the ground in Afghanistan is necessary.

Is Peace Within Reach?

The Taliban has thus far refused to directly negotiate with Ghani’s National Unity Government, which it views as a puppet of the West with no authority or legitimacy to make decisions or to represent the will of the nation. Instead, it has insisted on first talking only to the U.S. To date, the Taliban has had one meeting with Afghan political leaders, and it is likely they will meet again.

At a conference in Geneva in November of 2018, Ghani presented a five-phase approach for the negotiating process. First, the Afghan government will hold direct talks with the Taliban, followed by discussions with Pakistan and the United States. Then, regional actors and the Arab-Islamic world will be included, and finally, NATO and non-NATO countries. At the moment, what has been happening is precisely the opposite of what Ghani envisioned. The U.S. and the Taliban have had four direct meetings. In between which, U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad visited Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., India, and Qatar to consult with their officials. Ghani’s government is, so far, not even in the game despite the president’s recent attempts to soften his tone.

According to recent projections by military experts and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)¹ the Taliban controls nearly fifty percent of the territory in Afghanistan. While this figure is contested, the Taliban has an active presence in seventy percent of the country. Afghanistan remains a largely rural country with less than twenty eight percent of its population living in the cities.²

Even though the government predominantly controls the cities and urban areas, the rural territory is either under Taliban control or at best is contested.³ This leaves the Taliban at a distinct advantage as only a small proportion of the rural territory effectively remains in control of the government. In case of a peace settlement, it is highly unlikely the group would be willing to cede any control it has thus far gained and power to a government it ultimately considers to be illegitimate. Unsurprisingly, in response to Ghani’s offer of a Kabul office for the Taliban made during a recent visit to Nangarhar province, the Taliban restated its position that it will not, under any circumstances, talk with Ghani’s government.

It is an open secret that a significant portion of the Taliban’s income that used to run its war machine is generated from illegal taxation, opium, extortion, and ransoms, among other means. Drugs make up at least sixty percent of the Taliban’s income, a figure estimated at between $300 and $400 million each year.⁴ Furthermore, militia groups make more than $50 million annually from the mining industry, which is harvesting talc, chromite, marble and precious stones.

Foreign funding is another significant source of revenue for the Taliban. Although not easy to measure as these transactions are primarily carried out in unofficial and unregulated ways, including the hawala system, most experts estimate this funding to be between $200 to $300 million a year—coming mostly from the Gulf states. The fundamental question is what incentives will the NUG offer to the Taliban? Will the peace dividend for a local Taliban commander match what he currently makes each month as the result of the group’s drug trafficking and criminal activity, it’s myriad of other business ventures, and foreign funding?

Despite describing its direct talks with the United States as highly agenda-driven and articulate, the Taliban seems to lack a clear political objective. Unlike Hizbi Islami, which, at the time of its negotiations with the NUG⁵ had a clearer picture of how it might govern from Kabul, articulating what an end-state might look like and how some of its conditions could be feasibly implemented in a settlement has been a challenge for the Taliban. This is partly because the group realizes the limited degree of its acceptability within mainstream Afghan society.⁶

What is clear though is that the Taliban will demand a clear, comprehensive, and guaranteed plan from the Afghan government for its social, economic, and political needs—even if the group itself is lacking one. At almost every meeting, the Taliban has articulated its now-familiar demands, but beyond that, it struggles with how it sees itself back in the country. What form of a government will work? What specific laws would need to be changed? Will it respect the democratic processes and elections or will it only seek a share power with the existing government? In response to a question in Moscow related to power sharing, the Taliban’s chief envoy Sher Mohammad Abas Stanekzai said, “the Taliban has a clear roadmap for how to work with all political groups in the country to form a government based on the Sharia law.” Obviously, this isn’t enough even if the group had such a plan.

For its part, Ghani’s government is fraught with numerous problems. It might even be incorrect to call it a full and functioning government given that it has never had a full cabinet. For over fourteen months (May 2017 – July 2018), Ghani’s first Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum was in exile; currently, he is dispossessed of his authority and denied permission to attend cabinet and National Security Council meetings. More than half of the government’s twenty-five ministries and dozens of independent bodies have remained without legal heads since his presidency.

Ghani’s closest and top policy-making team is, at its best, made up of many junior, inexperienced individuals with no authority to make decisions. Despite Ghani’s obsession with bringing the country’s younger generation to the government, he has failed to find a practical balance in government recruitment. His administration has had a penchant for disregarding necessary qualifications for some of the most senior positions and has made hasty appointments. This is partly because he is deeply insecure and has a severe trust deficit. Moreover, a textbook micromanager, Ghani involves himself in every detail of the country’s business. This situation has caused serious problems for both the government and the state as a whole.

The security situation within Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Since the NUG was formed in 2015, More than one million Afghans have fled the country due to a lack of jobs and increasing insecurity and uncertainty. According to UNAMA, from 2015 to 2018, civilian casualties caused by both Taliban attacks and ANDSF operations reached nearly 35,000—the highest number since the civil war in the 1990s—almost half of whom are women, children and elderly.⁷

In a recent interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Ghani admitted that the ANDSF had lost up to 45,000 personnel since he took power.⁸ a figure that still seems modest when one consider the average casualties on a daily basis. Despite massive support from the U.S. and other NATO nations to strengthen the ANDSF, its institutions remain weak, disorganized, corrupt, and void of morale. Most importantly, political stability, the most critical indicator of a nation’s prosperity, is seriously crumbling. Afghanistan’s history has shown that when any leader ignored this element of polity, his demise and destruction was certain.

King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), President Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978), and Mullah Mohammad Omar Hotak (1994-1998) are only few examples of leaders whose individualistic, hasty, and poorly conceived approach to changing the country overnight put the country on the verge of destruction. To their credit, perhaps none of these leaders had any ill intent, rather it was their respective individual characters that led to their downfall. Regrettably, we are seeing similar trends today. While the mainstream political elites may be highly divided, when it comes to their relations with NUG, they have never been so united.⁹

The Afghan government’s foreign diplomacy is in shambles. Ghani’s day-to-day business with some of the most powerful and complicated countries in the region— Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—appears to be guided by books he has read. It has become commonplace these days that when Ghani or his policy team makes a statement on any issue, they then change their minds shortly thereafter. This shows a lack of strategic thinking and experience in the presidential palace. At a time when the future of the country is being debated on the world stage, the NUG’s diplomacy is seriously faltering. The government needs to demonstrate creative diplomacy, statecraft, and political ingenuity now, more than ever.

Recommendations for Policymaking

In light of the above and assuming that the Taliban will ultimately enter into an inter-Afghan dialogue, the following six points may help to guide participants in the Afghan peace process toward a successful and lasting outcome:

1. The government must go beyond a mere plan on paper and demonstrate its readiness to provide concessions based on the fundamental demands of the Taliban. President Ghani has spoken about roadmaps, plans or strategy, but has offered no details or evidence to indicate that a plan is in place. Any peace talks would require a plan that has immediate results and is based on, at a minimum, national consensus building, recognition of the Taliban as a political party, transitional confidence-building measures, a lifting of sanctions, release of prisoners, the reintegration of Taliban fighters and relocation of senior Taliban members along with their families. Ghani’s recent call for a possible Loya Jira (Grand Council) to discuss peace is a welcome step to engage in dialogues with Taliban, although that doesn’t seem to change the Taliban’s calculation about him.
2. At the moment, the biggest challenge for Ghani is securing a strong national support base for peace with the Taliban in Kabul, let alone in the rest of the country. The current situation, beset by a highly fragile political environment and pervasive security threats, calls for thinking beyond daily business. It is time to begin a meaningful national dialogue. Ghani must reprioritize his time and demonstrate leadership by facing reality. Afghans are frustrated with empty promises and by a lack of measurable progress. Every peace has a price, and strong leadership is needed to convince the majority of the country that it is in their interest to shoulder this cost. As such, if the Taliban continue to deny talking with the NUG, but is willing to talk to other Afghans, Ghani must not block it, let the process begin and must instead help a council of prominent Afghan leaders and politicians who can advance the talks. The government can serve as a coordinator of the process and can gradually take a more substantive role as was the case in negotiations with Hizb Islami successfully led by former National Security Advisor, Haneef Atmar, who is now a contender for the country’s presidency.
3. If the Taliban continues its rejection of talks with the Afghan government as a legitimate and trustworthy party with the authority to make a peace settlement work, the upcoming presidential elections may be a perfect opportunity for the group to talk to the new government. The current talks will take time and can be advanced by a future government. The period between now and the formation of the new government will be critical for both parties, however. It will also provide an opportunity for Taliban representatives to reach out to political leaders and, most importantly, potential presidential candidates to understand their visions and plans for peace. For its part, the Taliban can begin to explore its own future reconciliation and reintegration in Afghan society and the resolution of grievances. They must not forget that this war has affected millions of Afghans. Perhaps the biggest challenge for any future government will be to heal the wounds, pains, and suffering of the nation.
4. While Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is unlikely to completely cease in the near future, recent developments give cause for cautious optimism. These developments include the death of Maulana Samiul Haq, known as the father of Taliban, the release of key Taliban leaders including Mullah Berader, former Deputy to the Taliban leader who was recently named by Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhund as head of the Taliban political office in Doha; security reinforcement measures by Pakistani military along the Durand Line and the role Pakistan played in encouraging Taliban to meet with U.S. in Abu Dhabi and Doha. If Pakistan is truly committed to resolve the Afghan conflict, there is every reason to expect a settlement, even if talks take a longer amount of time. However, Pakistan needs to do much more in order to gain the confidence of the U.S. and the Afghans. For years, Pakistan has been playing a double game in which it does just enough on the surface to get incentives from the U.S., while still supporting the Taliban in the shadows.
5. There have been talks about forming an interim government with the Taliban to facilitate its full participation in future political activities. The Taliban has, however, denied that it has made such a proposition as many Afghans reacted negatively to the idea calling it a return to the country’s dark times after enduring tremendous sacrifices for so long. While holding timely and successful elections planned for July this year may be a challenging task for the Afghan government and its current weak and incompetent electoral bodies, it still can be the best possible option to show the country is moving ahead. Given the urgency of peace, if the current talks between the U.S. and the Taliban produce results, many Afghans will most likely be ready to accept another delay in elections or continue the talks with a newly elected government rather than having an interim government. Given the country’s history and the widening fractures within the Afghan political elites, it will be a mistake to expect a smooth transition beyond an interim government just like early 1990s. However, if talks do not yield results beyond March, elections will be the only and best way to go in July, yet the current momentum for achieving peace must not be lost.
6. Since President Ghani is running for a second term, he must respect the independence of the electoral bodies and avoid using state resources to manipulate the electoral timeline and process. The international community that supports and observes the Afghan elections must ensure that between now and July both the IEC and the NUG undertake the necessary measures to address the key technical and security concerns. Moreover, to increase confidence and public trust in the outcome of the election, Ghani and Abdullah’s term must officially end by April 20. During the period between April 20 to July 20, 2019, both the NUG and the international partners can focus on issues that can strengthen the capacity of the electoral bodies, in order to ensure they have sufficient technical resources and most importantly improve security and confidence in the country. Meanwhile, the most crucial issue will be to continue supporting peace initiatives—including aiming to achieve and maintain a ceasefire.

¹ SIGAR, Quarterly Reports, October 30, 2018
² World Population Review: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan-population/
cities/
³ There are areas in rural Afghanistan where no one has control. In some of these areas, the government operates for certain hours of the daylight and then Taliban emerge at night or vis versa.
⁴ Interview with Afghan Security Officials, September 2018.
⁵ Afghan government signed a peace accord with the Afghan insurgent group – Hizbi Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in September 2016 after nearly 18 months of negotiations.
⁶ While Taliban will undoubtedly continue to enjoy support of local communities in rural areas, which can be significant in case it enters talks and competes in politics, it will be viewed as the least favourable in the mainstream political scene.
⁷ UNAMA civilian casualty Report, 2018
⁸ CNN Anchor, Fareed Zakaria’s Conversation With President Ghani during World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting (2019) In Davos, Switzerland, January 25, 2019
⁹ Their recent rejection of Ghani’s call for joining the Peace Consultation Board was a clear sign of their distaste of the NUG. Following a presidential decree that formed a peace consultative board comprising of the majority of the influential political and Jehadi leaders, a majority of them rejected the offer or simply ignored it. The leaders who did not attend the board’s first meeting included former President Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, First Vice President Dustom, Professor Sayaf, Hazrat Mujaddadi, Mohammad Asif Muhsini, Mohamamd Younus Qanooni, Ismail Khan, Atta Noor, Sayed Mansoor Naderi and Sayed Hamed Gailani.

The Twin Goals of Peace and Elections in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, Mr. Atmar played a key role in the election of his former ally and current opponent, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, often referred to as “the Shadow President” during his tenure because of his enormous influence and clout within the Afghan political elite and the international community. He was the moderator, the glue, and the firefighter of a fragile unity government that was often at quarreling with itself. His moderation, inclusivity, wide consultative approach, and farsightedness combined with patience to Afghan politics is well-known within the Afghan political scene. He is a man to rely upon during crises and hardship—a crisis manager in turbulent times. In short, an all-weather friend of the international community and a man for all seasons for the Afghans.

Mr. Atmar served as Afghanistan’s Interior Minister, Minister of Education, and Minister of Rural Development after years of service in the development and non-governmental communities. during the tenure of former President Hamid Karzai. Mr. Atmar is credited with many institutional reforms and large-scale poverty reduction programs—such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP). He signed the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States to ensure sustained U.S. financial and technical support for the Afghan security forces. He also kept intact a shaky regional consensus on the Afghan war and peace efforts which broke down immediately after his departure from the National Unity Government due to the region’s lack of trust on his replacement and the incumbent President.

Mr. Atmar is a mixed Kandahari-Laghmani. He has lived an eventful life, having started his career with the former Afghan communist regime’s intelligence service an intelligence officer. He was subsequently injured during the famous battle of Jalalabad fighting Arab-Punjabi anti-communist jihadists who were attempting to take controls of Jalalabad city. He then left the service and started his career in the NGO community, heading several well-known non-government organizations that delivered aid and humanitarian assistance to communities across Afghanistan. During this time, he traveled through some of the most hostile environments in the country.

Mr. Atmar was a key participant in the first Bonn conference representing the Afghan community and NGOs. Later on, he was appointed to be Afghanistan’s first Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development by President Karzai. During his tenure as the Minister of Rural Development, he made a name for himself as a reformist, a builder of institutions, and as a service provider. He rolled out some of the most ambitious rural development programs in the history of the country such as the National Solidarity Program, microfinance initiatives, and National Area Based Development programs, among others.

His name was known in every Afghan village—more than 3,000 of them then—because of his community-driven, bottom-up approach to development. President Karzai, for political reasons as well as the desire to replicate his success in other ministries, asked to move and reform the Afghan Ministry of Education, he agreed and enacted similar reforms and institutional development measures on a vast scale.

Subsequently, again on political advice and given Mr. Atmar’s security background, President Karzai appointed him as the first technocrat Minister of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan in charge of local governance and the Afghan police. He designed and rolled out comprehensive reforms and institutional development measures in the Afghan police force, the ANCOP, the APPF, the ANTIC, and others.

At the time, many western and American officials even dubbed him as Afghanistan’s next president. He left the government over political differences with former President Karzai and launched his own political party, the Right and Justice Party, along with a successful business. During his time out of the government, Mr. Atmar and his party members adhered to strict political discipline and refrained from public accusations and playing dirty politics —engaging in amoral and unethical politics—with his opponents, winning him respect within the Afghan political class.

Mr. Atmar made a comeback with the election of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani as President of Afghanistan. Many credited Atmar for being the architect and brain behind Ghani’s election. He took the job of National Security Advisor, responsible for overseeing various domestic and foreign policy matters. During his tenure, he was the point person for and architect of many of the war and peace initiatives of both President Ghani and the international community, including the 4-year ANDSF development roadmap, negotiations with Hizb-e-Islami, regional security, and military diplomacy with Afghanistan’s neighbors.

Often referred to as the “Shadow President,” he was also subjected to a lot of criticism and attacks as the center of gravity of the national unity government. In Machiavellian form, the incumbent president used him as a scapegoat for his political and security failures while the Afghan opposition targeted him due to his serving as the center of gravity holding the government together. However, Atmar maintained his patience and ethical mindset. Many of his former critics, after witnessing his ethical behavior, are now his allies in his quest for high office. Mr. Atmar resigned his post to run for the presidency upon realizing the divisive, conspiratorial, and crisis-manufacturing actions of the incumbent, who is often surrounded by inexperienced Afghans with little affinity to the country and in pursuit of sectarian agendas.

A famous saying used to circle within the diplomatic community in Kabul which demonstrates the extent of Atmar’s influence and credibility: “If you want a lecture, go to the president. If you want to keep abreast of the latest fashion, go to the Chief Executive’s office. If you want to get things done, go to National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar’s office!”  Today, history once again has a calling for Haneef Atmar: to unite Afghanistan and put an end to politics of division, crisis manufacturing, ethnic politics, grudge, and humiliation and lead Afghanistan out of its current crisis. He has proven he is up to the task, so long as the people of Afghanistan give him the chance to take it on.

Mohammad Haneef Atmar: The Silent Unifier was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many countries, both regional and global powers, are working in Afghanistan to secure their interests in Southeast Asia. Afghanistan’s strategic location is of substantial value for India; increased and ongoing engagement in the country by India is likely.   India’s foreign policy goals are centered on enhancing India’s economic and political influence in Asia and around the world.  For instance, India’s long-term economic development will be assured if trade corridors are opened to connect India with Central Asian countries, and ultimately Europe through Afghanistan. This economic growth, in turn, will support increased Indian political influence throughout Southeast and Central Asia. Ensuring pro-Indian governments and sustained internal stability in Afghanistan are critical factors in cementing Indian regional hegemony.

India has been aggressively investing in the Middle East and Central Asia, with some of the more prominent initiatives being the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the acquisition and development of the Chabahar port in Iran. Both examples illustrate India’s substantial economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. Ensuring the flow of oil from oil-rich Central Asian states is crucial for India’s continued economic growth. According to the Economic Times, India is the third-largest importer of crude oil in the world. Some Indian officials have categorized India’s dependency on oil imports as an economic crisis. India has been urgently seeking alternative sources of crude oil in the region, in an effort to diversify in light of sanctions imposed by the United States on the Iranian oil industry, and Saudi Arabia’s close alignment with India’s arch-rival Pakistan.

India seeks to expand commerce and trade throughout Central Asia and Eurasia. India’s growing economy requires access to substantial energy resources like those found throughout the Eurasian landmass. Indian companies see tremendous opportunity for growth, as they are well-positioned to provide Central Asian states with technology and services. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Lapis Lazuli transit corridor in the region are competing to India’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that they can marginalize India’s trade in the region. The INSTC connects India to Russia, central Asian countries, Baltic, Nordic and Arctic regions. It is an Indian version of Chinese One belt One Road Initiative.

Should the United States lose a substantial amount of influence in Afghanistan, India’s goals of regional hegemony will be difficult to achieve. The U.S. expects India to play an increasingly major role in the region—particularly in Afghanistan.  India is connected with Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. Given that Iran is presently sanctioned by the U.S., Afghanistan is seen as a more viable option. While there are certainly discouraging factors—such as a lack of security—for heightened engagement in Afghanistan, there are a number of factors which could induce expanded regional cooperation. India is not only a major energy market for Central Asian energy, but it is also a way for smaller states to balance against China. Those countries who supply India with energy through Afghanistan could, theoretically, play a part in ensuring Afghanistan’s stabilization to facilitate efficient energy trade.

Neither Pakistan nor China is in favor of a substantive Indian presence in Afghanistan. Both countries have their own historical issues with India. From a strictly economic perspective, India’s activities in the region are seen by China as a threat to its ambitious BRI. For instance, Iran supports the INSTC as it would facilitate the export of Iranian natural gas and oil to Europe. India has also invested in port infrastructure in Iran in an apparent effort to disconnect Afghanistan from Pakistan. Additionally, India’s efforts to build hydropower dams along rivers in Afghanistan that flow into Pakistan and Iran is evidence of India’s strategic interests in the country, and will be hard-pressed to relinquish influence—even after a U.S. withdrawal.

India must extend assistance and support to the Afghan government in a way that benefits both countries to ensure India’s interests in the region. U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan are in alignment, as are both powers’ respective strategic goals. Therefore, it would be pragmatic for India to take advantage of the opportunities being provided by the U.S. One such opportunity being the exemption to specific Iranian sanctions granted to India by the U.S. State Department. The exemption will allow for the Indian-led development of a port in Iran as part of a transportation corridor designed to boost Afghanistan’s economy. India will have a harder time achieving its goals without support from the U.S and NATO, as Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan, coupled with China’s growing influence in Central Asia are major obstacles to India’s dreams of hegemony.

India’s Strategy for Regional Hegemony Depends on Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eighteen candidates have registered themselves for what is ultimately expected to be a tight race between the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani and his charismatic former National Security Advisor, Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has assembled a strong team of political heavyweights. Both known for their strong credentials as visionaries and leaders, they have embraced a progressive agenda for Afghanistan are anti-corruption advocates.

However, the two men have different approaches to governance; President Ghani is known to be short-tempered, impatient, and a results-based micromanager while Haneef Atmar has a reputation as a patient, strategic thinker and as a unifying figure who calls for moderation, inclusivity, and a broad-based government. Many political analysts predict that they might unite in the event of a second round given the complementary nature of their respective qualities, a fact which made them win the first presidential election of the post-Hamid Karzai era.

Afghan elections have always been chaotic but are a manifestation of how far the country has come.  Former archrivals are now settling scores at the ballot box, not with bullets. One of the highlights of the upcoming election is the candidacy of the infamous warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who once fought a bloody civil war against his rivals over the control of capital Kabul and until recently considered the Afghan government to be an illegitimate puppet. He later reconsidered and now seeks the Afghan presidency.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s current Chief Executive Officer and former foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, known to be a chronic campaigner, is a candidate for the fourth time. Out of five elections, Abdullah’s name has been on the ballot in four of them. This election is a clash between political titans who have different visions for a post-U.S. Afghanistan that is more self-reliant. This narrative is already present in the rhetoric used by the candidates; terms such as “Afghanization”. “ownership,” “standing on our own feet,” and “taking responsibility” are some of the buzzwords used by the candidates to signal preparation for a post-American future in Afghanistan.

What is on the Ballot?

The 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be a referendum on the devolution of power from the presidency to provincial units versus further centralization of power in the administration. With no constitutional justification, President Ghani has removed the Chief Executive Office, which created on the basis of the National Unity Government agreement mediated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and has called for a strong, centralized, and united presidency. Ghani’s his main rival, Mohammad Haneef Atmar,  has pledged to further devolve the powers of the presidency by creating a third vice president position and an Executive Prime Minister office after the approval of an Afghan Loya Jirga.

Many fear that, if left unchecked, both cases pose a real danger to the governance structures and overall unity of the country. On the one hand, there is concern that a centralized state in the hands of President Ghani, given his temperament and impatience, could descend into authoritarianism. On the other side, further devolution of power and the creation of a Prime Minister’s office could pave the way for federalism and the subsequent disintegration of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the 2019 elections represent a contest between two generations of Afghan politicians and political activists, and between two different visions of the country’s future. The first is the old generation, a mixture of jihadi-communists and royalists. The second group is the new generation of post-9/11 Afghans, mostly educated in the West and adhere to western values of democracy, freedom of speech, and fundamental human rights. The standard bearer of each of these visions will set the tone of the Afghan political landscape for many years to come.

Whoever takes the helm will have the tough job of providing security and developing a stagnant Afghan economy in light of dwindling U.S. resources and interest in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a divided and chaotic region is resulting in geopolitical spillover effects on the security and political situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace, security, the economy, and a balanced foreign policy will be critical priorities for the next Afghan presidential administration.

The Tyranny of Duality: Elections or Peace Process.

A new class of Afghan elites, politicians, and former officials have joined the Taliban in calling for an interim administration and the postponing the presidential election to a later date to accommodate the ongoing peace talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Many others don’t see the peace talks and the election as mutually exclusive. Instead, they see them as complementary and parallel to one another.

Both the peace talks and presidential elections can proceed concurrently for three purposes. The first is to put pressure on the Taliban to participate in the elections. The second purpose is to demonstrate the realities of a new Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the third being that the candidates can use peace as a rallying point to boost public opinion for the peace and reconciliation process. The choice should not be between either the election or peace talks, but rather both the peace process and the Afghan presidential elections can be mutually inclusive, complementing one another.

The Crisis of Afghan Electoral Bodies

The ineffectiveness, incompetence, and politicization of Afghanistan’s electoral bodies are primarily rooted in two areas. The first is a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government to build strong, impartial, and competent bodies. The second is the failure of the United Nations and the international community at-large to efficiently invest donor money and resources in electoral bodies to build capacity and systems.  These two factors are the key drivers of many of the problems within Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) today.

Successive Afghan governments and UN mission chiefs vowed to address these problems but to no avail; dozens of roadmaps and electoral reform programs were drawn up to overhaul the electoral bodies’ legal and policy frameworks significantly, but many of those plans remained on paper. Successive Afghan governments saw it as being to their benefit to keep Afghan electoral bodies weak to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities will give a government the opportunity to machinate and engineer the results of elections.

Afghan elections are considered to be one of the costliest elections per capita in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the logistical and security arrangements for elections in the country. Generous donations from various donor countries provide these funds. For Afghans to be able to afford elections in future, they will have to fundamentally change the economics of their electoral system and switch to more affordable technologies. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s electoral bodies require a significant legal, policy, and operational overhaul. At present, however, it seems impossible to carry out such a process given the limited timeframe, the risks of the election being engineered, and a lack of trust. Many in Afghanistan question the legitimacy of any election held under the current legal, policy, and institutional structures.

The Role of Kingmakers

The Afghan kingmakers are three distinct groups which play an essential role in shaping and paving the way for any potential candidate to win the seat of the presidency in the country. The first group depend of personalities such as former President Hamid Karzai, Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Atta Noor, among others. The second group is made up of influential families such as legendary former commander Masood’s family, former Vice President Marshal Fahim’s family, the Mojaddidi family, the Gilani family, and others. The third and final group are foreign powers in the region, the broader Islamic world, and the United States..

As of now, the majority of these factors favor the incumbent’s main rival, former National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has garnered the support of many of these personalities, families, and countries. However, unseating an incumbent president remains a difficult task given the state of the resources at his disposal.

The Role of the United States and the Region in the Afghan Elections

Regional and global politics have always played out in the Afghan elections with rival countries supporting one or several Afghan candidates to win favors with the Afghan political elites.  The support of external actors in the Afghan election scene has mainly been through three mediums: campaign money, propaganda through their state media outlets, and by leveraging their influence through proxies in favor or against one candidate or the other.

Unfortunately, these bitter realities still have not changed and play out in the Afghan electoral scene. It is increasingly evident that this time there will be three types of candidates from a geopolitical viewpoint which will face off in the Afghan presidential race: a candidate of the region, a candidate of the West, and others. In previous races, one or two of the candidates have been favored by both the region and the west, but in this race, it is clear that the preferred candidate(s) of regional powers differs from the candidate(s) favored by the United States and the West.

Afghan Elections: Unifiers or Dividers?

Elections are double-edged swords in post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. Elections can be both a unifying entity and a divisive power. In Libya. an election drove a large divide in a country where there are two administrations in two capitals. The last presidential election in Afghanistan could have resulted similarly, sending Afghanistan into disarray and a bloody civil if not for the wisdom and farsightedness of the candidates and the diplomatic skills of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

This time around, the threat of a disputed or drawn-out election remains. The legitimacy and acceptability of the presidential race depends upon the conduct of the electoral bodies and on the incumbent not to use government resources for campaign purposes. In fact, there is a high risk of a “non-government” this time if we the election is disputed.

Afghanistan’s presidential elections are set for July 2019, typically the peak of the Taliban’s summer offensive which will detrimentally impact the security and accessibility of electoral sites, which will be highly vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban attacks. Thus, certain population centers and pockets of Afghan towns and cities will be prevented from voting in the presidential elections. Such an outcome could lead to questions about the credibility and viability of the elections.

What to Expect: Winners and Losers

Many experts believe that due to the high number of candidates and a divided electoral landscape, the Afghan elections will go to a second round between the two candidates who manage to secure the most votes. In this case, many experts believe a runoff would be between the incumbent and his former National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar. Success will be contingent upon the coalition building and negotiation skills of both candidates. There is also the chance of a coalition government to avoid a deadlock.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the election won’t be held in the event of a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban, or if U.S. President Donald Trump makes an abrupt decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Of course, nobody can predict the future, but if history is any indicator, it seems highly likely that the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be tightly contested and will result in a runoff vote, followed by drawn-out negotiation period until the formation of the next Afghan government.

The Politics of Ballots over Bullets: Afghan Elections and Peace Process was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies have deployed cutting-edge aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. What is missing, however, is good human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities. Afghans have been entrusted with the task of HUMINT collection, but multiple Taliban infiltration and sabotage operations illustrate the need for comprehensive reform of Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

The Afghan intelligence community requires a robust overhaul. This includes investment in both human and technical capabilities alongside a comprehensive reform program. Afghanistan’s intelligence community is comprised of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Police Intelligence (PI) and Military Intelligence (MI). Some coordination centers, including Tawheed, NASRAT, and the Presidential Information Coordination Center (PICC) connect and share strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence between the individual agencies.

Regarding organizational hierarchy, the Afghan intelligence community is structured like a pyramid, with the powerful National Directorate of Security at the top. The NDS oversees Afghanistan’s overall intelligence machinery as it pertains to both internal and external security.

Though vested with substantial powers, the Afghan intelligence community has become heavily politicized and suffers from a lack of investment coupled with an old and inefficient bureaucracy. Afghanistan’s intelligence collection efforts are primarily focused on gathering HUMINT through long-standing networks of tribes, local commanders, traders, and government employees. This HUMINT is augmented with basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities.

The Five Eyes countries (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have done much to transform the Afghan intelligence community. However, more needs to be done to create professional, disciplined, and adequately equipped intelligence services. At present, arbitrary political appointments, a lack of professional intelligence schools, and the ongoing politicization of Afghanistan’s intelligence agencies have profoundly undermined their institutional integrity and credibility.

The Institutional History of Afghan Intelligence

Intelligence collection and analysis as organized tradecraft is a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan. It started with the creation of the Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat of the 18^th century King Abdul Rahman Khan. The founding father of modern Afghan intelligence is former Prime Minister and President Sardar Dawood Khan; he transformed Edara Zabt Ahwalaat Sedarat to establish the first-ever State Intelligence Services—Edara Estikhabarat Dawlati. This agency was later ideologically refined as communist governments took power with the help of the Soviet KGB, and renamed as KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD.

Today, a significant number of Afghan intelligence agents and officers are graduates of KGB training centers in Russia and former Soviet republics or satellite states such as Uzbekistan, East Germany, and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, police and military intelligence agencies were established during the communist period to conduct surveillance on political opponents, conduct counterintelligence operations and gather intelligence on criminals and crime syndicates in major urban centers.

The institutional history of the Afghan intelligence community has created legal and policy frameworks that are in dire need of reform. Updating and revising these frameworks to define and clarify the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the various intelligence agencies is essential to safeguard their legitimacy, integrity, and professionalism. At present, there is considerable overlap between the mandates and activities of Afghanistan’s military and civilian intelligence, especially in the areas of intelligence on criminal or terrorist activities, tactical-level intelligence, and strategic intelligence. These overlaps need to be clarified through a comprehensive, cross-agency review, which will serve as a road map for subsequent updates and revisions to the legal and policy frameworks used by the Afghan intelligence services.

Furthermore, robust investment is required to upgrade and equip intelligence training schools in the military and civilian sectors. These schools should be the Afghan intelligence community’s sole supplier of human capital to ensure job security, professionalism, and discipline while avoiding any politicization of the intelligence services. The only political appointees in positions of authority in the Afghan intelligence community should be the Director of the NDS and his first deputy; both should have a term limit of two to three years. The career professionals in the services must be immune from political appointments, while service chiefs and NDS personnel who have been discharged from service should be prohibited from engaging in any political or business activity for ten years. This will ensure that sensitive information they may have had access to will not be used for political or financial gain.

There is also the fact that the NDS is spread too thin. As such, there is a dire need to establish three new intelligence agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a counter-intelligence agency, and a joint intelligence committee consisting of the various intelligence service chiefs chaired by the President of Afghanistan. This improved institutional arrangement will clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency, improve oversight, increase inter-agency coordination, and enable each agency to better focus on its core mission.

The Intelligence Cycle and Modus Operandi

Afghanistan’s intelligence services currently lack a coherent methodology governing the collection and analysis of intelligence, and the delivery of final intelligence products. Little attention is paid to analyzing and corroborating raw intelligence, which is often presented as a final product. These shortcomings are primarily due to a lack of a coherent institutional culture and the absence of a system of intelligence development. The modus operandi of the three existing services needs to be upgraded with the right systems, procedures, and personnel. This process can start with the implementation of a robust intelligence development cycle, and clarification as to the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, and of departments within each agency.

Furthermore, the Afghan intelligence community would benefit from higher numbers of western-trained intelligence officers. Retirement incentives should be offered to older, KGB-trained officers. At the same time, existing intelligence training schools in Afghanistan need to update their curricula and increase their enrollment as older officers retire and demand for new officers rises.

Information Sharing and Coordination

While secrecy and information compartmentalization are fundamental aspects of the intelligence tradecraft, timely and effective sharing and coordination of information is an ongoing challenge for any intelligence service. While many improvements have been made with the establishment of coordination centers such as TAWHEED, PICC, and NASRAT, more needs to be done at the tactical and operational levels.

The fall of the provinces of Kunduz and Ghazni are examples of intelligence sharing failures in Afghanistan. Agencies were unable to coordinate and share intelligence regarding imminent Taliban attacks promptly. Information needs to be distributed in an efficient and timely manner to those with the proper capabilities to address the issue. Optimized inter- and intra-agency information sharing capabilities will change the face of the Afghan war.

Foreign Partnerships

Partnerships with external intelligence services are essential. Given Afghanistan’s geopolitical circumstances, the Afghan intelligence community can not afford to rely on a single partnership. Instead, it should diversify its foreign partnerships while distinguishing between strategic and non-strategic partners. The United States and the other Five Eye countries are examples of strategic partners.

The Afghan intelligence services should structure its foreign partnerships in three tiers. The first tier would be Afghanistan’s principal partners, such as the U.S. and the Five Eyes countries. The second tier should be comprised of the intelligence services of India, Russia, China, and neighboring countries. The third tier would include the rest of the world.

Paramilitary Forces

Like all intelligence agencies, Afghanistan retains a paramilitary force that is tasked with carrying out quick and effective counter-terrorism operations. These forces have been essential for actions taken against the Taliban, foreign terrorists, and Daesh (Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL). In the event of a reorganization or restructuring of the Afghan intelligence community, these forces and their operational capabilities should be maintained due to their critical role in counter-terrorism.

There is a critical need to improve inter-agency coordination when it comes to operational targeting, planning, and execution with other branches of Afghanistan’s security services. Due to the sensitive nature of operations carried out by paramilitary forces, there are often duplicate or overlapping operations. However, structures such as the Joint Services Operations Command (JSOC) can play an essential role in avoiding redundancies regarding efforts and resources.

SIGINT vs. HUMINT in Hybrid Warfare

The Afghan conflict has changed from insurgenct-proxy warfare to a hybrid war much like the ongoing conflict in the Donetsk and Donbass regions of Ukraine. Alongside covert involvement by Russia and Iran, Pakistan has employed a combination of proxy groups, psychological warfare operations (PsyOps), and economic blockades against Afghan forces, while simultaneously discrediting U.S. and NATO operations in the country. Much of the SIGINT Afghanistan has access to is provided by the U.S.-led coalition forces.

Afghanistan’s intelligence services primarily focus on developing intelligence products utilizing HUMINT capabilities and assets, albeit without much success given the significant number of attacks in major cities and military installations. A robust overhaul is needed to reform and develop full-spectrum capabilities that will enable Afghan government forces to counter hybrid warfare tactics employed by the Taliban and their foreign backers. Integrating HUMINT and SIGINT is a critical step that will improve the efficacy of intelligence products on the battlefield. The Afghan war won’t be won by drones, PC-12s, and other aerial capabilities alone; ground-based networks and sources can have a significant impact when coupled with the proper capabilities and resources.

Oversight and Control

During the eighties and nineties, the Afghan intelligence services—KAM, AGSA, and KHAD—were notorious for atrocities such as arbitrary arrests, mass executions, and forced disappearances. The predecessor of these agencies, Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat Sedarat, was a tool used for domestic surveillance of political opponents and dissidents of Afghanistan’s kings. Accordingly, intelligence and spycraft are looked at with suspicion by the Afghan people, as it brings back memories of KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD. Thus far, the NDS has been successful, to an extent, in its efforts to improve its reputation, but much more needs to be done.

The Afghan intelligence community’s budget is in need of a robust legal and policy framework to ensure accountability, both operationally and fiscally. In a democratic state, intelligence agencies are required to operate within the rule of law and uphold values like human rights. To their credit, the National Directorate of Security and its sister agencies have done much in this area, but more is required to improve their reputational standing. Measures such as quarterly reports to the parliamentary intelligence committee, ensuring access to detainees by domestic and international human rights organizations, and robust oversight by and reporting to the presidency and the National Security Council are all measures that would contribute to an increase in public and international confidence in Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

Information Trade and Budget Controls

Information is an asset, and if corroborated and verifiable, can be a game changer for Afghanistan. However, there is much more disinformation and rumors than solid, actionable intelligence. Raw data that is not put through a proper intelligence cycle before being included in a final intelligence product is virtually useless. In the intelligence tradecraft, most of the raw information turns out to be rumors and uncorroborated hearsay.

Meanwhile, large sums of money are spent to develop sources and produce intelligence products with little parliamentary or presidential oversight. The operational budgets of all three existing services under parliamentary and presidential oversight need to be assessed using a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the value of final intelligence products against the costs required to develop those products. While a degree of secrecy surrounding the budgets of intelligence services is warranted, there must be proper oversight to provide a check-and-balance mechanism to monitor corruption, inefficiency, and ensure a positive return on investment.

Intelligence in War: Fixing and Fitting Intelligence in the Afghan War was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hasn’t provided any details of the meeting, the visit is indicative of an Iranian effort to maintain relations with the Afghan government as the government negotiates with the Taliban. Furthermore, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has confirmed that Tehran and the Taliban were previously engaged in direct talks. On December 31, the Iranian government confirmed that a Taliban delegation had visited Iran for another round of negotiations.

Tehran is not only hedging by maintaining a dialogue with the radical extremist group; it’s assuming the role of a disruptor in the peace process to ensure its interests are secured in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and a select group of regional stakeholders. While the U.S. includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in its deliberations, it is excluding key stakeholders—Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

The Iranian government justifies its disruptive involvement by citing “legitimate concerns” regarding the rise of militant extremist groups in Afghanistan. Tehran previously adopted a similar approach in its engagements with Islamabad, which provides aid and haven to the Taliban. Iran’s willingness to engage with the Taliban is not unprecedented—the relationship dates back to 1994 when the Taliban was under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Relations continued under Omar’s successor, Akhtar Mansoor, who was killed in May of 2016 while returning to Pakistan after visiting Iran. According to his Pakistani passport, Mansoor spent two months in Iran before being targeted by a U.S. drone strike on the highway leading into Pakistan from the country’s Iranian border. 

Tehran does not want to sever ties with the Afghan Government while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with a resurgent Taliban, which is in control of more territory than at any time since 2001. Tehran considers the rise of militant Islamic extremist groups to be a key “legitimate concern,” along with the threat of a Taliban takeover of the Afghan government and the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran, and ensures a steady stream of black market U.S. dollars into the Iranian economy.

Ensuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.

In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.). 

Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow. 

The rise of Salafi extremist groups—facilitated with support from Gulf states—is another phenomenon motivating Iran to engage with the Taliban. Iranian overtures to the Taliban are an effort to ensure militant Islamist ideology imported into Afghanistan does not flow to Iran. Russia exhibited similar concerns when the Kremlin claimed that “Daesh [Islamic State] imported into Afghanistan” had expanded over Northern Faryab and Jawzjan provinces along the Afghan border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia reportedly met with Taliban representatives to negotiate a settlement agreement, as well as coordinate efforts to block and topple any Daesh activity in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. 

Beyond fomenting ongoing insecurity within Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been training Afghan refugees as Fatemiyoun mercenaries to fight against Daesh in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Thousands of vulnerable refugees who are devout Shias have joined the Fatemiyoun ranks to change their families’ legal status as refugees in Iran. They had reportedly returned to Afghanistan to counter Salafi extremism activity alongside the Taliban and combat militant Islamist activity in the western region of Afghanistan on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard.

Iran’s cooperation with a hardline Sunni extremist group like the Taliban group to counter threats to its interests in Afghanistan is a dangerous strategy. Going forward, Iran must act strategically; history has proven that engagement with the Taliban along with the selective use of terrorism will not achieve the end-result Tehran is expecting. The Iranian government must respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, recognize the Afghan state, and develop a bilateral relationship based on culture, trade, and legitimate interests for Tehran within a stable Afghanistan. 

In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.

Iran must play the role of a good neighbor to Afghanistan; the latter has never posited a threat to Iranian national security.  Iranian concern over the activities of Salafi extremist groups in Afghanistan is a legitimate one, however bypassing the Afghan Government in favor of non-state actors will not alleviate this concern, however justified. 

An Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies research finding shows that a majority of the Afghan elite (between 57 and 66.4 percent) has expressed satisfaction with Iran’s social, religious, and economic policies. However, the same survey findings show that 55 percent of the Afghan elite have expressed dissatisfaction towards the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political and security policies as they relate to Afghanistan. Iran has a role in the Afghan peace process, but it must act in good faith. 

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, a mineral-based economy is one of the few options available when it comes to establishing a solid foundation on which to develop Afghanistan’s economy. The development of the country’s mineral sector has been hampered by insecurity, political instability, poor policy direction, the absence of a basic legal framework, and a lack of necessary infrastructure and transit agreements with neighboring countries. However, Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present an alternative to the country’s increasing over-reliance on an economy dependent on foreign aid.

Afghanistan’s mineral deposits consist of metals and non-metals. Many strategically essential minerals can be found in the country, including beryllium (used in airplanes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and spacecraft), uranium, lithium, and niobium (a rare soft-metal use in semiconductor production). According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is estimated at around (US) $1 trillion. This figure is based on previously conducted Swedish, British, and Soviet geological surveys, in addition to more recent studies performed by the USGS. In total, however, only about 30% of Afghanistan’s territory was covered by previous geological surveys. Even though the earlier Swedish, British, and Soviet studies have been updated with more recent aerial geophysical and geochemical studies, a complete geological survey is required to understand the full potential of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits.

Existing data only accounts for 30% of the country, and isn’t comprehensive enough to confidently estimate the value and depth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. Furthermore, a complete geological study of Afghanistan would enable for a more accurate determination of the economic feasibility of developing the country’s mineral extraction and distribution capabilities. In other words, all that is known from existing geological surveys is that there are signs of what could be a substantial presence of minerals elsewhere in the country, but the details of specific deposits remain unknown. Already, doubts have been raised that Afghan mineral deposits could be economically unviable to develop resource extraction capabilities around. While these doubts may sway potential investors, the country’s known mineral deposits remain attractive from an investor’s standpoint.

There is a near-unanimous consensus in Afghanistan that the country must develop its mineral sector. When it comes to the pace of such development, however, there are three primary schools of thought within Afghan policy-making circles and the country’s political establishment. In the first camp are those who believe that the mineral sector development should be pursued without delay. They argue that Afghanistan must supplement declining foreign aid with revenues drawn from mineral extraction. Those in the second group posit that mineral sector development should be prioritized based on the revenue-generating potential of individual deposits. The third group opposes any progress until the political and security situation in the country stabilizes so that Afghans can explore any development in a more secure environment. Given the economic circumstances, combined with the urgent need to build a domestic economy that isn’t dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan has no choice but to move aggressively to develop its nascent mining industry.

Fast-paced development requires up-to-date and complete geological information concerning mineral deposits. However, such data is unavailable. Providing access to a comprehensive geological survey is a significant challenge, and undertaking such a study is a costly exercise. A complete study will be impossible without the outside investment, legal reform, and decisive political action that is needed to build a strong and apolitical Afghanistan Geological Survey, an agency which currently is deeply politicized and has a limited functional role, having been monopolized by a generation of Soviet-trained geologists.

Traditionally, it is the responsibility of the state to provide potential investors with the necessary geological survey data. Geological studies are essential when it comes to soliciting both private and public sector investment, at home and abroad. Complete geological surveys are expensive, costing millions of dollars the Afghan government cannot afford. This is where Afghanistan’s foreign aid donor community can play a crucial role.

To date, the Afghan government has received eight tenders and awarded two significant contracts with support from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.K. Department for International Development (DfID), and the World Bank. These include tenders for developing the Aynak copper mine, the Hajigak iron ore deposit, the Badakhshan gold mine, the Shaida copper mine, and the Ghazni gold and copper deposits. Almost all have their flaws, but the initiation of bidding processes and the awarding of contracts nevertheless sends a strong signal to the global investor community that the Afghan mining industry is open for business.

Recently, however, the National Unity Government (NUG) has announced its decision to review all received bids and awarded contracts. This announcement sends the wrong signal to investors, on the top of Afghanistan’s myriad of security, political, and infrastructure problems. It is well within the Afghan government’s right to review or even revise existing contracts and bids, however, halting the process altogether will be disastrous for the development of Afghanistan’s mining industry. All face shortcomings or obstacles concerning feasibility clauses, energy and water shortages, human capital challenges, and an absence of transit agreements, to name a few. The best way to address these shortcomings, however, is through bilateral negotiations and contract revision mechanisms, rather than canceling bids outright and effectively shutting down the bidding process.

On the other hand, artisanal and small-scale mining (for construction materials and precious stones, for example) remain a source of financial revenue for the Afghan government but, at the same time, are a significant driver of instability in regions of the country where government presence is little-to-nonexistent. The black market economy from these mines fuels the conflict within the country, particularly in the northern and eastern provinces. Today, part of the unrest in regions in the country’s north and east—such as the Logar province—is due to local rivalries over mineral revenues from small mineral deposits. In the short-term, the best way to tackle these issues is through the gradual incorporation of smaller-scale mining operations into the country’s overall strategy, as the rule of law and the reach of the country’s security forces extend to all parts of the country.

The Afghan government institutions responsible for the development of the country’s mineral sector (i.e. the MOMP and AGS) have little-to-no experience with managing the tendering process and the awarding of large mining contracts. The eight existing tenders, along with many of the awarded contracts represent are Afghanistan’s first experiences awarding substantial mineral rights contracts. They were solicited or awarded with technical expertise and assistance provided by foreign partners including the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force for Business Stability Operation (TFBSO), the World Bank, and DfID, amongst others. Many contracts have been awarded in a mostly noncompetitive environment where global mining corporations such as MCC or CNPCI, with years of experience negotiating large-scale mineral rights contracts, are entering into negotiations with Afghan officials lacking the necessary negotiating skills or expertise.

On the other hand, certain circles within the Afghan public and private sectors oppose awarding mining contracts to foreign firms and are advocating for the establishment of large state-owned oil and gas, iron, and copper corporations—possibly employing a public-private partnership model. However, this view loses sight of the fact that the Afghan labor force lacks the necessary technical expertise, and Afghanistan itself lacks the necessary financial capital to pursue a state-owned industrial model. The necessary technical knowledge, skilled human capital, and financial resources can only come from foreign firms for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan’s existing state-owned enterprises—such as the Afghan Gas Enterprise (AGE) and the Afghan Fertilizer Factory in the country’s north—are struggling financially and operationally, suffering from antiquated machinery and incompetent management resulting from years of conflict and instability.

The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) has been primarily occupied in recent years with the management and awarding of small-scale constructing material and precious stone extraction contracts through the MOMP Cadastre department. However, the role of such an vital institution shouldn’t be confined to the awarding of minor contracts. Instead, the MOMP should be empowered to oversee the proper implementation, oversight and control, audit, and financial revenue management, and technical oversight of all large and small mineral extraction rights contracts. The ministry is in desperate need of a severe overhaul if there is to be any substantive, long-term development in the Afghan mineral sector.

The Afghan tax and royalty regimes are further obstacles to the development of the country’s mining industry. The country’s tax structure is burdensome for investors and is internationally non-competitive—the country’s taxes are much higher than those in South American or African states. Royalty payments for the Aynak Copper Mine are set at nearly twelve percent, and rates for the Hajigak Iron Ore mine are around eight percent, far higher than international norms—which are between four and six percent. Simply put, the financial and economic regime presently governing the Afghan mineral economy is not attractive to potential investors. These factors must be changed if any long-term, sustainable development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector are to be seriously considered.

Another major obstacle to the development of the Afghan mineral sector is a lack a lack of necessary infrastructure to facilitate the export of minerals. Afghanistan is poorly connected to regional ports, both due to the country’s geography and the current security situation. An integrated infrastructure development strategy for the establishment of resource corridors to ports in the region as well as the construction of energy pipelines to power the plants for processing minerals before export. Such an integrated infrastructure development program would require billions of dollars in capital and technical expertise that is presently lacking in the country. The Afghan government should aggressively engage in resource diplomacy with its neighbors to gain access to ports to export commodities to international markets.

Despite these challenges, the Afghan mineral sector remains an attractive opportunity for both domestic and foreign investors. None of the difficulties mentioned above are formidable enough that they cannot be addressed by measures gradually enacted by the Afghan government. In the immediate-term, Afghanistan must present a strategic framework for the development of its nascent mineral sector—one that attracts both domestic and international investment. This framework must include reform of the country’s legal system, in addition to providing policy direction to attract foreign investors.

While Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present a tremendous economic opportunity for the country, the government must prioritize the mineral deposits it intends to put to domestic and international tender. Just a few successful bids and their successful implementation would serve as a pilot project, paving the way for further investment—a necessary step for the development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector.

Are Afghanistan’s Mineral Deposits the Answer to the Country’s Economic Woes? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan’s dream for a sustainable peace remains unmet since the country’s establishment. Amir Habibullah—son of Amir Abdur Rahman, the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan—recognized the need for national reform and reconciliation before his assassination nearly a century ago.

Since then, however, Afghanistan has experienced neither sustainable nor long-lasting peace. At present, the Taliban primary challenge to peace and stability in Afghanistan. All efforts at resolving the current conflict through negotiations have ended without success. These initiatives of the past seventeen years include high-level talks with the Taliban, reintegration programs, track-2, and track-1.5 diplomatic interactions, and local peace agreements. However, the fact remains that the policies mentioned above have not been implemented in a unified, continuous, and integrated manner sufficient enough to be called a process. Instead, efforts have been undertaken in isolation from one another.

My recent study on the peace process includes a nation-wide survey on the peace process for the first time in Afghanistan and indicates that all prior attempts at a negotiated peace have been failures. One might argue that judging the results of the peace process might be premature at this stage, given how the efforts are still ongoing. However, to diagnose the current status, it is important to understand public sentiment towards past efforts. More than 63.3% of the respondents opined that previous attempts at a peace settlement all failed. In this context, female respondents demonstrated a higher tendency (65.6%) than male respondents (61.6%).

Similarly, Uzbeks (73.3%), Tajiks (70.7%), and Hazaras (73.5%) demonstrated a higher tendency to say that peace efforts have failed, when compared to Pashtuns (49.3%). Multivariate analysis also shows that this association was robust and held after controlling for demographic and attitudinal factors. The curve of perception about the failure of the peace process goes up as the level of education increases. Additionally, respondents who said peace is possible were less likely (61.5%) to assess the peace process as a failure, compared to those who said peace is impossible (75.0%).

Similarly, the historical cases of peace agreements in Pakistan involving the Taliban’s sister organization, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), indicates that peace agreements with TTP are failed. The negotiations in Pakistan have some characteristics in common with the efforts made in Afghanistan. First, only a few peace agreements with TTP lasted longer than a few months. Second, after every agreement, TTP demanded further concessions. Third, the agreements led to further empowerment of the Pakistani Taliban. Bushra Gohar, a former Pakistani MP, said that Afghanistan must learn lessons from the failed agreements with Pakistani Taliban during the seventh Herat Security Dialogue. Gohar reiterated that these agreements in Pakistan only resulted in furthering the Talibanization (radicalization) of Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has become increasingly aggressive and has been demanding more concessions. Besides the withdrawal of international forces, the end goal of the Taliban is the replacement of the current political system of Afghanistan with a theocratic regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In contrast to the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States have taken a softer approach, and have given in to many of the Taliban’s demands. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban leadership sought amnesty for their terrorist activities. However, just a few years later the group demanded that it be recognized as a party to the conflict in Afghanistan as a legitimate actor, similar to how the PLO is regarded by the international community, rather than as a terrorist organization. Presently, the Taliban’s demands are indicative of the group’s re-radicalization. If the Taliban’s demands are agreed to, it will mean the restructuring of the entire Afghan political order that has been painstakingly constructed post-9/11.

On the contrary, the Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. have experienced setbacks regarding their negotiating position. The first setback was the violation of Afghanistan-owned and led peace process. This principle was violated with the initiation of direct talks between the U.S. and the Taliban alongside the last Moscow Format.

The violation of the three conditions for peace talks with the Taliban was the second setback. Before recent direct U.S. overtures to the Taliban, the international community and the Afghan government had three fundamental conditions for peace with the Taliban. The group must end all relations with terrorist groups; Taliban militants must lay down their arms; and the group must accept the constitutional order of Afghanistan, which has been the basis of political developments over the last several years.

While President Ashraf Ghani made an unconditional peace offer to the Taliban, the proposal highlighted four points: (a) Ensuring rights and duties of all citizens, particularly those of women, based on the constitution; (b) Accepting Afghanistan’s constitution, including its own provisions for amendments; (c) Ensuring activities of the civil services and the security and defense forces based on the law and; (d) Dismantling any armed group which is linked with foreign terrorist networks and transnational criminal organizations. However, it is unclear whether the points discussed above are preconditions or end conditions for the peace talks.

The current talks between the Taliban and the United States were initiated under circumstances where the Taliban has not accepted the legitimacy of the Afghan constitution. Furthermore, the group has failed to denounced terrorism. Similarly, the Government of Afghanistan has announced a 12-member negotiating team and a High Advisory Board for Peace. Both of these bodies substantially lack representation from civil society, women, youth, and academia. Unfortunately, the current scenario will not lead to sustainable peace.

The Peace Process in Afghanistan is a Failure was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ISI Directorate in Pakistan has enjoyed unparalleled power since its creation in 1948. As the ISI Director-General is selected by the Military Branch, the agency has remained steeped in army and military affairs for seventy years. From its outset, the ISI has backed terrorist organizations that provide strategic depth within India and greater influence in Afghanistan.

These efforts are designed to promote Pakistan’s regional hegemony—all while wreaking havoc on the national security interests of both India and Afghanistan. ISI support and aid for several terrorist organizations, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, have resulted in international condemnation of the ISI’s failures to prevent “systematic and persistent human rights violations,” albeit with little effect.

The ISI Regularly Fails to Implement Counter-Terrorism Policy

Within Pakistan, terrorist attacks have declined in recent years following legislation and ISI counter-terrorism policies enacted between 2013 and 2016. However, the ISI’s continued covert support for extremists has fostered a growing radical community and new splinter groups that have spread throughout the region.

After former President Musharraf’s pledge to join the War on Terror, the ISI vacillated between continued sponsorship of extremist groups in support of its interests and cracking down on radical anti-ISI groups within Pakistan. Ultimately, due to inconsistencies in its counter-terrorism campaign, Pakistan’s intelligence agency was quietly listed as a terrorist organization in U.S. military documents, instructing that ISI officers be treated the same as terrorists.

The ISI is plagued by a persistent hesitancy to destroy terrorist groups, instead hoping to nurture them and use them in the future against Pakistan’s regional rival, India. According to Pakistan’s police officials, ISI officers regularly halt investigations involving terrorist groups they support, further perpetuating violent extremism so long as it serves to enhance Pakistan’s regional influence.

What This Means for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan

Why does Pakistan, through the ISI, support terrorist groups? Following the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s leaders became almost fanatical about one thing: the idea that India sought to destroy the Pakistani state. While this claim has been repeatedly disputed by India and has overall been assessed as unfounded, Pakistan and its ISI have worked to limit India’s regional influence as much as possible.

Often, this has come in the form of support for anti-India terrorist groups—even at the expense of Pakistan’s security and internal radicalization. These terrorist groups have been released to carry out attacks in both India and Jammu and Kashmir while providing protections to the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan—using the state as a proxy in its perceived conflict with India.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s primary goal is to prevent India from gaining ground and obtaining too much influence. As the Taliban vies for more control, the ISI has provided it with military aid to ensure Afghanistan remains in a state of perpetual instability. Should the Taliban gain power, Pakistan will have bought itself a staunch ally in the region, with the potential to form a strategic partnership against India. Should the Taliban fail to gain power, Pakistan will have done its best to destabilize the country and prevent a potential strong governmental alliance with India. Pakistan is effectively hedging its bets on radical groups to foment insecurity within Afghanistan, as a more stable neighbor that decides to align itself with India is perceived as a threat to Pakistan’s national security, at least from the Pakistani perspective.

On December 11, 2018, in a surprising turn of events, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, acknowledged that the establishment of an Afghan peace is a “shared responsibility” of Pakistan and its neighbors. A “solution through dialogue” would be a step in the right direction for the region, despite the ISI’s recent subversive actions in Jammu and Kashmir. Currently, the words of Pakistan’s intelligence agency and senior government officials seem contradictory. While the state allegedly seeks peace in the region, the ISI remains committed to subversive activities that will foment ongoing regional insecurity.

The Future of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

If the attempts at an Afghan peace and a combined effort towards normalization in relations between India and Pakistan are to be successful, the ISI and the Pakistani state must renounce support for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other militant groups to be taken seriously. Such a declaration must occur before terrorism, and interstate conflicts further destabilize the region. According to the International Crisis Group, counter-terrorism in the region will be ineffective as long as the ISI continues to make distinctions between “good” and “bad” terrorist groups.

With is decades-long support for terrorist organizations targeting India, it will be difficult for the agency to break from this pattern any time soon. Instead, it will be up to the state to align its intelligence agency with the government’s regional goals. Without the ISI’s confrontation of extremist ideologies and a reassessment of its alliances, radicalization will continue to threaten regional security and inflame its perceived conflict with India. Until the “threat of India” has been recognized as a falsehood, it’s likely that the ISI will continue to build a haven for extremism.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Contributes to Regional Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan itself contributes a negligible amount to its national security and defense budget. Many are questioning the affordability and sustainability of maintaining an extensive national security apparatus, given Afghanistan’s slow economic development and substantial levels of poverty. Furthermore, the country lacks an indigenous defense industry. The most basic of the military’s needs, from boots to ammunition, must be imported from abroad—often at a high cost.

Afghanistan currently has a military, an intelligence service, and a police force that it can ill-afford—especially when coupled with militia forces recently created by the government. NATO commanders and Afghan military leaders are looking into possibly downsizing the ANSF beyond 2021. Furthermore, the Afghan National Budget is obliged under the terms of the Chicago conference to contribute $500 million in ANSF funding, but is under tremendous domestic constraints: a shortfall of domestic revenue, declining foreign aid, capital flight, growing insecurity, and persistent corruption. Due to these constraints, the Afghan government has called on the international community to supplement its commitments.

According to NATO, the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the army, air force, and national police force numbers approximately 345,000-strong. This figure can be expected to increase or decrease depending on the threat level and state of security in the country. Depending on the threat level within Afghanistan, this number can be expected to increase and this number is expected either to decline or increase depending on the security and threat level in the country.

Overseeing the sustainability and funding of the national security apparatus is primarily the job of the Afghan Treasury. However, the government is struggling to fund its non-military budget, even when defense expenditures aren’t taken into account. Within the ANSF, there are substantial challenges in the areas of budgeting, financial management, procurement, logistics, and expenditure arrangements.

Most of the financial management and procurement for Afghanistan’s national security apparatus is carried out through the Combined Security Transition Command for Afghanistan, also known as the CSTC-A. The Afghan military and police forces have a long way to go to overcome these challenges. To do so, there must be effective budget and financial management systems in place, overseen by properly-trained specialists.

In his memoirs, a former Soviet army general wrote that Afghans were tough warriors, but terrible military planners and strategists, The general was in Afghanistan providing assistance to the Soviet-aligned Afghan National Army in combatting the Mujaheddin. According to the general, Soviet military advisors found themselves repeatedly reminding Afghan military officers of specific battle tactics and strategies. As a result, Soviet forces found themselves having to take administrative affairs into their own hands. Illiteracy, a lack of intrinsic motivation, a culture of nepotism and corruption that centered around family and tribal relations has been the primary impediment to the formation of an effective Afghan national security apparatus.

Now, more than ever, Afghanistan is in dire need of of a politically impartial and highly trained corps of officers who are able to fill the shoes of U.S. military leaders in the country and those of other NATO members. Only then will the ANSF be able to take a strategic approach in the effort to deprive the Taliban of influence and drive it from its territories.

From a budgetary perspective, Afghanistan’s national security apparatus must be maintained in a sustainable and financially viable manner. Currently, the Afghan military, police, and security services are entirely unsustainable given the economic and financial constraints of the Afghan government. Based on fiscal and revenue projections, Afghanistan’s economy is years away from being able to meet the funding requirements to maintain its defense and security expenditures at their current levels.

Afghanistan’s Budget and National Security Expenditures

In an interview with the PBS program 60 Minutes, the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, U.S. General John F. Campbell (retired), noted that the country will, at some point, have to plan for a future decrease the number of their forces due to budgetary limitations. Such a decision will depend drastically on the political developments, peace process and threat level within the country. All these factors will play an important role in driving the security expenditures of Afghanistan higher or lower than its current levels.

For the Afghan government to be able to cover the cost of the army, air force, police, and intelligence services, the country must economize the national budget and produce a road map based on the budgets and financial requirements of the country’s national security institutions.

The Afghan government should also concentrate on building domestic industrial capacity to reduce national expenditures. This requires an in-depth analysis, broad-based political support and agreement and finally a commitment from the international community to support this process.

Financial Management, Procurement, and Logistics

The Afghan National Security Forces lack a centralized and digitized system for managing budgetary and financial matters, procurement activities, and logistical requirements. This deficiency has contributed to rampant corruption throughout the ANSF.

Afghanistan’s military and national police have been repeatedly accused of corruption in connection with a range of supplier contracts including contracts for boots and uniforms. Recently, millions of dollars worth of medical equipment and medicines were embezzled from Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan Army Hospital.

One of the key mission objectives of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is to assist the Afghan National Security Forces build their financial management, procurement and logistical capabilities, however many challenges remain.

The Role of Civilian Managers and Leaders in the ANSF

The ANSF are largely unwelcoming to civilians who undertake key administrative, policy, financial management, and logistical roles within defense and security institutions. In some instances, civilian professionals have been forced out of the ANSF, leaving the military and security forces themselves to manage administrative, policy, and financial affairs. However, they often lack the capacity to effectively manage these key functional areas.

Afghanistan’s national security institutions require the expertise and resources that, often, only civilians can provide. In the long run, with the establishment of military institutes and colleges, this function might be handed over to military personnel. In the short-term, however, there is a dire need for civilian expertise within the Afghan national security establishment.

Transparency and Accountability in Security Expenditures

It goes without saying that every military and security institution is required to ensure information is kept secret, including budgetary statistics. However, Afghanistan as a democracy, and like any other. it has to strike a balance between transparency and national security concerns. Doing so means that the Afghan public must be aware of the amount of money their defense and security agencies are spending. Continuing to keep such information confidential is a return to Soviet practices.

Publicly, little is known about the budgetary and financial management processes of the Afghan National Security Forces today. This is partly due to the fact that many financial resources are coming through the U.S. and NATO military channels, and partly due to the opaque nature of Afghanistan’s national security institutions.

The institutions of the ANSF are the institutions of a democratic state. As such, their budgets and finances should be publicly available both for scrutiny and support from voters. Only through popular support and public trust will Afghanistan’s national security institutions succeed in meeting their prime objective of providing security to the Afghan public.

Afghanistan’s Forgotten Indigenous Defense Industry

Afghanistan lacks the industrial capacity required for a domestic arms industry suitable for outfitting an expanding military and and security services. The basic munitions factories that were constructed by the British, the Turks, and the Soviets Kabul were destroyed, looted, or became inoperable during the turbulent period in the early 1990s. The U.S. and NATO have built only a few facilities for the repair and maintenance of Afghan military equipment.

Building a defense and military industry for Afghanistan is key to reducing the expenditures of the ANSF. The development of a domestic arms industry would also reduce Afghanistan’s dependency on foreign imports for basic equipment and munitions.

Significant financial and technical investment is required to revive arms manufacturing in Afghanistan. However, doing so would be the first key step in economizing the Afghan national security budget.

A Framework for a Fiscally Sustainable Force

Currently, the Afghan National Security Forces are financially unsustainable for the Afghan government. In the medium to long-term, the Afghan government will be forced to decrease the size of its military forces and security services unless Afghanistan’s economy suddenly improves substantially, a scenario which is unlikely.

The Afghan government should focus on a four-pillar framework to develop economically sustainable military and police forces:

1. Develop financial management and logistical capabilities within all Afghan national security institutions through establishing standardized financial management, procurement, and logistical systems with trained personnel.
2. Re-evaluate the entire security apparatus of the country from a financial and budget sustainability perspective. Based on the findings of this evaluation, the government should take steps to economize the expenditures of the Afghan military and police.
3. Further political dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbors and adversarial armed groups through negotiations and other mechanisms to reduce the current threat level and reduce violence in the country. Doing so will enable a reduction in the size the Afghan military, police, and intelligence services. An over-militarized Afghan state is not beneficial to any of actors within the country.
4. Launch a comprehensive investment program of investment to develop an indigenous defense industry.

The Fiscally Unsustainable Path of the Afghan Military and Security Services was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commander Alipour—known as “Commander Sword” by his supporters because of his exploits in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan’s inland provinces—was detained because of accusations of human rights abuse. His arrest follows the detention of a powerful police chief in the North, Nizamuddin Qaisari, who was arrested by the orders of President Ashraf Ghani as part of a crackdown on unruly officers behaving like rogue militia leaders. That incident also led to violent protests.

What is worth noting in both these incidents is the overly explicit ethnic fervor shown by the supporters of both the men who were objecting their arrests. The supporters of Alipour and Qaisari were predominantly from Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups, to which Alipour and Qaisari respectively belong. The intensity of the protests forced the government to walk back Alipour’s arrest. In Qaisari’s case, indictment proceedings of current vice president and Uzbek strongman Rashid Dostum on charges of sexual abuse had to be overlooked to let him return to the country from a self-imposed exile in Turkey to pacify pro-Qaisari protests. The unrest had, by then, paralyzed daily life in many northern provinces.

Another individual with a similar reputation as a rogue official, Kandahar’s police chief Abdul Raziq, was left unscathed until he was assassinated by the Taliban in November 2018. Raziq—now hailed as a national hero after his assassination—was no martyr. Although Raziq was spared from the crackdown largely because of his role in ensuring Kandahar’s security against the Taliban—and tacit support from the United States—his being spared from arrest highlights discrepancies in the treatment of individuals of different ethnic groups.

Raziq, unlike Alipour and Qaisari, was Pashtun, as is President Ashraf Ghani and the majority of his aides and advisors. Although the men are members of different Pashtun tribal confederations—Raziq was Durani while President Ghani is Ghilzai—the incident accentuates the privilege Raziq enjoyed due to his belonging to the same ethnic group as the president.

The peace talks with the Taliban have reached a critical juncture.

Zalmai Khalilzad, the veteran Afghan-American diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, has returned as U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy to hasten along the negotiation process. During this critical phase, attention must be paid to the ethnically-charged uproar engulfing Kabul following Alipour’s arrest. This is especially important due to the ambiguity of the situation.

The content of the peace talks remains a matter of debate even between the U.S. envoy and his Afghan hosts in the National Unity Government. The opacity of the negotiations could create anxiety among sections of Afghan society that are wary of giving the Taliban too generous of a deal. The content and nature of any future negotiations remains unknown, both to those involved and to outside observers, according to the head of Washington-based American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann in a recent discussion he attended at the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies.

Bellicose and opportunistic individuals among non-Pashtuns, similar to Alipour and Qaisari, might proliferate and see a boost to their popularity if a peace deal with the Taliban and their return to political dominance in any form put their ethnic groups in potential or actual harm.

What is more at stake—apart from safeguarding the delicate ethnic balance—is sustaining the advancements made by women, the civil society, and Afghanistan’s youth in post-Bonn Agreement Afghanistan. In the words of activist and former government official Shaharzad Akbar, what should be achieved through a deal is “an expansion of opportunities, not their curtailment.” Akbar added “if today a girl in Faryab cannot go to school, if in Helmand a girl is unable to study in a university, we want them to have this opportunity. Not a girl who is already going to school in Bamyan to be deprived of this right.”

A Hastily-Negotiated Peace Deal with the Taliban is a Slippery Slope

In a recent survey of over two thousand individuals from Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 90 percent of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the Taliban’s style of governance. To many who oppose the group’s politics and ideology, the Taliban’s blend of Islamic fundamentalism and tribal hierarchy might be palatable if they form a political party similar in nature to the parties formed by other militant groups from the Soviet resistance era. However, giving over too many concessions may lead to unforeseeable backlash, including by ordinary Afghans.

Over-concession would threaten the advancements in Afghan society made possible by an international commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction that has endured for over seventeen years. The Taliban’s return through an overly-generous power-sharing arrangement made possible by a hasty deal by U.S. envoy Khalilzad—allowing for the U.S. military withdrawal the U.S. president is impatient to achieve—will likely aggravate segments of society that view the group as a tribal outfit and political misfit.

Both the Taliban’s deeds and words do little to reinforce their claims of politico-ideological reform and a move away from the dogmatism demonstrated during the late 1990s. The Taliban’s online rhetoric grows harsher the more it nears what the group perceives as a military victory against the U.S. and Afghan security forces. This perception is reinforced by the constant unidirectional plea for peace from the U.S. and the Afghan governments that emboldens the group. The Taliban swiftly condemns anyone who contradicts their official pronouncements. Early in November, at a conference in Moscow to which the Taliban sent a delegation, the group issued statements demanding respect for the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Such rhetoric should be taken into account when considering whether the Taliban has genuinely reformed.

Any peace deal should include strong guarantees to prevent the Taliban—who’ve shown a penchant for totalitarian rule—from gaining too much power. This is vital for preserving social dialogue on important issues such as women’s rights, freedom of expression, and civic equality—among all ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

A recent statement by the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) gives some reassurance as to such guarantees through an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led negotiation process. The statement reiterates respect to the Afghan Constitution as a fundamental starting point. However, U.S. envoy Khalilzad has so far ostensibly circumvented the government in Kabul by directly engaging in talks with the Taliban’s political office in Doha.

More importantly, there is suspicion regarding Khalilzad himself who is not known for being impartial in his past dealings and has previously expressed favorable views about the Taliban. Members of the main anti-Taliban group, the Northern Alliance, might be reluctant to cooperate with him because Khalilzad has made efforts to politically sideline the group in the past—about which he elaborates effusively in his book, The Envoy. At present, sitting with Khalilzad would be akin to a “fool me twice” scenario for most of these actors.

The U.S. strategy should be depersonalized—with an impartial diplomat essential for doing so. Khalilzad himself could be seen as ethnically biased as he belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group. Any deal struck by Khalilzad, even if it is of sound basis, will be treated with suspicion by other Afghan ethnic groups. Further, nothing endangers the credibility of a peace deal more than a prevailing doubt concerning the intentions behind it. Replacing Khalilzad as U.S. envoy would go a long way in inviting confidence that the interests of all ethnic groups will be taken into consideration.

Projecting respect for equality is paramount to ensure the implementation of a sustainable agreement that won’t result in a civil war in the future. If any one ethnic group is perceived as receiving special treatment, feelings of insecurity will increase among the other groups. Historically—in Afghanistan and throughout the world—such insecurity has led to armed resistance and violence. Should history repeat itself in this way, the current stalemate with the Taliban may be seen in a nostalgic light.

The Political Ramifications of Trump’s Haste to Make Peace with the Taliban was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan has been plagued with four decades of war and conflict. Afghans are understandably wary of any notion of manufactured peace. It has been understood, to varying degrees, that a cessation of the ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the elected Afghan government can only be brought about by both parties coming to the negotiating table.

In early November in Moscow, Russia came closer to achieving this than any state has previously. The Kremlin hosted representatives from the Taliban and the High Peace Council—the committee formed to oversee such talks on behalf of the Afghan government. Among the representatives in attendance was an observer from the United States embassy, in addition to delegates from Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. Despite that these latest talks resulted in no concluding successes, the fact that both major parties merely came to the negotiating together was a success in-and-of-itself and certainly indicates a more productive dialogue going forward into 2019.

Despite the initial optimism going forward, however, these talks highlight a more disturbing trend, not just for Afghanistan, but for the rules-based global order; revisionism in U.S. foreign policy. Attempts to bring in the less hard-line members of the Taliban was a direct result of President Obama’s Afghan policy in 2011, the strategy was jointly implemented and overseen by the U.S. State Department and General Stanley McCrystal, then-commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has shifted considerably.

The shift in U.S. policy from the policy initiatives of the Bush administration resulted in several near-breakthroughs throughout the campaign, but the Taliban were reluctant to engage with both the U.S. and Afghan governments. The opening of a regional Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar, with US support, was a seen as a positive sign; that the Taliban were receptive to potential discussions.

Before anything more meaningful could take place, however, then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that there would be no talks with the Taliban. The reasoning, according to Karzai, was that the Doha office was flying the Taliban flag with signs on the building’s exterior proclaiming the office to represent the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; a signal not lost on the Afghan government. The perceived representation of Taliban legitimacy, shifting the narrative of the group from terrorists to a potentially legitimate state actor, was an affront to Karzai and the talks stalled shortly thereafter.

Despite the Afghan government’s lack of progress, there have been successful attempts by the U.S. to engage the Taliban through the Taliban’s presence in Doha. These efforts yielded tangible results. The office was instrumental in a 2014 prisoner exchange, when the U.S. transferred five Taliban fighters from Guantánamo Bay to Qatar, in return for captured U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.

Peace talks seemed to resurface over the next few years, culminating in 2018 when U.S. government officials and a Taliban spokesperson acknowledged that bilateral talks had taken place at Doha. This represented a fundamental change in U.S. policy for Afghanistan, which previously adhered to the long-held Afghan government wish that talks, no matter how informal, must include representatives from Kabul.

The Taliban, for their part, have consistently rebuked Kabul’s wishes, maintaining that it fails to acknowledge both the Karzai and subsequent Ghani governments as legitimate. Whilst the Taliban spokesperson described the talks in early 2018 with the US as “very helpful”, Trump has since angered the Quetta Shura by insisting to President Ghani that the Doha office ought to be closed; a move Ghani agrees with in principal, but one in which Qatar is unlikely to relent.

Moscow perceives itself as exploiting receding U.S. influence in the Middle East.

Despite the small but consistent glimmers of hope for a peaceful settlement under President Obama, the balance of power in the peace and reconciliation talks has shifted from Washington to Moscow under President Trump. This shift appears to be the result of two factors: The first is a long-term covert operation conducted by Russia in support of the Taliban, and the second being a withdrawal of U.S. influence and leadership in the region at a time where the U.S. could have been positioned in a way to be the prime actor in any peace talks, enabling Washington to set the conditions for moving forward.

The lack of clear Western leadership on the issue of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan has opened up a window through which Moscow has positioned itself as the key orchestrator of the talks. Paradoxically, the mujahadeen’s former enemy has become its chaperone and patron.

There has been wide speculation in the West that Moscow has been, at worst, supplying arms and cash to the insurgents, or, at best, facilitating their supply through Central Asia into Afghanistan. The Kremlin benefits from these operations as they ensure picking rights at the negotiating table, whilst simultaneously being taking care to avoid a fierce response from the United States. Of course, these allegations have been repeatedly denied by officials at the highest levels of the Kremlin.

At a time when the future of the rules-based global order seems no longer guaranteed, and with the liberal values of the West under threat, the U.S. and its coalition partners were gifted with an opportunity to shape the outcome of peace talks with the Taliban. Instead, Washington has reversed its position and allowed for Moscow to assume the leading role.

As a result of this geopolitical disruption, new questions arise. It remains to be seen how Moscow’s engagement will shape the talks going forward, and how this will this affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the broader region. If Russia is permitted to return to Afghanistan as a key player, facilitating the Taliban’s return to domestic politics, it will only serve to embolden an expansionist and revisionist Russian state in its campaign to degrade the rules-based, liberal world order.

Russia Returns to Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. At the same time, violent extremism and extreme ideology-based terrorism continue to spread throughout South Asia.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Disaster in South Asia: Nuclear Deployments & Violent Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.