In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.

The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.

This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with Russia and China, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.

Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in Ukraine serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.

The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.

The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.

The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.

Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.

First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.

Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.

Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.

Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.

Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.

Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.

Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

August 2, 1990: the end of the Cold War and the revival of imperialism in the Middle East. American troops have indisputably experienced the darkest bounds of these wars. Still, no one warned us about the consequences that three decades of missile launches would have on Middle Eastern civilians, their culture, and quotidian lives — except renowned philosopher, diplomat, and scholar — Charles Malik. The former UN Diplomat and General Assembly President faithfully preached for an autonomous  Near East and disapproved of any external engagement that deterred it.

To understand why foreign interference hinders the chances of peace and prosperity in the region, we must first acknowledge its significant effects on its indispensable assets. Malik humbly reminded us that all of humanity culturally and genetically originated within a 900-mile radius around Jerusalem, Beirut, or Damascus — including modern-day cities of Alexandria, Constantinople (Istanbul), Athens, and Mecca. In a 1952 Foreign Affairs piece, he referred to the complex region as the “Cradle of Civilization,” rich in ancient history, culture, and common agricultural staples which advanced human progress.^[1] Malik aimed to synthesize two perspectives that many considered antithetical; the West and Near East are deeply linked, a departure from the perspective that the two civilizations would always clash. Since Malik’s era, the modern dichotomy exacerbated from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism. In our post-9/11 minds, the West seems to perceive the other to be unsaveable.

Malik lived through arguably the most volatile decades of the 1900s, coming from a region stitched with eternal violence and genocide. His bold ideas were unique and challenged powers who sought to define borders according to their interests, including the British and French mandates for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Despite his Christian Orthodox faith, he sided against the British, another Christian Empire, and their century-long occupation that hindered Egyptian sovereignty and its potential to lead the region into a new era of peace and security. Malik particularly disapproved of France’s influence on his Lebanese homeland and the post-World War I Sykes-Picot Agreement that essentially placed its population (along with Syria) under French social and economic control. Though Lebanon declared its independence in 1926, the struggle for complete autonomy would last an additional twenty years.

As Lebanese Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, the thriving scholar embraced his political inclinations when he vocalized without hesitation his disapproval of global powers’ “formula after formula to reconcile imperial interests” and advocated for Arab independence from the West.^[2] Malik promoted Lebanon and the rest of the Near East’s autonomy through his fight for human rights and fundamental freedoms of conscience, reason, and liberal expression. One of his most celebrated contributions to this cause was the adoption of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights when he did not hesitate to vocalize the importance of the rightful hegemony of Cradle countries from external interference.

Malik did not believe in the UN as a replacement authority to fill the vacuum of power within the Post-WWII Cradle of Civilization, rather as the premier mechanism to display how humanity could fulfill its highest ideals. Instead, he looked to the West’s major thinkers and events as a blueprint, cultivating its highest ideas, such as natural rights from the Cradle’s Abrahamic faiths.

Yet much to Malik’s detriment, the British would return for Suez, France would come back for the Levant, the US would send arms to the Israelis, and even the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of various regimes. Nevertheless, Malik still hoped that the Cradle could progress economically, socially, and politically without external interference.

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According to Malik, the American-led West became a shell of what it once was in the name of countering communism. The West had a blueprint for multi-societal civilization to prosper under liberty. Still, it traded its core virtuous idea for short-term gains over lands that it had no legitimate claim to against a rival who also had no legitimate claim.

“The Near East mirrors, by deposit or reaction, the problems of the world. Whatever face the Near East shows today is fundamentally a face the West has shown it; and whatever weaknesses the Near East expresses are largely the weaknesses of the West. Thus, in a deeper sense of the problem of the Near East is the problem of the West.”  – “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

The West’s previously enlightened pursuit of reason, liberty, and progress is expelled in the apparent chase for oriental treasures in the name of power, profit, and geopolitical chess. The above quote, though written decades ago, can be applied today, perhaps even more appropriate. Yet what is most profound, as Malik would point out today, the Post-Cold War West, in search of another superpower foe, thought it could revamp a superpower region, a land which the scholar remarked as “eternal,” the Cradle of Civilization.

Malik’s fight for the right to a peaceful and prosperous life for the Near East is nowhere near its end. Humanity’s genesis from this exceptional region makes today’s Near East issues even more relevant to our daily lives. The West has enjoyed the Cradle’s food, dance, entertainment, and language for decades, romanticizing the unique aspects of its culture while ignoring its most crucial humanitarian issues, such as the genocide and banishment of minorities like the Assyrians.

As Malik would argue today, only when we realize that our connection to its thousands of years of war, migration, and progress lies deeper than the pursuit of superficialities such as power, natural resources, and profit will we realize the staunch impact that our passiveness wields on these pressing conflicts that ultimately affect us all? Charles Malik did not use the term “Cradle of Civilization” lightly, and it is up to us to vindicate its use.

^[1]  Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

^[2] Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

Middle East Versus the West? How a UN Diplomat’s Christian Perspective Resonates with Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Even among allies at the Security Council, such as the United States, France, and the U.K. — known informally as the P3 — relations have also broken down on critical issues, from the response to civil war in Libya to the role of the World Health Organization in the fight against coronavirus. More frequent use of informal meeting formats, especially among democratic countries, is a necessary step in efforts to end increasingly complex conflicts around the world.

In a recent attempt to ease tensions, the U.K.’s former Permanent Representative, Karen Pierce, initiated a new informal meeting format over the past year. Known by diplomats in New York as “sofa talks,” these gatherings take the form of unscripted meetings, which aim to develop a problem-solving mindset among representatives. There are no agendas and no minutes. The formula also differs from other meeting formats because representatives do not submit issues for discussion, and only Permanent Representatives (and the catering staff) are present. Crisis Group’s Richard Gowan coined the term “Pierce formula” to describe the new meetings.

In late March 2020, as the United States went into its coronavirus lockdown, Ambassador Pierce left New York to become British Ambassador in Washington. This transitional moment requires Security Council members to cement the format Pierce initiated as an essential tool for internal dispute resolution.

A diplomat at the U.K. Mission with whom I spoke welcomed the continued use of informal sofa talks, even if the prospect of holding in-person meetings in the near future remains low due to social distancing measures. While their exact form may be different in the future, informal meetings without agendas have demonstrably led to better working relationships, even when diplomatic ties are strained. From the British perspective, Pierce formula meetings have helped the U.K. to rebuild some semblance of a working relationship with fellow permanent member Russia since the low point of the Skripal poisoning in 2018.

Concerns about transparency at the United Nations should not limit the use of the Pierce formula. Transparency remains essential for the UN’s credibility. Over the past decade, the number of formal, open meetings of the Security Council has increased significantly to reflect member states’ desire for greater public accountability. In 2018, there were 275 open meetings and only 120 closed consultations. This marked a significant shift since the early 2010s when around half of meetings took place behind closed doors. In light of the broader trend towards greater transparency, the Security Council should not shy away from closed-door informal meetings when necessary if the formula delivers results in conflict de-escalation and peacebuilding.

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As the period of increased Security Council productivity immediately after the end of the Cold War demonstrated, private, informal meetings can generate more honest discussion and lead to better decision-making. In March 1992, for example, a Croatian priest contacted Venezuelan Permanent Representative Diego Arria during Venezuela’s presidency of the Security Council. He wanted to share his account of the ongoing violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only UN Secretariat officials were typically able to brief the Council formally. Instead, Arria gathered Security Council members informally to hear the priest’s first-hand accounts. From there, the “Arria-formula” emerged. The arrangement allows non-state actors, representatives of NGOs, and others, to brief the Council in an informal setting and is now a fully institutionalized feature of Security Council operations.

From 1989 to 1994 alone, the Security Council authorized 20 new peacekeeping missions. These resolutions required extensive informal discussions to reach an agreement on new Security Council mandates. Then, as now, the global order was in a state of transformation, and the increasingly divergent interests of permanent members in the 21st century necessitate more informal consultation to build trust and rapport.

Despite the challenges that the pandemic will continue to pose for face-to-face diplomacy, the need to maintain informal lines of communication, as well as open in-person discussions where possible, remains. During the pandemic, local actors, such as the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, took advantage of an international community distracted by domestic concerns about the coronavirus by escalating military action.

In a time of crisis, a coordinated international response is more important than ever. If Haftar and other regional players continue to sense paralysis on the part of the Security Council, the conflict will only escalate further beyond the reach of multilateral solutions. Frequent, unscripted dialogue between Security Council members is the first step toward greater unity, especially in the context of greater activism at the Security Council by Russia and China.

On the civil war in Libya, more Pierce formula meetings may enable France, the U.K., and the United States to understand each other’s positions more clearly, and thus formulate a unified set of proposals for peace. If U.S. Permanent Representative Kelly Kraft is serious about her recent assertion that Libya must find “a political path to stability,” then the use of informal meetings to reach consensus among traditional allies at the Council may be part of a multilateral solution. Without the improved understanding and cohesion that informal meetings can provide, it seems unlikely that the P3 can reign in their wayward Turkish and Gulf allies, whose continued incursions into the conflict in Libya divide the Council. While France continues to offer support to the United Arab Emirates’ intervention on behalf of Haftar, the United States is concerned about Russia’s involvement on the same side. Neither country’s approach helps the UN-backed government in Tripoli. As permanent members of the UN’s most powerful body, such an incoherent policy is unacceptable.

As the role of proxies and external actors in the wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen continues to shape the conflict, unity among allies at the Security Council is essential. Unity, especially among democratic Security Council members, acts as leverage against outside intervention in local conflicts, and may, in turn, influence Russian and Chinese geopolitical calculations. Informal mechanisms like the Pierce formula provide a critical forum for this effort.

The views expressed in this piece are solely those of the author.

A new formula for the UN Security Council was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current global pandemic that has affected us all has elicited extensive media attention.  A variety of theories have abounded on how the virus originated, i.e., that it is a biological weapon created in the lab by the Chinese, or by the U.S. military, or that it is fueled by the effects of 5G networks on our immune system. In addition, divergent views have emerged regarding the “hysteria” surrounding the pandemic, some preaching for a strict societal response, and others claiming that the surrounding panic is more detrimental for society than the danger of the virus itself. Leaders have responded differently to the crisis and have received both praise and criticism for their actions. Some leaders responded as soon as they heard warnings from the World Health Organization, which called it a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” in January, while others did not pay immediate attention to warning signs.  Some responded with the concept of building “herd immunity” throughout the society, others called for total lockdown. Some leaders are demonstrating transparency to their citizens and to the world community to tackle the challenge, while others resort to hiding information or disregarding efforts at a global response. All actions and reactions have received immense scrutiny through media platforms, as per the modern-day norm.¹

In this age of mass media, infinite narratives, and political polarization, where “objective” information often becomes blurred as subjective, could this pandemic be shining a light on what “responsible leadership” really means? Could a truth be emerging instead of a subjective opinion? In a public health crisis, conspiracy theories can kill.  Citizens look to their government for protection and are placing their safety in the hands of their leaders.  During such a critical moment, a leader must act in the best interest of the population and the world at large, or else be labeled as a leader who mishandled an epidemic and put lives at risk, something that is never taken lightly.  Even populist politicians, who have shown a general tendency to ignore scientific advice, have heeded policy recommendations from the scientific community to tackle the spread of the virus, demonstrating that denial is not a viable option. The role of the media remains critical in such an instance, as the media have a responsibility to present factual information and constructive solutions to the problem and have a duty to be critical of the mismanagement of leadership rather than encourage the spread of disinformation or politicizing the crisis. This crisis has the potential to reshape the way we view responsible leadership and see the value in constructive journalism and scientific data.

The sharing of information in our world today has evolved dramatically.  Some have coined the term “post-truth world” to illustrate the present-day difficulties of discerning truth from falsehood. We now have access to more information and evidence than ever before, yet facts seem to have lost their power somehow. Furthermore, the popularity of populists these days points to the tendency of people being attracted to what they consider more “genuine” messages as opposed to the narrative from the “establishment,” which has now been categorized as “elitist,” with little regard for the common folk.  Mainstream media, academia, science, and establishment politicians have all been placed in this category. The Oxford Dictionaries define “post-truth” as: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”  Societal trust in institutions has waned, as the general population has grown more inclined to believe that institutions such as academia or the media are simply platforms through which the establishment tries to control the narrative in society. In other words, there is a crisis of confidence. Today in the political West, instead of merely having left-wing versus right-wing politics, we increasingly see the division lying between anti-establishment and establishment political parties. Amidst this crisis of confidence, the current “information age” is a perfect breeding ground for the perpetuation of multiple competing narratives, mistrust, confusion, sensationalism, polarization and creates what seems like a “post-truth” environment.

Social media play an immense role in this “post-truth” concept. On social media, everyone has a voice and a space to share his or her belief system. People enjoy writing their thoughts and sharing comments, receiving attention, and building networks of like-minded people online. But what social media also perpetuate is polarization and sensationalism.²  To take the example of YouTube, its algorithm is constructed on the basis of encouraging the viewer to spend as much time as possible on its platform.  Therefore, when one searches for something specific to watch, videos with similar content appear as recommendations for what to watch next, reinforcing one’s point of view continuously, whether or not it is based on factuality. In addition, one’s activity on social media is recorded as data to which external companies have access.  These companies can then take advantage of one’s tendencies and beliefs to convey a particular world view to specific targets to help certain political campaigns. There have been multiple instances of troll farms creating fake accounts on social media and influencing users to be attracted to a particular viewpoint. Most of the time, this goes on without our even being aware of it.  In other words, we have lost touch with objective reality in some ways, are increasingly polarized, mistrustful, and are giving in to sensationalism, which news media channels have also taken advantage of as a way to increase their ratings. Social media offers impressionable youth and troll factories the opportunity for mischief without consequences. This type of reality is bound to breed, increasing distrust.³

Despite all the misinformation about the virus that is floating around, this pandemic has revealed an interesting twist in the form of an emerging truth.  People can say what they want to say, but the truth is that there is simply no getting around the actual numbers such as the number of cases, number of deaths, needed hospital beds, ventilators required, and witnessing the effects of one leader’s response compared with another on this set of variables. There is no room for downplaying something whose results are visible and affect the whole of society. No amount of denial or refusal to accept scientific facts is going to help in this situation.  Today’s pandemic requires that each leader take responsibility for the crisis to ensure the best outcome for his or her country, state or city, and the world at large.  In a public health crisis such as this one, we cannot ignore scientific expertise.  It is through their advice and assessments that we as a society can fully understand what is unfolding, and it is up to each leader to either heed their warnings or not. We do, however, continue to see politicized narratives and blame games from leaders who may not have reacted quickly enough, who instead attribute blame elsewhere while playing into their constituency’s worldview.  But even this practice has lost momentum and credibility in most places due to the critical nature of the crisis as it pertains to public health and the health of the economy.

China’s response to the virus has proven to be very controversial. Once the situation was made apparent domestically, draconian measures were implemented in the city of Wuhan, and the central government entrusted the scientific community with the handling of the situation, which now appears to be under control. So, on the one hand, the measures that were taken were in tandem with the expert advice of the medical community, and internal misinformation on the severity of the crisis was stopped once the central government took action against the virus. However, there was a significant problem in the handling of the outbreak when it first appeared. The problem initially was that the Wuhan province denied the severity of the virus, denied it was transmissible to humans, and did not share the information fast enough with the local population nor the central government, which allowed the virus to gain a tenacious hold. This original lack of transparency from Wuhan had severe consequences not only for China but for the international community.  Not acting quickly enough does not tame the spread of the virus. At the same time, it is still possible, and not revealing the extent of the problem to the international community doesn’t allow for enough preparation time for what is to come.  Institutions such as the WHO are only as effective as nations will enable them to be.  Its response will only be as successful as the information it receives and to which it has access. U.S. intelligence reports state that China may not have been transparent with the total number of infected cases or deaths that it officially reported, which also does not give the international community a sense of future trends in other countries.  China is now actively lending its help to the international community as a sign of solidarity and cooperation by sending supplies, rallying for global coordination, and hosting video conferences with other countries to share experiences, initiatives that the West is receiving criticism for not leading.⁴ But the international community’s outlook towards China remains distrustful due to their early mismanagement of the crisis and dubious declaration of official counts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and some right-wing media in tandem with Fox News were early on heard downplaying the disease, saying it was a “hoax.” However, once the numbers caught up to them, there was no getting away with that type of rhetoric anymore.  Credibility is lost when one toys with matters of life and death on this scale. Trump has had to listen to medical experts such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has consistently advocated for more robust measures such as imposing more prolonged and stricter lockdowns alongside increasing testing. Even though Dr. Fauci has become the target of an online conspiracy theory that he is trying to undermine the President, Trump has had to follow his advice and apply more appropriate policies.  Dr. Fauci has won the approval of 78 percent of Americans, while just 7 percent disapprove, according to the Quinnipiac national survey.[5] At this current time, Trump’s handling of the crisis is approved by about 41% of Americans.[6] Although the Trump Administration has previously shown a distaste for relying on scientific expertise, it is particularly harmful to do so during a pandemic.  If leadership tries to sow distrust in public health officials during a time when their advice is especially crucial, the results could be disastrous. Evidence shows that Mr. Trump, however, continues to mishandle information. He tweeted that the HHS Inspector General’s reporting on hospital shortages was wrong and fake and is criticizing the WHO for not having dealt with the virus aggressively enough to divert attention away from his own administration’s slow reaction, messages that encourage distrust in the information we receive from public health institutions and medical experts during a critical time. President Trump later decided to cut U.S. funding to the WHO, which is bound to have detrimental effects in nations that heavily rely on support from the organization. The U.S.’s “America First” strategy sends a clear message to the international community that it does not intend to provide global leadership during this crisis as it has done in the past. This also goes for the U.S.’ allies in Europe, with whom no efforts to coordinate the travel ban coming from the E.U. was made. The German view of Trump has been made apparent when a shipment of 200,000 masks destined for Berlin was supposedly re-routed to the U.S. The fact that Germany would even think of blaming the U.S. for this speaks volumes.⁷ Also, international action at the U.N. Security Council has been hampered by the U.S.’s objections over terminology and insistence on calling it the “Wuhan Virus.”⁸  Also, for the same reason, any hope of G7 foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on the fight against COVID-19 was killed.⁹ Trump has also ignored calls to create a global task force for COVID-19. When a leadership vacuum is produced, others rush to fill the void. In this case, it is China, as the U.S. backed away from activating any conventional international consortium to fight the virus with a united front.¹⁰

Narendra Modi, India’s right-wing populist prime minister, has ordered the most extensive lockdown in human history, pointing to the fact that despite one’s inclinations, inaction is simply not an option during this pandemic. Nevertheless, he is still acting irresponsibly in many ways. Modi dismissed the severity of the epidemic at first. When he yielded to the example of others in the international community and ordered the lockdown, he only gave the population of India four hours’ notice. This, in turn, led to mass labor migration across states largely on foot, surely an inviting breeding ground for the spread of the virus.  In addition, instead of actively mitigating the dissemination of misinformation, the government allows for the spread of utterly false information that has no scientific validity on how to cure the virus, such as by drinking cow urine or bathing in cow dung. Modi has also not stopped the politicization of the coronavirus as being a virus that originated from the Muslim communities, which are now the target of Hindu communities who think it is a ploy to destroy them. Hospitals are underfunded and underequipped, and minimal testing is being carried out. The difference is that some provinces in India are faring much better than others, and these so happen to be mostly the ones that are not governed by Modi’s BJP party. A couple of the southern provinces, such as Kerala in southwest India, are doing much better. They are the example of what the federal government should be doing, which is to follow the advice of the scientific community, reject false information, and limit grandiose expressions of misdirected success stories by leadership.

Germany has proven to be particularly responsible in dealing with the crisis. They tested extensively, made people stay home, used a system of early detection of cases, and had time to prepare for the influx of patients in hospitals. Also important to note is the way Chancellor Angela Merkel was very upfront about the seriousness of the epidemic and resisted any urge to sugarcoat anything, thus making people understand the importance of the situation and follow orders from the start. According to a German public opinion survey, 72% of respondents said they are satisfied with the government’s handling of the crisis. Interestingly to note also is that establishment parties in Germany have gained popularity during this crisis, while the popularity of anti-establishment parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has dropped.¹¹

South Korea has so far established itself as one of the more successful models for responding to the virus.  It is regarded as successful because it was transparent with other countries and with its own population from the outset. A combination of extensive testing and meticulous contact tracing allowed them to control the virus spread effectively. Health managers knew exactly what to plan for, and they used science to guide them through every step of the way. Taiwan is another excellent example.  The government acted immediately as of January with border control and the wearing of facemasks.  While they were reacting quickly, other countries around the world were still debating whether to take action or not. Some of the decisive measures implemented were a ban on travel from China, the introduction of strict punishments for anyone breaching home quarantine orders, a ramp-up domestic face mask production, island-wide testing, and punishment for those who spread disinformation about the virus. Most importantly, there was substantial public trust for the medical experts who held daily briefings on the matter.

Brazil is a good example of how the public can react when a leader does not act responsibly in the face of a public health crisis of this proportion. Jair Bolsonaro still hasn’t gotten the memo that distrusting the scientific community and generating misinformation can be dangerous. He has described the illness as a “cold” and has accused the media of manufacturing hysteria. The governors of Brazil have gone ahead and imposed lockdowns using their own powers, but Mr. Bolsonaro has encouraged Brazilians to ignore them. His irresponsibility towards the crisis has stirred a strong reaction from the public. Through his recklessness with the lives of Brazilians, he has hastened the possibility of his own departure on the political scene. Brazil’s Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta’s approval rating soared to 76% over his handling of the coronavirus crisis as he actively informed the population of the current situation and the appropriate measures to take. In comparison, the approval for President Bolsonaro’s handling of the crisis slipped to 33%, a poll by Datafolha showed.¹² Data also showed an increase in support for Brazil’s various governors, who demonstrated to be more in line with the advice of the scientific community than the President. So even part of Bolsonaro’s support base, people who elected the populist leader to reduce the rampant corruption in Brazil, has deemed him irresponsible when faced with this crisis. Bolsonaro later went on to fire the Health Minister after he advocated for a more unified voice from the government on television.

Meanwhile, the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko sneers at the lockdown measures being implemented all over the world. Lukashenko has not imposed a single restriction since the outbreak of the pandemic, claims that the situation is under control and that it suffices to drink vodka and take a sauna to cure the virus. Neighboring countries have expressed concern about his unorthodox response to the crisis. Without much of a state response, the citizens of Belarus have taken on the responsibility themselves to manage the crisis. People have volunteered to raise money for hospitals and needed supplies, private companies have allowed their staff to work at home, and football fans have called for competition to be suspended. The Metro has its carriages cleaned every day, and the Belarusian Orthodox Church has asked people to stay away from churches for now and are holding masses online. According to SATIO, a Minsk-based survey, about 48% of Belarusians stopped attending public events, and many have self-isolated.¹³ Cafes and restaurants have also decided to close or shift towards takeout and delivery. Some parents have stopped bringing their kids to school, which has forced the government to compromise and extend “spring break” by two weeks. That same survey stated that 70% of Belarusians favor a total ban on public events, and more than half would like to see education institutions close and have people work from home.¹⁴  Sixty-two percent of those surveyed feared the health system would collapse in the face of this pandemic.¹⁵ In a country without free media, the average citizen is left confused about the state of affairs and on what the government is doing. Social media has become a platform for citizens to gain awareness. A very influential post by a doctor on Vkontakte depicted the situation in the hospitals as “out of control.”¹⁶ The doctor was later called in by prosecutors.  Citizens of Belarus have taken to social media to criticize the President and his unethical response to the current pandemic under the hashtag #прашчальнаесловапрэзидзента, or “the president’s parting words.”¹⁷

Each of the examples examined has demonstrated that despite regime type or political affiliations, and despite general tendencies of some politicians to ignore science, it is evident that those who respect the advice of the medical community, who do not waste time propagating false information, who remain transparent and who engage in international efforts, have been deemed leaders who are tackling the virus more responsibly. Conversely, those who ignore experts, sow confusion among the public and demonstrate a lack of transparency and willingness to cooperate are seen as acting irresponsibly. Irresponsibility during a public health crisis ultimately leads to more infections, deaths, and general disapproval. There is no room for “post-truth” in the management of this crisis.  Denying it will cause outright danger to society. Mishandling it for political purposes is reckless, and encouraging false narratives steers the goal away from tackling the issue and responding with urgency. There is a clear binary between what is responsible here and what is not. The relative success that some countries have demonstrated in curbing infections has resulted from quick action, trusting the advice of the medical community, executing a sober strategy, and remaining transparent. The case of COVID-19 will show that responsible leadership is needed and that objectivity exists when assessing what is constituted as competent in the management of this crisis.

In this hotly discussed arrival of the “post-truth” era, people may have stopped demanding the truth because they have understood that they are excluded from any decision-making or ability to change their environment. “Infotainment” or information presented as entertainment has become commonplace. But now, during the coronavirus pandemic, faced with questions of life and death, there seems to be more of a demand for truth. The media have an essential responsibility to point out misinformation and deficiencies, ensure the correct dissemination of factual information, and refrain from politicizing a matter of urgency.  The media sources that do this will be labeled as more legitimate, while others who are trying to sow discord will lose credibility.  Trust is found in circumstances where people are seen to work together toward a greater goal. Rebuilding trust in society is going to take a while since our crisis of confidence stems from many complicated structural factors, including the economy and democratic processes. But what this crisis can teach us or at least shed light on is the importance of reliable information, leaders who make it their priority to protect us, and media that want to help us understand what is going on rather than confuse us more or leave us in the dark. If we work together as a society to combat this common enemy and take responsibility, people may feel the return of a sense that they can control their environment and contribute to a greater good – a feeling that would help stabilize our crisis of confidence.  The pandemic is shedding light on what is considered “responsible leadership,” both nationally and internationally.  This development is refreshing and essential in a world that has created so many different versions of the truth.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of the U.S. government or any U.S. government agency.

¹ A previous version of this article was published on April 17, 2020, by Loftus, Suzanne, “COVID 19: Post-Truth Age – Or Facts Making a Comeback?” The Globalist, April 17, 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/coronavirus-pandemic-covid19-media-social-media-misinformation-post-truth-populism/.

² Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

³ Simon Blackburn, “How Can We Teach Objectivity in a Post-Truth Era?” NewStateman, February 18, 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2019/02/how-can-we-teach-objectivity-post-truth-era

⁴ Evelyn Cheng, “Xi Calls for Coordinated Response to Coronavirus at G-20 Meeting,” CNBC, March 26, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/xi-calls-for-coordinated-global-response-to-coronavirus-at-g20-meeting.html.

⁵ Quinnipiac University Poll: https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3658

⁶ Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, “Poll: Majority of Americans Disagree With Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus Pandemic,” U.S. News & World Report, April 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-04-23/poll-majority-of-americans-disagree-with-trumps-handling-of-coronavirus-pandemic.

⁷ Matthew Karnitschnig and Judith Mischke, “Berlin Lets Mask Slip On Feelings for Trump’s America,” Politico, April 6, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-lets-mask-slip-on-feelings-for-trumps-america/.

⁸ https://www.france24.com/en/20200407-un-security-council-expected-to-hold-first-coronavirus-talks-thursday

⁹ Katie Simpson and Alexander Panetta, “G7 Ministers Spike Joint Statement on COVID-19 after U.S. Demands it be Called ‘Wuhan Virus,'” CBC News, March 25, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/g7-covid-19-coronavirus-wuhan-pompeo-trump-1.5510329.

¹⁰ John Haltiwanger, “The U.S. is ‘Not a Global Power’ Thanks to Trump’s Disastrous Coronavirus Response as China Fills the Void, Former U.S. Officials Warn,” Business Insider, April 15, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-chaotic-coronavirus-response-has-created-void-china-is-filling-2020-4?r=DE&IR=T.

¹¹ Sabine Kinkartz, “Coronavirus: Angela Merkel’s Approval Ratings Up Amid Health Crisis,” DW, April 3, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-angela-merkels-approval-ratings-up-amid-health-crisis/a-53001405.

¹² Anthony Boadle and Pedro Fonseca, “Brazilians Scorn Bolsonaro’s Coronavirus Efforts, Back Health Officials: Polls,” Reuters, April 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazilians-scorn-bolsonaros-coronavirus-efforts-back-health-officials-polls-idUSKBN21L1W8.

¹³ Anna Perova, “Uvereny, chto stanet khuzhe. Belorusov oprosili naschet ikh otnosheniya k koronavirusu,” Tut Novosti, April 1, 2020, https://news.tut.by/society/678769.html.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Linas Jegelevicius, “Belarus and Coronavirus: Lukashenko’s Business-As-Usual Approach is ‘Mind-Blowing Negligence,'” Euronews, April 21, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/21/belarus-and-coronavirus-lukashenko-s-business-as-usual-approach-is-mind-blowing-negligence.

¹⁶ James Shotter and Henry Foy, “Belarus Faces Growing Criticism for Dismissive Coronavirus Response,” Financial Times, April 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/925c16e9-bd18-4678-936a-0539588facfa.

¹⁷ Tatiana Zinkovich, “The President without a Plan: Alexander Lukashenko still insists nobody’s going to die from COVID-19. What on earth is happening in Belarus?” Meduza, April 16, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/04/16/the-president-without-a-plan.

COVID-19 and Responsible Leadership in a “Post-Truth” Age was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past year, conflict in Libya has escalated dramatically. In April 2019, the rebel forces of General Khalifa Haftar – supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – led an offensive to seize the Libyan capital of Tripoli, home to the UN-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj – backed by Turkey and Qatar. Since then, the conflict has continuously intensified, killing hundreds and displacing 150,000. In recent weeks, violence has increased around Tripoli, with heightened shelling and attacks by Turkish armed drones.

As COVID-19 now spreads across the country, Libya’s already precarious health system risks collapse. As of March, clashes between the warring factions had damaged 27 health facilities. According to a former senior coordinator for US Assistance to Libya, COVID-19 patients are “competing for medical attention with the war wounded.” This has left Libyan authorities pleading for a ceasefire to redirect efforts toward the pandemic. Yet attacks on health facilities have multiplied, and a lack of medical equipment and professionals, as well as cuts to electricity and water supplies, compound the situation further.

For migrants, the situation is especially dire. Even before COVID-19 reached the region, disrupting refugee resettlement and grounding flights, Libya’s almost 700,000 migrants and refugees, and over 200,000 internally displaced people faced conditions of high precarity. “[A]rbitrary arrest by non-State actors, detention for indefinite periods of time, bonded labor, harassment and general exploitation,” according to the International Organization for Migration, already led many to flee across the Mediterranean to Europe. Nonetheless, EU and Italian efforts to decrease migration from Libya over the past three years have succeeded, despite strong condemnation from human rights groups. The ever-deteriorating humanitarian situation is leading the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to warn that more refugees now will attempt risky sea crossings.

For Europe, this presents an all-too-familiar challenge. Long before the most recent escalations, stabilizing the conflict in Libya had emerged as a key security matter for Europeans due to concerns about extremism and the country’s position as a departure point for refugees. Yet disagreement within the EU has hindered the bloc from taking meaningful action.

Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey have stepped up to fill the void left by a lack of European – and American – leadership. In late 2019, Russia, who supports Haftar, sent mercenaries to Libya in an attempt to further assert influence in the Middle East. Turkey responded by deploying troops in support of al-Sarraj’s government. A day after European officials issued a joint statement condemning this foreign interference for “fueling the crisis” and urging an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” Presidents Putin and Erdoğan jointly called for a ceasefire in the region.

Europe’s weak sway over the situation was further confirmed after a German-led international conference convened on January 19 to “[unify…] the International Community in their support for a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis.” The “Berlin Process” brought together not only high-level European officials, but also the leaders of Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, among others. The joint communiqué released after the conference called on all parties to respect the 2011 UN arms embargo and end foreign interference in the conflict – a demand Libyans themselves have been making since long before Turkey’s most recent action.

Yet on January 25, the UN Support Mission in Libya reported that the previous ten days had seen numerous cargo and other flights landing at Libyan airports “providing the parties with advanced weapons, armored vehicles, advisers and fighters.” Clearly, any European diplomatic success achieved in Berlin had been short-lived.

Such immediate and blatant flouting of the conclusions of the Berlin Process confirms that external actors’ ambitions in Libya continue to prevent meaningful international action to resolve the conflict. Beyond the recent escalations in Turkish and Russian interference, nationalist and anti-immigrant European leaders have hindered agreement on EU migration policy, and thereby, a collective response to the Libyan conflict. In March 2019, Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing nationalist Italian party “The League,” blocked an EU mission rescuing and transporting migrants from the Libyan coast to Europe. Likewise, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, with Hungarian support, later objected to restarting this same mission.

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Yet in the face of the COVID-19 crisis and with the glaring void in global leadership left by the United States, the EU is stepping up to the geopolitical plate. In an attempt to finally fulfill French President Macron and European Commission President von der Leyen’s ambitions for the bloc, Europeans are working to coordinate a much-needed international response to the health crisis. France is spearheading G7 meetings and calling for debt suspension to allow African countries to manage the pandemic; and an EU-organized international fundraising conference raised $8 billion for laboratories working on a COVID-19 vaccine.

Such solidarity demonstrates that the EU is capable of meaningful coordination in times of crisis. As COVID-19 spreads throughout war-ridden Libya, dramatically exacerbating an already devastating situation for civilians and migrants alike, the EU must harness its recent show of global leadership to rise above the warring factions and spearhead a resolution to the conflict. A failure to do so would not only fuel criticism that the EU is unable, or unwilling, to forcefully exert leadership in hotbeds of conflict, but also perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian tragedy.

It’s Time for the EU to Lead in Libya was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the following, I will take stock of the lessons and conclusions I have drawn from the global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, focusing on the main actors of international politics and the world order. Drawing from international relations theory, I make the somewhat surprising claim that a Realpolitik lens would suggest self-interested cooperation among countries in the age of COVID-19. The countries of the world would fare better at managing the coronavirus pandemic if they were to cooperate—cooperation is in their national interest.

But first, a disclaimer. The lesson of Captivity is that we, as human beings find it challenging to see the most critical processes in the present, and we can rarely predict what the future may bring. As we are currently in the middle of this pandemic crisis (or perhaps only at the beginning), we cannot see clearly in the captivity of our current situation, from the captivity of our contemporary perspective. Nevertheless, I will attempt to draw out the most important lessons, while remaining cautious about predicting significant trends in the future.

What is Realpolitik?

Although Realpolitik was conceived by Prussian journalist-politician Ludwig von Rochau for domestic politics in the 19^thcentury, it has since become a prominent concept in the theory and practice of international politics. Henry Kissinger defines Realpolitik as “foreign policy based on calculations of power and the national interest.”¹ According to Kenneth Waltz, Realpolitik “indicates the methods by which foreign policy is conducted and provides a rationale for them.” Waltz lists the elements of Realpolitik as follows: “the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state.”² The 20^th century theorists of Realpolitik argue that such a concept (not necessarily under the same name) has been an ever-present thread running through the history of thinking about international relations. Kissinger associates Realpolitik with Napoleon III and Bismarck, while Waltz traces the concept back to Machiavelli in the Italian Renaissance and Thucydides in ancient Greece. Realpolitik is as old as humankind.

International Cooperation based on Self-Interest

Overall, the response of countries and governments around the world to the COVID-19 epidemic has been a significant failure, and this has been primarily a failure of global governance. The virus has spread globally, but in its management,  we barely find any traces of international cooperation. It has been handled entirely on the level of the nation-state. This is not surprising to those who look at the world through a Realpolitik lens.

International politics is characterized by anarchy, as there is no world government. Nation-states consider their interests first and shape their foreign policies accordingly. That is why it is telling that even Henry Kissinger, a diplomat-scholar often associated with Realpolitik, advocates for international cooperation on COVID-19 in his recent Wall Street Journal article. I agree there is a role for global governance in stopping this pandemic. Nation-states cannot do it on their own. Let’s see why.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) as a community and as an institution was virtually invisible in the period following the outbreak. Italy, the first and most dramatically affected member state in the EU, received assistance from China sooner than from the EU. It is no coincidence that the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had to apologize to the Italians for the EU’s delayed reaction. The EU’s image and the popularity of the pro-federalist position are significantly undermined by the fact that each EU member state has responded to the epidemic on a national level. In contrast, action at the EU level has been almost wholly absent.

Even the fact that the EU eventually provided substantial funding to help member states take action improved the EU’s image only slightly. It is also clear that a strictly national approach combined with a failure to share best practices has resulted in very different levels of effectiveness in slowing the spread of the disease in each member state. Consequently, the problems each member state now faces are very different, hence the possibility of EU-level cooperation and solutions is next to nothing.

China

Undoubtedly, China is primarily responsible for the outbreak and global spread of the epidemic. The Chinese Communist leadership practiced one of the worst traditions of their Soviet predecessors, the so-called “Chernobyl method,” at the beginning of the epidemic: denial and silencing. The existence of the outbreak was denied, and doctors who sounded the alarm were silenced and arrested. Then by mid-January, the Communist leadership realized that the coronavirus was a real problem and needed practical solutions. Subsequently, the government introduced strict measures in Wuhan and a few other parts of China, from curfews to mandatory mask-wearing to quarantining of those suspected of illness. All these measures were enforced by the iron fist of the Chinese police state. With these measures, the spread of the coronavirus in China was slowed down and then halted by March.

However, in the meantime, from November to January, the virus had already spread to most of the world. If China had not denied the existence of the epidemic and had closed its borders late last year, it could have spared the world its current level of suffering. In parallel with the rigorous management of the epidemic, China has also been working since the beginning of the year to spread misinformation about the American origins of COVID-19, and to portray itself as a “benevolent superpower” by sending masks and ventilators to many countries around the world. China is once again playing the game of international politics very shrewdly (applying a distorted sense of Realpolitik), and this time it is trying to strengthen its international image, its soft power, which has always been a weak point.

The United States

The number of Americans infected with the coronavirus is now over 1.7 million. This shows that American society has so far failed to deal with the coronavirus epidemic. I’ve identified five reasons for this, which fall into two groups: governance-related and socio-cultural factors.

The first group of reasons includes the fragmented nature of the U.S. government system and the public health management failures of the federal and state governments. (1) Unified action against a nationwide epidemic has been made impossible by the federal structure of the U.S. government, which has produced a fragmentation of authority and capabilities. While the federal government has deep financial pockets, it lacks many public-health authorities. At the same time, the state governments lack financial leverage and have limited legal authorities of their own. (2) President Donald J. Trump and his administration delayed by several months the necessary preparations for the epidemic despite having the world’s most extensive intelligence apparatus. Many constituent agencies were alerting the White House to the news of the coronavirus as early as November 2019. (3) State (and local) governments also woke up too late to the threat of the coronavirus (especially in the state of New York and in New York City, from where the virus spread all over the country). As I mentioned, state governments lack the financial resources to deal with such an epidemic, so they need the help of the federal government. The Trump administration has not responded to state requests for assistance very effectively either, and for weeks the president himself has been embroiled in a highly partisan war of words with the mostly Democratic governors of the most heavily infected states.

However, the delayed responses of political leaders alone do not fully explain the current catastrophe situation in the United States. There are also very deep-rooted socio-cultural reasons for the failure to manage the coronavirus. (4) American society has traditionally exhibited a high degree of individualism and a strong attachment to individual freedoms, and the role of the “state” is consequently limited. While in much of the world, a full lockdown has been imposed by central governments and enforced by police, in the United States, most “lockdowns” have been nothing more than a stay-at-home advisory from state governors. The federal government formulated even more restrained advice. (5) Finally, an essential socio-economic reason behind the extent of the outbreak in the United States is the privately operated and fragmented health care system—some of the demographic groups most exposed to the coronavirus do not even have access to adequate healthcare.

U.S.-China Competition

The dominant geopolitical competition of the 21^st century is unfolding between the United States and China. As a result, there is much discussion about which great power the current situation will propel forward and which will fall far behind. The jury is still out. Both great powers have been hit hard by the virus, but it currently appears that America has taken the harder blow. However, we must be careful with such a comparison because we do not exactly know what is going on in China, as the Chinese Communist leadership does not provide real data about either the epidemic or the economy. Joseph Nye shares this view in his recent Foreign Policy article; despite significant speculation to this effect, the coronavirus will not decide the competition between the United States and China, since more important factors play a role in it. His article fits into the debate of recent years among U.S. political scientists and historians about U.S.-China competition, in which Graham Allison and others warn that China, building on its significant resources (cheap labor, global trade network, fast-paced economic and technological development), will soon overtake the United States economically and push it off the top of the international system. On the other hand, Nye, Michael Beckley, and others emphasize that the United States has important structural advantages (geographic location, democratic political system, R&D capabilities, soft power, etc.) over China, and, on the other hand, the Asian superpower has many internal problems and weaknesses (demographic crisis, corruption, social inequality, regional disparities).

I share the latter point of view, but with one qualification. The United States starts from a good position in its competition with China, but its abovementioned domestic problems (fragmented government structure, polarization, weak healthcare system, growing social inequality) pose serious risks for the United States in this rivalry. The United States can compete with China and maintain its position of international leadership only if it remedies these deep domestic structural problems in the years to come. It is certainly relevant to the competition that China—having managed to control the epidemic domestically—has been building a new international role for itself, extending aid to many countries in fighting the pandemic. At the same time, the United States is currently hardly able to deal with its internal problems managing the pandemic, and cannot play any real international role in the fight against the coronavirus. What is more, the Trump administration has even withdrawn its support from the World Health Organization (WHO).

The Global Economy

The global economy is facing an unprecedented recession. As part of the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, most countries in the world have shut down significant portions of their economies. Prolonging this situation for months is leading to a severe economic downturn. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the recession has been brewing for quite some time. China’s economic growth – even based on unreliable official data – plummeted to around 3 percent in the last quarter of 2019, an incredible dive compared to the 7 percent expected by Beijing or to China’s average growth in recent decades. As a result of COVID-19, China’s economy suffered a 6.8 percent contraction in the first quarter of 2020; for the first time since 1976, the Chinese economy has shrunk and not expanded. The economic downturn in the European Union had also begun earlier. In the last quarter of 2019, the EU achieved 0 (zero) percent growth. Therefore, the economic crisis may have happened even without the coronavirus pandemic.

The United States recently joined China and the EU among the crisis hubs. The number of unemployed in America has risen to 43 million in the last ten weeks. The U.S. GDP posted a 4.8 percent decline in the first quarter of this year, and analysts expect an almost unprecedented 30 percent (!) contraction in the second quarter. World oil prices reached historic lows in April. We have to gradually reopen the economy everywhere as soon as the public health situation allows. However, I would caution against the overly optimistic view that reopening the economy now will avert the economic downturn. Even if the economy was reopened today, the virus is here to stay (until there is a vaccine), and many people will be afraid to resume their previous lifestyles completely; therefore, economic recovery will remain limited. And the coronavirus has already done much damage to our economies. The long-feared global economic recession is no longer on its way. It has already begun.

World Order

In the United States and elsewhere around the world, there has been a serious debate for some years now about how the world order is changing, what has characterized the international order so far, and what can replace it in the future. The abovementioned two articles, by Henry Kissinger and Joseph Nye, are also part of the continuation of these debates. Kissinger’s article is titled “The Coronavirus Will Forever Alter the World Order,” while Nye’s article counters with, “No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order.” Indeed, the coronavirus has not changed the world order (yet), but the world order is changing.

There are several ways we can talk about the world order. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, the international system changed from bipolar to unipolar. With the rise of China, however, a bipolar international system has re-emerged. This system, nonetheless, also bears some semblance to multipolar systems, as there are currently no two allied blocs behind the two superpowers like there were during the Cold War, and even America’s allies are busy building ties with China.

The United States established the current so-called liberal international order after World War II. After decades of successfully deepening and expanding this order, America has been gradually withdrawing from its leadership role under the administrations of Barack Obama and especially Trump. Kissinger writes in his article that to overcome the health and economic effects of COVID-19 and to defend the values ​​of the liberal international order, the world needs international cooperation, in which Washington must play a leading role. On this point, Joseph Nye formulates an idea similar to Kissinger’s: “Both for self-interested and humanitarian reasons, the United States should lead the G-20 in generous contributions to a major new COVID-19 fund that is open to all countries.” I agree with these suggestions because they combine Realpolitik and cooperation. Unfortunately, it seems there is little chance of the current U.S. administration leading such initiatives. Instead, it is imaginable that China will play such a role. It would certainly strengthen China’s position in the currently emerging new world order.

What the different international actors do not realize is that more cooperation would have helped avert the current pandemic or at least mitigate its spread and consequences. Theorists in international relations have long sparred over whether states are inherently more or less prone to cooperate. Realpolitik argues that cooperation is the exception, not the rule. A country will work with another country only if it is in its national interest. In this case, ironically, a Realpolitik lens would tell us that it is in countries’ national interests that they cooperate against the Covid-19 pandemic.

As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, billions of us have become captives in our own homes. Not only are we physically in captivity, but the economy (national economies and the world economy) has also become a captive of the coronavirus, and it is in this captivity that international politics also finds itself today. Moreover, just as the lesson of the novel Captivity shows us, our governments have been captives of their own circumstances and perspectives, and have not been able to see beyond them and to look at the crisis from a more holistic view. Such a view, in line with Realpolitik, would have shown us the path toward self-interested cooperation.

Once the immediate crisis is over, countries will need to rethink their cooperation in the fight against pandemics. A Realpolitik lens, however, shows that individual countries will only do this when they realize that such cooperation is in their well-conceived self-interest. Let’s hope they realize it. The sooner they do, the sooner our captivity ends.

¹ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 137

² Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1979), p. 117

Realpolitik & Cooperation in the Age of COVID-19 was originally published on Global Security Review.

An example of possible obstruction to diplomacy is the clash between the United States and China. An article in the New York Times stated that “Mr. Trump was scathing as he accused Beijing of concealing the outbreak first detected in Wuhan that has become a pandemic now paralyzing the United States.” The contentions were also become worse because of the words used by President Trump during his speech in White House briefing in calling coronavirus as “Chinese virus” and the term “Wuhan virus,” which was used by the Secretary of State Mr. Pompeo. Moreover, other top American officials also expressed their criticism against the Chinese government, particularly on withholding and distorting vital health data, which could create a global health risk. In response, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that there might be a conspiracy theory that the US Army might have produced the virus and brought it to Wuhan. Another picture of obstruction to diplomacy is the halting of trade relations between Southeast Asian countries and China.

Due to the restrictions in the travel of both humans and goods to prevent virus transmission, imports and exports are greatly affected. The spreading of coronavirus has been an obstruction to many economic relations, especially to Southeast Asia, which has been over-reliant on China as its vast market and trade partner in recent years. Furthermore, it is not only trade relations that have been affected by the COVID-19, but it also temporarily stops diplomatic meetings. A Foreign Policy article mentioned that “The coronavirus has all but halted the world of international diplomacy, derailing major summits and leaving diplomats stranded as governments temporarily ban international travel.” Socially, racism could also be experienced by the Chinese people as their country is the epicenter of the virus outbreak. Now there is a stigma among peoples that they are more likely to be carriers.

The above scenarios have described COVID-19 as obstructing diplomatic relations. However, there are also opportunities for diplomacy that could be seen in the world, along with fighting this pandemic disease. These are revealed in the actions initiated by the states in terms of collaborative efforts to stop the spreading of the virus. The continuous extension of help and donations across borders as well as the thawing of diplomatic ties despite political tensions. For instance, the meeting that was conducted last February 20, 2020, to talk about joint measures in combating COVID-19 has become an opportunity to bring closer the ASEAN member states and China.

Despite the ongoing territorial disputes between China and other Southeast Asian neighbors, this crisis has become an avenue for the contending parties to be united, prioritizing regional and global health and safety. Writing in The Diplomat, Lucio Blanco Pitlo said: “The meeting was remarkable for tackling not only the health dimension of the crisis but also its social and economic impacts, as well as how technology can be harnessed to mitigate the fallout.” China is currently working on mitigating the lasting damage of the virus in the region and also aiming to reinstate regional unity with its Southeast Asian partners. Additionally, it was noted by Faisal Al Yafai, “Such disaster diplomacy is vital in the moment. It sends an important message that political tensions, no matter how grave, can eventually be overcome by common humanity. But longer-term, it could also lead to better politics.” This hope can be seen by what happened recently when North Korea sent a letter to South Korea expressing condolences due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Canada also helped China by giving medical equipment despite the latest issue on the arrest of the Huawei executive in Vancouver. Recently, Japan generously donated masks with a poem, “Although we are separated by mountains and rivers, we live under the same sky.” In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has extended its help to Iran, which is often at odds with its Arab neighbors, by giving 7.5 metric tons of medical supplies.

We can see that in these difficult times, diplomacy should be of great concern. COVID-19 is now a problem for all countries and all peoples of the world. A global challenge must be overcome globally. This virus might not only affect the physical health of humankind but also cause the outbreak of a global conflict among countries if diplomatic relations are obstructed. On the other hand, this global health crisis might also be an opportunity for the unity of the world because common humanity will be prioritized over political, economic, and social rivalry.

COVID-19: Diplomatic Obstruction or Opportunity? was originally published on Global Security Review.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, President Trump and President Rouhani had agreed on a four-point document brokered by Emmanuel Macron as a basis for a meeting and relaunching negotiations between their respective countries. According to the text, which POLITICO claimed to have seen, Tehran would agree that “Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon” and will “fully comply with its nuclear obligations and commitments and will accept a negotiation on a long term framework for its nuclear activities.” It would also refrain from any aggression and will seek genuine peace and respect in the region through negotiations.”

The U.S. would agree to “lift all the sanctions re-imposed since 2017” and “Iran will have full ability to export its oil and freely use its revenues.” The meeting did not take place, though, as President Rouhani reportedly called it off because of Mr. Trump’s remarks in the UNGA of imposing further sanctions on Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian Supreme Leader has forbidden any talks with the U.S. unless the U.S. lifts all the sanctions on Iran. 

Meanwhile,  Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan had said in an address to media during the UNGA that both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and President Trump had asked him to work to deescalate the situation between them and Iran. He subsequently made a trip to Iran and Saudi Arabia in a bid to facilitate dialogue between both the countries. Also, shortly after UNGA, it was reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi had undertaken efforts to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the consent of Saudi Arabia. Abbas al Housavi, an official in Iraqi PM’s office, told Middle East Eye that the Saudis and Iranians both have conditions before the negotiations process starts. Middle East Eye later reported that Tahnoun bin Zayad, UAE national security adviser and crown prince’s brother, was in Tehran for at least 48 hours to defuse the Gulf crisis. 

Even though the agreed Trump-Rouhani meeting did not take place, it is nevertheless appreciable what President Macron was able to achieve through his shuttle diplomacy efforts. This instance is perhaps the closest the presidents of Iran and the U.S. have been to directly engaging with each other. Additionally, the four-point document was agreed upon by the two presidents, according to reports, and acknowledges the concerns of stakeholders. Thus, mediation efforts can now be augmented accordingly. It remains to be seen, however, what will come from the efforts of Pakistani and Iraqi Prime Ministers, as well as from the UAE National Security Advisor’s visit to Tehran.

Recent events underscore the necessity for dialogue

Furthermore, the events following the explosions that occurred on board the Iranian oil tanker Sabity in the Red Sea indicate genuine efforts by both Iran and Saudi Arabia to not only avoid tensions but also to de-escalate them. Iran has so far avoided explicitly blaming Saudi Arabia for explosions, despite alleging that two missiles hit the tanker near the Saudi Port of Jeddah. The Saudi Foreign Minister rejected any involvement in the Sabity incident. The spokesperson of the Saudi General Directorate of Border Guard claimed that Saudi Arabia’s attempts to assist the tanker were unsuccessful since the Sabity’s GPS was turned off, and it did not respond to repeated Saudi attempts to make contact. Ahead of PM Imran Khan’s visit to Iran, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Mousavi expressed Iran’s willingness to hold talks with Saudi Arabia in a bid to reduce or eliminate misunderstandings.

The attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last month is perhaps the event that can be most strongly attributed to the dramatic turn of events that is being observed. The Aramco attacks not only damaged the facilities but exposed Saudi Arabia’s military and economic vulnerabilities. Further, the U.S. shied away from overtly responding to Iran. It’s possible that MBS was made to realize the Kingdom can no longer rely on the U.S. for its security and that dialogue is needed to de-escalate the situation and find a way for sustainable, long-term regional coexistence with Iran.

“Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to directly label Iran for the Aramco attacks as the culprit demonstrates Riyadh’s uncertainties as to how to react given its obvious vital military and economic vulnerabilities. More than that, Riyadh has reportedly shown willingness to engage in talks with Iran mediated by Iraq—a dramatic turn from its more hawkish stance so far. In a nutshell, it seems that Iran’s risky game of brinkmanship since at least May has been quite successful in demonstrating its power of nuisance in the region,” said Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Visiting Fellow at the Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings Doha Center, when asked by the author for comment via email.

In a nutshell, there is a growing consensus about the necessity for talks. Yet, the occurrence of these talks remains only bleakly probable. This is because of the complications that arise out of Iranian, Saudi, and U.S. concerns, as well as from domestic politics in Iran and the U.S.

Dr. Nejad describes it this way: “Despite Macron’s strong efforts to arrange a Trump–Rouhani meeting at the sidelines of the UNGA and a four-point plan designed to exchange the lifting with U.S. sanctions with Iranian concessions in regional geopolitics and its ballistic missile program, Rouhani refused to take part in such a meeting, arguing that the U.S. needed to first lift sanctions. Rouhani’s position reflects that of the Supreme Leader Khamenei who, beyond that, seems to be opposed to the idea of his president engaging in talks with the U.S., which would lift Rouhani’s status at home—something Khamenei is unsympathetic to amid ongoing intra-elite rivalries in view of post-Khamenei Iran.” As for President Trump, he wants to talk to the Iranians but without lifting sanctions. His objective is to be seen as pressuring the Iranians via sanctions, thus forcing them to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the approaching 2020 U.S. Presidential Election has made it even more difficult for Mr. Trump to change course, lest he appears weak. 

Ending the stalemate

There have been attempts at mediation, but perhaps none of them have dedicated an adequate amount of effort at confidence-building measures between the rival countries. Thus far, mediators have tried to leverage the trust of the respective parties to facilitate talks, but have only managed to serve as interlocutors. Therefore, it is essential that confidence-building among these countries be considered a primary objective, which can then be further developed upon to get them to participate in a dialogue. This can only happen if reservations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. be addressed first, at least to an extent, if not completely.

In terms of the Iranian position with regards to negotiation, Dr. Nejad says that “although Iranian foreign-policy at times is Janus-faced, Iranian strategy since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has been a result of elite consensus, involving various domestic factions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary by the Supreme Leader, Iran, via Zarif, has been regularly testing the waters of entering into negotiations with the U.S., which is indispensable if Tehran wants to improve its economic situation.” The main hindrance is that Iran wants to be respected by the U.S., and President Trump is doing precisely the opposite. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Tehran Correspondent of Financial Times, quoted a relative of the Supreme Leader in a recent article as saying, “Mr. Khamenei is not fundamentally against negotiations but he believes the U.S. intends to turn talks into a trial of the Islamic republic.” The relative goes on to say that “he believes that we first need to be very strong in the region. We have shown that we are not too far from that point of determining regional developments. The U.S. should not be able to ignore our power.”

As for Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Yemen crisis will make the most important feature in any negotiations or talks between them. As Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former Iranian policymaker in his article in Los Angeles Times, has suggested that the solution of crisis can act as a precursor to talks between the two countries and also the U.S in long run. This can serve as an appropriate confidence building measure. Mr. Mousavia suggests that the UN Secretary General can take initiative and invite both countries, as well as member countries of the European Union and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to hold a dialogue aimed at ending the bloodshed in Yemen. Looking at the statements from both, Saudi Arabia and Iran, it seems as though both the countries have already realized in part that neither can hope to have security by levying insecurity on the other and it is time to quit the competition for regional hegemony. 

In a meeting with PM Imran Khan, Supreme Leader Khamenei said properly ending the war in Yemen can have positive effects for the region. The Supreme Leader added that “we have no motivation for animosity with these countries (Saudi Arabia), but they are influenced by the United States and act against the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with the United States’ will.” Both these remarks are critical in the sense that the Supreme Leader has made them himself, perhaps implying he also thinks working to resolve the crisis in Yemen is a good starting point. Furthermore, based on the rhetoric of its leaders, Iran is arguably more comfortable about dialogue with Saudi Arabia right now than it is with the U.S.

Thus, as Mr. Mousavian has suggested further in his article, and it makes sense that if Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, the EU, and the U.S. are able to reach consensus about an end game for the Yemen war, there is a greater opportunity for a reduction in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lastly, this can set the stage for U.S. and Iran to reduce their tensions, as it would mean the solution of a significant point of contention between the U.S. and Iran: the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Mr. Trump can use this as a basis for granting concessions to Iran and not appear weak. In return, Iran would consider revisiting its earlier stand that all sanctions on Iran be lifted and participate in talks with the U.S.

Confidence Building Measures Needed Before the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Start a Dialogue With Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Arctic is rapidly becoming a major geopolitical hot spot. While the melting ice in the region is presenting significant challenges to the environment, it is also creating opportunities for Arctic states and major global powers who seek to exploit the effects of climate change. One such opportunity is the growing access to deposits of natural resources, including abundant quantities of oil and natural gas. Another fraught issue is the dispute over the opening of the Northwest Passage, as shorter maritime navigation routes become available and states argue over who controls those waterways. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that shipping via these new routes will be two weeks faster than traditional routes, such as the Suez Canal.

To adapt to the changes brought about in the Arctic, the United States, Russia, and China have all devised strategies for how they intend to pursue their respective interests. The U.S. introduced the National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013, and in 2018 China released its own Arctic Policy. But far and away the most active Arctic power has been Russia, who has taken efforts to assert its maritime claims, develop resources, and even begin militarizing the region. In comparison, the United States is woefully behind as, even today, it owns a total of two active icebreakers—of which only one is functional.

To make matters worse, the United States finds itself at odds with even some of its closest partners in the region. Canada, a steadfast ally, and the United States have contrary positions on the ownership of the Northwest Passage. Canada insists the Northwest Passage is intrinsically Canadian while the United States maintains the idea the Northwest Passage is an international strait and should remain open for free navigation.

Surprisingly, this debate with our northern neighbor creates an opportunity for American cooperation with China. Much like the United States, China insists the region belongs to the “common heritage of mankind” and remains opposed to the kind of sovereignty Russia and Canada wish to apply to the region. China’s motivation is transparent: as a non-Arctic power, China cannot make the kind of territorial claims other Arctic powers can, and unless the area is internationalized, China would be dependent on adjacent countries—namely, Russia and Canada—to use these waterways. And the benefits of using these waterways would be enormous for China as Chinese shipping companies could shorten the length of their routes by approximately 30 percent, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars while also avoiding risks from piracy.

As the United States continues to play catch up in the region, Washington should consider working with Beijing to make freedom of navigation a reality in the region. Chinese support could help tip the balance within the Arctic Council and ensure Arctic waterways remain open by leveraging Chinese influence and resources in the region to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS).

China, which is no stranger to American FONOPS, has been on the receiving end of FONOPs-related lawsuits from the United States, which has challenged Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea—claims that are more spurious than those China refutes in the Arctic. China does risk undermining its stance in the South China Sea by endorsing this approach, but the enormous benefits of free access through the Arctic may very well be worth that risk.

There are several challenges to realizing this level of cooperation. First, increasing tensions between the United States and China may make it difficult to reach an agreement, despite this issue being a place where both countries can mutually gain. Second, China may be able to independently work out a favorable deal with Russia to allow passage for its ships and use of Russian icebreakers. This is a real possibility, as evidenced by China and Russia’s willingness to cooperate in other strategic areas. And, lastly, if the United States is unable or unwilling to help China make a case for FONOPS, a Sino-Russian deal might be China’s best option.

This is not to say cooperation with China is without risks. Pompeo is right to worry about Chinese investments and influence potentially eroding the base of support that the United States already has in the region. And giving China too much power within the Arctic Council runs the risk of upsetting a political balance of power that is roughly arrayed in favor of the United States. But, these disagreements should not prevent the United States from working with China in one of the few areas where interests are aligned. It’s even possible that further cooperation in the Arctic may help cool otherwise tumultuous relations between the United States and China.

The United States Must Work with China to Ensure Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic was originally published on Global Security Review.

This essay will examine selected policies and statements under Donald Trump’s administration and its implications for international law. These policies are: (1) The Travel Ban (Muslim Ban);¹ (2) Waterboarding and Torture;² (3) Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 2015;³ (4) Withdrawal from Iran’s Nuclear Deal (JCPOA);⁴ (5) North Korea Strategy;⁵ and (6) Recognition of Jerusalem as Capital of Israel.⁶

The (Muslim) Travel Ban

On January 27, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Executive Order No. 13769 known as Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.⁷ The executive order imposed a “Travel Ban” for ninety (90) days blocking the entry of citizens from the seven (7) predominantly Muslim countries which eventually reduced to six (6) and included North Korea and Venezuela by virtue of the Executive Order No. 13780.⁸ It also banned individuals from those countries in re-entering even with valid visas and green cards. Moreover, the order suspended the U.S. Refugees Admissions Program (USRAP) for one hundred twenty (120) days and—for an unspecified time period—it blocked all Syrian refugees.⁹ 

The primary purpose of the executive order is to ensure that hostile individuals will be prevented from entering U.S. territory.¹⁰ The order also intends to protect U.S. citizens from foreign terrorist attacks and exploitation of its immigration laws for malign purposes.¹¹ However, many protests and complaints were raised against the constitutionality of Trump’s policy and its alleged violation of international law. Nevertheless, this paper mainly focuses on the issue of whether or not Trump’s executive order is a breach of international law.

The argument against the constitutionality of the E.O. 13769 and 13780 was claimed to be a violation of the Establishment Clause¹² because the executive order predominantly barred the entry of citizens from predominantly Muslim countries, the complainants contend that Trump’s E.O. was a clear expression of religious discrimination. Opponents also argued that the order violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952¹³, where exclusion based on national origin is not allowed. 

In the context of international law, since the United States has been a party for a long time in three major related treaties namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967),¹⁴ the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969),¹⁵ and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951),¹⁶ the provisions of the E.O. which could discriminate the said countries because of their religion and place of origin as well as the suspension of the acceptance of refugees are clear violations of these treaties. Besides, the U.S. Constitution acknowledges treaties as part of the supreme law of the land.¹⁷ Based on the preceding, Trump’s Travel Ban implies that the President has not been careful in the execution of U.S. laws because he must comply with U.S. legal obligations under both treaty and customary international law.

The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, ruled in favor of the Travel Ban in Trump vs. Hawaii,¹⁸ where it decided that the ban was not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It was discussed that the number of Muslims banned by the E.O. did not comprise the majority of the Muslims in the world, so it cannot be counted as racial or religious discrimination. It is also mentioned that Trump has sufficiently fulfilled the requirements to justify national security measures that the entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interests.

Analyzing both sides, although Trump’s Travel Ban was upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional and protecting national interests, it will still generate some effects and consequences in the reputation of the United States in the international community. Trump’s action in this particular issue could create a negative impression to other countries about the United States’ political commitments in international relations and system which may result to further transnational legal processes that could eventually be encountered by the US.¹⁹ 

Waterboarding and Torture

On January 26, 2017, President Donald Trump issued a controversial statement, saying he wants to “fight fire with fire” in stopping terrorism. It suggests that he could be willing and open to bring back torture because he believes it works.²⁰  He argued that if the ISIS is ruthless in beheading citizens and posting it online, then it is not good that the United States is not allowed to do anything. He also stated during his campaign that when elected, “we’ll use waterboarding and a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding.” After he was elected, there was a draft executive order disclosed by the press which intends to reinstate the discredited program of interrogation of high-value alien terrorists to be operated at “black sites,” former CIA detention facilities outside of the United States. 

Consequently, Trump was again criticized because his statement could result in actions that will violate human rights. Although rhetoric and a draft are not yet laws and thus are unenforceable, the issue, in this case, is that whether or not Trump made a negative impression to U.S. integrity in the international community. While Trump wants to protect his country against high-valued alien terrorists, his statement may incur damages against the reputation of the U.S. on its commitment to international law and human rights. 

The United States is one of the signatories of the United Nations Convention Against Torture,²¹ an international human rights treaty under the United Nations to prevent any form of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment around the world.  Being a party to such Convention, Trump should abide in the agreement not only because it is codified, but because it is dignified. There is no doubt that as to whether or not a state is a party to the Convention every state is obligated to obey customary human rights law which includes the prohibition of torture, genocide, slavery and the prohibition of discrimination. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)²² prohibits such practices.

Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 2015

Another controversy about the administration and policies of President Trump was his intention to withdraw from the 2015 Paris Agreement.²³ It is an international multilateral agreement aiming to mitigate the effects of climate change. This deal was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty of which the United States became after its Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992. It was reported last June 1, 2017, that President Trump plans to withdraw from this agreement because he does not want to compromise the U.S. economy for the sake of others. He argued that the deal would hobble, disadvantage, and impoverish his country.²⁴ Though his intent to withdraw has no legal force now, the issue is whether or not President Trump could withdraw unilaterally from the Paris Agreement. 

To understand the legality of Trump’s intention to unilaterally withdraw from the said agreement, the following questions must be answered: (1) What type of international agreement is the Paris Agreement of 2015? And (2) What are the domestic and international policies and practices related to the treaty termination and withdrawal will apply in this case? The United States pacts with foreign nations may be in the form of treaties, executive agreements, or non-legal commitments, which involves the making of political commitments.²⁵

Under the Obama Administration, the Paris Agreement was considered as an executive agreement, which doesn’t require senatorial or congressional approval. Interestingly, the U.S. Constitution is clear when it comes to the procedures in entering into international agreements. However, there is no explicit provision concerning unilateral presidential withdrawal from these agreements. It suggests that if the U.S. domestic law allows the President to enter into executive agreements even without senatorial or congressional advice or consent, then it may also claim the authority to withdraw from such without seeking the approval from the legislative department. 

To identify U.S. historical practice in treaty termination, Stephen Mulligan, in his report entitled Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, The Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement,²⁶ enumerated five (5) categories:

1. Executive withdrawal or termination pursuant to prior authorization or direction from Congress;

2. Executive withdrawal or termination pursuant to prior authorization or direction from the Senate;

3. Executive withdrawal or termination without prior authorization, but with subsequent approval by Congress; 

4. Executive withdrawal or termination without prior authorization, but with subsequent approval by the Senate; and

5. Unilateral executive withdrawal or termination without authorization or direction by Congress or the Senate.

The first four (4) methods were practiced during the 19^th century, but at the beginning of the 20^th century, the fifth method began to be used in large part by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration during World War II—and thus became the norm. In connection with the unilateral withdrawal from a treaty by the President, Goldwater v. Carter²⁷ discussed the issue relative to President Carter’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan. The Court held that the President may terminate agreements which closely involves his foreign relations authority. At issue is a political question between the executive and the legislative departments and therefore is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. 

Since there is no question about the domestic policy on the President’s withdrawal, there is still a need to look at the method of treaty withdrawal and termination under international law. The most authoritative international legal basis for treaty termination and withdrawal is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).²⁸ As the Convention provides in Article 54:

The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place:

(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or

(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.

In the case of the Paris Agreement of 2015, Article 54 (a) of the VCLT will apply in terms of termination or withdrawal by any of the parties. Since not the United States did not have the consent of the parties, Article 54 (b) is not applicable. It is more evident when one reviews Article 28 of the Paris Agreement,²⁹ which provides that:

1.  At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party,  that  Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.

2.  Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.

3.  Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.  

We can see that the date that the Paris Agreement of 2015 entered into force was November 4, 2016, to which when we apply the above provisions will only allow the parties to complete the withdrawal process until November 4, 2020. Therefore, Trump Administration has no choice but to comply with the requirements of the Agreement until the allowable date of withdrawal. 

However, the only option the Trump Administration may do to withdraw from the Agreement is to apply Article 28 (3) which is to withdraw from the UNFCCC. The withdrawal process in the UNFCCC is nearly identical with the Paris Agreement, but it is possible for Trump to use it because the Convention entered into force in 1994 which means that the three-year withdrawal prohibition had expired. Hence, withdrawal from both the Agreement and the Convention could be consummated within one year. But as Trump did not taken any action to withdraw from the parent treaty, the United States remains a party to the subsidiary Paris Agreement until eligibility to withdraw will be allowable. 

Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)

On October 13, 2017, President Donald Trump criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)³⁰ related to Iran’s nuclear program entered into under the Obama Administration in 2015. The JCPOA was finalized by Iran and the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) placing limitations on Iran’s nuclear program as well as providing voluntary measures in which the P5+1 provides relief from sanctions imposed on Iran in exchange for specific Iranian nuclear-related actions. Trump announced that he would not renew specific certifications related to JCPOA, although he has an intention to not comply to certifications, it does not mean that the United States automatically terminate its participation in the JCPOA. 

The JCPOA is an unsigned document that encourages “voluntary measures” rather than binding obligations. The previous U.S.administration considered this document as a political commitment that did not require congressional or senatorial approval. There is nothing in domestic law or international law that can prevent Trump in withdrawing from this plan of action. However, on July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council approved the Resolution No. 2231,³¹ which terminated existing sanctions on the day of implementation. Although the document of JCPOA relies on “voluntary measures,” the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 may convert non-binding political commitments in the JCPOA into a legal obligation under the UN Charter.

The UN Charter provides in Article 25 that the Council’s decisions are legally binding. Usually, the nature of the decisions of the Council depends on the language used in the resolution. It is when we look at the content of the resolution that we can determine if it is binding or non-binding. It happened that the Resolution 2231 is a combination of non-binding recommendation and binding decisions. Another point is that the U.S. Congress did pass legislation to supervise Iran’s compliance with the plan of action, and this is known as Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.³² 

Given the above information, we can see that in the context of international law, the issue is whether or not President Trump violates international law in non-performance of its commitments in the JCPOA. By looking at the Article 36³³ of the JCPOA, it provides for dispute resolution mechanism that can be invoked by the United States or any of the parties if any of them believes that Iran is not complying with the plan of action. If the dispute remains unsettled, Article 36 allows the United States to stop performing its commitments in case Iran’s activities constitute “significant non-performance” of the JCPOA. As of now, there is no clear definition of the term “significant non-performance.”

North Korea Strategy

President Donald Trump statements against North Korea is one of the issues encountered by his administration. Trump issued various threats against North Korea like when he said “fire, fury and frankly power of which this world has never seen before.” He also threatened at the UN General Assembly, that he would destroy North Korea if it did not cease its harmful activities. This uncontrolled Trump’s rhetoric could provoke the unstable leader Kim Jong-Un into taking actions which could worsen the situation. This conflict between two egotistical leaders may result in encounters that will serve no one’s best interest but will be only destructive.³⁴ 

 As we examine the history of nuclear diplomacy, threats are not the best solution to encourage surrendering of weapons. Like Iran and Libya, it is through concerted, unified multilateral diplomacy and relief from sanctions that work better rather than violent threats. We can also notice that when intensive diplomatic dialogue increases, the more the North Korean aggravation decreases. This only implies that diplomacy is the best way to end the North Korean crisis. It is therefore critically advisable that the Trump Administration still abides in the Nuclear Deal and participate in the continuous multilateral dealings on the issue of North Korea. 

Recognition of Jerusalem as Capital of Israel

On December 6, 2017, President Donald Trump publicly declared his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This statement was so opposite with the past U.S. Administration’s foreign policy. He also stated that the U.S. embassy would be relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.³⁵  Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem will significantly isolate the U.S. in one of the most sensitive issue in the Middle East. It has brought many criticism and reactions from Arab and European leaders. It is also inviting threats to peace in the Middle East.

Opponents of the move argue that hasty decisions like Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital will eventually trigger conflicts and struggles on the disputed city. This decision by Trump was widely condemned by world leaders and international organizations.  On the other hand, Trump Administration claimed that this will not promote conflict but will give way to a more realistic peace negotiation. The issue, in this case, is whether or not Trump’s declaration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is against international law.

Following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the UN General Assembly voted for Resolution ES-10/L.22³⁶ condemning theU.S.declaration on the status of Jerusalem as null and void. UN General Assembly Resolution No. 181 Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, called for the partition of British-ruled Palestine into a Jewish State and Arab State. This resolution is also a basis about the internationalization of Jerusalem. The United States was one of the parties who voted in favor of this resolution. 

Conclusion

The administration of President Donald Trump is challenging the system of international law. Based on the above analyses of the selected policies and statements by Trump, there is always an implication to international relations. The role of international law is still to maintain peace and balance. One can see that when there is an action by Trump, there is also an opposite reaction by the international law. As a result, transnational legal processes are increasingly operational. 

As Professor Harold Koh explained in his lecture on the Trump Administration and International Law,³⁷ that every time Trump tries to challenge international law then there comes a counter-strategy which could be from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Governmental Organizations (GOs). The counter-strategy by these NGOs can be referred to as an outsiders’ strategy. This is a process where external actors from different non-state actors will conduct interaction, interpretation, and internalization of norms. On the other hand, the internal actors will react through insider’s strategy by engaging, translating, and leverage. These counter-strategies are unlike Trump’s strategy, which prefers a pattern of obedience, persuasion, and coercion. 

The analogy used by Koh was the “Rope-A-Dope” strategy. He explained that when Muhammad Ali fought George Foreman, Ali surprised everyone by retreating to the ropes and letting the champion pound him, taking pains only to avoid getting knocked out. After many rounds, Ali allowed his opponent to punch him out, until, in the late rounds, Ali finally came off the ropes and knocked out his now exhausted and weakened opponent. This analogy means that if the Trump Administration threatens to violate international law, actors outside the federal government can apply the external strategy. Meanwhile, actors inside committed to international law can continue to pursue the internal strategy. 

Trump as the loud player who loudly launches various ineffectual initiatives to change the status quo will force little change, get tired, exhausted, and frustrated from all failing around, and ultimately find himself getting politically “knocked-out.”

References

¹ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017.

² See CNN. (January 26, 2017). Trump on Waterboarding: “We have to fight fire with fire.” Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/donald-trump-waterboarding-torture/index.html

³ See BBC News. (June 1, 2017). Paris Climate Deal: Trump PullsU.S.out of 2015 Accord. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40127326

⁴ See CNN Philippines. (May 10, 2018). Trump Withdraws from Iran Nuclear Deal, Isolating him further from the World. Retrieved from http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/world/2018/05/09/trump-US-withdraws-iran-deal.html

⁵ See The New York Times. (August 8, 2017). Trump Threatens “Fire and Fury” Against North Korea if It Endangers US. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html

⁶ See The New York Times. (December 6, 2017). Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital and Orders U.S. Embassy to Move. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html

⁷ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017, supra note 1.

⁸ See generally Executive Order No. 13780, March 6, 2017.

⁹ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017, supra note 7.

¹⁰ Supra.

¹¹ Supra.

¹² U.S.Constitution, Amendment I

¹³ See Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)

¹⁴ See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967)

¹⁵ See generally International Covenant on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969)

¹⁶ See general Covenant and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)

¹⁷ U.S.Constitution, Article VI (2)

¹⁸ Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, 585 US_ (2018)

¹⁹ See Koh, H. (2017). Trump Administration and International Law. Faculty Scholarship Series. 5213. pp. 415-421. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=6215&context=fss_papers

²⁰ Supra, note 2

²¹ See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)

²² See The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)

²³ Supra, note 3

²⁴ Supra.

²⁵ See Mulligan, S. (2018). Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Congressional Research Service. pp. 2-4. Retrieved from www.crs.gov

²⁶ Supra, pp. 10-11

²⁷ Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

²⁸ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 54

²⁹ See Paris Agreement (2015), Article 28 

³⁰ Supra, note 4

³¹ See UN Security Council Resolution No. 2231

³² See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (2015)

³³ See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015), Article 36

³⁴ Supra, note 19, p. 37

³⁵ Supra, note 6

³⁶ See UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/L.22

³⁷ Supra, note 19, pp. 4-10

International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration was originally published on Global Security Review.

When news of the incident broke, Filipinos took to social media to express their outrage. According to a report published by Business Insider, “The Philippines has accused China of ramming a Philippine fishing vessel, sinking it, and then abandoning the crew to drown in open waters […] The crew of the sunken Philippine vessel was ultimately rescued by a Vietnamese ship operating nearby.”

The Turkish news outlet TRT World reported that Filipinos were angered after a Chinese vessel seemingly rammed a fishing boat in the South China Sea and left its crew to fend for themselves. The New York Times noted that the 22 Filipino fishermen were at sea before being rescued by a Vietnamese boat. The fishermen returned to the Philippines on board the Philippine Navy patrol ship BRP Ramon Alcaraz.

The incident occurred around midnight on June 9th, 2019 in Reed Bank (Recto Bank), 500 kilometers off from the coast of the Philippines. Reed Bank is considered to be a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishermen and is frequented by fishermen from other countries like Vietnam, China, and Taiwan.

The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) boat detection (VDB) located near the province of Occidental Mindoro revealed that at approximately 1:08 am local time (approximately an hour after the ramming incident), the Yuemaobinyu 422212 detected and allegedly berthed. Meanwhile, the borne-out F/B GEMVIR was transported towards the Caminawit, San Jose port. It also says that five months ago, around January 25th, the Chinese vessel was seen in the area.

A few hours after the news went viral, the Department of National Defense of the Philippines released the following statement:

“A collision between a Chinese and Filipino vessel was reported by Filipino fishermen near the Recto Bank in the West Philippine Sea on the evening of June 9, 2019. The collision sank the Filipino vessel. This is not the expected action from a responsible and friendly people.”

On June 13th, the Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro “Teddy” Locsin stated that the Philippines issued a diplomatic protest over the ship-ramming incident in the West Philippine Sea. The country’s top diplomat also described the collision on social media as “contemptible and condemnable.” Locsin’s statement was echoed up by an assessment from the Philippine military’s western command (WESCOM), and Alexander Pama, a  former chief of the Philippine Navy, said that there was no doubt that the Chinese vessel had intentionally hit the Philippine boat. Subsequently, the mayor of the town of San Jose in Occidental Mindoro expressed his belief the Chinese vessel had intentionally collided with the Filipino boat.

China released a press release admitting that a Chinese vessel from the province of hit a Filipino vessel in the vicinity of Reed Bank on June 9th. Interestingly, it claimed that the Chinese fishing boat Yuemaobinyu 42212 was “berthed” in the area when seven or eight Filipino fishing boats “besieged” it. Beijing stated that China regards its relationship with the Philippines relationship and the safety of life at sea with high importance and that it would continue to properly handle this issue with the Philippines seriously and responsibly. 

China maintained its claim that there was no such thing as a “hit-and-run.” Furthermore, on June 13th, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang called the incident “an ordinary maritime traffic accident” and said that China was still investigating the matter. “If the relevant reports are true, regardless of the country from which the perpetrator came from, their behavior should be condemned,” the Chinese official said. Intriguingly, statements were removed from the Chinese Embassy’s social media pages the Friday after the incident but were reposted on the Chinese Embassy’s official Twitter page one day later.

Philippine Navy chief Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad confirmed that the Chinese vessel which came into contact with a Filipino fishing boat and caused it to sink was no accident, but a deliberate maneuver to ram the smaller craft. Also, Gemvir 1 crewmembers had made it clear that it was a Chinese vessel that rammed their boat and not a Vietnamese vessel, as some officials had insinuated.

According to Junel Insigne, captain of the Filipino vessel, “Umikot muna sila, binalikan kami, sinindi yung maraming ilaw, nung nakita kaming lubog na, pinatay yung ilaw ulit bago umatras, bago tumakbo palayo (They circled us, went back, switched on their lights. When they saw us sinking, they switched off their lights and hurriedly left),” adding he could tell they were Chinese because of the type of ship lights. “Kung wala dun yung Vietnam, baka mamatay na kaming lahat (If the Vietnamese weren’t there, we would have died).”

Moreover, the Navy Chief said at the Maritime Symposium held at The Manila Hotel on June 14th that “The Filipino vessel was anchored. So when based on the International Rules of the Road, it had the privilege because it could not evade […] the ship was rammed. This is not a normal incident. The boat was anchored.” In similar instances, the Armed Forces of the Philippines may assist the relevant government agency in conducting a formal inquiry on the incident, given that it caused the fishermen and the boat owners over 2 million Philippine pesos worth of damages. It included about three tons of fish with an estimated worth of P1 million; P500,000 in capital, and P700,000 for the fishing boat.

Financial assistance was provided one week after the incident occurred. Agriculture Secretary Emmanuel Piñol, through the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), released P25,000 for each of the 22 fishermen under the Survival Response (SURE) Loan Program to help them recover losses incurred. Aside from financial assistance, the government, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource (BFAR), committed to grant the fishermen 30-footer fiberglass boats fully outfitted with engine and nets, in addition to 11 boats—each of which would be shared by two fishermen—in order for them to have a source of additional income while the F/B GEM-VIR 1 is being repaired. 

The government also tapped the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) for additional funding. The funding will not be limited to assisting the 22 fishermen, but will also be used to buy ice-making machines and cold storage for fishing grounds nationwide. Meanwhile, Vice President Leni Robredo gave P50,000 in financial assistance (under the Angat Buhay Program) to fisherman as she visited them in Mindoro.

Strategic Analysis

The 1951 San Francisco Treaty failed to assign possession of the Spratly Islands when Japan lost its title to them following its defeat in the Second World War. Article 2 states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” 

The Spratly Islands constitutes the chain of 200 islets, coral reefs, and seamounts. Its northern extension, the Paracel Islands, spreads across 250,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea, a vast continental shelf that constitutes a potentially rich source of oil and natural gas. It went further into an international conflict when several claimants began extracting resources from the seabed contiguous to their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the mid-70s. China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN states − Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam − all laid claim and occupied part of the islands in the South China Sea. The contested ownership over the Spratly Islands continues to be a key point of contention.

Meanwhile, a significant aspect of the territorial dispute in the South China Sea concerns China’s construction in the area. China has engaged in large-scale land reclamation activities in seven reefs (Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef) in the disputed Spratly Islands. In other words, China’s act from the past two weeks shows uncertainty from the previous records of reclamation and actual tension over its bid to resolve the issue. While the issue is no longer a dispute, it begs the question of sincerity and managing the maritime area, given that it has been decided since July 12^th, 2016 in the Hague Ruling on Arbitration Case.

As for the recent event, it very clearly shows the strategy of China’s psychological operations (PsyOps). For the first time, The United States Department of Defense dragged this paramilitary force (People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia/PAFMM under Paramilitary Forces) out of the shadows in 2017 in its annual report on Chinese military power. The Pentagon said the maritime militia is used to “enforce maritime claims and advance China’s interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.” In the 2018 report, the department said that the maritime militia (Chinese Yuen Tai Yu) plays a significant role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting. They live up to Sun Tzu’s statement in the Art of War: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio says it’s highly likely that a Chinese maritime militia vessel rammed the Filipino fishing vessel F/B Gimber 1 in the West Philippine Sea on June 9^th. Carpio stated, “this may signal the start of a new “gray zone” offensive by China to drive away Filipino fishing vessels in the West Philippine Sea, in the same way, that China is driving away Vietnamese fishing vessels in the Paracels.” Whether this claim by the lead magistrate bids for the verity of the maritime militia of China, it also yields the expectation that Vietnam also has militias. If other Asian countries can do so, this is also another avenue for the Philippines to develop among its citizens, like its Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) or Civilian Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, it would be much easier to probe the incident in the said area of operation if there was a vessel monitoring system put in place just like the lighthouses located nearby Benham Rise. The Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement (IUUF) Act of 2015 required countries to closely monitor foreign vessels through inspections and enforcement. This could be through satellite or non-satellite-based ship monitoring systems with installed transponders in every fishing boat. If this is enabled, this will transmit speed, location, proximity, and a faster tracking measure by passers or the vessels in real-time.

In support the IUUF, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) would have the authority to make more vessel inspections, deny port entry to vessels that illegally fish, and share the inspection data with other countries. The hope is that this will strategically communicate to the rest of the world that the Philippines is serious about cracking down on IUU fishing too, where maritime crimes are also being taken advantage of by poachers and intruders. To avoid such confrontation in the maritime domain, as said in international rules, stationary vessels should be avoided. Thus, the crew-members of oceangoing vessels, as well as commanding officers of warships, should be knowledgeable of the International Rules of the (maritime) Road. And lastly, the Philippine Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety Services Command shall exhaustively investigate the case.

In time, the prosecution must pursue the actual perpetrators who not only violated the rule of law but also committed economic sabotage on the Filipino fishermen whose livelihoods are dependent on fishing. According to Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and an expert on the geopolitics of the South China Sea, “if the Chinese vessel had deliberately rammed a stationary Filipino boat, it would be a clear breach of international norms.” Gregory Poling, Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, said that a large number of Chinese fishing vessels had been discovered in the Subi and Mischief Reefs of the Spratly Islands in 2018. He also noted at one point that all claimants must “find the path forward to manage these disputes before something breaks.”

If China is indeed found to be the responsible party after a “joint investigation,” despite efforts by those opposed to probing the incident, then China shall be held liable. China will continue to analyze the situation as it waits for feedback from the Philippines. China may also expand more in the West Philippine Sea as part of its regional strategy while engaging in a balancing act with the Philippines to maximize benefits from surpluses caused by trade tensions with the U.S. and at the same time trading with the Philippines and strengthening ties using silk roads. 

Mr. Lucio Pitlo III of Ateneo De Manila University and a Research Fellow to Asia Pacific Pathways for Progress Foundation Inc. says that the South China Sea dilemma still allows competition and cooperation among China and ASEAN. He said that “the Philippines plays its best despite being small. Small states’ curse is usually impacted by big states (whether they make love or make war). There is always an impact, but we can implore them not to engage in war.”

In sum, renewed tension creates challenges in many ways: trust and confidence among parties involved, forging alliances for stronger maritime cooperation (i.e. ASEAN-U.S., ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN+3, and Philippines-PRC), strategic policy and direction for ASEAN to push for a Code of Conduct sooner or later, semantics and narratives of various media mileage exploiting the masses and social media through news and propagandas on the side (i.e. President Duterte’s usage of  “little maritime accident”), legal and diplomatic luminaries with different stands, political vis-a-vis decision making from the top-level, crisis communication systematized strategy, the balancing act among states in trade while the issue at hand is being exploited by interest groups abroad, how reliable the rules-based approach and multilateralism that the two countries have not been in-sync in previous negotiations, and the domestic politics affecting how political proponents react and implement.

The Way Forward

While this incident may have impaired the diplomatic relations of the two states, the Philippines needs to maintain open lines of communication given the robust economic ties and high-dense investment that both states have already engaged in since 2016. Simultaneously, the Philippines has to be increasingly cautious with its actions since any miscalculation may result in more coercive tactics by China in the South China Sea. 

Technically speaking, the situation is far from open conflict, since bilateral economic cooperation has been improved under the current administration. It will  and should always be China seeking closer partnership with the Philippines—not the other way around. The Philippines will always present China with a dilemma and an opportunity. on China’s dilemma and opportunity. Though others view the diplomatic protest of the Department of Foreign Affairs as hypocritical, even if China ignores the protests (as it often does), the Philippines still stands to benefit. We do not want to repeat the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and the 2015 encounter of Filipino fishermen in the same area. During that time, the Philippines also lodged diplomatic protests with China over two alleged fishing-related incidents at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

We also have to be consistent in not tolerating such lies or fabrication for that matter (reversing the issue against Filipino fishermen), like the way China used as a pushback in 2013 Arbitration Case when they said that the tribunal (Permanent Court of Arbitration/PCA) debunked China’s claim of ownership to over 85.7% of enclosed water claimed by China using “nine-dash line,” which has no factual or legal basis.

In the long run, the Philippines has to push for and completely support the strict implementation of the Code of Conduct which has been overdue since 2017, when it was first discussed at the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines with other member-states. Despite President Rodrigo Duterte expressing concern and disappointment over the delay in the negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea last 34th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit Retreat on June 23rd, it still has to be supported by member states as an integral policy to push forward. Domestically, the Philippines needs to initiate fishing boat modernization programs, since the majority of the fishing boats being used in the Philippines are made from wood. Of course, Manilla needs an updated crisis communication system to be established with effective strategic communication from government agencies like DND, AFP, NSC, NICA, and the Office of the President. They have to formalize dialogue before issuing a press release to the public to avoid changing words from time to time.

In short, the June 9th incident is a wake-up call not only for the political and security sectors. Most of all, however, it is vital for the security of the commercial fishing industry, environmental protection, and especially human capital (in this case, Filipino fishermen). This is not just about those 22 Filipino fishermen; the entire population of the Philippines is dependent on maritime and food security as well.

Indeed, the Philippines has consistently presented grievances through multilateral forums, while China prefers bilateral negotiation. In other words, China has always opted for one-on-one talks about managing tensions in the absence of external actors. For us, China’s international security activism coupled with maritime gray zone operation, will continue in a multipolar regional security order. The most optimal way to manage this is to adhere to the rule of law while expanding economic connections with reliable trade partners to sustain national security based on national sovereignty and reducing hegemonic dependency. The Philippines must make use of all mechanisms at its disposal before asking for help.

Renewed Tensions Between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the region’s economic and security landscape continues to evolve, and as Chinese interests in the region grow, the United States government must increase its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through two avenues: first, by confirming an ambassador to ASEAN, and second, by sending President Trump as the head of the U.S. delegation to the 2019 East Asia Summit (EAS). These two actions would send a powerful message about American interest in promoting economic partnership, balancing against Chinese influence, and promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia.

The East Asia Summit represents one of the most important diplomatic events in the region. Featuring heads of state and government from ASEAN members and invited guests, the EAS provides a forum for high-level engagement in a key strategic part of the world for American security and trade interests. In recognition of this reality, President Obama attended the event on five separate occasions after the United States first received an invitation to the summit in 2011. In the past two years, however, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Vice President Mike Pence have attended the summit instead of the president. Leading the American delegation to this year’s EAS would allow President Trump to show partners in ASEAN that America remains committed to dialogue and collaboration in the region, even as China increasingly asserts its own interests there.

The president’s attendance at the East Asian Summit would provide the United States with a high-profile opportunity to demonstrate resolve in Southeast Asia. Additionally, filling the vacant position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would expand the number of channels for more sustained engagement. At this pivotal point for the region, the U.S. government must deepen its dialogue with regional partners even as the president attends this year’s summit to convey America’s high-level interest in Southeast Asia. China has recognized the importance of sending an ambassador to ASEAN, maintaining this representation without interruption since 2008. Given last year’s adoption of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, this role will only grow in importance.

These steps forward in American engagement with ASEAN member states are increasingly necessary.

According to the China Global Investment Tracker, a collaboration between the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, Chinese overseas investment in ASEAN member states has exceeded $55 billion since 2017. In Vietnam, for example, Chinese foreign investment has totaled almost $4 billion since the beginning of 2017. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the host country of the U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Chinese investment reached nearly $9 billion in the same time period.

As February’s controversy surrounding the role of Chinese firm Huawei Technologies in the Thai government’s 5G infrastructure initiative demonstrates, however, increased economic integration between China and ASEAN member states can come at a significant cost. In this environment, the United States must utilize diplomatic means to underscore continued economic engagement in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, these actions would send a message to the region: the United States seeks deeper diplomatic, economic, and strategic engagement with the nations of Southeast Asia, both on a more consistent basis and at the highest possible levels. Following last year’s passage of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), confirming a nominee for the position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would also signal continued support for heightened American involvement in the region by both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch. As China seeks to extend its influence among ASEAN member states through the simultaneous uses of inducement and intimidation, protecting U.S. interests in the region needs a whole-of-government response.

ASEAN presents the United States with more opportunities than challenges.

China has recognized the strategic importance of the region and taken action to engage economically and diplomatically. The combined gross domestic product of ASEAN member states exceeds $2.5 trillion. Defense spending among littoral states surrounding the South China Sea will likely reach $250 billion annually by 2020. The president should travel to the East Asia Summit this year in pursuit of those opportunities for partnership, and he should nominate someone to serve as U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN to do the same.

In the past, the United States led the way in engaging with ASEAN. The government sent an ambassador to the organization’s headquarters and established a diplomatic mission there before any other non-member state. President Obama represented the United States at the East Asia Summit five times in six years; President Xi Jinping has yet to attend the gathering, and President Vladimir Putin attended for the first time last year. Confirming a qualified individual for the vacant ambassadorship and sending the president to this year’s summit would signify American leadership in engaging with ASEAN once again.

Two Ways for the United States to Deepen Diplomatic Engagement with ASEAN was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such rhetoric is unusual for the head of state of a country that claims to have brotherly relations with the Russian Federation and is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU)—but not necessarily surprising.

Belarus and the European Union: Embargoes, Diplomacy, and Slow Progress

Belarus and the European Union have been steadily increasing their cooperation for several years. In 2019, Belarus welcomed the foreign ministers of both Hungary and Austria to the country to assist them in opening embassies. These visits, in conjunction with high-level diplomatic visits to Italy and Poland by Belarusian officials, reveals, more than anything, Belarus’ willingness to work with the West—and hedge against Russia.

While it’s likely that economic matters are pushing Belarus to work more closely with the E.U., the growing state of rapprochement is nevertheless a positive development. Increased trade and investment between Belarus and the E.U. will provide more opportunities for social, political, and economic engagement.

Despite the overall improvement in E.U.-Belarus relations, there’s been little to show in terms of concrete partnership agreements. This primarily has to do with Lithuanian concerns over a Belarusian power plant located close to the city of Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital. Lithuania has repeatedly pushed for the power plant’s closure, citing risks to the safety and well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, some European states continue to impose new conditions in the ongoing negotiations for visa-free travel.

The European Union has a policy of promoting and advocating for human rights and democracy in Belarus. It encourages these values by introducing new mechanisms and so-called “democratic” clauses into negotiations with Belarus to induce changes to Belarusian policies that don’t align with European values. Belarus’ continued use of capital punishment is a particularly contentious issue for the E.U.

Belarus and Russia: An Enduring But Turbulent Relationship

Despite the close bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus, the two countries have recently been increasingly at odds with one another. In January of 2019, Russia began to gradually increase its mineral extraction tax and reduce its oil export duty. While this is undoubtedly financially beneficial for Russia, it means that Belarus will lose one of the main benefits of its relationship with Russia: cheap oil and revenue from Russian oil duties. Over the next five years, Belarus is expected to lose eight to twelve billion dollars (U.S.)—even as it remains dependent on Russian oil and gas.

In spite of this disagreement, however, Russia and Belarus continue to engage in negotiations to further the implementation of the 1999 Union State Treaty, which established goals of introducing a single currency, customs regulations, courts, and legislative chambers for Russia and Belarus.

Where Does This Leave Belarus?

It’s unlikely that Belarus would willingly cede its sovereignty. Perhaps most importantly, entering into a union with Russia would mean giving up much of the power he currently enjoys. Moreover, there is no strong political will for a Russia-Belarus union.

When looking at Belarus’ relationship with the European Union alongside its relationship with Russia, it comes as no surprise that Lukashenko himself is walking a tight rope. On one hand, Belarus’s traditional slant has always been towards Russia and Eurasia. However, the E.U. can offer much in the way of trade, energy, and economic diversification—and is a way for Minsk to hedge against deterioration of its relationship with Moscow. For two decades, Belarus has played a game of “Monkey in the Middle.” Amidst increasing tensions between Russia and the West, however, it remains to be seen how much longer it can continue to do so.

Belarus: The State in the Middle was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Kuril Islands were annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Japan, however, still refers to the islands as its Northern Territories, and doesn’t accept their current status. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently discussed the future of the disputed islands, but according to official statements, they still haven’t reached a compromise. However, the very fact that the Kremlin is ready to discuss the return of its own sovereign territory to Japan is a sign of Russian weakness.

In a statement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the two leaders discussed the status of three of the disputed islands. The Kurils are made up of four islands, and some initial reports suggested that Moscow and Tokyo initially negotiated the fate of just two islands. Japan appears to be putting pressure on Russia, as Tokyo is increasing its demands.

Japan seeks the restoration of its sovereignty over all four of the Kuril Islands. Russia’s concern is that once Japanese sovereignty is restored, Tokyo might permit the United States to establish military bases on the Kuril Islands.  The Kremlin remains quite aware of this possibility but is negotiating the status of the territory nevertheless. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the primary goal of the bilateral talks is “signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan,” decades after the end of World War II. Is Lavrov’s conflation of the Kuril Islands matter with the fact that Russia and Japan have yet to formally declare an end to World War II hostilities a signal that the Kremlin is willing to cede territory in exchange for a formal treaty?

At the official level, the Kremlin is denying that it ever intends to return the Kuril Islands to its “dear Japanese partners,” as Putin refers to Abe and his government. Putin and Abe couldn’t reach an agreement, so they agreed to create conditions for eventually achieving mutually acceptable solutions. Once progress is made, the two countries could sign a peace treaty that would be mutually acceptable to both the Japanese and Russian people. This, however, is next-to-impossible as a large majority of Russians oppose returning the Kuril Islands to Japan. Similarly, even after seventy years, a majority of Japanese regards the islands as Russian-occupied Japanese territory. Thus, to find a solution, Japan, Russia, or both will have to compromise.

Japan, for instance, could reduce its demands from all four islands to two or three islands. However, the Kremlin fears that if it cedes even a single square meter of any of the four islands, it would be a sign of weakness, signaling a willingness to make further concessions. Tokyo would then increase pressure on the Kremlin to return more and more territory. What’s more, Moscow fears any agreement over the Kuril Islands could set a precedent it would rather not set. If the Kremlin was willing to enter into negotiations over the Kuril Islands, what’s to stop Berlin from seeking the return of Kaliningrad (formerly Konigsberg) to Germany?

Japan has waited over seventy years for a resolution to the Kuril Islands dispute, and it very well might keep waiting for a serious political crisis that could effectuate the breakup or splintering of the Russian Federation. If such a crisis occurs, Japan may seize the opportunity to restore sovereignty over its Northern Territories. In the meantime, however, Tokyo will maintain a dialogue in the hopes that Moscow will make a compromise. Such a scenario is unlikely, however, as the Kremlin fears such a compromise could open a Pandora’s box.

Will Russia Return the Kuril Islands to Japan? was originally published on Global Security Review.

European leaders announced the establishment of a European Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to facilitate payments for oil exported from Iran to other countries. However, it’s in Europe’s interest to immediately cease all funding and support for the Iranian government.

There are three reasons it’s in Europe’s interest to scuttle the SPV.

First, Europe cannot easily implement the SPV.  Europe not only faces unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States but must also contend with the hardliners in Tehran. With less than a month until the SPV is operational, the Iranian parliament has yet to approve two critical anti-money laundering bills. One is known as CFT (Countering the Financing of Terrorism) and the other relates to the United Nations Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Expediency Discernment Council, an Iranian body that ensures bills align with the principles of Sharia law, has yet to ratify the Palermo Convention.

Second, the Iranian regime will use the SPV as a means to acquire funding used to support terrorism throughout the middle east. Therefore, the special purpose vehicle won’t legitimize oil payments to Iran. The Iranian economy is heavily dependent on the oil industry, which has been entirely taken over by government and military entities such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.  Consequently, there are little resources to go towards privatizing or modernizing the economy. The Quds Force has allowed Iran’s infrastructure to decay while it has spent considerable amounts of money in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Gaza (Hamas). Furthermore, Europe’s SPV has tacitly condoned Iranian missile tests, as the mechanism could have been employed as leverage to induce a freeze Iran’s missile testing program.

Third, the SPV will only be a short-term panacea for Iran’s complex and corrupt economy, should the Iranian government decide to make use of the vehicle. As the U.S. has imposed more sanctions on Iran, the country’s currency has become increasingly volatile. Plummeting currency value has created turmoil both in the market and throughout the population. Banks and investment funds are going bankrupt in ever-greater numbers, and are increasingly unable to provide their customers with access to their savings. As a result, there have been regular protests and strikes throughout Iran.

It is wrong to assume the SPV is anything similar to other international intermediaries.

While it may seem that the mechanism is merely a means of paying for Europe’s oil demand, it is, in fact, a means of providing funding for fundamentalist religious groups within Iran, nearly all of which saw increased funding in Iran’s 2018 fiscal budget. The role of these entities is not to facilitate socio-economic productivity in Iran, rather, it is to create and disseminate propaganda that condemns European values.

Europeans are wrong if they hope that by offering the SPV, Iran will cease its malign activities. In 2018, the Iranian government dispatched operatives to Europe in an effort to assassinate members of Iranian opposition groups. These activities and Iran’s support for terrorist groups should come as no surprise for Europe. It was less than two decades ago in the 1990s that Iran attempted to carry out assassinations in Europe. The regime halted its behavior only after survivors took legal action in European courts.

Europeans have long turned a blind eye to the Iranian government’s pervasive violations of human rights. Today, it would behoove Europe to take a strong stance against the illegal imprisonment of union workers, torture or mysterious death of prisoners, child marriage, women’s rights and religious freedom in Iran.

Recently, Europe has taken some necessary steps towards overcoming its tacit acceptance of Iran’s domestic and international actions. Germany barred Mahan Air flights in early 2019, and French sanctions have sent a message against missile tests by Iran. Poland is hosting a meeting in February concerning the future of the Middle East and has excluded the Iranian government. Europe can shed light on the suffering of the Iranian people by ceasing all support and funding for the regime in Tehran. Europe should not legitimize a hostile, totalitarian, and fundamentalist Iranian regime.

A Precarious Future for Iran-Europe Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

When the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Partushev, claimed in mid-January that the continuation of policies “by the Kiev authorities can contribute to the loss of Ukraine’s statehood,” members of the international security community expressed outrage at what appeared to be a blatant threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, impulsive proclamations have overshadowed subtle diplomacy and enabled largely-unnoticed progress between Germany, Ukraine, and Russia to decrease tensions and facilitate a degree of quasi-cooperation.

In light of the November 2018 naval confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian vessels, maritime activities on the Sea of Azov, particularly in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, have exhibited the potential to escalate tensions between the two countries. Recently, however, the Russian government has accepted a German proposal for joint monitoring missions with France to ensure freedom of navigation for shipping on the Azov Sea—a proposal that is very much welcomed by Ukrainian officials. Joint Franco-German monitoring would help to prevent further confrontations between Ukrainian and Russian vessels and counter Russia’s claims to the right to regulate passage of the Kerch Strait.

In December, the Russian government rejected Germany’s initial proposal for monitoring missions by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Russian officials were disinterested in an expansion of OSCE missions beyond the current observations in the Donetsk-Luhansk region. However, with the removal of this stipulation, Russian President Vladimir Putin “immediately agreed” to allow German and French observers to evaluate Russian compliance with international law in the Sea of Azov and at the Kerch Strait, the site of the controversial bridge connecting the Russian mainland with Russian-annexed Crimea. The revised proposal, submitted to the Kremlin by Heiko Maas, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 18th, is intended to ensure Russian activities do not impede shipping through the Kerch Strait and comply with international maritime law.

Given Ukraine’s deep-seated interests in maintaining its freedom of navigation within the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has welcomed the German initiative as assurance against the potential for Russian forces to accuse Ukraine of noncompliance and induce penalties on Ukrainian maritime operations. Germany’s proposal arrives at a critical moment for Ukraine as twenty-four of its sailors involved in the November Kerch Strait incident remain in Russian custody  having been charged with illegal border crossing, which carries a sentence of up to six years in prison.

At a recent press conference, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin eagerly welcomed prospects of an international monitoring mission led by Germany with the caveat that he hopes Russian authorities “don’t manipulate it.” Klimkin further urged that the mission refrain from inadvertently legitimizing Russian activities on Azov and that it explicitly denounce the border between Ukraine and Crimea under international law while also refusing to acknowledge the Kerch Strait Authority.

Official negotiations between German, Russian, and Ukrainian officials have yet to occur as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas have constrained discussions of the mission to separate and private talks with Ukrainian and Russian leaders. However, upcoming talks between Ukraine and Germany to negotiate a “joint vision… to work with the Russian side” appear promising since diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine are, by-and-large, nonexistent. “They are at an absolute minimum – only for protecting our citizens,” Klimkin explained at a Kiev press conference earlier this month. “But we are looking for a formula, as soon as we find it, we will definitely apply it.” Germany’s effort to ensure the stability of the Sea of Azov and monitor the Kerch Strait may very well prove to be the missing variable in this formula.

Germany: The Subtle Mediator Between Russia and Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The summit occurred at a notably significant time because the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council may be at stake for the first time since its founding in 1981. The blockade of Qatar, the ongoing war in Yemen, and the diplomatic fallout over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi are a few of the major issues that have overshadowed the summit in Riyadh.

One notable absentee in Saudi Arabia was the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamid bin Hamad Al Thani. One reason for his non-attendance is the ongoing blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Due to the summit’s location in Riyadh, rather than in a more impartial state like Oman or Kuwait, it is possible the Emir opted not to attend to avoid an incident similar to the purported kidnapping of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017.

The GCC has been under significant strain since the blockade of Qatar was initiated in June 2017. Before the sharp downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the land border between the two countries was heavily trafficked. Now, however, Qatar’s single land border (the country is surrounded by water on three sides) has been entirely blockaded by three GCC members.

More recently, Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC has further inflamed tensions within the GCC. The Qatari decision to withdraw was due in large part to the country wanting increase gas exports, thus diversifying an economy that remains heavily reliant on oil. For now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait all seem to believe the GCC can survive the rift in regional relations. However, this remains to be seen.

The GCC was established in 1981 as a multinational organization intended to provide a collective defense mechanism against threats from post-revolutionary Iran. Today, members like Qatar are facing threats from other GCC members within the same bloc. Given the level of discord between the different members of the GCC, the organization may have little relevance remaining. The member countries are vying for different interests and maintain different threat perceptions. The GCC is currently comprised of three different groups. One group is Qatar and Oman (although Oman maintains that is politically neutral), another is Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with Kuwait attempting to play the role of mediator.

A core reason for the success of the GCC has been its provision of the free movement of people and goods between member states, but the future of the organization is in question. The GCC could eventually return to relevancy, but it will remain largely irrelevant for the foreseeable future, given the current state of the current crisis with Qatar. Very little will change as a result of the Riyadh Summit, but the aspirations of a single currency, a joint defense capability, and improved transportation links between member states remain distant ambitions.

The United States wants to see a unified GCC to act as a counter to Iran in the region, but the current Gulf crisis seems to have no end in sight. Since the ascendance of Mohammad bin Salman as Saudi Crown Prince, Saudi policy in the region has become increasingly aggressive. While the Saudis want to hedge against an expansionist Iran, Saudi actions in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon have only served to divide the GCC.

Saudi policies in the Middle East have arguably increased Iran’s influence in the region; Qatar’s increasingly close political and economic ties with Iran being a notable example. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have a close economic and military partnership. Oman or Kuwait could align closer with Qatar, or Qatar could form security and economic alliances with Iran and Turkey. To effectively counter Tehran, Riyadh needs to rethink its foreign policy. Failure to do so could result in a lasting rift within the GCC that would upend the already volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

2018 GCC Summit in Riyadh: An Uneasy Gathering was originally published on Global Security Review.

Approximately twenty-two million civilians require immediate aid, 1.2 million cases of cholera have been reported, and 8.4 million are experiencing severe food insecurity.  The conflict in Yemen, which has become a battleground for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis in existence today.

United States policy regarding the Arabian Peninsula has failed to address this tragedy. The U.S. has remained silent as its allies have contributed to increasing levels of human suffering. As peace talks start in Stockholm, the United States must call on Saudi Arabia to join the conversation for a peaceful resolution with the immediate goal being ensuring the security of Yemeni civilians.

For three years, the Saudis have been at war with the Houthis—a Shia rebel group that seized power in Yemen that has received support from Iran.  Saudi Arabia views the relationship between the Houthis and Iran as a threat, seeing the Houthis as Iranian proxies. Their response to the possibility of Iran expanding its influence on the Arabian Peninsula has been severe. The Kingdom has carried out air strikes and blockaded Yemen’s borders and ports, preventing essential food and supplies from reaching Yemen’s civilian population.

The United States has supported Saudi Arabia by providing the Kingdom with intelligence, weapons, and logistical support. Now, however, the U.S. needs to take an active role in paving a path to peace and security.

First, the United States must accept accountability. In August, the Saudi-led coalition used bombs purchased from the U.S. to carry out an air strike in Yemen.  The bombs hit a school bus and killed forty children.  The international community placed the blame on both Saudi Arabia and the United States.  The U.S. needs to acknowledge its role in the ongoing humanitarian crisis—failure to do so will damage the moral authority of the United States.

Second, the United States must assist Yemen in the road to recovery.  Washington must induce Riyadh to lift the blockades and halt air strikes. USAID could provide immediate life-saving assistance such as nutrition, clean drinking water, safe shelter, and treatment to those suffering from cholera. Doing so would prevent further spread of disease by administering vaccines to citizens in high-risk regions. Humanitarian intervention by a U.S.-led coalition may also alleviate some of the reputational damage that resulted from the Saudi air strikes.

Third—and most important—the United States needs to encourage and facilitate constructive dialogue between the opposing parties.  In November, the Houthis offered to agree to talks if the Saudis would agree to a cease-fire.  This was a sudden and surprising development.  On December 3rd, U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, traveled to the capital city of Sana’a to work with the Houthis to set the stage to move negotiations forward.  The United States must exert substantial pressure on Saudi Arabia de-escalate and take concrete steps toward a ceasefire.

The Khashoggi murder will no doubt complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, but the United States also has pressing interests in Yemen: a lasting peace settlement and a resumption of humanitarian aid to Yemen’s suffering civilian population. Failure to do so will only lead to greater regional insecurity for years to come.

Time for the U.S. to Act on Yemen as Negotiations Begin in Sweden was originally published on Global Security Review.

Thirty years ago, American and Soviet leaders signed a treaty eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons, making the world a safer place while setting the stage for gradual disarmament. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty has been a staple of the nuclear nonproliferation movement and the international security framework since it was signed in 1987.  Today, the Trump administration intends to abandon the treaty in response to alleged violations by the Russian Federation. Instead, the administration should use diplomatic channels to address these allegations with Russia.

The INF Treaty has protected U.S. allies in Europe and in Asia from a sudden nuclear attack and prevented the rise of many other potential nuclear weapons states around the world. Recently, Russia has been developing and testing missiles with ranges barred by the agreement. These forces are non-compliant with the treaty and undermine the spirit of arms control. The U.S. must respond to Russia’s actions, but there’s no need to walk away from the treaty just yet.

Nuclear security today requires a measured and responsible approach.  Before withdrawal, the U.S. should invite Russia to convene the Special Verifications Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance issues. Many U.S. allies question America’s commitment to the international order and impulsively tearing down a hallmark arms control agreement would reinforce that perception.

Rather than hastily abandoning the agreement, the U.S. should call on Russia to back up its denials through joint inspections of the forces in question. At a time when U.S. allies are losing faith in American leadership, the United States would do well to demonstrate its commitment to the international order it built. This course of action demonstrates that diplomacy is a viable option and international commitments are to be taken seriously.

America first doesn’t have to mean America alone.

If the commission provides substantial evidence of Russia’s violations, the U.S. would be justified in withdrawing. The U.S. would then be able to expand its deterrence capabilities while regaining the trust and support of its allies. Despite their suspicion over Russia’s development of nuclear weapons, U.S. allies largely don’t support a hasty withdrawal. Pursuing a measured diplomatic strategy in response to Russia’s alleged INF Treaty violations would reassure U.S. allies in a time of increasing uncertainty.

This strategy also offers a chance to avoid a prohibitively expensive nuclear build-up. The U.S. is slated to spend $1.2 trillion on nuclear modernization over the next thirty years. Reintroducing an entire class of nuclear-capable missiles would drive this number even higher. It could also lead countries like Iran or North Korea to renew their nuclear weapons programs, or even encourage new countries to pursue nuclear weapons programs of their own.

Some might point to the fact that the U.S. has convened this commission multiple times in the last few years and is no closer to a solution than it was in 2014. The United States had a similar disagreement with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. However, Soviet treaty violations were approached diplomatically and, eventually, progress was made. This strategy worked with the Soviet Union at a time when the stakes were much higher; there is reason to believe it can also work today.  Even if it doesn’t, the United States enhances its credibility with NATO allies while demonstrating a commitment to due-process.

Others are concerned about the risk represented by Chinese ballistic missiles, since China is not a party to the INF Treaty. They argue that withdrawal from the treaty would allow the U.S. to deploy INF-banned missiles in East Asia and close the missile gap with China. This move could just as easily kick-start a destabilizing arms race, a possibility American allies are concerned about  Even if intermediate land-based missiles were necessary, it remains to be seen whether or not U.S. allies would allow for their deployment on their territory.

It is important to address China’s missile capabilities, but leaving the INF Treaty is the worst of all options; the decision sharply reduces the likelihood of negotiating a similar agreement with China. The U.S. will be hard-pressed to portray itself as a credible negotiator when it so easily abandons a landmark arms control agreement. In lieu of initiating an expensive and dangerous three-way arms race, the United States should first attempt to preserve the current treaty and even bring China to the table. It might not work, but it makes little sense to walk away without trying.

Walking away from a major arms control treaty without the backing of allies undermines the United States’ reputation and upends the strategic environment in Europe and Asia. Rather than reverting to a precarious, Cold War-like order, the Trump administration should return to the negotiating table and address the allegations of noncompliance.  Doing so would demonstrate the U.S. is dedicated to maintaining a rules-based international order.

On the INF Treaty, Negotiations Can Work was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This September, Poland was also suspended from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary due to concerns over the level of judicial independence in Poland. Many in Poland and throughout the European Union have raised questions about the independence of the Polish judicial system from political interference, in light of a judicial reform law that came into effect on April 3, 2018.

40% of Polish Supreme Court justices are over 65—including Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf.

Not only does Poland's judicial reform legislation terminate the term of office for existing members by decreasing the retirement age and making it mandatory, it also gives the parliamentary majority the right to nominate a majority of their replacements.

In other words, all judges over the age of 65—over a third of all judges—will be forced to retire unless the president expressly approves an extension. Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf’s mandated six-year term is also set to be terminated early.Some judges have asked for presidential approval. However, many are concerned that only judges with politically agreeable views will be approved.

This law gives the PiS complete control over the supreme court, which acts as the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court is responsible for validating elections, thus implying that PiS could have the option to contest the outcome of unfavorable elections to a court that is politically dependent on the party.

Maintaining rule of law and other essential rights is essential for a functioning democracy.

In July 2017, a similar attempt was made to reform the constitution, in particular the judicial branch’s National Judiciary Council. That is the council which makes judicial appointments. The European Commission even threatened to trigger Article 7 of the EU treaty. However, protestors and observer’s collective sigh of relief was evidently short-lived.

The controversial bill was signed into law by President Andrzej Duda in December 2017. In January 2018, the Polish Supreme Court released a strongly worded statement claiming that the law goes “against the standards of the Polish Constitution, in addition to violating the principle of separation of powers, the independence of the courts and judges and the security of tenure of judges.”

Alongside the Supreme Court’s condemnation of the law, the European Commission elected to officially trigger sanctions under Article 7. These sanctions would strip Poland of its voting rights within the E.U. However, the chances of this are slim because enacting the sanctions requires a unanimous vote in the European Council, where Hungary has vowed to oppose it. The lack of meaningful response on the part of the council forced the European Commission’s hand in referring the matter to the European Court of Justice.

While this European Court cannot directly strip Poland’s voting rights, it can impose large fines. Despite the passage of the law, most of the Supreme Court justices also came into work after the law was implemented. There is widespread confusion over which judges are members of the court.

Poland is divided over its judges.

All of this controversy begs the question – why is there such a societal dislike of the judicial system in Poland? The majority of this rhetoric came from the PiS party, which has called judges a “caste of superhumans” and labeled the judiciary as “a state within a state.” Currently, polls indicate that Poles are split over the reforms, which 44% agreeing that judges should be forced into retirement at 65 with 33% disagreeing.

The rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union was founded. Therefore, the E.U. is bound to respond to any attempt to curtail it. While it is unlikely that that the Article 7 will enter fully into force, it is notable that the European Union felt it necessary to move to this step. It remains to be seen how the E.U. can respond effectively while maintaining strong partnerships with its more illiberal members.

E.U. Commission Refers Poland to European Court of Justice Over Rule of Law Concerns was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commenting on competitive interactions between a weak and a strong state, Thucydides is reported to have stated: “The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”  In assessing Iran’s strategic interactions with the United States, this statement is worth considering.

The United States and Iran have been enemies since the onslaught of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that ousted “America’s Shah” and transformed that country into the Islamic Republic it is today. Even though Iran is a weak power compared to the United States, it is not entirely without options. Some of these options appear promising, in terms of sustaining Iran’s strategic presence throughout the Middle East at a time when the United States is busy lowering its presence in that and other regions.

Weak but not without options

The Arab world post-Arab Spring has become a different region in terms of the ability of several major Arab states to manage the authoritarian systems within their borders.  Libya and Tunisia emerged as weak states—indeed, Libya is frequently depicted as a failed state—regarding political stability.

Gone is the iron rule of both Muammar Qaddafi and Zine al Abideen Bin Ali, which, if nothing else, guaranteed regime stability in Libya and Tunisia respectively.  Even though Egypt reverted to a military rule by ousting the democratically elected president of the Ikhwan, Mohammad Morsi, the political future of that country remains uncertain, with constant skirmishes between the military and ISIS.

In the Persian Gulf region, the Arab monarchies prevailed against any attempts of regime change by reformist/revolutionary groups but remained nervous about the prospects of their long-term survival.  The brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was destroyed by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  What emerged in its place is a weak country, ridden with mounting sectarian Shia-Sunni conflict, and conflict stemming from the mounting aspirations of the Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan.

As a Shia power inside a majority Shia Iraq (where about 65 percent of the population is Shia), Iran enjoys an advantage that no Arab state—all of which are majority Sunni—can match.  In fact, an argument can be made that the Wahhabi ideology of Sunni Islam, assiduously promoted by Saudi Arabia, has emerged as a significant impediment against the escalation of Sunni political influence inside Iraq and Lebanon.

The post-Saddam Iraq also became a place where Iran exercised its powerful presence and influence.  In that capacity, the pro-Iranian militias (aka Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) or Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), along with Sunni militant groups, did their very best to make America’s military presence inside Iraq a highly dangerous option.

When U.S. forces pulled out in 2011, Iran’s emergence as a major power inside Iraq became an irreversible reality.  Even after the decision of President Barack Obama to send some American troops back to Iraq to fight the Islamic State (aka ISIS), Iran’s presence and influence in Iraq remained unaffected.

In Lebanon (where Shias are generally regarded as having a substantial, if not a majority, presence), Iran has equally used Hezbollah adroitly to ensure that the Shia population remains a major player in the sustained power game among the Sunnis, Christians, and Shias.  As a paramilitary/political entity, Hezbollah also makes sure that the Sunni-dominated government in Lebanon is never allowed to have an inordinate influence over the Shia population.

Hezbollah’s role in bringing about the withdrawal of the Israeli occupiers from Lebanon in 2000 was an event that made it a major nationalistic paramilitary/political entity. Then in 2006, Hezbollah’s success in challenging the superiority of Israel’s military and surviving the intense bombing of its forces turned out to be another event enhancing its prestige in the Arab world.  Iran also accrued considerable strategic influence from both of these developments.

Iran’s decision to participate as a pro-Assad entity in the Syrian civil war is a decision whose long-term impact in the Levant will be felt for years to come.  As a pro-Syrian force, all Iran has to do is to ensure the sustenance of the Assad regime, while eradicating all anti-Assad militant forces, especially ISIS.

Advantages stemming from Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict

Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict in September 2015 brought about three developments, all of which were promising for Iran.  First, Russia’s entry elevated the Syrian conflict to the level of great power maneuvering, since the U.S. and its friendly forces were also present in Syria fighting ISIS.  Second, as an important supporter of Assad, Iran expected to have a major say in the future great power endeavors to resolve the Syrian conflict.  Third, Russia’s decision to target ISIS (along with other pro-American Islamist forces, even though Moscow never admitted targeting those forces) was to make Iran’s fight against ISIS considerably easier.

What also helped Russia is the fact that neither President Obama nor President Trump spent any effort in targeting the Assad regime. After ousting Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya from power, the United States seemed to have realized how important it was to leave the Middle Eastern autocrats in power.  The alternative to their rule was nothing but prolonged chaos, as was amply demonstrated in Iraq and Libya.  Russia not only understood that reality but was determined to exploit its strategic presence and influence in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Under the Trump administration, the United States, by deciding to spend its military resources on eradicating ISIS from Iraq (and later from Syria) has also unwittingly strengthened Iran’s presence as a power broker inside that country.

U.S.-Iran nuclear deal

Iran’s nuclear research program had the making of an ambitious plan for its eventual emergence as a nuclear weapons power.  Even though it vehemently denied having such a goal, the United States (along with Israel) was equally vehement in accusing Iran of having latent nuclear aspirations.  This issue had to be resolved in the global arena.

In an impressive show of diplomacy, the Obama administration brought about their fellow P-5+1 nations (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) to the negotiating table.  What emerged on 14 July 2014, was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Under this agreement, Iran reaffirmed that “under no circumstances will (it) ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.”  Still, the fact that Iran could keep its nuclear program appeared to its detractors as a temptation to cheat.

From Iran’s viewpoint, the signing of a nuclear (or other) agreement appeared dubious. This perception is due to the notorious American predilection for regime change as well as a related high suspicion that it cannot be trusted when it promises to be a party to nuclear negotiations, or that it will continue to honor it no matter who is sitting in the White House. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi were two targets of regime change.

In the case of Saddam, even though the administration of President George W. Bush claimed that the Iraqi dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction, no such weapons were found after the ouster of Saddam’s regime.  In the case of Qaddafi, after his renunciation of developing indigenous nuclear weapons, the United States, along with France and the U.K., took military action that eventually resulted in the dismantlement of his regime.

But Iran had no choice but to agree to the JCPOA due to decades of crippling economic sanctions levied by the U.S.

Iran’s options for charting the best course forward

On May 9, 2018, Donald Trump announced America’s withdrawal from JCPOA and promised to reimpose harsh economic sanctions on Iran.  This impetuous action placed the Western alliance system in a state of turbulence.  The U.K., Germany, and France announced their continued backing of JCPOA without the United States.  Still, much of their support depends on how strenuously the United States imposes its economic sanctions on any country that continues to do business with Iran.

Even with the weakening of American global leadership, it holds considerable economic swagger.  More to the point, the European countries appear determined about challenging the United States, but which of them is willing to pay the price, and which one of them is interested in going against the United States to support Iran’s continued observance of it is a question hard to answer.

The accession of Michael Pompeo to the job of Secretary of State and of John Bolton to the position of National Security Advisor, both staunch opponents of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal, also adds further impetus to the Trump administration’s resolve to punish Iran for its ambitious strategic posture in the Levant and for its prolific missile production program. The talk in Washington is that the cancellation of the US-Iran nuclear deal may be a prelude to Trump’s intention to bring about regime change in Iran.

Bringing about a regime change in Iran will be difficult for the Trump administration since it finds itself without allies in Europe and no support from China or Russia. However, even those realities are not likely to stop U.S. military action against Iran, if Trump is willing to pay an exorbitant price in the form of a potential tsunami of instability and turbulence in the Middle East.

Iran may be willing to discuss with the United States its commitment to the development of long-range missiles, but it is not likely to abandon it.  It might also be ready to have a general discussion over its commitment to the Assad regime and its support of Hezbollah of Lebanon.  However, no one can expect an outright abandonment of Iranian support of those two entities either.  In the final analysis, the best course for Iran, for now, is to remain steadfastly committed to observing the JCPOA.

What’s next for Iran after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal? was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s President Xi Jinping is known for his predisposition towards grand diplomatic gestures that demonstrate to the world that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is underway. As China seeks to play a leading role on the international stage and integrate regional players into its own multilateral institutions, expect there to be significant growing pains.

On June 9-10, leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states will meet in Qingdao for their 18th annual meeting. For the first time in the organization’s history, India’s Prime Minister Modi will participate in the meeting as a full-fledged participant. This elevation in India’s standing comes on the heels of strained Sino-Indian bilateral relations, most notably the Doklam standoff in the fall of 2017.

The SCO was founded in 2001 as a security cooperation organization between China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Billed as a new type of international organization that eschews the traditional U.S. alliance structure in favor of a consensus-driven approach, the SCO was China’s first serious foray into shaping the rules governing multilateral institutions.

As China continued to broaden its own priorities and engagement within Central Asia beyond the SCO’s initial counterterrorism mandate, the scope of the SCO’s cooperation similarly expanded. In recent years, China utilized the organization as a vehicle to sound out its ambitious economic projects, typified the Belt and Road Initiative; to develop a new framework for international cybersecurity law, and to conduct joint military exercises with regional partners.

Although India and Pakistan were admitted as SCO observers in 2005, this year’s transition to full member state status enables both to significantly shape the organization’s positions and priorities. In India’s case specifically, the SCO’s consensus-driven model will compel China and India to face incongruities in their own regional security priorities.

Nowhere is this split more evident than in Prime Minister Modi’s approach to President Xi’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which was made clear in India’s engagement with China earlier this spring.

In a break with usual practice, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi did not issue any official statements alongside their “informal summit” in Wuhan this April. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials commented that the purpose of their meeting, “was not to address specific problems, but to enhance strategic communication.” By lowering the stakes of engagement, Chinese and Indian officials were able to draw attention away from any substantive shortcomings and focus the public’s attention on the optical successes of Xi and Modi strolling along the lake.

Only days later, the Foreign Ministers of the SCO convened in Beijing to prepare for this weekend’s leader-level meeting. The official press release noted that all ministers, except India, formally endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). That India was unwilling to compromise its own position in the face of multilateral support underscores the government’s skepticism of BRI’s role in the broader region.

Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the SCO summit comes on the heels of his landmark Shangri-La Dialogue keynote speech outlining India’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although Prime Minister Modi noted the importance of a stable India-China bilateral relationship, his regional objectives align closely with the free and open Indo-Pacific strategies previewed by the United States and its allies.

This could cause friction during the upcoming summit. Official Chinese media outlets have publicly depicted the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and enhanced Quadrilateral cooperation between India, the United States, Japan, and Australia as a containment strategy designed to diminish China’s regional influence.

Where President Xi and Prime Minister Modi are more likely to find common ground is charting the broader trajectory of the international system. Both have publicly affirmed the need for an increasingly multipolar world order underpinned by multilateral institutions, rather than protectionism and isolationism.

However, beyond surface-level concurrence, do not expect to see agreement between China and India on the definition of a “multipolar world.” For India, multipolarity offers a new opportunity for ascending states to reaffirm the values and principles long-cherished by those participating in the existing rules-based international order. China’s interpretation of multipolarity feeds into broader revisionist objectives, including the creation of a sphere of influence on its

Undoubtedly, India’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will constrain China’s ability to use the institution as a cheerleader for some of its most controversial policies. But what China will lose in control, it could gain in legitimacy and prestige. This added clout could prove useful if China and Russia continue to use the SCO to press the United Nations to take controversial actions, such as considering the organization’s proposed internet governance measures.

Enlisting India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could provide the grouping with a mandate beyond its current scope. But where President Xi will find added prestige and status, he will be forced to reckon with the costs of an empowered India willing and able to challenge his own foreign policy goals.

What to Expect from Modi’s Participation in China’s Upcoming SCO Summit was originally published on Global Security Review.

The year 2017 was marked by conflict, instability, and humanitarian crises. But there were bright spots as well. Here are ten areas where progress has been reported around the world.

1. The World Health Organization reports in October that global measles deaths have decreased by more than 80 percent since 2000 to an estimated ninety thousand last year. The drop is part of a broader decline in child mortality, which has been more than halved since 1990.

2. Colombia’s largest Marxist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), completes its disarmament process in June, six months after it reached a peace agreement with the government, bringing to a close Latin America’s oldest and bloodiest civil conflict. The second-largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), agrees to a temporary cease-fire in September.

3. The hole in the earth’s ozone layer is the smallest it has been since 1988, NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports in October. Warmer weather conditions over the last two years prevented ozone-depleting chemicals from eating away at the protective layer, scientists say. They also attribute the improvement to decades of global efforts to reduce emissions of such chemicals.

4. Women’s rights advance in several Arab countries with the passage of legal reforms: Tunisia criminalizes violence against women, Lebanon and Jordan repeal laws that had permitted rapists to escape punishment if they wed their victims, and Jordan amends its penal code to do away with reduced penalties for so-called honor killings.

5. Eight countries adopted legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation, bringing the total to eighty-five, according to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association.

6. The number of people living in extreme poverty, making $1.90 or less per day, continues its steady drop, falling from roughly 35 percent of the world’s population in 1990 to 8.4 percent in late 2017, according to the Vienna-based World Data Lab.

7. Gambia’s longtime authoritarian president, Yahya Jammeh, steps down on January 20, 2017, weeks after losing his reelection bid to Adama Barrow and a day after troops from the regional bloc ECOWAS cross into the country. Barrow’s government releases hundreds of political prisoners, holds legislative elections deemed free and fair, and announces plans for a truth and reconciliation commission.

8. Maritime piracy declines in the first nine months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016, dropping 14 percent to 121 incidents, according to the International Chamber of Commerce. The organization attributes the improvement to more stringent naval patrols in some areas such as Indonesia. This follows a 25 percent decrease a year earlier.

9. After resolving Argentina’s billion-dollar dispute with bondholders in 2016, President Mauricio Macri continues promarket reforms that have lifted the Group of Twenty economy. October 2017 midterm elections reinforce Macri’s reform mandate, and the International Monetary Fund hails Argentina’s “systemic transformation of its economy” and progress in “restoring integrity” to the government.

10. The eurozone economy grows 2.5 percent more in the third quarter of 2017 than in the same period a year prior. The increase puts the zone’s economy on track to see its highest annual growth since before the 2008 global financial crisis. Unemployment in the single-currency area drops to 9.1 percent, its lowest level since early 2009.

10 Geopolitical Silver Linings in 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 Brexit vote and rising the popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin, in no small degree—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe seems to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continues to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions. For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

The E.U. Will Attempt to Implement Reforms in 2018

Europe is in dire need of reform, both politically and economically. The bloc faces significant internal divisions. Demographics, economic stagnation, and ideological arguments threaten the European Union’s ability to act as a global power.

Over the next two years, the E.U. will need to decide whether or not it is in search of an ever-closer union, mainly as it manages Brexit negotiations. The bloc’s leadership badly needs to prove the legitimacy and value of the Union, and consolidating power as the UK leaves may be the way forward.

While Brexit initially seemed to undermine the E.U.’s standing overseas, it may have had the opposite effect. Member states on the continent have primarily reaffirmed their commitment to the bloc, particularly following the election of pro-EU President Emmanuel Macron of France.

In fact, the loss of the UK may facilitate more easy implementation of EU-wide fiscal and monetary policies, as the UK has famously retained its currency—the pound—and with it, monetary sovereignty.

Security concerns may play a decisive role in further E.U. integration. Concerns about U.S. credibility following the election of Donald Trump could lead to higher military integration by E.U. members. Germany, which has maintained a more pacifist stance since the end of the Cold War, is integrating parts of its’ armed forces with the militaries of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania.

Increased numbers of NATO and European troops have been deployed along Europe’s frontiers with Russia and Belarus.  Additionally, there has been more and more talk of greater security integration and E.U.-wide policy towards defense and security.

What’s the future of the European Union?

Economically, Europe is still at risk. Eurozone banks continue to distribute capital unevenly due to irregular E.U. banking regulations. Migration within the E.U. will persist, as will migration to Europe from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Separatist movements will continue, encouraged by the Brexit movement.

Demographically, Europe’s population is changing. Aging population will consume government revenues as health care will be an even more significant concern. Youth unemployment in countries like Spain and Italy will continue to be a security risk, as this is a group at risk for violent radicalization. Growth will be dependent on Europe’s abilities to reform E.U. institutions, provide employment, and manage public anxiety about issues like immigration, terrorism, and national identity.

Of immediate concern is the aftermath of the recent Catalonian independence crisis in Spain. The handling of the issue by the central government in Madrid, the imprisonment of Catalonian political leaders, and the steadfast refusal of Catalonia’s leaders to find a compromise could destabilize the internal politics of the bloc, and encourage other separatist regions in E.U.-states like Belgium to pursue secession referendums of their own. The dispute could be prolonged in the aftermath of snap elections called in the wake of Madrid seizing administrative power over Catalonia.

The European Union Faces Challenges to Its Legitimacy in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Today, we finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital,” said President Donald J. Trump in a speech announcing his intention to construct a U.S. embassy there, reversing U.S. policy that dates back to President Harry Truman.

Israel considers the “complete and united Jerusalem” its capital, but Palestinians claim East Jerusalem for the capital of their future state. Trump is following through on a campaign promise that was a priority of some American evangelical and Jewish groups, but risks jettisoning a presidential initiative to establish Israeli-Palestinian peace, what he has previously called “the ultimate deal.” More immediately, the backlash against the move will likely include civil disobedience, and possibly violent protest, in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories. Protests could extend to Muslim-majority countries in the region, and the United States and Israel will face complications in their diplomacy the world over.

What is the international status of Jerusalem?

The walled Old City of Jerusalem, at just one square kilometer, is home to sites that are among the holiest in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Because of its unique cultural and religious significance, the UN General Assembly set aside Jerusalem to be a corpus separatum, or separated body, under UN trusteeship when it voted in 1947 to divide the British mandate of Palestine into two states, an Arab one and a Jewish one.

That position remained the international consensus even after the partition plan itself was preempted by Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948 and the subsequent invasion by Arab powers. An armistice the following year divided the mandate along what has become known as the Green Line, which cuts through the middle of Jerusalem. Israel established its seat of government in the western half of the city, while, across a no man’s land lined with barbed wire, Jordan took control of the city’s eastern half, including the Old City.

Israel captured East Jerusalem in 1967 and subsequently annexed it, redrawing its municipal borders to include surrounding Arab villages. In 1980, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, designated the united city as Israel’s capital. By contrast, the West Bank, also captured in 1967, was not annexed; it remains under military occupation and Palestinians have partial self-government there, through the Palestinian Authority (PA).While Israel controls the city, the Oslo Accords, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, stipulated that Jerusalem’s disposition would only be decided on in permanent-status negotiations between the parties. Other major issues under negotiation concern refugees’ right of return, security arrangements, borders, and mutual recognition.

Why is the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv?

The United States, like all countries that have relations with Israel, has kept its embassy in Tel Aviv so as not to preempt such an agreement between the parties. In so doing, the United States has claimed to be a neutral mediator. (In practice, the peace process has long been on hold.)

A 1995 U.S. law [PDF] requires the relocation of the embassy to Jerusalem, but allows for presidents to waive the requirement in six-month intervals “to protect the national security interests of the United States.” Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama issued waivers since then. Trump did so, too, on June 1, 2017, and again with this announcement.

What is the case for moving the U.S. embassy?

American and Israeli proponents of an embassy move say there is no national security imperative requiring such a waiver. U.S. diplomatic representation to Israel ought to be based at the country’s seat of government, particularly since the ambassador and embassy staff frequently conduct business there. What’s more, they argue, the United States almost universally recognizes whatever capital a country chooses for itself, and Israel should be no exception. Further, the diplomatic consequences of such a move can be contained by locating the embassy in West Jerusalem. That is presumed to remain a part of Israel under any plausible negotiated settlement, so relocating the embassy shouldn’t preclude a two-state solution that includes a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians have insisted on.

Such arguments have bipartisan buy-in in the United States. Martin Indyk and Daniel Shapiro, who both served as U.S. ambassadors to Israel under Democratic administrations, argue that moving the embassy could actually jumpstart the peace process if paired with recognition of Palestinian claims to the eastern half of the city.

How could Palestinians respond?

Neither Palestinians nor supporters of their cause abroad are mollified by those arguments. They view U.S. recognition of Jerusalem and an embassy move as a thumb on the scale of future negotiations, validating Israeli efforts to establish its claims in the absence of talks. And since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu routinely refers to Jerusalem as Israel’s “eternal, undivided capital,” and major Israeli opposition parties have welcomed the move, Palestinians could doubt that Israel ever intends to negotiate over Jerusalem.

Experts say Trump’s announcement is likely to compound a broader crisis of confidence among Palestinians that President Mahmoud Abbas, who has been in office for many years beyond his electoral mandate, can deliver statehood. Fatah and Hamas have called for three days of protest. Palestinian officials say they have no intention of sponsoring a third intifada, or uprising, yet there could well be grassroots violent resistance. To keep public confidence from further eroding, Abbas and the PLO could cut off security cooperation with Israel or withdraw Palestinian recognition of Israel. Saeb Erekat, a senior PLO official and veteran negotiator, said that by doing this the United States is “disqualifying itself to play any role in any initiative toward achieving a just and lasting peace.”

In the absence of negotiations, Palestinians could also seek membership in various UN agencies. U.S. law requires Washington to cut funding to any UN agency that admits the Palestinians as a full member, and so the United States could find itself without a voice at such bodies as the International Atomic Energy Association or the World Trade Organization.

What will be the international response?

Regional powers have already registered strong protests. Many of these are U.S. allies, and some have relations with Israel. Turkey said it will cut ties with Israel, while Jordan said it would thwart any subsequent U.S.-led peace initiative. Egypt and Saudi Arabia too warned Trump that recognition would be a provocation. Arab and Muslim publics around the world could protest the prospect that Jerusalem’s Islamic holy sites will remain permanently outside of Muslim control. Jordan’s King Abdullah II is particularly vulnerable to such charges, since the kingdom sponsors the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, a trust that administers these sites.

If Saudi Arabia is perceived to be unable to protect Palestinians’ interests, the move could redound to Iran’s benefit, analysts say. “Muslims must stand unitedagainst this major plot,” President Hassan Rouhani said.

Public opposition to U.S. recognition of Jerusalem could also constrain Saudi Arabia, which has quietly been pursuing relations with Israel; the two have a common interest in containing Iran’s regional influence. Popular Saudi support for Palestinian statehood has prevented the kingdom from normalizing relations.

European leaders too warned against the move, saying it would set back any possible two-state solution. Few, if any, countries are expected to follow the United States’ lead by recognizing Jerusalem and relocating their embassies, meaning Jerusalem’s status would be no less internationally contested than before.

Analysts say that al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State could use the move to boost their recruiting pitches. More immediately, demonstrations at U.S. embassies and consulates are likely, and the State Department has made preparations for heightened risks of attack.

Who lives in Jerusalem?

Jerusalem is home to nearly one million residents. West Jerusalem’s population of some 330,000 is almost entirely Jewish. The eastern half of the city, which comprises the Old City, Palestinian neighborhoods, and refugee camps, along with some newer Jewish settlements, is home to about 320,000 Arabs and 212,000 Jews. Unlike Palestinians who live elsewhere in Israel, most Palestinian East Jerusalemites have permanent residency, but not citizenship, since they do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the city.

East Jerusalemites complain of disparities in public services provided by the municipality, as well as discriminatory zoning, construction, and infrastructure policies, which, they fear, are meant to weaken Palestinian claims to the area. These inequities have in the past fueled protests and riots. So too have perceived changes to the management of and access to the Old City’s holy sites.

What’s At Stake With the U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States formally recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, according to an announcement made by President Donald Trump on December 6, 2017. The statement brushed aside widespread international opposition to the move. Trump will be directing the State Department to initiate the relocation of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which is claimed by Israelis and Palestinians. The move is expected to take several years.

During a public address from the Diplomatic Reception Room at the White House, Trump said his announcement “marks the beginning of a new approach to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.” He continued by saying that “there will, of course, be disagreement and dissent regarding this announcement — but we are confident that ultimately, as we work through these disagreements, we will arrive at a place of greater understanding and cooperation.” He added that “this is nothing more or less than a recognition of reality.”

Trump’s decision goes in direct contrast to decades of American policy, as well as the rest of the international community, except Israel. No nation has its embassy in Jerusalem. It is also likely to stymy any effort to restart long-stalled peace Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Israel is the only country in the world where the international community largely unrecognizes the national capital that is claimed by the government. In the last days of the Obama administration, then-Secretary of State John Kerry said Palestinians have a shared claim to the holy city.

Trump’s controversial move is nearly guaranteed to derail peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians have sought to lay claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state. Israel has occupied East Jerusalem since 1967. Trump will sign a six-month waiver off-setting the embassy’s relocation on national security grounds, according to an official knowledgeable on the matter.

Successive U.S. presidents of both parties have signed the waiver since the Jerusalem Embassy Act went into law in 1995, perpetually forestalling the building’s legislated move over concerns it could spark a diplomatic or security crisis, which would be a death knell for peace talks.

“Some say they lacked courage, but they made their best judgment based on facts as they understood them at the time,” Trump said about past presidents who signed the waiver. “Nevertheless, the record is in. After more than two decades of waivers, we are no closer to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. It would be folly to assume that repeating the same formula would now produce a different or better result.”

Palestinian leaders have already called for three “days of rage” to contest Trump’s decision.

Jerusalem is considered a holy city to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Any change to contested city’s status quo has been met with fierce opposition. Israel’s decision to restrict Muslim access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound in 2015 set off widespread street violence between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. An Israeli judgment to install controversial metal detectors at the mosque’s entrance earlier this year was ultimately reversed after being met with mass protests by Palestinians.

[bs-quote quote=”With widespread calls for demonstrations beginning December 6 in Jerusalem and the West Bank, U.S. government employees and their family members are not permitted until further notice to conduct personal travel in Jerusalem’s Old City and in the West Bank, to include Bethlehem and Jericho. Official travel by U.S. government employees in Jerusalem’s Old City and in the West Bank is permitted only to conduct essential travel and with additional security measures. United States citizens should avoid areas where crowds have gathered and where there is increased police and/or military presence. We recommend that U.S. citizens take into consideration these restrictions and the additional guidance contained in the Department of State’s travel warning for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza when making decisions regarding their travel.” style=”default” align=”center” author_name=”U.S. Department of State” author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/dos-logo-light.png”][/bs-quote]

Recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and moving the U.S. embassy to the city could spark unrest across the Middle East and simultaneously undermine American efforts to develop a new peace plan. The State Department has issued warnings to U.S. embassies about possible protests across the Middle East.

U.S. Recognizes Jerusalem as Israeli Capital was originally published on Global Security Review.

Leaving the EU is now looking like a distant possibility for France as well (many are calling it Frexit). Nationalists on the far-right like Marine Le Pen want increased national sovereignty over a collective Union. The United States-based think tank, the Pew Research Center, believes that more than 60% of the people in France view the EU as an unfavorable option. The study claimed that in case a referendum was held, almost 33% of the people would vote to leave, while 40% would want to remain. At least 22% would be left undecided, as per the reports of the study. Now, let’s talk about the strategic disadvantages of leaving the EU for France.

Leaving is Going to be a Serious Problem

First of all, leaving the EU is not an easy job by any means. Once a country joins the European Union, it can’t just up and leave at its behest. It is only recently that Britain invoked Article 50, which is the official notification of intent sent by Britain to the head of the EU, stating the country’s desire to leave. This is the first in a long line of steps for leaving the EU. Now, there are talks that serious levies will be placed on Britain, amounting to billions of pounds, for leaving the EU. Some countries in the EU claim that the process for leaving should become even harder and more expensive, which would ultimately prevent others from leaving too. This is a serious deterrent for any country that plans on leaving the EU.

The EU Nuclear Program

In order to combat the Russia deterrent, the European Union also plans to create its own nuclear weapons program. Under the proposed program, the nuclear weapons arsenal of France will be overseen by the European Union and will be put under common European command.

This will serve as a direct Russia deterrent, and will also provide protection to countries in the European Union. For France leaving the European Union, this could lead to serious sanctions, and a sizeable part of the country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons might also be seized by the European Union for use. For France, leaving the EU might mean increased sanctions because of its nuclear capability.

Economical Impact

Countries in the EU enjoy a variety of benefits, especially relating to trade between other countries in the EU. There are a streamlined set of guidelines that all countries are supposed to follow when trading with other countries in the European Union. Keeping aside the Russia deterrent or any other sort of deterrence that the country might face, perhaps one of the greatest issues that the country will face is related to trade.

However, if France decides to leave the EU, it will have to renegotiate deals with all of the major countries that it currently trades with. This could mean increased tariffs and costs, and could also lead some countries to increase trading prices with France. Naturally, this could cause serious problems for the country as that could lead to the abolition of long-standing trade deals that the country currently has in place. The main driving force for the campaign to leave the EU is due to the immigration policy, as well as a marked increase in the number of attacks in France.

Why Should France Stay in the European Union? was originally published on Global Security Review.