Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

Signed in July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. Article VI of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article VI serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.

The latest SIPRI report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.

In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).

This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.

Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.

Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era was originally published on Global Security Review.

The simulated conflict ended without regime change in Pyongyang, allowing Kim Jong Un to claim a political victory. While avoiding nuclear escalation may seem prudent, such an outcome could deal a lasting blow to the credibility of America’s extended deterrence in East Asia.

The Guardian Tiger scenario should not be dismissed as an academic exercise. It reveals a critical vulnerability in the psychological foundation of deterrence: the perception among adversaries and allies of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of its partners. If allies conclude that Washington will not cross the nuclear threshold even after a nuclear attack, they may question the value of the nuclear umbrella. Adversaries, meanwhile, may learn that nuclear coercion, carefully calibrated, can succeed.

In the simulation, North Korea escalated to a tactical nuclear strike against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the East Sea (Guardian Tiger I) and later against the Chinhae naval base (Guardian Tiger II), home to the Republic of Korea Navy’s Submarine Force Command and occasionally used for allied submarine visits. According to the report, American leaders debated nuclear retaliation but settled on conventional “pulsed” strikes.

In a real-world scenario, such strikes could plausibly involve precision-guided munitions from long-range bombers like the B1-B and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aimed at targets such as missile transporter-erector launchers, hardened artillery positions along the DMZ, and command-and-control facilities near Pyongyang. In the exercise, the US stopped short of regime change, seeking to avoid further nuclear escalation and prevent a direct war with China—a decision that would have allowed Pyongyang to absorb the damage, count the survival of its regime as a strategic win, and enter negotiations from a stronger position.

Extended deterrence depends on more than military capability. It is rooted in the belief, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that the United States is willing to defend its partners by all means necessary, including nuclear weapons. An American failure to respond in kind to North Korean nuclear use would plant seeds of doubt. Japanese and South Korean leaders could begin to question whether Washington would truly “trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul” if the stakes involved limited nuclear use rather than an existential threat to the United States.

That doubt could trigger cascading effects. Calls in Seoul’s National Assembly for indigenous nuclear weapons, expanded production of the Hyunmoo‑4 ballistic missile, and pressure on Tokyo to more seriously pursue nuclear sharing arrangements have already entered the political debate.

This concern is amplified by North Korea’s 2022 nuclear weapons law, which openly authorizes preemptive nuclear strikes in scenarios ranging from an imminent attack on leadership to undefined overwhelming crisis situations. Analysts note that the law’s language effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use, implying tactical employment to repel invasion and seize the initiative in war. Rather than viewing nuclear use as a desperate last resort, Pyongyang now appears willing to employ such weapons early. For example, a low‑yield detonation against South Korean or American forward-deployed forces to shock Washington and Seoul into political concessions.

The challenge grows sharper in the event of a dual contingency: simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Guardian Tiger II simulated such a scenario, with China launching a multi-domain assault on Taiwan while North Korea escalated on the peninsula. In such a real-world situation, US Indo-Pacific Command could be forced to divert the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from Yokosuka to the waters east of Taiwan, deploy B‑52H bombers to deter Chinese operations, and even consider repositioning some Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile defense batteries from South Korea to protect American assets in Okinawa and Guam.

Such shifts illustrate how a stretched American posture could reduce missile interception capacity on the peninsula and temporarily remove some nuclear-capable platforms from immediate Korean defense. North Korea could calculate that Washington, already balancing a larger confrontation with China, would avoid nuclear escalation in Korea to conserve resources and limit the risk of an all-out US-China war.

The political and strategic consequences would ripple across the region. In Seoul, public and elite opinion could shift sharply toward developing an independent nuclear arsenal—something 71 percent of South Koreans already support. South Korea’s nuclear latency, widely assessed by proliferation experts, suggests it could potentially produce a weapon in as little as 6 months if political consensus formed.

In Tokyo, the debate over counterstrike capabilities, missile defense expansion, and potential nuclear sharing with the United States would intensify, potentially accelerating deployment of Tomahawk missiles and further integration of F‑35A fighters, which, in the US fleet, are being certified for B61‑12 nuclear bombs, into allied defense planning. Beijing, meanwhile, could seize the opportunity to position itself as a stabilizing broker, offering to mediate between Seoul and Pyongyang while shielding the latter from full international accountability, further eroding American influence.

Avoiding nuclear escalation in a limited-strike scenario is understandable, but Washington cannot afford such a decision to be interpreted as weakness. Strengthening deterrence credibility in Northeast Asia will require more than declaratory statements. Clear and credible red lines for nuclear use must be communicated both publicly and privately. Integrated nuclear-conventional planning with allies should ensure that flexible response options, from proportionate nuclear strikes to overwhelming conventional retaliation, are executable on short notice. Contingency planning must explicitly account for simultaneous conflicts in Korea and Taiwan, with pre-positioned munitions, dispersed basing arrangements for nuclear-capable aircraft, and rotational deployments of dual-capable ships and submarines to maintain strategic presence even under force diversion.

Equally important is sustained alliance signaling. These include high-visibility joint exercises like the US-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, regular port visits by nuclear-capable submarines, and trilateral missile tracking drills with Japan. These measures reassure allies, complicate adversary calculations, and demonstrate that any nuclear use will incur unacceptable costs.

The Guardian Tiger exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how quickly deterrence can fray in the fog of crisis. A single decision to refrain from nuclear retaliation, however understandable at the time, could reverberate for decades and reshape the strategic balance in East Asia. In the nuclear age, preserving deterrence means guarding against both uncontrolled escalation and the perceptions of hesitation that could invite it.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

A Nuclear Umbrella in Peril: Lessons from North Korea’s Escalation Scenarios was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hypersonic weapons, capable of exceeding Mach 5 with unpredictable flight paths, shatter the bedrock principles of conventional missile defense. Their ability to glide and maneuver within the atmosphere allows them to evade radar detection and interceptor systems, compressing warning times to mere minutes. This drastic reduction in reaction time amplifies the risk of miscalculations and accidental escalation, particularly in moments of crisis.

The global balance of power is being fundamentally altered, not merely adjusted, by the aggressive pursuit of maneuverable hypersonic weapon capabilities. China’s DF-17 hypersonic missile, coupled with its reported testing of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a hypersonic payload, demonstrates a clear intent to achieve global strike capabilities with minimal warning. Russia’s deployment of the Avangard HGV on its SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the operational status of the Zircon hypersonic anti-ship missile further highlight the growing proliferation of these advanced weapons. North Korea’s claim of successful hypersonic missile tests, while requiring verification, signal a potential integration of these weapons into its theater nuclear strategy, adding another layer of complexity to regional security.

The inherent capacity of maneuverable hypersonic weapons to render existing missile defense systems obsolete signifies not just a technological leap, but a deliberate dismantling of established strategic certainties. The unpredictability of their flight paths and the compression of warning times do not just complicate defense planning; they erode the very foundation of strategic stability, where deterrence relies on the certainty of retaliation. The potential for these weapons to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads does not just increase their versatility; it blurs the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict, creating a perilous ambiguity that heightens the risk of miscalculation.

The ability to strike targets with minimal warning does not just enhance offensive capabilities; it creates a coercive tool, enabling states to exert pressure and achieve strategic objectives without resorting to large-scale conventional warfare. The potential for hypersonic weapons to be deployed in a first-strike role does not just raise concerns about escalation; it fundamentally alters the calculus of deterrence, where the threat of retaliation may no longer be sufficient to prevent aggression.

To counter this burgeoning vulnerability, the United States must not merely react, but fundamentally redefine its strategic posture, acknowledging that piecemeal technological solutions are insufficient to address the profound shift hypersonic weapons impose on the security landscape. The rapid development of the glide phase interceptor (GPI) and space-based tracking systems is not just about enhancing missile defense; it is about restoring a sense of strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries. The expansion of conventional hypersonic programs, such as the AGM-183 ARRW, conventional prompt strike, and the long-range hypersonic weapon, is not just about developing counterforce capabilities; it is about demonstrating a commitment to maintaining a credible deterrent, signaling to potential adversaries that aggression will be met with a swift and decisive response. The integration of hypersonic weapons into existing military doctrines does not just require tactical adjustments; it demands a fundamental reevaluation of strategic thinking, adapting to a new era of high-speed warfare.

The international community’s response to hypersonic weapons must not be limited to national defense initiatives; it must include a concerted effort to promote arms control and transparency. The absence of clear international norms and regulations regarding hypersonic weapons does not just create uncertainty; it fosters a climate of strategic competition, where states are incentivized to develop and deploy these weapons without restraint. The development of transparency and confidence-building measures is not just about reducing the risk of miscalculation; it is about building a foundation for strategic stability, where states can engage in dialogue and cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by these advanced weapons.

Hypersonic weapons represent a paradigm shift in military technology, fundamentally questioning if the world is entering a new era of vulnerability, undermining the foundations of traditional missile defense and reshaping the strategic landscape. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive approach that combines technological innovation, strategic adaptation, and international cooperation. Only through a concerted effort can the international community hope to mitigate the risks posed by hypersonic weapons and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies

Key Takeaways

• Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.
• U.S. Defense Leadership Changes: Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.
• Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments: Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.
• Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran’s growing missile capability.
• Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission: NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance’s credibility.
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates: Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.

International Developments

Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion

• Russia’s military spending will increase to 13.5 trillion rubles, estimated at 7-8% of GDP, its highest post-Soviet military budget.
• Significant investments in modernized nuclear and conventional forces to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.
• Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.

Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements

• Intelligence sources indicate Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China, raising alarms among Western security analysts.
• Iran continues uranium enrichment, prompting warnings from the UN about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.

China & Russia’s Nuclear Expansion

• Reports predict that by 2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
• Concerns grow over China’s accelerated nuclear development and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.

Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon

Escalation Risks in Space Warfare

• A RAND Corporation study warns that Russia may escalate conflicts in space early due to its heightened fears of a U.S. first strike.
• The study underscores Moscow’s increasing risk tolerance and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.

Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.
• U.S. extended deterrence remains under scrutiny, with debates over whether the Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization

• The U.S. Air Force confirms that the Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.
• Discussions continue over potential mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft to ensure nuclear survivability.

‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System

• President Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.
• Critics call it overly ambitious, but proponents argue that it is essential to counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Key Events

Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)

• Speakers: Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) & Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).
• Topic: Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)

• A 4-star USAF officer will serve as the featured speaker.
• Expected discussions on extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy.

Conclusion

The ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025, highlights key developments in U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues. With Russia’s increasing military budget, Iran’s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion, the U.S. faces a growing multipolar nuclear environment. Discussions on extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events will provide further insights into these critical security matters.

ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

These domains and areas are being weaponized for strategic purposes, as adversaries target cross-domain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests with the intent of weakening the Western security architecture and fragmenting alliance cohesion. The Trump administration must work closely with NATO allies to confront the many challenges that face them.

Strategic challenges, such as the Arctic, deep sea, and space, and the threats they pose require improved joint military readiness, enhanced deterrence by denial capabilities, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

“Over the last 15 years,” writes Scott Savits, “the Arctic has become a renewed theatre of military competition…. [T]op Russian officials have referred to the Arctic as Russia’s ‘Mecca,’ and a large fraction of Russia’s economy is based on Arctic fossil fuels and minerals.” Frustrating Russian efforts to gain a strategic advantage in the Arctic is of paramount importance to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Russia gaining an advantage in the Arctic will enhance its ability to establish escalation dominance against NATO in the event of a conflict with the alliance. Deterring Russia from broadening the scope of conflict, by threatening NATO’s vital interests in the Arctic, remains critical in dissuading other adversaries, such as China, from seeking to gain similar advantage.

With China developing and deploying new detection technologies in anti-submarine warfare, American nuclear submarine capabilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to detection and targeting. China’s “Death Star” satellite claims to possess detection capabilities that renders the ocean transparent for up to 500 meters beneath the surface, putting American submarines at risk.

In the space domain, it is estimated that loss of access to space would come at a cost of roughly One billion pounds per day to the British economy. The reported deployment of Russian anti-satellite weapons systems (ASAT) in space are clearly coercive moves designed to threaten NATO’s space assets.

Russia’s weaponization of space is especially concerning as NATO depends on space to conduct an array of operations across the spectrum of deterrence and defence. Most notably, NATO airpower relies on space-based and space-dependent systems to fulfil a series of critical security functions. Leveraging robust deterrence capabilities in orbit, through targeting Russian and Chinese space-based military and non-military assets, is critical to securing NATO’s vital interests in space.

Beyond seeking strategic advantage, China is also expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate since the end of the Cold War. The Pentagon forecasts that China will be a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035. The latest figures published by the Federation of American Scientists show that China now possesses at least 500 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—up 43 percent from 2020.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to undermine international norms by persisting in threats to use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Russia also deploys dual-use satellite technologies in space, capable of carrying nuclear warheads into orbit, in direct contravention of long-standing international treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the weaponization and nuclearization of space.

Meanwhile, Iran, a latent nuclear state, coerces the West by threatening the weaponization of its nuclear program. Iran also infiltrated the West by creating extremist networks through community centers, laundering money in major European and American cities that is used by criminal gangs to plot and execute terrorist attacks.

Proxies supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, can also launch increasingly devastating attacks. Furthermore, attacks like October 7, 2024, or September 11, 2001, do not warrant nuclear retaliation. A nuclear response to a terrorist attack, depending on the attack, is likely a disproportionate response.

China and Russia also engage in subversive activities within the cyber domain, sowing discord by using disinformation, intellectual property theft, and malign interference to destabilize NATO member states. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure can also inflict severe levels of damage. The appropriateness of cross-domain responses is yet to be decided.

The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, which lasted for 22 days, did not result in the triggering of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Yet, it was an attack on a NATO member state. The character of the attack complicated the process by which a viable and appropriate retaliatory response could be devised. In a multidomain threat landscape, hostile state actors conducting their operations in the grey zone can claim plausible deniability.

China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea also hold joint exercises, share intelligence, exchange military capabilities, and share a diplomatic and political kinship. This axis of Western adversaries shares the same geopolitical and economic objectives. They seek to replace the international rules-based order and establish alternative institutional frameworks to global order that undermine concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and national sovereignty.

Militarily, nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia, where Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers were provided to aid Putin’s war in Ukraine. Politically, emerging international blocs such as the BRICS demonstrate the extent to which countries like China and Russia are gaining traction in driving alternatives to the current order.

“As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the whole of digital and networked societies,” wrote Sean Monaghan, “so too will the capabilities required to deter them. A more complex threat environment will make predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more difficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.”

Hence, for deterrence to be effective today, credibility must incorporate more than hard power capabilities. Red lines must be communicated effectively across different channels. Resolve must be demonstrated through a force posture that includes a willingness to establish escalation dominance in a crisis scenario. The art of deterrence is also about determining and holding at risk what an adversary values.

As the outgoing US Secretary of Defence General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin said in 2022, cross-domain deterrence “is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause…. [It is] multidomain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”

Ultimately, deterrence is about credibly threatening to impose unacceptable costs, by denial or punishment, on a would-be aggressor. Those costs must convince the would-be aggressor that they outweigh any potential gains made.

Therefore, it is imperative for the US and NATO to increase cross-domain capabilities to match those of adversaries. Adopting a combination of different violent and non-violent means, to conduct deterrence credibly across multiple domains and at various levels of intensity, will enhance NATO’s ability to secure its vital interests in an increasingly volatile era of global strategic competition.

Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Deterrence and NATO’s Emerging Security Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Arms control and disarmament advocates differ with this view, seeing the deterrent as a risk that must be reduced in size and function via various forms of diplomacy that range from one-party declarations and codes of conduct to formal arms control agreements. These sorts of undertakings are currently moribund within officialdom, though enjoying an eternal spring of hope among the single-issue think tanks, academics, and commentators who strive to sway government.

Paradoxically the current surge in hostilities between the United States and the axis of autocracy (China, North Korea, and Russia) could furnish the spark that revives official efforts at both improving deterrence and renewed arms control. For instance, an updated Budapest Memorandum might form one component of a settlement or freezing of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An Iranian “regime change” may also offer a path for a true and verifiable non-nuclear-weapon Iran.

The modality of any future arms control arrangement could vary greatly. Not all arms control arrangements are treaties. Given the current international situation among nuclear-armed states, treaties might indeed be the least likely of modalities. Some modalities that future arms control arrangements could take include unilateral American declarations, American-backed codes of conduct, American-backed norms, agreement within NATO (such as the Committee on Proliferation or the Nuclear Planning Group), unilateral American renewal of earlier Negative Security Assurances (such as those deposited with the United Nations), bilateral or multilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral memorandum or other agreed instrument short of a treaty, and/or bilateral or multilateral treaties.

The Process of Arms Control

All these arms control approaches present challenges to American and NATO forces. They also present opportunities to refine force posture and employment options. Three concrete steps are useful in ensuring American and alliance leadership receives constant feedback with operational decision-makers.

First, it is important to sustain collaboration. As government and American allies contemplate arms control arrangements, nuclear-force commanders should offer information on the challenges and opportunities that various permutations of an arrangement present to force posture and operations. Not all ideas are operationally possible.

Second, highlight the challenges that an arrangement poses to fielded forces. As part of any discussions, commanders should relate how they would adjust operations as nascent arrangements move toward implementation. This would likely be a stepwise evolution of operations in reaction to implementation of disclosures and intrusion that could accompany various forms of arms control measures. Policymakers rarely understand what their aspirational objectives mean for operational forces.

Third, highlight opportunities an arrangement creates for forces. Similarly, commanders should monitor the evolution of arms control arrangements and be on the lookout for arrangements that permit gleaning information about adversary forces—information that is useful in crafting the best force posture, plans, and operational tactics.

These feedback loops would evolve in phases over the time that an arms control arrangement is contemplated, refined, and implemented (or rejected).

The Phases of Arms Control

Any future arms control agreement should have six phases:

Phase 1 takes place during internal American contemplation of potential arms control arrangements. Classified analysis of changes to operations that an arrangement might necessitate are discussed. When inspections are proposed, any detrimental effects to operations from various forms of inspection are discussed. Discussing the benefits of inspecting adversary installations is also an important consideration. 

Phase 2 occurs during outreach with adversaries and third-country parties. Internal “food-for-thought” papers from the operational community are prepared for negotiators and strategic-communications personnel. Deliberate public statements such as editorials and conference presentations serve a useful purpose in explaining American interests.  

Phase 3 takes place during formalization of an arms control arrangement. When requested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, the president, or other officials, public statements are made for adversary consumption. 

Phase 4 is the implementation phase. This is the period in which an arms control arrangement comes into effect by treaty agreement or as a unilateral/bilateral/multilateral action. Classified reports on implementation progress of the new arrangement are prepared. When inspections are part of the arrangement, coordination between government agencies occurs.

Phase 5 is focused on sustainment. During this period an arms control arrangement is in effect. Classified reports address difficulties from the arrangement. 

Phase 6 is the sunset period. This is when the arms control arrangement ends or appears to be faltering. Analysis of the operational steps, timeline, costs, equipment, and personnel necessary to terminate the arms control arrangement is conducted. Classified reports on progress toward ceasing any earlier changes to operations and capabilities, necessitated by the arrangement, are conducted.

Conclusion

Arms control for the sake of arms control was always a bad idea. The United States is no longer in a position where it can enter into arms control agreements because it furthers an idealist ambition to promote peace. Today, arms control is only useful if it furthers American interests.

Taking a hard-nosed look at arms control in its various forms is necessary, but it must be acceptable for the answer to be no. The United States is no longer in a position to act altruistically. Russia is a superior nuclear power, and China may reach a similar status within a decade. The world has changed and American leaders must accept that its adversaries are no longer willing to follow America’s lead.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a professor at Penn State-Brandywine. Views expressed are his own.

An Uncertain Future for Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Network of Powerful Allies

One of the strongest indicators of America’s continued leadership is its robust network of alliances. Over 50 nations are directly allied with the US, forming a global coalition that includes some of the world’s most powerful economies. Countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia consistently align themselves with American leadership, not just in military terms but also economically and diplomatically. Even in regions like the Middle East, traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and emerging partnerships are fortifying the US’s global standing.

Contrast this with the coalition of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. While this quartet may represent a serious challenge, it pales in comparison to the extensive alliances that the US leads. Most crucially, while Russia and China may appear aligned in the short term, they are not close allies in any deep or historical sense. The two powers have a long and fraught history, marked by strategic rivalry and suspicion. Their partnership today is one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. In the end, history tells us that such partnerships are prone to fracture, especially when national interests clash.

The reality of America’s network of allies compared to the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is stark. This balancing coalition does not even come close to the strength of the band wagoning coalition the US possesses. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with its 31 member states, represents not only the most powerful military alliance in history but also an economic powerhouse, accounting for over 30 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).

In contrast, China and Russia are economic competitors more than collaborators, and their combined GDP does not come close to rivaling the economic output of the US and its allies. Furthermore, China’s partnerships with nations like Iran and North Korea are limited by geography, sanctions, and divergent interests. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned and isolated state with little economic or strategic leverage beyond its nuclear capabilities, while Iran is mired in regional conflicts that prevent it from playing a major global role.

In essence, while China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may occasionally coordinate to challenge the West, their relationships lack the cohesion, shared values, and the long-term strategic alignment of the American-led alliance system. This coalition cannot hope to rival the strength, stability, and global reach of America’s network of alliances. For all the talk of a multipolar world, the US remains at the center of the most powerful and united coalition of nations in modern history, a fact that ensures its continued dominance on the global stage.

The Strategic Advantage of Geography

Another underappreciated advantage is geography. The United States enjoys a position of unmatched security, largely thanks to what scholars like John Mearsheimer call the “stopping power of water.” Unlike any other global power, the United States benefits from being bordered by two vast oceans. These natural barriers serve as formidable buffers against potential adversaries, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct invasion or immediate military threats to the mainland.

This geographic advantage has profound implications for national security and global influence. Unlike Russia, which shares extensive borders with Europe and Central Asia, and China, which borders several regional rivals including India, Japan, and Vietnam, the US is largely insulated from the chaos of regional disputes.

Moreover, this geographic separation means that the US can maintain a relatively smaller standing army compared to continental powers—focusing instead on advanced naval and air forces capable of projecting power far from its shores. American military bases, fleets, and alliances stretch across the world, but the mainland remains safely beyond the reach of conventional military threats.

This position gives the US a level of strategic flexibility that few nations can match. That is not to say the US Navy does not have issues facing its future, especially with shipyards and defense procurement. However, it is still considered the greatest Navy in the world as of 2024.

The Monroe Doctrine

Part of what makes the US so unique is its role as the uncontested regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine has long established the principle that no foreign power should interfere in the affairs of the Americas, solidifying U.S. dominance in its own region. No other nation on Earth holds this level of regional control.

This unrivaled regional hegemony allows the US to focus on maintaining global stability and leading from a position of strength. As long as the Western Hemisphere remains secure, the US can project power abroad with confidence, knowing that its backyard is free from external threats.

The Interconnected Economies of the U.S. and China

Finally, the specter of the so-called Thucydides Trap—the idea that a rising power (China) will inevitably clash with an established one (the US)—is not as likely as it may seem. While it is true that China’s economic and military rise is a concern, the interconnectedness of the two economies makes a full-blown conflict far less probable. The US and China are not just rivals; they are deeply intertwined economically. From trade to investment to the global supply chain, the economic fates of both nations are linked in ways that make large-scale conflict costly for either side.

This economic entanglement offers a powerful deterrent against conflict. Both nations have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, knowing that any war would be mutually destructive. This interdependence, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force, reducing the likelihood that the US and China will fall into the trap of inevitable conflict. However, it is worth noting that much of the same was said about the European powers just before World War I.

Conclusion: A Future of Optimism, Not Decline

Despite the challenges posed by emerging powers and the uncertainties of the global political landscape, the US remains in a position of unparalleled strength. Its vast network of powerful allies, its strategic geographic advantage, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, and the economic interdependence with China all suggest that the US’s role as the world’s leading hegemon is secure for the foreseeable future.

Rather than succumbing to the doom and gloom of some political pundits, it is time to recognize the many reasons for optimism. The US has the tools, alliances, and strategic advantages to maintain its leadership and continue shaping a peaceful, prosperous global order.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed here are the author’s own.

The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Issues Include:

Korea and Russia News

1. North Korean ICBM and Military Collaboration with Russia
   • North Korea recently launched its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to date, signaling its intent to counter U.S.-South Korean alliances. Following this, the U.S. and South Korea held joint air drills as a show of force.
   • Reports indicate North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading to Ukraine, marking a potentially destabilizing support for Russia’s war efforts. North Korea may seek advanced nuclear technology from Russia as part of their cooperation.
2. Strategic Reactions and Military Developments
   • The U.S. and South Korea have pledged deeper military and technology cooperation, emphasizing nuclear defense scenarios. Meanwhile, North Korea’s alignment with Russia is raising concerns about heightened regional instability and the potential extension of the Ukraine conflict.

ICBM Report to Congress on LGM-35A Sentinel

1. Program Overview
   • The LGM-35A Sentinel, set to replace the aging Minuteman III, forms the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Sentinel will enhance the U.S.’s deterrent capabilities with an expected procurement of 634 missiles, modernized silos, and facilities across strategic areas
2. Funding and Development
   • The FY2025 budget includes $3.7 billion from the Department of Defense and $1.1 billion for the W87-1 warhead from the National Nuclear Security Administration. Modernization will involve upgrades to 450 silos and over 600 facilities, establishing the Sentinel as a long-term, modular system to address future threats
3. Strategic Justifications
   • As a critical element of U.S. defense, the Sentinel program is designed to meet evolving threats, preserve industrial capabilities, and ensure cost-effective lifecycle management. The Air Force targets initial deployment in 2029.

Get the full report!

ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Essays:

1. Extended Deterrence and No First Use Policy:
   • The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, emphasizing nuclear abolition.
   • The U.S. policy of extended deterrence involves the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, biological, or chemical attacks.​
   • The Biden administration considered a “No First Use” policy, which could undermine the U.S. extended deterrent strategy.​
2. Nuclear Security Challenges:
   • The U.S. faces nuclear threats from China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
   • Significant investments in both conventional and nuclear forces are necessary.​
   • The U.S. must address the coordinated campaign of unrestricted warfare by these nations.​
3. Cost of Nuclear Modernization:
   • The U.S. plans to spend $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years on nuclear deterrence.​
   • Modernization is essential to replace aging systems like the MMIII ICBMs, B52 and B2 bombers, and Ohio-class submarines.​
   • The annual cost of modernization is around $19 billion, which is 3.5% of the current defense budget.

Quotes of the Week:

• “President Zelenskyy says Ukraine expects N. Korean troops to be deployed in battlefield in few days” and also sees the choice between joining NATO or going nuclear.
• Congressman Don Bacon: Emphasized the need to strengthen U.S. nuclear command and control due to the Russia-China alliance.​
• Sen. Mike Rounds: Highlighted the importance of preparing for the B-21 stealth bomber at Ellsworth AFB.​
• Noah Robertson: Reported on China’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion.​
• Wang Zhen: Criticized the U.S. for misrepresenting China’s nuclear development.

Strategic Developments:

• Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Some essays support Iran acquiring nuclear weapons to establish deterrence against the U.S. and Israel.
• China’s Nuclear Strategy: China maintains a minimum deterrent strategy and proposes a “No First Use” treaty.

Budget Comparisons:

• Medicaid Costs: The cost of Medicaid to illegal aliens over three years is $16.2 billion, nearly equal to the annual cost of U.S. nuclear modernization platforms for FY25 ($16.4 billion).​

Important Commentary:

• AEI Essay: Urges the next U.S. president to address the aging nuclear arsenal and consider stop-gap measures to mitigate long-term issues.​
• Chinese Disarmament Stance: China calls for the U.S. to stop misrepresenting its nuclear policy and emphasizes its no-first-use stance.​

To read the report visit the Global Security Review ICBM EAR report.

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ICBM EAR Report – Summary for October 25th was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. Plutonium Pit Production: Back In Business was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, the international security environment is anything but stable, certain, and peaceful. And the future is trending in the wrong direction for the United States and its allies. American strategic force posture must be rebalanced. The US needs a policy of strategic sufficiency 2.0 with new regional nuclear triads as its centerpiece.

Those who favor a rules-based construct of international relations now face the specter of broad and catastrophic threats from a new axis of authoritarianism. This axis is a political union comprised of authoritarian China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, each guilty of intense human rights abuses of their own people. They seek to create a new world order of control, coercion, and, when needed, armed conflict where they reap the benefits. This new political union could include aggression against the US and its allies simultaneously.

Their military prowess is greatly increasing, through a nuclear arms race that the United States is passively observing. Most importantly, this includes theater nuclear forces of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific and Europe. Today, the US simply has no theater range nuclear forces forward-deployed to the Pacific. According to the Congressional Research Service, all American nonstrategic nuclear weapons are either forward-deployed with aircraft in Europe or stored in the United States. Further, with Russia possessing as many as 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US and NATO are outpaced in theater nuclear forces in Europe by perhaps a 10-to-1 margin.

Unlike the Cold War, these threats are undergirded by China’s economic power, ironically fueled for decades by liberal societies enamored with China’s cheap product and labor. It is meaningless to characterize the American relationship with these regimes as competition. The United States and its allies are in conflict with them, not yet armed conflict, but conflict, nonetheless.

The US has four broad policy choices for its strategic force posture. First, it can stay within guidance of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and slowly modernize the strategic nuclear triad while reducing reliance on nuclear weapons hoping adversaries follow. However, every nuclear-armed adversary is deepening reliance on nuclear weapons and expanding nuclear forces, with no signs of stopping.

Second, the US can seek an isolationist foreign policy and aid its allies in developing and deploying their own nuclear capabilities. This option requires that the US all but abandon its policy of extended deterrence and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), placing regional security in peril and fostering geopolitical atrophy.

Third, it can promote new security architectures in Europe and the Pacific, where a leading regional ally would assume responsibility for providing the needed “nuclear umbrella” over fellow regional allies. This option is likely unworkable.

The fourth option is for the US to embrace its historical leadership role, strengthen its strategic force posture, and, working with Allies, reconstitute regional conventional defenses. The last option is the only prudent one to prevent conflict through deterrence against multiple adversaries for the foreseeable future. The logic of such a strategy should start with President Richard Nixon’s approach.

In the late 1960s, Nixon formulated a realist policy of “strategic sufficiency.” It was designed to adjust the American strategic force posture to the threats, uncertainties, and instability of that time. Such threats included rapid growth in Soviet nuclear forces and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. Nixon concluded strategic balance was essential for overall security, though it meant expanding the American nuclear forces immediately. Quantity was a quality all its own. If numbers mattered to the Soviets, then the United States needed to include them in sufficiency assessments.

In his first annual foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon argued strategic sufficiency required a military calculation of forces for warfighting, but explicitly argued sufficiency’s core idea was political. Forces could only be sufficient if they accounted for vital and long-term American security interests and aspirations, including the protection of global commercial markets.

Combined, the military and political features of Nixon’s sufficiency enabled the US strategic force posture to accomplish a wide set of policy goals. These included deterring the Soviets, assuring allies, countering coercion, providing a president political bargaining power to successfully wage an escalatory battle, fight and finish war on multiple fronts, and safeguard long-term interests.

To rebalance the force, the Nixon administration moved to upload nuclear missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to be able to attack more targets and overcome enemy defenses without reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy. Nixon also hardened intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, increased the mobility of forces, and increased air and missile defenses. Nixon coupled American security to allied security but demanded more of allies especially for conventional forces to deter regional aggression. Such was the logic and choices of Nixon’s policy.

However, Nixon’s sufficiency policy was formed in the 1960s, in an era when large or surprise Soviet nuclear attack was feared. It focused on American strategic nuclear forces that provide central deterrence of attacks on the homeland. Today, the most likely pathway to nuclear escalation and attacks on the homeland is through regional conflict, where adversaries have a significant and growing theater nuclear advantage, particularly in sub-intercontinental-range missiles. Allies are faced with direct and immediate threats of aggression and nuclear attacks. The United States nuclear triad of strategic systems is neither designed nor credible for waging regional nuclear war and escalation. It invites nuclear retaliation on the homeland.

Therefore, a strategic sufficiency 2.0 for the future must include nuclear forces necessary to satisfy Nixon’s military-political goals, but with a focus on the theater. Beefing up the American strategic nuclear triad is important, but so is expanding regional conventional forces and homeland defenses. However, the greatest deterrence priority for this new axis of authoritarianism is building American theater nuclear triads.

Adversaries calculate the totality of war and the risks of escalation all the way through war termination prior to making the initial decision to wage war. And so, the strategic force posture must have the forces in place to succeed at every step of conventional and nuclear war in order to deter war. Regional nuclear triads plug the greatest force sufficiency gap in this spectrum.

Regional nuclear triads would create a deterrent wall between regional conventional conflict and escalation to strategic nuclear conflict against the homeland. Today, such walls are virtually nonexistent. Regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific would be sufficient to provide the president a wide range of theater options to counter simultaneous axis escalation threats, without having to move forces from one region to the other. Such diverse options enable a president to successfully wage the regional escalation battle without using the strategic triad. To use the strategic triad would pointlessly drive central deterrence risks to the homeland.

Regional nuclear triads not only build the critical deterrent wall, but they are also sufficient to accomplish, at the regional level, the full range of Nixon’s military and political features noted above (deterrence, assurance, counter-coercion, escalatory bargaining, and war winning). Theater nuclear forces of such strength also hedge against the uncertainties involved in adversary nuclear force projection and intentions in the outyears. This reduces regional and homeland risks, and builds the high confidence needed of a strategic sufficiency policy.

Regional nuclear triads would have varying ranges and yields for proportionality and credibility and would afford the same force attributes of survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility provided by the strategic triad. This combination of attributes creates the military, political, and psychological effects that maximize adversary doubts and fears of the consequences of undesired actions. Placing regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific achieves this strong regional deterrent effect unlike any other policy option.

This should be achieved in both theaters. For example, the United States can deploy a combination of ground-based nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and nuclear-armed F-35 aircraft, nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (the SLCM-N), and air-launched nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles. Regional nuclear triad means-of-delivery and nuclear weapons must also be of sufficient numerical strength to balance Russian theater nuclear forces in Europe and Chinese/North Korean theater nuclear forces in the Pacific.

As mentioned earlier, American strategic force posture must account for military and political force requirements across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, in addition to regional nuclear triads, strategic sufficiency 2.0 also requires an American strategic force posture to make three other adjustments to deal with threats.

First, the US must upload its ICBM force with additional nuclear weapons. In keeping with Nixon’s uploading policy, the US should use uploaded missiles to keep pace, weapon for weapon, with Chinese strategic nuclear weapon deployments. This achieves the military and political purposes stated earlier, but also demonstrates political resolve toward arms control at some point.

Second, the posture must safeguard key elements of the homeland from enemy coercion. Missile defenses reassure the American people, but also enable a president to take the risks necessary to effectively escalate and win a conflict where nuclear use is threatened or takes place. A limited defense against coercive attacks against major American population centers and adversary first-strike weapons against American leadership adds that needed reassurance to the deterrence equation.

Third, in partnership with allies, the US must restore regional conventional forces to deter axis aggression. This should include a substantial number of American air-, sea-, and land-based conventional hypersonic missiles capable of defeating, at range, enemy defenses and their anti-access area-denial capabilities. It will also require greater allied burden and risk sharing through increased defense spending, expanding regional combat power and expanding access for American theater nuclear forces.

Challenges to a strategic sufficiency 2.0 policy come in several forms. Detractors may make the following arguments.

First, some may argue that expansion of American nuclear forces will spark an arms race. Unfortunately, an arms race already exists. The United States is not a participant.

Second, some may argue nuclear expansion is unaffordable. Nuclear forces, including ongoing strategic triad modernization, account for 6 percent of the defense budget and less than 1 percent of federal spending. Regional nuclear triads, uploading, conventional hypersonics, and improved missile defenses are minimal in cost. Deterrence is, however, far less expensive than warfighting.

Third, some may suggest a single nuclear weapon system, such as the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), is all that is needed for regional deterrence. But this approach leaves out critical military and political features of sufficiency such as attributes, warfighting capabilities, and escalation options that regional nuclear triads offer.

Finally, some could argue that the United States can accomplish its military and political objectives if the nation can strike key targets with the strategic nuclear triad. This force sufficiency assumption is a common trap. Nixon argued that while narrow military planning is necessary in helping to discern strategic sufficiency, he warned against “debatable calculations and assumptions regarding possible scenarios.” Rather, sufficiency dealt more with force capacity in its “broader political sense.” Anything less than full force balance is unacceptable.

The policy of the United States should be to embrace leadership and engagement in the world to resolutely safeguard its national security and that of its allies and partners. To do so, American policy should be to reconstitute strategic force posture, including expanding the strategic nuclear triad through MIRVing ICBMs; establishing theater nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific; expanding missile defenses; and expanding theater conventional forces.

War prevention is the object of deterrence, a strategy that has worked for over 75 years. Deterrence, strategic stability, and nonproliferation were always the strongest when the US and its allies were strong. Power is the language respected by authoritarians, and the US should not be afraid to wield it. Strategic sufficiency 2.0, with an emphasis on regional nuclear triads, can rebalance the American strategic force posture and create the conditions of strategic stability and deterrence effectiveness against the multipolar axis threat.

Jonathan Trexel, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and on the faculty of Missouri State University. The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Strategic Sufficiency 2.0: Deploying Regional Nuclear Triads was originally published on Global Security Review.

If your interest fits one of these areas:

• Experienced professional with expertise in arms control, nuclear deterrence, and international security priorities.

• Specialized in analyzing arms deals, assessing nuclear strategies, and understanding global alliances.

• Dedicated to promoting diplomacy, reducing the threat of nuclear war, and advocating for responsible statecraft.

Then this report gives you nuanced perspectives on nuclear proliferation in East Asia, focusing on Japan and South Korea, and China’s influence in the Middle East, as well as a deep understanding of international relations, security issues, and geopolitical developments.

Finding that you are committed to discussing critical issues shaping the world today,  here are the 7 critical take aways you’ll find most interesting:

1. Shift towards nuclear weapons, with concerns about reversing the momentum towards a world without nuclear arms.

2. Escalating tensions in various regions, leading to the emergence of opposing cold war-style camps. ​

3. Growing calls in Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the US. ​

4. North Korea’s rapid expansion of nuclear capabilities changing the nuclear balance on the Korean peninsula. ​

5. Increasing support for nuclear armament in South Korea. ​

6. Strengthened military alliances between the US, Japan, and South Korea. ​

7. China’s influence in the Middle East aimed at reducing American influence in the region. ​Welcome this key and influential information into your must read for the week and you will remain on top of what matters most in national security.

Read, share, print, discuss, give us your thoughts!

ICBM EAR Week of August 8, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

It might be tempting to dismiss these statements as yet another instance of grandstanding by an aggressor portraying itself as an innocent victim. However, it might be worth putting Putin’s comments into context for some decoding of the next steps required not only for the Ukraine conflict but for the entire European deterrence picture.

The deployment of American intermediate-range missile systems on German territory is scheduled for 2026. When declaring Russia unbound by any unilateral moratorium on deploying medium- and short-range strike capabilities, Putin blamed the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) for Russia’s necessary actions.

Russia plans to produce weapons similar to those prohibited by the INF Treaty, increasing the nuclear component of Russia’s military budget. Overall, Putin presented the US deployment of missiles in Europe as a strategic threat to Russia and a potential justification for Russia’s own nuclear response. Russian invasion of Ukraine and nuclear threats against NATO had nothing to do with it.

During his speech at the Naval Day Parade, Putin raised concerns about Western tolerance for nuclear weapon use and the deployment of missiles in Germany. There was also an aspect of pleasing the crowd at home and impressing on them the irrefutable logic of his leadership. Reminding Putin’s audience of Russia’s military power and strategic importance, particularly regarding the Baltic Sea, was paramount.

Putin often refers to what he characterizes as the period of great tension between the tragically defunct Soviet Union and the West—the Cold War. The Russian narrative once again views the West as an enemy. It is helpful to listen to Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. He advocated for an offensive stance towards the West and revigorated the Russian complex of obsidionalism (under siege mentality), which views the West as a long-term adversary.

When in 2008 Putin invaded Georgia, French president Nicolas Sarkozy barely managed to understand what the invasion meant. The naivete of the West convinced Putin that Crimea was up for grabs. Indeed, not one shot was fired by the West when Putin grabbed Crimea in 2014.

Putin is also well aware of the fact that the current NATO defense math simply does not add up. For example, France used to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—at the end of the Cold War. France stopped just short of completely gutting its military after 1991 and kept its nuclear weapons in working order. Three decades later, France struggles to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, though it has now substantially increased defense spending as of late. Most of Europe, except for the voluntarist Baltic and Nordic countries, is in this situation or even worse.

On the one hand, Russia may be trying to extend the Ukraine conflict as a way to justify increased defense spending. On the other hand, extending the Ukraine conflict also postpones Russia’s rearming for a much larger and deeper fight against NATO.

When Putin publicly threatens the use of nuclear weapons, it plays to domestic audience reassurance. Russian naval struggles in the Black Sea are real. The enlargement of NATO to Sweden and Finland only makes matters worse as the Baltic Sea now sees Putin with NATO able to cut off access to the Atlantic and Kaliningrad. After all, the expansion of NATO leaves Russia with NATO forces much closer on land and able to completely cut off Russia by sea in the West. It should come as no surprise then that Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has decided a structural investment in nuclear forces is his best option.

In his protracted conflict with Ukraine, the Ukrainians are provided enough military support to avoid defeat, but not enough to unambiguously prevail over Russia. Finnish President Sauli Väinämö Niinistö made an ouverture to Russia to suggest peace negotiations. Considering economic and military recruitment challenges and struggles on the ground and in the Black Sea, Russia may eventually seek negotiations. However, Putin and Russian leaders may be reluctant to negotiate as it could be perceived as a sign of weakness.

Western diplomacy should look deeper at the strategic and deterrence picture. It is rather challenging to create a consensus within Russia’s political circles regarding Putin’s foreign policies, particularly towards the West. Even the rapprochement and convergence of interests that led to the China-Iran-North Korea-Russia nexus, the “Axis of Upheaval” according to British prime minister Keir Starmer, is not something straightforward. Russia’s concern for China’s ambitions should never be underestimated.

Ukraine, however, is the immediate concern and deterring further NATO intervention is most important. Thus, Putin will continue to threaten in an effort to coerce NATO restraint and the further deterioration of Russia’s position in Europe.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Putin’s Nuclear Swagger was originally published on Global Security Review.

Doubtless the significance of Hiroshima speaks for itself. The bomb had previously been tested successfully in the New Mexico desert, but it had yet to be used under operational conditions. Scientists and military experts offered various predictions about whether the bomb would detonate as expected and what it might cause. The bombing of Hiroshima turned theory into practice. The United States created a new weapon of unprecedented and terrifying power.

On the other hand, even after the destruction of Hiroshima, the Japanese political and military leadership was not prepared to surrender. Anticipating an eventual American invasion of the Japanese home islands, the imperial government prepared their civilian population for protracted urban warfare and other means of diehard resistance to foreign occupation. Outside the home islands, large contingents of the imperial Japanese armed forces remained capable of fighting, absent a regime surrender.

Japanese leaders may have also doubted whether the United States was capable of repeating the destruction inflicted on Hiroshima. The US might have only one of these unprecedented weapons in its arsenal and, having used it, would need to defeat Japan’s military by an inevitable invasion, costly to Americans as well as to Japanese.

The bombing of Nagasaki changed this optimistic calculus to a more pessimistic one.  Now it seemed possible that the US may have many of these weapons ready for immediate use.  As we now know, the United States did not. But, if the war lasted well beyond August of 1945, the US could have manufactured and used additional atomic weapons against Japan. Facing this possibility, Emperor Hirohito made an unprecedented radio address calling on his population and armed forces to surrender.

The emperor’s address caused most, but not all, Japanese to accept the “unthinkable” surrender. A number of military officers committed ritual suicide, and a small coterie of fanatics tried to overthrow the government and continue the war, notwithstanding the wishes of the emperor.

But after the bombing of Nagasaki, most accepted that there was no alternative to surrender. The US wisely agreed to spare the life of the emperor and to avoid treating him as a war criminal, despite calls for his incarceration and execution on the part of many Americans. It was judged correctly that Hirohito would be a necessary legitimizing symbol useful in establishing a postwar democratic regime under the governance of Douglas MacArthur.

The bombing of Nagasaki is significant in other ways as well. It shows that deterrence is based not only on the experience of pain and destruction already inflicted, but also on the expectation of more pain to come, if the demands of an adversary are not met. The future unknown can be more terrifying than the known past, however terrible the past was.

By example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was able to rally parliament and the British public in 1940 to resist Hitler at all costs, regardless of the pessimism of some in the political establishment, many of whom preferred to make a deal with Hitler. It was not only the immediate peril of British forces deployed in France that mattered, but also the unknown fate of Britain under German rule that caused leaders and most of the British public to stand fast despite seemingly impossible odds.

The bombing of Nagasaki is significant in another way. Contrary to the predictions of many experts, it represented the last use of the atomic bomb fired in anger. Nuclear deterrence proved to be more durable and less brittle than expected, even during the worst moments of the Cold War. The Cuban missile crisis was a close call, but Khrushchev’s reckless gamble in America’s backyard was discovered by US intelligence and exposed in time for crisis management to succeed.

Can we assume that deterrence will hold firm in a new world order of rising competition and conflict among three nuclear-armed great powers; one rogue nuclear weapons state; a potential rogue nuclear weapons state; and possible additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Asia, or elsewhere? This question has special significance for Japan and takes us back to its singular experiences of atomic bombing. Their history has understandably created, in the minds of the Japanese people, an allergic reaction to the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal.  But, as Japan faces a more assertive China, an erratic North Korea, and an aggressive Russia, reality may overcome such resistance.

Thus far, Japan has depended upon the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter adversaries against nuclear coercion or first use. As the military configuration of Asia changes, leaders in Japan may begin to entertain the notion of a nuclear deterrent: modest in size, but sufficient to create the expectation of unprecedented, and unacceptable, damage to any prospective attacker. Should that day arrive, Japan will come full circle from the attack on Nagasaki.

Steve Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Significance of Nagasaki was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the B-21 bomber enters the Air Force inventory the number of nuclear-capable bomber bases sees very little change. With the nation preparing for the geopolitical era ahead, it is time to discuss the re-commissioning of Cold War–era United States Air Force (USAF) bases, whose geographic positions can once again play an important role in deterring the axis of autocracy that is forming in opposition to American and Western leadership.

The changing strategic landscape and re-emergence of great-power competition should prompt discussion of renewing a committed focus towards strategic deterrence and the nuclear capabilities needed to deter China, North Korea, and Russia. Many Cold War–era bases were strategically located to project power and respond to threats. Re-commissioning these bases could provide needed dispersal for a bomber force that is located at only three bases. While upgrades and modernization are necessary, existing infrastructure at bases that remain in use by National Guard units, for example, or other organizations could significantly reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Tankers and other supporting components to the bomber mission would also benefit.

Utilizing existing bases could minimize environmental impacts, construction costs, and impact on local communities. While the Base Realignment and Closure effort that followed the Cold War’s end allowed the United States to reduce defense spending through dramatic cuts to infrastructure, the three-decade hiatus from great-power competition is over and the consolidation impacted deployability and introduced strategic force vulnerabilities. Today’s accelerating threat requires the urgent re-establishment of a ready network of dispersal and forward bases.

In tandem with re-commissioning Cold War–era Air Force bases, the strategic value of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) must also be considered. As a critical asset in ensuring energy security, the SPR provides a buffer against potential disruptions in oil supply that could arise from geopolitical tensions or conflicts. Ensuring that military operations are not hampered by fuel shortages is paramount, especially when considering the logistical demands of dispersed air bases. By maintaining and potentially expanding the SPR, the US can safeguard its military readiness and resilience, ensuring that energy constraints do not undermine strategic deterrence and defense capabilities.

The expansion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal—including increasing the number of SSBNs, making Sentinel road-mobile, and acquiring more than the planned 100 B-21 stealth bombers, which are all required in the current strategic environment—underscores the need for re-commissioned bases. Not only are these bases useful for dispersal of bombers, but they have the potential to offer areas from which road-mobile ICBMs can disperse.

Admittedly, significant investment is required to modernize shuddered bases, including upgrades to runways, hangars, communication systems, and security. Environmental assessments and remediation efforts may also be necessary to address potential contamination from previous operations, adding to the cost and timeline. Re-commissioning could also disrupt local communities and raise concerns about noise pollution, safety, and environmental impacts, necessitating careful planning and community engagement. However, many towns devastated by the closure of bases would gladly welcome their return.

Significant resources are required to refurbish or rebuild facilities, integrate new aircraft and technology with existing infrastructure, coordinate with local authorities, and establish new supply chains and support networks. Legacy infrastructure at Air National Guard bases, for example, can reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient force structure while reducing costs. ICBMs, tankers, and other support elements would also benefit.

During the Cold War, the U.S. military employed a dispersal strategy to mitigate the risk of concentrated attacks on its airbases, scattering aircraft across multiple locations to enhance survivability and ensure retaliatory capabilities. This approach was vital in countering the Soviet threat—reducing the vulnerability of strategic assets. In today’s context of renewed great-power competition, with rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, adjusting the current strategy is essential.

Ultimately, the decision to expand the basing footprint should be built on a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits and a thorough understanding of strategic implications. By carefully weighing these factors, policymakers can make informed decisions that enhance national security while minimizing negative impacts on communities and the environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. Views express are his own.  

Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence? was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is some debate, however, as to their continued utility in modern times. They are costly to build, at least $13 billion, require a large complement of personnel, require an escort, and are vulnerable to attack from ballistic missiles and now hypersonic weapons. Disabling an American aircraft carrier would be a priority for enemy nations, as it would be a symbolic victory with great propaganda value for them. An aircraft carrier is simply a very attractive target that, depending upon the analyst, is more or less of an easy target. A missile strike that causes even a listing of a few degrees or propulsion damage can prevent them from being used by air assets.

While on paper supercarriers can carry up to 130 aircraft, they typically have about 70 aircraft of varying types at any given time. Some are under maintenance, some allocated to fleet protection, with the rest able to conduct offensive operations. Using rough math and averaging air wings, at any given time a carrier may have an estimated 15 aircraft in the air for offensive operations. Thus, in a large-scale conflict, it would be best for multiple carriers to work in concert, and for the navy to “surge” personnel and aircraft to deployed carriers.

The most dangerous threat to this strategy is the potential for an adversary, like China, to employ nuclear weapons against a carrier strike group. China, for example, could claim American naval assets are violating its sovereign waters, constituting an invasion, and employ nuclear weapons against the carrier strike group, hundreds of miles from land.

Such a scenario is certainly not a high probability but is a reasonable concern with an uncertain outcome. The ability of fleet defenses to prevent such a strike is uncertain. However, this risk does not negate the utility of carriers, in general. In fact, there may be some utility in building at least two supercarriers with even longer flight decks than the Gerald R. Ford class.

There are two areas where carriers have a possible future: carrying large swarms of long-legged drones and serving as mid-point logistical platforms. Such supercarriers could also host anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile interceptors, changing the boundaries and layers of continental missile defense, as needed.

Ostensibly, a drone-focused carrier can serve as a waystation for land-based drones and even host drone operators. With advancements in remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUV), it would make sense to redesign a new class of assault ships that can launch them. These can also be built cheaper and crewed by fewer personnel, with the goal of having more. In fact, they can be designed to be mostly unmanned and operate within the protection of a carrier strike group.

For supercarriers, their use behind the main lines of combat, between strike groups and mainland bases, has the potential to make them mobile bases for the purposes described above. Should a peer conflict begin in the Indo-Pacific, their use would be between Japan or Australia, and Hawaii, or as an alternative to American bases in the Pacific should China, for example, strike these bases.

The future use of aircraft carriers may be by American allies, whom, if trained, could deploy their own aircraft from American ships. South Korea and Japan, for example, have airfields in the region but, if struck by North Korea or China, may need an alternative hub to refuel and rearm. If land-based aircraft and airfields are at risk, it makes sense to have alternatives.

Contemplating and integrating the capabilities described is certainly well outside the US Navy’s current operational concept. American naval strategy is well established and slow to change, but, if former Indo-PACOM commander Admiral (Ret.) John Aquilino’s “hellscape” concept of a future asymmetric battlefield in the Indo-Pacific were to ever become a reality, rethinking the use of aircraft carriers may become a necessity.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Rethinking Aircraft Carriers was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though integrated deterrence outlines a comprehensive strategy, the complexities of integrating diverse tools and actors across multiple domains can be incredibly challenging. Coordinating actions between military, diplomatic, economic, and informational agencies require seamless communication, shared goals, and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. Even then, it still may not work. It is arguable that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the first example of integrated deterrence’s failure.

Prioritizing non-military tools within an integrated deterrence strategy can mitigate the risk of escalation and unintended conflict while providing proportionate responses to aggression, potentially avoiding the need for military force. Despite the application of various non-military measures, Russia was not dissuaded from its invasion, demonstrating the limitations of this approach in altering aggressive behavior when considering the impacts on Russia’s political influence, economic stability, and military capabilities. Economic sanctions against Russia over the past two years are proving an abject failure, as are diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia.

The effectiveness of an integrated deterrence strategy hinges on the same factor as previous and long-standing deterrence strategies—the ability to credibly threaten and, if necessary, impose meaningful costs on adversaries. This is difficult to achieve, especially when dealing with adversaries who are willing to tolerate economic pain, information warfare, or other non-kinetic actions.

At its core, integrated deterrence is designed to be flexible and adaptable, allowing the US to tailor its response to specific threats and adversaries. Theoretically, this can make it more effective than traditional deterrence, but there is little evidence to support the theory. In fact, integrated deterrence has been successful at extending the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and has utterly failed to restore deterrence with Russia. Russia’s nuclear threats have proven more successful in deterring American and European intervention on behalf of Ukraine.

The complexity of integrated deterrence leaves it prone to miscalculation and misinterpretation, as adversaries may perceive certain actions as escalatory or provocative. This can lead to unintended consequences and increase the risk of conflict, rather than supporting deterrence. Implementing integrated deterrence requires significant resources and investment across multiple domains. This can strain budgets and create competition for resources between different agencies and priorities.

Alliances, a crucial aspect of integrated deterrence, are important, but relying too heavily on them for deterrence can create vulnerabilities if allies are unwilling or unable to meaningfully contribute capability. This undermines the credibility of the overall deterrent effort. The shift to integrated deterrence as a preferred strategy for discouraging aggression against the interests and allies of the United States has seemingly positioned Russia and China in an advantageous position to seize a small window of opportunity to reshape the global power dynamic, while potentially creating the opportunity for states such as North Korea and Iran to extend their regional objectives beyond words.

Alternative strategies to integrated deterrence could focus on revitalizing traditional military capabilities while fostering deeper diplomatic ties with allies. Bolstering conventional forces and modernizing nuclear arsenals can serve as a powerful deterrent by signaling a nation’s willingness and ability to defend its interests. Simultaneously, strengthening alliances and partnerships through information sharing, joint military exercises, and technology cooperation can create a united front against potential adversaries.

This multifaceted approach, combining hard power with robust alliances, may prove more effective in deterring aggression than relying solely on economic or informational tools. Moreover, a renewed focus on arms control agreements could reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation, contributing to a more stable security environment. Ultimately, a balanced strategy that leverages military might, diplomatic cooperation, and arms control measures could offer a more comprehensive and robust approach to deterring aggression in the 21st century.

Time will tell if the choice to apply a strategy of integrated deterrence convincingly reinforces the all too important “will” necessary for any effective deterrence strategy or it results in the United States grossly miscalculating its ability to deter with non-military and non-nuclear means. If the Biden administration is wrong, American interests around the world will suffer greatly.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own. 

American Legitimacy and Integrated Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Flawed Modeling Assumptions

Game theory finds ideal tactics for conflicts between two opponents. It works great for something simple like checkers. But to get far it needs assumptions that, together, weaken the approach for something as tricky as convincing an adversary to never coerce or attack with nuclear arms.

In its basic form, game theory assumes both players have the same goals and want to avoid the same downsides. It also assumes all relevant information for the game is known fully and equally by both players, who are unbiased, unhurried, and perform all calculations perfectly. It assumes the game has a clear beginning and end, and moves are made in an orderly one-goes-then-the-other-goes manner.

Plainly, none of these apply well to states or blocs in a nuclear crisis or an escalating conventional shooting war. More subtly, game theory does not take account of tacit cooperation between opponents—such as to avoid nuclear Armageddon.

Modern game theorists are starting to study games with many players, in which different players have different goals and different information. But this research needs to mature more and be validated rigorously before it can be trusted enough to guide national defense.

Macroeconomics is a tool for understanding and managing the workings of a national economy. In its traditional form, macroeconomics assumes that everybody decides to buy or sell things based only on their price, and that all decisions are made with one hundred percent efficiency using complete information.

The difficulty of controlling a real-world economy is shown by the problems of fluctuating American inflation rates, recessions, and unemployment. While the conceptual framework of macroeconomics was adapted to analyze nuclear deterrence decades ago, there are practical limits to policy guidance obtained this way.

Modern research turned to what is called behavioral economics. This approach pays attention to the emotional reasons people do things. It also considers that different people seek different real and emotional rewards. Even sophisticated actors are driven by an irrational perception of risk. This emerging discipline seems promising, but still needs testing.

Systems analysis studies a problem, such as how to win a war, by breaking the warfighting into moving parts, then analyzes how those parts interact. The goal is to create statistics-driven procedures, such as body counts, that will achieve the desired outcome—victory.

Systems analysis has flaws for national defense policymaking. To get anywhere, it needs to make very difficult choices about exactly how to measure effectiveness, how to handle incomplete or absent data, how to take account of fundamentals and intangibles such as political will, and how to remove analyst bias. The near impossibility of doing all this successfully was demonstrated by the failure of systems analysis in the Vietnam Conflict.

Modern Threat Assessment

During the Cold War, other practical drawbacks of these technical tools were masked by the fact that the only major players of the nuclear deterrence game were the US and USSR. Neither became so aggressive or desperate as to resort to a nuclear attack. But there were close calls, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, peacefully resolved by back-channel bargaining between strong-willed leaders. Details of the next nuclear crisis, if one occurs, will be totally different and difficult to model realistically in advance.

Today, there are several significant nuclear adversaries confronting the US and its allies. The chances seem high that equations cannot capture the many psychological subtleties and unknown-unknown interactions, especially when several authoritarian regimes can form an opaque axis of expansion.

A good way to test the utility of behavioral economics and modernized game theory is to see if it can yield insights on dealing better with enemies who use nuclear threats against the United States, such as to limit American support for a beleaguered ally. The cases of Ukraine and Taiwan come to mind.

Conclusion

It is not just an academic exercise to confront and prevent the possibility that Russia, China, and North Korea may take their nuclear brinksmanship beyond mere verbal threats and saber-rattling exercises. Arms control advocates and defense policymakers need to recognize that nuclear attack is not simply a verbal bargaining chip thrown around by foreign potentates who are unserious, bluffing, or who have purely defensive goals. There is no pause button. There are no do-overs.

Nuclear deterrence cannot be reduced to a blackboard puzzle. Doing it properly needs undivided attention to the subtle nuances and fine distinctions that can make all the difference in an outcome. It calls for all-out political commitment despite many daunting complexities. Above all, effective deterrence requires deep understanding of how to make adversaries feel the raw fear generated when what they value most is at risk.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Nuclear Deterrence Is Not a Theoretical Game was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea, a relic of the Cold War, has evolved into a cult state centered around the Kim family. Despite its oppressive regime, the state’s endurance into the 21st century is perplexing. The regime maintains its grip on power through a combination of brainwashing, terror and strict social control. Public executions and pervasive surveillance cultivate an environment of fear, ensuring blind obedience from the population. However, beneath this veneer of control, North Korean society is sustained by bribery and corruption, which permeate every level of life.

Read the full article here.

Balloons and sleepwalking into conflicts was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since 2021, Russia upgraded or modernized approximately 85 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal. China undertook what then-Commander of United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, called “a strategic breakout,” with “explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces.” North Korea went from a fledgling 1980’s nuclear program to possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Iran’s nuclear program goes deeper underground, figuratively and literally, to avoid US threats and complicate US risk assessment.

Little occurred in the US nuclear arsenal during the same two decades. The nuclear enterprise is attempting to modernize each leg, with debatable levels of success. In June 2023, the Biden administration publicly confirmed and accepted American numerical nuclear inferiority for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The administration posits deterrence comes from quality over quantity. But how is a triad that is 30–50 years old qualitatively better than a new Russian arsenal?

The non-strategic nuclear arsenal rose in prominence as the Ukraine war began and Russia began making threats to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. Production of the B61-13 and life extension of the W80-4 emphasize regional nuclear deterrence and may preempt strategic conflict at a lower level but may arrive too late. Retiring the B83 purportedly transfers the hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) responsibility to the B61-13, streamlining the Department of Energy’s sustainment and modernization expenses. The Department of Defense is still weighing a 2022 study, evaluating future HDBT targets to demonstrate viability of the non-strategic capability.

Since 2021, the nuclear enterprise began receiving long-overdue attention, but it will take years to yield results. The enterprise competes for American talent, amongst lucrative technological fields, that it needs for successful reconstruction and for addressing the needs of the triad. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $500 million more than requested for plutonium pit production reconstitution at Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) goal is to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year, between the two facilities, by 2030. Assuming 80 pits per year went into refurbishing 85 percent of deployed nuclear warheads, matching Russia’s accomplishment, that pace would require nearly 16.5 years and almost 20 years for a 100 percent refurbishment. In FY 2024, the NNSA is requesting 8.6 percent more money than enacted in FY 2023 for the Product Modernization Program to support strategic nuclear weapons modification and life extension.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, refocused on strategic-level concerns, reprioritizing strategic power over Russia and China higher than post-9/11 terrorism. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for nuclear modernization, as previous NPRs did, but was followed by the financial resources outlined in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act required for execution.

There is a nexus between terrorism, nuclear weapons, and immigration. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and Hamas’ terror campaign against Israel. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon and provides it to any of these groups, the US may be left searching for nuclear fingerprints in the aftermath of a detonation. The Federation for American Immigration Reform reported Customs and Border Patrol data showing 3.2 million aliens illegally crossed into the US between October 2022 and October 2023. Among those apprehended, 172 aliens were suspected terrorists. One hundred sixty-nine attempted an illegal entry at the southern border. The notion of an attack on the homeland by terrorists using a smuggled weapon of mass destruction is a credible threat.

Law Enforcement sources assert terrorists can employ nuclear weapons without sophisticated delivery systems on US soil. Former FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker described the US as extremely vulnerable to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Swecker suggested that the mismanaged southern border is the key source of that vulnerability, concurring with a warning presented in December 2023 by the Department of Homeland Security. Preventing such dangerous exposure belongs at the forefront as policymakers seek to correct three years of negligent border protection. American strategic deterrence once overshadowed immigration, reducing temptation from adversaries abroad.

Nuclear-armed nations and proliferators alike must remember any nuclear attack against the United States from a terrorist organization will result in retaliation against the nation providing the weapon, as codified in the Bush Doctrine found in the 2002 National Security Strategy. While internal politics unnecessarily expose the US, those responsible can project strength by reiterating the consequences of exploiting that vulnerability and reemphasizing nuclear deterrence.

Terrorism and nuclear war are real. The US cannot afford to alternately overlook one in favor of the other. When adversaries see vulnerabilities, it invites aggression. Controlling who and what comes across US borders is essential to keeping Americans safe. Maintaining a modern, reliable, and lethal nuclear deterrent can foundationally dissuade terrorist attacks on US soil.

Dan Wasserman was both a missile operations and maintenance officer in the United States Air Force. He remains active in the field. The views expressed are his own.

Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea continues to increase its weapons production while advancing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nascent submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) legs of an emerging nuclear dyad. At the same time, China increased its numbers and types of nuclear weapons and dual-capable delivery systems. It has built multiple fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce and separate plutonium. Moreover, China’s fielding of a dual-capable fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and hypersonic glide vehicle raises questions about its commitment to its long-standing policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

As Matthew Kroenig notes, the more nuclear weapons a state has, the more assertive and coercive it tends to become to achieve its goals. This fits China’s pattern of behavior and is consistent with North Korea’s modus operandi. These developments threaten vital American security interests by undermining extended deterrence—placing the United States and mutual defense treaty allies at increased risk.

To counter this situation, while preserving strategic options for use during periods of acute crisis, “nuclear castling” would involve the restationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea. In chess, castling involves the simultaneous moving of the king and rook in a protective maneuver that preserves capabilities and opens new possibilities across the board.

Repositioning American nuclear weapons to South Korea would help close an emergent theater deterrence gap and modernize extended deterrence for all Indo-Pacific allies. The following proposal addresses how these weapons would serve an even greater imperative than in the past, even if only to provide the president of the United States options for use in extremis.

The United States should restation B61-3, 4, and/or 12 nuclear gravity bomb variants in South Korea for delivery of low-yield weapons by dual-capable F-35A, F-15E, or F16C/D. New START Treaty limitations only apply to heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, as opposed to these lower yield warheads and fighter aircraft. Additionally, the South Korean Air Force should train to perform conventional support for nuclear operations (CSNO), similar to how the air forces of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe operate. The United States should also use this opportunity to invite the Japanese Air Force to participate in CSNO training and operations.

Skeptics will likely say the April 2023 Washington Declaration between the United States and South Korea should have a chance to strengthen deterrence and assurance. Part of the agreement commits America to reintroducing periodic ballistic missile submarine patrols in the vicinity of South Korea. In addition to South Korea reaffirming its pledge not to seek its own nuclear weapons and commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Washington Declaration clears the way for America and South Korea to establish a nuclear consultative group modeled on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

In fact, within six months of the Washington Declaration, the USS Kentucky made the first visit of an American ballistic missile submarine to South Korea since the 1980s. The visible gesture of deterrence accompanied the inaugural meeting of the American and South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group meeting on the same day in July 2023.

In parallel, an April 2024 display of combined air operations with the South Korean and Japanese Air Forces further contributes to theater deterrence. But, while the Washington Declaration is an important step in the right direction, more is needed to deter North Korea or China and to assure our regional allies.

Others will also argue that reintroducing small numbers of nuclear weapons to South Korea will not make an appreciable difference in North Korea or China’s perception of risk or the credibility of America’s nuclear deterrent. However, repositioning weapons within the theater to deter two nuclear arms–racing aggressors and assure allies creates options for the United States that do not require employment of strategic weapons. For allies that rely on extended deterrence, reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea would renew confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella.

While some observers may also view any reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea in this manner as a contravention of the NPT, the United States would rely on custodial control to align with the NPT. Though fundamentally different than long-standing NATO arrangements that pre-date the NPT, restationing nuclear weapons in South Korea is a comparable approach that involves a treaty ally of the United States. Most importantly, there is a historic precedent between both countries.

At a relatively low cost and risk, restationing nuclear gravity bombs in South Korea has a high return on investment if agreed to by the South Korean government. Additionally, considering production delays for the American Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the current Ohio-class submarines and the similarly lengthy timeline for fielding a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, this recommendation is a timely option for strengthening overall American nuclear deterrence.

The Indo-Pacific chess board has strategically shifted since the United States last stationed weapons there. The longer America maintains a regional nuclear status quo in the face of egregious North Korean and Chinese nuclear arms racing, the less credible and more overstretched America’s nuclear deterrent may appear. Nuclear castling offers an approach to close the emergent deterrence gap and to provide a forceful example of interoperability for treaty allies, complementing bold integrated deterrence moves and magnifying a new sense of integrated assurance.

COL Michael R. DeMarco serves in the United States Army Reserve. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

Nuclear Castling in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton, labels this issue the three body problem. As nuclear strategy experts suggest, American deterrence capabilities and overall numbers both matter.

Patrick McKenna and Dylan Land’s “Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates,” details four essential variables for right-sizing the arsenal: risk management, deterrence and assurance goals, force use guidelines, and operational constraints. This article will unpack the matter of risk management.

Risk management issues permeate virtually every decision about nuclear posture and arsenal right-sizing. The perspectives of tolerable nuclear risks held by America, this country’s adversaries, and this country’s allies all matter to effective global nuclear peacekeeping.

Deterrence theorists rightly argue that the US should start by understanding exactly what each adversary values most and their goals. This information is useful in determining what to hold at risk—the high value assets to target. The total number of those targets is an essential input to arsenal right-sizing.

Political and fiscal compromises have a major impact on arsenal size as well. For the United States, the finite capacity of the defense industrial base is a major current constraint. The less money available to sustain America’s triad, the greater the risk that the force structure is not adequate to deter adversaries and assure allies. The weaker the political will to resist coercion, and to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attacks, large or small, the less successful is deterrence and assurance.

Similarly, the less the production capacity of the defense industrial base, the less the US is able to implement on a timely basis whatever types and numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads are the chosen arsenal size and force structure.

Since nuclear deterrence has never failed, analysis is necessarily prospective and does not rely on large quantities of data or past experience. Instead, there is a reliance on inferences from military and political history, combined with playing out, on paper, the aftermath of a nuclear war.

The United States is now dealing with the unpleasant reality that any significant expansion in the nuclear arsenal is accomplished much less rapidly than adversaries can grow and strengthen their own arsenals. Actuarial science suggests that guarding against catastrophic failures calls for worst-case planning. Given the catastrophic results of nuclear warfare, right-sizing the nuclear triad must deter all adversaries simultaneously. This includes accounting for the instance in which China, North Korea, and Russia collaborate to coerce or attack the United States. Should they ever take the gamble to launch a nuclear attack, American deterrence has utterly failed.

An upper bound on American deployed warheads is the sum of what is needed to deter each adversary in isolation. This is because should US Strategic Command deploy enough nuclear weapons to simultaneously hold Chinese, North Korean, and Russian targets at risk, deterrence is likely to hold. Keep in mind, there is no historical example to suggest that all weapons will strike designated targets.

Thus, the fewer weapons there are to strike targets, the greater the risk of deterrence failure. This leaves the old pejorative, “We will make the rubble bounce,” important when considering that probability of target destruction is certainly much lower than many believe.

As with other inputs to triad right-sizing, wherein less of an important resource increases the risk of deterrence failure, the more the total number of deployed nuclear warheads falls short of the upper bound mentioned above, and the greater the risk becomes that one or another scenario of adversary coercion or attack will occur and possibly succeed.

But assuming the US fields a large enough and modernized arsenal, there is a disincentive for any single attacker to strike the United States and for a second adversary to wait, assess the damage, and perhaps complete what the initial attacker did not. There is also a disincentive for all adversaries to collaborate in a unified attack. Absent a large American arsenal, such considerations become more viable.

Risk is relative. There is seldom one right answer when many limited resources are being competed for, while the nation must also address other priorities besides the all-important national defense. But to go very far below the upper bound of the total number of high-value targets risks deterrence failure. Any resource savings are short-term and illusory. The costs of deterrence failure vastly eclipse any imagined benefits to a too-small arsenal.

Only further research and development, strategic planning, intelligence analysis, and open debate can lead to a sound consensus on exactly how big the nuclear arsenal needs to be during the risk-laden years that lie ahead. There is no time to waste.

Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with four decades of experience. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Right-sizing was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) tested its first nuclear device on October 9, 2006. This action exacerbated an already significant threat perception by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Because of the United States’ treaty agreement concerning the defense of South Korea and Japan, both nations, while uneasy, were confident in American security guarantees. In the subsequent two decades, the North Korean threat has grown considerably as has the China threat.

On December 18, 2023, the Associated Press reported that “North Korea on Monday conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test in five months, likely launching a developmental, more agile weapon, as it vows strong responses against US and South Korean moves to boost their nuclear deterrence plans.” The DPRK tested the Hwasong-18 ICBM. Theodore Postol argues that the Hwasong-18 is “identical” to the Russian Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 2). Jacob Gleason describes the Topol-M as having a range of 10,500–12,000 kilometers. The ranges of the Topol-M and DPRK’s Hwasong-18 are similar. According to Ridzwan Rahmat, the “Hwasong-18 is deployed onboard a nine-axled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).”

Rahmat suggests that the Hwasong-18 is possibly equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which enhances its strategic military posture by enabling a singular missile launch to engage multiple targets concurrently. Drawing on the framework posited by Postol, which draws a parallel between the SS-27 and the Hwasong-18, it is plausible, to infer that the Hwasong-18 missile may have the capacity to carry up to four nuclear warheads.

In the context of North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, it is imperative to formulate a strategic response that effectively deters Kim Jong Un from engaging in provocations that might threaten the United States, South Korea, or Japan. Within this intricate security landscape, the United States is responsible for reinforcing and validating the trust of regional allies, specifically the ROK and Japan.

Regarding the American commitment to South Korea, the Department of Defense provides insights that emphasize the necessity of a robust and unwavering alliance framework to ensure regional stability and counter the threats posed by the DPRK’s military advancements. This necessitates a nuanced approach that balances deterrence with diplomatic engagement, thereby maintaining regional peace and security while upholding the integrity of international alliances.

As the Department of Defense recently reminded Americans, “In 1953 the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) signed the Mutual Defense Treaty pledging to promote peace, defend against external threats, and strengthen collective defense in the Pacific region. Seventy years later, the U.S.-ROK Alliance now stands as one of the world’s premier alliances.” This is a clear statement of commitment to the alliance with South Korea. To comply with the “defend against external threats” directive, the United States needs to change its nuclear policy toward North Korea.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, Article III states, “The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.” These agreements codify an American commitment to the ROK and Japan.

If either South Korea or Japan lost faith in American commitment to their security, both countries have the technical capacity to pursue their own nuclear arsenals to deter the DPRK. To prevent such an eventuality, the United States, under the auspices of the Washington Declaration, is actively expanding its assurance efforts. The success of American efforts is evinced in the South Korea announcement: “The United States and South Korea plan to draw up joint guidelines on nuclear defense strategy by the middle of next year and establish an integrated system to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Yonhap news agency said on Saturday.”

For American assurance efforts to work long term, the United States must explore multiple options to mitigate the potential security threats posed by North Korea. First, the US must continue support for joint exercises, like Ulchi Freedom Shield, but also consider including greater employment of nuclear weapons. The message conveyed through exercises is simple—the US and ROK alliance is prepared, through practice, for conflict.

Second, the United States should rotationally deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This will signal North Korea that the United States is deeply committed to South Korean security. However, this strategy requires cautious execution to avoid provoking China, which could lead to unintended consequences.

Third, the United States could also undertake a continuous deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. They were in South Korea for decades and widely accepted by South Koreans. Nuclear weapons would be more welcome today given North Korean nuclear pursuits.

China is certain to respond negatively to any of these options, as would North Korea. However, the consequence of doing nothing may produce a situation that allows the DPRK to push the escalation rhetoric and provocations to the point of conflict.

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and China’s nuclear breakout are increasingly concerning for South Korea and Japan as both nations see these efforts as a clear threat to their own security. American commitment to the ROK and Japan remains on shaky ground, despite the positive steps taken since the Washington Declaration. Countering those threats with a very clear commitment of American nuclear weapons may prove just the right demonstration of commitment to friend and foe alike.

James M. Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The North Korean Missile Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

European nations’ responses to the Russia challenge remain fragmented. They also show little concern about threats from China and North Korea. This led to a lack of strategic alignment between the US and Europe on the problem of facing the combined threat of China, North Korea, and Russia.

France and Germany prevented the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from qualifying China as a threat. France also torpedoed a NATO attempt to open a representative office in Japan. Neither does Europe plan to get involved in a Taiwan conflict. Max Hoell, during his talk, said, “European strategic autonomy thus appears to translate into a quasi-equidistance between Washington and Beijing.” This perspective appears correct.

The European political discourse is replete with concerns that a second Donald Trump presidency will usher in a post-NATO world. Such concerns miss the point. Regardless of who is in the White House in Washington, DC, the views of American presidents evolve as resources become finite. Europe needs to step up to the plate and not only pay their fair share for Europe’s defense, but also understand the need for a division of labor to defend a world threatened by revisionist powers. British and French deterrence face a credibility challenge. If faced with a conflict against China or Russia, Europe’s nuclear arsenals may not deter absent American support.

Realpolitik is to advocate a stronger transatlantic cooperation in extended deterrence. To rely solely on national European deterrence introduces reliability issues, such as the security of one country depending on the presidential power of another. Certain political parties, if victorious in French or German elections, would opt to appease China and Russia—possibly ending NATO and a European nuclear deterrent. Ideally, Europe should increase its contributions to deterrence efforts, including strategic alignment with NATO, increasing defense spending, and expanding European nuclear capabilities within the framework of transatlantic cooperation.

There is a need, though, for political leadership to engage domestic audiences in understanding the importance of nuclear deterrence to garner support for necessary security policies. Educating the public on nuclear realities and strategic imperatives is vital. European nations should continue evaluating their security strategies in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics and disruptive technological advancements. Only modernization can ensure adaptability and effectiveness in deterrence efforts.

Practically speaking, what are the options for a European nuclear deterrent involving France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) that operate in concert with the United States? A joint European nuclear force, unified under joint command and control involving France, Germany, and the UK, could provide a deterrent against threats to European security, but at a level well below that of Russia. Another option, an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella under a bilateral arrangement between the UK and France to cover other European nations, could provide security guarantees and potentially share nuclear assets.

Independently maintaining and enhancing European nuclear capabilities and further developing their own nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy may be a necessary step. But that would further fragment the approach to European security. Alternatively, Europe could create a European federation where a unified nuclear force is established. Spearheaded by France, Germany, and the UK, it could support a “European Federation Nuclear Force.” This option, which is no less than the Holy Grail of European unity and strategic autonomy, would require significant political integration and coordination among European states. Nationalist tendencies would prove problematic. This not only sounds far-fetched, based on decades of previous attempts, but the contemporary climate of election interference and electoral tactics make it not only a remote prospect, but also a repellant to a majority of voters.

A fiscally sustainable endgame could be an expanded NATO nuclear-sharing agreement, with additional European countries sharing the burden of nuclear responsibilities within the alliance, together with France and the UK. The feasibility and desirability of these options would depend on various factors, including intra-European political will and transatlantic cooperation, while getting the China and Russia strategic picture right. A combination of realist threat perception and American-led deterrence realpolitik can generate the kind of tremendous pressure under which Europe will prove itself to be adaptive and step up to demonstrate its ability to lead and deter.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, North Korea unexpectedly launches a limited preemptive strike against the American homeland. The United States responds with a decapitating strike against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Through unlikely errors, Russia believes that the United States is attacking them instead of North Korea. In response, Russia launches a large-scale strike. This leads the United States to launch everything. Bing, bang, boom, and we have Armageddon followed by nuclear winter and the death of billions. In interviews with Vanity Fair and Mother Jones, Jacobsen argues that the US has a plan to conduct nuclear warfighting, based on a series of previously adopted requirements that leave the president little leeway to modify his response. This problem is only made worse by the fact that the president has sole authority to employ nuclear weapons. To this point, Jacobsen argues that military “war mongers” have a very “aggressive culture” that has a predilection to “jam” the president toward “quickly launching a massive retaliatory strike.”

Jacobsen asserts that American intercontinental ballistic missiles are on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” Why? She interviewed William Perry who used the term. Bam, nuclear weapons are on hair trigger alert and missileers have itchy trigger fingers.

While admitting that nuclear deterrence has worked for seven decades, Jacobsen warns that deterrence will fail and when it does, any use of a nuclear weapon will result in large-scale nuclear war. Why? Jacobson interviewed Paul Bracken, who participated in government sponsored wargames—four decades ago—that ended in general nuclear war. Ipso-facto, the use of one nuclear weapon leads to Armageddon.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, American missile defenses are a complete failure. Why? She interviewed Ted Postol who said they do not work—case closed. Her conclusion is that missile defense is a farce and a waste of money. And the United States is lying to itself if it thinks they will ever stop an inbound nuclear weapon.

Elsewhere in the scenario, the president is forced to launch a large-scale nuclear response against the Russians within six minutes. Why? Jacobsen was also told by Perry that the president “will not wait” and thus assumed that Ronald Reagan’s memoir, in which he made an off-hand remark about having six minutes to decide on nuclear weapons use, reflects policy. Abracadabra, the president must decide to use nuclear weapons within six minutes.

Jacobsen’s predilection for incorrectly contextualizing the statements of those she interviewed is both stunning and worrying. The conclusions she draws about the present from the statements of former, often Reagan era or earlier, officials boggles the mind. Jacobsen does not seem to grasp the fact that she or her interviewees may be wrong about the relevance of their past experience to the present. Three examples are indicative.

Problems

First, Jacobsen is wrong about the alert status of the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. They are not on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” The United States does not have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy/doctrine. Nothing of the sort exists. Adam Lowther and Derek Williams dismantle this argument and explain that the United States maintains a launch-under-attack option, which allows the president to employ intercontinental ballistic missiles pre-, mid-, or post-strike. The option requires nothing of the president.

A number of variables will influence this decision. What is important to remember is that there is tremendous work that goes into thinking through scenarios well before they ever arise. Thus, the idea that these weapons are on hair trigger alert is ridiculous. Years of planning and analysis take place left of launch.

Second, Jacobsen is clearly unfamiliar with the design and purpose of wargames. They are specifically designed to understand the implications of a concept or capability. This means a scenario is artificially designed to ensure participants achieve the game’s objectives. Thus, when Jacobsen assumes that because a wargame or series of wargames end in general nuclear war, that a real conflict must necessarily end in general nuclear war, she is fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose and arbitrary nature of wargames. Within the wargaming community, it is well understood that they are not predictive of the future but are instructive of potential options.

Third, missile defenses are not worthless, as Jacobsen claims. They are making steady improvements in their ability to destroy targets. Ted Postol, her primary source of information about missile defenses, was wrong about the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome system. Hard data is proving that missile defenses, in this case Iron Dome, are far more effective than Postel believed.

Although there are additional areas where Jacobsen incorporates inaccurate information into her scenario, the point is clear. Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario would be far more accurately titled, Nuclear War: A Novel or Nuclear War: Disarmament Propaganda. The biggest challenge with the book is that Americans with little understanding of nuclear operations will believe the bias with which Jacobsen writes. This makes it imperative that those within the nuclear community speak out and correct the record. Nuclear deterrence is too important to turn over to a journalist with an agenda.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Annie Jacobsen Gets It Wrong about Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2024, the world’s population surpassed 8 billion citizens. This is more than a 300 percent increase since 1950, which is an important year for global warming. It was this year when carbon-dioxide (CO₂) emissions began to increase dramatically—driving up the global temperature.

Today, the average American emits about 15 tons of greenhouse gases annually, while the average African emits less than 1 ton per year. The global mean is about 4.3 tons per person per year, a 4.8 percent increase over the previous year.

As the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists points out, the planet is now feeling the devastating effects of the 1.1-degree Fahrenheit increase in global temperature since 1880. According to the Bulletin, recent global warming is responsible for the increased risk of wildfires, the rise of rare diseases, the decline in global crop yields, and may even cause a “mosquito-pocalypse.”

Nuclear weapons deserve a large share of blame for these events. Let me explain.

Nuclear Weapons and Climate Change

As the graph below illustrates, 1–2 percent of the global population, mostly civilians, perished annually because of war between 1600 and 1945. Since 1950, with the development and fielding of great-power nuclear arsenals, that number has declined to less than 0.1 percent.

It is no mere coincidence that the global population has increased 300 percent in only seven decades. The fielding of large nuclear arsenals by the United States and Russia ensured that the great powers and their allies would not engage in World War III, or any other great-power war, that historically ensured the planet did not become overpopulated. Built on a foundation of White privilege, nuclear deterrence created a fear of utter destruction, which completely eliminated great-power war and led to a marked decline in the frequency and severity of all conflict—causing the human population to explode. Thus, the check on population growth was removed.

These weapons not only limit war, but they also decrease defense expenditures and the resources required for reconstruction after war. For example, the United States spent almost half of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) waging a world war from 1942–1945. More recently, the United States spent at least $3 trillion fighting limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, because of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, American defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, averaged a mere 5 percent during the Cold War and is now at a low of 3.5 percent.

The consequence of this reallocation of wealth from conventional warfare was unprecedented economic growth, which not only allowed populations to increase but also allowed societies to improve the health, prosperity, and consumption of their citizens—dramatically reducing poverty and increasing the average life expectancy (62 percent). This prosperity also led to the most rapid increase in technological development in human history.

The population growth and human prosperity brought about by seven decades of effective nuclear deterrence may appear to be a net positive, but a closer look reveals that human prosperity comes at the cost of devastating increases in the rate of global warming. There are simply more humans generating more greenhouse gases than ever, and the problem is only getting worse. There is a solution.

Solving the Climate Change Problem

It is time for the United States to take the lead in nuclear disarmament. If the United States, Great Britain, and France disarm, Russia, China, and North Korea will surely follow suit. The global community can then pressure India and Pakistan to disarm as well.

This does not mean we must put an end to war. Nuclear disarmament properly allows the world to return to waging large-scale conventional wars, which regulate population growth and economic prosperity. Such wars will help bring man-made global warming to an end. For example, a war between the United States, Russia, and China—post nuclear disarmament—would optimistically eliminate 80–160 million people. The planet would receive a respite in CO₂ production not enjoyed since the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns of 2020–2021.

The return to large-scale warfare will also ensure worldwide economic degrowth, which will further reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. It is only through a less prosperous world that we can ensure global warming ends. Another equitable feature of this strategy is that population will be reduced among the richest, most consumptive nations, possibly leaving room for some modest increases in the developing world.

Some may balk at this solution because they believe a return to great-power wars is not necessary because green energy will solve the problem. Unfortunately,  green energy’s high cost, unreliable energy production, and visible failures in Texas, Germany, and elsewhere are likely to turn people against a degrowth strategy relying on a green energy transition. Despite our best efforts, renewable energy simply cannot meet the insatiable demand of a wealthier and healthier global population. A return to widespread warfare is the only feasible solution.

It is time we follow the advice of Jonathan Swift, who, in his pamphlet, “A Modest Proposal: For preventing the children of poor people in Ireland, from being a burden on their parents or country, and for making them beneficial to the publick,” courageously sought to solve the Irish poverty problem by encouraging the Irish to sell their children as food for the hungry. Making the world safe for war is an equally innovative approach to ending global warming and deserves the same consideration Swift’s proposal received. We must act before it is too late.

Postscript

For those wondering if this is a serious article, the answer should be obvious, no. The article employs a rhetorical technique, reductio ad absurdum or, as Jonathan Swift called it, satire, to make a point. In short, a world without nuclear weapons is prone to frequent great-power wars that create greater human misery. No amount of hope can change what history and human nature have, for at least five thousand years, shown to be true.

Adam Lowther, PhD, is Vice President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Climate Change Consequences of Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

Several months ago, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an article by Zak Kallenborn in which he defended nuclear weapons and their utility. Rebuttal articles published made two fundamental arguments. First, realism predicts the unavoidability of war, which requires the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is unreliable because previous close calls predict future failure.

The authors believe that reducing nuclear weapons to [near] zero limits the danger in inevitable future wars because future cheating or proliferation would only take place in small numbers, thereby limiting the damage of nuclear use. History and game theory prove this argument dangerously flawed.

For two millennia, major power wars occurred several times per century. Oxford’s Max Roser charts this bloody cost over the past 600 years. In that time 5–10 people per 100,000 population died in these wars, most of them civilians. In the past century deaths topped 100–200 deaths per 100,000 population.

Then after World War II something happened. Over the past seven decades this death rate has plummeted 99 percent to near zero (0.1/100,000 population). This is in spite of small spikes, which are attributable primarily to ethnic genocide in the (non-nuclear) global South. The world did not magically become more pacific. It built nuclear weapons.

The same abolitionists who criticize Kallenborn are horrified by the scale of the slaughter in Gaza and Ukraine. Over 315,000 Russian and 31,000 Ukraine troops are dead in Ukraine and 12,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza. Nuclear abolitionists fail to grasp, this is a mere drop in the bucket compared to great power war.

For example, during World War I, there were 480,000 casualties in 7 days at the Battle of the Marne. There were 848,614 casualties at Passendaele and another 946,000 at Verdun. During World War II, more than 61,000 British civilians died in the Battle of Britain. Over 83,000 British and American airmen died over Germany

European deaths during World War II are estimated at 28.7 million people. Great-power war gave rise to Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler, who exterminated over 30 million people between them. Stalin’s genocide of  3.5 to 7 million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 is the historical context for Ukrainian resistance today.

When it comes to killing civilians, the Japanese beat Stalin and Hitler combined. They killed over 300,000 Chinese during the “Rape of Nanjing.” China suffered over 35 million casualties during the Japanese occupation. When atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese army was still killing an estimated 250,000 Chinese every month.

During World War II, conventional bombing raids killed more civilians in a single night than both atomic bombs. In the Dresden firestorm, caused by allied conventional bombing, 135,000 Germans were incinerated. The ability of today’s conventional weapons is even greater.

The only answer to the horror of war is to keep the peace through effective deterrence.  To do this, those who would wage war must know the reward does not justify the risk. Deterrence does this at every level of conflict.

Arms control treaty regimes, the source of stability for nuclear disarmament advocates, are largely a failure. Despite the existence of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa all sought or obtained the bomb. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also failed to stop nuclear testing, with the violations of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States have either not signed or ratified the treaty.

Russia breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during the Obama administration and then suspended participation in New START in 2023. As a result, for the first time in five decades, there is no nuclear arms limitation treaty between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union. Russia already maintained a policy of escalate to de-escalate during New START negotiations and, in fact, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military doctrines all contemplate nuclear warfighting across the spectrum of conflict.

Deterrence is working every day and is not reserved for discussions of nuclear war. As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia coalesce in an authoritarian coalition, deterrence remains the last best hope for averting war. It works along the entire continuum of conflict, reducing the likelihood of war. In short, nuclear weapons save lives.

Colonel Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Nuclear Weapons Abolition Will Kill Millions (Again) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Furthermore, the discourse surrounding most disarmament discussions involves the United States leading by example in fulfilling its disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with the expectation that other nuclear-armed states will emulate this action. However, this is an unrealistic expectation. Expecting other nuclear-armed states to follow the United States in disarmament is like expecting a group of competitive athletes to slow down to match the pace of the slowest runner.

The Perilous Vacuum

The fact is, the American nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of national security strategy. It is designed to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks against the United States and its allies. The credibility of this deterrent is based on the perception that the United States has the capability and the will to use its nuclear weapons, if necessary.

This perception is reinforced by the United States’ strong commitment to its allies and its willingness to defend them against aggression. The mere existence of a nuclear-armed United States serves as a powerful deterrent against potential adversaries, dissuading them from pursuing aggressive actions that could escalate into catastrophic conflicts.

However, the prospect of a world without American nuclear deterrence is a chilling one. The balance of power would shift dramatically, and the risk of conflict and devastation would soar.

If the US followed through on abolitionist desires and disarmed, adversaries would pounce on the opportunity to exercise their expansionist goals and flex their militaristic ambitions. First and foremost, the absence of an American nuclear deterrent would create a dangerous power vacuum, inviting aggression from ambitious states and opportunistic actors.

One example of this is seen in the case of North Korea. Despite facing international sanctions and condemnation, North Korea continues to pursue advancements in its nuclear weapons program. The regime in Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as essential for its survival and a means to deter the United States and South Korea.

If the United States no longer possessed a credible nuclear deterrent, North Korea might feel emboldened to take aggressive action such as direct military aggression against South Korea. This would lead to all-out war on the Korean Peninsula.

The presence of an American nuclear deterrent helps to prevent such a scenario by making it clear to North Korea that any aggressive actions will be met with a swift and overwhelming response. Without this deterrent, rogue states like North Korea could be more inclined to pursue their expansionist agendas, leading to increased tensions and the potential for conflict in regions of strategic importance.

The Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo

Furthermore, the absence of an American nuclear deterrent erodes the credibility of the nuclear taboo, the unwritten norm that nuclear weapons should not be employed. The fear of nuclear retaliation by the United States has long served as a potent force in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. Without this fear, the threshold for nuclear use is lower, increasing the likelihood of nuclear warfare and the unimaginable human suffering it would entail.

States such as Russia would no longer fight wars of attrition on its borders with lesser military powers, such as Ukraine, if a taboo against nuclear first use disappears. Russia could force capitulation through the use of nuclear coercion and/or employment. This is a worst-case scenario and likely a primary reason why the US is hard pressed to ignore Article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and preserve its nuclear deterrent into the foreseeable future—despite abolitionist ambitions.

Moreover, a world without American nuclear deterrence will likely see the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states. Absent an American deterrent, countries that feel threatened by their neighbors, no longer protected under by an American nuclear umbrella, may seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

This proliferation would further destabilize the international system, increasing the risk of nuclear conflict and the catastrophic consequences that would follow. That is unless Kenneth Waltz was right and that a world with more nuclear weapons is a safer world.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the prospect of a world without an American nuclear deterrent is a daunting one, where the balance of power shifts dramatically to authoritarians, and the risk of conflict and devastation escalate. Thus, it is essential for the United States to maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent.

To accomplish this, the US must craft convincing narratives regarding the capability, intent, and credibility of its nuclear arsenal. Despite abolitionist ambitions, the continued presence of an American nuclear deterrent remains vital in deterring aggression, preventing conflict, and preserving stability in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own

The Perilous Void: Imagining a World without U.S. Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

In nuclear deterrence, where the stakes are high and the consequences of failure are catastrophic, narratives play a crucial role in shaping strategy and influencing outcomes. Narratives surrounding nuclear weapons have profound effects on perceptions of credibility, intentions, and, ultimately, shaping the behavior of states. Understanding the role of narratives in nuclear deterrence is essential for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of nuclear politics.

Role of Narratives in Shaping Perceptions of Credibility

Narratives are important in nuclear deterrence strategy in shaping perceptions of credibility. The credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent is essential for its effectiveness in deterring potential adversaries. States that possess clear escalation dominance and nuclear superiority will hold an advantage in perceptions of resolve and strength. However, credibility is exclusively tied to a state’s willingness to use the bomb.

In the United States, the president is responsible for influencing the perceptions of his adversaries through crafting a compelling narrative that will properly induce fear into his enemy. Narratives that emphasize a state’s willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons can enhance its deterrence posture, dissuading others from taking aggressive actions. The only other way to enhance credibility beyond strategic narratives is to employ nuclear weapons in some capacity. Such acts are unpalatable for moral and ethical reasons, which leaves crafting convincing narratives as the preferred means of influencing an adversary.

Influencing Perceptions of Intentions

Narratives also influence perceptions of intentions. States often use narratives to signal their intentions and clarify their strategic objectives. For example, a state may adopt a narrative of minimum deterrence, emphasizing its nuclear arsenal’s defensive nature and its commitment to avoiding nuclear conflict. China is the prime example.

The inverse strategy to a narrative of minimum deterrence would be a narrative of maximum deterrence. In this approach, Russia, for example, emphasizes the offensive capabilities of its nuclear arsenal and its readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a wide range of scenarios. This narrative seeks to maximize the perceived threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Unlike the minimum deterrence narrative, which emphasizes restraint and a defensive posture, the maximum deterrence narrative emphasizes assertiveness and a willingness to escalate to achieve strategic objectives. Such narratives can help reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing clarity about a state’s nuclear policy.

Shaping Perceptions of Capabilities

Narratives also play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of capabilities. States often use narratives to convey information about their nuclear arsenal’s size, sophistication, and survivability. These narratives can influence how other states perceive the balance of power and make strategic calculations. For example, a state that portrays its nuclear arsenal as modern and reliable may be seen as more credible and capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Additionally, the concept of secure second strike is fundamental. This capability refers to a state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a devastating counterattack after absorbing a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory arsenals, which encompass a variety of delivery systems such as submarines, land-based missiles, and strategic bombers, are critical components.

Narratives surrounding second-strike retaliatory arsenals are designed to convey specific messages about a state’s nuclear capabilities. By highlighting the sophistication and survivability of their arsenals, states seek to deter potential adversaries by signaling that any attack would result in a devastating response.

Limitations of Narratives

Narratives in nuclear deterrence strategy are powerful tools, but they also have inherent limitations. One major limitation is the potential for misinterpretation or manipulation. Different states may interpret the same narrative in different ways, leading to misunderstandings and increased tensions. Moreover, narratives can be undermined by actions that contradict the message being conveyed. When China emphasizes its commitment to peaceful coexistence but then takes provocative actions, such as conducting aggressive military exercises near Taiwan, the credibility of its narrative is eroded. This is known as the credibility-action gap, where actions speak louder than words, undermining the narrative’s intended message.

When leaders openly talk about a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, expressing a moral revulsion to using them even in extreme circumstances, it can inadvertently weaken the state’s deterrent posture. Adversaries may perceive this as a lack of resolve, believing that the state would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons even if its survival was at stake.

Importance of Narrative Control

In the context of nuclear deterrence, narrative control is not just a strategic advantage but a fundamental necessity. It is through narrative control that states can shape perceptions, manage crisis situations, and ultimately enhance their deterrence posture. This is important for four reasons.

First, narrative control allows states to shape how their nuclear capabilities are perceived by others. By crafting a narrative that emphasizes their resolve, states can deter potential adversaries by conveying a clear and credible message. This perception can influence how other states make strategic calculations and may deter them from taking aggressive actions.

Second, during a crisis, narrative control can be crucial in de-escalating tensions and preventing misunderstandings. A carefully crafted narrative can provide clarity about a state’s intentions and actions, helping to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to escalation. By shaping the narrative surrounding a nuclear incident, states can help manage crisis situations and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

Third, narrative control is essential for enhancing the credibility of deterrent threats. A state that successfully controls the narrative can convey a clear and credible message about its willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. This can enhance the credibility of its deterrent threats, making them more effective in deterring aggression.

Fourth, narrative control can help reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. By shaping perceptions, managing crisis situations, and enhancing credibility, states can deter potential adversaries and maintain peace and stability in the nuclear age.

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the teams take the field, their profiles are worth noting. After all, they each bring a different style of play to the field of competition.

The United States

The United States is a titan of technological innovation and military prowess. With a defense apparatus that leverages cutting-edge technology, including cyber capabilities, stealth technology, and unmanned systems, the Americans exemplify agility both in thought and action.

Its strength lies not just in its superior hardware but in its ability to integrate information warfare, space dominance, and artificial intelligence to outpace and outthink its adversaries. These strengths are also seen as weaknesses by the opponent, which they plan to exploit.

The Challengers

On the other side, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea form an axis of strategic adversaries. Each brings unique strengths to the table. What holds this team together is shared desire to defeat the United States.

China, with its rapid military modernization and significant advancements in areas like hypersonic weapons and space technology, poses a multidimensional threat. With the second largest economy in the world and a population only rivaled by India, is should come as no surprise that China finds itself in the Super Bowl of Deterrence.

Russia, seasoned in electronic warfare, unconventional strategies, and disinformation brings a wealth of experience in disrupting adversary operations. Although Russia’s performance shows a weakened player, the United States can never forget Russia’s trump card, which it has yet to play.

Iran, with its asymmetric warfare tactics, proxies, and extensive international network, excels in creating unpredictable challenges. In short, Iran is an agent of chaos on the field.

North Korea, as the smallest player on the field, adds a wildcard element with its nuclear capabilities and cyber warfare tactics. America’s advantage against North Korea is that the North Korean objective is a simple one: preserve the regime.

The Game Plan

The Super Bowl of Deterrence is not won by brute force alone but by the ability to disrupt the adversary’s decision cycle and achieve strategic overmatch. In many respects it is like a game of chess, where the objective is to force the other player into a position where the only option is defeat.

The US strategy hinges on its agility and technological edge, aiming to outmaneuver its opponents by disrupting their communications, blinding their sensors, and sowing confusion within their ranks. This game is about anticipation, where the US seeks to predict and counter its adversaries’ moves before they can execute, effectively scoring preemptive strikes in this lethal contest of wits and will.

The autocrats have a simple game plan: prevent the United States from moving forces into the region by making them blind, deaf, and dumb through cyberattacks on command-and-control systems and the American military’s logistics network. Attacks on American space assets is also a key element of the autocrat strategy.

Role of Allies and Partnerships

In this complex game, American allies and global partners play a crucial role, akin to the role played by special teams. The US leverages its network of alliances and partnerships to extend its reach, gather intelligence, and coordinate actions that pressure and isolate the opposing side. These relationships enhance the United States’ strategic positioning, providing logistical support and enabling joint operations that amplify its power-projection capabilities.

The autocrats do not have a similar set of alliances and partnerships. With their team built on a mutual desire to defeat the United States, the same level of trust and cooperation the United States has with its allies does not exist. Thus, team cohesion is tenuous.

Conditions for Victory

Victory in the Super Bowl of Deterrence is measured not in points on a scoreboard but in the ability to maintain global stability and prevent conflict. The ultimate goal for the United States is to deter aggression and ensure that its adversaries think twice before acting. This requires a delicate balance of showing strength without escalating tensions unnecessarily. This includes employing a mix of diplomacy, economic power, and military forces to maintain the status quo and protect national interests.

For the autocrats, victory is the toppling of the American-led international order. The asymmetry of interest in the contest means that the two teams will play a very different game for very different purposes. The dynamics of this contest are inherently unpredictable. Just as in football, where a single play can change the outcome of the game, the Super Bowl of Deterrence is fraught with uncertainties. Technological advancements, shifts in global politics, and unexpected moves by any player can alter the strategic landscape, requiring constant vigilance and adaptation by all involved.

Conclusion

The Super Bowl of Deterrence stands as a testament to the importance of strategy, technological supremacy, and the human element in the quest for global security. In this game, the stakes are immeasurably high, and the consequences of failure are real. Through agility, innovation, and strategic partnerships, the United States is positioned well and viewed by its opponent as a formidable contender that is ready to defend its title and ensure peace in an ever-changing world.

This epic contest is a vivid reminder that in the arena of global security, the game is always on, and victory favors the prepared, agile, and resilient. Like football, good intentions mean nothing. Preparation and capability mean everything.

Greg Sharpe is the Director of Communications and Marketing at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The Super Bowl of Deterrence: The Ultimate Showdown in Strategic Overmatch was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts to conventionally deter Iran failed with Iran-inspired fighting spreading from Gaza to the Red Sea, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Recently, three American soldiers were killed and 34 wounded in a drone attack by Iran-backed militants in northeastern Jordan, according to US Central Command. The Pentagon has reported more than 160 attacks by Iranian-linked militia groups on American bases and forces in the Middle East since Israel was attacked on October 7, 2023. These actions place immense pressure upon President Joe Biden to strike the sovereign territory of Iran, which Iranian leaders may view as an act of war.

Moreover, recent political decisions render the threatened use of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program impotent. In February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded President Trump’s United Nations (UN) sanctions restoration. This was followed by President Biden’s decision to release $6 billion “in exchange for the release of five Americans detained in Iran” and another $10 billion in a sanctions waiver that grants Iran access to money from Iraq in exchange for electricity purchases.

Recently, Maj Gen Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, said the country is not seeking war with America, but is not afraid of it either. Iran’s aggressive behavior certainly lends credence to the statement. Iran is emboldened by its allies and empowered by its proxies. This, of course, is backstopped by an eerie sense of confidence that Iran may soon become a nuclear power. In May of 2022, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that “Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb,” with a uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent that had grown four times in just 90 days.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and founder of the US Institute for Science and International Security, said that if Iran continues producing enriched uranium at the same rate, the regime will have enough weapons grade material to make 12 nuclear bombs within five months. Meanwhile, Iran successfully launched three satellites into space using a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket. This achievement undoubtedly accelerates Iran’s ability to perfect and field a future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), likely the regime’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery system.

The United States is now experiencing coordinated aggression. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”

Furthermore, the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board recently warned in their Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity that the United States must be concerned that adversary states could engage in opportunistic acts if or when the United States is engaged in other conflicts.

The bipartisan America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also advised that the possibility of opportunistic or simultaneous multi-state aggression should no longer be construed as improbable. According to the report, “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Opportunistic aggression can translate to other hostile states like Iran and North Korea in league with Russia and China if they perceive American limitations in capability, capacity, or the will to fight with enough ferocity as to induce the fear to attack in the first place.

It appears that Iran is taking advantage of an already beleaguered United States that continues to support Israel in its war with Iranian-backed Hamas; exports arms, munitions, and intelligence to Ukraine; deters a hostile North Korea; and must endeavor to discourage Iran’s top oil importer (China) from invading Taiwan. All of these “fronts” are collectively testing American diplomacy, burdening the American taxpayer, challenging the American defense industrial base, negatively impacting military readiness, and now producing American casualties.

Killing Americans is a clear escalation and yet another indication that Iran remains undeterred by the current threat of American power. These acts are timed to take advantage of an overburdened America and are designed to frustrate American efforts within the region and ultimately convince the United States to abandon its Middle East interests and allies. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s untimely proclamation on September 29, 2023, that “[t]he Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades” was a complete misreading of the region.

Successful deterrence requires the consistent application of power. Deterrence messaging must not be muddled or muted. It must be clear, powerful, and credible. How is this done?

First, the Biden administration must immediately end sanctions relief of Iran. The United States can never fund its adversaries.

Second, the United States must take a systematic approach to eliminate the weapons, command and control, and supplies of Iranian proxies. They must not be allowed to threaten American and allied forces across the region.

Third, the United States must credibly communicate through strength by moving nuclear assets closer to the region. The United States seems content to use ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) to deter North Korea. An SSBN in the Arabian Sea would communicate a similar deterrence message.

Fourth, America must heed the warnings of opportunistic multi-state aggression and prepare a robust capability to address this very real and demonstrated threat. To do otherwise risks abandoning regional allies in conflict.

Fifth, America must not attack Iranian targets within sovereign Iranian territory unless President Biden and Congress are ready to declare war. What may be a regional conflict for the United States is a fight for survival for the Mullahs in Tehran.

Iran and its proxies are not deterred from attacking American forces, whether motivated by opportunistic aggression or existential circumstances. It is time to create a real sense of fear within the Iranian leadership. They must dread economic isolation, the destruction of proxies, and potential attack on what Iran holds most valuable—themselves and their nuclear facilities.

However, unless prepared to declare war, the United States must limit its retaliation to targets outside sovereign Iran. To attack Iranian soil would be a clear indication that deterrence has failed and could potentially lead to an all-out war. Restoring deterrence after such an event would come at a much higher cost.

Deterrence aims to make the adversary afraid to attack by creating a preferable condition of war avoidance. The goal is to convince the adversary that maintaining a peaceful status quo is the best option. Starting a war to prevent another war is a bad strategy, and it does not qualify as deterrence.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterrence Is Failing in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States’ current National Security Strategy states that an era of “strategic competition” exists, which the recent Joint Concept for Competing defines as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” It notes how America’s “adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power, below the level of armed conflict, to pursue objectives that threaten the strategic interests of the United States, its allies, and its strategic partners” and to “win without fighting.”

If NASA is a national security organization, then it may be a primary, even principal tool to protect America’s strategic interests and to achieve America’s strategic objectives and should act responsibly as a custodian of America’s security interests, rather than merely as a science and exploration agency. So, is NASA a national security organization?

Many will say no and argue that NASA has a science and exploration mission, and that “NASA doesn’t do security.” Some assert that NASA was specifically created by President Eisenhower, distinct from the military industrial complex to be a tool of diplomacy, with national security belonging elsewhere.

Of course, that might come as news to President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, who partially created NASA as a cover for his top-secret National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). It likely would also come as a surprise to President Kennedy and to the first generation of Cold Warriors at NASA, who heeded President John F. Kennedy’s call that “the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon, and to the planets beyond. And we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace.” They won the first great victory of the Cold War—America’s first strategic competition.

President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “control of space means control of the world.” In fact, declassified documents reveal that NASA’s Mercury, Saturn, and the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Programs were designated as the “highest national priority category” under the Defense Production Act.

It would surprise Congress, who authorized NASA, the most. NASA’s purposes are codified in Title 51–National and Commercial Space Programs of the United States Code. The law states,

Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that adequate provision be made for…space activities. Congress further declares that such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over…space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States).

It also unambiguously states, “the making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance,” and that “the administration and the Department of Defense, through the president, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions related to…space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” In fact, NASA has a long history of direct cooperation, during the Cold War, with the Air Force,  DARPA, SDIO, and NRO to advance the nation’s security interests through peaceful means and applications.

NASA’s primary job during the first strategic competition was to showcase the vibrancy of democratic capitalism over the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy. Landing a person on the Moon, a symbol for national strength, was a way to woo newly independent states to the West’s side of the Cold War.

When the Cold War ended, NASA still had a security mission, but without the broader context of strategic competition it was asked to enhance security through diplomacy. This also included employing Russian rocket scientists and engineers to prevent them from building intercontinental ballistic missiles for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to the NASA Administrator, America is in a new space race as part of a broader strategic competition with China and Russia. This time it is not using space technology as a symbolic proxy of national power, but rather developing space technology to secure long-term national economic power. Thus, NASA was given a mission to lead the “return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization.”

The national vision begins with a “campaign to utilize…the surface and resources of the Moon, and cis-lunar space to develop the critical technologies, operational capabilities, and commercial space economy.” The National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy explains that the United States will “leverage collaborations with private entities to enable capabilities for large-scale ISRU and advanced manufacturing at the Moon.”

Despite such clear policy direction from two administrations, it is not uncommon to hear NASA personnel eschew any mandate for economic development or industrial development in space, preferring to concentrate only on what advances their own exploration. The mandate is crystal clear in law.

In Title 51, NASA’s purpose includes, “the preservation of the United States preeminent position in…space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes” and the “preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in…space science and technology.” Title 51 also calls for the “establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of…space activities.”

NASA is a national security organization whose duties include ensuring the pre-eminence of the United States. Its job is not to build weapons or engage in conflict—but to pursue American strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Now that the US is once again in strategic competition, it is time for NASA to return to its roots as a primary competitor in seeding and cultivating economic, industrial, and logistical expansion. Thus, NASA’s Artemis planning must not be only in the narrow context of a Moon-to-Mars exploration program, but also must be made in the broader context of securing long-term economic security for the United States and its partners.

Peter Garretson is a Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), co-director of AFPC’s Space Policy Initiative, and author of Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space and The Next Space Race: A Blueprint for American Primacy. The view’s expressed are the authors own.

Is NASA a National Security Organization? was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the Cold War, the Navy contributed significantly more to the nuclear arsenal. The current limitation is traced back to the George H. W. Bush administration’s response to the successful outcome of the Cold War. President Bush recognized that with the end of the Cold War the United States needed to draw down its nuclear forces as the Soviet threat receded into history. Pushing for more arms control and assurance measures to allow for the new world order to take shape made strategic sense.

The Soviets were no longer a threat, the Chinese did not have sufficient capability to harm the United States, and there was no other rising nuclear power. Thus, the Bush administration eliminated all tactical nuclear forces from the Navy’s inventory. However, today’s geopolitical realities are very different.

The Current Challenge

The Trump administration recognized the deficiency in nuclear strategy and capability. Trump both sought to develop the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and fielded the W76-2 low-yield warhead for the Trident D5. Whether the W76-2 is a tactical weapon or a low-yield strategic weapon is debatable, but its purpose was to offer an alternative to the limited capability of Europe-based nuclear-armed dual-capable fighter aircraft.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the administration’s goal with the SLCM-N was to diversify nuclear delivery platforms that would not rely on allied support and hedge against any so-called breakout scenarios by adversaries, which is exactly what the Chinese began by the end of the Trump administration. Recognizing the risks from emerging threats and additional nuclear powers, President Trump’s SLCM-N proposal offered a credible means to deter multiple hostile nations while continuing to provide assurances to allies and partners.

Indeed, with China and Russia modernizing their strategic deterrent and seeking unique delivery means that undermine arms control agreements and North Korea making significant gains in its nuclear arsenal, it now makes strategic sense for the Biden administration to not only pursue SLCM-N, but also additional nuclear capabilities—to prevent conflict.

There are many in the arms control community that object to adding any new systems.  Some argue that new weapons would lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, particularly if they are considered theater or tactical nuclear weapons. They argue such a move turns deterrence into warfighting. The Congressional Research Service also claims that the Navy would sacrifice conventional capability and introduce unneeded friction into ally operations and cooperation.

Yet there are other issues that nuclear strategists should consider. Since the elder Bush eliminated tactical nuclear weapons from the Navy’s arsenal, the surface fleet and naval air forces do not possess the knowledge or means to deploy nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict where it becomes a necessity. Such a requirement generates significant need for training and certification of surface combatants and air assets. Nuclear weapons handling, storage, security, and employment are all part of the equation. Today, the Department of Defense and the Navy lack a feasible and suitable plan to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into the surface fleet and among assets, if required, which escalation over Taiwan could generate. With the Biden administration scrapping the SLCM-N in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, it appears that the status quo for the Navy will see no expansion of the sea leg.

However, it is time for the United States and the Navy to take a hard look at the capabilities required to both deter and, if necessary, defeat the Chinese in a Pacific conflict.  Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are all growing increasingly belligerent and seeking to change the American-led world order to one that better suits their authoritarian goals. This is nothing new.

Nuclear weapons are becoming the go-to means to deter the United States and America’s allies. To address the challenges discussed, reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons into the Navy makes strategic sense. This is not to “mirror” the adversary, but to give decision-makers more options for both deterrence and warfighting. A good start is to field SLCM-N in the Navy arsenal, but this is not the only system nuclear strategists should consider.

Additional Recommendations

Two additional recommendations are worth noting. First, as the B61-12 and B61-13 come available, returning a fighter-delivered gravity bomb to naval air wings is worth examination. Given their variable yield and short range, they have the ability to meet specific targeting needs in naval warfare. The very fact that that they are deployed to the fleet may also prove a sufficient deterrent to prevent conflict in the first place.

Second, the long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile may also be useful for deployment on surface ships. These weapons may also have a similar effect in convincing an adversary that the complexity of the deterrence calculation, and its failure, is not worth the risk.

As Paul Giarra writes, the Cold War Navy’s deployment of nuclear weapons across the fleet had a “sobering effect” on the Soviets. That effect deterred conflict. It is time to apply the lessons of the Navy’s past experience to the growing Chinese naval threat. It may aid in deterring conflict over Taiwan.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The US Navy’s Nuclear Posture: Fit for Purpose was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, international order is breaking down. Essays by Walter Russell Mead, Victor Davis Hanson, and Nadya Schadow, for example, detail this breakdown, and all reference China and Russia as top culprits. The October 2023 report from the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States likewise weighs in with an acute warning that China, Russia, North Korea (DPRK), (and soon Iran) are now in the business of using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool with which to secure their objectives—raising the danger of nuclear conflict to the highest level since the 1945 dawn of the nuclear age.

American nuclear deterrent strategy is part of the international order and prevented direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the Cold War, American extended deterrence over NATO and allies in the Pacific prevented, respectively, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and a repeat of the DPRK invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

During the Cold War’s nearly five-decade-long struggle, the US faced one nuclear-armed peer adversary. In  2022 as the head of US Strategic Command warned, the US will soon face not one but two nuclear-armed peer competitors and do so for the first time in its history.

The unique dangers of this environment are reflected by the manner with which Russia and China see deterrence. Their goals are not designed to prevent war, but to embolden both nations to successfully engage in aggression—such as against Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan. Their nuclear capability acts as an umbrella under which they succeed in preventing the United States from defending the rules-based order. If the US stands down, military aggression succeeds and is not deterred.

Today’s emerging strategic environment contains a change that is not fully appreciated. American conventional military superiority, for example, is believed to help guarantee American and allied security. The US kicked Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, and decimated ISIS a decade later—all through conventional military superiority. American strategy, then and now, relies on superior technology and precision weapons, all backed by the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

However, when President Yeltsin decreed in April 1999 that the Russian military would develop highly accurate and very low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, he set Russia on a path that now enables President Vladimir Putin to dominate warfare in Europe. China is in the process of adopting a strategy that threatens to introduce limited nuclear strikes into the conventional battlefield mix—“escalate to win”—leading the former commander of US Strategic Command to conclude that American conventional battlefield superiority “cannot hold.”

Without a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to restrain adversaries from using nuclear weapons, American plans to prevail on the conventional battlefield will no longer hold. And equally invalid is the Global Zero assumption that the US can prevail on the battlefield if the United States relies on conventional forces in a conflict that goes nuclear.

What then can the US make of the push by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to rewrite the rules of international behavior? That is, what should Americans make of what Russia describes as the unfair unipolar agenda and Iran describes as the great “global arrogance”? Americans should certainly worry that the nation is unprepared for the years ahead.

China’s growing nuclear arsenal emboldens President Xi Jinping to run roughshod over the South China Sea and its Philippine neighbors—flying military aircraft and steaming naval vessels recklessly in international waters. China may also be assisting Venezuela’s effort to grab oil-rich areas of Guyana. This is all taking place at a time when China is seeking bases on the Persian Gulf and near Gibraltar.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and regular threats to use nuclear weapons need little description. This is at a time when Russia maintains at least a 10 to 1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States.

Nearly nuclear-armed Iran, partially under the protection of Moscow and Beijing, wages war through Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis. The Iranians and their allies are killing thousands, grabbing commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, assassinating regime opponents, and ransoming hostages. The American response is, at best, muted.

North Korea recklessly and with impunity fires hundreds of missiles over Japanese and ROK territory and manages a vast international criminal complex of drug running, human trafficking, and weapons transfers, all while imprisoning millions of its own people in the world’s worse gulag. This is all made possible by China. It is through Chinese banks that North Korea avoids sanctions and finances its ongoing mayhem, including its nuclear program.

In short, the United States faces a daunting challenge that it must manage if the American-led international order has any hope of surviving the growing challenges the mayhem brothers present. The time to act is now.

The Mayhem Brothers: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The article’s opening line sets the articles tone, “The world is entering a dangerous nuclear arms race unlike anything since the first atomic bomb, but it does not have to end in catastrophe.” The problem with this assertion is twofold.

First, the one example of nuclear arms racing we saw, which took place between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was likely responsible for the fact that the two great power never fought World War III. Rather than sparking conflict, the arms race deterred it.

Second, what is happening today is in no way comparable to the Cold War arms race, which saw global nuclear arms climb to a total of 63,632 fielded weapons in 1985. According to the Washington Post, the Russians field 1,588 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 1,912 tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese number is less well known but the Department of Defense’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023) estimates the People’s Liberation Army fields about 500 nuclear weapons and will field about 1,500 by 2035. The same Washington Post article suggests the United States fields 1,644 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—with no plans for growing the size of the American arsenal.

This about a 90 percent reduction in the number of fielded nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States removed more than 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe between 1991 and 1993.

This means that the number of deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the three major powers sits at about 5,050 weapons. If you include the arsenals of India, Pakistan, North Korea, France, and the United Kingdom, the number rises to about 6,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons.

It is hard to compare what is taking place today with what occurred during the Cold War. For an arms race to take place, there must be participants. The Biden administration has made it very clear; the United States will not increase the size of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. Russia has the capacity to expand its arsenal rapidly. China is doing just that. The United States is sitting in the stands and watching its adversaries.

The editorial board then laments the lack of arms control agreements to prevent adversaries, the Chinese in particular, from growing the size of arsenal. If the editorial board shares the view of many within the arms control community, then they too incorrectly assume that all arms control agreements are inherently good and stabilizing. In reality, arms control agreements are only good when they advance the United States’ national interest, which is not synonymous with their very existence.

When you take into account Russian violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Opens Skies, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and likely violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the at all costs desire for arms control with Russia is too often a bad deal for the United States that sees the nation constrain its military capability while the Russian buy time to overcome military weakness.

In short, arms control for arms control sake is neither an inherent American interest, nor is it inherently stabilizing.

The editorial board also places great hope in recent meetings between the United States and China in which arms control was discussed. What the editorial board’s article fails to reveal is that the November talks were an utter failure in which the Chinese made it clear that no arms control agreement is possible.

Finally, there is a mistaken and unsubstantiated belief that more nuclear weapons is inherently destabilizing. This idea is not born out by the historical record. A careful reading of Cold War history makes it clear that the large Soviet and American nuclear arsenals of the era caused leaders in both the United States and Soviet Union to exercise great caution, avoid provocative actions, and demonstrate restraint in the face of uncertainty.

It is not strength that is provocative but weakness. If the United States seeks to ensure nuclear weapons are never used, it should meet the threat head on and follow the recommendations of the bi-partisan Strategic Posture Commission Report. Authoritarians respect strength. It is time the United States shifts from blind optimism to just that.

Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Curtis McGiffin in the Vice President for Education and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.

The report is urgent, reasonable, and sound, assessing emerging threats in the international security environment, the United States’ posture against those threats, and offering sound recommendations to address urgent deficiencies. The report consolidates the strategic threats facing the US and defines the context of the nation’s new strategic posture. These threats are addressed by others, but the report captures them collectively, presenting a menacing glimpse into the future. It is vital that the country gets behind these recommendations without delay.

Sound Recommendations

The nation’s current strategic posture is predicated on a benign threat environment, favorable political relationships, arms control, and a post–Cold War system of international cooperation. The report draws attention to vast and worsening threats, with implications for US and global security.

Today, the risk to strategic stability is simultaneous regional conflicts escalating to threaten the homeland, allies, and partners. The US must adapt the Defense Planning Guidance to address this new environment. This logic undergirds the rationale for sweeping changes to the nation’s strategic posture, to include enhancing our conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to meet this new era’s deterrence, assurance, warfighting, and war termination requirements.

In isolation, the strategic threats are deeply troubling; combined they are alarming. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine includes repeated coercive nuclear threats. Russia may feel confident making such threats and unilaterally suspending adherence to the New START, given its 10-to-1 advantage in “non-strategic nuclear forces” and its modernized strategic nuclear forces. China undertook a rapid and comprehensive nuclear breakout, described as “breathtaking” by the former commander of USSTRATCOM. This breakout is propelling China to peer status with the US and Russia and posturing it to pursue a coercive strategy. Meanwhile, North Korea continues its nuclear expansion, threatening the US homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran persists in fomenting regional instability as it stubbornly progresses toward becoming a nuclear weapons state.

The commission correctly warns that the US must presume that the Russia-China strategic partnership could include cooperation in waging war against the US and its allies in ways that maximize their advantages. This means, the US must deter both, and be prepared to combat both simultaneously, with the potential for simultaneous nuclear escalation.

The Report is Reasonable

When considering US strategic posture force requirements, the commission cites the traditional role of nuclear weapons, including deterrence, assurance, achieving objectives if deterrence fails, and hedging the force. The report also ascribes common, basic tenets of American nuclear strategy to include assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and allied assurance, the policy of calculated ambiguity, and hedging for future uncertainty.

When these roles and tenets are overlaid with simultaneous two-war planning, a wide-ranging set of recommendations necessarily results. These include tailored responses to threats, such as defense against decapitation strikes; the need to address the imbalance in strategic nuclear forces between the US and its adversaries; regional risks associated with theater nuclear force disparities; and comprehensive infrastructure reform of the nuclear weapons complex and defense industrial base.

For American strategic nuclear forces, this could include replacing delivery platforms, modernizing warheads and command and control, recapitalizing the entire nuclear enterprise infrastructure, preparing to upload some or all of our hedge warheads, deploying the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (with some road-mobile), building more B-21 bombers and supporting tankers (with some bombers on alert), and building more ballistic missile submarines, Trident missiles, and ship-building facilities.

To address widening disparities in theater nuclear forces, modernized nuclear forces need to be developed and deployed to provide forward-basing, survivability, yield variation, penetrability, and promptness in both INDOPACOM and EUCOM. Certainly, this alludes to the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and similar platforms. But the report does not stop there.

The United States’ nuclear weapons complex is vast but outdated, limited in responsiveness, and ill-equipped to meet existing and emerging threats. Therefore, the complex needs modernization and expansion to meet requirements, as well as to hedge against technical failures, delays, delivery system losses, or a further worsening of the threat environment. This includes recapitalization of nuclear weapon pit production and nuclear enterprise technical expertise.

Other significant recommendations include fielding missile defense systems designed to deter and defeat limited attacks by Russia, China, and North Korea. This is a significant expansion of the scope and mission of missile defenses. The report also recommends developing offensive and defensive space assets, fielding increased numbers of long-range (hypersonic) conventional strike weapons; improving our strategic supply chain; improving private-sector contracting processes; pursuing a global ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems; and establishing nuclear deterrence as the top priority in the Departments of Defense and Energy.

 Getting Behind It

The US believed conventional dominance would deter conflict. Theater nuclear forces were removed from the Pacific and modernization of strategic nuclear forces was consistently delayed. Americans forgot that to first deter war and then wage war, if necessary, “quantity is a quality all its own.” The nation allowed the industrial base to both atrophy and be outsourced.

In a world marked by diverse threats and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict against multiple nuclear adversaries, there are no reasonable alternatives to the report’s recommendations. Arms control is not the answer to risk-tolerant adversaries and others seeking an organic deterrent capability. Allies and partners could and should share the burden of deterrence in the long run but that will take unavailable time.

The costs and risks of simultaneous armed conflict with nuclear-armed peers is unquestionably higher than the costs associated with a strong strategic posture aimed at preventing conflict and associated escalation of nuclear risks. America’s Strategic Posture is a sound, reasonable, and urgent document and stands alone as the most credible solution to the nation’s current challenges. It is time to once again “awaken a sleeping giant” and set America on the right path.

Dr. Jonathan Trexel is a graduate faculty member with Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It was originally published on Global Security Review.

The concept of a successful deterrence strategy in any domain boils down to three key requirements: a credible threat (capability to support such a threat), the will to carry out the threat, and effective communications. Part of the problem for Japan is that it failed to develop a credible capability. Furthermore, the three non-nuclear principles (not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Japanese territory) leave Japan fully dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.

For Japan’s effective deterrence in all domains, mere rhetoric about threats is insufficient. As an island nation entirely dependent on maritime access, Japan needs a military capability and clear communication of its determination to achieve domain superiority and escalation dominance over adversaries.

Credibility is based on a nation’s past behavior and its demonstrated willingness to respond to aggression. Clearly, Japan has baggage in its history of aggression and colonization in the Indo-Pacific. Both North Korea and China consistently frame a pacified post-war Japan as the aggressor every time Japan makes a move to survive and claim its right to defend itself in a hostile neighborhood. Japan, however, is now rearming itself.

Space, as a domain, is no exception to deterrence principles. The 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test by China triggered Japan’s review of its passive approach to space infrastructure defense. Japanese spacecraft are at risk of attack through such means as jamming, close approaches by anti-satellite vehicles, and kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that are designed to disrupt or destroy satellites. China has further demonstrated its ability to capture uncooperative spacecraft in geosynchronous Earth orbit, posing a significant concern to Japanese assets in space—and to any critical space infrastructure.

Japan’s transition to a militarily sovereign posture is a protracted process. Japan began by cutting the Gordian knot of post–World War II pacifism in 2014 when it “reinterpreted” Article 9 of its constitution, rather than revising or adjusting it. That sea change operationalized Article 14 of Japan’s 2008 Basic Space Law, Ensuring International Peace and Security as well as the National Security Strategy of Japan, which stipulates, “The State shall take necessary measures to promote space development and use to ensure international peace and security as well as to contribute to the national security of Japan.”

Over the next decade, Japan’s posture evolved from a non-military use of outer space to a deterrence-oriented military capability in space. In 2018, Japan’s defense policy introduced the concept of multi-domain operations, emphasizing national security space capabilities as a central aspect of Japanese strategy. And in 2022, Japan expanded its Space Operations Squadron into a Space Operations Group, responsible for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) space domain awareness operations.

For too long Japan’s space sector development was constrained to civilian aims only. Faced with existential threats, Japanese policymakers realized how vital it was to foster civilian and military cooperation in space for economic gain and furthering national security. Japan’s strategy is to develop an Earth-orbital-cislunar ecosystem.

In the same vein as Japan relies on free sea lanes for communications across the Indo-Pacific, at sea and in space, Japanese-American security cooperation is paramount. The threat of attacks on commercial satellite constellations and spacecraft in orbit and cislunar space is all too certain a reality, in view of already occurring daily threats and attacks on space and cyber assets.

As space continues to be a domain of strategic importance and increasing economic value for Japan, its Space Operations Group must strengthen its space situational awareness capabilities to track and identify hostile objects in space. However, while space situational awareness is essential, Japan must ultimately develop a war-winning space force to effectively deter attacks and win conflicts in space.

The JASDF should be given the policy direction and resources to develop agile, responsive, and lethal capabilities to ensure the protection of Japanese and allied commercial and military assets in space. For that matter, so should the US Space Force.

Challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and globally resemble a gathering storm. Yet, Europe, in part due to its quasi-irreversible techno-economic entanglement with China, remains unclear on what it will do in case of a Taiwan or Japan contingency. An informal yet functional partnership between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) is already established. Yet, France, furthering its relationship with China, recently opposed the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.

On November 11, 1983, Ronald Reagan addressed the Diet in Tokyo, “I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region but throughout the world. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen? My answer is without hesitation: Yes we do, and yes we will.” Forty years later, the Gipper’s words have not aged a bit.

In space, as on Earth, the mutual commitment of Japan and the US, as staunch allies, should ensure the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open, all the way to orbit, cislunar space, and beyond.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since its publication last fall, few foreign policy analysts would argue the world is more secure than it was then. In fact, they would likely argue just the opposite. Blaming the current state of affairs on the NPR would be unfair, but to some, there are key attributes of the NPR that led to more instability than security. To better understand these concerns, let us revisit some key points in the document.

What It Says

The NPR opens by suggesting that “nuclear deterrence is foundational to broader US defense strategy and the extended deterrence commitments that we have made to allies and partners.” Readers are also informed that the government is committed to disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Due recognition is given to the fact that our principal adversaries (Russia, China, and North Korea) are expanding and diversifying their nuclear and non-nuclear arsenals, which is necessitating the United States replace its legacy nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review (2022) then gets to the heart of the Biden administration’s plan.

This plan includes: adopting a strategy and policy that sets a high bar for nuclear employment; adopting integrated deterrence; eliminating the “hedge against an uncertain future”; strengthening extended deterrence and allied assurance; pursuing arms control, strategic stability, and nonproliferation; reducing the risk of miscalculation; full-scope triad replacement and  modernization of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb; and cancellation of the nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N).

The Nuclear Posture Review then turns to the threat posed by Russia and China. According to the administration, by some point in the 2030s the United States will face two nuclear peer competitors or potential adversaries. The changing security environment poses four challenges to deterrence: (1) there is a heightened risk of nuclear weapons use; (2) China is fielding a peer nuclear arsenal; (3) opportunistic aggression is creating deterrence challenges; and (4) multi-domain challenges, which we do not fully understand, are proving challenging.

The Nuclear Posture Review then details the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy. It makes three points: nuclear weapons exist to deter strategic attacks directed against the homeland and allies and partners, nuclear weapons exist to assure allies and partners of American commitment, and nuclear forces exist to achieve American objectives if deterrence fails.

The document then shifts to tailored strategies or “Country-Specific Approaches.”  What appears here is a strategy statement that indicates America’s biggest concern is Russia and China. North Korea is recognized as a threat which, should Kim Jung Un use nuclear weapons “will result in the end of that regime.” It is clear that the United States remains committed to nuclear deterrence in Europe. The same is true for the Indo-Pacific, with the American focus shifting there.

Whether through naivete or simple hope, the United States will continue honoring New START treaty commitments while Russia does not. With New START expiring in 2026, the Biden administration desires to negotiate a new arms control treaty, in spite of the clear evidence, even then, that Russia had different desires.

It is only later in the NPR that a discussion of nuclear modernization takes place. On the positive side, the administration calls for making dual-capable aircraft (F-35) ready to carry the B61-12 gravity bomb; fielding the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the B21 bomber, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile; modernizing the NC3 system; and modernizing the weapons complex.

Finally, the Nuclear Posture Review examines the need to refurbish the nuclear stockpile. The Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are called to improve coordination for development and refurbishment of nuclear systems, with NNSA improving production of weapons components required for the short term and beyond.

Six Months later…What Does the NPR Get Right?

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review gets three things right. First, it does not make “no first use” or “sole purpose” the nuclear policy of the United States. This was a wise decision. Such a decision recognizes that in the current security environment the actions of Russia, China, or North Korea may necessitate a nuclear response to a non-nuclear action. With threats in the cyber and space domains possibly posing a catastrophic risk to the United States and America’s allies questioning our commitment, avoiding either of these policies is wise.

Second, the Biden administration’s continued support for modernization—despite opposition from the disarmament community—was the right decision. As the document states, “We will continue to employ a nuclear triad and are fully committed to the programs that will begin to field modernized systems later this decade.”

Third, the Biden administration clearly committed to needed investments in the production capabilities of the nuclear weapons complex. With the post-Cold War reductions across the science and manufacturing base that took place, the expansion currently under way is a good start, with much more needed.

Every action of Russia, China and North Korea since the Nuclear Posture’s release underscores the wisdom of these decisions.

Six Months Later…What Does the NPR Get Wrong?

There are numerous areas where the Nuclear Posture Review gets it wrong. Time has only underscored the recklessness of the Biden administration’s desire to advance its nuclear disarmament inclinations in the face of Russian aggression and Chinese expansion. The administration’s desire to eliminate the nation’s nuclear hedge, which is the only way to rapidly (3-5 years) expand the American nuclear arsenal, is dangerous.

A Russian breakout from New START limits, continued Chinese expansion and aggression, North Korean expansion, an Iranian bomb, and other events will necessitate an American expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Technical failure of one warhead type may also require the nation to use its hedge. Elimination of the hedge as a “formal role of nuclear weapons” is reckless and dialogue should continue to educate the Biden administration and Congress on this so that the decision is reversed.

Cancellation of SLCM-N is also a significant and destabilizing mistake. Fielding SLCM-N was seen as a way to provide a non-strategic nuclear option to Russian threats in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Those threats continue in the present because NATO’s dual-capable aircraft (capable of carrying a B61 gravity bomb) are largely political tools and do not effectively deter Russian nuclear threats.

The arguments against SLCM-N do not stand up well against scrutiny. In a defense budget of about $800 billion per year, SLCM-N is a rounding error. It is also a low-yield nuclear option that does not reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons carried by ballistic missile submarines, like the W76-2. Since SLCM-N is carried by attack submarines instead of ballistic missile submarines, it adds an additional low-yield option on vessels that operate very differently from the strategic nuclear fleet. This is an unwanted complication for Russia, China, and North Korea, which strengthens American deterrence and improves ally assurance.

The Biden administration’s continued support for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also a mistake that unduly hampers modernization of the nuclear arsenal. If the nation is embarking on a reinvigoration of nuclear production capability, it is important to reserve the right to test new designs and materials as needed. Testing also has signaling value, particularly in an environment where testing is exceedingly rare. Science-based stockpile stewardship has its strengths, but it is foolish to preclude the option to test in the event it becomes necessary.

The Nuclear Posture Review also fails to clearly explain how the nuclear arsenal defeats hardened and deeply buried targets. It also fails to address unconventional uses of nuclear weapons against the United States. For example, how will the nation respond to an electromagnetic pulse that causes widespread loss?

Admittedly, many long-time nuclear practitioners feared a more disarmament-friendly document, which leaves those same practitioners accentuating the positives discussed above. The document was still largely deaf to a declining strategic environment that has only worsened. North Korean expansion of its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missile program did not pause with the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review. Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and its nuclear expansion are still on pace. Russia continues to threaten NATO and the United States with nuclear weapons use.

Since its publication, the strategic environment and America’s place in the world has only declined. When Bob Peters recently called for a new Nuclear Posture Review, he was right. We should all join him in that call. It is time to let reason, not optimism, drive American nuclear strategy.

The authors thank Bill Murphy, Christine Leah, Zak Kallenborn, Larry School, James Ragland, and Tom Ramos for their contributions to this article.

President Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review…Seven Months Later was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, the United States held an unparalleled political, economic, and military position in the post-communist era. For nearly three decades, liberal values propped up by an unrivaled technological superiority outpaced its European allies and dwarfed the concerted efforts of Asian and Latin American developing nations. International organizations, such as NATO, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization facilitated cooperation among nations and created incentives for states to work together.^[i] Consecutive international agreements, treaties, and conventions aimed to stabilize regions, resolve disputes and deep conflicts of interest, and remedy residual power imbalances which thwarted institutional cohesion and domestic prosperity. The rising tides of economic globalization promised to lift all boats. 

Yet, “instead of a peaceful world order and near-universal acceptance of benevolent U.S. leadership,” as one well-regarded international scholars has indicated, “the post-Cold War world continued to operate according to the more traditional dictates of realpolitik”^[ii] necessitating extensive budgetary commitments to the U.S. security and military. The increase in total global wealth failed to sufficiently proof emerging democracies against the likelihood of war and the 2001 treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and China came to yield contrasting dividends in 2020. The U.S.’ “constructive relationship” with China and a “special relationship” with Russia have been outpaced by Chinese appropriation and near-monopolistic power over global supply chains, aggressive Russian exercise missions in the Arctic, the Baltic, and the outer space, and further exacerbated by the pandemic-affected social, political, and economic realities on the ground. 

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The National Defense Strategies issued in the past three years have acknowledged an “increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order.”^[iii] For the authors of the NDS 2018, it has become gradually more apparent that China and Russia strive to shape a world that is consistent with their authoritarian model, while Iran and North Korea seek to guarantee regime survival and increased leverage by seeking nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional weapons.^[iv]

The new millennium has thus been marked by rapid technological and social change provoking geopolitical realignments, regional power struggles, and unabated military, research, and economic rivalry. The United States recognizes that international strategic competition between trade partners as well as political foes is on the rise and that it must adjust its national security and defense strategies to unilaterally meet the emerging challenges.^[v]

What’s at issue

In the next great power competition, traditional forms of kinetic warfare will undoubtedly give way to simulated but not less effective non-military methods involving close collaboration between civilian and military sectors of the economy and society. These phantom warfare scenarios will likely occur in the cybersphere through unmanned agents of surveillance, manipulation of algorithmic data, and advanced use of Artificial Intelligence and drone technologies. Scientific advances will breed a new generation of sophisticated biotechnologies enabling synthetic engineering of pathogens and biological compounds which will permanently alter the national security landscape and their use for offensive and defensive purposes, will make the conduct of future conflicts a permanent feature in the military toolkit of industrialized and highly developed nations as well as developing and rising or revisionist powers seeking strategic advantage via non-traditional means. 

The resulting cool war – or “an on-going conflict that involves constant offensive measures that seek to damage the economic health of a rival and the targeting of ‘cutting edge technologies’”^[vi] – sets as its goal the maintenance of a stable thermal equilibrium preventing the conflict from turning hot or resulting in full kinetic or nuclear engagement. 

Non-kinetic violence unleashed to maximize political and economic goals will be accompanied by a considerable diffusion of power across networks of state and non-state actors capable of inflicting damage to vital state interests without the possibility of being traced, actively monitored, or prevented by current legal and extra-legal systems in place. Future theaters or war will undoubtedly blur conventional lines of distinction drawn in international law between civilians and combatants, international and non-international conflicts as well as challenge states’ responses to asymmetric warfare and the degree of proportionality required to effectively repel unconventional attacks on state-owned infrastructure and resources.

The post-9/11 intelligence threat assessments focused heavily on biological weapons in the hands of terrorist groups. Substances such as anthrax, smallpox, and other conventional biological agents comprised a list of the most likely culprits instigating terror on a global scale. As late as 2017, Homeland Security cited concerns with threats of bioterrorism which included high-profile disease outbreaks, such as Ebola and viruses like dengue, chikungunya, and Zika.^[vii] Highly virulent compounds and substances resulting from marked improvements in nanotechnologies and bio-engineering can also constitute a novel form of asymmetrical “hybrid” conflict defined by the NATO 2014 Wales Summit Declaration as a specific set of challenges and threats (including cyber and terrorism) “where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.”^[viii]

There is a reason, therefore, to assume that bio- incidents will, in the future as much as they had in their disreputable past, become once again more fully integrated into the “hybrid” warfare design and constitute, along with cyber and terrorism, a (re)emerging threat paradigm in the new state-power competition. 

The White House’s 2018 Biodefense Strategy in alignment with the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies biological threats – whether naturally, occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin – as among the most serious challenges facing the United States and the international community.^[ix] The document puts significant emphasis on enhancing the national bio-defense enterprise to protect the United States and its partners abroad from biological incidents. It sets out five goals and objectives for ameliorating the risks stemming from the evolving biological risk landscape. They are: (i) Enabling risk awareness to inform decision-making across the bio-defense enterprise; (ii) Ensuring bio-defense capabilities to prevent bio-incidents; (iii) Ensuring bio-defense enterprise preparedness to reduce the impacts of bio-incidents; (iv) Rapidly responding to limit the impacts of bio-incidents; (v) Facilitating recovery to restore the community, the economy, and the environment after a bio-incident. 

The United States Government Accountability Office’s “National Biodefense Strategy” report underscored, however, several lapses in the 2018 Biodefense Strategy Report, such as lack of “clearly documented methods, guidance, processes, and roles and responsibilities for enterprise-wide decision-making”^[x] complicating coordination of response mechanisms to bio-incidents thus putting the initiative in danger of failing to meet its long-term bio-defense objectives. 

In recognition of the changing threat environment, the Trump Administration’s 2021 budget priority requests call for $740.5 billion for national security, $705.4 billion of which will be dedicated to the Department of Defense’s investment priorities, which include building a more lethal, agile, and innovative joint force.^[xi]

An overview of funds allocation demonstrates an emphasis on traditional tools and methods of warfare, such as nuclear modernization ($28.9 billion), missile defeat and defense ($20.3 billion); munitions ($21.3 billion) as well as newer frontiers of potential conflict, including cyberspace ($9.8 billion) and the space domain ($18.0 billion). The proposed budget also anticipates expenditures in bio-research but does not explicitly support or articulate specific bio-weapons defense research and development objectives. Its investments in bio-technologies focus on (1) “$1.3 billion for the Agricultural Research Service, which conducts in-house basic and applied research, develop vaccines, and provide enhanced diagnostic capabilities to protect against emerging foreign animal and zoonotic diseases that threaten the Nation’s food supply, agricultural economy, and public health.”^[xii] (2) “$14 billion investment in DOD science and technology programs that support key investments in industries of the future, such as artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and biotechnology.” (3) “HHS bio-defense and emergency preparedness procurement through the BioShield program and the Strategic National Stockpile, and includes $175 million to support Centers for Disease Control’s global health security activities, an increase of $50 million compared to the 2020 enacted level.”^[xiii]

The United States continues to invest heavily in medical intelligence under the auspices of the Department of Defense to monitor the research terrain in order to identify the known knowns and known unknowns.

Bio-events: Who’s in Charge?

The Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture have been tasked with bio-surveillance responsibilities, which include developing personnel, training, equipment, and systems to support a national bio-surveillance capability.^[xiv] As of May 2020, Homeland Security has been working on future-oriented enhancements comprising of: 

1. The Enhanced Passive Surveillance program geared toward delivering a “surveillance system for identifying endemic, transboundary and emerging disease outbreaks in livestock…and  identify trigger points to alert officials for action.” 
2. The BioThreat Awareness APEX program will “develop affordable, effective and rapid detection systems and architectures to provide advance warning of a biological attack at indoor, outdoor and national security events.” 
3. The Bio-surveillance Information and Knowledge Integration Program seeks to develop a Community of Practice (COP) Platform prototype that integrates multiple data streams to support decision making during a biological event as well as inform training tools for state responders.”^[xv]

The programs here enumerated aim to complement the existing systems in place, including the BioWatch program managed by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs monitoring aerosol releases of select biological agents, natural and man-made as well as the Department of Defense’s Airbase/Port Detector System or Portal Shield System designed to provide early warning of biological threats to high-value assets, such as air bases and port facilities.^[xvi]

The 2010 Report to Congress issued by the US Government Accountability Office claims, however, that “there is neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a focal point with the authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national bio-surveillance capability” and that “efforts to develop a bio-surveillance system could benefit from a focal point that provides leadership for the interagency community.”^[xvii]

References

^[i] Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy, (New York: Ferrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018). p. 71.

^[ii] Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy, (New York: Ferrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018). p. 74.

^[iii] United States Department of Defense. 2018. National Defense Strategy: Summary. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf p. 2.

Bio-Security in the Age of Global Pandemics was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the apparent reemergence of great power competition in recent years, the possibility of military conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary has rekindled old debates about the role that damage limitation should play in U.S. nuclear planning.

Nuclear damage limitation involves reducing the U.S.’s vulnerability to an adversary’s nuclear weapons.  It is a warfighting capability intended to enable the United States to prevail in a nuclear conflict, should one arise.  There are a number of ways to achieve damage limitation, but most discussions of this topic focus on two in particular: neutralizing an adversary’s nuclear missiles before they can be fired, generally known as counterforce, and intercepting incoming missiles after they have been launched but before they reach their targets.

Current American policy states that damage limiting capabilities are an important component of the nation’s overall strategic posture.  The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, asserts that if U.S. strategic forces fail to deter an enemy attack, the U.S. “will strive to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible and on the best achievable terms for the United States, allies, and partners.  U.S. nuclear policy for decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if deterrence fails.”  It adds that “U.S. missile defense and offensive options provide the basis for significant damage limitation” in the event of a nuclear conflict.

The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review, issued in January 2019, echoes this approach.  It affirms that in the event of a conflict, the United States would seek “to prevent and defeat adversary missile attacks through a combination of deterrence, active and passive missile defenses, and attack operations to destroy offensive missiles prior to launch.”

These official assertions are a far cry from the long-held conventional wisdom among U.S. civilian leaders that, as Ronald Reagan once put it, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”  Maintaining some damage-limitation capabilities, as the United States has always done, is sensible in that it provides U.S. policymakers with flexibility in the event of a nuclear crisis.  However, emphasizing damage limitation as a primary element of U.S. strategic posture carries considerable risk.  Damage limiting capabilities may seem like prudent investments in self-protection by a nation that adopts them, but rival nuclear powers tend to see them as threatening and provocative.  While such capabilities do have the potential to reduce the costs of a nuclear war, they also increase the likelihood that one will occur.

There are two main arguments in favor of emphasizing damage limitation.  The most obvious is that it enhances the U.S.’s ability to defend itself and its allies if a nuclear war happens.  Damage limitation proponents believe that since there is always a possibility that nuclear deterrence will fail, it would be irresponsible for the United States to forego nuclear warfighting capabilities.  They contend that if a conflict were to arise, damage limiting options would be necessary to minimize a nuclear-armed opponent’s ability to impose unacceptable costs on the United States.

The second argument for damage limitation is that it enhances extended deterrence by strengthening the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas.  These commitments, which are intended both to deter aggression by hostile actors and reassure American allies of U.S. support, may seem uncertain if the attacking nation possesses nuclear weapons.  Other countries, both friends and foes, might reasonably question whether the United States could be counted on to intervene on an ally’s behalf if its adversary had the ability to destroy American cities.

Nuclear-armed opponents would not need to have a nuclear arsenal as powerful as that of the United States to deter American military intervention.  They would only need the ability to credibly threaten to inflict more costs on the United States than Washington would be willing to bear.  Crisis outcomes often turn on the question of which side possesses greater resolve.  Superior resolve corresponds to greater acceptance of risk, and in a crisis or conflict, the side that is more risk-tolerant has a significant advantage.  It can credibly threaten to escalate—or, if need be, actually escalate—to a point where the danger of an unacceptable outcome for the opposing side exceeds its willingness to contest the first side’s actions.

Advocates for emphasizing damage limitation see it as a way to compensate for a perceived lack of American resolve.  Any U.S. confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary would take place far from American shores.  The adversary, being much closer to the scene, would likely believe that it cared more about the confrontation’s outcome than the U.S., and it might well be correct in making such an assessment.  (For instance, it is generally recognized that in the event of a crisis or conflict over Taiwan, the outcome would matter much more to China than it would to the U.S.)  As a result, the adversary might be more willing to take escalatory actions that risked a nuclear exchange than would the U.S., giving it an advantage in any brinkmanship contest.

According to damage limitation proponents, this advantage would be negated if the United States possessed sufficiently effective damage limiting capabilities.  Such capabilities would reduce the costs the U.S. could expect to incur if a nuclear conflict did happen and would, therefore, weaken a hostile nuclear power’s ability to deter the U.S. from intervening on behalf of an ally.  If U.S. allies and potential enemies both believed that the United States could substantially reduce its nuclear vulnerability, then the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be greatly enhanced—or so goes the thinking.

One of the specific ways the U.S. has sought to use damage limitation to strengthen extended deterrence is by deploying a variety of missile defense systems.  Some of these systems are likely more effective than others.  The conventional wisdom is that the longer the range of the inbound missile, the more difficult it is to shoot down.  U.S. continental missile defenses have demonstrated a fifty percent success rate in testing over the last decade, but the tests have been highly scripted and have not simulated actual wartime conditions.  In addition, the system relies on an array of radars and other sensors located in space and on the ground that would be vulnerable to attack.

It’s unclear what perceptions in Washington and foreign capitals would be regarding the effectiveness of U.S. strategic defenses if push came to shove.  It does seem fair to say that for the foreseeable future, the system will be unable to provide anything approaching “leakproof” protection to the U.S. homeland against even a modest-sized nuclear attack.  As a result, nuclear plans that emphasize damage limitation require extensive capabilities for neutralizing an opponent’s weapons before they can be employed.

There is significant debate within the national security community about the potency of U.S. counterforce capabilities.  Current U.S. nuclear delivery systems are generally accurate enough to destroy an adversary’s nuclear forces if their locations can be determined.  However, North Korea, Russia, and China all possess mobile, land-based missiles which could be difficult to find, particularly during a crisis when they would likely be dispersed and concealed in order to increase their survivability.  In order to execute an effective counterforce attack, the U.S. would also need to overcome an enemy’s efforts to disrupt the U.S.’s ability to locate, track, and destroy the correct targets in a timely manner.  Nonetheless, some modern observers contend that U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities have become so advanced that launching a disarming first strike against an opponent is a realistic option.

The main problem with emphasizing damage limitation in U.S. nuclear war planning is that it undermines stability and risks making nuclear war more likely.  While it is theoretically true that damage limitation options may enhance stability by strengthening deterrence, this assumes that a crisis or conflict would necessarily occur as a result of large-scale aggression by an adversary.  It further assumes that potential U.S. opponents see nuclear weapons primarily as tools for coercion or aggression.  Many American observers fail to appreciate the fact that hostile regimes genuinely fear the United States.

While the U.S. views China, Russia, and North Korea as potential aggressors, these nations likewise view the United States as a serious threat.  The latter two appear to view it as an existential one.  In all three cases, the primary purpose of their nuclear forces is to deter a U.S. nuclear attack and, in the cases of North Korea and Russia, a conventional one as well.  Failing that, they could utilize their nuclear arsenals to either deny the U.S. the ability to achieve its objectives or impose sufficiently high costs on it that it feels compelled to cease its military operations.

This is not to deny that nations like North Korea, China, and Russia have revisionist aims.  Rather, it is to point out that belligerent actions on their part would likely stem from more than just a sudden desire for conquest or expansion.  A crisis or conflict could arise because of an accident, misunderstanding, or because a low-level confrontation led to unanticipated escalation (for instance, the United States and North Korea nearly came to blows in August 1976 over the removal of a poplar tree in the Korean Demilitarized Zone).  Under such circumstances, an adversary could make undesirable decisions that are motivated less by greed or conquest than by fear of U.S. intentions.  While American damage limiting capabilities might be useful for deterring the former, they can also contribute to the latter.

In the context of an international security crisis between two nuclear powers, the concept of stability pertains to the likelihood of nuclear escalation.  Crisis stability is high when neither side has an incentive to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against its opponent.  Typically, this condition is met when both sides possess a significant number of nuclear weapons that can survive an opponent’s first strike and be used for retaliation.  Thus, when the state of affairs is characterized by mutual deterrence, stability is enhanced.

Crisis instability is high when one or both sides possess capabilities that allow them to threaten the opponent’s ability to retaliate.  In a period of heightened tensions, the risk of war would already be significantly higher than during normal peacetime conditions.  If the chances of war seemed high enough, each side would likely perceive there to be advantages in engaging in nuclear first use and disadvantages in not doing so, even if there were significant asymmetries between the two sides’ arsenals.  The side with larger nuclear forces would have an incentive to mount a counterforce first strike before its opponent could employ its nuclear weapons. The side with the smaller arsenal would be incentivized to go nuclear early, before any of its nuclear forces could be destroyed.  In this way, U.S. emphasis of counterforce in its nuclear planning would greatly undermine stability during a crisis, something that is highly undesirable.

U.S. strategic missile defenses would also exacerbate crisis instability.  Most knowledgeable observers believe that these systems would only be partially effective at best.  The smaller the inbound attack, the more effective they would be.  In a security crisis in which the likelihood of nuclear conflict seemed high, this situation would further incentivize striking first.  A counterforce first strike by the U.S. would reduce the number of missiles the adversary could launch against U.S. targets, making the task of American missile defenses more manageable.  The adversary, in turn, would have an incentive to launch its missiles before that could happen, knowing that a larger first strike against the United States would have a better chance of overwhelming U.S. defenses than would a smaller retaliatory one.

The Missile Defense Review is fairly clear that it envisions U.S. counterforce strikes occurring after an adversary engages in first use.  This is consistent with the U.S. claim that the primary purpose of its nuclear arsenal is to deter nuclear attacks against it and its allies.  However, the United States also publicly reserves the right to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if it believes circumstances warrant it.  American counterforce options could easily be employed in a first strike backstopped by U.S. missile defenses, and potential adversaries may well conclude that they are intended for this purpose.

If the goal is to limit nuclear damage, a U.S. counterforce attack would make much more sense as a first strike rather than as an act of retaliation.  It’s unclear what circumstances would prompt the U.S. to take such action.  In the early stages of an emergent security crisis, the risk of nuclear escalation would seem low.  This would reduce the impetus for a U.S. first strike, since no rational American leader would want to start a nuclear war that could be avoided.  At the same time, the effectiveness of a U.S. counterforce attack would likely be higher near the beginning of a crisis than it would be later on, since the adversary would almost certainly take steps to improve its arsenal’s survivability as the crisis intensified.  This would incentivize an early U.S. preemptive strike, especially since American leaders would know that the opponent might resort to nuclear escalation anyway even if the U.S. initially exercised restraint.

The effectiveness of U.S. damage limiting capabilities in a shooting war would be highly uncertain.  Conflicts rarely unfold in ways that conform to pre-war expectations, new weapons do not always work as anticipated, and the fog of war can never be completely eliminated.  A nuclear counterforce attack has never been attempted in human history, and no missile defense system has ever been used in action against a large-scale missile attack.  These considerations alone should raise questions about the wisdom of emphasizing damage limitation in U.S. nuclear planning.

This uncertainty about the effectiveness of U.S. damage limitation capabilities creates the worst of all possible worlds.  In a crisis or conventional conflict, the possibility that the United States could launch a disarming first strike would incentivize first use by the adversary, as described above.  However, recognition on all sides that no damage limitation system could ever be 100 percent effective would limit damage limitation’s contribution to extended deterrence because Washington would likely view the risk of just one American city being destroyed as intolerable.

Deemphasizing damage limitation in U.S. nuclear war planning would enhance crisis stability without undermining extended deterrence.  Global perceptions about the strength of U.S. security commitments are informed by a number of factors, including U.S. policy declarations, conventional military power, the strength of its alliances, and its ability to respond in kind to an adversary’s first use.  It’s worth noting that even though the Soviet Union was capable of inflicting enormous devastation on the United States during the Cold War, Washington was still able to deter Moscow from attacking vital American interests, despite the fact that the U.S. possessed only a modest damage limiting capability.

Fears that a hostile nation might view its ability to launch nuclear attacks against the U.S. homeland as a license to engage in aggression are also not supported by historical evidence.  The last 75 years have demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not terribly useful for achieving offensive aims that seek to alter the status quo.  They are, on the other hand, extremely useful in deterring an adversary from engaging in first use.  Even if the United States altered its strategic posture to deemphasize damage limitation, its nuclear arsenal would still constitute a potent deterrent to any nation contemplating nuclear escalation.  As a result, an adversary of the United States would be unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons unless it believed it had no other choice.

Fundamentally, the debate over whether or not U.S. nuclear policy should emphasize damage limitation is between those who believe the United States should possess the ability to win a nuclear war and those who prioritize the stability of mutual deterrence.  This is an argument that dates back to the 1960s when the Soviet Union first began to approach nuclear parity with the United States.  Many nuclear experts hold views that lie somewhere between these two perspectives.

The truest believers in damage limitation tend to be individuals who hold hawkish views about U.S. foreign policy in general, and they have been influential under the Trump administration in setting U.S. nuclear policies.  They see damage limitation as a trump card that can negate an opponent’s ability to deter the United States with nuclear weapons. It will never be possible to fully eliminate U.S. vulnerability to nuclear attack, and efforts to enhance the U.S.’s ability to fight and win a nuclear war only serve to make such a conflict more probable. Avoiding that outcome should be the overriding goal of U.S. nuclear planning.

Nuclear Damage Limitation in an Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

This essay will examine selected policies and statements under Donald Trump’s administration and its implications for international law. These policies are: (1) The Travel Ban (Muslim Ban);¹ (2) Waterboarding and Torture;² (3) Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 2015;³ (4) Withdrawal from Iran’s Nuclear Deal (JCPOA);⁴ (5) North Korea Strategy;⁵ and (6) Recognition of Jerusalem as Capital of Israel.⁶

The (Muslim) Travel Ban

On January 27, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Executive Order No. 13769 known as Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.⁷ The executive order imposed a “Travel Ban” for ninety (90) days blocking the entry of citizens from the seven (7) predominantly Muslim countries which eventually reduced to six (6) and included North Korea and Venezuela by virtue of the Executive Order No. 13780.⁸ It also banned individuals from those countries in re-entering even with valid visas and green cards. Moreover, the order suspended the U.S. Refugees Admissions Program (USRAP) for one hundred twenty (120) days and—for an unspecified time period—it blocked all Syrian refugees.⁹ 

The primary purpose of the executive order is to ensure that hostile individuals will be prevented from entering U.S. territory.¹⁰ The order also intends to protect U.S. citizens from foreign terrorist attacks and exploitation of its immigration laws for malign purposes.¹¹ However, many protests and complaints were raised against the constitutionality of Trump’s policy and its alleged violation of international law. Nevertheless, this paper mainly focuses on the issue of whether or not Trump’s executive order is a breach of international law.

The argument against the constitutionality of the E.O. 13769 and 13780 was claimed to be a violation of the Establishment Clause¹² because the executive order predominantly barred the entry of citizens from predominantly Muslim countries, the complainants contend that Trump’s E.O. was a clear expression of religious discrimination. Opponents also argued that the order violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952¹³, where exclusion based on national origin is not allowed. 

In the context of international law, since the United States has been a party for a long time in three major related treaties namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967),¹⁴ the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969),¹⁵ and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951),¹⁶ the provisions of the E.O. which could discriminate the said countries because of their religion and place of origin as well as the suspension of the acceptance of refugees are clear violations of these treaties. Besides, the U.S. Constitution acknowledges treaties as part of the supreme law of the land.¹⁷ Based on the preceding, Trump’s Travel Ban implies that the President has not been careful in the execution of U.S. laws because he must comply with U.S. legal obligations under both treaty and customary international law.

The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, ruled in favor of the Travel Ban in Trump vs. Hawaii,¹⁸ where it decided that the ban was not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It was discussed that the number of Muslims banned by the E.O. did not comprise the majority of the Muslims in the world, so it cannot be counted as racial or religious discrimination. It is also mentioned that Trump has sufficiently fulfilled the requirements to justify national security measures that the entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interests.

Analyzing both sides, although Trump’s Travel Ban was upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional and protecting national interests, it will still generate some effects and consequences in the reputation of the United States in the international community. Trump’s action in this particular issue could create a negative impression to other countries about the United States’ political commitments in international relations and system which may result to further transnational legal processes that could eventually be encountered by the US.¹⁹ 

Waterboarding and Torture

On January 26, 2017, President Donald Trump issued a controversial statement, saying he wants to “fight fire with fire” in stopping terrorism. It suggests that he could be willing and open to bring back torture because he believes it works.²⁰  He argued that if the ISIS is ruthless in beheading citizens and posting it online, then it is not good that the United States is not allowed to do anything. He also stated during his campaign that when elected, “we’ll use waterboarding and a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding.” After he was elected, there was a draft executive order disclosed by the press which intends to reinstate the discredited program of interrogation of high-value alien terrorists to be operated at “black sites,” former CIA detention facilities outside of the United States. 

Consequently, Trump was again criticized because his statement could result in actions that will violate human rights. Although rhetoric and a draft are not yet laws and thus are unenforceable, the issue, in this case, is that whether or not Trump made a negative impression to U.S. integrity in the international community. While Trump wants to protect his country against high-valued alien terrorists, his statement may incur damages against the reputation of the U.S. on its commitment to international law and human rights. 

The United States is one of the signatories of the United Nations Convention Against Torture,²¹ an international human rights treaty under the United Nations to prevent any form of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment around the world.  Being a party to such Convention, Trump should abide in the agreement not only because it is codified, but because it is dignified. There is no doubt that as to whether or not a state is a party to the Convention every state is obligated to obey customary human rights law which includes the prohibition of torture, genocide, slavery and the prohibition of discrimination. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)²² prohibits such practices.

Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 2015

Another controversy about the administration and policies of President Trump was his intention to withdraw from the 2015 Paris Agreement.²³ It is an international multilateral agreement aiming to mitigate the effects of climate change. This deal was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty of which the United States became after its Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992. It was reported last June 1, 2017, that President Trump plans to withdraw from this agreement because he does not want to compromise the U.S. economy for the sake of others. He argued that the deal would hobble, disadvantage, and impoverish his country.²⁴ Though his intent to withdraw has no legal force now, the issue is whether or not President Trump could withdraw unilaterally from the Paris Agreement. 

To understand the legality of Trump’s intention to unilaterally withdraw from the said agreement, the following questions must be answered: (1) What type of international agreement is the Paris Agreement of 2015? And (2) What are the domestic and international policies and practices related to the treaty termination and withdrawal will apply in this case? The United States pacts with foreign nations may be in the form of treaties, executive agreements, or non-legal commitments, which involves the making of political commitments.²⁵

Under the Obama Administration, the Paris Agreement was considered as an executive agreement, which doesn’t require senatorial or congressional approval. Interestingly, the U.S. Constitution is clear when it comes to the procedures in entering into international agreements. However, there is no explicit provision concerning unilateral presidential withdrawal from these agreements. It suggests that if the U.S. domestic law allows the President to enter into executive agreements even without senatorial or congressional advice or consent, then it may also claim the authority to withdraw from such without seeking the approval from the legislative department. 

To identify U.S. historical practice in treaty termination, Stephen Mulligan, in his report entitled Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, The Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement,²⁶ enumerated five (5) categories:

1. Executive withdrawal or termination pursuant to prior authorization or direction from Congress;

2. Executive withdrawal or termination pursuant to prior authorization or direction from the Senate;

3. Executive withdrawal or termination without prior authorization, but with subsequent approval by Congress; 

4. Executive withdrawal or termination without prior authorization, but with subsequent approval by the Senate; and

5. Unilateral executive withdrawal or termination without authorization or direction by Congress or the Senate.

The first four (4) methods were practiced during the 19^th century, but at the beginning of the 20^th century, the fifth method began to be used in large part by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration during World War II—and thus became the norm. In connection with the unilateral withdrawal from a treaty by the President, Goldwater v. Carter²⁷ discussed the issue relative to President Carter’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan. The Court held that the President may terminate agreements which closely involves his foreign relations authority. At issue is a political question between the executive and the legislative departments and therefore is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. 

Since there is no question about the domestic policy on the President’s withdrawal, there is still a need to look at the method of treaty withdrawal and termination under international law. The most authoritative international legal basis for treaty termination and withdrawal is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).²⁸ As the Convention provides in Article 54:

The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place:

(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or

(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.

In the case of the Paris Agreement of 2015, Article 54 (a) of the VCLT will apply in terms of termination or withdrawal by any of the parties. Since not the United States did not have the consent of the parties, Article 54 (b) is not applicable. It is more evident when one reviews Article 28 of the Paris Agreement,²⁹ which provides that:

1.  At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party,  that  Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.

2.  Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.

3.  Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.  

We can see that the date that the Paris Agreement of 2015 entered into force was November 4, 2016, to which when we apply the above provisions will only allow the parties to complete the withdrawal process until November 4, 2020. Therefore, Trump Administration has no choice but to comply with the requirements of the Agreement until the allowable date of withdrawal. 

However, the only option the Trump Administration may do to withdraw from the Agreement is to apply Article 28 (3) which is to withdraw from the UNFCCC. The withdrawal process in the UNFCCC is nearly identical with the Paris Agreement, but it is possible for Trump to use it because the Convention entered into force in 1994 which means that the three-year withdrawal prohibition had expired. Hence, withdrawal from both the Agreement and the Convention could be consummated within one year. But as Trump did not taken any action to withdraw from the parent treaty, the United States remains a party to the subsidiary Paris Agreement until eligibility to withdraw will be allowable. 

Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)

On October 13, 2017, President Donald Trump criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)³⁰ related to Iran’s nuclear program entered into under the Obama Administration in 2015. The JCPOA was finalized by Iran and the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) placing limitations on Iran’s nuclear program as well as providing voluntary measures in which the P5+1 provides relief from sanctions imposed on Iran in exchange for specific Iranian nuclear-related actions. Trump announced that he would not renew specific certifications related to JCPOA, although he has an intention to not comply to certifications, it does not mean that the United States automatically terminate its participation in the JCPOA. 

The JCPOA is an unsigned document that encourages “voluntary measures” rather than binding obligations. The previous U.S.administration considered this document as a political commitment that did not require congressional or senatorial approval. There is nothing in domestic law or international law that can prevent Trump in withdrawing from this plan of action. However, on July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council approved the Resolution No. 2231,³¹ which terminated existing sanctions on the day of implementation. Although the document of JCPOA relies on “voluntary measures,” the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 may convert non-binding political commitments in the JCPOA into a legal obligation under the UN Charter.

The UN Charter provides in Article 25 that the Council’s decisions are legally binding. Usually, the nature of the decisions of the Council depends on the language used in the resolution. It is when we look at the content of the resolution that we can determine if it is binding or non-binding. It happened that the Resolution 2231 is a combination of non-binding recommendation and binding decisions. Another point is that the U.S. Congress did pass legislation to supervise Iran’s compliance with the plan of action, and this is known as Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.³² 

Given the above information, we can see that in the context of international law, the issue is whether or not President Trump violates international law in non-performance of its commitments in the JCPOA. By looking at the Article 36³³ of the JCPOA, it provides for dispute resolution mechanism that can be invoked by the United States or any of the parties if any of them believes that Iran is not complying with the plan of action. If the dispute remains unsettled, Article 36 allows the United States to stop performing its commitments in case Iran’s activities constitute “significant non-performance” of the JCPOA. As of now, there is no clear definition of the term “significant non-performance.”

North Korea Strategy

President Donald Trump statements against North Korea is one of the issues encountered by his administration. Trump issued various threats against North Korea like when he said “fire, fury and frankly power of which this world has never seen before.” He also threatened at the UN General Assembly, that he would destroy North Korea if it did not cease its harmful activities. This uncontrolled Trump’s rhetoric could provoke the unstable leader Kim Jong-Un into taking actions which could worsen the situation. This conflict between two egotistical leaders may result in encounters that will serve no one’s best interest but will be only destructive.³⁴ 

 As we examine the history of nuclear diplomacy, threats are not the best solution to encourage surrendering of weapons. Like Iran and Libya, it is through concerted, unified multilateral diplomacy and relief from sanctions that work better rather than violent threats. We can also notice that when intensive diplomatic dialogue increases, the more the North Korean aggravation decreases. This only implies that diplomacy is the best way to end the North Korean crisis. It is therefore critically advisable that the Trump Administration still abides in the Nuclear Deal and participate in the continuous multilateral dealings on the issue of North Korea. 

Recognition of Jerusalem as Capital of Israel

On December 6, 2017, President Donald Trump publicly declared his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This statement was so opposite with the past U.S. Administration’s foreign policy. He also stated that the U.S. embassy would be relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.³⁵  Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem will significantly isolate the U.S. in one of the most sensitive issue in the Middle East. It has brought many criticism and reactions from Arab and European leaders. It is also inviting threats to peace in the Middle East.

Opponents of the move argue that hasty decisions like Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital will eventually trigger conflicts and struggles on the disputed city. This decision by Trump was widely condemned by world leaders and international organizations.  On the other hand, Trump Administration claimed that this will not promote conflict but will give way to a more realistic peace negotiation. The issue, in this case, is whether or not Trump’s declaration to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is against international law.

Following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the UN General Assembly voted for Resolution ES-10/L.22³⁶ condemning theU.S.declaration on the status of Jerusalem as null and void. UN General Assembly Resolution No. 181 Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, called for the partition of British-ruled Palestine into a Jewish State and Arab State. This resolution is also a basis about the internationalization of Jerusalem. The United States was one of the parties who voted in favor of this resolution. 

Conclusion

The administration of President Donald Trump is challenging the system of international law. Based on the above analyses of the selected policies and statements by Trump, there is always an implication to international relations. The role of international law is still to maintain peace and balance. One can see that when there is an action by Trump, there is also an opposite reaction by the international law. As a result, transnational legal processes are increasingly operational. 

As Professor Harold Koh explained in his lecture on the Trump Administration and International Law,³⁷ that every time Trump tries to challenge international law then there comes a counter-strategy which could be from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Governmental Organizations (GOs). The counter-strategy by these NGOs can be referred to as an outsiders’ strategy. This is a process where external actors from different non-state actors will conduct interaction, interpretation, and internalization of norms. On the other hand, the internal actors will react through insider’s strategy by engaging, translating, and leverage. These counter-strategies are unlike Trump’s strategy, which prefers a pattern of obedience, persuasion, and coercion. 

The analogy used by Koh was the “Rope-A-Dope” strategy. He explained that when Muhammad Ali fought George Foreman, Ali surprised everyone by retreating to the ropes and letting the champion pound him, taking pains only to avoid getting knocked out. After many rounds, Ali allowed his opponent to punch him out, until, in the late rounds, Ali finally came off the ropes and knocked out his now exhausted and weakened opponent. This analogy means that if the Trump Administration threatens to violate international law, actors outside the federal government can apply the external strategy. Meanwhile, actors inside committed to international law can continue to pursue the internal strategy. 

Trump as the loud player who loudly launches various ineffectual initiatives to change the status quo will force little change, get tired, exhausted, and frustrated from all failing around, and ultimately find himself getting politically “knocked-out.”

References

¹ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017.

² See CNN. (January 26, 2017). Trump on Waterboarding: “We have to fight fire with fire.” Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/donald-trump-waterboarding-torture/index.html

³ See BBC News. (June 1, 2017). Paris Climate Deal: Trump PullsU.S.out of 2015 Accord. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40127326

⁴ See CNN Philippines. (May 10, 2018). Trump Withdraws from Iran Nuclear Deal, Isolating him further from the World. Retrieved from http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/world/2018/05/09/trump-US-withdraws-iran-deal.html

⁵ See The New York Times. (August 8, 2017). Trump Threatens “Fire and Fury” Against North Korea if It Endangers US. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html

⁶ See The New York Times. (December 6, 2017). Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital and Orders U.S. Embassy to Move. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html

⁷ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017, supra note 1.

⁸ See generally Executive Order No. 13780, March 6, 2017.

⁹ See generally Executive Order No. 13769, January 26, 2017, supra note 7.

¹⁰ Supra.

¹¹ Supra.

¹² U.S.Constitution, Amendment I

¹³ See Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)

¹⁴ See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967)

¹⁵ See generally International Covenant on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969)

¹⁶ See general Covenant and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)

¹⁷ U.S.Constitution, Article VI (2)

¹⁸ Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, 585 US_ (2018)

¹⁹ See Koh, H. (2017). Trump Administration and International Law. Faculty Scholarship Series. 5213. pp. 415-421. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=6215&context=fss_papers

²⁰ Supra, note 2

²¹ See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)

²² See The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)

²³ Supra, note 3

²⁴ Supra.

²⁵ See Mulligan, S. (2018). Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement. Congressional Research Service. pp. 2-4. Retrieved from www.crs.gov

²⁶ Supra, pp. 10-11

²⁷ Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

²⁸ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 54

²⁹ See Paris Agreement (2015), Article 28 

³⁰ Supra, note 4

³¹ See UN Security Council Resolution No. 2231

³² See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (2015)

³³ See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015), Article 36

³⁴ Supra, note 19, p. 37

³⁵ Supra, note 6

³⁶ See UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/L.22

³⁷ Supra, note 19, pp. 4-10

International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the U.K. attempts to redefine its role on the international stage once it withdraws from the European Union, London will move to embrace old allies and new partners in an attempt to forge stronger ties to emerging markets in the East.

The relationship between Japan and the United Kingdom has the potential to be of enormous mutual benefit to both parties. The two are both fiercely proud island nations with considerable geopolitical clout.  In a recently published audit of global geopolitical capability by the Henry Jackson Society, the U.K. was ranked second only to the United States, with Japan being ranked sixth. The study defined the U.K. as a global power, and Japan, despite being the third-largest economy worldwide, is described as a “hemispheric power,” meaning that it has the geopolitical capability to wield influence within the northern hemisphere.

The U.K.-Japan Relationship is Built on Security and Trade

Relations between the Japanese and British began over 400 years ago. The Anglo-Japanese partnership was solidified in 1854 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. The treaty defined the relationship between the two countries as one centered around mutually beneficial commerce and security. After relations improved following the end of World War II, trade and security once again became the foundation blocks upon which the Anglo-Japanese relationship was built.

Abe’s visit was, by no means, coincidental in timing. Abe intended to provide reassurances to both British businesses and undecided politicians over British Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit deal. Specifically, Abe made the case that May’s deal is the best option for Japanese businesses who rely on the United Kingdom’s access to the European single market. Japanese investment in the U.K. reached £46.5 billion in 2016, with over 1,000 Japanese businesses employing over 150,000 people.

The Japanese automobile manufacturers Nissan, Honda, and Toyota produce nearly half of the 1.67 million cars assembled every year in the U.K., of which the vast majority are exported. As the British auto industry employs just-in-time manufacturing processes, any future E.U. tariffs and border delays will have a negative impact on the industry.

Japan has long-relied on the U.K. as its gateway to Europe. While access to the single market may be reduced once Britain leaves the Union, there are still advantages for businesses operating in the U.K. A growing labor market and a highly skilled manufacturing base, technological prowess in research and development (ranked second in the world after the U.S.), stable trade relations, and the status of the English language as a lingua franca for international business and diplomacy are all significant factors in attracting and maintaining Japanese interest and investment.

Prime Minister Abe’s other key message for the U.K. is one intended to convey Japan’s desire for increased defense and security cooperation. Abe stated that the two nations are “partners as we strive to uphold rules-based international order and to promote global and regional security.” Abe’s statement follows significant developments in bilateral defense cooperation over the past 18 months.

British Prime Minister Theresa May sought to expand defense cooperation on her visit to Japan in August 2017. May highlighted that the two nations common global interests are underpinned by a strong defense relationship centered on a commitment to the “rules-based international system, free and open international trade and the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”

This meeting between the two heads of government resulted in the Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, an agreement which seeks to further bilateral engagement on security issues including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and cybersecurity. Securing international sea lanes throughout the Indo-Pacific region from foreign aggression is another key objective, as is increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations. The declaration established the conditions for Japan, which has been reluctant to develop offensive military capabilities after the Second World War, to increase its regional military engagement.

A “Global Britain” Approach to Foreign Policy

Furthermore, the agreement set the stage for unprecedented levels of Anglo-Japanese defense cooperation throughout 2018. In a demonstration of a “Global Britain” approach to foreign policy, the Royal Navy deployed three ships to Japan: the HMS Albion, Sutherland, and Argyll.

The deployed ships supported a variety of missions, including enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and participating in joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The deployment significantly improved interoperability between the Royal Navy and the U.K.’s closest ally in Asia. Additionally, British Army personnel from the Honorable Artillery Company participated in exercises on Japanese soil alongside their Japanese counterparts for the first time, the only foreign military forces to do so alongside the U.S.

At a strategic level, these actions demonstrated the U.K.’s commitment to regional stability, international law, and the United Nations Law of the Sea; crucial components to the maintenance of a rules-based global system and essential to countering Chinese subversion and expansion across the region. Growing bilateral defense cooperation between the U.K. and Japan demonstrates that the relationship is more than one based solely on national interests, instead, it is one of a higher strategic significance.

As the U.K. prepares to leave the European Union, it is evident that trade is foremost amongst Japanese concerns. Considering the level of Japanese investment into British industry over the last forty years, this is understandable. However, once the U.K. has formally left the Union, engagement with allies like Japan should be the highest priority.

A Global Britain approach to foreign policy seeks to maximize the United Kingdom’s geopolitical capabilities as a global power. To do this, the U.K. must be seen as upholding the core values and standards of the rules-based global order. The U.K. can sustain its geopolitical capabilities while strengthening British influence around the world by reinforcing strategic partnerships with powerful allies like Japan while seeking out new opportunities for cooperation and engagement. Failure to do so would be detrimental to both British economic interests and overall global security.

U.K. and Japan Heighten Defense Cooperation Ahead of Brexit was originally published on Global Security Review.

On April 27, 2018, Kim Jong Un became the first North Korean leader to step foot in South Korea – where he was welcomed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

A few days later, the South Korean government reported that Kim had promised to give up his nuclear arsenal under certain conditions.

While some viewed the summit with skepticism and issued reminders about Kim’s villainous past, others began talking of a unified Korea – a reasonable reaction considering that the leaders signed a document called the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula.

The intentions of these two leaders are key. While Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin may tweet and hold meetings, it is the nearly 80 million Koreans who will determine the future of how they will share their peninsula.

As scholars who study Japan, Korea, and East Asia, we know that the “Cold War” has always been “hot” in Asia. That’s why we suggest the focus now should be on forging new ties with North Korea. The question of how South Korea and North Korea will merge can be left for the future.

To understand why it’s helpful to remember why Korea was split into two countries in the first place.

Creating two Koreas

In August 1945, in the basement of the State Department in Washington, D.C., two American army officers traced a line across a National Geographic map and divided the Korean peninsula – at the time colonized by Japan – at the 38th parallel.

This division was part of an Allied vision of Japan’s impending defeat.

Many – especially the Russians – had anticipated that Japan would be divided like Germany.

After all, it was Japan, not occupied Korea, who was the enemy combatant. Yet the Soviets acquiesced to the American idea.

Ideological camps among Koreans that had taken root under Japanese oppression challenged one another for expression in the following months. Eventually, the communists gained leadership in the North and their challengers in the South.

Five years later the Korean War erupted to claim the lives of one in eight Koreans. Tens of thousands of international participants would also die in what history books flatly name the first major conflict of the Cold War.

The 1953 armistice ending the fighting in Korea more or less followed the 1945 line. Under this agreement, Koreans who had collaborated, resisted or simply endured Japanese rule prior to the Korean War (1950-1953) now found themselves assigned entirely new identities: “North Korean” and “South Korean.” The meaning of these names has diverged and morphed into new realities on both sides since then.

The view from South Korea

In South Korea, people often refer to the Korean War as yugio – literally 6.25 – referring to June 25, 1950, when the grandfather of today’s North Korean leader ordered his troops to cross the border and attack the South. This state-sanctioned narrative reinforces an antagonistic relationship. The North is framed as the aggressor, the South as an innocent victim, and the U.S. and the West as the savior of South Korea. Not unimportantly, North Koreans call the same history “The Fatherland Liberation War.”

While the 2015 Asan Report finds that more than 80 percent of South Koreans “dutifully” answer that Korea should be reunified, fewer than 20 percent support immediate reunification. Their sense of an ethnic bond is decreasing, and reunification is mostly seen as an economic burden.

In 2010, former president Lee Myung-bak proposed a “reunification tax” to support the costs of reunification, whenever it came. The tax proposal received little support from the public or among politicians, especially after the North’s attack on a South Korean warship Cheonan and the shelling of the South’s Yeonpyeong Island later that year. Speaking in 2014, former President Park Geun-hye also tried to promote a positive image of reunification, calling it a “jackpot” (daebak).

She claimed that reunification – a combination of North Korean labor and South Korean technological advancements – would create jobs and strengthen the Korean economy.

Despite government’s effort to reposition the reunification issue, public opinion data show that South Korean youth are only increasing their detachment from North Korea.

An easier path

So, if an older generation’s understanding of reunification is a hard sell, what is the path forward?

South Korea could instead seek a peaceful coexistence of two Koreas with free trade, free exchange of people and no military threats. Perhaps public support for reunification may reemerge and strengthen as ties are strengthened through increased exchanges at the civil level and greater economic independence in the North, thereby lowering the “costs of reunification.”

One of the main reasons there has not yet been a resolution to the “North Korea problem” has been persistent, divergent dreams of reunification. For the U.S. and South Korea, a reunified Korea would be a liberal, capitalist democracy. For North Korea, China, and Russia, a reunified Korea would not be a close ally of the United States and certainly would not host U.S. troops.

Over the last 30 years, the benefits of a divided Korea have only increased for those outside the peninsula. Initially, North Korea served as an important “buffer state” between the communist China and Russia to the north and the democratic and capitalist countries of South Korea, Japan – and their ally, the United States. Even after the Cold War ended, ideological differences among these important geopolitical players has continued, reinforcing the benefits of North Korea’s liminal status.

If we can follow public opinion in South Korea and temporarily abandon the dream of a single Korea, it is possible to see that everyone would benefit from a peaceful, prosperous, nonnuclear North Korea. China’s economic success has demonstrated that a country can take advantage of markets without becoming a capitalist democracy. It can offer North Korea guidance on how to develop using the Chinese model.

If neighboring countries opened up their markets to trade and offered targeted foreign direct investment, North Korea can experience the kind of economic miracle that Japan, South Korea, and China have already enjoyed.

If the United States and its allies can offer security guarantees to North Korea, it should not need to hold onto its deadly nuclear weapons.

If North Korea can recognize that it is in everyone’s interest that North Korea not only continues to exist but becomes more prosperous, then perhaps Kim Jung Un will make good on his promise to let go of his nuclear ambitions.

Once North Korea is more economically independent, maybe reunification can be conducted as a joyful reunion between equals. That day is far in the future, however. In the present, powerful negotiators must find the skill to chart a path toward peace and prosperity for North Korea. If they can manage it, they will have left a great legacy to the world.

The Goal in Korea Should be Peace and Trade—Not Unification was originally published on Global Security Review.

Editor’s note: This video was produced by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the University of Singapore. Global Security Review content was used to source some of the information provided.

Geopolitics in 2018: Non-state actors, economic growth, climate change, cyber attacks, and North Korea

1. The Islamic State threat moves to Southeast Asia, where over 1,000 fighters have joined their ranks. The Islamic State is active in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, and it is responsible for at least one attack carried out in Indonesia in 2017.
2. The global economy is projected to grow by almost 4% in 2018. Oil prices are expected to remain stable through the year, and the Federal Reserve of the United States is widely expected to continue raising interest rates.
3. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula continue to persist.  The chance of a war with North Korea could be close to 70% if there is no cessation of nuclear threats from the North Koreans, says Senator Lindsay Graham. China is preparing for a flood of refugees across its border.
4. Climate change will accelerate in 2018.  Scientists are observing an acceleration in rising sea levels.
5. The fallout from the massive cyber attacks in 2017 will begin to emerge. Data breaches affected governments, corporations, and private citizens across the world.

5 Predictions of Major Global Security Threats in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea’s nuclear program began in the early 1990s, and in its first decade or so was often thought to be a means of extorting financial and material support. The Agreed Framework, established in 1994 to manage the crisis, looks in hindsight like a reward for stopping the country from misbehaving.

North Korea got the world’s attention – and Donald Trump’s – when it said on July 4 that it had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time. The weapon, potentially equipped with a nuclear warhead, could reach Alaska.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to almost any target located within the United States—continental or otherwise. This test was conducted after a hiatus of more than 70 days and has served to escalate tensions.

There are few options for dealing with North Korea—and none are good.

Leaders around the world agree that North Korea should be a top priority, but given the reclusive nation’s belligerence, options are scarce. Furthermore, ties between North Korea and its traditional ally China are growing increasingly fraught, as China reduces coal exports to the “hermit kingdom.” As China withdraws, Russia steps in to exploit the crisis by propping up the North Korean regime with energy and technology.

The U.S. has three options for managing the North Korea crisis. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities, it could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons, or the U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

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Explore the analysis, assessments, forecasts, and commentary in our series: “Geopolitics and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions.“

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Kim Jong Un is consolidating his grip on power through a combination of patronage and dread and is doubling down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history of warfare and occupation along with current distrust makes cooperation difficult.

Continued North Korean provocations, such as additional nuclear and missile tests, may worsen equilibrium in the region and immediate nations to take actions, sometimes unilaterally, to defend their security interests.

Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear-nation, for safety, prestige, and political legitimacy. With the news from U.S. President Donald Trump that he would be willing to engage in a meeting with the North Korean dictator, it now seems that Kim is on track to securing that status which he so deeply craves.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he has previously signaled little interest in participating in talks on denuclearization.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Now, that seems to have changed, as well. North Korea is reportedly willing to discuss the possibility of their relinquishing their nuclear weapons in exchange for a security guarantee, according to statements made by South Korean officials.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence—or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer. Now, with North Korea seeming to be on track to engage in direct talks with the U.S., China has been summarily cut out of the process.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening US alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military and Security Capabilities

Having come out of a particularly disruptive year in terms of domestic politics and subsequently securing another term as Prime Minister,  Shinzo Abe, has the political mandate to pursue his agenda of reforming the Japanese constitution.

The snap election in October 2017 was seen as a referendum on Abe’s ambitious proposal to revise the Japanese Constitution to pave the way for the normalization of the country’s military and to pass an enormous economic reform package.

North Korea’s persistent weapons tests, particularly the ones which involve launching missiles on Japanese territory, undoubtedly helped to drum up support for the Prime Minister and his party.

Japan will likely pursue increased spending on its military and become a more significant presence in the region, particularly as China has begun flexing its maritime muscles in the East China Sea and the heavily contested South China Sea.

If China continues to escalate its island-building and militarization programs in the South China Sea, Japan will likely join the U.S. in performing “freedom of navigation” exercises in an attempt to de-normalize Chinese encroachment in the region.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military Posture to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

• In the short term, the U.S. will have a diminished presence abroad due to its domestic political divisions.
• Economic crises and inequality have contributed to widening societal and class divisions. The number of men not working and not seeking work is at its highest since the Great Depression. However, incomes have risen slowly, and investors see high rates of return on both domestic and foreign investments.
• In the long term, there is a reason to believe that the U.S. will maintain its position as a world leader and that the current state-of-affairs may even act as a catalyst for the U.S. to come to terms with its’ responsibilities as a 21st-century superpower.  

Politically speaking, the United States remains profoundly divided in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections. However, growing solidarity and activism around critical issues such as gun control, healthcare, and tax reform have been useful in checking executive and congressional power. The U.S. court system has also proven to be a valid check on executive power, intervening on issues like immigration reform and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.

The Double-Edged Sword of U.S. Credibility

Contradictory statements from within the executive branch with regards to defense and national security policy will test U.S. government credibility. As evidenced by the recently-fired Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s many public statements that were in direct contrast to rhetoric from the White House, such activity is a diplomatic double-edged sword: it causes concern for allies, but it creates uncertainty for adversaries.

The deeply entrenched military and national security bureaucracies mean that the U.S. is potentially more prone to force, as military leadership undoubtedly knows that a credible force capability must support any stated threat. This is in stark contrast to the center of U.S. diplomatic credibility, the State Department. Scores of U.S. senior diplomats and foreign service officers have left the State Department, leaving it bereft of regional or issue-specific expertise and institutional memory.

This will harm the U.S. in the short term. Any negotiations held with North Korea will be done with a shortage of expertise, potentially putting the U.S. in a disadvantaged situation, depending on the nature of the talks. Another area of U.S. policy that will suffer in the short term is the Iran Nuclear Deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The two issues could become intertwined if the Trump administration withdraws from the Iran deal, which would signal to the North Koreans that any agreement signed with the United States isn’t a credible one, particularly when one examines the history of similar agreements that were entered into with Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein.

In the long term, there is a reason to believe that the U.S. will maintain its position as a world leader and that the current state-of-affairs may even act as a catalyst for the U.S. to come to terms with its’ responsibilities as a 21st-century superpower.  

However, this is contingent upon effective execution of the National Defense Strategy, and the National Security Strategy, both of which identify China and Russia as the most significant strategic national security threats to American interests. This return to “Great Power” geopolitics will be defined by the U.S. and its allies acting to preserve the international status quo, while states like Russia and China seek to uphend it to impose an alternative order for their own benefit.

Is the U.S. in decline? Probably not, but rocky times could be ahead.

Despite an overall economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, the United States faces considerable challenges. Domestically, these problems include decreased public trust in institutions, “fake news” proliferating on social media, a growing wealth gap, and technological disruption to financial and labor markets.  On the global stage, there is considerable anxiety about the role the U.S. will play in what seems to be an increasingly multi-polar world order.

The international community will scrutinize the United States’ every move over the next decade. They will be watching for signs of internal dissent, cooperation, contradiction, and isolationism. Economic policy, ethnic tensions and identity politics, tax policy, and workplace regulations will be areas of focus. Lack of progress in these areas could signal a broader decline for the United States. This would mean a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, decreased federal authority, and diminished U.S. influence in global affairs.

Nevertheless, the United States’ possesses undeniably massive levels of human and security capital. It is deeply entrenched in international political and economic systems, while a clear separation of powers within U.S. government institutions ensures that abrupt withdrawal from foreign engagements remains unlikely.

U.S. influence is likely to remain stagnant or constrained in the short term.

Contradictory rhetoric from the executive branch will impede U.S. credibility abroad and harm American interests. Persistent contradictions from within the administration heighten the risk of U.S. engagement in significant conflict. While the short-term outlook for the United States’ role as the global leader remains uncertain, in the long-term, the U.S. will continue uniquely positioned to stay at the forefront of the worldwide order. The United States has weathered hard times before.

The 1970s were a period of high national anxiety but were followed by a robust economic recovery and a greater sense of global leadership. Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

U.S. Foreign Policy Could Become Increasingly Aggressive in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iran’s Bid for Regional Hegemony.

Iranian leaders must be pleased with how 2017 played out. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad looks to be securely in power in Damascus. Ditto Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Islamic State lost much of its territory. The Iraqi government retook the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Houthi rebels have Saudi Arabia bogged down in a quagmire in Yemen. Iranian involvement figures prominently in all of these developments, which has entrenched Iranian influence across the region. But this success is not Tehran’s doing alone. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy missteps have helped as well. Besides its ill-considered Yemen adventure, Riyadh led the effort to embargo Qatar for its alleged pro-Iranian sympathies and support for terrorism.

That has pushed Qatar closer to Tehran and created a diplomatic headache for Washington. (Qatar hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East.) Still, Saudi Arabia likely retains President Donald Trump’s ear. The new U.S. National Security Strategy vows to “neutralize malign Iranian influence.” Contrary to his campaign pledge, Trump hasn’t pulled the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). He instead opted to refuse to certify Iran’s compliance. That effectively kicked the issue over to Capitol Hill. Congress has now effectively kicked it back to him. While the White House wants to turn up the heat on Tehran, the question remains how far it will be willing to go. After all, Europe opposes torpedoing the JCPOA, and the White House has its hands full with North Korea. One thing you can be sure of: Iran will press its advantage wherever it can.

North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions.

Something has to give. Trump has vowed to prevent North Korea from gaining the capability to hit the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. He’s backed that up with angry tweets and threats to unleash “fire and fury.” So far North Korea isn’t blinking. Pyongyang boasted after its ballistic missile test last month that it “can now reach all of the mainland U.S.” That’s probably not true. However, the trend is not America’s friend. Unfortunately, Washington’s options for compelling Pyongyang to back down aren’t promising. China either can’t—or won’t—use its economic leverage to make North Korea cry uncle. Meanwhile, the cost of U.S. military action would likely be steep—possibly even “catastrophic.”

A diplomatic solution might still be forged. But that would almost certainly require recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons power—at the risk that Pyongyang will pocket any concessions and then renege on its commitments. It has done that before. Yes, the United States can rely on deterrence to keep North Korea at bay. That strategy worked against the far larger Soviet threat. The danger is that Kim Jong-un may be willing to take risks that Soviet leaders weren’t. Of course, an assassination, coup, or popular uprising could scramble everything—and not necessarily in a good way. However the situation plays out, the current level of tensions creates the possibility that war will begin not through calculation but miscalculation.

Crisis in Venezuela.

Venezuela should be a prosperous and vibrant country. After all, it has the largest proven oil reserves in the world. Instead, the country is gripped by a horrific economic and political crisis. The fault lies squarely with President Nicolás Maduro. He has implemented disastrous economic policies and run roughshod over the country’s constitution. Hungry Venezuelans bitterly joke about being on a “Maduro diet,” medicine is in short supply, and Maduro’s allies have frustrated efforts to change things at the ballot box. As bad as things were in 2017 for Venezuelans, things could be even worse in 2018.

The International Monetary Fund projects that inflation will exceed 2,300 percent next year. And Maduro has banned three opposition parties from participating in next December’s presidential election. Venezuelans have taken to the streets to protest Maduro’s dictatorial ways. More than one hundred protestors have been killed, but nothing has changed. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans have fled to neighboring countries. Latin American countries are divided over how to respond. The United States has already imposed sanctions on Venezuelan officials and may impose more. Trump’s suggestion that U.S. military intervention might be necessary drew rebukes from across Latin America and probably gave Maduro a much-needed propaganda victory. In all, Maduro isn’t likely to go unless Venezuelans make him go.

Trump’s Effort to Transform Trade.

President Trump has been complaining about America’s “horrible” trade deals since the mid-1980s, and he made it a central theme of his 2016 presidential campaign. But during his first eleven months in office, he spent more time barking than biting on trade. True, he signed a presidential memorandum pulling the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, he didn’t impose tariffs on China or withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, or the World Trade Organization (WTO), all steps he either implied or vowed on the campaign trail to take. That may soon change.

The White House is moving to impose punitive actions on predatory Chinese trade practices, its demands for revamping NAFTA look to be unacceptable to Canada and Mexico, and it is waging a low-level war against the WTO. Trump’s push to counter what he calls “economic aggression” could create considerable turmoil abroad—and at home. America’s trading partners are likely to retaliate. No one knows how far such tit-for-tat actions might go. What is known is that some U.S. export sectors would be hurt. Meanwhile, Trump’s trade initiatives won’t fix what bothers him: America’s yawning trade deficit. The United States runs a deficit because Americans consume far more than they save. Tweaking trade deals won’t change that. To make matters worse, the tax bill he has championed will likely make the trade deficit larger.

China’s Ambitions Abroad.

Xi Jinping had a terrific 2017. He consolidated his hold on power and now ranks as China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. The question is, how will he use his new status? To judge by his 205-minute speech to China’s National Party Congress in October, he won’t be sitting on the sidelines; he will be flexing his muscles. He used the terms “great power” and “strong power” twenty-six times in his speech. Xi’s assertive foreign policy will likely mix soft and hard power.

He will be offering substantial aid to countries throughout Asia under the banner of the One Belt One Road initiative. Most countries will find it hard to pass up these funds, even if they sometimes come with substantial strings attached. Beijing will also be supporting sympathetic politicians and groups overseas, a tactic that has started to trigger a backlash. The vinegar supplementing the honey will be China’s continued effort to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. Countries in Southeast Asia will be watching closely to see whether, and how, the United States pushes back on China’s effort to make itself the regional hegemon. A world order may hang in the balance.

The Mueller Investigation.

Americans aren’t the only ones watching to see what happens with the investigation Special Counsel Robert Mueller is conducting. Foreign capitals are as well. President Trump has called the investigation a “witch hunt,” and he dismisses allegations that his campaign colluded with Russia as “fake news.” Partisans on both sides think they know how the investigation will turn out. We’ll see who is right. What we know for sure is that Trump’s former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn has pled guilty to lying to the FBI, as has former Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos. Mueller also has indicted Trump’s former campaign manager, Paul Manafort and Manafort’s business partner and senior Trump campaign staffer, Rick Gates.

Trump’s lawyers predict that the investigation will wrap up shortly; history suggests it could drag on for months. At a minimum, the investigation distracts White House attention from policymaking and raises doubts overseas as to whether Trump has the political capital to carry through on his threats and promises. At the maximum, the investigation could plunge the United States into an unprecedented constitutional crisis. Whether we get either extreme or an outcome somewhere in between, America’s democracy is being tested. We’ll see if we live up to the framers’ expectations.

Democracy Under Stress.

Democracy is under siege. Just examine the rankings that Freedom House generates—global freedom has been declining for over a decade. The problem isn’t just that emerging democracies like Thailand and Turkey have slid back into authoritarian rule, though that’s bad enough. Many Western democracies are struggling as well. The EU is threatening to strip Poland’s voting rights in EU institutions because Warsaw has adopted anti-democratic laws, while Spain faces a secessionist movement in Catalonia. Centrist political parties across Europe have been losing vote shares to parties on the two extremes. Traditional center-left parties have had the most trouble, having suffered humiliating defeats in the Netherlands, France, and Austria among other places. But center-right parties are struggling as well, as recent elections in Britain and Germany attest.

The United States still has a robust two-party system, but its democracy also seems far from its glory days. Congress struggles to carry out is most basic function, funding the government, Trump regularly violates longstanding democratic norms, and many Americans view members of the opposite party unfavorably. It’s not surprising, then, that some now see the United States as a “flawed democracy.” Authoritarian governments like China and Russia are both working, in different ways, to undermine free and fair elections across the globe. Is democracy doomed? No. It remains popular worldwide, even if it has become less so among young people in democratic countries. There will be important elections in 2018 that could reverse the negative trends, though they might also give us more “illiberal democracies.” Here’s the thing about democracy: it empowers the people. It’s up to them to use that power wisely.

Corey Cooper and Benjamin Shaver contributed to the preparation of this post.

Geopolitical Hotspots: The World in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cyber attackers pose many threats to a wide range of targets. Russia, for example, was accused of hacking Democratic Party computers throughout the year, interfering with the U.S. presidential election. Then there was the unknown attacker who, on a single October day, used thousands of Internet-connected devices, such as digital video recorders and cameras compromised by Mirai malware, to take down several high-profile websites, including Twitter.

From 2005 to 2015, federal agencies reported a 1,300 percent jump in cybersecurity incidents. Clearly, we need better ways of addressing this broad category of threats. Some of us in the cybersecurity field are asking whether cyber deterrence might help.

Deterrence focuses on making potential adversaries think twice about attacking, forcing them to consider the costs of doing so, as well as the consequences that might come from a counterattack. There are two main principles of deterrence. The first, denial, involves convincing would-be attackers that they won’t succeed, at least without enormous effort and cost beyond what they are willing to invest. The second is punishment: Making sure the adversaries know there will be a strong response that might inflict more harm than they are willing to bear.

For decades, deterrence has effectively countered the threat of nuclear weapons. Can we achieve similar results against cyber weapons?

Why cyber deterrence is hard

Nuclear deterrence works because few countries have nuclear weapons or the significant resources needed to invest in them. Those that do have them recognize that launching a first strike risks a devastating nuclear response. Further, the international community has established institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to counter the catastrophic threat nuclear weapons pose.

Cyber weapons are nothing like nuclear ones. They are readily developed and deployed by individuals and small groups as well as states. They are easily replicated and distributed across networks, rendering impossible the hope of anything that might be called “cyber nonproliferation.” Cyber weapons are often deployed under a cloak of anonymity, making it difficult to figure out who is really responsible. And cyber attacks can achieve a broad range of effects, most of which are disruptive and costly, but not catastrophic.

This does not mean cyber deterrence is doomed to failure. The sheer scale of cyber attacks demands that we do better to defend against them.

There are three things we can do to strengthen cyber deterrence: Improve cybersecurity, employ active defenses and establish international norms for cyberspace. The first two of these measures will significantly improve our cyber defenses so that even if an attack is not deterred, it will not succeed.

Stepping up protection

Cybersecurity aids deterrence primarily through the principle of denial. It stops attacks before they can achieve their goals. This includes beefing up login security, encrypting data and communications, fighting viruses and other malware, and keeping software updated to patch weaknesses when they’re found.

But even more important is developing products that have few if any security vulnerabilities when they are shipped and installed. The Mirai botnet, capable of generating massive data floods that overload internet servers, takes over devices that have gaping security holes, including default passwords hardcoded into the firmware that users can’t change. While some companies such as Microsoft invest heavily in product security, others, including many Internet-of-Things vendors, do not.

Cybersecurity guru Bruce Schneier aptly characterizes the prevalence of insecure Internet-of-Things devices as a market failure akin to pollution. Simply put, the market favors cheap insecure devices over ones that are more costly but secure. His solution? Regulation, either by imposing basic security standards on manufacturers or by holding them liable when their products are used in attacks.

Active Defenses

When it comes to taking action against attackers, there are many ways to monitor, identify and counter adversary cyberattacks. These active cyber defenses are similar to air defense systems that monitor the sky for hostile aircraft and shoot down incoming missiles. Network monitors that watch for and block (“shoot down”) hostile packets are one example, as are honeypots that attract or deflect adversary packets into safe areas. There, they do not harm the targeted network, and can even be studied to reveal attackers’ techniques.

Another set of active defenses involves collecting, analyzing and sharing information about potential threats so that network operators can respond to the latest developments. For example, operators could regularly scan their systems looking for devices vulnerable to or compromised by the Mirai botnet or other malware. If they found some, they could disconnect the devices from the network and alert the devices’ owners to the danger.

Active cyber defense does more than just deny attackers opportunities. It can often unmask the people behind them, leading to punishment. Nongovernment attackers can be shut down, arrested and prosecuted; countries conducting or supporting cyberwarfare can be sanctioned by the international community.

Currently, however, the private sector is reluctant to employ many active defenses because of legal uncertainties. The Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University recommends several actions that the government and the private sector could take to enable the more widespread use of active defenses, including clarifying regulations.

Setting international norms

Finally, international norms for cyberspace can aid deterrence if national governments believe they would be named and shamed within the international community for conducting a cyber attack. The U.S. brought charges in 2014 against five Chinese military hackers for targeting American companies. A year later, the U.S. and China agreed to not steal and exploit each other’s corporate secrets for commercial advantage. In the wake of those events, cyber espionage from China plummeted.

Also in 2015, a U.N. group of experts recommended banning cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, including a country’s computer emergency response teams. And later that year, the G20 issued a statement opposing the theft of intellectual property to benefit commercial entities. These norms might deter governments from conducting such attacks.

Cyberspace will never be immune to attack – no more than our streets will be immune to crime. But with stronger cybersecurity, increased use of active cyber defenses, and international cyber norms, we can hope to at least keep a lid on the problem.

Cyber Deterrence: Cybersecurity’s Next Phase was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities.
2. The U.S. could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons.
3. The U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Accepting a Nuclear North Korea?

The Trump administration could execute a complete policy reversal and accept North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in negotiations. This would undermine American foreign policy in that it would be seen as the capitulation of the United States to the rogue state of North Korea.

The North Korean government will, in no way, sign a nuclear weapons agreement with the Trump administration that sees them left without a nuclear arsenal. The concept of nuclear deterrence is fundamental to not only North Korea’s national security strategy but to the survival of the Kim family itself.

Military Options for North Korea

Based on the stated end-goal of “denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula, it is unlikely that the U.S. would submit to demands like talks without preconditions, or agree on a framework for future negotiations. Such an action would look as if the U.S. was weak in upholding a stated national security objective.

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It would also be seen as a sign of weakness by countries like Iran, Russia, and China. The alternative would be to use military force—something that seems increasingly likely to occur.

Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), an Iraq War veteran and Purple Heart recipient, said: “we are far closer to actual conflict over North Korea than the American people realize. Everything we’re doing shows a military that, in my personal opinion, has turned the corner.” Senator Duckworth added, “the president is likely to make this decision [to attack], and we need to be ready.”

Launching a Pre-Emptive Strike on North Korea

A conflict in North Korea could erupt with an overwhelming pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korean government, nuclear, artillery, and military targets. This would involve strategic planning to ensure all necessary assets are in the region at the right time.

Despite the outdated nature of North Korea’s military forces, they remain a formidable adversary. North Korea ranks fourth among the world’s largest militaries with more than 1.1 million personnel in the country’s armed forces, accounting for nearly 5 percent of its total population.

Article 86 of the North Korean constitution states “National defense is the supreme duty and honor of citizens,” and it requires all citizens to serve in the military. The regime spent an average of $3.5 billion annually on military expenditures between 2004 and 2014, according to a U.S. State Department report.

Although its neighbors and adversaries outspend Pyongyang in dollar-to-dollar comparisons and defense experts, say it operates with aging equipment and technology, the regime’s forward-deployed military position and missiles aimed at Seoul ensure that Pyongyang’s conventional capabilities remain a constant threat to its southern neighbor. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has cautioned that war on the Korean peninsula would be “catastrophic” and he has described North Korea as “the most urgent and dangerous threat  to peace and security.”

“Sleepwalking” the path to war with North Korea

The alternate route to war is more subtle than an overwhelming pre-emptive strike. As the U.S. military steps up its air surveillance and show-of-force flights along North Korean borders, the risk of an incident occurring grows by the day. North Korean forces may perceive a show-of-force flight by a U.S. bomber as a critical threat and shoot it down, or they may believe it to be within North Korean airspace (even if it isn’t) and shoot it down just the same.

If an event such as this were to take place, there is little debate that the U.S. President would order a counterattack. North Korea has a significant number of artillery and short-range missile batteries within range of Seoul. There is little doubt that, in the event of an escalation to conflict, these would be used immediately to inflict as much damage as possible on South Korean and American positions (both military and civilian).

In contrast to Syria, where American destroyers launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at a target within Syrian territory from the safety of the Mediterranean and without much of a risk for a counterattack, U.S. forces engaged in a counterstrike against North Korea in such a scenario would be land, air, and sea forces of overwhelming capability. There would be very limited time to secure critical military assets and positions before they could be used against U.S.-allied forces.

The U.S., South Korean, and (presumably) Japanese forces would need to concentrate initial efforts on disabling North Korea’s artillery batteries and missile installations that are within range of Seoul, eliminating the regime’s command-and-control capabilities over their troops, and securing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal before it can be used.  It would be nearly impossible to execute a pre-emptive strike that minimized civilian and military casualties. Any war, conflict, or use of force on the Korean peninsula will risk a resulting death toll of a size not seen since the last Korean War.

Sleepwalking into War: The North Korean Quagmire was originally published on Global Security Review.

10. Robert Mugabe’s Ouster. Can someone be both a hero and a villain? The career of Robert Mugabe suggests the answer is yes. Like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Mugabe endured years in prison to lead the movement that ended white minority rule in his country, then known as Rhodesia, but known today as Zimbabwe. That victory for human decency is to his credit. But unlike Mandela, Mugabe never grasped that democracy means letting go of power. He ran Zimbabwe for thirty-seven years and planned to rule for longer, even if that meant running the economy into the ground and becoming increasingly ruthless. His presidency ended only when tanks rolled into Harare in November to force him from power. The trigger was his decision to shove aside his vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in favor his wife, Grace. The seventy-five-year-old Mnangagwa had been Mugabe’s associate for more than half a century. Rather than go quietly, the man known as “the Crocodile” because of his ruthlessness struck back. Mugabe quickly lost the support of his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and after some hesitation, finally resigned. Zimbabweans rejoiced at the news of his ouster, and Mnangagwa promised to hold new elections next year. Based on his early decisions, however, the new boss looks a lot like the old boss.

9. Britain Triggers Article 50. The June 2016 “Brexit” vote was merely advisory. Actually initiating divorce proceedings from the European Union (EU) required Britain to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The move “from which there can be no turning back” finally came on March 29. Britain now has until March 29, 2019, to negotiate the terms of its departure. Prime Minister Theresa May tried to shore up Britain’s weak negotiating leverage this spring by calling a snap election. The decision backfired; her Conservative Party lost its parliamentary majority, and she ended up leading a hung parliament. In early December, Britain and the EU reached an agreement on several critical preliminary issues, including how much Britain has to pay to settle its debts to the EU (somewhere between €40 billion and €60 billion). Assuming that deal holds, the two sides can now focus on the rules that will govern their future economic relationship. Those negotiations will likely be difficult; EU members have yet to agree among themselves on what terms to offer, and the British Parliament has asserted its right to vote on the final agreement. Unless a deal is signed, sealed, and delivered by March 29, 2019, or a unanimous EU agrees to an extension, Britain faces a “hard Brexit.” That would maximize how much disruption its divorce from the EU causes. The clock is ticking.

8. The Rohingya Crisis. The Rohingya may be the most persecuted minority group in the world. They have lived in Myanmar for centuries. Most of them are Muslims, though some are Hindus, in a country in which nearly nine out of ten people are Buddhists. The Rohingya have long been discriminated against, often violently so, and the Myanmar government refuses to acknowledge them as citizens. The latest and ugliest surge of violence began in August when Rohingya began fleeing into neighboring Bangladesh telling stories of mass killings, systematic rape, and torture. At last count, more than 400,000 have fled Myanmar, and thousands more have been displaced internally. The Myanmar military denies committing atrocities, insisting that it is combating attacks on police posts and army bases by Rohingya insurgents. But it’s clear, as the U.S. government has charged, that the Myanmar government is engaged in ethnic cleansing. Aung San Suu Kyi, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and Myanmar’s most prominent official, has done little publicly to end the violence. That’s probably because the military still runs the country despite the political opening of the past few years.

7. The Fall of Mosul. ISIS shocked the world in June 2014 when its forces captured Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. Within a month, ISIS had declared a new caliphate. Although President Obama once dismissed ISIS as “the JV,” it proved to be a stubborn foe. Finally, in October 2016, Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers, backed by Britain, France, and the United States, as well as by Iran, launched an offensive to liberate Mosul. In June 2017, after a three-year-long occupation, the city was finally liberated. The cost was high. Perhaps as many as 40,000 civilians died in the fighting and another million displaced. The city itself was devastated and will take years to rebuild. Unfortunately, the liberation of Mosul did not resolve the divisions that bedevil Iraq. In September, Iraqi Kurds voted for independence, which triggered clashes between the Iraqi army and Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi government, with the help of Iran, seized control of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk from the Kurds. By the same token, the loss of Mosul didn’t mean the demise of ISIS. The group has a cyclical history, waxing and waning in strength over time. As its territorial control diminishes, it’s likely to revert back to its insurgent roots. All in all, Iraq’s future remains troubled.

6. Mohammad bin Salman Remakes Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) is a young man in a hurry. Back in June, his father, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, made the thirty-two-year-old his heir, after deposing the previous crown prince, the king’s nephew and MBS’s cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef. MBS immediately got to work. His vehicle for remaking the country is Vision 2030, a two-year-old initiative that seeks to modernize Saudi Arabia’s economy and society. The idea is to prepare the country for a post-oil future and to loosen its conservative social structures. The former goal has Saudi Arabia proposing to take its state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco, public, while the latter has it allowing women to drive. MBS moved quickly to consolidate power. In November, he had eleven of his cousins arrested on corruption charges. (Their jail cell was a Ritz-Carlton.) President Trump applauded the move. But MBS isn’t only looking inward. He is moving aggressively to counter Iranian influence in the region. He championed Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, which created a humanitarian disaster for Yemenis and a quagmire for the Saudis. He also pushed for this summer’s Saudi-led embargo of neighboring Qatar. Some experts think that MBS is Saudi Arabia’s best chance for a moderate and prosperous future. Others worry that he is reckless. A lot turns on which side is right.

5. Global Growth Picks Up. Ten years after the Great Recession started, global economic growth is accelerating and stock markets around the world are hitting record highs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in October that “The outlook is strengthening, with a notable pickup in investment, trade, and industrial production, together with rising confidence.” The IMF added the caveat that “recovery is not yet complete.” However, even cautious optimism has been in short supply for nearly a decade. The IMF predicts that global economic growth will average 3.6 percent in 2017. That’s a half percentage point higher than in 2016. The Eurozone has been a particular bright spot—growth there is at a ten-year high and unemployment is at a nine-year low. The U.S. economy grew 3.3 percent in the third quarter of 2017, a three-year high, and unemployment is the lowest it’s been since 2000. China looks to be beating its target of 6.5 percent growth in 2017, though it continues to face risks. Even Russia, which has struggled for several years because of low oil prices and sanctions over Ukraine, is seeing modest growth. The big question is whether good economic news will give a political lift to globalization by tamping down rising protectionist and nationalist impulses around the world.

4. The Globe Continues to Warm. The news is not good. The earth is getting warmer, whether people believe it or not. In September, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announced that 2017 was shaping up as the second warmest year on record. What is the warmest year? 2016. The other eight warmest years on record have all occurred since 1998. Do the devastating hurricanes that struck the Caribbean this summer, causing upward of $290 billion in damage and displacing hundreds of thousands, prove that human activity is changing the climate? No. After all, catastrophic storms aren’t new, and storms may create more havoc today because societies are denser and more dependent on modern amenities. Still, the dramatic melting of the Arctic and Antarctic and of glaciers around the world is something that climate scientists have been predicting for decades. And it’s basic physics that warmer oceans temperatures mean bigger storms. But the mounting evidence that the climate is changing hasn’t moved governments to make substantial reductions in the emission of heat-trapping gases, even if only as an insurance policy against the fact that climate scientists might be right. President Trump announced in June that the United States would leave the Paris Climate Agreement, and words have been more common than deeds in other foreign capitals. The trend is not our friend.

3. North Korea Defies the World. Successive U.S. presidents have insisted that they would prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. They backed that up by offering carrots, imposing sanctions, and threatening military action. North Korea hasn’t listened. In early September, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. Three months later it tested a ballistic missile that looks capable of hitting any U.S. city. President Trump says he will stop North Korea in its tracks, vowing that North Korea “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” tweeting that “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded,” and calling North Korean leader Kim Jung-un “Little Rocket Man.” Trump has also pushed China to solve the problem. While Beijing is taking a tougher line on North Korea, it can’t—or won’t—compel Pyongyang to back down. Only military force looks likely to do that. But the cost of military action would likely be steep—possibly even “catastrophic.” On the other hand, allowing North Korea to remain a nuclear power poses big risks as well. Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo have tough choices ahead in 2018.

2. Xi Jinping’s “Extraordinary Elevation.” Not even Adele with her five Grammy awards had as good a year as Xi Jinping. Although China blatantly exploits international trade rules, Xi won applause for his January speech at Davos championing globalization and likening protectionism to “locking oneself in a dark room.” In April, President Donald Trump feted him at a two-day summit meeting at Mar-a-Lago and quite noticeably avoided his typical China-bashing rhetoric. In June, Xi won more global accolades for doubling down on his commitment to the Paris climate agreement. But his biggest success came in October at the nineteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress. It was a coronation. Xi was named to his second five-year term as party general secretary. He was also named a “core leader,” a title denied to his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao. The congress also wrote “Xi Jinping Thought” into the party’s constitution, an honor previously bestowed only on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Best of all for Xi, the congress ended without naming anyone as his successor. When Trump called Xi “king of China” during his November “state visit-plus,” he wasn’t far off the mark. Xi is China’s most powerful leadersince Mao, and he’s likely to be around for a while. If you’re wondering how he might approach foreign policy in the years ahead, consider this: in his 205-minute speech to the party congress he used the terms “great power” and “strong power” twenty-six times. So don’t expect him to sit on the sidelines while others try to set the agenda or the rules.

1. Donald Trump Champions America First. Donald Trump campaigned on a pledge to do things differently and to do different things in foreign policy. He has been good to his word since getting to the White House. He has canceled U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrawn the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement, refused to certify that Iran is in compliancewith its nuclear obligations, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, ramped up the use of drones, and relegated democracy and human rights to the sidelines of U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, Trump hasn’t enacted all of his campaign promises. He beefed up rather than withdrew U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and he hasn’t declared China a currency manipulator or kicked NAFTA to the curb. But his tough campaign trade talk may soon be U.S. policy. Trump is poised to take punitive actions against Chinese trade practices, his demands for a revamped NAFTA look to be unacceptable to Canada and Mexico, and he’s waging a low-level war against the World Trade Organization. Trump’s dismissal of traditional foreign policy practices even has some fellow Republicans questioning whether America First means embracing a “doctrine of retreat.” Many of America’s closest allies are worried. They fear the era of U.S. global leadership is ending. If so, the consequences are epic.

Other stories of note in 2017. In January, António Guterres became the ninth secretary general of the United Nations. In February, Israel announced plans for its first new settlement in the West Bank in more than twenty years. The United States began deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) system in South Korea in March. Violent protests wracked Venezuela in April, a critical point in the country’s constitutional crisis. In May, Emmanuel Macron defeated Marine Le Pen to become France’s youngest president. In June, Montenegro became the twenty-ninth member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The G20 met in Hamburg in July and failed to agree on climate action. In August, Britain’s Prince Philip announced he was retiring from making official appearances. Russia and Belarus carried out the Zapad 2017 military exercises in September. Catalonia’s October independence referendum triggered a political crisis in Spain. In November, thousands attended a far-right nationalist rally in Warsaw. The Australian parliament voted in December to legalize same-sex marriage, making Australia the twenty-fifth country to do so.

So that’s my top ten world events of 2017 plus some other events of note. You may have a different list, or you might put these events in a different order. If so, please let me know on Facebook or Twitter.

Corey Cooper and Benjamin Shaver contributed to the preparation of this post.

10 Most Significant Global Events of 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

A leaked document published on the Chinese microblogging site Weibo, states that China is constructing numerous refugee camps capable of holding large numbers of asylum seekers fleeing potential disaster on the Korean Peninsula. “As the situation on the North Korean border intensifies, the Changbai County Government is preparing to build five refugee camps,” the document states.

The document has since been removed from Weibo. It remains unverified but is linked to the Changbai branch of the China Mobile Group, the largest state-owned telecommunications company in China. Changbai county sits on the Chinese side of the border with North Korea.

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The document states that “as required by Changbai County Government, the local China Mobile branch will be responsible for ensuring the full functionality of mobile signals and communication networks in the region.” It adds that Shenhai Fu, the local branch manager is leading the team, and had inspected the alleged construction site earlier this month on December 2 under the instruction of the Changbai County Government.

“Shenhai Fu has led the team to visit the settlement, and performed communications tests,” the document continues, adding that signals were still not up to par and weak in specific areas. The document’s language, as well as the subtitle “North Korean refugee settlement plans” imply the telecommunications services and tests were one part of a significant project.

The validity of the original three-page document hasn’t been independently verified at this time, however, analysts say that the format it was written in, the language used, the level of detail, the mention of Shenhai Fu by name (whose social media accounts are linked to China Mobile), as well as the fact the original document had since been completely culled, have led many experts to conclude the report is genuine.

Contingency Planning

“It’s a perfectly sensible decision and to be expected that China will be putting contingency plans in place for a potential influx of large numbers of refugees from the Korean Peninsula given the current situation,” China-Korea expert Dr. Leonid Petrov told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

“I know that Russia — who also shares a small border with North Korea — has been building refugee camps some 15 years ago as part of its contingency plans, in case of an exodus triggered by famine or war or the like.” Petrov continued by saying “it’s only a sensible decision, and from the Chinese perspective, it would be wise to plan [in advance] and prepare the capacity to accept and absorb large groups of people, given that the neighboring provinces are heavily populated by ethnic Koreans.”

He added that “pre-empting that situation is, of course, the ideal, which is why Beijing officially maintains its position of denuclearization on the peninsula.” Dr. Petrov also said the logistics mentioned in the document and language used make “perfect sense” given the geography the region along North Korea’s border with China.

China Constructing Refugee Camps Along North Korean Border was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may have to resign by the beginning of 2018. A report published by the New York Times comes at a time when the relationship between Tillerson and U.S. President Donald Trump is increasingly strained.  White House officials were cited in a report detailing that a plan is being discussed to replace the current Secretary of State.

According to the New York Times, “The White House has developed a plan to force out Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, whose relationship with President Trump has been strained, and replace him with Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, perhaps within the next several weeks, senior administration officials said on Thursday.” The report added,  “John F. Kelly, the White House chief of staff, developed the transition plan and has discussed it with other officials.”

On Thursday, President Trump responded to questions from reporters by saying, “He’s here. Rex is here.” White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders later rejected the reports in a statement: “There are no personnel announcements at this time.” Sanders added, “Secretary Tillerson continues to lead the State Department, and the entire cabinet is focused on completing this incredibly successful first year of President Trump’s administration.”

In response to media reports, Senator Bob Corker (R, Tennessee), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. Tillerson was “unaware of anything changing.”

What’s the Potential Cause of Tillerson’s Ouster?

Tillerson and Trump diverge sharply when it comes to foreign policy.  The BBC’s Barbara Plett compared the two to ‘chalk and cheese in temperament and the way they work…Mr. Trump is also said to have complained that his secretary of state is too ‘establishment.’”

Their differences in foreign policy have repeatedly come to light. The Secretary of State has sought diplomatic engagement with North Korea but has repeatedly been rebuked by the President.  When Tillerson stated that back-channel engagements with the North Korean regimes had been established, Trump tweeted, “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”

During the GCC crisis, President Trump apparently supported the Saudi-led bloc and said that the blockade against Qatar was “the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism.” Conversely, Tillerson has issued statements warning about the humanitarian impact of the blockade and warned that the embargo against Qatar might adversely affect the fight against terrorism.

The New York Times later reported that “President Trump tweeted on Friday that reports he would soon fire Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson were ‘fake news,’ and that ‘I call the final shots.’ The tweet came just hours after Mr. Tillerson called reports that the White House wants him to resign ‘laughable,’ even as one of his closest aides planned to leave the department.”

White House Signals Secretary of State Rex Tillerson May Be Replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile after over 70 days without any such activity. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, this is the third ICBM test launch of 2017.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the missile most recently launched by the North Koreans “went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.”

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The ICBM was launched from an area north of Pyongyang in Sain Ni, North Korea. The missile traveled east for about 620 miles (1000 kilometers) before splashing down into the Sea of Japan. The missile landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone which extends 200 nautical miles from the Japanese coastline.

This latest test launch by the North Koreans occurred just months after North Korea launched ballistic missiles over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido on two separate occasions.

The missile was launched in a near-vertical trajectory, meaning that if it were fired for distance in a more horizontal trajectory, it would be capable of reaching Washington D.C. and other cities on the east coast of the United States.

The Pentagon has stated that it is working with its interagency partners in the Intelligence Community, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Energy to develop a more detailed assessment of the launch.

Pentagon spokesman Army Colonel Robert Manning said: “We [the United States] remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation.”

The Response from South Korea

In response to the North Korean missile launch, the South Korean military demonstrated the capabilities of its precision-targeted missiles by firing a number of them off the coast of South Korea.

The latest provocation from North Korea comes at a time of division in the trilateral relationship between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. While the South Korean government, cautious about provoking hostilities with the North, has encouraged restraint and dialogue, the United States (backed up by Japan) has increased its threats of military intervention against North Korea if it continues to conduct testing to further its nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile programs.

North Korea Launches ICBM Capable of Reaching Continental U.S. was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. nuclear forces, operated by the Air Force and Navy, have entered a years-long period that will see the modernization of warheads, bombs, and delivery systems. Many of these land-, air-, and sea-based systems, which constitute the so-called nuclear triad, entered service during the Cold War and will reach the end of their life cycles in the coming decades.