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ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25

Peter Huessy0 Comments

ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025 Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies Key Takeaways Significant…

Re-Establishing Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities in the United States Navy

William Atkins1 Comment

In an era marked by escalating tensions, the concept of nuclear deterrence still holds profound significance and elicits multifaceted discussion and debate. One proposition in the defense community is the…

If You Build It, They Might Come

James McCue0 Comments

Beneficiaries of American extended deterrence seek reassurance through visible and tangible efforts. This default to only thinking about American action disregards important options to improve nuclear deterrence. There is a…