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Nuclear Planning Group

NATO’s Sentry Operations Show Why the Indo-Pacific Needs a Nuclear Alliance

Allies & Extended Deterrence, Archivealliance architecture, Arctic Sentry, Article 5., Baltic Sentry, China, conventional deterrence, critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, Eastern Sentry, Extended nuclear deterrence, grey-zone coercion, Indo-Pacific, integrated nuclear deterrence, interoperability, North Korea, nuclear alliance, Nuclear Planning Group, Russia, Sentry operations

NATO’s Sentry Operations Show Why the Indo-Pacific Needs a Nuclear Alliance

Natalie Treloar0 Comments

Published: July 20, 2026 NATO’s recent establishment of Baltic Sentry (2025), Eastern Sentry (2025), and Arctic Sentry (2026) reflects more than a response to Russian aggression. Collectively, these operations demonstrate…

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SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS

Allies & Extended Deterrence, Archive, Arms Control & NonproliferationASEAN, AUKUS, Australia, China, Collins-class submarines, cruise missile, Deterrence, Euro-Atlantic, Extended nuclear deterrence, Henderson shipyard, HMAS Stirling, Indo-Pacific, NATO, Nuclear Planning Group, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, precision strike capability, rotational presence, Russia, self-defense, slcm-n, SSN-AUKUS, strategic stability, submarine arms race, US Navy, Virginia-class submarines

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS

Natalie Treloar4 Comments

The sea-launched cruise missile–nuclear (SLCM-N) is a planned nuclear-armed cruise missile that is intended for deployment on US Navy submarines, potentially Virginia-class attack submarines, by 2034. Under Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) Pillar…

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An Uncertain Future for Arms Control

Allies & Extended Deterrence, Archive, Arms Control & Nonproliferation, Strategic AdversariesAmerican interests, Arms Control, bilateral agreements, Budapest Memorandum, challenges, China, codes of conduct, collaboration, Diplomacy, disarmament, force posture, hostilities, implementation, inspections, Iranian regime change, multilateral agreements, NATO, NATO Committee on Proliferation, Negative Security Assurances, non-nuclear-weapon Iran, norms, North Korea, nuclear deterrent, Nuclear Planning Group, operational decision-makers, opportunities, Penn State-Brandywine, Russia, Stephen Cimbala, sunset period, sustainment, treaties, unilateral declarations, United States

An Uncertain Future for Arms Control

Stephen Cimbala0 Comments

A strong nuclear deterrent reduces risks to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such is the view of many within the nuclear enterprise. Arms control and…

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