Turkey provides advanced military equipment to Pakistan and financial support when necessary. The success of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones in Ukraine are but one example of Turkey’s push to build a technologically sophisticated military force.

Greece, however, is focused on domestic programs and is developing a military capable of effectively deterring Turkey, should the desire to seize further Greek territory arise. Greeks are complacent and too willing to view membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a guarantee against Turkish aggression.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a diplomatic visit to Cyprus on June 15, 2025. This was a fortuitous visit because India has long dealt with the kind of challenges Turkey poses to Greece. The country has also undertaken an effort to modernize its forces, which offers lessons for Greece.

The United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total military spending, with their total expenditure amounting to $1.6 trillion. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) most recent data highlights that India is consistently investing more in defense, as security issues increasingly dominate national priorities.

India is among the top five military spenders in the world, according to new SIPRI data. India’s defense spending increased by 1.6 percent in 2024, reaching $86.1 billion, making it the fifth largest military power in the world.

India’s first domestically produced hydrogen-powered drones are ready for use. Sharad Shah, Managing Director of Paras Defense Space Technologies, says his company is able to support India’s immediate security needs following the recent attacks. And just as India was preparing to launch deadly strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan, Paras announced a strategic joint venture with Haven Drowns in Israel, a US-based global company recognized for its autonomous, hydrogen-powered, and mission-specific drones.

The joint venture with Haven Drones will create a new capability in India for the design, manufacture, and supply of next generation drone systems tailored to India’s defense and internal security. These drones serve long-term plans to address global crises.

Paras is a defense engineering company specializing in advanced cutting-edge optical systems, optoelectronic systems, and defense solutions—not originally a drone manufacturer. The drones that emerged from this Indian-Israeli collaboration were tested on the highly volatile border of Israel. What makes them a game changer for India is their resilience and autonomy. These are hydrogen-powered unmanned aircraft that can stay in the air five times longer than current systems and are virtually silent, making them ideal for round-the-clock surveillance. One model can hover 500 meters above the ground, maintaining continuous surveillance of vast areas.

The recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in the Pahalgam region of Kashmir underlines a harsh reality; persistent surveillance and rapid response are no longer optional—they are urgent. Paras is focused on providing real-time intelligence and countermeasures through surveillance technologies that can be deployed without delay and is working with India’s Ministry of Defense to ensure border security.

Both India and Greece must give maximum effort to protect their borders with state-of-the-art drones that can both prevent entry of illegal aliens and detect enemy movements. Greece can benefit greatly from drones in the Evros, which borders Turkey by land and sea. India has similar challenges in the Kashmir region, which borders Pakistan, and in Arunachal Pradesh, which China illegally claims by calling it South Tibet. These common challenges make India a natural partner.

India’s defense sector has experienced strong growth in recent years, driven by the government’s strong emphasis on innovation and increased defense spending. Rising border tensions and global geopolitical challenges spurred both domestic and international orders of Indian defense hardware, demonstrating increased confidence in the capabilities of Indian defense manufacturers.

The domestic defense industry grew to Rs 1.27 lakh crore (over $18 billion) in 2024, registering a remarkable growth of 174 percent since 2015. This impressive growth is supported by government efforts along with foreign military sales that include more than 17,000 items, which encourages domestic production for the international market.

It is time for Greece to start developing its own heavy industry sector and to stop relying on tourism as its source of revenue. In the 1980s, Greece even stopped making automobiles and started depending on loans from European organizations. Given Greece’s central location as the buffer between Europe and the Middle East, it is time to start investing in its own domestic arms manufacturing industry which is exactly what the “Made in India” movement is all about.

Of course, Greece does not have a domestic arms industry, but it understands the complexity of the simultaneous crises that impact the country. It is because of worsening conditions that the Greek Air Force is strengthening air defenses on Crete.

There is, however, positive news. Minister for National Defense Nikos Dendias proposed the creation of a defense dome, Achilles’ Shield, for the country. This effort is already underway as part of the Agenda 2030 effort. This follows the approval of the New Force Structure and the 12-year Armament Program by parliament and the Kysea. These efforts are a good start.

If Greece follows India’s example and invests in an indigenous arms industry that serves both Greece’s needs and an international market, the endeavor can prove successful. Restoring domestic industrial production is also an important undertaking for a country that has largely seen its domestic manufacturing industry perish. Greece has too long rested on its laurels while Turkey modernized its military and grew its domestic defense industry. Taking the positive elements of India’s efforts and avoiding their mistakes can serve as a path forward for Greece.

Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer who works as a journalist writing about human rights violations in South Asia. She works for Greece’s biggest newspaper, Skai.gr, and Huffpost.Gr, as well as international distinguished news sites such as Modern Diplomacy and Global Research. 

The Future of War Is Coming from India to Greece was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently criticized the US proposal for a nuclear deal, while also expressing his doubts about the success of talks. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff argued that Iran should not be allowed to possess enrichment capabilities and declared such capabilities a red line. Iran, however, rejected the US demand and stuck to the traditional Iranian narrative that Tehran will continue the enrichment process with or without a deal. The divergent positions of the two sides indicated that the talks were likely to reach a dead end, but this time Iran’s nuclear program appeared to have reached a pivotal moment.

As Iran has gained the tools and necessary understanding of enrichment technology, it was unrealistic to think that Iran would completely terminate its enrichment capabilities without the pressure of a war or regime change. Structural realist Kenneth Waltz claimed that if Iran became a nuclear power, nuclear balance and stability vis-à-vis Israel would result. However, it is worth critically reviewing this argument in the context of the South Caucasus region, particularly Azerbaijan, as this challenges Waltz’s notions.

Offensive Realism

In his 2012 article, “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb,” Waltz argued that trying to dissuade a country from seeking a nuclear weapon via sanctions and isolation does not yield a positive result, as the case of North Korea illustrates. Waltz formulated three scenarios regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In the first scenario, Tehran was compelled to end its nuclear program in the face of heightened international sanctions and diplomacy. In the second scenario, Iran developed a breakthrough capability but stopped short of testing a nuclear weapon. In the third scenario, Iran conducted a nuclear test.

It is worth mentioning that in the two decades since Waltz wrote the article, international sanctions and increased diplomatic pressure failed to achieve a meaningful result. Even with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s enrichment continued in exchange for sanctions relief. The second possible prediction that Iran will acquire the capability but not test a nuclear weapon can be applied to the present. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Iran as on the “threshold of a nuclear weapon.”

Waltz’s central argument is based on the assumption that Israel’s nuclear edge in the Middle East creates an imbalance and that Iran’s intention is to provide a nuclear balance, thereby creating deterrence between Israel and Iran. However, considering Iran’s regional policies over the past decades and its foreign policy instruments, such as using surrogates and proxy forces to destabilize its neighbors and the entire region, one can argue that the notion of Iran’s possession of nuclear capabilities would create “stability” through a nuclear balance does not stand scrutiny.

The ideological nature of the Iranian regime alongside its expansionist foreign policy challenges Waltz’s view. Iran’s increasing ballistic missile capabilities and drone production is an indication that the Iranian nuclear program will facilitate Iran’s offensive nuclear capabilities.

Waltz also overlooked the domestic dimension and variables, meaning the imperialist tendencies within Iran, as well as variables in perception, such as the worldview of the Supreme Leader and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders. Moreover, Waltz’s argument that Iran is striving to ensure its own security by possessing nuclear weapons is questionable in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which repeatedly shows that having a nuclear deterrent does not shield a country from attack and loss of territory via conventional means.

While structural realists view the international system as anarchic and see states as striving, at a minimum, to ensure their survival, the offensive realist perspective explains state behavior more accurately. In fact, the anarchic nature of the international system directs states to maximize security, and to do so they maximize relative power. Regardless of specific threats states try to expand power. As security is not guaranteed under the anarchic international system, states maximize power to ensure their security.

As John Mearsheimer argues, states maximise their relative power because having military advantage ensures their security. The notion that Iran possessing nuclear weapons is about ensuring Iranian security and creating a nuclear balance fails to address the offensive nature of Iranian foreign and security policies in the region as well as its expansionist approaches.

An offensive realist perspective explains Iran’s nuclear program strategy accordingly, as Iran’s track record and foreign policy instruments show it takes a hegemonic approach in the region to maximize its influence over neighboring countries and increase its relative power. Waltz viewed Iran’s nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Israel, but a nuclear-armed Iran would have a very different geopolitical role in a region like the South Caucasus, sandwiched between two rogue, imperialist regimes—Iran and Russia.

Considering that Iran and Russia are strategic allies that share common geopolitical views of the West and desire to curtail the Westward-looking foreign policies of the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, a nuclear-armed Iran will not create a balance but push regional actors towards Russia against their will—particularly considering that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unlikely.

According to Robert Gilpin, “As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy.” Thus, a nuclear-armed Iran would engage in solidifying and maximizing its geopolitical goals and interests in its neighboring countries, creating more instability.

Iran’s Nuclear Programs and the Region

The lessons of Russia’s imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine and Russian official narratives such as the rejection of Ukrainian identity and statehood are proof that Iran’s nuclear program, and potential weaponization of it, pose an existential security risk to Azerbaijan as an independent country and the South Caucasus region, in general. Iranian imperial ambitions, coupled with a grudge against Azerbaijani independence, puts the country’s security at risk.

Azerbaijan’s close ally Turkey, which does not possess nuclear weapons, cannot serve as a counterweight for a nuclear Iran. Iran prefers a weak Azerbaijan on its northern border.

Iran also prefers to use Azerbaijan’s neighbor, Armenia, against Baku. A nuclear Iran might further embolden Armenian revanchist circles to seek a change in the status quo, which could start another war.

A nuclear-armed Iran may also increase its efforts to destabilise Azerbaijan via proxy groups, such as the Huseyniyyun Brigade, as Tehran attempts to curtail Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. However, a nuclear deal may still allow Iran to use the lifting of sanctions to increase its political and economic influence in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus via soft power and proxies.

Thus, a nuclear agreement with the United States and fielding nuclear weapons both pose potential risks. The Iran-Russia 20-year strategic pact, which was signed recently, also points to the fact that both Moscow and Tehran will further cooperate and stand against a Western role in the region. Increasing Iranian-Russian military cooperation is also a point of concern. Both countries are heavily sanctioned internationally, but they do not pose an obstacle to the growing trade and military ties between the two states.

Azerbaijan’s position as a link between the West and Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran, is an irritant in Moscow and Tehran. Iran’s staunch opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is evident in its stance against the Zangezur corridor as Tehran does not want to lose leverage in the South Caucasus as Armenia’s close ally. The facilitation of the transfer of Indian weapons to Armenia and the transfer of Russian weapons to Armenia via Iranian soil illustrates the fact that the Iranian regime continues to be a source of destabilization in the region. In short, a nuclear Iran allied with Russia cannot establish a nuclear balance in the South Caucasus region; rather it will increase security risks and pose an existential threat to the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Contrary to Kenneth Waltz’s argument that a nuclear balance would lead to stability, this analysis suggests it will instead lead to instability—particularly in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s war on Ukraine shows, direct imperialist activities by a nuclear Iran cannot be precluded from the future of a nuclear-armed Iran. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran is bad for the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the World. It will not bring Kenneth Waltz’s stability.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Nuclear Iran Would Pose an Existential Threat to the South Caucasus was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.

A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety

The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.

The memory of Iraq’s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.

Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard

Iran: A Threat Undiminished

Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.

Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The proliferation of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.

Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North

While Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school education systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to Jarabulus.

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey’s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.

Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic resets, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.

Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation

Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with Druze militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.

While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.

Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection

Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.

1. Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking

Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The Captagon crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.

Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the resurgence of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.

2. Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence

Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions relief, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s debt to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.

Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.

An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence

Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an opportunity for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.

This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.

Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty

Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.

Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.

Syria as a Forward Defense Zone

Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.

In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

İmamoğlu was charged with “establishing and leading a criminal organisation, accepting bribes, misconduct in office, unlawfully recording personal data and bid rigging.” Prosecutors have even sought to charge him with “aiding an armed terrorist organisation,” a reference to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in a decades-long conflict with the Turkish state over its policies of oppression against the Kurds. While the court ruled that this particular charge was “not deemed necessary at this stage,” the broader strategy is clear: in Turkey, anyone who challenges the ruling system can easily be accused of terrorism to be sidelined from power.

What makes İmamoğlu’s case particularly striking is the historical irony of his party, the CHP. Since the founding of modern Turkey in 1923 by Mustefa Kemal (Atatürk), it was the CHP that institutionalized the denial of Kurdistan and suppression of Kurdish identity—a policy that has been carried forward by every ruling party since. Today, the very tools of repression once used against the Kurds are now being turned against the Kemalists themselves, exposing the cyclical nature of Turkey’s political repression.

Turkey is classified as a brown country with both democratic and authoritarian features, but democracy, legality, and citizenship rights effectively disappear in southeastern Turkey, known by the local Kurds as Northern Kurdistan. Since the 1920s, successive governments have maintained a state of emergency under different guises, all of which are used to systematically suppress Kurdish rights.

Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), backed by the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), are pursuing a dual strategy: systematically eliminating political rivals while continuing Turkey’s long-standing policy of denying Kurdish rights. This is evident in their approach to Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, and his call for disarmament, which the MHP manipulates for political purposes.

One of Erdoğan’s latest moves is his attempt to co-opt the Kurdish Newroz (New Year)—a significant cultural and political event for Kurds.

Erdoğan plans to propose that Newroz be celebrated collectively by the “Turkic world” under the auspices of the “Organization of Turkic States” in May 2025. This is a calculated attempt to erase Kurdish identity from a festival that was once banned by the Turkish state until 1992.

A day after Erdoğan’s speech on March 21, 2025, the desire to erase the Kurds as a separate people, became evident in the Kurdistani city of Urmîyeh (Urmia) in western Iran, where Kurds form the majority. Emboldened by Turkish and Azerbaijani-backed efforts, Azeri pan-nationalist mobs, with implicit support from the Iranian regime, gathered in Urmîyeh after a mass Kurdish Newroz celebration (marking the year 2725). The mobs called for massacres of the Kurds and a continuing denial of Kurdish identity.

To Erdoğan, Turkey’s “spiritual geography” spans “from Syria to Gaza, from Aleppo to Tabriz [in Iran], from Mosul to Jerusalem.” It is expansive and does not brook any challenge to this view.

As protests erupted in Turkey against İmamoğlu’s arrest, demonstrators chanted “rights, law, justice.” These same voices, however, remain silent when it comes to the rights of Kurds, who continue to suffer under the very system their political fathers—Atatürk and the CHP—created. This selective outrage exposes a deeper truth, Turkey’s political battle is not about justice but about control. In many respects, Kurds are viewed by the Turks similarly to how the Chinese view Uighurs. Turkish treatment is sometimes little better.

İmamoğlu is still awaiting trial, but history suggests that today’s persecutors could become tomorrow’s victims. The Kemalists who once labelled Kurds as “terrorists” now face similar accusations themselves, as Turkish power struggles turn inward. What is unfolding is not a fight for democracy but a conflict among Turks to dominate the state apparatus.

Despite their internal rivalry, both the CHP and AKP, along with their Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) ally, share one common reality—they need the Kurdish vote to win the next general election in 2028 and cement their grip on power. This places the Kurds and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) in a precarious position, as both factions seek to manipulate Kurdish political aspirations for their own gain. This exposes the so-called “peace” initiative they launched in October 2024 as insincere from the start. Neither the Kemalists nor Erdoğan’s Islamists-nationalists offer true change for the Kurds.

In this high-stakes power struggle, the Kurds must be vigilant against being used as mere pawns in Turkey’s internal conflicts. Americans must also pay attention to Turkish politics because Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is also home to American nuclear weapons. Thus, Turkish treatment of Kurds serves as a signal for the direction of the Turkish state, which should matter to the United States.

Dr. Loqman Radpey, an expert on Kurdistan and the Middle East, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the legal and political dimensions of conflicts in the Middle East, including Kurdistani regions in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and the Soviet Union. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law (published by Routledge in 2023), the first comprehensive historico-legal account of Kurdish aspirations for statehood. His upcoming work, “Self-Determination during the Cold War,” will appear in The Cambridge History of International Law (Volume XI).

From Repression to Expansion: Turkey’s Power Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was a seismic event, striking a blow to both Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. While Moscow, despite its war in Ukraine and mounting Western sanctions, remains committed to its military bases, Iran’s position is far more complex. Unlike Russia, whose primary interests are geopolitical and military, Iran sees Syria as an ideological and strategic battleground central to its regional ambitions.

The de facto regime in Damascus faces an uphill battle in asserting control over a fragmented and failing state. Recent upheavals have occurred, with over a thousand, including civilians, killed in Latakia and other coastal cities. These are historical Alawite strongholds, which highlights the government’s fragile grasp on power. These disturbances, fuelled by remnants of Assad’s rule, cannot be subdued through isolated security operations or curfews alone. They expose a deeper dissatisfaction that neither Damascus nor its external backer, Turkey, can easily suppress.

Despite its opposition to a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, Iran, as a Shia’ state, retains influence over the Alawite community—the backbone of Assad’s former regime. Tehran cultivated religious and political alliances with the Alawites, ensuring that its ideological footprint in Syria endures, even as the political landscape shifts.

The situation is further inflamed by the transitional constitution, which upholds Syria’s identity as the “Syrian Arab Republic”—denying the existence of non-Arab nationalities and imposing a Muslim president with near-absolute authority and Islamic law as “a main source” of legislation. This exclusionary framework was rejected by Kurds and Druze alike, who view it as a mere continuation of Assad’s rule, now under a Sunni Islamist veneer. The brutal repression that has accompanied the regime’s efforts to enforce this new order, resulting in thousands of civilian and military deaths, only fuels further opposition.

In southern Syria, the Druze, long wary of both Sunni Islamist factions and Iranian hegemony, are positioning themselves to consolidate local autonomy. Under Israel’s umbrella, the Druze are unlikely to align with any single faction, instead leveraging their position for greater self-rule. Meanwhile, Israel maintains a watchful eye on the evolving situation, preserving its military presence in the south of Syria. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, an extremist Sunni regime in Damascus presents a far greater security threat than a Shi’a-dominated government, making Israel’s calculations in Syria more complex than ever.

For Turkey, the evolving situation presents both opportunities and challenges. While Ankara may find common cause with Sunni factions seeking to assert dominance over Syria, it will remain constrained by Iran’s interests. Iran deeply embedded itself in Syria’s military, economic, and political structures, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) playing a pivotal role in shaping the previous regime’s policies. Iran has sacrificed thousands of Quds and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces and billions of dollars in Syria. Iran made significant efforts to keep Assad in power and no one can imagine that Tehran will simply walk away and abandon its investment.

The Iranian regime followed this strategy before. After eight years of war with Iraq and massive losses, it steadily expanded its influence over Iraq’s Shi’a sector. Even after the fall of Saddam and the rise of ISIS, Iran established military proxies, ensuring that Iraq remained unstable.

Through control over Shi’a political parties, it works to suppress the Kurdistan Regional Government and keep the Sunnis weak. Those with a stake in Syria’s future should expect a similar Iranian strategy, this time through the Alawites. Iran will seek an opportune moment to replicate the strategy and will not allow Turkey, which has invested significantly less in Syria, to reap the political and economic benefits that Syria offers.

Looking forward, Syria’s future will be shaped by the competing interests of regional and global actors, each pursuing their own trajectories. The western part of the country, where the new regime struggles to consolidate power, will remain a flashpoint for unrest. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze-controlled territories are likely to maintain relative stability. The Kurdish forces, with their well-organized military and political structures, have effectively consolidated power, establishing governance mechanisms independent of Damascus.

Israel has little incentive to back any radical transformation that could empower hostile factions. What remains undeniable, however, is that the new regime in Damascus lacks the capacity to curb Iran’s entrenched influence. Tehran has invested too much in blood and resources to relinquish its foothold.

In the ever-shifting sands of Syrian politics, Iran remains a force—one that neither Turkey nor the new rulers in Damascus should ignore as its axis of resistance has the potential to reshape itself—as evidenced by the conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus and Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran’s ally, Russia, continues to maintain bases in the Alawite-controlled region, which leaves the Russians ever a concern.

Loqman Radpey, PhD, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the international legal and political dimensions of the right to self-determination for peoples and nations, including the case of Kurdistan. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law.

Iran Can Reconfigure Its Foothold in Post-Assad Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.

In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.

In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to conduct a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.

External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.

Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally supported by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.

Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.

Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.

With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.

Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.

The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future

The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.

Continued Fragmentation

The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.

For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.

Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has indicated that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already fears that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.

Iranian Consolidation

Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.

For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.

Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts

While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.

On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to strike most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.

The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to conduct precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on “supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.”

The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.

As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

Science and education are part of strategic ties in recent years. The “Program of educational cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the State of Israel for the years 2023-2026” forms the basis for developing this vital field in mutual cooperation. As Azerbaijan strives to reform its education system in order to make schools future-ready and sci-tech focused, it benefits greatly from the exchange of teachers and education experts to train and learn from the Israeli experience.

Cooperation on climate change, high tech agriculture, green energy, and water are also part of the educational and scientific ties. Israel’s high-tech economy and agriculture and its experience in green energy and water desalination provide Azerbaijan a unique opportunity to diversify and develop the non-oil sector of its economy.

Cybersecurity is also part of the educational ties between the countries with staff at the Technion, a public research university based in Haifa, contributing to the training of Azerbaijani students on a cybersecurity program.

Food security with a focus on grain is another new angle in Azerbaijan-Israel ties. Israel’s food security, and specifically its requirement for grain, will be met by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, following the disruption to supplies as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war. This will be a huge boost to both Israel’s and Azerbaijan’s food security, as Azerbaijan will receive advanced technology from Israel as part of the deal.

The high level of religious tolerance and historical lack of anti-Semitism in Azerbaijan form a strong basis for people-to-people relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The village of Qırmızı Qəsəbə (Red Village) in the Quba region of Azerbaijan, home to an old community of Mountain Jews, is believed to be the world’s only all-Jewish village outside Israel and the United States. The opening of the Mountain Jews Museum in the village is also a testament to the positive role of Azerbaijan in Jewish-Muslim coexistence and the promotion of harmony and tolerance. Azerbaijani Jews form a strong bond between the people of the two countries and their significant presence in Israel also promotes bilateral ties.

An important development in the energy sector, a key part of the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel, took place in October 2023, when Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR was granted a gas exploration license alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed to explore an area north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean. This is a significant boost to SOCAR, increasing its role in the world energy market and introducing a new aspect to Azerbaijan-Israel energy cooperation. Around 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports come from Azerbaijan.

Diversification of supply and non-reliance on Arab oil has been a key component of Israeli energy security over the years. Azerbaijani oil pumped to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and transported onwards to world markets forms a major source of revenue for the Azerbaijani budget and, as such, has been crucial in the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure, armed forces, and the large-scale reconstruction in Azerbaijan’s liberated lands.

Azerbaijan’s energy policy forms the backbone of the country’s independent foreign policy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline bypasses both Russia and Iran and has proved a key asset following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Kazakh oil shipments, for example, most of which pass through Russia, have been disrupted.

Since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Iran has singled out the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as well as Azerbaijan, putting them under pressure to cut off the key crude oil supply to Israel and thereby to damage the basis for Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy.     Iran launched media propaganda against Azerbaijan. Leftist so-called nongovernmental organizations, financed by Western-donor political figures such as Greta Thunberg and Qatar-financed outlets such as the Middle East Eye, also criticized Azerbaijan.

The attacks reveal the range of political sides that are keen to damage and destroy the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. Attacks against SOCAR’s HQ in Istanbul, organized by pro-Hamas Islamists and leftists, with the tacit approval of circles within the Turkish government, were also part of the campaign.

Azerbaijan-Israel strategic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, stood firm in the face of attacks from various circles, geopolitical turbulence, and pressure. The incoming Trump administration should value Baku’s role in the energy security of Israel, the European Union, and Turkey, which are key US allies.

Azerbaijan and Israel developed the defense component of their strategic partnership over the years. Israel is one of the main sources of Azerbaijan’s defense imports and modernization of the armed forces. Azerbaijan made skilful use of Israeli defence products in liberating its lands; most notably, Israeli’s Barak 8 anti-ballistic missile defense system intercepted an Iskander missile fired from Armenia over the capital Baku.

Israel, too, stood firm in the face of pressure during the war in 2020 and did not allow third parties to influence their defense cooperation with Baku. The defense cooperation also came under extensive media attack by pro-Armenia and pro-Iran elements who consider the Azerbaijani-Israeli defense partnership a threat to their interests. Iran feared Azerbaijan’s growing role since Baku’s victory in the Karabakh war and the high-level conduct of its armed forces.

A strong Azerbaijan on its northern border is a nightmare for Iran. Tehran invested heavily for decades to keep Azerbaijan weak, but this failed badly with the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Azerbaijan-Israel defense cooperation is vital for regional security and the containment of rogue actors such as Iran, which pose an existential security threat to both countries.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Israel and Turkey appear to have inflicted a strategic defeat on Iran. Considering the strained nature of Turkish-Israel relations, due to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backing Palestinian extremist groups, it is in the interests of both Israel and Turkey not to collide in Syria and to manage the risks.

In this regard, Azerbaijan can play a key role in coordinating and reconciling both Israeli and Turkish interests to avoid confrontation in Syria. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev visited Israel in December, where he had meetings with high-level Israeli officials including Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and President Isaac Herzog. The trip was a positive development in reducing confrontational elements in Turkish-Israeli ties and keeping backchannel communications open.

It is in Azerbaijan’s interests to reconcile or at least reduce the negative atmosphere between its two key strategic partners Israel and Turkey, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role in the recent normalization process between the two countries. Baku also proposed setting up a trilateral regional format for strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey before the Hamas terrorist attack derailed the fragile Israeli-Turkish ties with Erdoğan siding with Hamas.

Overall, it is worth noting that both Azerbaijan and Israel benefit strategically from their partnership in various fields. The contribution of their relationship to the security environment of the South Caucasus and the Middle East is important as it also opens new opportunities.

The role of Azerbaijan in easing the tension in Turkish-Israel ties becomes more significant with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Azerbaijan and Israel have both stood firm during geopolitical crises, protecting their strategic ties and blocking third-party attempts to influence them, thereby proving that their partnership is reliable and mutually beneficial.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Azerbaijan-Israel Strategic Relationship Proves Its Importance was originally published on Global Security Review.

As discussions of retaliation by Israel continue, the media discuss Iranian oil refineries as possible targets that might be hit. Israeli Defence minister, Yoav Gallant, stated that retaliation against Iran’s missile attacks will be “lethal and surprising.” Meanwhile, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked social media accounts are already spreading reports that Tehran warned the United States that actions against Iranian oil refineries will lead the Islamic Republic to target oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to a Reuters report, Iran also warned the Gulf Arab states that any use of their airspace or military bases to target Iran will be unacceptable and threatened a military response.

Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s reference to Azerbaijan as a potential target, should Israel attack Iranian oil refineries, is an indication of the Islamic Republic’s growing threat to critical energy infrastructure not only in the Middle East, but also in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea basin region. Azerbaijan supplies 40 percent of Israel’s energy needs and Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure is the backbone of its independence in the geopolitically tense region.

Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR, alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed, was awarded a licence to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are a primary concern for Iran.

In anticipation of Israeli retaliation against the Iranian ballistic missile attacks, the Iranian media continues to make unsubstantiated claims about supposed secret Israeli military bases in Azerbaijan with a ridiculous accusation that Azerbaijan is one of the origins of sabotage against the Islamic Republic. Talking about possible Israeli retaliation against Iranian oil facilities, Iranian diplomat Abbas Mousavi falsely claimed in an interview to Tejarat News that Israel deployed many planes to Azerbaijan.

In fact, since Hamas launched the brutal terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023, Iran’s main goal is the consolidation of the members of the Organisation of Islamic States to achieve an economic blockade and diplomatic isolation from Israel. Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeatedly called on Arab and Muslim countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel. Iranian officials frequently repeat similar calls showing Tehran’s agenda behind the Hamas attacks, which aimed to disrupt economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and Muslim-majority nations.

Iran’s multidimensional strategy behind the Hamas attacks was based on several ambitious goals, including preventing possible normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; derailing the Abraham Accords; preventing efforts to improve strained Turkish-Israeli ties; and trying to inflict economic and diplomatic damage on Israel-Azerbaijan strategic ties. Iran’s strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian media outlets launched coordinated propaganda attacks against Turkey and Azerbaijan for supplying crude oil to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline since the Hamas terrorist attacks and start of the subsequent war in Gaza. Iran-inspired, pro-Hamas Islamist, and leftist circles in Turkey staged several demonstrations where they vandalised Azerbaijani oil company, SOCAR, offices in Istanbul in an attempt to halt oil exports.

Considering the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, the country is a comfortable space for Iranian propaganda and hybrid activities covered by so-called Islamic narratives. Ironically, the fact that Iran is a major energy supplier to Armenia and supplied the formerly Armenian-occupied Karabakh region received no similar response from Islamists or leftists in Turkey.

Coercive Actions

Iran’s military threats against Azerbaijan increased from the end of the Second Karabakh War, when the balance of power in the South Caucasus shifted in Baku’s favor. Iran conducted several military drills near Azerbaijan’s border, putting on a show of force against the geopolitical changes in the region. In late September and early October 2021 Iran suddenly conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s borders.

An Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman described the exercises as a “sovereign right,” saying, “Iran will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist regime” near its borders. Iran undertook another military provocation a year later when Tehran laid pontoon bridges across the Araz River near the Azerbaijani border and crossed the river as part of war games. In March 2023, an Iranian air force fighter jet violated Azerbaijan’s airspace. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador, and the Azerbaijani Defence and Foreign Ministries issued a joint statement condemning the incursion.

When Israel liquidated Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, in Damascus in April 2024, Iranian member of parliament, Jalal Rashidi Kochi, called for strikes on an Israeli embassy in the region, preferably in Azerbaijan. Iranian attempts to target the Israeli embassy and ambassadors in Baku were also foiled on many occasions over the years; the most recent reported attempt involved the arrest of an Afghan national in July 2023. Recently Iran has enhanced its naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea and increased naval drills, including joint drills with Russia.

Iran’s Missile and Cyber Capabilities

Iran possesses numerous capabilities to threaten critical infrastructure including energy and power in the region. Among them Tehran’s ballistic missiles and cyber tools are key. Iran maintains the largest ballistic and cruise missile force in the Middle East, capable of reaching 2,500 kilometres from its borders. Moreover, these capabilities combined with Iran’s drone arsenal can overwhelm missile defence systems. Iran’s missile attacks against Saudi oil facilities in 2019 were conducted by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.

Iran has improved its offensive cyber capabilities, too, and is capable of causing localised and temporary disruption to corporate networks for days or weeks. Drilling oil wells, pumping crude oil, and loading fuel are processes where cyberattacks can cause significant disruptions. According to an FBI report released in August 2024, Iran exploited computer network vulnerabilities to infiltrate and steal sensitive technical data from organisations in Israel and Azerbaijan. In July, cybersecurity firm Check Point reported that an Iranian hacker group named Muddy Water, affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, increased its cyber activities against targets in Azerbaijan, Israel, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Securing Critical Infrastructure

Overall, considering Azerbaijan’s key role in the energy security of vital American allies, such as Europe, Israel, and Turkey, and its significant help in supplying energy to US-friendly states Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the next administration needs to reverse shortsighted Biden State Department policy. The decision not to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, damages American interests in the South Caucasus. It is in the interest of the US and Azerbaijan to expand their military and technical partnership to secure critical infrastructure in the region.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Threat to Azerbaijan’s Critical Energy Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

In March 2023 Azerbaijan finally opened its embassy in Israel, despite establishing bilateral relations in 1992. Baku opted to open its embassy in Tel Aviv after restoring its territorial integrity. The next month, in April 2023, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, making it the closest Israeli embassy to Iran, just 17 km from the Iranian border. Iran followed all these diplomatic moves with annoyance and concern.

Normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations was also widely discussed as an extension of the Abraham Accords. Momentum similarly grew in 2022 for Israel and Turkey to normalize their strained relations. At the next meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed to continue developing bilateral relations and to pay official visits to each other.

Azerbaijan’s initiative to set a new trilateral format for cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey was advancing rapidly in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty for Tehran. The October 7, 2023, attack on Israel gave Iran the chance to derail possible Saudi-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties and stop the Azerbaijani initiative for trilateral cooperation in its tracks.

Tehran seized the opportunity of the war in Gaza to pursue its grand, multidimensional strategy. It is using economic means, via a set of coercive actions, to achieve foreign policy objectives, something widely overlooked. Iran’s multidimensional strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian strategy prioritizes using economic means to isolate Israel by derailing its relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s subtle, calculated, approach also intends to inflict an economic blow on Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which makes substantial revenue from the export of oil via Turkey to Israel.

Considering the global nature of the modern economy, economic power plays a significant role in shaping geopolitical outcomes and foreign policy. In this case, Iran’s usage of political, diplomatic, and media instruments, as well as its regional proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, merits analysis. The use of economic means to shape geopolitical outcomes and achieve foreign policy goals is the cornerstone of Iran’s multidimensional strategy. Iran does not possess the necessary economic means, by itself. However, the Islamic Republic does possess significant geopolitical assets in the form of proxy groups and diplomatic and media resources, which it is using to hinder or shut down global navigation and prevent the flow of strategic commodities to Israel.

The late Iranian foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, called on Muslim-majority countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel and expel its envoys in October 2023. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Muslim countries to cease trade, particularly food and oil with Israel, the following month. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, followed Ayatollah Khamenei’s call and appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel.

The call for an economic boycott of Israel by Muslim-majority states gives an insight into Iran’s multidimensional strategy. The late Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, also reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s call for a boycott of Israel at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2023. President Raisi argued that Islamic countries must cut diplomatic relations as well as refuse to buy Israeli goods, echoing Khamenei’s call. Weeks after his call for an economic boycott, Ayatollah Khamenei had urged Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel to halt diplomatic ties for a limited period. In January 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his call for a total blockade of Israel by Muslim countries.

The official rhetoric of Iran’s leaders clearly shows Tehran’s multidimensional strategy of using the war in Gaza to isolate Israel economically, impose an oil embargo, destroy economic and diplomatic ties between Israel and Muslim-majority countries, and position Iran as a major geopolitical force in the region. To implement this strategy Iran has employed coercive media propaganda against many countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Iranian media has intensified criticism of Turkey for its trade and economic ties with Israel and Azerbaijan for oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which meet 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil.

Iranian media has also targeted Turkish president Erdoğan for not cutting trade relations with Israel, which was actively used within Turkey by Islamist circles including the leader of the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), Fatih Erbakan, in recent local elections. The New Welfare Party, which sympathizes with Iran, managed to get 6.1 percent of the nationwide vote—contributing to Erdoğan’s first election loss in decades. When Erdoğan’s ruling party suffered the election setback, he launched economic measures against Israel, halting trade. Iranian media propaganda and the active shaping of the narrative in the run-up to elections in Turkey yielded a significant result by creating strain in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. The multidimensional Iranian strategy of achieving goals in multiple theatres has so far succeeded in two places: Turkey and Yemen. Using the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping, Iran positioned itself as a key player that can shut down trade not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Bab al Mandab Strait.

Iran’s strategy of using economic means to achieve its goals also entails containing and weakening Azerbaijan by inflicting significant revenue losses. Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed were awarded a license to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have long been a primary concern for the Iranian establishment. The military-technical partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan helped Baku boost its national security and defense, as well as to retake control of its territory from occupying Armenian forces. Changes in the realities of South Caucasus politics since 2020 are a security concern for Tehran. Constant Iranian media attacks against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline are part of the multidimensional Iranian strategy.

Better understanding Iran’s strategy is important if the United States desires to counter those efforts. Iran’s use of hybrid warfare, proxies, media propaganda, and blackmail—to force neighboring countries to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Israel—is having some success but is not in the interest of the region. Iran’s primary goal is to derail the normalisation process under the Arab-Israeli Abraham Accords; to strain Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic ties; to damage Azerbaijan’s independence by targeting its primary source of revenue; to prevent the emergence of the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey trilateral cooperation; and to prevent further diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. It is only through understanding Iranian efforts that the United States, Israel, and the larger region can prevent Iran’s success.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Multidimensional Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Previously known as the Turkic Council, the OTS was founded in 2009. Since then, it has grown into a fully-fledged international organization, to include several institutions—the General Secretariat in Istanbul, the Turkic Academy in Astana, the Turkic Cultural Foundation in Baku, as well as several other entities such as an OTS representative office in Budapest.

Engagement with the Central Asian Turkic states is strategically significant in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. First and foremost, the ongoing geopolitical turmoil in the neighborhood leaves Azerbaijan as a vital link on a geographical route for Central Asian states, bypassing both Russia and China in their engagement with the external world. The issue of economic diversification, particularly in the form of the diversification of energy routes, makes Azerbaijan a strategic route for Kazakhstan to export its oil to Western and world markets without using the existing traditional route through Russia.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s state oil companies, KazMunaiGas and SOCAR, signed an agreement in March 2024 on a gradual increase in the transit of Kazakh oil via Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan expressed willingness to increase receipt of Kazakh oil to 2.2 million tons annually. The usage of Azerbaijani energy pipelines, in particular the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, is a strategic necessity for Kazakhstan to export its oil to world markets. Oil shipment via Azerbaijan will gradually grow to 16.5 million barrels a year, double the 2023 figure.

Azerbaijan’s recent participation in Central Asian summits as well as the joint summits and meetings of Central Asian states and the Gulf countries (GCC) is also a new trend in its foreign policy and highlights the strategic importance of Baku for Turkic states. The areas of cooperation are huge and cover strategically important topics such as logistics, trade, energy routes, and economic and security aspects. Considering that the US, Germany, and United Kingdom (UK) increased their engagement with the Central Asian Turkic states since the Russia-Ukraine war, and that the US and Germany institutionalized their engagements in the format of 5+1, Azerbaijan’s strategic role for these countries is also growing.

With the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty President Aliyev made integration with the Turkic states a national priority. Amidst the Russia-Ukraine war and the confrontations between the West and Russia and the US and China, Azerbaijan seeks to stay out of this global struggle and reduce its negative impacts in a region where security is already being affected.

The OTS has traditionally focused on culture, transportation, and logistics. President Aliyev proposed expanding OTS cooperation to include military, defense, and defense-industry matters, which reflects a proactive approach in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in the midst of the increasing global and regional security issues.

Richard Outzen identifies five regional security dynamics that accelerate military integration and cooperation between the Turkic states. They are the economic and technological development in the Turkish defense industry, which is enabling Turkey to become one of the leading nations in the production and export of drones. Turkey’s military capacity, with a professional military that can provide training, education, doctrine, and military equipment to the countries that are seeking to diversify from Russia’s traditional dominance also matters. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, which is seen in its support for Armenian irredentism against Azerbaijan, its war in Georgia (2008), and ongoing war against Ukraine, turned many away from Russia. Generational change in Turkic states, American withdrawal from Afghanistan (2021), and disagreements among the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states are all factors shaping the view that no external power or military alliance can be a reliable security guarantor and that the Turkic states will have to step up joint security efforts to face security challenges.

According to Cavid Veliyev, following the liberation of Azerbaijani land from Armenian occupation, Azerbaijan became a target country for Western organizations, mainly driven by an orientalist and selective approach to the principle of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. As a result, Western institutions lost credibility in the eyes of Azerbaijani society. The OTS, however, emerged as a crucial ally of Azerbaijan. Its support for the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty over the occupied lands has not gone unnoticed by the Azerbaijani public.

President Aliyev’s proposal to bolster defense and military cooperation among the member states builds on the Astana Declaration, approved by the heads of state at the 10th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States on November 3, 2023, which commits to joint efforts in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and separatism.

The Turkic states face many of the same security threats. Russia is an aggressive and unpredictable neighbor. The rise of an assertive Chinese foreign policy is worrisome. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan is problematic. American attempts to project its confrontation with China onto economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative in the region is also an issue of concern. Terrorism, particularly the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in neighboring Tajikistan worries Azerbaijan greatly. Finally, there is the issue of separatism.

The Turkic countries share a vision of joining efforts to face these collective security risks. They are represented in two different security organizations, with Turkey as a NATO member and Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic as members of the Russia-led CSTO. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are not members of either military bloc. Although Azerbaijan is a neutral country as a non-aligned movement member, it has strong relations with NATO and participates in NATO programs. It took part in the peacekeeping contingent in NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Baku also has close security ties with CSTO members such as Kazakhstan.

Additionally, Azerbaijan has a military alliance with Turkey, enhanced by the 2021 Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey. The declaration highlights mutual security commitments, such as strengthening defense capability and military security, conducting joint Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises and training, increasing the interaction and interoperability of the armed forces, increasing joint weapons production, and holding joint meetings of the security councils on national security issues.

If the territorial integrity and sovereignty of either state is violated, the parties will hold joint consultations and coordinate their political, diplomatic, and military efforts to eliminate the threat. With the recent change in the landscape in the South Caucasus region, the Shusha Declaration is the embodiment of the emerging Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation as the decisive military-economic factor shaping regional developments and the security architecture.

The OTS covers a vast geography with substantial natural and human resources. It has close to 170 million inhabitants with the potential for this number to increase to 250 million by 2050, and the potential to produce $2 trillion in gross domestic product. The significance of the Turkic states increased following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Europe’s trade routes with China passing via Russian territory become insecure geopolitically.

Its concrete projects include the establishment of an investment fund, integration and ease of customs procedures, and the promotion of the Middle Corridor between Europe and China via the South Caucasus and Central Asia, also known as the Trans Caspian trade route. There are increasing investments that ensure intra-regional connectivity with well-developed infrastructure projects among the member states.

In short, Azerbaijan, which is often overlooked by Western states, is a country actively working to place itself as a key partner to the West, while recognizing that it sits between Russia and China—an unenviable position. Supporting Azerbaijani efforts to improve its economic success and security efforts will only make the country a more reliable partner for NATO and the United States.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. 

Analyzing the Turkic Vector of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.

While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.

The Demographic Transition

One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.

Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As Table 1 shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.

 Table 1

Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. (These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.)

These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.

The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.

The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.

Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.

The Two Percent Myth

The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

            The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.

Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.

Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.

The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?

A European Nuclear Deterrent

 One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.

One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.

One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).

While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.

Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.

For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.

Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Is Trump Right About Europe? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

The modern Turkish Armed Forces form its identity with the foundation of the Republic, protecting the tenents of the Founding Father, Atatürk, who enshrined a constitution that is still today one of the most advanced legislative examples of governance, spanning Secularism, National Unity, and the very existence of the nation-state itself. These principles upheld as both a virtue and a right, function in unison with the Imperial legacy of the nation, encapsulated via Fatih The Conqueror who upon his victory at Constantinople (subsequently renamed Istanbul) placed Kayser-I-Rum otherwise translated as Caesar of Rome as one of his main honorifics, enabling the bestowment of respect for the responsibility to also protect citizens who are descendants of those that once lived within Ottoman borders as displayed in operations spanning Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Syria across the decades and continuing to this very day.

The Turkish Armed Forces play a crucial role in curbing Russian influence in nations like Syria and Libya and stopping the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to gain inroads in the Aegean. Turkey is one of the few NATO nations with active personnel directly countering the Russian Federation, notably in Libya and Syria. At the same time, Turkish Bayraktar drones and newly allocated Turkish naval corvettes support the valiant Ukrainian forces leading their campaign to reclaim their homeland.

The integration of the Turkish Republic and the Turkish Armed Forces into the region’s supreme power has resulted in further integration into NATO and the emergence of a pan-continental power. The introduction of the TCG Anadolu aircraft carrier and the use of F-35s and Eurofighter jets will underscore the security of the grain export agreement and ensure Turkish military and state prowess in the Black Sea and by defacto the Caucasus. The renewal of military alliances, such as the US-Turkish Mechanism and the military alliance between the United Kingdom and the Turkish Republic, highlights the importance of protecting the Eastern and Southern Flanks of NATO. In the coming period, Turkey will integrate hypersonic missiles into its arsenal of strength, in tandem with the US commitment to modernize existing tactical nuclear capabilities already held in the country.

The recent earthquake that has impacted historical cities such as Gaziantep and Adana, where the Incirlik Airbase is located, has once again turned the populace and leadership of the country to the Turkish Armed Forces. The TAF has taken full operational control over the fallout of the seismic damage, displaying their leadership, operational prowess, and sense of duty beyond purely being the Armed Forces of the Turkish nation. As Turkey approaches its centennial anniversary, the Turkish Armed Forces remain the beacon of the homeland and its guardian, providing hope and affection to citizens who have lost their homes and loved ones due to the quakes.

More Than an Army: The Turkish Armed Forces as a Core Pillar of National Identity was originally published on Global Security Review.

Affected cities include Gaziantep, a historical city with a lineage spanning from the Roman Empire to the Ottomans, which has become a powerhouse for overseas exports in recent decades. Other devastated cities include Hatay, Kahramanmaras, and Adana, where the strategic Incirlik Air Base is located. Additionally,

Re-Building Paradise: A complete revitalization of the South-East of the Turkish Nation post the earthquakes of 2023

Osmaniye, Kilis, Malatya, Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, and Şanlıurfa have been impacted, bringing the total to ten affected provinces across the region.

Rather than adhering to existing city planning doctrines, a new approach must be implemented, incorporating both incentivization and distinct governance oversight. This will ensure the revitalization process is not hindered by other political developments, ranging from socio-political matters to day-to-day topics dominating the media cycle. Drawing inspiration from the London Docklands Development Corporation and the revitalization of East London in the 1980s, an emergency decree should grant tax breaks and relief to the southeast of Turkey.

An immediate Presidential Executive Order is necessary to designate all ten affected provinces as 25-year tax-free regions for domestic and international corporations. Individuals who move to the area or have existing registrations will also benefit from income tax exemptions for the same period. This policy promotes capital inflow and ensures existing residents are not priced out. Private investors must contribute a percentage of social housing, similar in quality to their own projects, to the local populace at cost. This approach is reminiscent of Singapore’s successful combination of foreign investment and social cohesion through high-quality social housing.

To curb unemployment, a 90% mandatory quota must be imposed for employing local Turkish workers, while incorporating similar quotas at the executive board level for Turkish entities. Those who relocate their businesses to the region will also benefit from the above-mentioned fiscal advantages. The ports of Iskenderun and Mersin will invigorate these developments by prioritizing sea routes and expanding the existing free trade zones.

Innovation must be reciprocated in governance by establishing a body directly accountable to the Presidency, superseding all Cabinet Ministers and Ministerial levels. This body will comprise Turkish Armed Forces officers and leading civilian administrators from various fields, forming a triumvirate to oversee region-specific redevelopment. This will ensure that the revitalization effort remains uninterrupted by internal or external politicization and election cycles.

The solution is clear as the Turkish nation looks toward a new dawn, with global support from allies like Israel and the United States and Turkey’s growing regional power in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The nation must move swiftly to not merely rebuild but to create a fundamentally new form of regional planning, administrative governance, security infrastructure, and economic policy. This innovative approach will serve as an example to other nations as they face the opportunities and challenges of the 2030s.

Revitalizing South-East Turkey After the 2023 Earthquakes was originally published on Global Security Review.

Amongst the backdrop of the shared concern for Taipei’s security threats permeated all levels of society from the People’s Republic of China via the Chinese Communist Party or, in other words, directly from Xi Jinping himself, with each statement indicating a China that has now positioned itself as not simply our competitor but rather our collective foe.

The capabilities of the Chinese People’s Republic are correlated heavily to a system of governance allowing them to grant the Executive with a full ‘vestiture’ of power, able to threaten our way of life in an instance and further strike at us via hypersonic missiles that no longer require local positioning close to our borders to reach our very zip codes themselves. China doubles down on its executive privilege by being able to bypass (via non-existence) the equivalent of Senate Appropriations to arm our foes. At the same time, we are left to the mercy of special interest groups and biased lobbies when seeking to arm NATO allies such as the Republic of Turkey. They require a trifecta of F-35s, Patriot missile defense systems, and shared hypersonic missile placement to counter the Russian Federation on the Southern and Eastern Flank of the Transatlantic Alliance. The case is clear for more power to be granted to the Executive in the United States as well as NATO nations to ensure that we can utilize statecraft at its ‘maxima’ concerning both committing to and executing both our unilateral and shared national security objectives against President Putin who enjoys the largesse of a modern Ivan the Terrible and Xi Jinping seemingly governing China in a manner akin to Emperor Wenzong of Qing.

A system of governance that vests further direct command to NATO leaders domestically, notably in matters concerning military deployment as well as the provision of strategic hardware amongst allies, is imperative in the current backdrop globally, which is far more reminiscent of the permeations before the First World War juxtaposed with that of the implicit build-up to the Cold War. To enable such prowess overseas, notably in countries that already function within a Presidential system within NATO, such as the United States and the Turkish Republic, domestically, systems must be in place to ensure local stability. One such successful structure that provided our security in the West for many decades against the Soviet Union was referred to as GLADIO or, in other words, “Stay-Behind,” with the coinage being that military-civilian structures were in place to ensure both the continuity of the state in the event of a Comintern invasion or domestic subversion campaign and on day-to-day basis combat local anti-NATO illegal organizations and cells from endangering the lives of one’s populace and to halt any infiltration at the time by Soviet assets within Western governments. Recently, Chinese assets were identified within the U.S. Treasury Department, and Russian Agents were charged with acts amounting to seeking a total dismantling of the American political system; therefore, our foes have already commenced actions indicative of exploiting our systematic institutional weaknesses and domestic “Stay-Behind” structures are crucial to combat China and Russia’s campaign to use our form of Democracy, with all its benefits and caveats, in a manner to undermine our way of life.

There are two very successful organizations in this regard which were exemplified historically by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey, one being the “Force Research Unit” (F.R.U.) and the other “Kontrgerilla” (Counter-Guerrilla) respectively for both nations. The F.R.U. exemplified the British Army’s clinical response to the thousands of killings carried out by the Separatists in Northern Ireland with heroics displayed by the late Captain Robert Nairac, with the section’s activities being noteworthy in combatting both the domestic strife caused by the illegal separatists as well as stopping overseas support provisioned to them by the Soviets. In the Turkish Republic, against a backdrop of compounding political tensions between the 1970-the 80s, Counter-Guerrilla successfully defeated a plethora of illegal Stalinist, Marxist and Leninist groups seeking to destabilize the NATO member nation domestically and thus ensuring the structure and continuity of the state while cutting off Soviet support for such cells providing NATO with shared security from Istanbul to Washington.

Whilst the populace in the United States bemoans a political system where such discontent is evident by the recent creation of the Forward Party whereby though insignificant with regard to political clout, is sufficient emphasis that those chosen to lead our nations are not fulfilling their vows “spoken upon thee” when first seeking office, the fact is that no matter the individual, no matter the party, unless the Executive has parity of power with regard to governance at a level that is comparable with the executive privilege enjoyed by our superpower foes who are seeking to undermine the rules-based international order, then we run the risk of losing the war of “Great Power Competition” and unless we streamline our institutional governance to prioritize whomever we choose to lead us, empowering them also with the apparatus to mobilize and safeguard our national security via clandestine our very way of life in the West itself may be at the mercy of the next stage of Beijing’s Hypersonic missiles.

New Age NATO: The necessary might of leadership, minus the inhibitions of bureaucracy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of the AUKUS agreement, EU member states must come to terms with the loss of primacy and the shift of the U.S.’s geostrategic center of gravity to the East to counter Chinese expansionism. The old Eurocentric western security architecture is essentially in shambles, hindering NATO’s integrity as well. The emerging “Quad” alliance between the U.S., U.K., Australia, India, and Japan diminishes NATO’s importance in the Indo-Pacific. The French and other traditional allies and partners—members of EU and NATO—collectively appeared more enraged than China, highlighting the clumsy formation of AUKUS that was accelerated by the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle. AUKUS marks a turning point in global geopolitics that will have a domino effect on several parts of the world—one being the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the diplomatic blow of AUKUS and Angela Merkel’s retirement from frontline politics, France’s first reaction was to strengthen its ties with Greece and increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing a rearmament deal that modernizes the Hellenic Navy and commits to an important Defense Assistance Agreement. The latter includes a clause of mutual defense assistance—similar to the mutual defense clause (Article 42.7 TEU) of the Treaty of the European Union—in case one of the two states is attacked on its territory.

Analysts note a relation between AUKUS and U.S. support for France to pursue a more proactive role in the Eastern Mediterranean through the game-changing Franco-Greek deal that bolsters the Greek armed forces with three Belharra frigates (+1 option). Athens previously ordered 18 Rafale fighter jets and has plans to acquire six more in the future.

France already showed its intention to support Greece against Turkey during a prolonged 82-day crisis that brought Greece and Turkey (two historic rivals and NATO members) to the brink of conflict. Back in 2020, the Turks deployed their seismic research vessel Oruç Reis accompanied by a flotilla of warships to conduct surveys on the Greek continental shelf (as described in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS III) that Turkey claims with the unsubstantiated Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) naval doctrine. The Mavi Vatan opposes UNCLOS III provisions and is based on the arbitrary assumption that all islands are deprived of the right to exert jurisdiction on the continental shelf. However, the Law of the Sea is binding on all states to the extent that it represents customary international law, and although Turkey is not a signatory to it, it has to comply with it.

French President Emmanuel Macron openly criticizing Turkey’s activity on the Greek and Cypriot continental shelf/exclusive economic zone (EEZ) said, “I don’t consider that in recent years Turkey’s strategy is the strategy of a NATO ally… when you have a country which attacks the exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of two members of the European Union.” In contrast, on another occasion, he clarified that “France has been very clear. When there were unilateral acts in the eastern Mediterranean, we condemned them with words, and we acted by sending frigates.” After signing the Franco-Greek deal in Élysée Palace, he also noted that “it will help protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of both states.”

France’s intervention came as no surprise since it has competing interests with Turkey over Syria, Lebanon, and Africa. As Professor of Geopolitics Kostas Grivas explained, France has a large presence and significant geopolitical interests in Africa. Its strategic depth is in Africa, incorporating more than the Francophone states.

The Mediterranean is bridging France with the African continent; thus is imperative to maintain control of it, especially after the recently discovered energy resources attracting a great deal of interest. This brings France closer to Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus in a containment effort against Turkey’s expansionism left unanswered by the EU’s inability to guard its outermost borders.

The Turks, as expected, expressed their frustration with the newly formed Franco-Greek strategic alliance by putting pressure on Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish frigates obstructed the Maltese-flagged research vessel Nautical Geo hired to conduct research related to the EastMed gas pipeline. The ship attempted to work on the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (delimitated with Egypt) and Cypriot EEZ (delimitated with Egypt). Turkey, however, is claiming the same continental self with the Mavi Vatan doctrine.

With an increased military presence, the Turks aimed and succeeded in forcing the Americans on yet another equidistance statement. A State Department spokesman said the U.S. “encourages all states to resolve maritime delimitation issues through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law,” an announcement that overlooks the fact that the Turkish frigate obstructed Nautical Geo’s work on Greek and Cypriot delineated EEZs.

The Connection Between AUKUS, the Franco-Greek Pact, and the EastMed Pipeline was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yes, Turkey is a NATO member and an important regional actor, but Turkish democracy has waxed and waned. Despite these challenges, one key group—the Hizmet movement, inspired by the teachings of Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen – has been a staunch advocate for Turkish democracy. But Hizmet has been demonized by Erdoğan as an “enemy of the state” and repeatedly scapegoated by Erdoğan’s regime. As Erdoğan owns the megaphones in Turkey, he has used them so frequently against Hizmet that he has created an alternate reality that, unfortunately, has recently been amplified in the West.

From 1923 when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey up until the Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) took office in 2002, the Turkish state was defined by anti-religious and anti-Kurdish military-cum-judiciary rule. During this period, the Turkish state frequently scuttled popular democracy through military intervention in the name of protecting the regime. In 1960, 1970, and 1980, military coups overthrew the civilian governments.

After decades of the military pulling the strings, the AKP called for real reforms and won popular support in 2002. The AKP’s success was driven by both the cultural capital provided by Hizmet’s international outreach and political support from Western powers eager for a moderate Islamic foothold in the region in the aftermath of 9/11.

At the time, Hizmet and the AKP shared a vision of a democratic Turkish state (2002-2011) with civil society bolstered by moderate Islam. The AKP, dominated by its relatively liberal faction that was genuinely committed to creating a democratic Turkish state and Hizmet, a Sufi-influenced socio-religious movement focused on promoting universal human understanding and democratic values, cooperated and coexisted. This convergence of a social movement (Hizmet) and a political force (AKP)—but without any programmatic alliance—ushered in Turkey’s most democratic period, characterized by rule of law, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, an independent judiciary, and regular elections.

During this period, Hizmet helped prepare Muslim students to compete for positions in state institutions and Hizmet participants emerged as effective democracy advocates, helping to sway public opinion to support meaningful constitutional reforms in 2010. The movement’s increased visibility and civic contributions, however, produced two unintended consequences: resentment from opposition groups and fear within the Erdoğan-led Islamist faction of AKP that the movement could erode Erdoğan’s political power.

On the heels of successful and popular constitutional reforms in 2010 limiting the military’s political power, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan sought to deploy Hizmet as a political tool to solidify his own power. He demanded that the movement’s growing global network align behind his leadership and promote him as a leader of the Muslim world.

Gulen personally opposed both the concentration of power in a single executive as well as the politicization of his ideas. Although the final decision was left to the movement’s volunteers, Gulen advised against granting Erdoğan’s request which fueled the latter’s growing resentment and suspicion of the movement.

In 2014, Erdoğan narrowly won the presidential election after three terms as Prime Minister (2003-2014). After taking office, he bolstered his power by transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential system and changing the constitution. Erdoğan also marginalized perceived opposition including the AKP’s liberal faction, independent media, Kurdish opposition, and Hizmet.

In 2016, Erdoğan used the pretense of the failed military coup to further consolidate power. Despite lacking any credible evidence, Erdoğan alleged that the Hizmet movement and Gulen had orchestrated the coup. Both Hizmet participants and Gulen himself have repeatedly denied any involvement. These allegations, as well as hundreds of thousands of arrests, not only imprisoned Gulen’s supporters—and others including Pastor Brunson—but also cast anyone with tangential Hizmet connections as a traitor. This ostracization as well as purges of Hizmet participants and allies deprived hundreds of thousands of livelihoods and access to social institutions.

Despite Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism, Turkey has remained an essential ally for Western powers. To maintain political and economic ties, Western leaders have walked a fine line, neither embracing nor alienating Erdoğan’s regime. Even actions that flouted Turkey’s status as a NATO member, such as purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system and attacking the U.S.’s Kurdish allies in the fight against ISIS, have produced few consequences.

Western powers, including the United States, however, must recognize that Erdoğan is the real threat to Turkish democracy. His regime will continue to persecute critics, undermine regional stability, and weaken key alliances. Erdoğan has made it abundantly clear that he will continue to act with impunity and distort facts to undercut those that stand in his way, particularly movements like Hizmet that have been longstanding champions of Turkish democracy. Erdoğan cannot be allowed to rewrite history.

Turkey’s Faltering Democracy and Western Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the two edifices are on opposite ends of Europe, they have much in common. Both are arguably the most beautiful standing expressions of Mediterranean civilization, and both represent a vanquished world. Hagia Sophia was the crowning architectural achievement of Orthodox Christianity and the Byzantine Empire, and the Great Mosque of Cordoba remains the unparalleled testimony of Islamic identity in Spain. When the civilizations that built the monuments collapsed, both structures underwent forced conversions.

Speaking after the July 10 decree to turn Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wasted no time in riling up Islamist support for his controversial decision, saying it appeals to those from “from Bukhara to Andalusia.”Andalusia references the Mosque of Cordoba – which, although it resides in Spain, has long been a point of obsession for AKP elites with visions of restoring what they view as the golden age of their civilization. They believe that this civilization is locked in an irreconcilable struggle with Christendom.

Other key members of the AKP have made their feelings about the Cordoba Mosque well known. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently cited the conversion of Cordoba into a church to defend Ankara’s decision to convert Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Likewise, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu justified the Hagia Sophia decision by evoking the Cordoba mosque, opining that under Spanish administration, “the miracle of Cordoba Mosque almost disappeared.” Davutoglu further asserted that it was hypocritical to discuss Hagia Sophia without talking about the Great Mosque of Cordoba.

Yet this comparison is merely a pretext for supremacist policies. In fact, notwithstanding their similarities, there are vast differences between the two buildings. While the Great Mosque of Cordoba is the primary historical monument to Islamic civilization in Spain and was of regional significance, its influence and place within Islam were not comparable to Hagia Sophia. As the former capitol of Orthodox Christianity, Hagia Sophia has a place within the Orthodox world that is more comparable to the Kaaba for Muslims or Saint Peter’s Basilica for Catholics – it was the capitol and cultural center of Orthodoxy. Hagia Sophia is, according to Theophilos III, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, “The heart of the Eastern Orthodox Christian world as a site of Christian worship, sanctified by the blood of martyrs.”

Moreover, the AKP’s rhetoric of right by conquest belies its disingenuous concern for the Great Mosque. Popular Turkish discourse influenced greatly by the AKP, portrays the 1453 conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, an event that represents the culmination of the conquest of the Christian Byzantine Empire and Constantinople, as a moment of glorious military triumph, the capstone in the myth of the creation of the Turkish nation. “In our civilization,” said Erdogan in late August, “conquest is not occupation or looting – it is spreading the dominance of Allah in the conquered land.” Thus, according to Ankara, the conquest of Hagia Sophia is fundamentally good and therefore dissimilar to the conquest of the Great Mosque.

Hagia Sophia and the Great Mosque of Cordoba are priceless artifacts of a now long-lost world. To subject them to conquest rhetoric and to use them to settle scores disgrace their multi-faith legacy.

Turkey Uses Medieval Score-Settling to Justify Its Hagia Sophia Conversion was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a chance that Bashar Al Assad is going to depart from his position of power in the near-term. The regime, however, will continue to hold power—the U.S. prefers to maintain the current regime, which has been a long-term American policy. For the United States, the maintenance of the current regime is the only viable solution, which can aid its interests in the future. This dilemma of whether or not to replace the current Syrian regime has been ongoing since the Obama era, where an alternative regime could not be found to replace the existing one. Thus, the Obama administration initiated a covert CIA program to fund the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions in southern and northern-western Syria that the administration deemed to be moderate. The reason for this program was to create a stalemate between the regime and the rebels due to Obama’s stated goal of reducing the presence of U.S. troops in the region as a result of the Bush Administration’s debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. In short, the Obama administration wanted to maintain the regime while preventing it from prevailing over the country.

There is also another reason for upholding the Syrian regime, which benefits both the U.S. and Israel. Over the years, both Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar have utilized a rhetoric of invoking the Golan height lost due to the 1967 war as bolstering the regime’s popularity and the regime’s survival. Thus, it is arguably in the interests of both the U.S. and Israel to preserve a weakened Syrian regime. And Turkey and Russia have been aiding the U.S. plan in Syria for some time now.

When Donald Trump assumed the U.S. presidency, he disputed the efficacy of Obama’s strategy as well as the presence of American troops in Syria. Thus, Trump disregarded the notion of backing rebel groups in Syria, arguing that it would fuel further Islamic extremism. Besides the tensions between the U.S. and Russia, which is standard between adversarial great powers, there has also been much cooperation between the two. Russia has maintained a presence in Syria since Obama’s time to support the Syrian regime and in fighting ISIS. After Obama, President Trump has also coordinated with Russia over the past few years in accelerating the defeat of ISIS through forming a temporary partnership based around counterterrorism—something which Obama could not fully accomplish.

The Trump Administration’s objectives have been based on withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria as much as possible while leaving Russia to back the Assad regime through military force.  Where America has continued to utilize Russia in supporting Assad from the air and simultaneously in defeating ISIS. In reality, however, Russia is not content with being in the region since Syria is not a geopolitical imperative for Russia unlike, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltics; therefore, Russia has remained trapped in Syria.

Russia also hoped that cooperation with the U.S. by getting involved in the Syrian crisis could somehow aid in removing the U.S. and EU sanctions due to its Crimean annexation of 2014. Mike Pence suggested that the administration’s decision on sanctions would depend on whether “we see the kind of changes in posture by Russia and the opportunity perhaps to work on common interests,” including making common cause against the Islamic State. As for the E.U sanctions, they can be removed by the U.S. pressuring the Europeans through applying sanctions on Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which Europe depends on. Although Russia has learned to work around the sanctions, they have continued to pose a considerable amount of pressure on its economic health. Perhaps more importantly, Russia intervened in Syria to convey its material heft to the world, which makes more sense psychologically than strategically. Putin’s ultimate goal has been to show off Russia’s military capabilities and preserve its commercial interests. When Russia sustained an air campaign in Syria for an approximate period of two months, the world was amazed by its military capabilities. Putin is most concerned with the appearance of Russia’s strength.

Thus, Russia cannot withdraw from Syria without achieving some sort of military victory on paper. Otherwise, the whole Syrian intervention would be useless—a scenario that Putin wants to avoid at all costs. By creating a quagmire, America has restrained Russia in Syria to create further complications for Moscow since being in Syria would distract Russia from its primary geopolitical imperatives. This is why the Trump administration did not reject Russia’s presence in Syria after Obama’s departure as it did in comparison to the U.S. funding of rebels and the presence of American troops in Syria.

The justification for both the Trump and Obama administrations to coordinate with Russia is twofold: it enables the U.S. to focus its military power elsewhere, also trapping Russia in Syria, further economically straining the Kremlin. Russia will always remain a foe in America’s eyes and vice versa. Clinton, Bush, Obama all have tried to carve out Russia over the years since America’s policy revolves around Eurasia, and Trump is not so different. The installation of missiles in Poland in 2007, the Withdrawal from the Anti-missile ballistic treaty (ABM) in 2002, which was criticized by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, and NATO. Are are all indicators of the U.S-Russian rivalry, which goes back to 1917, and America has continuously tried to apply a different approach to prevent a rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia. The overall policy remains the same, but the styles and means of carrying out that will continue to change—successive presidents will employ different strategies in executing the same policy.

Russia’s role in Syria really demonstrates the United States’ paramount power: it wields a significant amount of influence in the Middle East despite the fact that U.S. relative power is diminishing. Putin thought that Syria would be a simple mission, which would help to restore Russia’s great power image, but reality begs to differ. So far, Russia has revolved around American policies within Syria, which is quite embarrassing for a self-described great power. This is because the Middle East remains within America’s sphere of influence, not Russia’s.

Turkey’s role strictly orbits around America’s policy towards Syria. Just days after the U.S. envoy for Syria arrived at Ankara in December 2018, Turkish President Erdoğan announced a Turkish incursion within northern Syrian. However, this was a massive blow to the Kurdish fighters in Syria- American allies. During the same month, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Robertson stated that any unilateral action within northeast Syria was “unacceptable”. This statement was released since the Turkish intervention would affect the U.S. relationship with its Kurdish partners, which Turkey planned on targeting. Following the Pentagon’s statement, Turkey paused its new military operation in northeast Syria as it found itself trapped between two conflicting views emerging in Washington. After the dispute was settled in Washington, a few days later, the Turkish president then announced the continuation of the military operation in northeast Syria. Erdoğan and Trump spoke by phone and agreed to ensure “more effective coordination” between their countries’ military operations in Syria. These events indicate that Turkey is broadly abiding by American policies.

When Trump decided for the second time in 2019 to withdraw more U.S. troops from Syria, it left Kurdish fighters in Syria even more exposed to Turkish military assaults. Why would the U.S. betray its allies in such a manner? The reason for the withdrawal was to help the Assad-regime regain its grip on the country, where it left the Kurds with no other alternative except to surrender and return to Assad, and once again come under his regime’s control. There was no other rational option that the Kurds could have pursued to maintain their survival. Thus, the withdrawal of U.S. troops has brought the U.S. plan one step closer to fruition, which is preserving the Syrian regime in a weakened state. James Jeffrey stated, “we want to have cooperation with Turkey across the board on all Syrian issues. He further pointed out that the Kurds were always a tactical maneuver in Syria.

Turkey has aided the U.S. plan for Syria by fighting ISIS and forcing Kurdish fighters to align themselves with the Assad regime. In early March of 2020, the Turkish shelling of the Russian-backed Assad regime forces left the regime vulnerable—having failed to protect their frontline against repeated Turkish and rebel assaults. However, Russia was unwilling to respond to Turkey’s actions. A week later, Russia and Turkey reached a cease-fire in Idlib province, which was subsequently violated by the Assad regime within 15 minutes of implementation. Moreover, Erdoğan warned a month later that Damascus would suffer “heavy losses” if it continued to violate the cease-fire, where the Syrian regime was using the novel coronavirus as a pretext to yet-again renege on the agreement.

Both Russia and Turkey have played a role in supporting U.S. policy in Syria, which is to preserve—in a weakened state—the Assad regime. Thus, Russia has allowed the Syrian regime’s hatred for the Turkish to manifest into military action, which would result in Turkey retaliating through its military assaults on the regime’s land forces, which would result in weakening the regime even further than it already is. As Russia helped the regime regain back most of the territory in Syria, it had simultaneously allowed occasional Turkish assaults on Syrian forces. This illustrates that both powers—Turkey and Russia—are working (wittingly or unwittingly) to achieve the U.S. plan in Syria- even though both sides have displayed animosity towards each other, but has not got in the way of supporting the U.S. America is able to achieve all this since the international system is based upon U.S. hegemony.

The American Plan for Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

Recent statements by US Ambassador to Greece, Geoffrey Pyatt, support the notion that Greek islands have rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. If Greece were to act upon these claims, Greece’s held small island of Kastellorzio cuts Turkey’s EEZ claims in half. But what if Turkey enforces its claimed maritime boundaries? How would Greece, neighboring states, and the US respond?

The Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) face an increasingly complex operational environment. Athens sits in an increasingly hostile region replete with irredentist neighbors, such as Turkey, and growing interest from the great powers, particularly from China and Russia. Despite common NATO membership, relations between Turkey and Greece have ebbed and flowed throughout the past 40 years, recently, intensifying over Cyprus, Aegean Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean. The transatlantic security partnership is buckling, under the weight of political nativism and the competing national interests of its member states.

In this new geopolitical environment, the HAF are outmatched in terms of size, military capabilities, and technology, I posit a scenario wherein Turkey decides to act on its territorial claims on the Greek islands in the Mediterranean Sea. In such a scenario, Ankara displays both the willingness and capability to carry out while a thorough examination of some of the HAF’s operational shortcomings, finally, what Athens can do to close the widening security gap with its hostile neighbors.

Turkey-Greece relations are arguably at their worst since 1974. In May, Greek and international media reported movement of Turkish special armed forces upon Greek sovereign territory along the Evros river, spanning the area of about 10 football fields. This followed heightened levels of Turkish aerial incursions into Greek airspace, which in recent years have become a near-daily occurrence. According to the Greek Ministry of Defense, Turkey has violated Greek airspace “thousands of times.”

Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey is demonstrating an increased willingness to use military power in pursuing its policy objectives,  Some key examples of this are Ankara’s invasion of northern Syria and deployment of Turkish military frigates to secure illegal oil drilling EEZ. President Erdoğan’s actions and rhetoric have provoked an immense backlash from many actors such as Egypt, Israel, and Greece who have been forced to ramp up elocutions as Turkey flexes its Mediterranean reach.

All these events have led to today’s crucial stakes, where the HAF finds itself in an entirely new defensive situation juxtaposed to a Turkish military that increasingly uses military power to further strategic goals in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s new agreement with the Tripoli Government (GNA) now places aggressive claims upon Greek islands, claiming maritime boundaries across the Eastern Mediterranean. These new boundaries have been condemned by the international community, despite the Tripoli Government’s recognition by the United Nations. President Erdoğan has also pushed Turkish armed forces to set up a base in Misrata, Libya, a front in the Libyan Civil War.

Greece has attempted to curtail Turkey’s rise in the Eastern Mediterranean through Operation IRINI and aggressive appeals to the EU and the United States, but these have been mainly unsuccessful. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ direct bilateral talks with President Erdoğan also have shown no progress. In July of 2020, Prime Minister Mitsotakis openly stated that Turkey’s new claims with the Tripoli Government are a “totally illegal memorandum of understanding” in international law.

Among the Turkish claims in the Eastern Mediterranean is the contentious and tiny island Kastellorizo and its smaller satellites, Ro and Stroggeli. These were granted to the Mussolini’s Italy through a series of agreements with Turkey and secured by Greece through the 1947 Treaty of Paris, a treaty that Turkey did not participate in, and thus, has never recognized Greece’s claims upon the island. The island is lightly defended by a small army base and an airstrip, and it has a population of fewer than 500 people. Still, its isolated location, far away from the major Greek islands, makes it a critical strategic location for Turkey to support its desired ambitions in the Mediterranean.

Over the past decade, Turkey has been increasing its amphibious war capabilities, continually improving its technologies to provide for sea-to-land invasions. One such example is the TCG-Anadolu, which can serve as a landing vehicle launched from nearby Aksaz Naval Base for Turkish Special Forces and marines, who have recently gained combat experience according to unclassified reports. Under the Mavi Vatan or “Blue Homeland” grand strategy, Turkey’s increased investments in the naval capabilities are a deliberate effort to expand its reach into the Aegean.

Greece is enforcing an EEZ in the region of Kastrellorizo that is four times its square meter area. Still, Turkey has ardently argued against this, pointing to the Turkish precedent against international accords, which state that islands cannot create EEZ’s. Weeks after the Turkey-GNA agreement, Turkish Foreign Ministry affirmed this view:

“The [Greek] islands cannot influence the coastal projection of Turkey, the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the islands on the opposite side of the middle line between two mainland areas cannot create maritime jurisdiction beyond their territorial waters.”

Notional Scenario, Phase 0: Turkey Prepares for the Operation

The year is 2023.  Due to a resurgent wave of opposition, President Erdoğan’s reelection chances are grim. His efforts to members within his own party and the crackdowns on journalists have not halted his domestic adversaries. Meanwhile, the economic situation has grown worse. At the same time, the Lyra declines in potency, and Turkey’s GDP stagnates. Predictions from world economists that damage from SARS-COV-2 could make the domestic economy collapse prove to be true.

Using the power of domestic media to his advantage, President Erdoğan disseminates anti-Greek propaganda and ramps up rhetoric about the unfair Treaty of Lausanne (the binding agreement that currently forms Greco-Turkish relations). He stokes nationalist morale against the upstart Greeks who have used their status as an EU member to pressure Turkey with its aggressive EEZ claims.

Inside Ankara, discussions occur that Turkey is not only capable of capturing a small, lightly-defended    Greek island like Kastellorizo, but the West’s lack of real response to powers’ seizure of territory (i.e., Russia and Crimea, China and Hong Kong) has set a new standard of apathy towards aggression. Surely, attacking the Greek capital of Athens would create an Article V, united NATO forceful response and possible additional responses from non-NATO nations such as Serbia, an Orthodox country, and nearby Egypt and Israel. Therefore, President Erdoğan must hammer the narrative on the international stage that Kastellorizo and its near satellites are (1) unjustly in Greek hands, (2) rightfully Turkish due to an agreement with the GNA, and (3) an encroachment of the West’s right to claim lands within non-Western nation-states.

Notional Scenario, Phase 1: “Checkmate”

Ankara’s tactical checkmate will rely on speed to get Athens to surrender its holdings on Kastellorizo in order to protect its small civilian population. The Turkish Air Force uses their classic antagonistic air tactics to create a diversion in the northern Aegean with fighter jets out of Balikesir Air Base. From naval ports near Marmaris, Turkey administers a naval blockade cutting off the potential for Greek authorities to intervene without shooting first.

The Turkish Armed Forces could use their superior firepower and special forces to attack the island of Kastellorizo within hours. Still, it is more likely Turkey will opt not to use force and instead encircle it in a hostage maneuver.

Athens is aware that the Turkish infantry is highly experienced due to recent campaigns in Syria and Libya. The Greeks could not risk a devastating loss if they fight for Kastellorizo, while an attack elsewhere on Turkey could jeopardize other Greek islands such as Rhodes, Lesvos, Chos, and Chios. Greece’s underfunded military could not last in such a considerable conflict that encompasses the entire Aegean. Therefore, Turkey’s “checkmate” tactic is accomplished without a single weapon being fired.

Notional Scenario, Phase 2: Diplomatic Unrest

Athens attempts to invoke NATO Article V, but member states are divided as the conflict is between two “allies.” Specifically, Germany, an unofficial foreman in EU-Turkey dialogues on the Syrian Refugee Crisis, would likely call for Turkish appeasement as President Erdoğan continues to press the threat of unleashing new immigration rhetorically.

Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., the U.S. would be forced into an awkward position of taking another stance in the Aegean Dispute. Although U.S. Ambassador Pyatt’s recent statements supported the notion of Greek EEZ’s on islands (thereby rejecting the Turkish view), American rhetoric in the 1996 Imia/Kardak dispute would likely follow the same precedent of status quo ante. The U.S. is non-party to UNCLOS, the standard that created EEZ’s; therefore, the U.S. would have no choice but to side against Greece’s claim on Kastellorizo.

Outside of the NATO alliance, new allies to Athens, Egypt, and Israel would not be in a position to respond due to the sheer speed of the Turkish Armed Forces. Aggressive hostility and possible drills would occur, yet neither states would make any drastic attempts to assist with force.

Notional Scenario, Phase 3: A Renegotiation of Lausanne

While maintaining a blockade on Kastellorizo and her satellites, President Erdoğan calls Athens to the table. The 1923 borders are at stake. States friendly to Turkey, such as Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Qatar, now recognize Kastellorizo as Turkish sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Turkish media proclaims President Erdoğan to be a hero for reclaiming so-called lost territory. His approval ratings skyrocket, ensuring a more extended claim on authority for years to come.

As an ongoing standoff in the Aegean continues, the western press loses interest. EU and NATO members such as France and Poland may spark pro-Greek rhetoric while outsiders such as Serbia call for attention, yet Greece will remain alone in negotiations. Depending on the situation, Turkey would call for (1) the end of Greece’s use of EEZs on offshore islands, such as Kastellorizo, Chios, Chos, and Lesvos, and (2) the recognition of its occupied portion of Cyprus as the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

How Can Greece Improve Readiness?

The HAF lacks two critical qualities that can be remedied: a quick reaction force (QRF) that can respond to a Turkish attack on its islands and sufficient deterrent capabilities to forestall a Turkish invasion. Although the HAF has special operations troops, including the noteworthy Raider Forces, they are too small to defend a 400 mile (643 km) coastline of islands in the Aegean.

Policymakers in Athens and HAF command should look to Israel as examples of a nation with a pristine QRF that can respond to any threat immediately. Although the two are not exactly similar in size, the Greek government could ask the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for development and assisted training of a QRF in exchange for Israeli use of its airspace for its training purposes. The QRF would be amphibious, highly mobile, and able to deploy within hours from designated locations on strategic Greek islands, such as but not limited to Kastellorizo, Rhodes, Crete, Lesvos, Chios, Limnos, or Samos. This new group of HAF volunteers or conscripts who have opted for the assignment can be deployed by sea or rotary-wing aircraft.

To challenge a naval blockade and amphibious assault on Kastellorizo, Greece could purchase the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile system, which is capable of deployment from the island and its satellites. Variants of the Gabriel have already been exported to nations with similar defense budgets (by fiscal dollars, not per GDP) such as Argentina, Chile, and South Africa.

Greece also needs more assistance on the possible threat of Turkish warships entering its waters. Perhaps the oldest and cheapest way to do so is through sea mines. The MANTA, an Italian shallow water sea mine, has a proven record of success against multi-billion dollar ships and is cost-effective for the underfunded Greeks.

Athens can also strengthen its relationship with the U.S. diplomatically, financially, and militarily. After the entrance of China into the European community, Prime Minister Mitsotakis can pivot to Silicon Valley and U.S.-based military companies by proclaiming his country to be the most technologically ambitious nation in Southern Europe. He would use the Huawei-U.S. technology competition to bargain a financial deal on technology and communications improvements designed to watch over the Aegean. Military industry contractors looking for procurement deals with the Pentagon could be encouraged to make agreements in efforts to test new technology, including 5G, for the benefit of the HAF.

Finally, Greece has a valuable port in Souda Bay, Crete, in which the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center [NMIOTC] trains allied operators (as seen above) for modern combat. Greece should leverage the base for a long-term deal with Washington to affirm the U.S.’s geostrategic interests in the region. As Russia now operates freely from warm Syrian waters, Libya continues its civil war, and anti-Western terrorist groups maneuver in Africa and the near east, the port is irreplaceable for the U.S. Prime Minister Mitsotakis, although contradictory to his persona, could ramp up rhetoric against the U.S. much in the same way that President Trump did with NATO, asking for extra spending. Mitsotakis could follow suit and use Trump’s tactic for Greece’s benefit.

Conclusion

Turkey can quickly seize Kastellorizo and her satellites without repercussions. Claims to the islands, unchallenged military defense, an unstable domestic economy, a robust military, and apathy from Western powers on the global stage are all significant factors that can push President Erdoğan into this operation.

Taking Kastellorizo could also be a final play by Turkish grand strategists to get Greece to renegotiate the defining principles of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which resulted in a Greek EEZ in the Aegean and Turkey ceding Cyprus (an agreement that Turkey has already broken). If Greece remains unprepared, it will lose territory, Turkey will gain a stronger foothold in quasi-internationally recognized Greek waters, NATO will remain submissive to an ally gone rogue, and Erdoğan will emerge as the dominant player in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Kastellorizo is the Key to Turkish & Greek Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past year, conflict in Libya has escalated dramatically. In April 2019, the rebel forces of General Khalifa Haftar – supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – led an offensive to seize the Libyan capital of Tripoli, home to the UN-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj – backed by Turkey and Qatar. Since then, the conflict has continuously intensified, killing hundreds and displacing 150,000. In recent weeks, violence has increased around Tripoli, with heightened shelling and attacks by Turkish armed drones.

As COVID-19 now spreads across the country, Libya’s already precarious health system risks collapse. As of March, clashes between the warring factions had damaged 27 health facilities. According to a former senior coordinator for US Assistance to Libya, COVID-19 patients are “competing for medical attention with the war wounded.” This has left Libyan authorities pleading for a ceasefire to redirect efforts toward the pandemic. Yet attacks on health facilities have multiplied, and a lack of medical equipment and professionals, as well as cuts to electricity and water supplies, compound the situation further.

For migrants, the situation is especially dire. Even before COVID-19 reached the region, disrupting refugee resettlement and grounding flights, Libya’s almost 700,000 migrants and refugees, and over 200,000 internally displaced people faced conditions of high precarity. “[A]rbitrary arrest by non-State actors, detention for indefinite periods of time, bonded labor, harassment and general exploitation,” according to the International Organization for Migration, already led many to flee across the Mediterranean to Europe. Nonetheless, EU and Italian efforts to decrease migration from Libya over the past three years have succeeded, despite strong condemnation from human rights groups. The ever-deteriorating humanitarian situation is leading the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to warn that more refugees now will attempt risky sea crossings.

For Europe, this presents an all-too-familiar challenge. Long before the most recent escalations, stabilizing the conflict in Libya had emerged as a key security matter for Europeans due to concerns about extremism and the country’s position as a departure point for refugees. Yet disagreement within the EU has hindered the bloc from taking meaningful action.

Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey have stepped up to fill the void left by a lack of European – and American – leadership. In late 2019, Russia, who supports Haftar, sent mercenaries to Libya in an attempt to further assert influence in the Middle East. Turkey responded by deploying troops in support of al-Sarraj’s government. A day after European officials issued a joint statement condemning this foreign interference for “fueling the crisis” and urging an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” Presidents Putin and Erdoğan jointly called for a ceasefire in the region.

Europe’s weak sway over the situation was further confirmed after a German-led international conference convened on January 19 to “[unify…] the International Community in their support for a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis.” The “Berlin Process” brought together not only high-level European officials, but also the leaders of Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, among others. The joint communiqué released after the conference called on all parties to respect the 2011 UN arms embargo and end foreign interference in the conflict – a demand Libyans themselves have been making since long before Turkey’s most recent action.

Yet on January 25, the UN Support Mission in Libya reported that the previous ten days had seen numerous cargo and other flights landing at Libyan airports “providing the parties with advanced weapons, armored vehicles, advisers and fighters.” Clearly, any European diplomatic success achieved in Berlin had been short-lived.

Such immediate and blatant flouting of the conclusions of the Berlin Process confirms that external actors’ ambitions in Libya continue to prevent meaningful international action to resolve the conflict. Beyond the recent escalations in Turkish and Russian interference, nationalist and anti-immigrant European leaders have hindered agreement on EU migration policy, and thereby, a collective response to the Libyan conflict. In March 2019, Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing nationalist Italian party “The League,” blocked an EU mission rescuing and transporting migrants from the Libyan coast to Europe. Likewise, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, with Hungarian support, later objected to restarting this same mission.

Mobile homes offer a unique living experience with the convenience of being able to move them to different locations. They are becoming increasingly popular due to their affordability and flexibility. Mobile Home provide an affordable way for people to own their own home without having to pay for expensive land or construction costs. They also provide a great way for people who want to travel or live in different places without having to buy multiple homes. With mobile homes, you can enjoy the same features and amenities as traditional houses, but with the added benefit of being able to move it wherever you want.

Yet in the face of the COVID-19 crisis and with the glaring void in global leadership left by the United States, the EU is stepping up to the geopolitical plate. In an attempt to finally fulfill French President Macron and European Commission President von der Leyen’s ambitions for the bloc, Europeans are working to coordinate a much-needed international response to the health crisis. France is spearheading G7 meetings and calling for debt suspension to allow African countries to manage the pandemic; and an EU-organized international fundraising conference raised $8 billion for laboratories working on a COVID-19 vaccine.

Such solidarity demonstrates that the EU is capable of meaningful coordination in times of crisis. As COVID-19 spreads throughout war-ridden Libya, dramatically exacerbating an already devastating situation for civilians and migrants alike, the EU must harness its recent show of global leadership to rise above the warring factions and spearhead a resolution to the conflict. A failure to do so would not only fuel criticism that the EU is unable, or unwilling, to forcefully exert leadership in hotbeds of conflict, but also perpetuate the ongoing humanitarian tragedy.

It’s Time for the EU to Lead in Libya was originally published on Global Security Review.

Currently, Russia holds a third of Europe’s gas imports and imports 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually through Ukrainian pipelines. The two most important reasons for Russia’s gas monopoly are economical and practical: distance and cost. Geographic proximity makes Russian gas not only more reliable than other competitors but also cheaper and closer.

Why Build Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream?

The pre-existing monopoly begs the question of why build two new pipelines, both of which have attracted ardent criticism from the United States and certain European countries. Many critics claim, for example, that Russia has the potential to exploit that energy dominance for political gain. Others argue that Nord Stream 2 would supply gas to Germany first, effectively removing other EU nations from the decision-making process and exacerbate inter-EU tensions.

However, building two new pipelines broadly serves Russian interests. Both projects not only cement Russia’s monopoly on gas but also open the door towards Russian gas exports reaching China as well as seize a share of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Nord Stream 2 mainly helps Russia export gas to the northern European market and bypass Ukraine and the corresponding political situation there. TurkStream also plays a role in circumventing Ukraine, carrying gas to south and southern Europe and Turkey.

To answer critics’ concerns about energy security, many European politicians point to proposed legislation that aims to prevent Russian market manipulation, long-term goals to address the security of supply challenges, and diversification away from fossil fuels. The Third Energy Package, for example, aims to liberalize and integrate natural gas markets—ultimately aiming to break up the Russian-state own monopoly (i.e., Gazprom and Rosneft).

The EU’s Energy Union strategy further commits to ensuring that every EU state has access to at least three different sources of gas. Additionally, many EU states are moving away from fossil fuels. Some Baltic states, for example, are developing LNG terminals (ex: the Klaipeda LNG terminal) to diversify their gas imports and supporting low-carbon energy sources.

Despite these attempts to become more energy-dependent, Europe truly does not have a leg to stand on. Up until 2030, Russian pipeline gas and global LNG will remain the two main sources of gas for the EU. Further, no significant pipeline gas that does not already originate in Russia will be available in the EU before 2025.

TurkStream

After the cancellation of Russia’s South Stream project in 2014, Russia quickly moved to replace one pipeline project with another. The South Stream project was led by Gazprom and aimed to transport Russian gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and, from there, disperse within Europe. However, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine, along with a regulatory dispute between Gazprom and the EU, the project was canceled.

In response, Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Turkish state-owned gas company) to construct TurkStream in December 2014. In 2019, TurkStream was officially completed and on January 8, 2020, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated TurkStream and certified it ready for use.

Nord Stream 2

In 2012, after the successful construction of the initial Nord Stream pipeline, Gazprom also moved to expand to additional lines (later named Nord Stream 2). In 2015, Gazprom signed an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, E.On, OMV, and Engie to build Nord Stream 2. Poland blocked this plan in 2017—leading Gazprom to develop a financing plan with Wintershall, Engie, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, and Uniper instead.

In 2018, Germany approved Nord Stream 2’s construction permits in German waters. Although the U.S. has threatened sanctions on companies that work with Gazprom—causing Allseas to pull its support—Gazprom has claimed that it would complete construction alone and would finish by 2020.

Many observers note that TurkStream is likely a counter to the original U.S. backed Southern Gas project, which was developing a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe and that Nord Stream 2 is a bid to replace Ukraine as a transit state. Not surprisingly, members of the U.S. government have expressed concern over TurkStream and Nord Stream 2—claiming that it threatens European energy independence and security.

Many Central and Eastern European states see the pipeline as an attempt to undermine European unity and bypass transit states such as Poland and Ukraine—also depriving those countries of transit fees. However, Germany has argued that the pipeline was purely market-driven. In response to threatened U.S. sanctions, Germany warned the U.S. to “mind its own business.”

Together, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 provide Russia with over 140 bcm in capacity—amounting to almost the same as Ukraine’s total transit capacity. TurkStream not only provides Russia with a stronger monopoly on gas in southern and southeastern Europe but also strengthens an already-strong Turkish-Russian relationship. Given the financial incentives to be Europe’s new gas hub, it is no wonder that Nord Stream 2 has also led to a stronger German-Russian relationship.

Russia’s Energy Dominance: Reinforced

The construction of TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 reinforce Russia’s dominance of the energy market, even though it may not lead to the political leverage that many critics expect. With one pipeline already completed and another expected in 2020, both TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 illustrate Russia solidifying its grip on the European market while also expanding its reach to other markets. This monopoly on gas is strengthened by Europe’s gas market—where demand is only growing.

In 2019, Europe imported 123 bcm of gas last year, nearly twice as much as 2017. Further, critics who point to energy security and independence, such as the U.S. do not affect policy in practice. While sanctions against working with Gazprom have somewhat of an effect in cooling interest, in this case, economic interests trump security interests. Russia’s geographic proximity to Europe means that Russian gas will be closer and cheaper than other competitors for the foreseeable future.

However, while Europe’s gas markets may be inherently dependent on Russian gas, Russia is similarly reliant on the European market as a buyer for its gas. In short, Europe is Russia’s most important market for Russian natural gas exports. This limits Russia’s ability to manipulate energy politically without severely compromising its economic relations with Europe. Therefore, Russian renewed energy dominance in Europe is certainly on the horizon with the imminent arrival of Nord Stream 2 and preexisting TurkStream. However, it is not nearly as concerning as Russophobic critics would have the public believe.

Russia’s Renewed Energy Dominance in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

“We have already drilled two wells in waters to the east and west of the island of Cyprus, and the [ship] Yavuz will be drilling our third well. Such activities will continue with determination,” Turkish Energy Minister Fatih Donmez recently said at the Turkey Energy Summit.

Current drilling by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government has provoked a wide array of actors in the Eastern Mediterranean including Israel and Egypt, both U.S. allies. Illegal Turkish drilling vessels in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are even accompanied by military vessels. The activity has many in Nicosia and abroad worried as international oil companies have major stakes in the region since the discoveries of hydrocarbons off of the Cypriot coast several years ago.

Why is the Eastern Mediterranean so vital to the world economy? The U.S. Geological Survey believes 122 trillion cubic feet of gas is in the area, however, the exact potential for gargantuan wealth to be found is yet to be confirmed. The area contains a vast amount of potential energy for Europe, which is heavily reliant on imported gas. This is especially true for the EU’s dependence on imported gas from Russia, the world’s second-largest exporter with a roughly 18.6% share of global production. European energy needs are extremely crucial for the global economy, and, of course, the President of the United States, as he is using the message of U.S. economic growth and record-level fossil fuel production as a foundation for his 2020 campaign.

Meanwhile, since the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, states that once held no close ties with one another are now actively working together to maintain regional security. For the past decade, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel engaged in trilateral talks on energy cooperation for electricity and oil (catching the attention of communities at home, an inspiration for the creation of a “Hellenic-Israeli Alliance” in the U.S. Congress). Gas pipelines are currently under development and will reach into Europe via the Greek mainland.

The “Energy Triad” made progress with neighboring Egypt as well. In fact, Israel has begun exporting gas to Egypt as obstacles impeding cooperation are removed while Cyprus announced a strengthening of ties with Egypt through economy and tourism. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi also seeks to strengthen and modernize Egypt’s navy in response to the threat posed by Turkey in the region to protect the country’s growing Mediterranean and Red Sea oil and natural gas interests.

“Countries that were once not talking are now coming together”, said Georgios Lakkotrypis, Cypriot Minister of Energy and Commerce in a recent interview. Talks between the four have brought Italy, Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority to the table.

The restructuring of alliances to hedge against Turkey is similar to the unofficial anti-China coalition forming in the South China Sea, as powers are converging against Beijing—so are Mediterranean powers against Ankara. Yet Moscow has emerged as another major player in the Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not only been instrumental in the aid of Syrian President Bashir Al Assad’s government but also recently sold the S-400 missile system to America’s NATO ally, Turkey. Congress then barred Turkey from acquiring the American F-35 fighter as punishment—further straining Turkey’s relations with the West and undermining its reliability as an ardent partner in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, since the Greek-led 1974 coup d’état in Cyprus and subsequent Turkish invasion, the island has been divided, with Turkish forces illegally occupying the north while the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls the south. With no military except for a small defense force, outfitted with small patrol boats and anti-tank weapons from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Cypriot government is essentially defenseless. But Russian influence in the region is further complicated by Cyprus’ decision to actively hold Russian money, leading to skepticism regarding the inclusion of Cyprus into the American sphere. However, a recent U.S. Congressional delegation announced that the Cypriot government is working to terminate the laundering boogeyman head-on.

What are the options for President Trump with an increasingly aggressive Turkey and a resurgent Russia in the region—as an entente of economic and military cooperation forms in the Eastern Mediterranean?

John Gay, Executive Director of the John Quincy Adams Society, a nonpartisan Washington, D.C. based organization whose stated aim is to steer foreign policy conversation in direction of “More strategy. Less war”, takes the issue of Turkish self-interest back to the President’s administration:

“Trump has rightly pointed out that many U.S. allies do not do much to defend themselves, instead preferring to rely on the United States to defend them. The best way out of this is for those allies to become more capable of defending themselves. This has a twofold benefit for the United States: first, they do more (or all) of the fighting; second, they have a stronger interest in their own survival and well-being than we do, so they can make more credible commitments and threats against those that endanger them than we can make on their behalf. That’s especially true with a state like Cyprus since we don’t have a formal alliance commitment to them. If we believe a strong, independent Cyprus offers benefits to U.S. security, letting them buy our weapons is a way to get that on the cheap.”

The first option for the President is to make arms and modern radar systems available for Cypriot purchase to improve the country’s defensive capabilities, including but not limited to: short- and medium-range artillery, guided anti-tank missiles, and surface-to-air missile technology. At present, Cyprus remains barred from purchasing weapons from the U.S. A bipartisan bill to lift the Cyprus arms prohibition, co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Marco Rubio (R-FL), failed to make it out of the Senate.

However, within the new National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section 1270I, the prohibition can be lifted so long as one major obstacle is overcome: Russia (See: Section 1270I, e, 1, a and b). For Cyprus to receive arms from the U.S., it must first cooperate with Washington to counter Russian money laundering in Cypriot banks and terminate any refueling of Russian naval vessels that frequent the island on Eastern Mediterranean patrols.

The President may waive these requirements for one year if he chooses (See: Section 1270I e, 2). Arming Cyprus could be an effective way to apply pressure to a NATO ally pursuing objectives contrary to the interests of the United States.

Another option for President Trump is to reduce, block, or obfuscate Turkey’s role in NATO. Erdoğan values its membership in NATO, but Turkey’s membership is only one means to arm and defend itself (as the case was made when they purchased weapons from Russia). President Emmanuel Macron of France has already vehemently condemned Ankara’s actions in the Cypriot EEZ and recently dispatched French naval forces to deter further Turkish actions in the area.

While European Council President Donald Tusk recently affirmed that “the European Union stands united behind the Republic of Cyprus and expects Turkey to respect sovereign rights of the member states,” the situation is further complicated by Erdoğan’s cooperation in certain areas, such as participating in the Defeat ISIS Coalition. “Turkey opened its military bases to the United States and Coalition partners in July 2015. Since that time, Incirlik Air Base has been critical in the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” the U.S. State Department said earlier this year.

However, taking action against Ankara may backfire, Turkey could pivot even further towards Moscow and Tehran. The three have already met to discuss the future of Syria without the consultation of the United States. Estranging Turkey from NATO cooperation could ultimately backfire as the U.S. could lose an ally for its future Eurasian interests.

The final, most immediate, and detrimental action against Turkey is economic sanctions—a move that may further exacerbate the state of Western-Turkish relations. Turkey is very dependent on foreign investor influence, especially Germany. Trade between the EU and Turkey is valued at approximately $220 billion. U.S. trade with Turkey is worth some $24 billion. While European and American political parties may be easy to jump to economic retaliatory means, they must also remember Erdoğan’s trump card.

The Turkish president has publicly stated that if Western powers take action against him, he will retaliate by sending over 3.6 million Syrian refugees to Europe. The Turkish economy has already felt a considerable impact with the recent devaluation of the Lira and, theoretically could save a significant amount of money by sending refugees to Europe if hit by further economic hardship (although Europe, and possibly the U.S., would almost certainly retaliate to impose further economic costs on Turkey).

President Trump must make a decision along with the support of lawmakers and the Pentagon that will uphold international law and standards on illegal economic activities by entities of one state in the EEZ of another sovereign state. Turkey’s illegal oil drilling shows no signs of abating in a region vital to the global economy and crucial to U.S. geopolitical interests.

Turkish Oil Drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ Threatens to Destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean was originally published on Global Security Review.

Up until the Libyan National Army (LNA) reached the southern outskirts of Tripoli, the campaign somewhat resembled a sneak attack. The LNA is lead by General Khalifa Haftar, an ex-Libyan Army officer who served under Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. From 1990 to 2011, Haftar lived in exile in the United States, returning to Libya in 2011 during the country’s revolution, holding a senior position in the group that overthrew Gaddafi’s regime.

In Haftar’s rhetoric, the assault is described merely as a campaign to liberate the capital from the extremist Islamic groups governing it. These assertions do have some logic to them, apart from the fact that the purported extremist groups aren’t overtly specified. Nevertheless, attempting to capture the capital—let alone effectively administering the country after a victory—may prove to be a bridge too far.

General Haftar Gains Ground

Ever since the chaotic events of 2011, Haftar has nearly continuously fought against jihadists, managing to achieve significant territorial gains. In earlier campaigns, some of his troops are known to have committed war crimes, but it would be a fallacy to assume no such crimes were committed by extremist groups on the opposing side.

Since the fall from power and subsequent death of Muammar al-Gaddafi in late 2011, Libya has lacked an effective central government. After a transition period, elections were held in 2012, which resulted in violence and left the country without functioning state organs. Concurrently, as an interim governing authority was established in Tripoli, Haftar struck an alliance with the rival governing body, the House of Representatives in Tobruk, Libya.

The legitimacy of the Tobruk-based government is itself disputed. Initially, it was recognized by the West, most likely in the hope that it would ultimately unite with the Tripoli-based government. This optimism could be deemed naïve, especially after Haftar quickly managed to mobilize an army (the Libyan National Army) primarily from Gaddafi-era officers and soldiers, with support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The LNA succeeded in capturing various cities in Eastern Libya, including Benghazi, after defeating ISIS and Shura Council forces in 2017.

After gaining power over Libya’s vital oil production areas in 2016, Haftar temporarily lost the key export ports of Brega, Es Sidr, and Ras Lanuf, but was able to reestablish control over them shortly after that. In contrast to their successes in eastern Libya, Haftar and his allies lost control over Tripoli’s international airport in 2014. However, heavy fighting damaged the airport’s facilities—if not even ruined them—rendering the airport inoperable.

In the wake of these clashes, Misrata-led armed groups and their allies formed the “Libya Dawn” coalition and took over the capital. In December 2015, Libya’s two main rivals—the House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based Libya Dawn coalition—reached an agreement over the formation of a UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), which was formed in Spring 2016.

Clashing Congressmen in the Capital

The supreme authority in Tripoli is the Presidential Council (PC), made up of nine members and chaired by the prime minister. Some members of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives never accepted the idea of a GNA, leaving little chance for any future cooperation. This is unsurprising, however, given that in any merger, members of both power centers would lose standing relative to their current positions.

Notably, the head of the GNA—Fayez Al-Sarraj—was a member of the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Regardless, this detail never fostered trust between the rival factions, nor did it prevent Haftar from seizing valuable oil installations in southern Libya.  Initially occupied by armed clans and militant groups, the GNA had to send troops to protect these facilities from Haftar’s advancing forces.

On the other hand, Haftar isn’t the only one causing gray hairs for Libya’s newly formed state institutions. Basing its mandate on the General National Congress elections of 2012, the Government of National Salvation of Khalifa Ghwell was also founded in Tripoli, though without any real governing structures. In 2016, Ghwell again tried to reassert his position but failed. The following year, he and his troops were finally ousted from the capital. Even though Ghwell’s possibilities were limited, the intra-Tripoli clashes 2016–2017 challenged Al-Sarraj’s regime, and in turn, provided momentum for Haftar to slowly approach the capital.

It is likely that internal rivalries existed amongst decision-makers in Tobruk, and that Al-Sarraj was expected to loyally support the aims of the eastern Libya-based House of Representatives. Instead, in the eyes of his former colleagues, he became too independent and powerful through his apparatus in Tripoli, which led to open confrontation between rival factions.

Despite any doubts held concerning Al-Sarraj’s loyalty, not all parliamentarians in Tobruk supported Haftar’s final push towards Tripoli. Dozens pledged their support for the general, but a number rejected the use of force and urged their colleagues to convene and elect a new chairperson. Those dissenting viewed the incumbent as a close ally of Haftar, but failed to gather the necessary quorum to hold a vote until later, but were unable to effectuate any meaningful action.

Foreign Friends & Funding

Despite sharp divisions between those allied with him, Haftar had no problem commencing his campaign to seize Tripoli. When Haftar ordered his troops to “liberate” Tripoli on April 4, 2019, he had already secured Saudi-Arabian backing as well as support from Egypt and the UAE. GNA forces shot down UAVs that were reported to be of Emirati origin, even though the UAE was not officially involved. Furthermore, it is likely that Saudi funding financed the Tripoli campaign, including pay for soldiers.

On the surface, it would seem paradoxical that Haftar—a man whose stated purpose is combating extremism—is funded by Saudi Arabia’s Wahabbi monarchy. However, considering that Libyan extremists mainly subscribe to a different strain of Islamic fundamentalism than the Saudis, the paradox is not so striking. Turkey, a major regional rival of the Saudis, has provided support and backing to Al-Sarraj and wasted no time in denouncing Haftar’s move against Tripoli. Ankara has also been accused of transporting fundamentalist militants to Libya from areas that were formerly controlled by ISIS, and more recently, of arming GNA forces.

Fervent Egyptian support for Haftar is similarly complex. President Al-Sisi has taken a hard line against Islamist movements—notably the Muslim Brotherhood—but such predilections have yet to deter Egyptian participation in a Saudi-funded operation. From Cairo’s perspective, ensuring extremist groups stay away from Egypt and its vicinity is a goal that justifies even minor procedural deviations.

Similarly, French decision-making is heavily guided by security concerns. France’s strategy of ambiguity, however, merits some explanation. In 2011, airstrikes carried out by French fighter jets, alongside British and U.S. planes, were instrumental in ousting Gaddafi. Shortly after that, however, Paris began to support Haftar’s campaign against militant fundamentalists in Libya. France vetoed a UN Security Council resolution over Libya’s current situation, which was perceived as too unilaterally condemning of Haftar, illustrating France’s pragmatic approach.

More recently and in a logical continuation of its strategic ambiguity, France called on the UN Security Council to facilitate a settlement in Libya. After Al-Sarraj threatened western energy companies operating in Libya over the status of their operating licenses, France relaxed its seemingly supportive stance towards Haftar’s LNA. While exhibiting sympathy for the endangered GNA in Tripoli, as well as a willingness to serve as an intermediary, Paris is increasingly aware that it’s unlikely a negotiated settlement will be reached.

Al-Sarraj’s threat similarly applies to Italian firms. While the Italian government has held meetings with representatives of both sides, it has mostly limited itself to rhetorically highlighting the need for a political solution to the conflict. While Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s position as the head of a populist left- and right-wing populist governing coalition is a question in-and-of-itself, the primary reason for the Italian government’s intransigence is likely the ongoing refugee crisis. Italy has been a prime destination for migrants setting off from the Libyan coast, and is, rather cynically, weighing which of the warring parties is best-positioned to stem (if not stop entirely) the substantial influx.

In contrast, Libya’s neighbor Tunisia is not so concerned about possible refugees, not least because Haftar controls most of the Libyan side of the Libyan-Tunisian border. If allegations of Tunisian arms sent to Tripoli and fighters joining GNA are true, Tunis may have lost one income source. Still, a humanitarian catastrophe next door would cause significant economic and social problems for Tunisia as well.

For its part, Russia denies involvement in the escalation in Libya. In the past, Moscow has provided Haftar’s forces with arms, and Russian private security firms have reportedly been engaged in operations within Libya. The Kremlin, however, is more focused on the international legal precedents that would be established in the event of a UN-brokered settlement, so as to be able to later refer to it as a model for resolving internal conflicts. If Western powers—mainly the U.S., France, Britain, and Germany—agree to a UN-brokered settlement, the precedent established in Libya could be used by Moscow to settle, on its own terms, internal conflicts it has provoked through the creation of quasi-states like Transnistria, Abkhazia, and the Donetsk People’s Republic, to name a few.

Haftar advances towards Tripoli

As the UN voiced its concern over impending hostilities— in vain—Haftar’s forces closed in on the capital along the two main roads that run parallel to one another into Tripoli. The initial phase was rather quick, and Haftar’s troops succeeded in advancing to the Tunisian border in the west and Janzur on the western outskirts of Tripoli, essentially cutting the city off from any supplies or reinforcements, leaving just two small GNA-loyal pockets along the coast. In the opposite direction, this also prevents possible refugees from crossing over to Tunisia.

Shortly after that, the LNA lost one airplane, reportedly due to technical failures. The LNA bombed the city’s only functioning airport, Mitiga, which was closed for several days. Once again, the heaviest fighting has been concentrated in and around the old airport, located roughly 30 kilometers south of the city center. For now, Haftar is in control the airport itself, with enemy forces just yards away.

Situated between the two main roads leading to Tripoli from the south, the airport serves as a crucial foothold to block access to the city, as well as a forward base from which to conduct further operations. Together with Janzur (had its capture succeeded—instead, around 140 of Haftar’s men were besieged and captured) and a strategic intersection close to the suburb of Tajoura, these gains would offer optimal positions from which to lay siege to the city. Or, if the LNA manages to establish a hold on the old airport, Janzur isn’t even needed, since the LNA already controls Surman, which blockades the area west of Al-Zawiyah.

As of this article’s publication, the LNA’s main base of operations remains in Gharyan, some 60 kilometers from Tripoli, whereas the frontline goes from the Qaser Bin Ghashir suburb adjacent to the old airport. Gharyan itself closes a counterattack route via Kilka—the corner of the vast GNA-loyal enclave situated behind the LNA—just southwest of Tripoli. The LNA’s loss of Al-Aziziyah was a setback, and fierce fighting continues around it and the old airport. The LNA has managed to achieve minor territorial gains around Al-Aziziyah, and for a short period, were able to progress to the Tripoli Medical Center, roughly 10 kilometers from the city center.

Overall, the LNA has been unable to break through the Tripoli defense lines, which have been reinforced by fighters from Misrata. If Haftar were to concentrate all his forces in Tripoli, it would weaken his flanks, leaving his positions open to a possible counterattack from Misrata—towards Bani Walid or from along the eastern coast. Conversely, by drawing in and binding as many Misrata-based armed groups as possible to the Tripoli trenches, Haftar diminishes the likelihood of a counterattack from Misrata.

Launching an assault on a new front along the coast by Sirte is another tactic Haftar could employ to prevent any attacks on his forces from the rear. On the other hand, however, it implies that breaking through Tripoli’s southern defenses proved harder than initially expected. Thus, clashes remain sporadic, but increasingly heavy shelling has inflicted large amounts of damage on the southern Tripoli suburbs, as thousands have fled amidst a death toll that has risen into the hundreds. Even if the fighting remains localized, the situation could worsen quickly. With deteriorating living conditions, there is a risk of a far greater humanitarian crisis.

No easy solution

Escalation into a full-scale civil war cannot be excluded, given the aspirations of the involved parties. As the capital plays a strategic role, capturing it would solidify—to an extent—Haftar’s control over Libya. Nevertheless, maintaining control over crossroad towns such as Tarhouna, Bani Walid, Waddan, and a small village east of Sirte remains vital for LNA operations in the northwest of Libya.

On the other hand, Al-Sarraj’s most effective (and likely only) way to remain in power is to defeat Haftar’s LNA at Tripoli’s gates. A counterattack from Misrata or anywhere else would bog down forces plus weaken the capital’s southern defenses. Thus, the GNA’s primary objective is ensuring that the main routes into Tripoli remain closed to the LNA to preclude the possibility of a siege on the city.

In the event of an all-out civil war, there would be no victors. First and foremost, the death toll would likely rise into the tens of thousands, and it would take substantial time and resources to rebuild Libya after another civil war. Hafter can’t afford to lose the battle for Tripoli, as it would mean the end of his career. If Haftar is victorious, the population of Tripoli isn’t likely to welcome him as a liberator, thus forcing him into a long campaign to win their hearts and minds.

Likewise, if the GNA prevails, it cannot be sure whether the various armed groups backing it now would subsequently submit to its authority. This would be particularly so if the decisive factor delivering the victory were troops from Misrata, who might seek a more significant share of power, encouraged by their successes and perceived leverage. In this scenario, the intra-Tripoli situation from 2016-2017 would likely repeat itself. Furthermore, several armed groups remain, among whom are former ISIS militants, who could take advantage of factional infighting. Such groups are unlikely to submit to the rule of a central governing authority, and whoever should prevail in Tripoli must effectively deal with these factions—or else the next conflict is already looming.

Haftar Ante Portas Tripoli was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of course, much has been said about Brexit over the past years, so much so that it has become nearly impossible to escape the daily dose of Westminster’s drama. Economic experts have warned of the potential danger of exiting the E.U. without a deal, to then warn of the genuine damage that Britain’s Brexit limbo is doing to the economy. British entrepreneurs have been split on the consequences of the vote, with some embracing the opportunities that free trade agreements beyond the E.U. framework might bring, and others complaining of the reduction in market access and the difficulties in attracting skilled workers to the country.

Political activists, journalists, and experts have been mobilized as early as the Brexit vote, providing commentaries, analyses, and opinions on the thousand political, social and historical implications of the referendum result. Immigrants, from both the EU and beyond, have either stoically braced themselves hoping for a painless outcome, or packed their bags and given up on a country that has made its views so painfully clear. In short, and whatever political inclination one might have, one thing is sure: the Brexit quagmire has profoundly altered the fabrics of British society, irreversibly changing how the nation-state functions, exists and is perceived, both domestically and abroad. 

There is, however, one segment of British society that, arguably more than others, encapsulates the dramatic changes occurring in the post-Brexit landscape and, ironically, it is the same segment that has created the conditions for its demise. The irresponsibility of the British political class and its increasingly apparent detachment from various societal predicaments has led to a forceful renegotiation of the pact between government and individuals, whereby deep-seated resentments have found their way into a new wave of mainstream ultra-nationalism.

With the era of austerity—prompted by the collapse of the global financial system—weighing heavily on the shoulders of the poor and shrinking the middle class, the rescue of the super-rich by governments entrenched in neoliberal market logic has opened the door for a general reassessment of the political order, and for a growing mistrust towards the promised benefits of the current status quo. The global landscape further played a role in creating such a strong polarisation.

The E.U.’s eastbound expansion has put the Kremlin on high alert, encouraging Putin to a more proactive role in propping up Eurosceptic leaders, as he funnels millions into the pockets of parties such as the French Front National, the German Alternative for Germany, the Italian La Lega, and, allegedly, the British “Leave.EU” campaign team. Simultaneously, the legacy of the war in Syria has had far-reaching socio-political implications, effectively increasing the gap between nativist and non-nativist groups in Europe and framing European political discourse along the lines of the “Us vs. Them” paradigm.

It is in this context of fear, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement that nationalistic sentiments find their way to the dinner table, as mainstream society becomes progressively more exposed to narratives advocating for the reform of internationalism, a retreat from the global, and a general denunciation of the foreign. This was, after all, the pillar upon which the Brexit campaign was built, and the underlying message that resonated the most with the public. “Take back control” became the simplest and most effective way to channel the entire spectrum of pro-Brexit stances into a hopeful slogan, but also to tap into the primary driver of people’s anxieties – the widespread sense of abandonment and impotence, and the promise of social redemption. 

The Politics of Politics

It is likely that historians will write down Cameron’s decision to hold the E.U. referendum as one of the greatest political miscalculations in British history. As the story goes, the former British Prime Minister called the Brexit referendum in the hopes of consolidating the unity of the Conservative Party ahead of the 2015 general elections, effectively tying British membership to the E.U. to strategic considerations of party politics.

As leader of a party that had traditionally maintained a certain scepticism towards the European Union—perfectly encapsulated in Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, in which she claimed: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels”—Cameron knew that the easy “remain” victory he had anticipated and hoped for would help him consolidate his leadership, draw the hardliners out of his party, and finally put the E.U. issue to bed. Even more, Cameron hoped that the promise of a referendum would be enough to stave off the risk that the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP)—which had made of anti-immigration and anti-E.U. sentiments the pillars of its political agenda—would attract conservative votes and play in favor of the Miliband-led Labour Party: “Look, we have heard the message loud and clear about the things you want to see changed. We will change those things”—he pleaded—“come with us, come back home to us rather than risk all of this good work being undone by Labour.” 

People did hear him, loud and clear. Not only was Cameron re-elected into a second term, but he had also won a majority that, however thin, allowed him to head the first majority conservative government for twenty years. The cheering in Downing Street, however, might have been short-lived. According to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Cameron did not expect to win a majority in 2015; rather, he thought that he would again have a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, who would promptly block the referendum in exchange for concessions on the alternative vote in local elections.

Had things gone to plan, Cameron would have arguably had his cake, eaten it, and enjoyed it too. He would have stabilized his party, silenced the E.U. issue among conservative MPs, inflicted a severe defeat to UKIP, scared the E.U. into renegotiating some of the most disputed aspects of British membership, and secured another five years into government without taking responsibility for a referendum that was promised but never happened. But with the ideologically-awkward, yet politically-convenient, Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition now out of the picture, Cameron had to deliver on the promise made: give British citizens an in/out option on the EU. As Tusk put it: “Paradoxically David Cameron became the real victim of his victory.”

With the referendum now sure to take place, further political miscalculations were made by the Prime Minister in the run-up to the vote. By late 2015, the House of Lords passed a motion with a majority of 82 to lower the voting age to 16, which was aimed at enfranchising youngsters to politics and give them a voice on the E.U. referendum. While Brexiteers predictably trembled at the prospect—as the “leave” and “remain” camps were segmented along  “old” and “young” demographic lines—Cameron too firmly rejected the idea, fearing that left-inclined young voters would turn the tide against the conservatives in future general elections. Thus, putting again party politics before the upcoming E.U. vote, Cameron disenfranchised around 1.5 million potential young voters that were likely to vote “remain.” In retrospect, considering that “leave” won by approximately 1.2 million votes, a young pro-E.U. vote could have indeed saved Cameron’s political career. 

The voting age miscalculation was not the only one committed by the government, but one of the many that occurred since the referendum was promised in January 2013. Above all, there was Cameron’s inability to appreciate popular moods concerning the question of Britain’s E.U. membership, which in turn severely restricted his chances of selling home the new deal he negotiated with Brussels after the 2015 elections.

The popular argument is that Cameron’s attempt to revisit the parameters of the UK-E.U. relationship was mostly unsatisfactory—or as The Sun put it, “pathetic” and “gutless”—and that he should have pressed for more concessions. While there might be some truth in this, since Cameron had repeatedly downplayed the chances of a “leave” vote to E.U. leaders—even commenting back in 2014 that he would easily win “by 70:30”—the three main miscalculations lied elsewhere.

First, Cameron believed that the concessions obtained from the EU, particularly in relation to the issue of immigration, would be enough to sway popular consensus towards the “remain” camp, as he misread people’s anxiety as stemming from in-work benefits for E.U. immigrants (which he managed to renegotiate) instead of from the numbers of E.U. immigration (which he could not).

Immigration ranked first among people’s top concerns, and although the “emergency break” on benefits was aimed at discouraging new migrants from moving to Britain, it was surely not enough to placate the fears of the British people. Second, Cameron failed to read the overarching mood and narratives driving the Brexit campaign, which had become increasingly polarising, slogan-driven, and dominated by strong popular emotions. There was arguably little room for in-depth analyses of the legal niceties of the summit’s set of conclusions, and many of the concessions obtained were either lost in the wind or swept under the carpet by Brexiteers, who simply adjudged they amounted to nothing as they were not binding. Third, and perhaps even more importantly, Cameron’s failure to bring home concrete results that practically addressed people’s fears, directly played into one of the most effective Brexit tropes, one which claims that Britain has given up its sovereignty to the EU.

When Ian Duncan Smith, Cameron’s former Work, and Pensions Secretary, lashed out at German Chancellor Angela Merkel accusing her of directly sabotaging the government’s efforts to control immigration, the British press went on overdrive. The Sun, which claims 33.3 million readers each month, promptly ran the news story titled: “Cam’s in her hans: Germany SABOTAGED David Cameron’s E.U. renegotiation, and he let them, IDS [Ian Duncan Smith] sensationally claims,” in which Ian Duncan Smith’s point was clearly made: “The Germans said from the outset, you are not getting border control. Full stop… We put ourselves in a compliant position to another country which doesn’t have your best interests necessarily at heart… We are now in a worse position than we were before.”

Here lay one of Cameron’s main miscalculations, or perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of his political naïveté. The prime minister hoped that he could both quell the “leave” side’s unrest by securing a better deal with the E.U.—which would have in turn afforded him an almost certain victory in the referendum—while simultaneously win over E.U. leaders, Merkel above all, by forcing them to make concessions on free movement.

Of course, no one in Brussels was willing to sacrifice the unity and fundamental principles of the Union to get Cameron out of the political jam he had put himself into. This meant that, when the E.U. deal was brought back home with accusations of German interference and of Cameron’s incompetence, Brexiteers were able to find yet another reason to push for the “leave” vote. As UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage commented: “[David Cameron] is not aiming for any substantial renegotiation… no promise to regain the supremacy of Parliament, nothing on ending the free movement of people and no attempt to reduce Britain’s massive contribution to the E.U. budget”.

With the deal being presented to the public as nothing short of a major disappointment, pro-leave elites came to be equipped with the perfect rhetorical weapon which allowed them to tie together the issue of immigration with the issue of sovereignty: if Britain wanted a chance at regulating the migration flux into its borders, it had to make itself “independent” from the European Union.

The final, fatal blow to David Cameron’s “remain” campaign was delivered by a series of misguided steps that the prime minister took as he attempted to keep the Conservative Party united and avoid public clashes between high-profile conservative MPs. Indeed, by the time he returned to London with an underwhelming set of promises on the future of Britain’s relationship with the EU, the pro-Brexit faction in Westminster was in full swing, relentlessly campaigning to give Britain a supposed “independence” from Brussels. With the European Research Group (ERG) moving conservative MPs towards a hard-Brexit stance that was directly opposed to the European ambitions of their party leader, two senior figures in the conservative party, Michael Gove—himself a ERG member—and Boris Johnson, came to the forefront of the “leave” campaign as early as February 2016, the former out of (primarily) principles, the latter out of (primarily) ambitions. 

In line with his overarching belief that “remain” would get an easy win, and that remaining in Europe was, by all means, the sensible thing to do, Cameron rested assured that both MPs would back him in the campaign out of loyalty to the premiership, out of friendship, and out of reason. The miscalculation, however, proved itself costly. Indeed, not only was Cameron forced to resort to convoluted maneuvers to soften the blow when his friends moved to the other side—first by attacking Johnson and then calling for a truce—but it also meant that the leave campaign could now benefit from the support of two, high-profile conservatives.

Indeed, both Gove and Johnson had different ideas from David Cameron when it came to Europe, as throughout their political career both had, more or less publicly, argued cases against Brussels’s legislative influence over London, as well as criticized EU’s laws on free movement. More than that, the former London mayor saw in the Brexit referendum the political opportunity of a lifetime, as he reasoned that, although Brexit was a major political gamble, it could offer the perfect chance to advance his trajectory to Downing Street, effectively guaranteeing him enough conservative support to prop him up to become next prime minister, either after the end of Cameron’s mandate or after his resignation.

On the other hand, Michael Gove’s Brexit stance was underpinned by a stronger Euroscepticism, by an ever-lingering sense of ideological fatigue, and by an equally strong Orientalism which had made him a central player during the “Trojan Horse’ affair—a scandal that eventually contributed in convincing Cameron to remove him from his role of education secretary. As such, while the £30,000 pay-cut might have played a role in spoiling his friendship with Cameron, his “Us VS Them” ideology informed his stance in relation to the issue of immigration, so much so that the speech with which he announced his support to the “leave” campaign was primarily framed along those lines: 

“E.U. immigration policies have encouraged people traffickers and brought desperate refugee camps to our borders. Far from providing security in an uncertain world, the EU’s policies have become a source of instability and insecurity… the E.U. is proving incapable of dealing with the current crises in Libya and Syria. The former head of Interpol says the EU’s internal borders policy is ‘like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe.'”

Crucially, that is not to say that both MPs jumped on the Brexit wagon light-heartedly. As Shipman notes, both Gove and Johnson remained on the fence for as long as it was possible for them to do so, sincerely torn between their beliefs and their loyalty, and between the comforting certainty of a “remain” vote, and the many unknowns of the Brexit gamble. But when Cameron presented the result of his E.U. negotiations, and with the Conservative Party already effectively fractured between “leavers” and “remainers’, both MPs saw slim chances of casting a vote in favour of Brussels, opting instead for what they believed was the natural outcome of a political career never shy of anti-E.U. sentiments. 

After February 2016 delivered two important and highly regarded MPs to the Brexit cause—which spread the feeling that “leave” was not, after all, utter lunacy—it should have been an all-out war for a prime minister whose chances of winning were getting increasingly slim. It was not. Instead, Cameron refused to confront either Johnson or Gove in television debates for fear that Brexit would turn into, as he commented, “a Tory psychodrama.”

Indeed, Cameron became more concerned with the idea of rebuilding the Conservative Party after Brexit than with Brexit itself and reasoned that a public confrontation against leading conservative MPs of the caliber of Johnson and Gove would demolish any appearance of party unity. Perhaps, Cameron still believed that “remain” would be the natural outcome of the referendum, or perhaps he was willing to sacrifice his political career for the good of the party. Regardless, the prime minister scrapped the idea of a “blue on blue” debate and opted instead for a confrontation with a very familiar face in the “leave” camp: Nigel Farage, on June 7.

Although the two never shared a stage—rather had allocated slots to make their case and take questions from the audience—the show unveiled the underlying logic behind the entire Brexit debate, giving a clear sense of what real drivers of the “leave” campaign were and which popular sentiments were underpinning it. Indeed, for as much as David Cameron attempted to play the “economy card”—claiming, at times arrogantly, that every expert had warned against the economic repercussions of Brexit—immigration remained the salient issue which many in the audience wanted to keep as the focus of the debate. This played directly into the hands of the UKIP leader, for Farage—a controversial figure in British politics whose 20-year long political career was built on anti-immigration sentiments—knew too well that his audience was not in the TV studios, but at home, and was eager to hear more about the dangers of the EU’s free movement policy.

Crucially, although many in the press were quick in attributing the victory to the more polished David Cameron, any mention of immigration virtually assigned a point to the “leave” side. Indeed, on the one hand, Cameron had no real answers to give, for there was no easy solution to the question of immigration; and on the other, Farage was quite happy to keep the debate on that specific issue, even if that meant casting himself as an untouchable hardliner in the “leave” camp. For example, when a woman from the audience raised the issue of Farage’s comments linking the Cologne sexual assaults to remaining in the EU, he promptly responded: 

“It’s a massive issue in Germany; it’s a huge issue in Sweden. I think Angela Merkel has made a big mistake by saying “please anyone come.” And what’s happened is, a very large number of young, single males have settled in Germany and in Sweden, who come from cultures where attitudes towards women are different.”

Although Farage’s stance sits at the far-end of the Islamophobic discourse that emerged during the Brexit campaign, it is useful to remember that such a narrative was widely and happily shared among Brexiteers. Ian Duncan Smith repeatedly claimed that a vote to remain would expose the UK “to terror risks.” Gove’s announcement that he would back the “leave” vote revolved around the security threat posed by the E.U. free movement rule, which, he claimed, “actively abets terrorists.” Johnson too, despite his long history of controversial comments, seized the opportunity to argue that Brexit would improve Britain’s security against the terror threat. 

Of course, this is not to say that the Brexit campaign was centered on the question of Muslims in Britain, nor that “leave” voters were solely motivated by their views on Islam. Instead, British discontent with the European Union encapsulated a wide array of popular beliefs and discontents with social issues, with the political class, and with the country’s economy. Even so, however, it is significant that Brexit came to be framed along the lines of security, terrorism, and multiculturalism, rather than, for example, practical considerations of economic stability.

Sure, Gove dismissed any attempt at rationality when he claimed that Britons “have had enough of experts,” but the “leave” team could not win the debate by merely rebutting technical arguments. Instead, they needed something that they could tie to both the global landscape and to the question of Britain’s E.U. membership.  As “Take back control” offered them the perfect slogan to silence pragmatism, the issue of Middle Eastern migrants and the widespread panic around terrorist attacks in Europe gave them the ideal ammunition to make their stronger case: leaving the E.U. could rid the country of Muslim migrants, and with them, of the risk of terrorism. 

These arguments had a profound impact on British society, which came to the inevitable conclusion that there was, in fact, a link between terrorism and Brexit. In January 2016, the vast majority of people polled by YouGov (77%) demanded a ban of the Islamic veil in British schools, and another 58% believed that many economic restrictions had to be imposed on asylum seekers. By February 2016, 56% believed that “a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society” existed. As Brexit slowly paved the way for a wave of Islamophobic sentiments across the country, by June 2016 immigration became the most important issue for voters. After the referendum, hate crimes against racial and religious minority reached an all-time record. 

The Turkish Question 

Much of David Cameron political credibility had also being compromised by his fearless stance in support of Turkey’s entry into the European Union, which in the run-up to the referendum vote became another significantly hot topic for British society, busy assessing the pros and cons of its membership to the Union. In that sense, Cameron was more Tony Blair than he was Margaret Thatcher.

Indeed, while the Iron Lady became responsible for introducing the concept of “Britishness” in an attempt to emphasize the need to preserve British national identity against the growing European one, the New Labour leader had long advocated the idea of a Turkish seat at the European table. Behind Blair’s support of Ankara lied practical considerations of foreign policy, as Turkey’s strategic value—further increased by the events that followed 9/11—trumped the socio-cultural factors that had made other member state sceptical, for a country boasting a population of nearly 80 million, 99% of which Muslim, was perceived by many European bureaucrats as a threat to Europe.

Ironically, one key argument which would underpin both Blair’s and Cameron’s stance concerning the Turkish question was more sectarian than pragmatic. Indeed both leaders believed that Turkey’s accession would contribute towards staving off the risk of a “clash of civilisation” between Muslims and non-Muslims, as it could strengthen Turkey’s resistance against Islamist fundamentalism while simultaneously shutting down “intense arguments about the incompatibility of Islam with democracy or Islam with human rights and modernity.”

Secure in his belief that Turkey, sitting at the border between Europe and the Middle East, could indeed bridge Christianity and Islam, in 2010 Cameron commented: “Turkey can be a great unifier. Because instead of choosing between East and West, Turkey has chosen both. And it’s this opportunity to unite East and West that gives Turkey such an important role with countries in the region in helping to deliver improved security for us all.”

However, with the Brexit referendum unveiling the country’s real mood about immigration—and even more so in relation to multiculturalism—Cameron sensed that his support for Turkey’s entry in the E.U. was misplaced. Indeed, the question of Turkey’s membership was quickly weaponized by Brexiteers—both outside and within Cameron’s own government—who began to spread claims that Britain would be flooded by Muslim migrants carrying crime, security threats and the risk of further strains on the country’s public services such as the National Health Service (NHS). As new posters reading “Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU: Vote leave, take back control” began to circulate, David Cameron spectacularly U-turned on his pro-expansion stance, ridiculing the Ankara government during a May 2016 interview, in which he claimed that it would not be able to join the E.U. “until the year 3000”.

Equally spectacularly, however, David Cameron maintained a somewhat ambiguous stance over this issue, which was made even more suspicious after leading Brexiteers such as Gove and Johnson had demanded from the government a clear commitment to veto Turkey’s entry. Arguably to their delight, this never happened. Whether because he feared that such a commitment could jeopardize Britain’s bilateral relationship with Turkey, or because he did not want to face future diplomatic awkwardness at European level, Cameron never clearly gave assurances that he would, in fact, veto Turkey’s accession, rather, he relied on the French government—which had conveniently called for a referendum on the issue—to stop Ankara from entering the Union. Again, however, Cameron’s political calculations played into the wrong hands: as questions about Britain’s loss of sovereignty lingered, his decision to pass the gavel to Paris on such a crucial issue made many wonder why was Downing Street “relying on somebody else” to stop Turkey’s accession. “Take back control” scored another important victory. 

The issue of Turkey became central in the Brexit saga. Indeed, by then the “leave” campaign had begun to show one of its ugliest faces, creating a sectarian divide that leveraged on pure prejudice against migrants—and even more so against Muslims. Crucially, while early efforts to sway public opinion towards the “leave” option had focused on issues of sovereignty and economics (with strong emphasis being placed for example on Britain’s E.U. membership fee), Brexit supporters were quick in shifting towards arguments that could be more easily understood, and that could have a more significant impact among the “anxious middle” in British society.

While it was arguably difficult to make an economic case in support of Brexit—for the E.U. remains the largest single market in the world and the world’s largest economy—the global context that framed the Brexit vote provided “leave” campaigners with anti-immigration ammunition. In the years that followed the rise of the Islamic State (IS), Europe had witnessed increasing anti-Muslim sentiments stemming from large numbers of migrants fleeing war zones in the Middle East, as well as from some high-profile Islamist terror attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and England.

Thus, fuelled by its furthest-right activists operating in the streets and online, anti-Muslim sentiments in Britain found unexpected legitimisation in the words of mainstream politicians such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, who promptly linked their Brexit ambitions to the issue of immigration, which was in turn connected to the question of opening British doors to Turkish Muslims. Completing the picture, Nigel Farage’s infamous “Breaking Point” poster—showing a large queue of non-white, Middle Eastern-looking migrants and a sign reading “We must break free from the E.U. and take back control”—further strengthened the connection between the “leave” vote and Muslim existence in Britain, regardless of their nationality or status.

Little did it matter that the majority of mainstream Brexiteers promptly distanced themselves from the radical views of the UKIP leader. In a short period, Brexit had not only come to be firmly discussed in terms of immigration and border control but had come to be framed within a “Us VS Them” paradigm that further allowed for a mainstream scapegoating of Muslims. It is thus unsurprising that a record surge in anti-Muslim hate crimes occurred in fact in the aftermath of the vote, as abuses such as “Get out – we voted Leave,” or “Shouldn’t you be on a plane back to Pakistan? We voted you out,” became the clearest, and ugliest, a manifestation of what the Brexit vote meant for many.

The Economy, Stupid

Any analysis of the Brexit referendum and the moods that it encapsulated would be incomplete without an assessment of the economic backdrop within which the vote occurred. Indeed, while party politics and the question of Turkey steered the outcome towards the “leave” side, revealing the significant political capital that issues such as multiculturalism and immigration have in such circumstances, it was the economic situation in Britain that provided the conditions for anti-Muslim sentiments to emerge. 

A plethora of studies have convincingly demonstrated that there exists a direct correlation between economic conditions and openness towards immigration and that, specifically, worse economic condition—such as high rates of unemployment—directly impacts how migrants come to be perceived by nativist groups. For example, Johnston and Lordan have found that “prejudice among native-born whites increases with the unemployment rate,” and that a mere 1% increase in unemployment can result in a 4% increase in prejudice among middle-class men in full employment.

Others have contended that “While a functioning welfare state can compensate the globalization losers… welfare cuts may do the opposite,” suggesting that austerity programs have a direct effect in attracting individuals to populist parties and in increasing anti-immigration sentiments. And others yet have contended that “once unemployment and austerity hits, people tend to turn against themselves by using their last democratic weapon: turning against democracy itself by voting for extreme right-wing parties.” In short, many notable studies (including post-Brexit ones) have given empirical and theoretical evidence in support of the broadly held belief that Britain’s economy played a key role in swaying public opinion against migrants and Europe. 

From a political perspective, Cameron’s decision to call for a referendum after years of austerity was, by all means, political suicide. Just months before the general elections of 2015, The Guardian ran an article in which it was stated that the government planned to slash out a further £55 billion by 2019, which added to the already £35 billion cuts since the Conservative Party seized Downing Street. The cuts were unforgiving. Funding for social enterprises providing help for the disabled, for refugees, or even for job seekers, almost entirely disappeared—forcing many to shut down.

Funding for councils was nearly halved, with public services for housing and leisure, libraries, and even roads maintenance collapsing. Proposals to freeze working-age benefits, to reduce the benefit cap of £3000, and to limit access to housing benefit for people under 21, loomed. Child poverty increased, police cuts turned into higher crime rates, food banks emptied, and 120,000 deaths came to be directly linked to Cameron’s austerity program under the unforgiving label “economic murder.” 

Ironically, the Cameron government was both relieved and surprised by the muted reaction to its austerity program, particularly considering that when Spain adopted equally severe austerity measures, the country went into something resembling a civil war. In truth, however, Britain’s discontent had a very different face, short of Spanish hot-blood and full of British aplomb. Indeed, instead of taking the streets, Britons took the polling booth and cast a vote that reflected years of frustration and disillusionment, preferring the unknowns of a “leave” vote to the economically unsustainable status quo. And while ascribing the Brexit vote solely to the economic disaster that the conservative elite-driven austerity caused might be reductive, enough research exists to substantiate the claim that the thousand cuts brought about by the Cameron government did play an important role in channeling anti-E.U. sentiments. 

For example, people in the poorest households were more likely to support “leave” than those in households with incomes over £60,000 per year; people out of work were equally more likely to favor Brexit than those in fulltime employment, as were people in low-skilled and manual labor. The most impoverished towns in England overwhelmingly voted for “leave’, with Boston (Lincolnshire) heading the group with 76% of people in favor of Brexit, and with South Holland (Lincolnshire) and Castle Point (Essex) following with nearly 74% and 73% respectively.

Interestingly, all three towns witnessed dramatic cuts on services and benefits. Lincolnshire, for example, suffered from severe cuts to the police force, which caused a sharp increase in “austerity crimes that led to an overall crime increase”; meanwhile, emergency funding for low-income families in Essex shrunk by 87%. All this accompanied a variety of other measures that dramatically shrunk towns” budgets and compromised the lives of millions. Significantly, the districts that suffered the most from the austerity cuts imposed by the government recorded a surge in votes for UKIP, “whose raison d’etre,” argues Fetzer, “was Britain’s exit from the EU.” 

While Cameron’s ruthless subscription to neoliberal logics of anti-welfare, state-slashing, poor-punishing, strict policies of pro-market madness might explain his inclination to subjugate Britain under a 10-year long austerity plan, his decision to call for an in/out E.U. referendum amid his austerity project remains puzzling at best. On balance, it could also be cynically interpreted as the clearest sign of how self-entitled, privately-educated elites had lost touch with the reality on the ground. Enveloped in a happy bubble of self-righteousness and privilege, Cameron severely misjudged how the economic impact of his austerity program was providing populist narratives of division and ultra-nationalism with powerful ammunition.

UKIP, conversely, sensed that trend, as since 2012 it moved from targeting the middle class and focused on the “less educated, worse off, insecure and pessimistic (white) voters.” To be sure, Cameron’s follow-up decision to use his face for the “remain” campaign was also profoundly misguided, as by 2016 his approval rating had sunk to 34%, with 58% claiming he was not “doing a good job.” When the Panama Papers showed to the public that their prime minister had benefited from a comfortable family nest of offshore money—which inspired the famous nickname “Dodgy Dave”—another good chunk of public confidence went missing. With 68% of surveyed Britons claiming they would not trust him on tax avoidance, David Cameron’s “remain” campaign inevitably came to suffer from another important blow.

Brexit Orientalism 

While the analysis of the Brexit saga’s economic backdrop provides a partial explanation of the sentiments with which millions of British citizens approached the referendum, it also sheds light on the dynamics that helped to frame the E.U. vote within an anti-Muslim discourse. Indeed, keeping in mind that the last decade has witnessed explosive tensions in the Middle East—first with the Arab Spring, then with the rise of IS, and then with the war in Syria—the popular mood created by Cameron’s austerity program helps understand why anti-Muslim rhetoric came to the forefront during the campaign and, more violently, after the vote. Two reasons can be found for this. 

First, Cameron’s view of migration contributed to the creation of a space for anti-migrant sentiments to emerge so forcefully during the Brexit campaign and, ironically, in limiting the effectiveness of his own “remain” campaign. Having already advocated “good immigration, not mass immigration” during a 2011 speech in parliament, Cameron repeatedly lashed out at Brussels’s free movement policies claiming that the weak economies of certain member states were preventing Britain from reducing its capacity for migration. As noted earlier, he sought to reduce immigration by making the prospect of living in Britain unattractive, first through the emergency break discussed with E.U. leaders in the 2015 summit, and second through the Immigration Act 2014, the goal of which was to “create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration” by making it increasingly difficult for non-British to access basic services such as employment, healthcare, housing, education, banking, and others. 

What is particularly striking, however, is that Cameron’s position was not limited to the issue of free movement in Europe, but extended to a racializing narrative that effectively created an overlap between the need to control migration and the issue of multiculturalism. In October 2011, the government’s view on this became abundantly clear, as a direct connection between the economic difficulties faced by many and the presence of minority communities across the country was spelled out:

“Excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country. Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and social pressures too. When large numbers of people arrive in new neighborhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same language as those who live there, perhaps not always wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a discomfort and tension in some of our communities… And there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while the better off reap many of the benefits. So I think it’s absolutely right to address all of these concerns because if people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues, they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest.”

Remarkably, the October speech followed another memorable moment in Cameron’s relationship with cultural diversity. Speaking in Munich in February 2011, he stated that multiculturalism had failed, because “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream…We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.” The speech was significant, as the juxtaposition of multiculturalism with terrorism effectively reframed interfaith and interethnic relationships along the lines of securitization. In the space of a few months, Cameron had thus managed to link multiculturalism—and Muslims specifically—to both economic issues and terrorism.

As such, while much of his follow-up measures created a strong degree of separation between the government and British Muslims (for example, during the Trojan Horse scandal, or when he rejected calls for annual meetings with Muslims, or when he threatened deportation for Muslim women who failed English language tests, or when he introduced the concept of “British values” to tackle extremism, or when his cabinet asked Muslim leaders to demonstrate that Islam is compatible with “British values’), they also contributed in conflating the issue of economic immigration with that of multiculturalism and race. Thus, by the time the Brexit campaign came to be centered squarely on immigration, “leave” came to be construed as a means to stop Muslims from entering, or living, in the UK. The high circulation of Islamophobic tweets in the immediate aftermath of the referendum effectively showed that Brexit had “framed “western” identity in non-inclusive terms and unleashed social anxieties about Muslims as the foreign “other’.” 

The second factor that contributed to bringing Brexit about, among other things, Muslim existence in Britain, ought to be found in UKIP’s political revival. Moving from being a fringe party of “loonies” and “closet racists”—as Cameron once described them—to becoming one of the fastest growing parties in British politics as early as 2013, UKIP traditionally ran on inflammatory political agendas centered upon strong anti-E.U. and anti-immigration sentiments. Its 2015 manifesto, for example, spells out the party main objectives and shows its aggressive stance in relation to the issue of immigration: 1) End immigration for unskilled jobs for a five-year period; 2) Tackle the problem of sham marriages; 3) Introduce a new visa system for workers, visitors, students, families and asylum seekers; 4) End access to benefits and free NHS treatment for new immigrants until they have paid tax and NI for five years; 5) Require all visitors and new immigrants to the UK to have their own health insurance; 6) End welfare tourism with a five-year embargo on benefits for migrants; 7) Allow British businesses to choose to employ British workers first.

UKIP’s nationalist agenda accompanied an even more concerning stance about Muslims and Islam. The investigative group Powerbase identifies many links between the party and Islamophobic organizations such as the Dutch Freedom party, the EDL, Pegida UK, Liberty GB (formerly British Freedom Party); as well as with European far-right parties within the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) umbrella. Even more, UKIP’s then leader Nigel Farage had never made a mystery of his views on Muslims and Islam. In 2012 he argued:

“On the issue of Islamification, I think we have to do a bit more, probably starting in our schools to actually teach people about the values of our Judeo-Christian culture… There are over twenty police forces now in this country turning a complete blind eye to the operation of Sharia courts and Sharia law…  if you’re not prepared as a nation to stand up for your cultures and your values, then those cultures and values will be threatened.” 

In 2014, he blamed Muslims for anti-Semitism in Europe; in 2015 he claimed that people’s concerns over immigration were founded, as Muslims were attempting to create a “fifth column” to effectively “kill” Britons. He further added:

“There is an especial problem with some of the people who’ve come here and who are of the Muslim religion who don’t want to become part of our culture. So there is no previous experience, in our history, of a migrant group that comes to Britain that fundamentally wants to change who we are and what we are. That is, I think, above everything else, what people are really concerned about.”

 A few months later, he accused Muslims of having “split loyalties”; and later in 2017 he stated:

“There are quite big areas of east London that have become wholly Muslim areas… There are gangs of men out saying to women in short dresses there shouldn’t be there; to people in having a drink that they shouldn’t be there. There are parts of Paris and parts of Brussels that are even worse. Any woman, in a normal manner, if she walks down the streets, she will receive abuse.”

With such a long history of Islamophobic comments, it is perhaps unsurprising that when Farage became one of the most recognizable faces in the “leave” camp, the Brexit campaign turned squarely on a debate about multiculturalism, which focused on Muslims above any other ethnic group. Indeed, while pro-leave MPs and activists were “playing defense” on the economy for the entire duration of the campaign, a shift in focus towards the issue of immigration afforded them the greatest yet fighting chance. Farage himself knew too well that immigration had to be played up if “leave” wanted that chance. He was so sure of this that in April 2016 he declared:

“What I have urged “Vote Leave”—the official designated vehicle—we have got to get onto the other part of the pitch, we gotta start attacking the enemy’s goal, and where the enemies are at their absolute weakest is at this whole question of open door migration, the effects that it’s had on the lives of ordinary Britons over the course of the last decade, and the threat that it poses given the new terror and security threat that we face in the West… I would love myself and UKIP to work with you [Vote Leave] on this campaign. Because actually we are the form horses when it comes to immigration when it comes to the impact that it’s had on people in this country.” 

The official “leave” campaign never allowed Farage to add his name to the team, and promptly distanced itself from his most controversial moves. In a bid to secure a favorable outcome, Brexiteers across the political spectrum found themselves resorting to very similar arguments. 

Conclusion

Research conducted by Hope Not Hate showed that 49% of “leave” voters believed that “There are no go areas in Britain where sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter,” against a mere 19% of “remain” voters. Similarly, 54% of “leave” voters agreed that “Islam is generally a threat to the British way of life,” against 17% of remainers. Subsequent polls showed that 47% of “leavers” believed that the government was deliberately hiding the truth about the number of migrants living in the UK, and 31% believed that “Immigration to this country is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims a majority of the country’s population.” 

The conflation between the issue of E.U. migrants and the securitization of Muslims came to the forefront of the Brexit campaign as a result of clever political calculations on one side, and not-so-clever political mistakes on the other. 

Mistakes punctuated Cameron’s political career since the announcement of the referendum up to his resignation. Failing to read popular moods stemming from his aggressive austerity policy, the prime minister called for a simple in/out referendum on the future of Britain in the EU, incidentally at a time in which his approval rate was at historical lows. This was followed by a series of missteps that directly helped the “leave” side to build a case for Brexit.

First, Cameron returned from the E.U. negotiations without significant achievements. While it could not have been otherwise, as Brussels does not negotiate on the four indivisible freedoms, his mistake lied in his belief, or hope, that E.U. leaders would rescue him out of the political jam he had put himself into.

Second, Cameron failed to give practical reassurances on the question of Turkey’s entry in the EU, choosing to rely on the French government for a potential veto. This was further inflamed by his traditional pro-Turkey stance, which made his U-turn appear insincere and contributed to spreading conjectures about European power vis-à-vis Britain’s sovereignty.

Third, he put party politics above any other consideration or concern. This occurred when he called the referendum to strengthen his leadership; when he misjudged Gove and Johnson’s stance losing them to the “leave” camp; when he refused to debate conservative Brexiteers; and when he rejected the idea of lowering the voting age.

Finally, he blamed the failings of his austerity policy on migrants, further declaring the failure of multiculturalism and conflating Muslim existence in Britain with issues of terrorism and extremism. On the opposite side, Brexiteers displayed incredible flexibility in their willingness to capitalize on such mistakes. Recognizing their slim chances of winning on the economy front, “leave” MPs, activists, campaigners, and newspapers bet everything on immigration, further strengthening the link between immigration and terrorism.

The vilest manifestation of this trend was Farage’s “Breaking Point” poster, arguably a culmination of a 20-year long career built upon the demonization of minorities. But while the poster might have horrified some of the most moderate Brexiteers, the increased support for UKIP during the 2015 elections, and the relentless anti-Muslim narrative upon which UKIP had consolidated its appeal, proved that the “Muslim card” could indeed be a wise one to play. 

Brexiteers across the political spectrum capitalized on this. Gove, for example, claimed he “shuddered” after seeing the poster, yet his speech in support of Brexit was built within the framework of security, terrorism, and immigration. Hardly a surprise. His view that “The west faces a challenge to its values, culture, and freedom as profound in its way as the threat posed by fascism and communism,” had made him a key player during the infamous Trojan Horse affair.

To be sure, the entire “Vote Leave” campaign—the mainstream face of the otherwise ugly affair—came to be centered upon the Muslim-Immigration-Terrorism triad as soon as Brexiteers realized technical arguments on the economy were unbeatable. At the sound of “Murderers, terrorists and kidnappers from countries like Turkey could flock to Britain if it remains in the European Union,” they secured the long-awaited victory—condemning millions of Muslims to violence and discrimination in the process.

Brexit and the Politics of Islamophobia was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, the results of the country’s recent local elections—described by commentators as a significant blow to the AKP party—reveal an uncertain future for the president and his party. The AKP lost in three of Turkey’s major cities, of which one—Istanbul—was instrumental in Erdoğan’s early political career before ascending to the presidency. A key influencing factor in the March elections was the country’s slowing economy, which opposition parties attributed to government mismanagement as they urged voters to hold the government accountable.

The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) won the 2019 elections in Istanbul and the capital of Ankara, Turkey’s two largest cities. The ruling AKP secured a nationwide victory with a slim majority of 51%, despite losing in Istanbul and Ankara, due in part to an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The CHP’s victories in Turkey’s Istanbul and Ankara represents a turning point in Turkish politics and an obstacle for Erdoğan, as the two cities are the financial and political hubs of Turkey.

However, the opposition’s attempts to pin the blame on the government for the country’s ailing economy failed to resonate with many Turkish voters. Many nationalists and AKP-supporters perceive the economic situation as the work of interfering foreign powers, a reflection of a broader, ongoing power play between Ankara and Washington. Many Turks feel the effects of this strained relationship as growing distrust of the United States becomes increasingly widespread throughout the population. Relations between Erdoğan and U.S. President Donald Trump had fluctuated substantially and nearly collapsed when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey in retaliation for the detention of the American pastor Andrew Brunson.

Turkey’s economy has suffered as a consequence of U.S. sanctions. The lira has dropped by 25%, embattling the corporate sector and creating hardships for ordinary Turks. Threatening rhetoric from the Oval Office continued in 2019, as Donald Trump took to Twitter with a threat to devastate the Turkish economy if Turkey moved against Kurdish militias in Syria following the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The rift between Washington and Ankara widened during the Syrian conflict, in which the United States supported Kurdish militias, a move denounced by Turkey, which sees such groups as terrorist organizations. These developments evidence a shift in the geopolitical landscape as Turkey turns to regional partners like Iran and Russia. Despite a shifting landscape, U.S. sanctions and threats have proven effective in damaging the Turkish economy by halting foreign investment, increasing inflation levels to an all-time high, and curbing economic growth. 

Erdoğan’s performance on the world stage resonates with many Turkish voters. This corresponds with Kiniklioglu’s analysis, in which he describes nationalism as an incredibly influential force in Turkish politics. For example, the Turkish government was successful in gaining overwhelming domestic and international support during the investigation into Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, wherein Turkey was instrumental in leading the investigations. As a result, Turkey’s foreign policy has received strong support from all sides of the political spectrum.

Erdoğan’s nationalist appeal increased during the election, amid suggestions that the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, the former Greek Orthodox cathedral and mosque which is now a museum, should once again become a mosque in response to the U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Furthermore, the AKP government was credited with a strong economic record, and in a bid to retain public support has pledged to increase public expenditure on infrastructure, such as the new Istanbul Airport, and rebalance the country’s current account deficit.

Turkey paid off its IMF debt in 2013, a success that remains a hallmark achievement for the government. Turkey’s tourism industry has boomed, with growth in 2018 reported being 63%, a positive development for an industry tarnished by regional conflicts. Turkey is on target to host 40 million foreign tourists this year, which would make it the sixth most-visited nation in the world. Many Turkish voters and government-supporters are proud of these accomplishments and attribute the country’s economic woes to foreign powers dedicated to weakening Turkey.

The local elections of 2019, in which the government achieved a narrow victory won, are indicative of the presence of democracy in Turkey. The claims of Islamisation of Turkey under Erdoğan is misunderstanding the contextual background of Turkey, as Professor Aktar states, “one cannot Islamise a country that is already Muslim.” Islam in Turkey is rooted in the Ottoman tradition of Sunni Islam, an empire that was “multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural.”

Erdoğan’s faith comes from the Sufi strain of Islam, the antithesis of Wahhabi Islam. Many of the tariqas (Sufi groups) are vital political influencers whose support Erdoğan needs to remain in power. The nuances of AKP’s Islamism are often disregarded in naive attempts to conflate Erdoğan and ISIS (Daesh) ideologically. One of Erdoğan’s key political objectives is ensuring Turkey’s national security in a volatile region. While Erdoğan’s nationalist tactics during the election backfired, Turkey’s political future remains unclear. Despite the government’s significant electoral loss in Turkey’s major cities, it obtained a narrowly won mandate to govern until the next round of elections in 2023. 

Turkey’s Local Elections and the Future of Erdoğan’s Leadership was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Crimean Peninsula may have strategic significance for the Russian military, but Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer play the Crimea card at home for political gain. Even though the 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in a sharp increase in the Russian president’s approval ratings, five years on the matter has been overshadowed by widespread economic hardship.

Crimea is heavily subsidized by Moscow, with no hope of becoming economically self-sufficient in the current political climate. Russia has invested billions of rubles into the peninsula but has yet to resolve the most critical issue: water supply. Crimea, especially its northern region, is heavily dependent on Ukraine when it comes to water and power supply.

Following the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Ukraine imposed an economic embargo of the peninsula, cutting off its supply of water and power. The embargo resulted in severe economic and ecological problems for northern Crimea. More recently, Russia has established two power stations to strengthen the peninsula’s energy security. However, Moscow has been unable to ensure a sustainable water supply.

Had Russia seized the whole of southeastern Ukraine—and not just Crimea as some Russian hardliners suggested at the time—the water-supply problem may have been avoided. Since such actions weren’t taken, however, Crimea was without an overland connection to the Russian mainland until 2018, when Russia completed construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait that connected the mainland to the peninsula. 

The Kerch Strait, however, is a strategic vulnerability for Russia. In the event of a conflict, the bridge would be an easy target for sabotage. To hedge against this vulnerability, the Russian military deployed the S-400 integrated air defense system along with additional warships to Crimea in the aftermath of the November 2018 clash between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Kerch Strait.

The Kremlin must also contend with growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Crimea was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Today, Crimean Tatars—a Turkic ethnic group—retain strong cultural and religious ties to Turkey. Given that Turkey has been pursuing a more active foreign policy in recent years, it’s likely Ankara will pursue a more proactive role in Crimean affairs in the long-term. In the short-term, however, Turkey is expected to maintain its behind-the-scenes role.

The current geopolitical climate means that Moscow will have to manage Crimea like a suitcase without a handle for the foreseeable future. The Kremlin has invested heavily in integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation, but Western sanctions enacted in response to Russia’s behavior have helped to isolate the peninsula, raising prices and inhibiting economic development.

Despite these difficulties, approximately seventy-two percent of Crimean respondents said that their lives have improved since Crimea’s annexation, according to polling conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM).  However, in the long-run, the economic situation in Crimea and throughout Russia will only deteriorate due to the effects of Western sanctions.

Russia Faces Rising Costs 5 Years After Crimea’s Annexation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has transferred at least five warships out of the Caspian Sea into European waters in response to threats in that theater, at least temporarily leaving Russia without a substantial portion of its Caspian firepower.

There have been two separate redeployments over the past month. In the first, Russia sent three missile ships into the Sea of Azov, between Ukraine and Russia, along with two auxiliary vessels. In the second, it sent two corvettes into the Sea of Azov and then onward to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

The former deployment appears to be related to Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine: the Russian military blog BMPD and other observers have linked it to the opening of the new bridge across the Kerch Straits connecting Crimea to Russia. “It appears very likely that they are not preparing to return to the Caspian,” wrote analyst Sergey Ishchenko on the website Svobodnaya Pressa.

The latter is related to Russia’s operations in Syria, the state news website RT reported. After that, the ships could be heading to join the Baltic Fleet, BMPD speculated. “It’s not yet clear whether they will return to the Caspian Sea upon the completion of their military service in the Mediterranean,” BMPD wrote.

The Caspian is a closed sea, but a series of canals and the Volga and Don rivers connect it to the Sea of Azov, allowing Russia to move ships in and out.

The two corvettes are two of the Caspian Flotilla’s most powerful ships, having launched some of the Kalibr missiles that Russia used to strike targets in Syria in 2015. (The two ships now off the Syrian coast are the Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug. Another Corvette of the same class, the Uglich, remains on the Caspian, as do two frigates, the Tatarstan and Dagestan.)

The redeployments take place as the Caspian Flotilla is getting ready to move from its current home base in Astrakhan to Kaspiysk, in Dagestan. Russian officials have vowed that the new base at Kaspiysk will be one of Russia’s most technologically advanced naval bases.

“Enormous construction works are taking place now” in Kaspiysk, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said in April. “Piers, berths, servicing points, residences. The quantity of our officers and soldiers is going to grow manifold.”

At the same time, tension appears to be diminishing on the Caspian, with many of the other littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan – cooperating recently to an unprecedented degree. The five littoral states reportedly recently agreed on a long-awaited convention delimiting the sea, the foundation of much of the strategic uncertainty there, and so Moscow may be calculating that its limited resources are not best spent on the Caspian. In any case, the ships could always go back the way they came.

Russia Transfers Five Warships Out of Caspian Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.
• Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.
• The United States is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).
• The European Union’s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.
• The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).

The global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.

This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

 Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.

A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe’s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7’s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.

China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050

While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn’t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.

However, China is projected to be the world’s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.

By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.

Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.

Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.

Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies. 

Today’s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.

Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Turkey’s military offensive into the northwestern enclave of Afrin launched Saturday, amid anger at a U.S. decision to form a 30,000-strong border security force for Syria.

Russia relocated military personnel and military police officers from the Syrian region Afrin where Turkish military operations have initiated against Kurdish forces, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

A report published by Reuters stated that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian military, Valery Gerasimov, and his counterpart in the U.S., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, discussed the situation in Syria via telephone.

The report cited Russia’s Defense Ministry and disclosed no details of the call. The alleged conversation took place after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on that the Turkish military had begun an offensive ground operation in Syria’s Kurdish-controlled Afrin region.

Turkey’s actions in Syria come at a low point in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The United States backs the Kurdish forces in Syria, which were instrumental in the U.S. campaign against ISIS. Turkey initiated the in the aftermath of a cross-border shelling by artillery units of the Turkish army.

The Turkish air force has conducted air raids in support of ground forces in Afrin, while the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has also engaged Kurdish fighters in the region. U.S. support of  Kurdish militia groups in Syria—groups Turkey considers to be terrorists—has contributed to a widening division between the two NATO allies.

Turkey, for its part, has accused the U.S. of supporting an attempted military coup against the Turkish government in 2015 and, despite being a NATO member, has moved to align itself closer to Russia by signing defense agreements with the country.

Turkey’s President Erdogan has used the coup in justification of his rapid consolidation of power which has decreased the influence of Turkey’s democratic and secular institutions. The U.S. uses the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey as a central hub for regional operations, and also stations several adjustable-yield B-61 nuclear bombs there.

Russian officials issued Kurdish authorities in Afrin with an ultimatum on behalf of Syrian government

Russian military officials proposed handing over the Kurdish-controlled region in Syria’s northwest to the Syrian government to avert a Turkish military offensive, according to Kurdish officials cited in a report published by the Associated Press.

Russian officials reportedly suggested to Kurdish leaders that they cede administration and control of Afrin to the Syrian government. The Russians said that in doing so, the Kurds would avoid a military offensive from Turkey.

Ilham Ahmed, a senior Kurdish official who was named in the report, stated that Russia gave Kurdish authorities in Afrin a choice: hand control over to the Syrian government or face a Turkish military offensive.

All Kurdish officials cited in the AP’s report refused the Russian-initiated proposal, vowing to resist an attack from Turkey. Geographically, Afrin is surrounded by territory controlled by Syrian government forces and militia groups backed by Turkey.

Russia Presented an Ultimatum to Kurdish Authorities in Syria Before Turkish Assault was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Saudi-backed proposal for a peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians would see the town of Abu Dis as the future capital of Palestine—instead of East Jerusalem. The proposed initiative would give the Palestinian Authority only limited sovereignty over Palestinian territory which has stirred widespread anger in the region.

The New York Times reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman presented the proposal during Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Riyadh last month. It was during that visit that Bin Salman reportedly gave an ultimatum to Abbas that he was to either accept the proposed peace plan or resign. Activists are responding to the Saudi proposal on Twitter using the hashtag #JerusalemIsOurCapital.

Abu Dis is a Palestinian town located to the east of East Jerusalem, which is occupied and administered by Israel. Situated within Area B, Abu Dis is currently administered by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Palestinians Would Have Partial Sovereignty Over a Non-Contiguous State

Under the Saudi-proposed peace plan, the Palestinians would have partial sovereignty over a non-contiguous state located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank would remain. The Palestinian diaspora—Palestinian refugees and their descendants living in other countries—would not receive the right of return to Israel. Saudi Arabia reportedly gave Abbas two months to respond to the offer.

US President Donald Trump has recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and has begun the process of relocation the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a decision that lies in contrast to several decades of U.S. policy in the Middle East and risks fuelling violence across the region. Regional leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and Jordan’s King Abdullah have publicly criticized the decision but were careful not to condemn the U.S. President’s decision too forcefully.

Palestinians Would Get Limited Sovereignty in Saudi-Proposed Peace Plan was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s GDP trajectory over the next 34 years is distinctly separate from its GDP per capita progression, demonstrating that while strong population growth can be an integral driver of Gross domestic product growth, it may also make it more challenging to boost income levels.

Nevertheless, this gap is closing. U.S. Gross domestic product per capita is presently around four times the size of China and almost nine times that of India. By 2050, these openings are projected to reduce to about double China and approximately three times India’s, demonstrating long-term income convergence.

The global economy will slow down with time, with a marked moderation in growth rates following the year 2020. Annual worldwide financial growth will average around 3.5% until 2020, slowing down to 2.7% for 2021-2030, 2.5% for the decade following that, and then to 2.4% for 2041-2050.

This will happen because many advanced economies are experiencing and will experience a marked decline in their working-age population. At the same time, emerging economy growth rates will average out as these economies grow.

Challenges for policymakers in achieving a long-term, sustainable expansion

To realize their full economic potential, emerging market governments must implement structural reforms to improve their macroeconomic stability, infrastructure and institutions, evaluations show the high possibility that emerging economies must grow and thrive in the coming decades.

But to realize this opportunity in total, they must undertake sustained and adequate investments in education, infrastructure, and technology. Worldwide demand growth and falling oil price over latest years have highlighted the significance of savings for long-term sustainable growth. Underlying all this is the requirement to develop political, economic, legal and social institutions to create incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship, making economies wherein to do business.

Looking forward, the global economics faces many challenges to profitable economic growth. Structural developments, like aging populations and climate change, require forward-thinking policies that equip the workforce to be able to make societal contributions later in life while promoting sustainable development.

Falling international trade growth, rising inequality, and increasing economic uncertainties will intensify the need to achieve economies which generate opportunities for everybody in a broad selection of industries. Businesses will need to adopt flexible and proactive approaches to navigate fast-changing and aging markets.

Market developments will create opportunities for business.

These will appear as these economies advance to new industries, to engage with world markets as well as their populations—which will be more youthful on average than in advanced countries—get more affluent.

As these emerging nations develop their institutions, fostering social stability and strengthening their macroeconomics principles, they’ll become more attractive places to conduct business and live, bring talent and investment. These economies are often volatile and quickly evolving, however, so companies will need operating strategies to succeed in them. Businesses should be ready to adjust their brand and market positions to match and preferences.

An in-depth understanding of the local marketplace, policy agendas, and consumer priorities will be crucial. Frequent collaboration with local partners will be essential. One key recommendation is that international companies along with other investors will be patient enough to ride out the short-term economic and political downs and ups which will unavoidably occur every once in a while in markets as they head toward adulthood. However, failure to interact with these markets means missing out on the bulk of the expected global economic development between now and 2050.

Acheiving Sustainable Economic Growth in the E7 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The self-proclaimed Islamic State, once estimated to have occupied a third of Iraqi and Syrian territory, has been reduced to a handful of enclaves, bringing a complicated endgame into focus. In July 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory in Mosul, as his troops, with U.S. backing, recaptured Iraq’s second city.

In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recaptured the Islamic State’s self-styled capital of Raqqa in October, and the SDF and forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are both closing in on the Islamic State in its final eastern redoubt.

Introduction

The rapidly receding footprint of the Islamic State has raised the risks for new confrontations as various armed groups in Iraq and Syria, and in some cases, their foreign backers, vie for influence in the newly liberated areas. Meanwhile, experts warn that if the victors in both countries fail to make political arrangements that accommodate civilians and facilitate the return of refugees, the hard-fought military campaigns may only lay the groundwork for future cycles of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The following is a sketch of security, displacement, and reconstruction concerns in both countries.

Iraq

Security. Iraqi forces’ entry into Hawija in October marked the Islamic State’s loss of the last remaining city under its control. Three major armed groups remain in territory formerly held by the Islamic State: the Iraqi military, mostly Shia quasi-state militias, and the Kurdish peshmerga. They are cooperating with each other in some instances and competing in others.

The Islamic State’s sweep through Iraq in 2014 highlighted how the Iraqi military had been hollowed out by corruption, but recent advances showed how the force had been reconstituted; it is now regarded by many Iraqis as a professional force. Even so, the counterterrorism forces have been exhausted by the pace of the campaign for Mosul and other major cities, and both Iraqi forces and predominantly Shia militias have faced accusations of abuses, including extrajudicial executions of people suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State and collective punishment of their families.

A U.S.-led international coalition has backed Iraqi forces, primarily through air power. Most U.S. forces are advising the Iraqi military, though special forces have served on the front lines. The White House has set a cap on U.S. troops in Iraq of 5,262, but the number actually deployed at any particular time may be higher.

Also on the battlefield are Kurdish peshmerga, whose ranks may exceed 150,000, and Popular Mobilization Fronts (PMFs), predominantly Shia, numbering more than sixty thousand. Many are loyal to Iran, while others are loyal to the Iraqi clerics Moqtada al-Sadr or Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. A significant challenge for the state will be incorporating them into the conventional security apparatus. Another will be accommodating local armed Sunni Arab tribal groups. These various armed groups are jockeying to control territory abandoned by the Islamic State.

Iraqi Kurds are contesting oil-rich, ethnically mixed territories adjacent to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s three provinces, where they have had autonomy since 1991. But these territorial claims have highlighted tensions between Kurdish factions, as well as between the Kurds and others. At the center of the dispute is Kirkuk, a city occupied by Kurds since their initial advance against the Islamic State in 2014. Iraqi forces raised the national flag there once again in October 2017, apparently welcomed by the local ruling Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK has been uneasy with the drive for independence led by the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules from the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil.

The Islamic State’s last Iraqi enclave lies in western Anbar Governorate, along the Syrian border. Having lost the vast majority of its territories, analysts expect Islamic State militants who have fled the Iraqi military and militias to shift to guerrilla tactics.

Displacement. More than three million Iraqis are internally displaced. A third of them [PDF] are displaced within Nineveh Governorate, of which Mosul is the capital; some eight hundred thousand people are displaced from the city. Another fifth are in the Kurdish provinces of Erbil and Dohuk, In areas where there was little destruction, such as Mosul’s eastern half or Tal Afar, the displaced have been quick to return home, but elsewhere housing stock and infrastructure have been destroyed, and public services remain minimal, and many residents remain in makeshift camps. Tribal leaders in some cases have blocked the family members of suspected militants from returning home.

Reconstruction. Much of Mosul, particularly the western Old City, was destroyed, mostly by air strikes carried out by the U.S.-led coalition against entrenched Islamic State fighters. The United Nations estimates a third of the housing stock there has been destroyed; so too has much of the public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and water and electrical supply. Islamic State militants blew up the landmark al-Nuri Mosque and left behind mines and booby traps that have killed hundreds and could take more than a decade to clear. Also in urgent need of repair is the Mosul Dam, whose failure could jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of Iraqis.

Repairing basic infrastructure in Mosul alone could cost more than $1 billion, according to a UN official, and altogether, the Iraqi government has estimated that rebuilding the country will cost in the realm of $100 billion. Particularly given the decline in oil prices, which has left the state running a deficit, Iraq will depend on foreign assistance. But corruption is endemic [PDF], so countries and multilateral institutions may be reluctant to extend funding. The United Nations’ 2017 appeal for humanitarian funding was just shy of 50 percent met as of August.

Syria

Security. The Islamic State’s remaining presence is more substantial in Syria than Iraq, but with U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led forces declaring victory in Raqqa, territory in Deir ez-Zour Province remains its last stronghold. Islamic State fighters there are under fire from both Bashar al-Assad’s forces, backed by Russian air power, and Kurdish-led ones supported by the U.S.-led coalition.

U.S. officials are in northern Syria laying groundwork for the administration of Raqqa. The SDF backs civilian governance structures there, and U.S. forces are training a militia to police the city. It is unclear how much control the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian Kurdish political party, will have in these areas; in other Arab-majority areas the SDF liberated from the Islamic State, such as Manbij, PYD cadres are the ultimate authorities, and some suspect that Kurdish fighters will claim the territories they liberate for their de facto autonomous region known as Rojava.

Circumstances will grow even more complicated in Deir ez-Zour Province. New tensions might arise if the Sunni Arab majority there sees Kurds administering their territory as occupiers. Meanwhile, other nearby armed groups may enter the melee as their foreign backers—primarily Iran and Turkey—vie to secure influence in territories that are unlikely to return to Damascus’s centralized control. Among those groups are Iran-backed PMFs crossing over from Iraq and Sunni Arab rebel forcesthat had been backed by Jordan and the United States. Some observers believe Syrian Kurds are grabbing up territory in the oil-rich province as leverage to press for autonomy under a future settlement. The U.S. military has outposts across this region, and as the Islamic State’s footprint is diminished, clashes between these various forces will grow more likely, analysts say.

Displacement. With both the campaign against the Islamic State and the broader civil war winding down, some internally displaced Syrians are returning home. The International Organization for Migration reports that more than six hundred thousand did so in the first seven months of 2017, out of more than six million in all, though it cautions that not all returns were voluntary.

An additional five million Syrians are refugees in countries bordering Syria, and about a million have applied for asylum in the European Union. As war wanes, countries hosting refugees may face popular pressure to declare Syria safe for refugees’ return, as some have for Afghanistan. (Jordan has reportedly already deported registered refugees.) But while Syria is likely to remain divided among various spheres of influence, Assad’s continued rule from Damascus appears assured, and would-be returnees fear conscription or arrest, if not open fighting.

Reconstruction. The campaign against the Islamic State, as well as the broader civil war, has ravaged Syria. Some 7 percent of its housing stock has been destroyed, and another 20 percent damaged, the World Bank found. Likewise its educational and health-care systems have been largely destroyed, as well as much of its physical infrastructure. Rebuilding the destroyed physical capital could cost between $100 and $200 billion, according to an IMF study [PDF], but the damage to intangibles—destroyed institutions and networks that facilitate economic activity—may have exacted an even higher cost, according to a World Bank study.

The scale of the destruction is so great that reconstruction could not be done without a massive infusion of international aid and loans, but analysts warn that any such funds would likely end up in the coffers of Assad’s cronies or local power brokers loyal to him, and be used to reward loyal communities at the expense of others.

An April conference in Brussels sought to muster international support for reconstruction, but concluded that it could not successfully be done without a “genuine and inclusive transition that benefits all the Syrians.” The participants intended the prospect of international financing to incentivize the warring parties to return to what has been a fruitless UN-sponsored peace process years in the making. Assad, however, appears disinclined to compromise his authority, and he could instead turn to China, Iran, and Russia for financing.

What to Watch For in Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.