Understanding the Implications of Hybrid and Non-Linear Warfare
I. Introduction
The concept of warfare has evolved significantly over the years, with the traditional notion of state-on-state conflict increasingly giving way to more complex forms of engagement. This essay explores the concept of hybrid and non-linear warfare, a strategy that systematically blurs the lines between war and peace, and its implications for international security. The Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-2023) and the Chinese approach to hybrid warfare, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, serve as case studies to illustrate the practical application of these concepts.
Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, refers to a strategy that disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. These strategies have become increasingly prevalent in the 21st century as state and non-state actors seek to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional warfare1.
The Russo-Ukrainian War provides a clear example of these tactics in action. The conflict, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, has been marked by a mix of traditional military operations, cyber attacks, and information warfare.2 The war has also been characterized by its non-linear nature, with the front lines and the state of war and peace often blurred.
Meanwhile, China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly about Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers another perspective on these strategies. Chinese military theorists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work “Unrestricted Warfare,” have outlined a broad approach to conflict that includes not only military actions but also economic, informational, and other non-military means.3 This approach, evident in China’s actions in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, reflects a strategic shift towards hybrid and non-linear warfare.
This essay aims to explore these issues in depth, examining the nature of hybrid and non-linear warfare, its implications for international security, and how it has been employed in the Russo-Ukrainian War and by China. In doing so, it seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of these complex and evolving forms of warfare.
II. Hybrid and Non-Linear Warfare: An Overview
Hybrid and non-linear warfare represent two of the most significant developments in conflict and warfare in the 21st century. Their complexity and fluidity characterize these forms of warfare and the blurring of traditional lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.4
Hybrid warfare is a type of conflict that blends conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. This form of warfare is not limited to a single shape or dimension and can involve a mix of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war.5 The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been in use since at least 2005 when it was employed to describe the strategy used by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War.6
Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. This form of warfare utilizes a grand strategy approach, where force-on-force conflict is not the primary objective. Instead, the goal is to create a complex and fluid situation that exploits an opponent’s weaknesses.7
Several factors, including advances in technology, the increasing interconnectedness of the world, and the evolving nature of threats, have driven the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare. These forms of action allow state and non-state actors to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional war. However, they also pose significant challenges to international security, as they can be difficult to detect and counter and have far-reaching impacts on societies’ political, economic, and social fabric.8
In the following sections, we will delve deeper into these concepts and explore their implications through the lens of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s approach to hybrid warfare about Taiwan and the South China Sea.
III. Case Study: The Russo-Ukrainian War
The Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2014 and is a prime example of hybrid warfare. The conflict started with disguised Russian troops’ covert invasion of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. This was followed by the seizure of territory in Ukraine’s Donbas region by Russians and local proxy forces, marking the expansion of the conflict.9
In the early stages of the war, Russia employed a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics to destabilize Ukraine. This included cyber warfare, propaganda, economic pressure, and the deployment of “little green men” – soldiers without insignia who were later confirmed to be Russian personnel.10
However, the war took a significant turn on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.11 This marked a shift from the hybrid warfare tactics used in annexing Crimea to a more traditional form of warfare. Despite initial gains by Russian forces, Ukrainian defenders repelled attempts to seize Kyiv and other major cities and soon launched counterattacks at Russian positions.12
The full-scale invasion was not executed in the same manner as the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The gradual escalation of tensions and the failure of Russia at a strategic level to achieve its objectives became evident. The invasion resulted in a significant loss of life and displacement of people, with millions fleeing Ukraine.13
The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates the complexities and challenges of hybrid warfare. While Russia initially succeeded in destabilizing Ukraine through a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics, the shift to a full-scale invasion marked a significant escalation of the conflict. The failure of Russia to achieve its strategic objectives despite this escalation highlights the limitations of hybrid warfare when confronted with a determined and resilient defense.
The Russo-Ukrainian War also underscores the international implications of hybrid warfare. The conflict drew widespread international condemnation and led to significant sanctions against Russia. It also highlighted the role of global alliances and partnerships in countering hybrid warfare tactics.14
IV. Case Study: China’s Approach to Hybrid Warfare
China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly in the context of Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers a unique perspective on applying non-linear warfare strategies. This section will analyze China’s hybrid warfare tactics, focusing on its maritime gray zone operations, cyber warfare capabilities, and information warfare strategies.
China’s hybrid warfare strategy combines military, economic, diplomatic, and informational means to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to open warfare.15 This approach is particularly evident in China’s maritime gray zone operations in the South China Sea. China has been using a combination of naval, coast guard, and militia forces to assert its territorial claims in the region.16 These operations are designed to incrementally alter the status quo in China’s favor without provoking a military response from other regional actors or the United States.17
China has developed significant capabilities in the cyber domain and has been accused of conducting cyber espionage and cyberattacks against foreign governments and corporations.18 China’s cyber warfare strategy is driven by its perception of other countries’ changing cyber warfare approaches and practices, especially those of the U.S. and Russia.19 The Chinese government views cyber warfare as consistent with its military strategy, which is modified according to the national security environment, domestic situation, and activities of foreign militaries.20
China’s information warfare strategies also play a crucial role in its hybrid warfare approach. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been using information warfare to control the narrative within its borders and influence perceptions abroad.21 The CCP employs various tactics, including censorship, propaganda, and disinformation campaigns, to shape public opinion and advance its strategic objectives.22
In the context of Taiwan, China’s hybrid warfare approach is designed to isolate Taiwan internationally, undermine its political system, and gradually erode its will to resist unification with the mainland.23 This strategy includes diplomatic pressure to reduce the number of countries recognizing Taiwan, economic coercion to make Taiwan more dependent on the continent, and military intimidation to demonstrate China’s resolve to achieve unification.24
China’s approach is multifaceted and adaptive, reflecting its strategic objectives and the evolving security environment. This approach allows China to pursue its interests and assert its influence without resorting to open warfare, thereby minimizing the risk of escalation and international backlash.
V: Causes and Consequences of Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare, as a complex and multifaceted form of conflict, is driven by various causes and has significant national and international security consequences. This section will explore these causes and effects, drawing on various academic sources to provide a comprehensive analysis.
V.1 Causes of Hybrid Warfare
The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the diverse nature of this form of conflict. One key driver is the changing nature of power in the international system. Monaghan notes that the diffusion of power away from states and toward non-state actors has created an environment where hybrid threats can thrive.25 This is particularly true in the digital domain, where non-state actors can wield significant influence.
Another cause of hybrid warfare is the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action, which is often costly and risky. Hybrid warfare allows states to exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war, using military and non-military means to achieve their objectives.26 This is evident in the case studies of Russia and China discussed in the previous sections.
V.2 Consequences of Hybrid Warfare
The consequences of hybrid warfare are significant and wide-ranging. At the national level, hybrid warfare can undermine state sovereignty, security, and the rule of law. This is evident in the case of Ukraine, where Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has resulted in a protracted conflict that has undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.27
At the international level, hybrid warfare can destabilize the global system and challenge the norms and principles that underpin it. This is particularly the case in the South China Sea, where China’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has challenged the principle of freedom of navigation.28
Hybrid warfare also has significant implications for the conduct of warfare. As Baines and Edwards note, hybrid warfare blurs the lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.29 This complicates the conduct of action and poses significant ethical and legal challenges.
VI: Rethinking Warfare: A New Framework
The evolution of warfare, particularly the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare, necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to these threats. This section will explore the need for a new framework, the critical elements of this framework, and how it can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China.
- The Need for a New Framework
The traditional understanding of warfare, which primarily focuses on conventional military conflict, is no longer sufficient to address the complexities of the contemporary security environment30. Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare, along with other non-military tools, has become a prevalent strategy for state actors.31 This necessitates a new framework that can effectively address the multi-dimensional nature of hybrid warfare. - Key Elements of the New Framework: The new framework should incorporate the following key elements:
- Comprehensive Understanding of Hybrid Warfare: The framework should provide a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare, including its various dimensions, such as conventional, irregular, cyber, and information warfare.32 It should also consider using non-military economic, diplomatic, and political tools.
- Recognition of the Role of Non-State Actors: The framework should recognize the role of non-state actors in hybrid warfare. This includes not only insurgent groups and terrorists but also cybercriminals, hackers, and other actors who state actors can co-opt to achieve their objectives.33
- Incorporation of Technological Developments: The framework should incorporate the impact of technological developments on warfare. This includes using cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies.34
- Focus on Resilience and Defense: The framework should emphasize the importance of resilience and defense in responding to hybrid threats. This includes not only military security but also strengthening societal resilience, cyber protection, and other non-military reasons. 35
- Application to the Case Studies of Russia and China: The new framework can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.
- Russia: The new framework can help to understand Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine. It can shed light on Russia’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures36.
- China: The new framework can help to understand China’s use of hybrid warfare in its approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea. It can shed light on China’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures.37
The continuous evolution of warfare necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to hybrid threats. This framework should provide a comprehensive experience of hybrid warfare, recognize the role of non-state actors, incorporate technological developments, and focus on resilience and defense. It can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.
VII. The Agile Approach to Hybrid Warfare
The agile approach to hybrid warfare is a strategic response that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making in the face of complex and evolving threats. This approach is particularly relevant in hybrid warfare, where the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare are blurred, and the adversary’s tactics constantly evolve.
The agile approach is not a new concept in military strategy. It is rooted in maneuver warfare principles, which emphasize speed, surprise, and initiative to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process.38 However, applying these principles to hybrid warfare is a relatively recent development.
The NATO Alliance has recognized the need for an agile approach to hybrid threats. In its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders agreed on a strategy to enhance the Alliance’s resilience against hybrid threats, emphasizing the need for rapid decision-making, enhanced situational awareness, and improved strategic communications.39
The U.S. Department of Defense has adopted an agile approach to hybrid threats. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the need for a more agile force that can quickly adapt to new threats and challenges.40 This approach has been further developed in the concept of Multi-Domain Operations, which seeks to integrate capabilities across all domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) to create multiple dilemmas for the adversary.41
The agile approach to hybrid warfare also has implications for defense acquisition and technology development. Rapid technological change and the proliferation of advanced technologies to non-state actors and near-peer competitors have increased the complexity of the threat environment. Defense organizations must rapidly adopt more agile and flexible acquisition processes to field new capabilities.42
However, the agile approach is not without its challenges. It requires high coordination and integration across different domains and agencies, which can be challenging to achieve in large and complex organizations. It also requires a cultural shift towards greater risk tolerance and a willingness to experiment and learn from failure.43
An agile approach to hybrid warfare offers an intriguing framework for responding to the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare. However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.
VIII. Policy Recommendations
The complexity and evolving nature of hybrid warfare necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to policy-making. The following recommendations are proposed to counter hybrid threats effectively:
- Strengthening International Cooperation: The international community must work together to counter hybrid threats. This includes sharing intelligence, coordinating responses, and developing joint strategies. In this direction, NATO has already taken steps, establishing the Hybrid Analysis Branch and the Hybrid Warfare Fusion Cell to enhance understanding and response to hybrid threats.44 However, more can be done to strengthen these efforts, including expanding these initiatives to include non-NATO members and fostering closer cooperation with the private sector and civil society.
- Building Resilience: Resilience is critical to countering hybrid warfare. This includes societal resilience, such as public awareness and media literacy to counter disinformation campaigns, and institutional resilience, such as robust cyber defenses and crisis management capabilities.45
- Investing in Research and Development: Technological advancements play a significant role in hybrid warfare. Therefore, investing in research and development in artificial intelligence, cyber security, and advanced weaponry can provide a competitive edge.46
- Enhancing Legal and Normative Frameworks: Hybrid warfare often exploits legal and normative gray zones. Therefore, enhancing international legal and normative frameworks to address these challenges is crucial. This includes clarifying the application of international law in the cyber domain and developing norms against the use of disinformation and other hybrid tactics.47
- Adopting a Whole-of-Government Approach: Countering hybrid threats requires a coordinated approach involving all government sectors. This includes the military and intelligence agencies and departments dealing with foreign affairs, domestic security, finance, and infrastructure.48
- Promoting Strategic Communication: Effective communication is crucial in countering hybrid warfare. This includes both internal and external communication within the government with the public and international partners. Strategic communication can help to counter disinformation, build public trust, and promote a unified response to hybrid threats.49
Countering hybrid warfare requires a comprehensive and adaptive approach involving all societal sectors. By strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication, we can effectively counter the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare.
IX. Conclusion
Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber action with other non-military tools, has emerged as a significant challenge in the contemporary security environment. This essay has comprehensively analyzed hybrid war, its causes and consequences, and the need for a new framework to understand and respond to these threats.
The case studies of Russia and China illustrate hybrid warfare’s diverse and complex nature. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and China’s approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea demonstrate how state actors can exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war to achieve their objectives.50 51 These case studies underscore the need for a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare that includes both military aspects and non-military dimensions, such as economic, diplomatic, and political measures.
The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the changing nature of power in the international system and the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action.52 The consequences of hybrid action are significant and wide-ranging, undermining state sovereignty and security, destabilizing the international system, and complicating the conduct of warfare.53
The agile approach to hybrid warfare offers a promising framework for responding to these complex and evolving threats. This approach emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making and incorporates the impact of technological developments on warfare.54 However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.
The policy recommendations proposed in This essay provide a roadmap for countering hybrid threats. These include strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication.55 However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on the specific circumstances of each country and the nature of the threats they face.
Endnotes
1 Smith, M. E. (2016). Hybrid warfare and its implications for defense and security policies. European View, 15(2), 223-234.
2 Galeotti, M. (2019). The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Case Study in Non-Linear Warfare. In Non-Linear Warfare (pp. 45-64). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
3 Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
4 Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 1-72.
5 Kaldor, M. (2012). New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. Stanford University Press.
6 Van Puyvelde, D. (2015). Hybrid war – does it even exist? NATO Review. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/05/07/hybrid-war-does-it-even-exist/index.html
7 Hoffman, F. G. (2009). Hybrid warfare and challenges. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, (52), 34-39.
8 Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2015). A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War.” Kennan Cable No. 7. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
9 Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power.” Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 2016.
10 “Documents on Democracy: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Journal of Democracy, 2023.
15 Fravel, M. Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 292-319.
16 Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson. “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Studies in Chinese Military Science (2019).
17 Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. “China’s Vision of Victory.” The Diplomat, June 6, 2019.
18 Segal, Adam. “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1, 2019.
21 Brady, Anne-Marie. “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping.” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017.
23 Chase, Michael S., and Benjamin S. Purser III. “China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications.” RAND Corporation, 2015.
24 Tsang, Steve. “Taiwan’s Impact on China: Why Soft Power Matters More than Economic or Political Inputs.” The China Quarterly 177 (2004): 25-44.
25 Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
26 Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
27 Galeotti, Mark. “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.'” Foreign Policy, 2018.
28 Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
29 Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
30 Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
31 Johnson, R. (2018). Hybrid warfare and its countermeasures: A critique of the literature. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(1), 141-163.
32 Thiele, R. D. (2017). Hybrid warfare and the changing character of conflict. Connections, 16(2), 65-72.
33 Popescu, N. (2015). Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian. EUISS Issue Alert, 4.
34 Kostyuk, N., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2019). Invisible digital front: Can cyber attacks shape battlefield events? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 317-347.
35 Baines, P. R., & Jones, K. (2019). Influence and interference in foreign elections: the real threat to the ‘free and fair’ election process? Intelligence and National Security, 34(5), 685-703.
36 Galeotti, M. (2016). Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(2), 282-301.
37 Cheung, T. M., & Thomas, J. (2018). The impact of China’s military modernization on regional stability. In China’s Evolving Military Strategy (pp. 1-30). Brookings Institution Press.
38 Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
39 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.” NATO. July 9, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/officialtexts133169.htm.
40 “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.” U.S. Department of Defense. March 4, 2014. https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014QuadrennialDefenseReview.pdf.
41 “Multi-Domain Operations.” U.S. Army. https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2018/12/06/.
42 Gansler, Jacques S., and William Lucyshyn. “Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?” University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. October 2014. https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-acquisition-reform-where-do-we-go-here.
43 Blanken, Leo J., and Jason Lepore. “Is the U.S. Military Ready for Agile Acquisition?” War on the Rocks. August 14, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/is-the-u-s-military-ready-for-agile-acquisition/.
44 “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.
45 “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and Trust as the Antidote,” NATO Review, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.
46 Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,'” Prism 8, no. 2 (2019): 104-120, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism8-2/PRISM8-2Monaghan.pdf.
50 Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
51 Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
52 Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
53 Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
54 Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
55 “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.
About the Author
Joshua Ball is VP of Marketing at Codio and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He also serves as Executive Editor of Global Security Review and in the U.S. Marine Corps Cyber Auxiliary. Joshua holds a MA of International Relations from the University of St Andrews.
