The first commercial nuclear power plant in the Arab world is now fully operational, with all four units online and providing roughly a quarter of the country’s electricity. In a region traditionally defined by oil wealth, Barakah represents an intentional shift toward a diversified, low-carbon economy aligned with long-term sustainability goals.

The urgency behind this shift stems from rising domestic energy demand, climate commitments, and the need to hedge against volatility in fossil fuel markets. The UAE’s strategy positions nuclear power not as a replacement for hydrocarbons, but as a stabilising foundation within a broader clean-energy system. With global competition intensifying over clean-technology leadership, the UAE’s nuclear program has become a key pillar of national planning, industrial policy, and diplomatic signalling.

Barakah’s completion is notable in a world where many nuclear projects are delayed or cancelled. Built with South Korea’s KEPCO and operated by Nawah Energy Company, the reactors were brought online between 2021 and 2024 on a timeline that compares favourably with international benchmarks.

The program is overseen by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework and publishes transparent safety and inspection assessments. This regulatory credibility underpins both domestic public confidence and international recognition, distinguishing the UAE’s program from states whose nuclear ambitions raise proliferation concerns.

The impact on decarbonisation is already measurable. According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Barakah currently avoids around 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions annually, equivalent to removing nearly 4.8 million cars from the road. This mitigation supports the UAE’s net zero by 2050 Strategic Initiative.

This forms part of wider clean-energy planning that includes hydrogen, expanded solar capacity, and carbon-efficient industrial development. Nuclear power provides stable baseload output that complements intermittent renewables and stabilizes the electricity system as demand grows.

The UAE’s nuclear program is also a catalyst for scientific and industrial capabilities. Prior to Barakah’s commissioning, the UAE invested in human capital through institutions such as Khalifa University, which established the Emirates Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) to support reactor safety, radiation science, and advanced materials research. Alongside operator training and regulatory capacity building, these programs expand domestic expertise in high-value sectors that extend beyond power generation. Over time, these skills contribute to cybersecurity, digital instrumentation, robotics for plant inspection, and reactor systems modelling.

This knowledge base has spillover effects in multiple fields. In nuclear medicine, investments in radiopharmaceutical production and imaging facilities have strengthened diagnostic and therapeutic services, enabling the UAE to become a regional hub for advanced cancer treatment. In agriculture, the application of nuclear techniques such as the sterile insect technique (SIT) has supported integrated pest management, reducing chemical pesticide use and improving food security. In industry, nuclear-powered low-carbon aluminium production demonstrates how nuclear energy can decarbonize energy-intensive exports, positioning the UAE competitively as global markets introduce carbon border adjustment mechanisms.

However, several longer-term challenges require sustained policy focus. First, the UAE’s nonproliferation model, which commits to no enrichment and no reprocessing, enhances international trust but requires resilient fuel-cycle logistics. Ensuring diversified fuel suppliers and clearly articulated strategies for spent-fuel management will be essential over the fleet’s 60- to 80-year operational life.

Second, as more renewable energy is integrated into the grid, nuclear power plants will need to operate flexibly to maintain system stability. This will require advanced forecasting, large-scale storage solutions, and coordinated dispatch strategies.

A third challenge is ensuring that the nuclear workforce remains locally grounded and resilient. While Emiratization in the sector has advanced, retaining specialised talent requires clear career progression pathways, applied research opportunities, and continued collaboration with global operators, research laboratories, and regulatory bodies. Sustaining this talent pipeline is vital not only for Barakah’s long-term success but also for future reactor projects or advanced nuclear applications.

These considerations are particularly important as the UAE explores a potential second nuclear plant, which has been signalled in government discussions and energy planning reports. A second site could reinforce fleet-level operations, enhance outage scheduling, expand industrial applications, and deepen domestic supply-chain maturity. If pursued, the contracting and technology-selection process will become a significant geopolitical signal in the Gulf energy landscape, particularly as other states in the region show growing interest in nuclear power.

The UAE is now uniquely positioned to shape the trajectory of civil nuclear development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Establishing a GCC Nuclear Regulation and Safety Forum, anchored in FANR’s experience, could enable shared emergency preparedness frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and safety culture norms. Similarly, coordinating research networks in radiopharmaceutical production, nuclear-enabled agriculture, and advanced reactor technologies could support regional industrial integration. These collaborative frameworks would not only enhance security and performance standards but also reduce duplication of effort among neighboring states.

Looking ahead, discussions around small modular reactors (SMR) and microreactors are expanding globally. These technologies offer potential applications for district cooling, desalination, and off-grid industrial clusters. For the UAE, SMRs could complement rather than replace large-scale reactors. Any adoption pathway must be grounded in demonstrated vendor maturity, regulatory readiness, supply-chain localization, and long-term cost predictability. The UAE’s existing regulatory and operational foundation gives it a comparative advantage in evaluating such options pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

The UAE’s experience demonstrates that new nuclear programmes can be delivered on time, integrated into a national climate strategy, and used to catalyse broader scientific and economic development. The challenge now is to advance from successful construction to strategic expansion, ensuring fuel-cycle resilience, embedding research translation, supporting workforce depth, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. If these next steps are taken with the same planning discipline that characterised the first phase, the UAE will not only retain its role as the GCC’s leader in civil nuclear power but also provide a model for how emerging economies can balance energy security with strategic ambition in a decarbonizing world.

Tahir Azad, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Energy Security and Strategic Ambition: Evaluating the UAE’s Nuclear Journey was originally published on Global Security Review.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, President Trump and President Rouhani had agreed on a four-point document brokered by Emmanuel Macron as a basis for a meeting and relaunching negotiations between their respective countries. According to the text, which POLITICO claimed to have seen, Tehran would agree that “Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon” and will “fully comply with its nuclear obligations and commitments and will accept a negotiation on a long term framework for its nuclear activities.” It would also refrain from any aggression and will seek genuine peace and respect in the region through negotiations.”

The U.S. would agree to “lift all the sanctions re-imposed since 2017” and “Iran will have full ability to export its oil and freely use its revenues.” The meeting did not take place, though, as President Rouhani reportedly called it off because of Mr. Trump’s remarks in the UNGA of imposing further sanctions on Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian Supreme Leader has forbidden any talks with the U.S. unless the U.S. lifts all the sanctions on Iran. 

Meanwhile,  Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan had said in an address to media during the UNGA that both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and President Trump had asked him to work to deescalate the situation between them and Iran. He subsequently made a trip to Iran and Saudi Arabia in a bid to facilitate dialogue between both the countries. Also, shortly after UNGA, it was reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi had undertaken efforts to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the consent of Saudi Arabia. Abbas al Housavi, an official in Iraqi PM’s office, told Middle East Eye that the Saudis and Iranians both have conditions before the negotiations process starts. Middle East Eye later reported that Tahnoun bin Zayad, UAE national security adviser and crown prince’s brother, was in Tehran for at least 48 hours to defuse the Gulf crisis. 

Even though the agreed Trump-Rouhani meeting did not take place, it is nevertheless appreciable what President Macron was able to achieve through his shuttle diplomacy efforts. This instance is perhaps the closest the presidents of Iran and the U.S. have been to directly engaging with each other. Additionally, the four-point document was agreed upon by the two presidents, according to reports, and acknowledges the concerns of stakeholders. Thus, mediation efforts can now be augmented accordingly. It remains to be seen, however, what will come from the efforts of Pakistani and Iraqi Prime Ministers, as well as from the UAE National Security Advisor’s visit to Tehran.

Recent events underscore the necessity for dialogue

Furthermore, the events following the explosions that occurred on board the Iranian oil tanker Sabity in the Red Sea indicate genuine efforts by both Iran and Saudi Arabia to not only avoid tensions but also to de-escalate them. Iran has so far avoided explicitly blaming Saudi Arabia for explosions, despite alleging that two missiles hit the tanker near the Saudi Port of Jeddah. The Saudi Foreign Minister rejected any involvement in the Sabity incident. The spokesperson of the Saudi General Directorate of Border Guard claimed that Saudi Arabia’s attempts to assist the tanker were unsuccessful since the Sabity’s GPS was turned off, and it did not respond to repeated Saudi attempts to make contact. Ahead of PM Imran Khan’s visit to Iran, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Seyed Abbas Mousavi expressed Iran’s willingness to hold talks with Saudi Arabia in a bid to reduce or eliminate misunderstandings.

The attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last month is perhaps the event that can be most strongly attributed to the dramatic turn of events that is being observed. The Aramco attacks not only damaged the facilities but exposed Saudi Arabia’s military and economic vulnerabilities. Further, the U.S. shied away from overtly responding to Iran. It’s possible that MBS was made to realize the Kingdom can no longer rely on the U.S. for its security and that dialogue is needed to de-escalate the situation and find a way for sustainable, long-term regional coexistence with Iran.

“Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to directly label Iran for the Aramco attacks as the culprit demonstrates Riyadh’s uncertainties as to how to react given its obvious vital military and economic vulnerabilities. More than that, Riyadh has reportedly shown willingness to engage in talks with Iran mediated by Iraq—a dramatic turn from its more hawkish stance so far. In a nutshell, it seems that Iran’s risky game of brinkmanship since at least May has been quite successful in demonstrating its power of nuisance in the region,” said Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Visiting Fellow at the Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings Doha Center, when asked by the author for comment via email.

In a nutshell, there is a growing consensus about the necessity for talks. Yet, the occurrence of these talks remains only bleakly probable. This is because of the complications that arise out of Iranian, Saudi, and U.S. concerns, as well as from domestic politics in Iran and the U.S.

Dr. Nejad describes it this way: “Despite Macron’s strong efforts to arrange a Trump–Rouhani meeting at the sidelines of the UNGA and a four-point plan designed to exchange the lifting with U.S. sanctions with Iranian concessions in regional geopolitics and its ballistic missile program, Rouhani refused to take part in such a meeting, arguing that the U.S. needed to first lift sanctions. Rouhani’s position reflects that of the Supreme Leader Khamenei who, beyond that, seems to be opposed to the idea of his president engaging in talks with the U.S., which would lift Rouhani’s status at home—something Khamenei is unsympathetic to amid ongoing intra-elite rivalries in view of post-Khamenei Iran.” As for President Trump, he wants to talk to the Iranians but without lifting sanctions. His objective is to be seen as pressuring the Iranians via sanctions, thus forcing them to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the approaching 2020 U.S. Presidential Election has made it even more difficult for Mr. Trump to change course, lest he appears weak. 

Ending the stalemate

There have been attempts at mediation, but perhaps none of them have dedicated an adequate amount of effort at confidence-building measures between the rival countries. Thus far, mediators have tried to leverage the trust of the respective parties to facilitate talks, but have only managed to serve as interlocutors. Therefore, it is essential that confidence-building among these countries be considered a primary objective, which can then be further developed upon to get them to participate in a dialogue. This can only happen if reservations of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. be addressed first, at least to an extent, if not completely.

In terms of the Iranian position with regards to negotiation, Dr. Nejad says that “although Iranian foreign-policy at times is Janus-faced, Iranian strategy since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has been a result of elite consensus, involving various domestic factions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary by the Supreme Leader, Iran, via Zarif, has been regularly testing the waters of entering into negotiations with the U.S., which is indispensable if Tehran wants to improve its economic situation.” The main hindrance is that Iran wants to be respected by the U.S., and President Trump is doing precisely the opposite. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Tehran Correspondent of Financial Times, quoted a relative of the Supreme Leader in a recent article as saying, “Mr. Khamenei is not fundamentally against negotiations but he believes the U.S. intends to turn talks into a trial of the Islamic republic.” The relative goes on to say that “he believes that we first need to be very strong in the region. We have shown that we are not too far from that point of determining regional developments. The U.S. should not be able to ignore our power.”

As for Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Yemen crisis will make the most important feature in any negotiations or talks between them. As Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former Iranian policymaker in his article in Los Angeles Times, has suggested that the solution of crisis can act as a precursor to talks between the two countries and also the U.S in long run. This can serve as an appropriate confidence building measure. Mr. Mousavia suggests that the UN Secretary General can take initiative and invite both countries, as well as member countries of the European Union and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to hold a dialogue aimed at ending the bloodshed in Yemen. Looking at the statements from both, Saudi Arabia and Iran, it seems as though both the countries have already realized in part that neither can hope to have security by levying insecurity on the other and it is time to quit the competition for regional hegemony. 

In a meeting with PM Imran Khan, Supreme Leader Khamenei said properly ending the war in Yemen can have positive effects for the region. The Supreme Leader added that “we have no motivation for animosity with these countries (Saudi Arabia), but they are influenced by the United States and act against the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with the United States’ will.” Both these remarks are critical in the sense that the Supreme Leader has made them himself, perhaps implying he also thinks working to resolve the crisis in Yemen is a good starting point. Furthermore, based on the rhetoric of its leaders, Iran is arguably more comfortable about dialogue with Saudi Arabia right now than it is with the U.S.

Thus, as Mr. Mousavian has suggested further in his article, and it makes sense that if Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, the EU, and the U.S. are able to reach consensus about an end game for the Yemen war, there is a greater opportunity for a reduction in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lastly, this can set the stage for U.S. and Iran to reduce their tensions, as it would mean the solution of a significant point of contention between the U.S. and Iran: the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Mr. Trump can use this as a basis for granting concessions to Iran and not appear weak. In return, Iran would consider revisiting its earlier stand that all sanctions on Iran be lifted and participate in talks with the U.S.

Confidence Building Measures Needed Before the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Start a Dialogue With Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The secretary’s statements came after Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen took credit for the strikes. The U.S. rejected this claim, citing intelligence that the attacks did not originate within Houthi-controlled territory. On the sidelines of the 2019 UN General Assembly, the leaders of the U.K., France, and Germany backed the U.S. position that Iran was behind the attacks. “It is clear for us that Iran bears responsibility for this attack. There is no other explanation,” U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in a joint statement. However, the three European leaders stopped short of labeling the incident an “act of war.”

This is not to say that the strikes were in any way inconsequential. The two fields—located in the eastern part of the Kingdom—are by themselves responsible for half of the country’s total oil production and around five percent of all oil production globally, approximately 5.7 million barrels a day. Taking into account the nearby supergiant Ghawar field, eastern Arabia is the largest and most concentrated oil production site in the world.

Oil markets responded appropriately: Brent futures spiked almost fifteen percent to $69.02 (USD), the most significant jump in more than a decade. Gas futures skyrocketed more than thirteen percent, and consumers have been feeling the effects at the pump. For just the third time in its history, authorization was given to draw from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a means to mitigate worries about supply and assuage markets.

More than a week after the attack, prices stabilized: Brent prices have settled at just over $63 and WTI at $58 (USD). For now, the worst economic effects of the incident seem to have petered out before any last damage could be done.

But this episode serves as a stark warning and reminder to American policymakers and energy stakeholders: modern global energy infrastructure is exceptionally centralized and situated in the most geopolitically sensitive areas in the world, which makes the highly integrated system susceptible to the numerous and ever-changing risks associated with such geographies. Those seemingly abstract hazards can translate into real crises, which can have considerable implications for American economic and security interests at home and abroad.

The United States is certainly no stranger to energy concerns stemming from insecurities in the Middle East. Indeed, such fears were the very foundation of the Carter Doctrine and, more recently, was a driving force behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And the Abqaiq oil field itself has been a target in the years since then; the most high-profile incident has been an unsuccessful attempt by al Qaeda to disrupt production using suicide bombers in trucks. Prices only increased moderately after that episode, which occurred in 2006.

Why, then, has the United States continued to subject itself to the risks of relying on such a fragile and insecure part of the world for price assurance and supply security?

Rather than go through great pains and international embarrassment to arm the Kingdom to the teeth with advanced weapons systems (which has only served to encourage and exacerbate the very reckless adventurism that produces events like those that occurred last month), the United States should do all it can to reduce its exposure to the price instabilities wrought by Middle Eastern conflicts, thereby hedging against further unrest.

This means doubling down on existing trends: capitalizing on innovations in drilling technologies to continue the shale revolution and increase crude oil production capacity, utilizing the nation’s genuinely mammoth natural gas endowment, taking advantage of both developments to increase our exports of both oil and natural gas, and continuing to shift the share of energy imports away from OPEC—whose output is greatly affected by the political turmoil that grips its members—and toward more reliable neighbors like Canada and Mexico.

But ensuring protection from global energy shocks means more than relying on what’s beneath our feet. Renewables are inexhaustible, emissions-free, and an increasingly economically competitive source of energy. Here too, the United States is trending in the right direction: electricity generation from renewable resources has doubled since 2008 and is now responsible for nearly eighteen percent of total electricity supply.

This change has come in spite of the deep-seated antipathy the Trump administration has towards the renewable sector, despite the current political climate and economic inclinations of significant industry players. To promote energy diversification and thus an insurance policy against price spikes, the White House should reexamine its policy of propagating political fantasies like “clean coal” at the expense of market forces, which are pushing the American energy portfolio toward embracing renewables.

This sort of diversification and due diligence will prevent something like what occurred in Abqaiq and Khurais last month into “an act of war.” In short, if the security of American energy supply—the foundation of economic growth and national security—no longer hinges on a few oil fields across the pond, there would be no need to sacrifice more blood and treasure on another unpopular war in the Middle East.

Moreover, if security concerns did arise there or in another energy chokepoint—Venezuela, the Steppes, or Russia, for example—Washington could launch a strategic offensive without concern for the effect such a war would have on gas prices or general energy supply. Top military and political brass could make decisions without the fear of energy insecurity weighing on their every move.

As tensions between the regional powers of the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel—heat up, the possibility of war is the highest it’s been in a decade. As war rages in Yemen and Iran continues breaching the limits outlined by the nuclear deal, the long-lasting proxy fight that has decimated the region could transform into an all-out war between nations. If the Israelis feel emboldened to fight back against Iranian aggression (as recent news reports suggest), a cataclysmic conflict could decommission more than sixty percent of the world’s crude oil supply and send markets into a tailspin.

Americans no longer have the patience nor tolerance for U.S. interventionism in the Middle East. Significant fuel price increases have severe short- and long-term economic consequences for low- and middle-income earners. Furthermore, the Middle East is no longer as strategically important for U.S. national security interests in light of shifting power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The future of U.S. national security and economic prosperity depends on the Trump administration (and future administrations) pursuing a policy of energy diversification while exercising restraint in Middle Eastern affairs.

Rethinking U.S. Energy Security to Hedge Against Heightened Instability in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict in Yemen—one of the Arab world’s poorest states—has roots that extend back to the Arab Spring uprisings of the early 2010s—and beyond. The Houthi insurgency has been in existence since the early 2000s, but it wasn’t until 2012 when a wave of protests forced Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down after ruling the country for 22 years.

Saleh’s successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was elected in a single-candidate election in 2012, much to the opposition of the Houthis, who boycotted voting. Hadi failed to successfully manage the country’s problems with food insecurity, unemployment, corruption, and militancy. Political instability only widened once a proposal to reorganize Yemen as a federal state divided into six regions was rejected, and security deteriorated significantly. Hadi was eventually forced from office in February 2015 as his relationship with the Houthis deteriorated severely.

Houthi militants began engaging with the Yemeni Army, and Hadi was placed under house arrest. However, he managed to flee the capital to his hometown of Aden, from where he made a public declaration that he retained executive power. However, he fled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the Houthi’s expanded the territory under their control.

In the years since Hadi’s ouster, the situation in Yemen has significantly worsened. In addition to hosting a bloody civil war, Yemen has seen numerous acts of terrorism, carried out mostly by groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS (Daesh). The United Nations has said it considers the humanitarian crisis in Yemen as the world’s worst. Millions of Yemeni civilians have been displaced, with millions more lacking access to clean water, food, and healthcare. Over one million cases of cholera have been reported in the country, resulting in thousands of deaths. 

Foreign Intervention

Like the majority of Iranians, the Houthis are members of the Shia sect of Islam. In the broader Islamic world, Shia Muslims are a minority; the majority of Muslims belong to the Sunni sect. In involving itself in the Yemeni civil war, Iran likely saw an opportunity to advance its interests in a region where it has few friends while frustrating the efforts of Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s regional rival, to consolidate its influence on the Arabian Peninsula.

Part of Iran’s strategy in Yemen was providing Houthi forces with arms—crucially, drones, and ballistic missiles which are regularly employed against targets in Saudi Arabia. In the past several months alone, there have been numerous drone or missile strikes on critical infrastructure and energy facilities in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Tehran has mobilized its most important proxy group, Hezbollah.

In response to the Iranian regime’s support for the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of its regional allies to prosecute a military campaign aimed at restoring Hadi to power. The United States and the United Kingdom have assisted the coalition, providing intelligence, logistical support, and arms to the Saudi-led coalition to counter what they perceive as Iran’s growing influence and the Iranian regime’s efforts to further destabilize an already-troubled region. Complicating Riyadh’s efforts, however, the United Arab Emirates—the Saudi’s primary ally in the conflict—recently began withdrawing its forces from Yemen.

Iranian Proxy Groups

Providing material, financial, and advisory support to proxy forces in lieu of direct engagement enables Iran to engage in regional conflicts with a degree of deniability. Proxy forces are utilized to shape political developments in specific areas while minimizing potential costs for Iran and are arguably regarded within the regime as a beneficial tool for achieving its foreign policy objectives.

The Islamic Republic provides Houthi forces with weaponry, supplies, training, and logistics, a strategy that aligns with Tehran’s playbook for shaping political and security conditions in a favorable manner. Hezbollah, based in Lebanon and perhaps the best-known Iranian proxy, has, over time, acquired substantial political powers, influence, and capabilities—both in Lebanon and beyond. 

In Yemen, Hezbollah has advised and delivered Iranian weapons to the Houthis. In Syria, the group has provided support to Bashar al Assad’s government forces. Among other groups that have served as Iranian proxies in Syria are Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) and the Iraqi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), established in 2006.

U.S.-Iran Tensions and Escalation

Tensions between Tehran and Washington have continued to escalate for the past few months. However, direct military confrontation between Iran and the U.S. remains an unlikely option given U.S. President Donald Trump’s continued restraint despite escalatory provocations by the Iranian regime. However, the Trump administration will continue to provide logistical support, intelligence, and weapons shipments to Riyadh—despite bipartisan opposition in the U.S. Congress.

Both sides are already deeply involved in the Yemeni civil war, and their respective interests are seemingly intractable. That being said, the leader of both parties understand the devastating costs a full-blown war would have. As a result, the conflict in Yemen will persist for the foreseeable future, fueled by a regional quasi-hybrid proxy war between the U.S.and the Islamic Republic that shows no sign of deescalating. 

Yemen is a Battleground in Iran’s Proxy War Against the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Up until the Libyan National Army (LNA) reached the southern outskirts of Tripoli, the campaign somewhat resembled a sneak attack. The LNA is lead by General Khalifa Haftar, an ex-Libyan Army officer who served under Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. From 1990 to 2011, Haftar lived in exile in the United States, returning to Libya in 2011 during the country’s revolution, holding a senior position in the group that overthrew Gaddafi’s regime.

In Haftar’s rhetoric, the assault is described merely as a campaign to liberate the capital from the extremist Islamic groups governing it. These assertions do have some logic to them, apart from the fact that the purported extremist groups aren’t overtly specified. Nevertheless, attempting to capture the capital—let alone effectively administering the country after a victory—may prove to be a bridge too far.

General Haftar Gains Ground

Ever since the chaotic events of 2011, Haftar has nearly continuously fought against jihadists, managing to achieve significant territorial gains. In earlier campaigns, some of his troops are known to have committed war crimes, but it would be a fallacy to assume no such crimes were committed by extremist groups on the opposing side.

Since the fall from power and subsequent death of Muammar al-Gaddafi in late 2011, Libya has lacked an effective central government. After a transition period, elections were held in 2012, which resulted in violence and left the country without functioning state organs. Concurrently, as an interim governing authority was established in Tripoli, Haftar struck an alliance with the rival governing body, the House of Representatives in Tobruk, Libya.

The legitimacy of the Tobruk-based government is itself disputed. Initially, it was recognized by the West, most likely in the hope that it would ultimately unite with the Tripoli-based government. This optimism could be deemed naïve, especially after Haftar quickly managed to mobilize an army (the Libyan National Army) primarily from Gaddafi-era officers and soldiers, with support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The LNA succeeded in capturing various cities in Eastern Libya, including Benghazi, after defeating ISIS and Shura Council forces in 2017.

After gaining power over Libya’s vital oil production areas in 2016, Haftar temporarily lost the key export ports of Brega, Es Sidr, and Ras Lanuf, but was able to reestablish control over them shortly after that. In contrast to their successes in eastern Libya, Haftar and his allies lost control over Tripoli’s international airport in 2014. However, heavy fighting damaged the airport’s facilities—if not even ruined them—rendering the airport inoperable.

In the wake of these clashes, Misrata-led armed groups and their allies formed the “Libya Dawn” coalition and took over the capital. In December 2015, Libya’s two main rivals—the House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based Libya Dawn coalition—reached an agreement over the formation of a UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), which was formed in Spring 2016.

Clashing Congressmen in the Capital

The supreme authority in Tripoli is the Presidential Council (PC), made up of nine members and chaired by the prime minister. Some members of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives never accepted the idea of a GNA, leaving little chance for any future cooperation. This is unsurprising, however, given that in any merger, members of both power centers would lose standing relative to their current positions.

Notably, the head of the GNA—Fayez Al-Sarraj—was a member of the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Regardless, this detail never fostered trust between the rival factions, nor did it prevent Haftar from seizing valuable oil installations in southern Libya.  Initially occupied by armed clans and militant groups, the GNA had to send troops to protect these facilities from Haftar’s advancing forces.

On the other hand, Haftar isn’t the only one causing gray hairs for Libya’s newly formed state institutions. Basing its mandate on the General National Congress elections of 2012, the Government of National Salvation of Khalifa Ghwell was also founded in Tripoli, though without any real governing structures. In 2016, Ghwell again tried to reassert his position but failed. The following year, he and his troops were finally ousted from the capital. Even though Ghwell’s possibilities were limited, the intra-Tripoli clashes 2016–2017 challenged Al-Sarraj’s regime, and in turn, provided momentum for Haftar to slowly approach the capital.

It is likely that internal rivalries existed amongst decision-makers in Tobruk, and that Al-Sarraj was expected to loyally support the aims of the eastern Libya-based House of Representatives. Instead, in the eyes of his former colleagues, he became too independent and powerful through his apparatus in Tripoli, which led to open confrontation between rival factions.

Despite any doubts held concerning Al-Sarraj’s loyalty, not all parliamentarians in Tobruk supported Haftar’s final push towards Tripoli. Dozens pledged their support for the general, but a number rejected the use of force and urged their colleagues to convene and elect a new chairperson. Those dissenting viewed the incumbent as a close ally of Haftar, but failed to gather the necessary quorum to hold a vote until later, but were unable to effectuate any meaningful action.

Foreign Friends & Funding

Despite sharp divisions between those allied with him, Haftar had no problem commencing his campaign to seize Tripoli. When Haftar ordered his troops to “liberate” Tripoli on April 4, 2019, he had already secured Saudi-Arabian backing as well as support from Egypt and the UAE. GNA forces shot down UAVs that were reported to be of Emirati origin, even though the UAE was not officially involved. Furthermore, it is likely that Saudi funding financed the Tripoli campaign, including pay for soldiers.

On the surface, it would seem paradoxical that Haftar—a man whose stated purpose is combating extremism—is funded by Saudi Arabia’s Wahabbi monarchy. However, considering that Libyan extremists mainly subscribe to a different strain of Islamic fundamentalism than the Saudis, the paradox is not so striking. Turkey, a major regional rival of the Saudis, has provided support and backing to Al-Sarraj and wasted no time in denouncing Haftar’s move against Tripoli. Ankara has also been accused of transporting fundamentalist militants to Libya from areas that were formerly controlled by ISIS, and more recently, of arming GNA forces.

Fervent Egyptian support for Haftar is similarly complex. President Al-Sisi has taken a hard line against Islamist movements—notably the Muslim Brotherhood—but such predilections have yet to deter Egyptian participation in a Saudi-funded operation. From Cairo’s perspective, ensuring extremist groups stay away from Egypt and its vicinity is a goal that justifies even minor procedural deviations.

Similarly, French decision-making is heavily guided by security concerns. France’s strategy of ambiguity, however, merits some explanation. In 2011, airstrikes carried out by French fighter jets, alongside British and U.S. planes, were instrumental in ousting Gaddafi. Shortly after that, however, Paris began to support Haftar’s campaign against militant fundamentalists in Libya. France vetoed a UN Security Council resolution over Libya’s current situation, which was perceived as too unilaterally condemning of Haftar, illustrating France’s pragmatic approach.

More recently and in a logical continuation of its strategic ambiguity, France called on the UN Security Council to facilitate a settlement in Libya. After Al-Sarraj threatened western energy companies operating in Libya over the status of their operating licenses, France relaxed its seemingly supportive stance towards Haftar’s LNA. While exhibiting sympathy for the endangered GNA in Tripoli, as well as a willingness to serve as an intermediary, Paris is increasingly aware that it’s unlikely a negotiated settlement will be reached.

Al-Sarraj’s threat similarly applies to Italian firms. While the Italian government has held meetings with representatives of both sides, it has mostly limited itself to rhetorically highlighting the need for a political solution to the conflict. While Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s position as the head of a populist left- and right-wing populist governing coalition is a question in-and-of-itself, the primary reason for the Italian government’s intransigence is likely the ongoing refugee crisis. Italy has been a prime destination for migrants setting off from the Libyan coast, and is, rather cynically, weighing which of the warring parties is best-positioned to stem (if not stop entirely) the substantial influx.

In contrast, Libya’s neighbor Tunisia is not so concerned about possible refugees, not least because Haftar controls most of the Libyan side of the Libyan-Tunisian border. If allegations of Tunisian arms sent to Tripoli and fighters joining GNA are true, Tunis may have lost one income source. Still, a humanitarian catastrophe next door would cause significant economic and social problems for Tunisia as well.

For its part, Russia denies involvement in the escalation in Libya. In the past, Moscow has provided Haftar’s forces with arms, and Russian private security firms have reportedly been engaged in operations within Libya. The Kremlin, however, is more focused on the international legal precedents that would be established in the event of a UN-brokered settlement, so as to be able to later refer to it as a model for resolving internal conflicts. If Western powers—mainly the U.S., France, Britain, and Germany—agree to a UN-brokered settlement, the precedent established in Libya could be used by Moscow to settle, on its own terms, internal conflicts it has provoked through the creation of quasi-states like Transnistria, Abkhazia, and the Donetsk People’s Republic, to name a few.

Haftar advances towards Tripoli

As the UN voiced its concern over impending hostilities— in vain—Haftar’s forces closed in on the capital along the two main roads that run parallel to one another into Tripoli. The initial phase was rather quick, and Haftar’s troops succeeded in advancing to the Tunisian border in the west and Janzur on the western outskirts of Tripoli, essentially cutting the city off from any supplies or reinforcements, leaving just two small GNA-loyal pockets along the coast. In the opposite direction, this also prevents possible refugees from crossing over to Tunisia.

Shortly after that, the LNA lost one airplane, reportedly due to technical failures. The LNA bombed the city’s only functioning airport, Mitiga, which was closed for several days. Once again, the heaviest fighting has been concentrated in and around the old airport, located roughly 30 kilometers south of the city center. For now, Haftar is in control the airport itself, with enemy forces just yards away.

Situated between the two main roads leading to Tripoli from the south, the airport serves as a crucial foothold to block access to the city, as well as a forward base from which to conduct further operations. Together with Janzur (had its capture succeeded—instead, around 140 of Haftar’s men were besieged and captured) and a strategic intersection close to the suburb of Tajoura, these gains would offer optimal positions from which to lay siege to the city. Or, if the LNA manages to establish a hold on the old airport, Janzur isn’t even needed, since the LNA already controls Surman, which blockades the area west of Al-Zawiyah.

As of this article’s publication, the LNA’s main base of operations remains in Gharyan, some 60 kilometers from Tripoli, whereas the frontline goes from the Qaser Bin Ghashir suburb adjacent to the old airport. Gharyan itself closes a counterattack route via Kilka—the corner of the vast GNA-loyal enclave situated behind the LNA—just southwest of Tripoli. The LNA’s loss of Al-Aziziyah was a setback, and fierce fighting continues around it and the old airport. The LNA has managed to achieve minor territorial gains around Al-Aziziyah, and for a short period, were able to progress to the Tripoli Medical Center, roughly 10 kilometers from the city center.

Overall, the LNA has been unable to break through the Tripoli defense lines, which have been reinforced by fighters from Misrata. If Haftar were to concentrate all his forces in Tripoli, it would weaken his flanks, leaving his positions open to a possible counterattack from Misrata—towards Bani Walid or from along the eastern coast. Conversely, by drawing in and binding as many Misrata-based armed groups as possible to the Tripoli trenches, Haftar diminishes the likelihood of a counterattack from Misrata.

Launching an assault on a new front along the coast by Sirte is another tactic Haftar could employ to prevent any attacks on his forces from the rear. On the other hand, however, it implies that breaking through Tripoli’s southern defenses proved harder than initially expected. Thus, clashes remain sporadic, but increasingly heavy shelling has inflicted large amounts of damage on the southern Tripoli suburbs, as thousands have fled amidst a death toll that has risen into the hundreds. Even if the fighting remains localized, the situation could worsen quickly. With deteriorating living conditions, there is a risk of a far greater humanitarian crisis.

No easy solution

Escalation into a full-scale civil war cannot be excluded, given the aspirations of the involved parties. As the capital plays a strategic role, capturing it would solidify—to an extent—Haftar’s control over Libya. Nevertheless, maintaining control over crossroad towns such as Tarhouna, Bani Walid, Waddan, and a small village east of Sirte remains vital for LNA operations in the northwest of Libya.

On the other hand, Al-Sarraj’s most effective (and likely only) way to remain in power is to defeat Haftar’s LNA at Tripoli’s gates. A counterattack from Misrata or anywhere else would bog down forces plus weaken the capital’s southern defenses. Thus, the GNA’s primary objective is ensuring that the main routes into Tripoli remain closed to the LNA to preclude the possibility of a siege on the city.

In the event of an all-out civil war, there would be no victors. First and foremost, the death toll would likely rise into the tens of thousands, and it would take substantial time and resources to rebuild Libya after another civil war. Hafter can’t afford to lose the battle for Tripoli, as it would mean the end of his career. If Haftar is victorious, the population of Tripoli isn’t likely to welcome him as a liberator, thus forcing him into a long campaign to win their hearts and minds.

Likewise, if the GNA prevails, it cannot be sure whether the various armed groups backing it now would subsequently submit to its authority. This would be particularly so if the decisive factor delivering the victory were troops from Misrata, who might seek a more significant share of power, encouraged by their successes and perceived leverage. In this scenario, the intra-Tripoli situation from 2016-2017 would likely repeat itself. Furthermore, several armed groups remain, among whom are former ISIS militants, who could take advantage of factional infighting. Such groups are unlikely to submit to the rule of a central governing authority, and whoever should prevail in Tripoli must effectively deal with these factions—or else the next conflict is already looming.

Haftar Ante Portas Tripoli was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is therefore unsurprising that in recent months, the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have ramped up efforts to consolidate and expand their trade and investment ties with the republics of Central Asia. In January, Saudi Arabia expressed its intent to invest heavily in Uzbekistan’s textile industry as part of a broader commitment to expand economic cooperation. On March 20^th, 2019, Tajikistan secured a loan worth $25.5 million (USD) from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development for infrastructural repair in its impoverished southeast. 

Leading the Gulf’s charge into Central Asia is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A flurry of diplomatic activity has taken place so far this year, culminating in March with the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan visiting Abu Dhabi. Bilateral economic ties have been strengthened, mainly through the Mubadala Development Company, the sovereign wealth fund of the UAE. Mubadala secured extensive investments in Kazakhstan’s polyethylene and polypropylene production and aerospace industries in 2018. In March of 2019, the company announced its intention to invest $10 billion (USD) in Uzbekistan’s manufacturing, agricultural, and energy sectors. 

While economic links such as these have existed between the two regions since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the recent acceleration of GCC overtures toward Central Asia is driven by a conflation of geopolitical and economic developments. The persistence of low oil prices, coupled with continued volatility of the global market, has crystallized the need for both regions to diversify their economies. The prosperous Gulf States see in the likes of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan sizeable investment opportunities in industries beyond energy, such as agriculture and manufacturing. 

In turn, the cash-strapped countries of Central Asia rely on outside investment to fuel national economic development and the GCC make for particularly attractive partners. Not merely do they offer seemingly endless capital, but until recently they have appeared to transcend the predatory geopolitical maneuvering that has tended to follow investment in the region from the likes of local powers—namely China and Russia. Both have approached investment in Central Asia as a means through which to secure political interests. China, for example, has recently purchased vast tracts of arable land in Tajikistan, arousing government fears of monopolization.  

How long the perception of GCC neutrality can be maintained, however, is uncertain. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been driven to Central Asia in recent months in-part by a desire to pre-emptively combat further incursions into the region by a rival power: Iran. The country has deep historic cultural and political links with the area and is increasingly expressing an interest in expanding its economic presence.

Tehran has been probing investment opportunities in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan amid an improved diplomatic atmosphere following the signing of the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea in August of 2018.  There is scope for Central Asia to become a zone of contestation between the Gulf and Iran, as an extension of the competition that defines their conduct in the Middle East.  Though this development won’t be to the taste of Central Asian governments, it is unlikely to deter the highly profitable trajectory of their expanding ties with the GCC. 

The Geopolitical Implications of Expanding Ties Between the Gulf and Central Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the threat from the extremist Sunni group dwindled, Iran-backed militias have been strengthening their foothold in the region. In Iraq, Tehran is working to integrate Shia militia forces into the Iraqi military, cementing its influence over Baghdad. In Syria, the Iranians are reinforcing militia groups as they attempt to cement their presence in the country as a deterrent to Israel. Additionally, Iran is supplying Hezbollah with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and precision-guided missiles.

However, Iran is not without internal complication. Over the past year, the value of the Iranian Rial has decreased substantially and the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and its unilateral re-imposition of sanctions have only exacerbated Iran’s economic troubles. Furthermore, there is a tug-of-war brewing in Tehran between members of the ruling class aligned with President Hassan Rouhani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the reformation of the Iranian economy. In short, domestic affairs and declining revenues will constrain Iranian efforts to strengthen its regional influence in 2019.

Tehran’s Problems Are Washington’s Opportunity

For some countries, however, Iran’s troubles could be perceived as a strategic opportunity. As 2019 progresses, the U.S. will enlist existing allies and forge new partnerships to contain Tehran’s expansionist aims. One such coalition, albeit still in the making, is the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), also known as the “Arab NATO.” Another group of partners is the Kurdish militias in Northwest Iran, with whom the U.S. has cultivated solid ties. Washington could also encourage insurgencies in the Iranian regions of Khuzestan and Baluchistan.

To effectively push back against Iran, however, the U.S. must work alongside allies with which its interests are closely aligned. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates will all readily endorse activities designed to constrain Iranian influence, but will first have to overcome decades of mistrust and hostility.

For the time being, each state will have its own issues to deal with. For Saudi Arabia, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi will cast a long shadow over the ruling House of Saud. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has come under increasing international scrutiny, but any major change in the status quo is unlikely. Beyond the Crown Prince, Riyadh will strive to make progress on its Saudi Vision 2030 initiative, which the government expects will enable it to ease up on austerity measures and promote economic activity in the non-oil sectors.

An End to the War in Yemen?

To the south of Saudi Arabia is the ongoing civil war in Yemen. The conflict has proved increasingly costly for the involved powers, not to mention the millions of civilians who lack access to food, shelter, and medicine. In November 2018, the U.S. Senate voted to move ahead with a bill that, if passed, would end Washington’s involvement in the Yemen War.

Now that the Democratic Party has assumed control of the House of Representatives, the pressure to end the conflict will only increase. In Tehran, there are calls for the country to negotiate with the United States for sanctions relief in exchange for a scaling-down of Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen.

2019 could present an opportunity for the U.S. and Iran to de-escalate tensions, should the interests of both countries align enough—especially when it comes to Yemen. Should a successful agreement be implemented regarding Iranian involvement in Yemen’s civil war, it could serve as a jumping-off point for further engagement.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

In the Levant, Hezbollah has acquired precision-guided munitions from Iran and manufactures them in Lebanon.  For Israel, this presents a strategic threat. Many Israeli policymakers believe a preventive strike against Hezbollah while the group remains preoccupied with the conflict in Syria is necessary.

As such, there is the possibility that, at some point in 2019, Israel conducts one or more offensives against Iranian-Hezbollah supply lines in Syria and Lebanon. Such a strike would likely target storage and manufacturing facilities for guided munitions. In doing so, however, Israel will have to ensure it avoids inadvertently targeting Russian or Turkish assets in an increasingly crowded battle space in Syria.

Setting aside the fact that such a preventive offensive against targets in Lebanon would be a violation of international law, airstrikes alone would likely fail to achieve any meaningful objectives. In the last war with Hezbollah, Israel inflicted enormous damage in Lebanon but ultimately failed to achieve its objective. A similar outcome is likely for a coming air offensive unless Israel is willing to commit ground forces as well.

U.S. Troops to Withdraw from Syria?

In Syria, the war appears to be entering its final phases. In December of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria. However, no deadline or timeline was given for the departure, which will ultimately grant a strategic advantage to Russia and Iran, as well as possibly allow for a reemergence of ISIS or a similar Sunni extremist group.

In the Syrian province of Idlib, the situation will remain particularly volatile throughout 2019. Turkey has pledged to increase its engagement in the region and commit troops. However, there is little agreement between individual Turkish-backed groups which has resulted in growing infighting. At the same time, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has vowed to retake the province, even as Russian, Iranian, Syrian, Kurdish, French, and American forces are situated nearby. Given the number of opposing forces in such a congested area, there is a risk for a rapid and inadvertent escalation.

Managing Tensions Between Turkey and the U.S.

With regards to tensions between Turkey and the United States, the two will likely come to some sort of agreement over how best to proceed in Syria. Although Ankara and Washington are both hostile to Assad, the two disagree over the next phase of the conflict. Washington sees combating ISIS as the top priority; the closest partner for the U.S in this effort mission is the YPG, a Kurdish militant group currently in control of Northeast Syria. Turkey, which sees the YPG as a terrorist group and a threat to Turkish national security, seeks to deny the YPG a safe haven in Syria.

To settle these differences, Turkey and the United States will have to negotiate an agreement. Washington is unlikely to turn its back on the Syrian Kurds as long as ISIS remains a credible threat. Rather, it will likely make minor territorial concessions to Turkey without undermining the security of the Syrian Kurdish militias. President Erdogan’s proposal for a “safe zone” along the Turkish border and in territories controlled by the YPG is one arrangement being considered.

Regardless, Turkey can’t simply walk away from the United States. It depends on the U.S. to balance against Russia. Likewise, the United States needs to maintain its relationship with Turkey, a NATO ally, to counter Russia in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, especially since tensions between Moscow and Washington will likely worsen throughout 2019.

The Middle East will remain susceptible to foreign influence and prone to conflict throughout 2019. The primary catalyst being heightened competition between great powers, along with competition between regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran. Furthermore,  an increasing propensity for unilateral action by a number of players in the region increases the chance for a substantial escalation.

Conflict and Competition in the Middle East Will Persist Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hasn’t provided any details of the meeting, the visit is indicative of an Iranian effort to maintain relations with the Afghan government as the government negotiates with the Taliban. Furthermore, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has confirmed that Tehran and the Taliban were previously engaged in direct talks. On December 31, the Iranian government confirmed that a Taliban delegation had visited Iran for another round of negotiations.

Tehran is not only hedging by maintaining a dialogue with the radical extremist group; it’s assuming the role of a disruptor in the peace process to ensure its interests are secured in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and a select group of regional stakeholders. While the U.S. includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in its deliberations, it is excluding key stakeholders—Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

The Iranian government justifies its disruptive involvement by citing “legitimate concerns” regarding the rise of militant extremist groups in Afghanistan. Tehran previously adopted a similar approach in its engagements with Islamabad, which provides aid and haven to the Taliban. Iran’s willingness to engage with the Taliban is not unprecedented—the relationship dates back to 1994 when the Taliban was under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Relations continued under Omar’s successor, Akhtar Mansoor, who was killed in May of 2016 while returning to Pakistan after visiting Iran. According to his Pakistani passport, Mansoor spent two months in Iran before being targeted by a U.S. drone strike on the highway leading into Pakistan from the country’s Iranian border. 

Tehran does not want to sever ties with the Afghan Government while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with a resurgent Taliban, which is in control of more territory than at any time since 2001. Tehran considers the rise of militant Islamic extremist groups to be a key “legitimate concern,” along with the threat of a Taliban takeover of the Afghan government and the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran, and ensures a steady stream of black market U.S. dollars into the Iranian economy.

Ensuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.

In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.). 

Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow. 

The rise of Salafi extremist groups—facilitated with support from Gulf states—is another phenomenon motivating Iran to engage with the Taliban. Iranian overtures to the Taliban are an effort to ensure militant Islamist ideology imported into Afghanistan does not flow to Iran. Russia exhibited similar concerns when the Kremlin claimed that “Daesh [Islamic State] imported into Afghanistan” had expanded over Northern Faryab and Jawzjan provinces along the Afghan border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia reportedly met with Taliban representatives to negotiate a settlement agreement, as well as coordinate efforts to block and topple any Daesh activity in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. 

Beyond fomenting ongoing insecurity within Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been training Afghan refugees as Fatemiyoun mercenaries to fight against Daesh in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Thousands of vulnerable refugees who are devout Shias have joined the Fatemiyoun ranks to change their families’ legal status as refugees in Iran. They had reportedly returned to Afghanistan to counter Salafi extremism activity alongside the Taliban and combat militant Islamist activity in the western region of Afghanistan on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard.

Iran’s cooperation with a hardline Sunni extremist group like the Taliban group to counter threats to its interests in Afghanistan is a dangerous strategy. Going forward, Iran must act strategically; history has proven that engagement with the Taliban along with the selective use of terrorism will not achieve the end-result Tehran is expecting. The Iranian government must respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, recognize the Afghan state, and develop a bilateral relationship based on culture, trade, and legitimate interests for Tehran within a stable Afghanistan. 

In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.

Iran must play the role of a good neighbor to Afghanistan; the latter has never posited a threat to Iranian national security.  Iranian concern over the activities of Salafi extremist groups in Afghanistan is a legitimate one, however bypassing the Afghan Government in favor of non-state actors will not alleviate this concern, however justified. 

An Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies research finding shows that a majority of the Afghan elite (between 57 and 66.4 percent) has expressed satisfaction with Iran’s social, religious, and economic policies. However, the same survey findings show that 55 percent of the Afghan elite have expressed dissatisfaction towards the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political and security policies as they relate to Afghanistan. Iran has a role in the Afghan peace process, but it must act in good faith. 

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The summit occurred at a notably significant time because the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council may be at stake for the first time since its founding in 1981. The blockade of Qatar, the ongoing war in Yemen, and the diplomatic fallout over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi are a few of the major issues that have overshadowed the summit in Riyadh.

One notable absentee in Saudi Arabia was the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamid bin Hamad Al Thani. One reason for his non-attendance is the ongoing blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Due to the summit’s location in Riyadh, rather than in a more impartial state like Oman or Kuwait, it is possible the Emir opted not to attend to avoid an incident similar to the purported kidnapping of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017.

The GCC has been under significant strain since the blockade of Qatar was initiated in June 2017. Before the sharp downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the land border between the two countries was heavily trafficked. Now, however, Qatar’s single land border (the country is surrounded by water on three sides) has been entirely blockaded by three GCC members.

More recently, Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC has further inflamed tensions within the GCC. The Qatari decision to withdraw was due in large part to the country wanting increase gas exports, thus diversifying an economy that remains heavily reliant on oil. For now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait all seem to believe the GCC can survive the rift in regional relations. However, this remains to be seen.

The GCC was established in 1981 as a multinational organization intended to provide a collective defense mechanism against threats from post-revolutionary Iran. Today, members like Qatar are facing threats from other GCC members within the same bloc. Given the level of discord between the different members of the GCC, the organization may have little relevance remaining. The member countries are vying for different interests and maintain different threat perceptions. The GCC is currently comprised of three different groups. One group is Qatar and Oman (although Oman maintains that is politically neutral), another is Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with Kuwait attempting to play the role of mediator.

A core reason for the success of the GCC has been its provision of the free movement of people and goods between member states, but the future of the organization is in question. The GCC could eventually return to relevancy, but it will remain largely irrelevant for the foreseeable future, given the current state of the current crisis with Qatar. Very little will change as a result of the Riyadh Summit, but the aspirations of a single currency, a joint defense capability, and improved transportation links between member states remain distant ambitions.

The United States wants to see a unified GCC to act as a counter to Iran in the region, but the current Gulf crisis seems to have no end in sight. Since the ascendance of Mohammad bin Salman as Saudi Crown Prince, Saudi policy in the region has become increasingly aggressive. While the Saudis want to hedge against an expansionist Iran, Saudi actions in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon have only served to divide the GCC.

Saudi policies in the Middle East have arguably increased Iran’s influence in the region; Qatar’s increasingly close political and economic ties with Iran being a notable example. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have a close economic and military partnership. Oman or Kuwait could align closer with Qatar, or Qatar could form security and economic alliances with Iran and Turkey. To effectively counter Tehran, Riyadh needs to rethink its foreign policy. Failure to do so could result in a lasting rift within the GCC that would upend the already volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

2018 GCC Summit in Riyadh: An Uneasy Gathering was originally published on Global Security Review.

Approximately twenty-two million civilians require immediate aid, 1.2 million cases of cholera have been reported, and 8.4 million are experiencing severe food insecurity.  The conflict in Yemen, which has become a battleground for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis in existence today.

United States policy regarding the Arabian Peninsula has failed to address this tragedy. The U.S. has remained silent as its allies have contributed to increasing levels of human suffering. As peace talks start in Stockholm, the United States must call on Saudi Arabia to join the conversation for a peaceful resolution with the immediate goal being ensuring the security of Yemeni civilians.

For three years, the Saudis have been at war with the Houthis—a Shia rebel group that seized power in Yemen that has received support from Iran.  Saudi Arabia views the relationship between the Houthis and Iran as a threat, seeing the Houthis as Iranian proxies. Their response to the possibility of Iran expanding its influence on the Arabian Peninsula has been severe. The Kingdom has carried out air strikes and blockaded Yemen’s borders and ports, preventing essential food and supplies from reaching Yemen’s civilian population.

The United States has supported Saudi Arabia by providing the Kingdom with intelligence, weapons, and logistical support. Now, however, the U.S. needs to take an active role in paving a path to peace and security.

First, the United States must accept accountability. In August, the Saudi-led coalition used bombs purchased from the U.S. to carry out an air strike in Yemen.  The bombs hit a school bus and killed forty children.  The international community placed the blame on both Saudi Arabia and the United States.  The U.S. needs to acknowledge its role in the ongoing humanitarian crisis—failure to do so will damage the moral authority of the United States.

Second, the United States must assist Yemen in the road to recovery.  Washington must induce Riyadh to lift the blockades and halt air strikes. USAID could provide immediate life-saving assistance such as nutrition, clean drinking water, safe shelter, and treatment to those suffering from cholera. Doing so would prevent further spread of disease by administering vaccines to citizens in high-risk regions. Humanitarian intervention by a U.S.-led coalition may also alleviate some of the reputational damage that resulted from the Saudi air strikes.

Third—and most important—the United States needs to encourage and facilitate constructive dialogue between the opposing parties.  In November, the Houthis offered to agree to talks if the Saudis would agree to a cease-fire.  This was a sudden and surprising development.  On December 3rd, U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, traveled to the capital city of Sana’a to work with the Houthis to set the stage to move negotiations forward.  The United States must exert substantial pressure on Saudi Arabia de-escalate and take concrete steps toward a ceasefire.

The Khashoggi murder will no doubt complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, but the United States also has pressing interests in Yemen: a lasting peace settlement and a resumption of humanitarian aid to Yemen’s suffering civilian population. Failure to do so will only lead to greater regional insecurity for years to come.

Time for the U.S. to Act on Yemen as Negotiations Begin in Sweden was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Recently, however, the ground has been shifting. As we point out in a recent article, Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti’s port. The port currently accounts for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports. It has done so by actively trying to interest partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya.

But it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. This is because a port deal involving Somaliland will challenge Djibouti’s virtual monopoly over maritime trade. In addition, it may entrench the de-facto Balkanization of Somalia and increase the prospects of Ethiopia becoming the regional hegemon.

Ethiopia’s regional policy

Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a strategic perspective. It is closest to Ethiopia and will connect the eastern, primarily Somali region of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. It will also provide a much needed outlet for trade, particularly the export of livestock and agriculture.

The development and expansion of the port at Berbera supports two primary pillars of Ethiopia’s regional policy. The first is maintaining Eritrea’s isolation. The aim would be to weaken it to the point that it implodes and is formally reunited to Ethiopia. Or it becomes a pliant, client state.

The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia enables Ethiopia to focus on quelling persistent internal security difficulties. It also keeps up pressure on Eritrea.

Ethiopia’s ambitions for Berbera have been hampered by two problems. Firstly the Republic of Somaliland – a de-facto independent state since 1991 – still isn’t recognised internationally. This makes engagement a political and legal headache. Secondly, Ethiopia, doesn’t have the critical resources needed to invest and build a port.

Ethiopia had been trying to get Abu Dhabi and Dubai interested in the Berbera Port for years. It’s latest push was assisted by a number of factors. These included a shift in the UAE’s military focus in Yemen and Ethiopian assurances of more trade and some financing to upgrade the port.

Ethiopia’s diplomatic push – which coincided with developments across the Gulf of Aden – finally got it the result it craved. In May 2016, DP World, a global mega-ports operator, signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years.

The Berbera Port deal

It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal if it didn’t see some long-term commercial benefit. The deal also includes economic, military and political dimensions.

Economically, for example, there will be investments in Somaliland’s fisheries, transportation and hospitality industry. The UAE will also establish a military installation in Berbera. The base is intended to help the UAE tighten its blockade against Yemen and stop weapons being smuggled from Iran.

Politically, the Berbera Port deal has provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland. There has been some popular anger aimed at Somaliland’s former president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka “Silanyo”, and his family who reportedly benefited personally from it. Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area.

But the anger in Somaliland pales in comparison to the reaction in Mogadishu. This is because the Somaliland government has remained largely isolated internationally – until the port deal.

Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa.

Ethiopia’s wins

The bottom line is that Ethiopia has engineered access to another port and enhanced its security and strategic economic interests. With the growth in annual volumes of transit cargo, Ethiopia has, for a long time, needed alternative routes from Djibouti.

In addition, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port by acquiring a 19% share in the deal.

And by wangling a legally binding agreement between Somaliland and another state, Ethiopia has potentially paved the way for eventual international recognition of Hargeisa.

Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland through a combination of pressure and material incentives. By bringing significant outside investment and recognition, Ethiopia can also increasingly meddle in its internal affairs. This is a conundrum for Hargeisa. It finds itself increasingly emboldened to act independently. Yet it remains constrained by the need to get Addis Ababa’s approval.

As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services on Somaliland’s new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal.

But one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia’s rising power and influence over the entire region.

How an Ethiopia-backed port is changing power dynamics in the Horn of Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Both powers are vying for regional hegemony as Iran seeks a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, while Saudi Arabia works to remain at the top of the region’s hierarchy and protect its national security.

The people of Yemen continue to languish in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as the conflict persists. The situation has been aggravated by violent attacks against cities alongside growing food insecurity perpetuated by closed ports and embattled infrastructure. The proxy war has fomented widespread instability in Yemen, creating a breeding ground for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

While most Al-Qaeda offshoots have died out or reduced their presence, the AQAP branch has remained intact by taking advantage of Yemen’s instability while continuing to make threats against Saudi Arabia and the West.

Today, a large proportion of U.S. security experts believe that AQAP is the largest terrorist threat to the United States—more so than the Islamic State, the strength of which is consistently sensationalized by the media. Experts believe AQAP is capable of building bombs without metal, making them easy to transfer across international borders and nearly impossible to detect.

As the Saudi Arabian-led coalition—backed U.S. weapons, equipment, and intelligence—fights Iranian-backed Houthi forces in the northern Yemen, it is also combating AQAP militants in the country’s south.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia escalated operations against AQAP, using drone strikes in Yemen to target the group’s leaders. Unfortunately, these counter-terrorism efforts have actually made the situation worse.

Saudi Arabia pursues its national security interests on the Peninsula.

The deterioration of Yemen’s internal security has allowed AQAP to gain a strong foothold in a relatively lawless and unstable state.

The terrorist group’s close vicinity to Saudi Arabia has made the monarchy uneasy due to its hatred of the Saudi monarchy for its relationship with the United States.

Saudi Arabia’s shared border with Yemen allows AQAP members to easily enter Saudi Arabia, allowing the group to destabilize the Kingdom.

With Iranian-backed forces in northern Yemen and AQAP militants in Yemen’s south, the situation is increasingly precarious for Saudi Arabia.

To prevent the two aggressors from advancing, Saudi Arabia seems likely to continue carrying out airstrikes and ground assaults as the two groups gain ground and threaten not only Saudi Arabia’s regional interests and its national security.

The U.S. moves to stop the spread of AQAP.

U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over the past few years have not only supported the country’s fight against Houthi rebels in Yemen. They have also been intended to eliminate the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and limit its potential expansion.

Prior to the Houthi rebellion, the U.S. and Yemeni President Hadi maintained built a strong alliance, with U.S. officials touting Hadi as a leader in counterterrorism.

Once Hadi’s regime collapsed, however, U.S. policymakers had to depend more heavily on the alliance with the Saudi monarchy to target AQAP.

In 2017, the White House stated that its recent arms deal with Saudi Arabia was struck not only to protect Saudi Arabia’s national security, but to assist in counter-terrorism operations in the Peninsula.

Reportedly, the sale would reduce the need for the U.S. military to participate in combat operations. However, U.S. special forces were deployed to assist Saudi troops in Yemen later that year.

As of 2018, anti-AQAP efforts have targeted over 3,000 Al-Qaeda members, forcing them into Yemen’s interior. However, the group continues to benefit from the lack of stable leadership in Sana’a, continuing its attempts to fill the power vacuum despite U.S. and Saudi efforts to eliminate it.

AQAP is easily exploiting the situation in Yemen.

Despite U.S. and Saudi efforts, experts have argued that the campaign against AQAP in Yemen may have actually helped the group prosper by destabilizing the region and providing new gaps for the terrorist group to exploit.

Al Qaeda has been able to further capitalize on the fact that many Yemeni civilians are turning against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as they watch the actions of the two countries deepen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

Despite this, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have continued their strikes upon AQAP, though their imprecision has resulted in numerous civilian deaths.

Over the course of just two days in January 2017, the U.S. military performed a ground operation in Al Bayda Province that resulted in the death of 24 civilians.

Just a few months later, 30 U.S. airstrikes against AQAP killed a few dozen more. The U.S. declared these actions a success—but to Yemeni civilians, these events were further proof that the U.S. is not a benevolent actor, but would continue to steer the fate of the Middle East to ensure its own national security interests.

Naturally, the number of civilian casualties has brewed distaste for the U.S. in the Yemeni psyche, a feeling that is rapidly replacing their once pro-U.S. attitudes.

As stated by Dafna H. Rand, a representative of the U.S. State Department, the continuity of the war and U.S. involvement in Yemen will potentially foster anger against the U.S. that could encourage radicalization and increase AQAP membership.

AQAP’s anti-Saudi Arabia and anti-Western stance has resonated with some Yemeni civilians who feel that the Saudi-U.S. partnership has devastated their country and deteriorated their quality of life. Eventually, larger numbers of Yemeni civilians may see AQAP as the only secure and stable option for their country.

U.S. soft power is the key to countering AQAP.

Ultimately, the strength of AQAP may grow as more civilians begin to support its cause against the Saudi monarchy and the West.

While both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have entered the fray with AQAP on grounds of preserving their own respective national securities, their biggest accomplishment thus far has been to foment hatred within Yemen, all while plunging more cities into crisis.

If Yemeni civilians continues to perceive the U.S. as a threat, AQAP’s anti-U.S. sentiments will gain steam. Instead, the U.S. needs to reduce involvement in airstrikes and ground assaults and take on a more humanitarian role—ensuring food security, providing medical aid and access to education, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.

Facilitating reconstruction in Yemen would benefit all parties. Yemeni civilians will benefit from increased humanitarian aid, the U.S.’s assistance would hopefully engender more positive feelings in Yemeni civilians and slow the acceptance and spread of AQAP.

Is the U.S.-Saudi Partnership in Yemen Strengthening Al-Qaeda? was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to reports in the French newspaper Le Monde, Saudi Arabia has asked the government of France to assist it in preventing Qatar from buying the S-400 system from Russia.

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced air defense missile system, and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements to purchase the S-400 system.

The report states that King Salman of Saudi Arabia expressed his “deep concerns” concerning Qatar’s intentions to purchase the air defense system.

Furthermore, the King specifically threated to take military action against Qatar if the S-400 sale goes forward and the missile system is deployed.

King Salman reportedly stated in the letter that “the kingdom [Saudi Arabia] would be ready to take all necessary measures to eliminate this defense system, including military action.

Qatar and Russia signed a military and technical cooperation agreement on military in 2017.

In January of 2018, the Qatari ambassador to Russia was quoted saying that Qatar’s government was in talks at the “advanced stage” to acquire the Russian S-400 missile air defense system.

Despite Saudi Threats, Russia Indicates S-400 Deal Will Go Forward

A senior Russian politician has said that Russia will supply Qatar with an anti-aircraft missile system despite Saudi Arabia’s reported threats.

Russian Lawmaker Aleksei Kondratyev, a member of the Russian upper house and the deputy chairman of the committee on Defence and Security, said Russia would pursue its own objectives in determining the countries that it allows to purchase its S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

“Russia seeks its own interest, supplying S-400 to Qatar and earning money for the state budget. Saudi Arabia’s position has nothing to do with it, Russia’s plans will not change,” Kondratyev said in remarks to Russian state media, adding that “it is clear that Riyadh plays a dominant role in the region, but Qatar gets an advantage by enhancing its armed forces due to the acquisition of Russian S-400 systems.”

No End in Sight

Saudi Arabia, backed by other regional powers including Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, broke off relations with Qatar in June last year, after harshly criticizing Qatar’s deepening ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s strategic rival in the region, and accusing the Gulf state of funding terrorism throughout the region.

In April of 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir warned Qatar that it faced “imminent demise” unless it provided funding and support for a U.S.-led military presence in Syria.

Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa said in a May interview with a Saudi-owned newspaper that there was no “glimmer of hope” for an end to the crisis.

Saudi Arabia Threatens Military Action if Qatar Purchases Russian S-400 Air Defense System was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last couple of weeks, the Gulf region has been on a rollercoaster ride. Risk analysts are struggling to deal with the dramatically changing geopolitical and financial environment while a direct military confrontation between the Saudi-led alliance and Iran’s proxies is around the corner.

The signals coming from the Saudi capital Riyadh are still the same; Saudi Vision 2030 and the Aramco IPO are on track. The media remains skeptical about the unforeseen crackdown on corruption, a week after the so-called “Davos in the Desert” financial get-together in Riyadh (October 24-26), where 3,500 CEOs and financial wizards convened.

The fallout of the direct attack on Saudi Arabia’s financial moguls and construction giants, such as Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal and the Binladin Group, would put fear in the heads of investors in New York, London, Beijing, and Moscow.

Most agreed that bin Salman overplayed his hand, causing instability in the country and the region.The reality for insiders, however, looks different.

The anti-corruption crackdown by MBS is part of his overall strategy to implement Vision 2030. First of all, the Davos in the Desert meeting showed the financial world’s immense interest in investment opportunities in the kingdom. Considering that 99 percent of the attendees had never visited Saudi Arabia before, while only the speakers already represented a $22 trillion value of assets under management, MBS could tick off another box on his long list to make Vision 2030 a success.

At the same time, the Trump Administration and the UK government tried to woo MBS to list the Aramco IPO on their stock exchanges. Some would have become more lenient towards a flexible approach when looking at the amount of interest, but MBS upped the ante and pushed for new hard-needed changes. The anti-corruption crackdown was carefully considered and timely and served not only to remove corruption in the kingdom but can also be seen as a way to remove remaining opposition to MBS’s future reign.With military precision, MBS removed most of the obstacles still blocking a possible MSCI Emerging Markets Index listing in 2018.

By taking out high-profile businessmen that were already convicted several times for corruption and removing princes that held commanding positions within the armed forces, MBS moved the kingdom towards a more modern economy while consolidating his own power. The inclusion of the kingdom in the MSCI index will bring a multitude of FDI, much larger than the Aramco IPO. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, for example, gives European pension and investment funds the possibility to invest in the kingdom and trade on its stock exchange. The Saudis have reportedly already attracted $9 billion in recent weeks. Some analysts are much more optimistic when looking at the long range of IPOs planned on the Tadawul (Saudi stock exchange).

MBS’s domestic popularity has increased in recent months. The Crown Prince has great support among the youth and has shown to be listening to the majority of his people while being unafraid to make dramatic changes to outdated social structures within the kingdom. Still, MBS understands internal Saudi politics and will try not to completely upset the establishment.

At the same time, regional instability and unrest complicate MBS’s agenda.

The confrontation between Arab nations and Iran has reached a tipping point. And looking at the statements made by UAE’s minister of foreign affairs on November 12 during the Emirates Policy Center’s Abu Dhabi Strategic Debates (ADSD2017) on Sky Arabia shocked the audience. The direct attack and accusations vented towards Iran and Qatar, both accused of promoting instability, financing terrorism, and extremism, were of an unprecedented tone. Gargash also accused both of committing “acts of war”, especially via arming Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah. These accusations are openly supported and repeated by a long list of Arab politicians and leaders.

The war drums are being banged—and this time not as an empty threat, but as a precursor to real military action. Most analysts are looking to Riyadh, as they expect MBS to lead this operation against Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Iranian IRGC; most likely the lead will be taken by the UAE.

Expect military action in the coming weeks, with—or without Washington’s support.

The political show around Lebanese PM Hariri is only part of this. Analysts tend to forget that Hariri’s real power is in Saudi Arabia, where he is the owner of construction giant OGER, currently under investigation as it is in financial trouble. MBS has taken the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone and remove OGER out of the picture in Saudi Arabia while destabilizing Lebanon. This was organized in close cooperation with other Arab leaders. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, a close friend of MBS, will head the anti-IRGC venture, as Abu Dhabi has been doing for years under the radar in Yemen, Syria and especially Libya.

Military action can be expected, with or without the support of Washington. As several Arab ministers and advisors have stated in recent days, it’s time for Arabs to take the future into their own hands. Washington can support, but not lead. If no American assistance is given, others will undoubtedly fill the gap. Moscow has been extremely quiet the last weeks, not indicating any support for Tehran nor trying to mitigate between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis and Iran-Hezbollah. These plans seem to have already been discussed in the respective capitals, as ministers of the said countries have convened in several places.

If action is taken against Iran and its proxies, OPEC and oil prices will be impacted immediately. Oil price increases of $5-10 per barrel a day could be a distinct possibility. An escalation in Lebanon, due to the inclusion of Israel in the action, or maritime traffic attacks in the Gulf, would only push prices up further. After years of low geopolitical risk premiums, risk has returned to the market. This time, however, they are new players, unknown to the majority of risk analysts. MBS and Iran will put volatility back on the market where it belongs.

Saudi Corruption Crackdown Could Permanently Boost Oil Prices was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions are increasing between the Shia-minority and the Kingdom’s Sunni ruling class in the aftermath of the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr. Regional jihadists are attempting to foment sectarian conflict in the kingdom by exploiting the unrest post-execution. In hopes of diluting attention focused on al Nimr, Saudi Arabia decided he’d be executed alongside 46 others, the majority of which were Sunnis accused of having links with Al Qaeda.

Per sentencing protocols, Saudi authorities would not have to give prior notice of the execution.  Security forces were able to suppress low-level actions by activists, but a worrying concern has been the rising number of jihadist suicide strikes taking place not just in the Sunni portions of the country, but in Shiite populated areas.

Shiite extremists are bombing Shiite mosques

Suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques are designed to goad Shiites into retaliating, creating an even more significant security issue for elites, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed a leadership role in Saudi counterterrorism and defense efforts.

Jihadist exploitation of the al Nimr execution would involve strikes on religious targets and security forces, given the difficulties in targeting and disrupting petroleum infrastructure with such attacks. The killing of al Nimr will complicate negotiations for a political settlement in Syria.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to sit down in December when the region’s foreign ministers meet to negotiate on Syria. The two sides disagree over the groups that should be party to a post-Al Assad political solution, assuming all parties can even create the necessary battlefield conditions to engage in a political transition in Syria.

The proxy conflict in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ongoing in Lebanon, where a political agreement on the presidency is contingent on improved Iran-Saudi dialogue.

Saudi Arabia is Fostering a Sunni Coalition

Saudi Arabia isn’t the only Sunni power experiencing tensions with Tehran. As Turkey grows more assertive in the area, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria will be crucial arenas for competition between the old opponents.

Saudi Arabia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Tehran is a test for the Sunni regional coalition that Riyadh has painstakingly tried to gather in the past few years.

Thus far, the states that have followed Riyadh’s lead to Iran protests are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Bahrain, at the heart of the Saudi camp, has already reminded his ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian charge d’affaires in October.

Saudi Arabia has been attempting to foster a tighter relationship with Cairo to underpin its Arab coalition and will be signing grants and loans worth $3 billion for Egypt on Jan. 5 to make apparent the priority Saudi Arabia is giving the relationship.

Egypt will gladly accept the monetary support, but Cairo can be expected to maintain a more balanced approach with regards to contentious cultural disputes in the region. The execution of Al Nimr is a piece of a much more significant regional game.

The United Arab Emirates, which was in close military coordination with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Libya and Syria, downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran by recalling its ambassador and ordered a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats stationed at the Emirates. Sudan that has seen its alliance with Riyadh reinforced while distancing itself from Iran—expelling the Iranian ambassador—has received increased Saudi monetary assistance.

Kuwait, conscious of its Shiite minority, condemned Iran after the attack on the Saudis Embassy but stopped short of severing diplomatic relations. Egypt chose to be more cautious, condemning Iran and avoiding any mention of Mohamed Fathi Abdel Ati, an Egyptian national who had been one of the Sunnis executed in the same group as al Nimr.

Analysis: Saudi Arabia will look abroad for support after lackluster support from Sunni neighbors

Saudi Arabia will focus on securing its oil facilities while dealing with sporadic bouts of unrest and jihadist attacks. While managing these domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia will look overseas for allies at the time of need.

The response will be mixed from its Sunni neighbors, based on how much they rely on security and assistance. The United States and others in the West will meanwhile do their best to maintain their distance from the proxy conflicts which are part and parcel of the changing regional balance of power between Iran and its adversaries.

Increased Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East as the Saudi-Iran Proxy War Heats Up was originally published on Global Security Review.