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People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Not Part of China: An Explanation of Japan’s Taiwan Policy

Allies & Extended Deterrence, Archive, Arms Control & Nonproliferation, Deterrence & Foreign Policy, Strategic Adversariesacknowledge vs recognize, Article 8 Potsdam, Cairo Declaration (1943), China–Japan relations, Deterrence, diplomatic language, false narratives, Indo-Pacific security, international law, international neutrality, Japan–China Joint Communiqué (1972), Japan–Taiwan policy, One China Policy, People’s Republic of China (PRC), postwar treaties, Potsdam Declaration (1945), psychological warfare, Republic of China (ROC), San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), Sanae Takaichi, sovereignty, strategic ambiguity, Taiwan status, Taiwan Strait, Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), U.S.–PRC Joint Communiqué (1979), unresolved status of Taiwan

Not Part of China: An Explanation of Japan’s Taiwan Policy

Lindell Lucy0 Comments

On December 3, Hong Kong’s main English newspaper, The South China Morning Post, posted on the social media website X, “Breaking: Japan’s Sanae Takaichi reaffirms Taiwan is a part of…

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Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth

Allies & Extended Deterrence, Archive, Deterrence & Foreign Policy, Government & Politics, Strategic Adversaries2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, adversary military modernization, aerial fleet demands, ammunition ship cycling, Australia–U.S. cooperation, basing scarcity, carrier-based aerial refueling, China strategic depth advantage, Chinese nuclear arsenal growth, coercive actions, Cold War deterrence lessons, combat logistics forces, conventional forward deployment, conventional munitions stockpiles, conventional war in Europe, credibility of deterrence, deep hinterland, deterrence operations, dispersed allies and partners, extended deterrence, Extended nuclear deterrence, force posturing, forward-deployed U.S. forces, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons, fuel stockpiles, Great Power Competition, high-value bases, Indo-Pacific security, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), Japan–U.S. cooperation, limited defensible terrain, limited strategic depth in Indo-Pacific, logistics stress, missile defense pre-positioning, missile launch rates, mutual defense treaty, NATO commitments, neutral/non-aligned states, normalization of nuclear threats, North Korean nuclear arsenal growth, nuclear alliance responsibilities, Nuclear arms control, nuclear competition, open-ocean battlespace, Pacific coast infrastructure, People’s Republic of China (PRC), pre-positioning capabilities, rear bases to forward reload areas, regional rules-based order, resupply and transit times, sensor resource allocation, strategic competitor, strategic depth, sustaining operations over prolonged conflict, target concentration, targeting dilemmas for China, vertical proliferation of defenses, Western Pacific theater

Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth

Robert Peters & Christine M. Leah1 Comment

The world is entering a new age of nuclear competition, characterized by the breakdown of nuclear arms control and the return of great power competition and conventional war to Europe.…

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