Ideology matters, as I learned from surviving 18 years under the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The United States pretended otherwise for three decades, clinging to the “end of history” and similar dreams. Today, with ideologically driven conflicts simmering around the world, it is time for America to integrate deterrence, defense, and a theory of victory across the so-called gray zone of geopolitics. Doing so will require policymakers to start listening to what America’s enemies have been saying for years about their ideological designs.

In 2004, when questioned about whether a Venezuela-Cuba alliance was exporting communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States averred: “It is a thing outdated in time and it is not understanding the relationships that exist between the countries.” That was a backhanded ‘yes,’ if there ever was one. The message was meant to assuage the busy, post-9/11 national security community, diverting attention away from the problems brewing south of the U.S. border. More than two decades later, the annual warnings of USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commanders before Congress have finally been heeded by the White House.

Ideology has been slapping America in the face since the late 1990s. For this era of refocusing on state-based threats, it comes in these forms and many others: Beijing’s obsession with employing “united front” organizations to silence dissidents overseas; Moscow’s obsession with Ukraine, kicking off a murky war in 2014 that is now sustained conventionally; Tehran’s obsession with aiding and abetting proxy martyrs of the Islamic Revolution; Havana’s and Caracas’ shared obsession with waging “asymmetric war” on Western powers (which included flooding the American homeland with illicit narcotics); and Pyongyang’s obsession with subverting Seoul’s political processes and civic life. All these gray-zone efforts have an ideology at the heart. Their ideologies, variously rooted in Marxism, religion, and revanchism, drive the leaders of these states to employ irregular warfare tactics without any remorse and at any cost to civilians in the West or anywhere else. You will not find high degrees of intellectual coherence between these constructs; shared hatreds and collectivist doctrines and dogmas are cohesive enough for what now amounts to an anti-Western coalition.

Anti-Western adversaries became sneakier when strategizing and aligning with those espousing similar worldviews. They also became more convinced of their moral superiority. The U.S. national security community makes arbitrary distinctions between geopolitics and ideology. These distinctions obfuscate reality, which is already tough to comprehend, and lead to poor policymaking. Nowhere is this weakness more prominent than in the domain of irregular warfare. How did ISIS carve out its domain between Iraq and Syria, for instance, if not through the aid of its ideology?

Discussing rival-state ideology in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security seems to generate discomfort despite some strides to understand strategic cultures. It started with the spectacular triumphs of 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations’ ideological variables have been marginalized in the Federal Government. The American bureaucrat could finally put ‘Sovietology’ to rest, and, with it, anything to do with alternatives to liberal internationalism. The term ‘Great-Power Competition’ continues the delusion; ‘strategic-ideological struggle’ captures reality much better.

Disclaimer: Ideologies are messy. Their study requires incredible levels of nuance, subtlety, cultural awareness, philosophical skill, and extensive interpretive room. It is not a field of expertise attuned nor prone to engineering solutions or linear responses, making it politically dangerous to confront ideological challengers. Bringing up ideology always risks alienating a group and hurting its feelings. Hence, American political leaders and senior officials have scarcely breathed a word about state-centric ideological conflict since the demise of the USSR.

This problematic approach is a vestige of America’s long-gone “unipolar moment.” Through mirror imaging, it takes our attention away from elements that the Western world’s rivals thrive on. Several foes of the West have developed highly complex irregular warfare doctrines, intelligently focusing on the types of operations that some of these actors can excel in, and backing off from the type of war that they know they cannot win. Because illegality is the common denominator to all irregular warfare activities coming from any type of challenger, ideological zeal and fervor are absolute strategic imperatives to the leaders of these revanchist entities. Indeed, during the Global War on Terror, we recognized it as an essential enemy warfighting capability. Ideology is the glue that authoritarians, totalitarians, and other extremists apply to bind together the domestic constituencies that they rely on for control and aggression. In ideology, those leaders find the corpus of thought and the narratives required to morally justify atrocities committed in pursuit of greed, territorial expansion, or a simple clinging to power.

Acknowledgement is growing that defeating mere symptoms of its rivals’ irregular warfare campaigns cannot bring American strategic victory or even achieve deterrence in the “gray zone.” Looking back at the U.S.-led quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, more observers have called for defeating root ideologies, rather than just crushing the fighters who currently espouse a certain ideology’s flavor-of-the-moment (e.g., Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, FARC, ELN, etc.).

Defeating our enemies must include defeating their ideologies. This no longer demands global wars in the traditional (conventional) military sense. To defeat regime ideologies, whole-of-government efforts require dusting off forgotten or atrophied competencies that America used to cultivate, including the ‘dark arts’ of U.S. foreign policy. Washington needs to articulate once again what it believes in, beyond vague notions of stability, and bring like-minded allies to our side.

David Guenni is completing his doctorate with Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense & Strategic Studies. His research focuses on nation-states’ employment of narcotrafficking as an irregular warfare modality. He is a Venezuelan political asylum seeker in the United States, having spent many years in the struggle against the Chavista regime in Caracas. His opinions are his own and no one else’s.

Why Ideology Matters in Irregular Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is the third trilateral meeting between these countries this year. The issue of terrorism in Pakistan was a top agenda in all three conferences. Apart from trade cooperation and CPEC, it matters most. The truth is that terrorism-related threats have their sources in Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus not only contended with internal insurgents but also with non-state actors based in Afghanistan. These players are aided by regional instability, ideological havens, and a rushed Western departure.

In the Global War on Terror, Pakistan was at the receiving end of a conflict it never initiated, yet it paid with blood and billions of dollars over the past two decades. This involvement led to the deaths of over 70,000 Pakistanis and resulted in losses exceeding $150 billion to Pakistan’s economy, post-9/11. The trauma is deep and the cost staggering, whether it was the school massacre in Peshawar, terror attacks on urban centers, or assaults on security forces. Even today, Pakistan continues to grapple with terrorism, a remnant of the Global War on Terror.

A 2024 report noted that more than 1,600 civilians and security personnel were killed in terror bombings and gun attacks. 2024 appeared to be the deadliest year, as more than 685 servicemen were killed in 444 terrorist incidents. In March of 2025, Pakistan ranked second in the Global Terrorism Index, as terrorist attacks rose by 45 percent.

A new phase in Pakistan’s war on terror began with the launch of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024, a multi-faceted counterterrorism initiative aimed at breaking the chain of terrorism-related violence. A distinguishing feature of this operation is its full acknowledgment of cross-border terrorism, particularly that originating from Afghanistan. The operation focuses on improving intelligence capabilities, strengthening diplomatic ties with the Taliban government in Kabul, and aligning border management with broader security measures.

Operation Azm-e-Istehkam could potentially mark a systematic reform in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, built on a structure centered on intelligence-driven operations, regional cooperation, and social and economic reforms. However, for the operation to be implemented successfully, it must be accompanied by progress across the Durand Line. External sanctuaries in Afghanistan will continue to undermine the internal security gains achieved by Pakistan as long as the country remains a permissive environment for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups.

As far as China is concerned, its interest in the Pak-Afghan rapprochement is twofold. One is that it aims to prevent any spillover of terror into Xinjiang province through radical networks. China wants to counter any strategic threat to CPEC, particularly since their officials have already been attacked by insurgents in Baluchistan. China also seeks to hamper the increasing influence of India in Kabul.

Furthermore, the economic presence of China can be used to influence the Taliban to tone down their attitude towards Pakistan. Beijing can contribute to creating integrated security architecture by offering aid, developing infrastructure, and offering trade incentives, especially the prospect of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. This might include collective management of the border and repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as coordinating intelligence.

In July, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Tianjin, China, emphasized the need for Afghan stability and greater cooperation among regional states. Beijing’s message was more than mere diplomacy. It signaled a strategic recalibration. This stance was echoed by Pakistan Foreign Minister Dar and was followed by a series of high-level talks between Pakistan and the Taliban regime, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing.

Previously, in May 2025, a trilateral dialogue was held in China between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The meeting produced a symbolic willingness to reinstate diplomatic relations between Islamabad and Kabul at the ambassadorial level. More importantly, it opened an avenue for future regional security cooperation, not only against TTP terror but also against threats such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which have also drawn Beijing’s attention.

These trilateral engagements offer Pakistan two opportunities to internationalize its concerns over cross-border terrorism and the chance to tie those concerns to broader regional stability and economic growth.

China’s mediation introduces a new variable into the equation, shifting the dynamic from a binary of conflict and impunity to a triangle of pressure, cooperation, and mutual interest. Provided it is adequately utilized, the trilateral effort between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has the potential to evolve from a symbol into a solid plan—and out of weak diplomacy into stable security.

Qurat-UL-Ain Shabbir is a research officer at CISS.

Can Trilateral Diplomacy Secure Pakistan from Terrorism? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, when looking deeper, combining field developments, the Taliban’s contradictory conduct, and shifting regional dynamics, reveals a more complex reality. This enmity may not be as absolute as it seems. Instead, it could present a multi-layered game in which the Taliban leverages the ISIS-K threat to justify internal repression, gain regional legitimacy, and position itself as the “lesser evil.” In this light, ISIS-K might serve both as a tactical threat and a strategic asset for the Taliban—a manufactured crisis that enables the group to tighten its grip on power at home and increase its geopolitical leverage abroad.

Open Hostility or Controlled Competition?

Since appearing in Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched brutal attacks on civilians, from deadly bombings against religious minorities to assaults on hotels housing Chinese and Russian citizens. These incidents were widely publicized, framing ISIS-K as a dangerous destabilizing force in the public mind.

Yet, a closer look reveals an intriguing pattern: the majority of ISIS-K attacks occurred in provinces like Nangarhar and Kunduz, the very areas where the Taliban launched “anti-ISIS” operations to consolidate their own authority. The Taliban consistently portray their campaigns against ISIS-K as “heroic battles” against terrorism. Yet beneath this narrative lies a troubling question: could the Taliban be managing or even facilitating ISIS-K’s presence as a pretext to justify their own rule, gain international support, and ruthlessly crush opposition?

It appears ISIS-K never posed an existential threat to the Taliban. On the contrary, its existence allows the Taliban to brand themselves as “terrorism fighters” while targeting domestic opponents, civil society activists, former security personnel of the previous republic, and even ethnic groups like Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Nangarhar, for example, hundreds were detained on allegations of ties to ISIS-K, though many were once affiliated with the republican government.

For the Taliban, ISIS-K represents a “manageable threat,” dangerous enough to draw local and international backing, but not so strong as to undermine their own power. In fact, it provides an opportunity for the Taliban to further entrench themselves.

The Haqqani Network and Crisis Management

At the heart of this theory lies the Haqqani Network, a sophisticated and shadowy branch of the Taliban known for its long-standing ties with Pakistani intelligence services and transnational jihadist networks. Field patterns suggest that in eastern Afghanistan, there is a kind of covert coexistence between the Haqqanis and elements of ISIS-K. Major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul, including assaults on hotels frequented by Chinese and Russian diplomats, raise suspicions that these incidents may have occurred with either Haqqani facilitation or their tacit approval. There are also reports indicating that some mid-level ISIS-K leaders once cooperated with the Haqqanis.

This relationship can be analyzed through three possible scenarios. First, there is the direct management scenario. Here, the Haqqani Network actively directs parts of ISIS-K to operate within controlled limits.

Second, there is the limited influence scenario. In this scenario, the Taliban and the Haqqanis have some influence over ISIS-K and use it for political purposes.

Third, there is the independent ISIS scenario. In this case, ISIS-K acts independently, but the Taliban opportunistically exploit its existence for political gains.

Although there is no definitive evidence of full collusion between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the Taliban’s selective responses to ISIS-K’s activities suggest we are witnessing “crisis management” rather than an all-out war. Even if we dismiss the first scenario, there is sufficient evidence to support the second. While the Taliban may not entirely control ISIS-K, they at least seek to manage it, benefiting from its existence while preventing it from becoming a genuine threat to their dominance.

A Regional and International Bargaining Chip

For the Taliban, ISIS-K is not merely a domestic issue, it is also a key “bargaining card” in dealings with regional powers. By presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against ISIS-K, the Taliban have transformed from international pariahs into reluctant but necessary security partners for neighboring countries.

To China and Russia, they say, “Without us, ISIS-K will spread into Central Asia and Xinjiang.” To Iran, they warn, “Weakening the Taliban will empower ISIS-K on Afghanistan’s western borders.” To Pakistan, they remind, “Uncontained ISIS-K activity could jeopardize economic security and projects like CPEC.” By managing the ISIS-K threat, the Taliban position themselves as the lesser evil and draw financial and political support from regional actors.

Crisis Engineering: A Familiar Tactic

What the Taliban is doing today is not unlike Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s, when Islamabad exaggerated the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to extract financial and political concessions from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban have now reproduced this model, creating and managing a more extreme enemy to bolster their own position. This tactic aligns with the theory of a “constructed crisis,” in which security actors inflate or even control threats to use them as tools for pressure and legitimacy.

It is likely, then, that the Taliban never intend to fully destroy ISIS-K. Its continued existence forms an essential part of their political and security survival strategy.

Targeted Attacks: Eliminating Opponents in Terror’s Shadow

In this geopolitical chess game, the Afghan people remain the primary victims. The Taliban’s “anti-ISIS” operations increasingly target civil activists, former security forces, and even ethnic minorities. Some ISIS-K attacks, like the one on the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, fueled suspicions about the Taliban’s role, or at least their prior knowledge, of such incidents. Some reports even suggest that the Taliban warned their personnel in advance of certain attacks.

These operations may act as a tool for the “targeted elimination” of internal opponents, allowing the Taliban to avoid direct responsibility. Rather than weakening the group, this tactic reinforces the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan’s security equations.

Taliban and ISIS-K: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

At first glance, the Taliban and ISIS-K seem like sworn ideological enemies. But on closer inspection, field evidence and geopolitical logic suggest their relationship is far more complex than a simple rivalry. The Taliban leveraged ISIS-K’s presence to crack down on internal dissent, bolster their regional legitimacy, and present themselves as a defensive shield against terrorism and global threats emanating from Afghan soil.

As long as this intricate game continues, the Taliban can maintain their role as a “necessary but unpleasant” player in regional and global affairs, while Afghanistan remains trapped in a security quagmire with no easy way out.

For reasons of personal safety, the author has used a pseudonym.

The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan: A Real Rivalry or a Strategic Game to Engineer Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instability and American Aid

Pakistan is not a stable country. There are concerns that the state may disintegrate. Its military and ISI are infiltrated by individuals linked to terrorist groups. Without focused American engagement, Pakistan’s instability could lead to either the theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists or the sabotage of a nuclear facility. Moreover, a long-running territorial dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism could easily escalate into a conflict or nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan gets a free ride. Between 1948 and 2016, it received over $78.3 billion in US military and economic support. In return, it is duplicitous. Over half of this aid was allocated to counterterrorism efforts, yet Pakistan’s military and the ISI continue supporting the Taliban and other extremists. The US annually provides Pakistan $2 billion in military and economic aid without proper oversight. Of this amount, $100 million is allocated to the Strategic Plans Division to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. Despite this assistance, Pakistan provides safe haven to dozens of terrorist organizations and their leadership. Its military’s continued support for them increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by a proxy.

The Case for a Joint US-Pakistan Task Force

A joint US-Pakistan task force is necessary to enforce oversight, strengthen strategic ties, and provide a direct US role in securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A formal framework will mitigate the risks of mismanagement or unauthorized access and maintain control over critical aspects of nuclear security. It will enhance collaboration between military and intelligence agencies, enabling both sides to identify and respond to emerging threats while leveraging their combined expertise in human intelligence and counterterrorism.

A joint task force will also enhance nuclear security through specialized training. American experts in nuclear security and cyber defense can provide essential training to Pakistani forces, strengthening their operational readiness and capability to protect nuclear sites. Both nations conduct regular nuclear security drills—often referred to as “Armageddon tests” to assess vulnerabilities at nuclear sites. These drills help identify personnel weaknesses and prevent potential security breaches.

Deterrence, Sovereignty, and Regional Tensions

The presence of US military personnel in Pakistan will also serve as a powerful deterrent to terrorist organizations. US support in securing nuclear facilities reduces the probability of terrorist attempts to infiltrate and breach nuclear facilities or execute large-scale attacks. This cooperation also signals the seriousness of nuclear security in the region to potential adversaries.

Establishing an American military presence in Pakistan could be perceived as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, US involvement would be limited to advisory, intelligence, and technical support roles. This role would enable Pakistan to retain full control over its nuclear assets and security operations.

A US military presence in Pakistan could also escalate regional tensions—particularly with India. The two states have irreconcilable differences when it comes to Kashmir, and both sides believe they should control all of Kashmir, not just one part of it. An attack on civilians or military forces on either side of the line of control in Kashmir could easily escalate into a major conflict. However, the US can use diplomatic channels to ensure regional actors, including India, are aware of the task force’s defensive nature. The task force aims to secure nuclear sites and combat terrorism, not alter the region’s strategic balance.

Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

The world cannot afford nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. By establishing a Joint US-Pakistan task force, the US both protects global security and reaffirms its leadership in the fight against nuclear terrorism. This partnership strengthens nuclear safeguard, prevents nuclear theft, and stabilizes the region. The US must act now to ensure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are protected. Together, we can turn a potential crisis into a collaborative success. The time to act is now for a safer and more stable world.

Timor Nawabi is currently pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in Science and Technology, focusing mainly on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary was originally published on Global Security Review.

The brainwashing of youths, monopoly over illicit drug production, sheltering and supporting global terrorist groups, weaponization of poverty, and recruitment of refugees has brought Afghanistan to the verge of an imminent explosion, with consequences that may prove more consequential than those of September 11, 2001. Understanding what the Taliban is doing deserves further explanation.

Brainwashing the Youth

The Taliban’s focus on educating Afghan youth in religious schools (madrasa), which serve as training centers for militants and suicide bombers, poses an immediate and long-term threat to the region and the West. Through relentless brainwashing, these madrasas create a generation of children and teenagers steeped in radicalism. Young recruits are taught that martyrdom and suicide attacks are not only honorable but also necessary.

What makes this particularly worrisome is the sheer scale. Tens of thousands of young minds are being primed for violence, and this army of youths will be deployed somewhere. The consequences for neighboring countries and the West, which are already struggling with radicalization, could be catastrophic. As Roza Otenbayeva, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said to the UN Security Council, “The Taliban do not allow any monitoring of these schools and we don’t know what they teach there.”

According to the Taliban Ministry of Education, at least 17,300 madrasas are officially active across Afghanistan. Meanwhile, according to an order issued by the Taliban on June 20, 2022, three to 10 jihadi schools, with a capacity of 500–1,000 students each, are being built in every district of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has 408 districts, and the construction of three to 10 new jihadi schools per district could quickly turn the country into the center of global terrorism.

Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is once again a haven for international terrorist groups. The Taliban’s victory emboldened and empowered extremist groups, providing them with the space to reorganize, train, and plan. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now operate freely inside Afghanistan. Taliban ties with these terrorist groups are not superficial. They are rooted in common ideology, long-term political interests, and, most importantly, many Taliban leaders have long-standing family ties with the leaders of these groups.

According to a report in Hasht-e-Subh, the Taliban are building well-equipped bases with residential houses for the Al-Qaeda network and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni province. Likewise, UN reports, especially the July 2024 report, are proof of this claim. The United Nations says Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is a “safe haven” for groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This network of relationships ensures that the Taliban will continue to cooperate with these groups in their collective efforts to destabilize the region, expand influence, and export terror globally, creating a security disaster with devastating global consequences.

Drug Monopoly

Although the Taliban officially banned the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, it has monopolized the industry. By limiting the supply, the Taliban is driving up the price of drugs, making the trade more profitable for themselves and their affiliates. As noted in the July 2024 UN Security Council report, it is still too early to assess the full impact of the poppy cultivation ban. However, senior Taliban officials oppose the ban. Poppy farmers lose while the Taliban profits. The report states, “Due to poppy stockpiles, the drug trade in Afghanistan remains significant.”

The world’s lack of attention to this development risks creating an underground drug economy, further empowering the Taliban and their allied terrorist groups—undermining security and stability in Afghanistan and the region. As the Taliban’s drug empire expands, terrorist groups will increasingly benefit.

Weaponization of Poverty

One of the most dangerous strategies used by the Taliban is the deliberate impoverishment of the Afghan people. By doing this, they pursue two goals.

First, they plunge a large portion of the population into extreme poverty and eliminate opportunities for education, employment, and basic survival. This makes it easier to recruit people into their ranks and allied terrorist groups.

Second, the Taliban’s control over local resources and their monopoly on illicit trade provides ample financial incentives for those willing to fight for them. In this way, poverty becomes a weapon and fuels rebellion and radicalism.

Recruitment of Deported Asylum Seekers

The Taliban encourages the deportation of Afghan refugees by secretly cooperating with some countries, particularly those in the region. This is a policy that is of strategic importance to the regime.

Many deported Afghans, returning to the land where they find no means of survival, are easily recruited by the Taliban and allied terrorist groups. Deportation is vital for the Taliban, as it ensures a steady stream of disillusioned and frustrated individuals who become pawns in their larger scheme.

Many countries fail to grasp the significance of this issue and view it superficially. Deporting immigrants, especially from Western countries, fuels anti-Western sentiments among the population, making them susceptible to serving terrorist groups.

Time Is Running Out

If the world continues to ignore the dire situation in Afghanistan, the consequences will soon prove irreparable. The brainwashing of the nation’s youth, Taliban drug running, safe havens for terrorists, the weaponization of poverty, and the recruitment of refugees will soon impact Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and India, will suffer the most, but the impact will not be limited to the region. Countries far beyond, especially in the West, will be in the crosshairs of these repercussions.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The Biden administration, particularly Jake Sullivan, believes that drones and aerial surveillance can control the situation. This reflects a strategic mistake reminiscent of America’s approach during the Cold War. Ultimately, that mistaken view contributed to the rise of international terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abandoning the Afghan people once again will prove catastrophic, especially the West.

As an Afghan, I urge the West to pay attention and ensure that the Afghanistan that led to 9/11 does not become the same Afghanistan of the near future. It may be a landlocked country in Central Asia, but Afghanistan has already proved that it can cause great harm when left to its own devises.

The author is an Afghan who, for reasons of safety, is unnamed.

The Coming Disaster in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

These ominous developments did not happen overnight but are made worse by bad American security policy decisions just as China and Russia were simultaneously deciding to confront the United States leadership role in the world. Critical to a growing China and Russia threat is bad American nuclear policy choices.

Key to this decline were ten bad American policy decisions. These policies began in the wake of the Soviet Union’s decline and continue to the present. Let me explain.

First, America began by buying Francis Fukuyama’s flawed “end of history” thesis and believed that the “liberal international order” of the early post–Cold War period would remain in perpetuity, with authoritarian regimes collapsing as democracy and capitalism triumphed. This, as we know, proved untrue.

Second, the United States unilaterally eliminated almost its entire theater nuclear weapons arsenal, the very type of nuclear forces where there is now a serious and growing imbalance between the United States and China and Russia.

Third, after terrorism took the place of the Soviet Union as America’s top threat, the United States identified the solution to terrorism as democratization through force. The attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), US embassies in Africa (1998), and USS Cole (DDG-67) were the kindling that served, in part, to justify the later invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, despite the extraordinary take down of Saddam’s Iraqi forces in Gulf War I (1991), the deterrent value of liberating Kuwait disappeared by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were then followed by two more decades of futile efforts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fifth, the United States long assumed a cooperative arrangement with China and Russia would prevent nuclear proliferation. American leaders failed to recognize that both nations played an important role in enabling North Korea’s successful nuclear program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with a 1982 decision by Deng Xiaoping and Yuri Andropov to transfer nuclear technology to client states.

Sixth, for three decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US took a holiday from modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Now, as the US attempts to reverse course, the entire nuclear establishment requires refurbishment to make modernization possible.

Seventh, the US ignored Russian incursions into Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine during 2008–2014. Then, just prior to the 2022 invasion, the US compounded these mistakes by both declaring that the US response would depend upon how much Ukraine territory was taken or, later during the war, Ukraine could negotiate an end to the war by ceding additional territory to Russia—a country responsible for the deaths of many millions of Ukrainians during the Soviet Union’s existence. This only encourages Russian aggression.

Eighth, the US abandoned Afghanistan and left significant military equipment behind for the Taliban to use. A billion-dollar embassy and $14 billion worth of military equipment was quickly incorporated into the new Taliban-led government’s arsenal or sold to terrorist organizations around the world. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a humiliating action that undermined respect for the United States.

Ninth, the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Iranian regime allowed Tehran to continue its ballistic missile and nuclear program with increased funding from a return of assets previously seized by the United States. The Trump administration brought Iran under some semblance of control by cutting its foreign exchange reserves by over $100 billion. The killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ General Qasem Soleimani was a clear signal that then-President Donald Trump would not tolerate Iranian-backed terrorism.

The Biden administration backtracked on efforts to deter Iran. Since October 2023, Iran has conducted 170 attacks, primarily against US and assets in the region. Iran combined forces with Houthi rebels to largely shut down commercial freight and crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran also rebuilt its foreign exchange reserves, while becoming more closely allied with Russia and China. This all took place as Iran moved closer to a nuclear weapon.

Tenth, the United States long dismissed warnings about the rise of Chinese military power and the threat it posed to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s massive investment in cyber, space, conventional, and nuclear weaponry will soon make China a peer of the United States. Asian allies of the United States are increasingly worried by China’s actions.

The United States must act to alter its course before it is too late. A return to a strong military, capable of fighting two peer competitors is necessary. It may also be time for a second Manhattan Project to implement the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s  recommendations. With nuclear modernization facing regular delays, there may be no other option. Whatever the solutions are, the time to act is now.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

America’s Downward Slide was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the Taliban’s spokesman in Qatar said that the Taliban now has “a policy of not having any kind of discrimination against the Shia people,” the Hazaras have been continually attacked at schools, weddings, and mosques for their support of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as well as their involvement with Iran to fight against Sunni Muslim forces in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.  

The Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Brigade recruits Hazara and Shia Afghan refugees, offering them payment, citizenship, and other legal protections in return for serving in the brigade. As persecution and targeting of the Hazaras continues, relations between Tehran and the Taliban regime will sour. In response, the brigade may look to recruit more Hazaras, who may be more willing to fight due to intense political and social isolation. 

Once the largest of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, Hazaras now make up only 9 percent of Afghanistan’s population of 36 million, and Genocide Watch has declared this a “genocide emergency.” Offering protection for the Hazara people is more than an international security interest for the United States, but an urgent moral responsibility. Their support for the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has deepened Taliban antipathy towards the Hazaras, and now that the United States has withdrawn troops, the Hazara community is more vulnerable than ever to Taliban violence. As a key stakeholder in Afghanistan that waged a war for two decades, the failure to protect the Hazaras is an acute human rights failure on part of the United States.   

While UN Donors, including the United States, pledged $1.2 billion in September to provide emergency assistance to Afghanistan in response to the economic and humanitarian crisis enveloping the country, the absence of significant international pressure on human rights issues leaves the Hazaras in a vulnerable position. To prevent a genocide of the Hazaras and further abuses against other minority groups, the United States needs to channel humanitarian assistance through independent organizations and condition longer-term development aid on respect for the human rights of the Afghan population.   

When the Taliban was last in power in the late 1990s, they were an international pariah due to their strict form of Islamic rule in which they forced women to stay home, banned girls from going to school, banned television and music, and held public executions. The Taliban’s initial public statements demonstrated willingness to moderate some of their past harsh policies; however, actions on the ground have not always matched their statements. There is the potential that coordinated pressure from the United States and other countries could encourage the Taliban leadership to follow through with their stated commitments on respecting human rights, especially those of women and minorities. 

Although President Joe Biden withdrew from Afghanistan to focus on foreign policy priorities in the Indo-Pacific, protecting minorities like the Hazaras is important for demonstrating global leadership on human rights issues, as well as preventing terrorism and deeper civil conflict in Afghanistan. This effort should be a shared responsibility. For the United States to effectively pressure the Taliban to protect the Afghan population it needs to have other international partners on board. 

As a condition of long-term development aid, the US and its partners should request the Taliban allow independent human-rights observers into the country to monitor and catalog abuses and make public the human rights violations of the Hazara people and other minorities. By conditioning development aid on respect for human rights, the Taliban will be less likely to commit serious abuses against these groups. This strategy allows the United States to continue to support the Afghan population without supporting the Taliban’s actions. 

 The UN Human Rights Commission must also begin to investigate the killing of Hazaras as genocide or as a crime against humanity. Publicizing the situation of the Hazara people would hopefully lead to international reckoning and urgency to help the situation before it becomes worse. The United States needs to take early preventative measures given these warning signs so the administration is not complacent in genocide as it has been in the past.

Protecting the Hazara People of Afghanistan is a Moral Obligation the World is Failing to Meet was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States provides substantial diplomatic and economic support to Pakistan. Unfortunately, this policy inadvertently enables Pakistan’s economic, political, and military support for the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups. The U.S. should move from its dubious relationship with Pakistan to a more compatible alliance: India should become America’s premier South Asian ally.

Pakistan is an unreliable and untrustworthy ally. From the Taliban’s inception in the 1990s, The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has supported them with money, training, and supplying weapons. It continues to be a significant source of financial and logistical support. In addition, the Taliban own real estate in Pakistan and receive large donations from private Pakistani citizens. The Taliban also teach their brand of Islam in numerous madrassas (Islamic Schools) all over Pakistan, a valuable tool to influence and recruit new members.

Since 2009, the U.S. government has committed over $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion in emergency humanitarian response. U.S. assistance includes projects supporting economic growth and bilateral trade; refugees and refugee-housing communities; law enforcement; civil society; and countering infectious diseases. In addition, the U.S. is Pakistan’s largest export destination country and has been one of Pakistan’s top investors. Examples of U.S. investments include consumer goods, energy, chemicals, agriculture, transportation, and communications. Yet, despite all the resources the U.S. has invested in helping Pakistan, Pakistan still harbors and supports the Taliban.

The U.S. should shift attention and priority to India as the premier South Asian U.S. ally. This new policy would keep economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan but lessen them over time as the U.S. builds closer ties to India. It makes more sense for the U.S. to focus on India as the essential South Asian relationship. Both countries share a commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights, and the rule of law.

India also shares a commitment to counterterrorism. India actively opposes the Taliban. Unlike Pakistan, India is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups.

Lastly, adopting this new policy instead of a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan would prevent a more powerful Taliban. Economic sanctions on Pakistani military and government officials with ties to the Taliban would likely be counterproductive and cause a backlash. Pakistan might even increase monetary and arms support for the Taliban. However, a growing and ever-closer U.S. relationship with India would send Pakistani officials a powerful message.

Critics argue that the U.S. neglect of Pakistan in favor of India will increase tensions in South Asia. However, tensions are already growing because of a Taliban-leaning Pakistani government. India’s relations with Pakistan are always tense. The difference is that a more robust U.S.- India relationship can bring more regional stability than keeping things status quo or pushing towards a more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. India is a more reliable partner.

Current U.S. -Pakistan policy has enabled Pakistan to support and assist the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups for the past two decades. Pakistani intelligence officials deliberately lie to CIA officials regarding Taliban whereabouts, yet still claim they are committed to fighting the War on Terror alongside the U.S. Continuing down this path with Pakistan is a dead end. It is time to chart a new course with India. A U.S. alliance with India would protect U.S. strategic interests and contribute to regional stability and peace.

India Should Become The United States Premier South Asian ally was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue came to the forefront of debate when the RAND Corporation’s peace plan began circulating in Kabul as early as January 2019. Entitled “Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan,” the draft document proposed a joint interim government with the Taliban as the first essential step towards a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Adding to the controversy and fueling speculations was a statement by the Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting new governing arrangements in Afghanistan to facilitate and speed up the ongoing Afghan peace talks.

The idea of an interim administration also has supporters among Afghan politicians and power brokers who most probably see it as their ticket for returning to the center of Afghan power politics.

However, lost in the noise are the consequences of going down the road of a joint interim administration with the hardliner Taliban who isn’t compromising on their regressive demands at all, and the likelihood of its success, especially when the international community is wrapping up its Afghanistan adventure and are preparing to leave the country altogether?

Jeopardizing the Peace Process and Achievements

Proponents of the idea of an interim government forget, and the new Biden administration must know, that any discussion of an interim administration with the highly infamous Taliban—more than 80 percent of Afghans have no sympathy for the group—further boosts the insurgents’ morale and feeds into their narrative.

In other words, talks of an interim government with the Taliban inadvertently acknowledges the insurgent groups false rhetoric and blatant propaganda that paints the U.S.-led international community’s retaliatory intervention (in response to 9/11 attacks) as an invasion, degrades the UN-sanctioned multinational security forces presence in Afghanistan to occupation, and justifies their own bloody campaign as freedom fighting and just war for some delusional salvation of Afghanistan.

An interim administration would also tip the balance of power further in favor of the Taliban, especially after their diplomatic victory of discussing troop pullout with the Trump administration, and provide them with an opportunity to take on the scattered Afghan parties and groups and squeeze them to the extent of reversing the gains and rewriting everything.

Existing democratic institutions, freedom of speech and free press, women’s rights and advancements, and above all, the Afghan Constitution that guarantees all of the above would be in great jeopardy.

Although some claim that the Taliban have changed and are now open to discussing previously taboo and highly sensitive issues, including women’s rights and freedom of expression and press, ground realities indicate otherwise.

The recent rise in violence across the country coupled with targeted killings of any and every Afghan who might speak against or could potentially challenge the Taliban’s narrative and worldview cast severe doubt on the insurgents’ intentions. The Taliban’s vague verbal commitments wrapped up with Islamic suffixes about women, the press, and the inclusive government just adds to the suspicion.

Furthermore, the interim government’s volatile environment coupled with the Taliban leadership’s highly negative view of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) could cause panic among the ANDSF rank and file. Fear of the unknown future plus inclination to survive could easily force the ANDSF to vie for political and even ethnic support, causing the ANDSF disintegration.

And this is not an exaggeration; Afghanistan’s defense and security establishment has previously experienced overnight breakdown and integration into ethnolinguistic factions after the dramatic fall of the Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullahs government in the early 1990s.

Funding And Oversight Challenges

It is important to note that this is not the year 2001. Thus, the international community is not as enthusiastic about prolonged engagement with and rebuilding Afghanistan as they were back then in the first Bonn Conference held nearly two decades ago.

A lot has changed over the last twenty years, and Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the international community. The world is facing new challenges, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, and its grave impact on the world economy cannot be overlooked.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the donor countries, already on the verge of leaving Afghanistan, to embark on a new state-building mission in the war-torn country. Even if some of these donor countries would like to contribute generously, they will have a tough time selling the idea of engaging with and sponsoring a Taliban-dominated government to their respective citizens, many of whom have lost their sons and daughters in the fight against insurgents over the last two decades.

The United States’ principal partners in Afghanistan, European Union, and India are highly skeptical about an interim administration with the Taliban. India has clearly stated that it doesn’t like the idea.

And this isn’t the only issue. The U.S.-led international community has also drastically reduced its military presence in Afghanistan. As part of the Trump administration’s peace deal with the Taliban, the international coalition has already reduced itself to just a few thousand troops scheduled to leave the country in the next few months, pending the new Biden administration’s review.

Even if the remaining foreign troops stay in Afghanistan, their tiny footprint is not enough to ensure the country’s political stability. In the absence of a sizable security assistance force coupled with no disarmament program for the insurgents, the probability of interim government success between two opposing poles, the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, is zero.

Rather than acting as a catalyst for lasting peace, an interim administration at present would further exacerbate the already uncertain environment in favor of the militant Taliban, fuels infighting among democratic forces currently serving and supporting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and result in chaos for the country, which could be costly to the international community down the road.

Therefore, to minimize the probability of an apocalyptic scenario in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international community must look up and push for other options such as convincing the Taliban (with the help of their main patron, Pakistan) to share power with the current Afghan government or participate in UN-supervised early presidential as well as parliamentary elections in the country.

A militant group changed for the good and willing to share power and respect the will of the people as has been claimed about the Taliban, and a critical external player, Pakistan, satisfied with the Taliban’s return to power should have no problem with alternative governing and power-sharing arrangements.

An Interim Government Could Cause Chaos in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In order to gain attention and to distinguish itself from the Taliban, IS-K is employing new tactics like targeted killing, as well as complex attacks designed to instill as much fear as they can. Targeted killings has increased in major cities, especially in Kabul. IS-K has been capable of launching heart-wrenching, high-profile complex assults, killing hundreds of people.

Last May, IS-K militants stormed a maternity hospital in Kabul, killing newborn babies, mothers, nurses, and a police officer. On the same day, they targeted a funeral gathering in Nangarhar through a suicide attack, killing dozens of people. Similarly, they conducted a complex attack on a Sikh temple in March, killing 25 worshippers, in a ruthless targeting of the Hazara minority. The group also claimed responsibility for an attack on the U.S. military Bagram airbase in Parwan province.

With the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, IS-K stands ready to inherit the role of violent spoiler. It poses a serious danger as it attracts fighters from across the region. IS-K, with its global agenda has been able to recruit fighters from more than a dozen countries. Militants from the Middle East under pressure in the Syria war have joined IS-K in Afghanistan. Foreign fighters from India, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined their ranks in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the suicide attacks on Sikh minorities was attributed to one of their Indian fighters, who hailed from Kerala. Battle hardened, educated, and professional fighters in the thousands are skillful in attracting foot soldiers and brainwashing the poverty-stricken illiterate population of the country.

In addition to ideological propaganda, IS-K has been using coercion, force, intimidation, and empty promises of finances to recruit local fighters. One major challenge for IS-K has been the xenophobic nature of Afghans and hate among local residents regarding their brutal tactics they used from the outset of their operations in the country. Moreover, extortion, taxation, and mineral resources exploitation, which are major sources of revenue for IS-K has also caused concerns among local Afghans.

With their fighters coming from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, IS-K has the capacity to destabilize Central Asia, once it gets a firm foothold in Afghanistan. This remains one of the major concerns of Russia and Iran who view IS-K as a group driven by Salafi ideology, working to destabilize Central Asia. Most of IS-K fighters come from the middle class and are operative in far flung areas. They have been successful in getting safe havens in the capital, Kabul.

IS-K has been active in nine provinces from Nangarhar and Kunar in the east, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Badakhshan in the north and Ghor in the center west. IS-K is viewed sympathetically by some ethnicities in the north. Key Tajik and Uzbek commanders like Mawlawi Satar and Mawlawi Abdullah Majid have already joined IS-K. Who are actively involved in the recruitment of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek fighters in their ranks. When their regional leader Aslam Farooqi was captured in Kandahar along with 12 Pakistani nationals—including 4 women, a Bangladeshi man, and 2 Russian speaking women—it is believed Farooqi was engaged in an effort to contact groups in the South in order to bring  them to their ranks.

Some security experts believe that IS-K lacks the capability to launch complex attacks on its own. Taliban’s hardline wing, the Haqqani network, is suspected of providing technical assistance to IS-K in conducting complex attacks. IS-K and Haqqani network share a mutual interest—to undermine the Kabul government control and credibility by conducting attacks in major cities. Thus, on one hand, the Taliban takes the blame out of itself while, on the other hand, they portray the weakness of the government, meanwhile, IS-K relevance is served better. Afghan Government calls IS-K as the new face of the Haqqani network.

IS-K is an emerging threat, which represents itself as a replacement of the Taliban. It seeks to establish a Caliphate beginning in South and Central Asia, which will expand as Muslims across the globe join. This will be horrendous not only for U.S. national security interests but can destabilize the whole region. With their recent brutal attacks, IS-K has proved the fact that we are faced with a renewed threat, a new reign of terror, limited but far more complex and violent.

With the U.S.-Taliban Deal in place, IS-K seeks to build a reign of terror in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and NATO forces observed mutual truce for three days over the Eid ul-Fitr holiday in June. In an earnest statement, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that his government was ready for “comprehensive peace and talks” and that he would be willing to discuss all Taliban concerns, including “the future role of international forces” in the country. President Ghani’s historic speech aimed to build on the extraordinary success of the truce’s first day Friday, in which pictures of thousands of Taliban members, government troops, and civilians celebrating the Eid holiday together across the country flooded social media.

A remarkable shift in U.S. policy on peace negotiations with the Taliban also formed new momentum after Washington came to the predictable conclusion that it must give up on a military solution and embrace negotiations with the Taliban. Having decided to accelerate peace talks, and speak directly with the Taliban during a new round of peace negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appointed veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018 aimed at eventually winding down America’s longest war. The United States and the Taliban have since held several rounds of negotiations in Doha. Khalilzad’s stated position at the commencement of the talks was that there were four topics to discuss and that these topics were tied into a package. The principle was reflected in the phrase “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

The four topics were:

• Withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Afghanistan
• Anti-terrorism guarantees by the Taliban
• Inclusion of the Afghan government in the negotiations, and
• Permanent, Afghanistan-wide ceasefire

The Taliban declined to talk directly to the Afghan government until an agreement on U.S. forces withdrawal is secured, although Taliban leaders met with Afghan warlords and ex-government officials in nonofficial talks to marginalize the Afghan government. The U.S. negotiating team, led by Khalilzad and the Taliban team have reportedly made significant progress in nine rounds of negotiations. U.S. peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that Washington and the Taliban had reached an “agreement in principle” with regards to the withdrawal of American troops from the war in Afghanistan. In exchange, the Taliban would accept to enter immediate peace negotiations with the Afghan government and stop ISIS, al-Qaida, or any other terrorist organizations from operating out of their territory. But just days prior to the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks which led to America’s protracted war in Afghanistan, President Trump disclosed in a series of tweets that he had canceled a secret Sunday summit with Taliban and President Ghani at Camp David and he also stated that the peace negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban were “dead” after Taliban militants claimed responsibility for a car bombing that killed 12 people including an American soldier in Kabul. The reason, he claimed, was that the Taliban insurgents had confessed to killing an American soldier in order “to build false leverage” in its peace talks with the U.S. In a statement to Al Jazeera, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said Washington would regret canceling negotiations led by high-level officials from both sides. “We had two approaches to put an end to the occupation in Afghanistan, one was jihad and fighting, the other was negotiations,” Mujahid said. “If Trump wants to stop negotiations, we will take the first approach, and they will soon regret it, ” he said.

Trump’s abrupt announcement left in doubt the future of the deal agreed in principle by Zalmay Khalilzad, for the withdrawal of thousands of American troops over the coming months.

The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee subpoenaed Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump’s top negotiator for Afghanistan, demanding him testify before lawmakers about his talks with the insurgents. Congressman, Eliot Engel, accused the Trump administration of keeping Congress and the American people “in the dark” about the talks. President Ghani formerly had spoken of the risks of moving too quickly to reach an agreement with the Taliban and warned Trump’s administration not to marginalize his government in the negotiations. But National Security Adviser to President Ghani Hamdullah Mohibbroadside went a step further, accusing Khalilzad of selling out Afghanistan, betraying the trust of a strategic ally, and questioning the intentions of Trump’s Afghan-born emissary.

Resumption of Talks

Following a three-month-long impasse of the US-Taliban negotiations, President Trump paid a surprise Thanksgiving visit to Afghanistan to meet with both U.S. troops and President Ghani on November 28, 2019. He told reporters that he had resumed peace talks with the Taliban and claimed they are eager to ink a deal, less than three months after he abruptly called off official talks. “The Taliban wants to make a deal, and we’re meeting with them, and we’re saying it has to be a cease-fire, and they didn’t want to do a cease-fire, and now they want to do a cease-fire, ” President Trump said during a meeting with Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. “We’re going to stay until such time as we have a deal, or we have total victory, and they want to make a deal very badly, “Mr. Trump added. The statement came on an unexpected journey as the president sought to highlight a record of achievement while he campaigns for re-election. Reacting to Trump’s statement, the Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, welcomed Trump’s announcement and he said, “We are ready to recommence negotiations from the stage that had been stopped. However, it will take some time to formally commence the peace talks with the U.S.”

[bs-quote quote=”Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

Zalmay Khalilzad launched a new chapter of the Afghan peace process in October 2019 by meeting with Pakistani leadership, the Chinese, Russians, European, and NATO, and Mullah Ghani Baradar, the Taliban group’s top political leader in Qatar, and Khalilzad resurrected peace negotiations with the Taliban on December 7, 2019, in Doha. The talks were held behind closed doors since both sides had agreed on confidentiality.

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a landmark agreement in Doha that could result in the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan within 14 months. The U.S.-Taliban comprehensive accord predetermined a series of commitments from both sides relating to withdrawal mechanisms for U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan, counterterrorism, intra-Afghan negotiations, and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Afghanistan. The Taliban also agreed not to assault American and coalition forces provided they were withdrawing their troops from the country, while in return as 5,000 prisoners would be released from Afghanistan’s prisons. But the militant group has kept attacking Afghan forces. While claiming they will only conduct operations on rural bases. It is correct that this landmark accord offered a golden opportunity to end one of the longest-running conflicts in the world if the intra-Afghan negotiations were to commence. But finalizing the end of an almost two-decade war is not like finishing the production of a television-show season.

The wider consequences of the agreement between the U.S.-Taliban remain ambiguous. Plenty of Afghans believe that bringing the world’s superpower to the humbling point of withdrawal has been a great triumph for the Taliban, giving that there are no clear pledges in the agreement to secure the achievements made since 2001, including the constitutions, women’s rights, human rights, civil and political rights for all citizens, and the culture of tolerance.

Khalilzad became a biased party to the conflict with vivid interests and intentions. More precisely, he played the role of viceroy whereby he took over command from his superiors of the procedural homework and reframing the issues. It appeared that the U.S. envoy neglected western sacrifices and betrayed Afghans by dropping the “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” principle and have delegated two of the four original topics of the negotiations to any future “intra-Afghan negotiations” including the all-comprehensive cease-fire. Khalilzad also suggested the Taliban that the “intra-Afghan negotiations should not be conducted by a team of the Afghan government alone but by an “inclusive and efficient national team. This team would encompass government, warlords, civil society, and women’s emissaries. The shift in Khalilzad’s approach further marginalized and undermined the position of the internationally recognized Afghan government.

Engaging in bilateral talks was perhaps the only diplomatic approach to get around the Taliban obstruction on direct negations with the Afghan government. But as a means to encourage the Taliban to hold actual peace talks, it seems, for now, to have faced a deadlock. In lieu of taking more time and inducing for engagement on the full four-point package agreement, addressing the root causes of terrorism, and putting pressure on sponsors of the Taliban, especially Pakistan, which is a major sponsor of terrorism in the region and utilizes proxy war as a foreign policy tool. Khalilzad has given in to Taliban pressure and has conceded the crucial negotiations on Afghanistan’s future political system to intra-Afghan talks, which may or may not take place.

Does the U.S.-Taliban Deal Devalue American Sacrifices and Betray the Afghan People? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ever since the commencement of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, India has struggled to play an influential role in Afghanistan. Despite being one of Afghanistan’s most valuable strategic partners, India remains a mute spectator of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks as well as intra-Afghan negotiations. As India finds itself increasingly ignored in Afghan affairs, the time has come for Delhi to make its presence felt in the landlocked country and ensure that it’s not excluded from negotiations going forward.

India in Afghanistan: a Proactive Economic Partner

India has played a critical role in supplying economic aid to Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2002, India has provided humanitarian aid and invested in major infrastructure projects as well as smaller developmental initiatives which have provided Afghanistan with a much-needed lifeline amidst ongoing war, sectarian divisions, and terrorism.

Major projects that have benefited from Indian investment include the construction of the Parliament Building in the country’s capital, Kabul, where India committed $178 million (USD), spending approximately $28 million thus far, the $150 million Zaranj Delaram highway project connecting western Afghanistan with the strategic Chabahar port in Iran, and the $42 million Salma Dam Project on the Hari Rud river in the province of Herat province—which includes the construction of a power transmission line connecting the city of Pul-e-Khumri with Kabul. India has also signed a trilateral preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and Iran.

Inspired by India’s history of successful community engagement programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal, hundreds of social development programs were launched in Afghanistan in conjunction with 250,000 tons of wheat to be provided to primary schools as food assistance. Furthermore, India provides technical advisers to Afghan public institutions, offers training for Afghan civil servants and policemen, and contributes funds to an Afghan Red Crescent Society program which provides free medicine and healthcare consultations in its medical missions in five Afghan cities.

India’s Role in the Afghan Taliban Peace Talks

Historically, India has been staunchly anti-Taliban. When the Afghanistan government led by President Mohammed Najibullah collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah’s subsequent assassination in 1996, Delhi grew increasingly alarmed by the Taliban’s rise to power. On the other hand, the Taliban has historically maintained a neutral position when it comes to India, even expressing a willingness to engage with India—provided that India abstained from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Today, India has adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the Taliban. Delhi understands the potential consequences of a resurgent Taliban, but it must face the geopolitical reality that the Taliban controls over half of the territory of Afghanistan. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 229 districts were controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan government as of January 31, 2018—approximately 56.3 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. On the other hand, 59 districts—approximately 14.5 percent—were controlled by the Taliban.

India is concerned that a return to power by the Taliban will undermine the fragile government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—which is struggling to provide basic necessities and security to the Afghan people as it continues to battle the Taliban for its very existence. In a sign of its changing position towards the Taliban, the Modi government dispatched two former highly-decorated diplomats in November 2018 on a “non-official visit” to Russia to participate in negotiations with the Taliban that were being held there.

Former diplomat and secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Vivek Katju—  known for his hardline stance against the Taliban—has adopted somewhat different take on the Taliban issue. Writing in an editorial for The Indian Express, Katju argued that it is in India’s strategic interests to engage with the Taliban to not only maintain its influence in Afghanistan but to better understand the power dynamics of the broader South Asian region.

India must increase and sustain engagement in Afghanistan, particularly after not being invited to participate in quadrilateral talks between the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China after talks between U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar. China subsequently issued a statement saying that India was not intentionally excluded from the quadrilateral talks and that India would be included in future regional discussions involving the Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan.

While India has put forth clearly defined red-lines concerning its dealings with the Taliban, its willingness to engage in discussions with the battle-hardened militants is evidence that Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic stance.

India’s Expectations for the Taliban

India’s first expectation is that “all initiatives and processes must include all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” Historically, the Afghan government has often been sidelined by international interlocutors in their engagements with the Taliban. Furthermore, this expectation indicates a degree of acceptability in Delhi over negotiating with the Taliban, as the group represents a “section of the Afghan society.”

Delhi’s second expectation is that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate,” meaning that democratic processes and human rights—including women’s rights—should be respected.

Thirdly, India expects that any process “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” This expectation is crucial for India, as it highlights the threat posed by terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State. Furthermore, this expectation implies that Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be permitted to expand their operations into Afghanistan.

India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of the peace process in Afghanistan. The country is an important partner and is of great strategic value for India—especially with India’s control over the Iranian port of Chabahar, which has been granted a sanctions waiver by the U.S. government. India must up the ante in Afghanistan by initiating track II diplomacy, engaging with tribal elders, and convincing the Taliban to adopt and maintain a favorable stance towards India while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for foreign terrorist groups. Furthermore, should the Taliban return to power with backing from Pakistan, India will be in a challenging position concerning the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in South Asia.

Is India’s Influence in Afghanistan Declining? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Essentially, the Afghan national security apparatus requires a significant reorganization. Afghanistan’s existing military and security architecture must be reconfigured and restructured to accommodate former Taliban fighters and commanders, given the drastic changes that will come to the country’s threat environment once the Taliban give up the fight and agree to a peace deal. This could be either vertical or horizontal integration of individuals, groups, or units of Taliban commanders and fighters within Afghanistan’s existing military, civilian, and political institutions.

Many senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would want to join leadership roles in the Afghan army and police whereas their foot soldiers would like to join the Afghan security forces en masse. This will require a detailed roadmap outlining the ways and means of military integration. More importantly, such an integration roadmap should serve as a guarantor and accelerator for the long-term sustainability and resilience of any peace deal.

The Afghan Taliban is estimated to have between 60,000 and 100,000 fighters under the leadership of mutually exclusive operational commanders, along with mutually dependent political factions within the group, and a highly centralized chain of command but decentralized control and decision-making systems, which gives considerable levy and authority to local commanders to decide routine day-to-day operations in consultation with Taliban shadow administration officials (i.e. governors). This number fluctuates, peaking during the summer months, with seasonal fighters and volunteers coming from Pakistani madrasas to fight in Afghanistan. Numbers are at their lowest during the winter months, due to harsh weather conditions and logistical hurdles.

The Afghan government estimates that one-third of these fighters are foreign terrorist fighters who fight under the Taliban umbrella—these are global, regional and Pakistani terror outfits such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, ETIM, IMU and LeT among others. These fighters are vital for Taliban finances, logistics and provide sophisticated explosive making expertise. Therefore, any peace deal at the outset should require the Taliban to break ties with these terror outfits and foreign terrorist fighters. A challenging task which Taliban are yet to show the resolve and determination to undertake.

The integration of over 100,000 fighters and commanders into military and civilian life is going to be a daunting and fragile task, which would require delicate management and sharp political negotiation skills with both Afghan ownership alongside third-party foreign oversight—preferably from the United Nations.

Afghanistan is no stranger to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants into military and civilian life. Back in 2004, the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP) administered through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of thousands of former mujahidin and combatants but with mixed results. It was followed by the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group (DIAG) program which again had mixed results given lack of Afghan ownership and a strong presence of warlords within the Afghan security and military institutions.

Any military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the ranks of the Afghan military and security institutions would have to be defined within the limits of the type and structure of the new state and subsequently what kind of a security structure and organization would be agreed upon by all sides of the conflict. Furthermore, international experience especially in Africa and South Asia shows that after a peace deal certain countries have opted to downsize the number of their security forces given the new threat environment and have opened up space through reservation and quota within the shrinked security structure for the combatants and their commanders to become apart of the new security and military apparatus.

Military integration of the Taliban fighters and commanders within any new or existing military and security architecture would require a multi-year phased linear approach under the ownership and management of Afghans with the technical assistance of a third party ie the United Nations (UN) with political plus financial support of the United States and its NATO allies as they draw down their troops and redirect a fraction of that cost towards financing the budget required to reintegrate Taliban combatants and commanders in the Afghan military and civilian life.

The Approach

International experience shows that there are mainly three approaches to military integration. Albeit, Afghan history can also guide us in this regard and has its own versions of military integration after the fall of the communist regime in the 1990s and later in early 2000 during the fall of the Taliban regime – both of which were more institutional cleansing than military integration. 

The three military integration models are: 

1. A consent-based approach, where a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict is reached between the warring parties and the government forces absorb the combatants within its ranks and/or the two forces from the different warring parties merge and constitute a brand new single national security force. 
2. A complete demobilization model, where the government downsizes its forces but does not integrate combatants into the national security forces.
3. A coercive model of peace building, where forced disarmament and demobilization of the armed rebels takes places with external assistance (i.e., UN mandated forces).

In all these models—the most feasible one for the Afghan case is the consent based model whereas the ANDSF is resized based on the new threat environment and security landscape and the Taliban commanders and fighters are accommodation across all the level of ANDSF through a quota and reservation system.

The Prospects

In the event of a comprehensive deal with the Afghan Taliban – military integration will inevitably be part and parcel of any peace deal. The foundational questions which needs to be tackled at the outset of any peace deal will be: what will be the size and shape of the new security and military architecture of Afghanistan in view of the new security environment and based on what model (i.e. NATO or non-NATO military model) as well as the future relationship of the Taliban with the United States and its allies. These foundational questions will determine the size, scope and sustainability of the future Afghan military and security forces of which the newly demobilized Taliban fighters and commanders will be an integral part of it. 

Subsequently, the Taliban can be integrated at three levels, with senior commanders at the top, mid-level commanders in the middle, with foot soldiers making up the base. Integration can be done individually, in groups, or unit integration at the field level. Senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would expect positions of influence within or outside of the Afghan military and security services. This can be approached through a bottom–up field level integration at the division or corp level or be undertaken through individual negotiations with Taliban military leaders through a screening and filtering mechanism.

Much will also depend on the size of the new Afghan military and their operational priorities in view of the rise of Daesh and emergence of Taliban splinter groups and criminal outfits post Taliban peace deal who would split from the Taliban chain of command and carry on the fight in pursuit of their own political and business agendas.

Under such such circumstances—in the interim—the Afghan government and its allies will have to integrate Taliban rank and file within the existing ANDSF size and structure and then through a roadmap transform and downsize ANDSF into a more affordable and sustainable force. This interim integration could be done through center and field level integration (i.e., integrating Taliban units to various geographical army corps across the country and integrate senior Taliban commanders in Kabul HQ).

In the long run – the Afghan government together with its allies, will also have to decide how many professional armed forces and how many auxiliary local forces they need for securing the country. This could provide an opportunity for Afghans and their NATO allies where the existing army could be kept as a professional force, albeit significantly downsized, whereas the Taliban forces with some exception could be added as auxiliary local forces given their vast presence in the country side to complement the security work of the newly reorganized Afghan army.

Furthermore, the Taliban commanders and fighters will need to go through sensitization programs as well as short and long-term training courses plus attend joint exercises with the Afghan forces to promote unity in the force. This will help cohesiveness and efficiency within the command and control structure of the newly reorganized and reconfigured Afghan military.

The Challenges

Naturally, with the military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the security infrastructure of Afghanistan comes many sets of political, military, institutional, cultural, financial and budgetary challenges. In fragile countries such as Afghanistan, the biggest of them all will be the political challenge – wherein both sides of the conflict remain committed and resilient regardless of the change in personalities and leaders to the agreed terms of the peace deal and do not use military force as a means of political leverage on each other.

Most of the peace deals and military integration plans fail because one side renege on their commitments and start using military force as a political leverage. Second, comes the institutional absorption capacity to accept change and not to resist the integration of the Taliban commanders and fighters within their ranks.

This is followed by the management and financial requirements which is the least of our worries since a third party (i.e. the UN with the help of the international community) will assist in providing the technical expertise and raise funds to finance the budgetary requirements of the peace deal and military integration plan.

In the case of Afghanistan, the two top challenges will be political resilience and institutional capacity to transform and accommodate the newly integrated Taliban commanders and fighters. The rest can be managed.

The Mechanism

Based on international best practices, there are normally two internationally recognized mechanisms through which Taliban fighters and commanders can be integrated within the rank and file of Afghan forces: (a) a temporary parallel co-existence mechanism until full integration happens which is normally referred to as interim security arrangement; and (b) immediate reintegration whereas forces are immediately disarmed and demobilized by individuals, groups and units sometimes keeping the entire command and control structure intact.

Both mechanisms have their pros and cons, under the interim security arrangement both forces co-exist within their geographies under their control but in a cooperative manner (i.e. ceasing hostilities providing security and law enforcement services to their respective areas eventually merged into one force). This mechanism is a recent phenomenon due to size and institutional absorption capacity issues. Many military integration and DDR processes have failed because it has stalled due to institutional capacity issues and political infightings. Therefore, an interim period is envisioned whereas the forces are integrated in instalments over a period of time while both forces co-exist with each other in a cooperative manner conducting joint patrols, joint trainings and exercises. This will assist in better integration and merger of the two forces.

The immediate mobilization mechanism is doable only when the size of the opposing warring parties are small and the institutional absorption capacity in the military apparatus of the country is high with a firm political will and adequate financial resources at hand. This is normally the classic method of military integration whereas the armed rebels are disarmed and demobilized immediately and reintegrated within the government security forces through an elaborate screening, training and professionalization process.

The Way Forward

For any peace deal to succeed in a complex case environment such as Afghanistan, it is imperative that it has to have a robust military integration roadmap for integrating Taliban fighters and commanders within the existing or a new Afghan military and security apparatus. This means Afghans together with their international partners will need to reassess their force size, posture, composition and operational readiness in view of the new challenges that would emerge in the event of a post peace deal with the Taliban.

The Taliban leadership will also have to evaluate and make certain key decisions such as what kind of an army and police they envision for Afghanistan? How do they intend to break their ties and fight foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, LeT, and others, as well as to define their long-term relations with the United States and its allies?

Finally, the United States and its allies must define what, when, how, and under what circumstances they will continue assisting post-peace deal Afghan security forces reconstituted and reorganized with Taliban commanders within its ranks?

All of the above decisions will have a significant bearing over the success and failure of any potential military integration plan for the Taliban commanders and fighters within the ranks of the Afghan security forces.

Frenemies: Prospects and Challenges for the Military Integration of the Taliban into the Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban consider direct negotiations with the United States in Qatar and elsewhere as a platform for national and international recognition rather than a true path to a peaceful end to the Afghan conflict. President Trump’s anti-war stance, the reconciliatory tone of the establishment in Washington, deteriorating relations between President Ghani and the U.S. administration, and an increased regional and global engagement with the Taliban leadership have made the group firm believers in a military victory and the return of an Islamic Emirate based on sharia law.

This engagement is a tactic taken from the playbook of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and isn’t a sound strategy to pursue peace—rather, it complements their military strategy on the battlefield. This reality was made clear in the recent congratulatory message of the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhund, where he reiterated: “No one should expect us to pour cold water on the heated battlefronts of Jihad or forget our forty-year sacrifices before reaching our objectives.”

In another part of the same statement, he stated that “with this initiative, the Islamic Emirate is conducting victorious operations on the Jihadi battlefronts and leading negotiations with the Americans about ending the occupation of Afghanistan, the objectives and goals of both being bringing an end to the occupation and establishment of an Islamic system.” Both sections of the statement make it abundantly clear that the Afghan Taliban firmly believe in a military victory and consider the on-going peace talks as a mere political addition to their battlefield military strategy and not a genuine effort to end the Afghan war.

Shortly after the release of the Taliban Eid statement, the U.S. Special Envoy for Peace—veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad—termed the Taliban statement as “bombastic” and “ serves to complicate & disrupt” the Afghan peace process. He called on the Taliban to reduce the level of violence and continue negotiations to end the war. This statement and the ones before with a reconciliatory tone from Washington has not only emboldened the Taliban but has made them firm believers in the United States and allies defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the U.S. envoy sees his mandate to negotiate with the Taliban and the Afghan government, respectively on four inter-related items: Joint counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, a U.S. troop drawdown, a ceasefire; and Intra-Afghan dialogue along with discussions over the future of U.S.-Afghan relations. After several unsuccessful attempts to mediate and forge unity among a divided political elite in Kabul , Zalmay Khalilzad views the government in Kabul as politically divided and unable to form a united political front and high powered national negotiation team to engage with the Taliban as apart of the intra-Afghan dialogue. This has been primarily due to increased electoral politics and factional infighting combined with a lack of a coherent understanding of war and peace among the political and military elites in Afghanistan.

In turn, Zalmay Khalilzad, under pressure from Trump administration to show results on the peace talks is in a rush to conclude the first two items of his mandate i.e. counter-terrorism and troop withdrawal timetable in his new round of negotiations with the Taliban in Doha which is dangerous and goes against his stated negotiation approach, saying that  “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”

The Afghan government has criticized this negotiation approach of U.S. envoy to the extent of accusing him of “acting like a viceroy” and of legitimizing the Taliban as an alternative to the incumbent government in Kabul for political expediency in Washington. Zalmay Khalilzad has in turn denied these allegations and has expressed that he always consults with President Ghani before and after his lengthy negotiation sessions with the Taliban.

The Afghan peace process has presented an intriguing platform for all sorts of domestic and regional interests to play out: the Taliban see a divided house in Kabul and believe that rocky relations between Washington and Kabul are an opportunity to be exploited so as to present themselves as an alternative government; the region uses the Afghan peace talks as a card to gain favors and make geopolitical score points against the United States. For instance, Pakistan uses it to extract economic benefits to improve its fragile economy, Iran and Russia use as a platform it to discredit NATO and U.S. efforts in the country while the Arab world uses its to advance their proxy and sectarian agendas.

To exploit this opportunity further, the Afghan Taliban is pursuing a three-pronged interconnected pol-mil strategy: negotiations with the United States, pitting the region against the United States and exploiting great power political faultlines, and dividing the Afghan political elite from the Afghan government. For the Americans, the Taliban assure them that they are no longer affiliated with Al Qaeda and other affiliated foreign terrorist organisations. They are an insurgency with a domestic agenda and do not subscribe to global jihad. The Taliban also assure the Americans that they will never let the Afghan territory to be used against the United States and its allies.

On the contrary, in their negotiations with regional powers such as Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, the Taliban provides guarantees that they will never let regional terrorist groups threaten Afghanistan’s neighbors. Additionally, they and call on the country’s neighbors to join hands to expel the Americans from Afghanistan who they view as both a threat to the region and the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban pursue a policy of “divide and rule” when it comes to intra-Afghan talks. They use Afghan political elites against the government and the Afghan government against the elites to erode the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of the Afghan public and present themselves as a unified alternative political entity.

This three-pronged strategy that the Afghan Taliban pursue has four primary goals: to gain national and international political legitimacy at the cost of an elected government in Kabul, to negotiate with the United States on behalf of themselves and their regional sponsors on a timetable for troop withdrawal, secure the release of prisoners, restore the restoration of the Islamic emirate; and finally, to isolate, delegitimize, and divide the government from the political elites in Kabul.

This calculus of the Afghan Taliban is based on three assumptions: political anarchy and disunity in Kabul, war fatigue on the part of the U.S. and its allies, and heightened regional tensions over U.S. presence in Afghanistan specifically with regards to Iran and Russia. This is a perfect recipe for Taliban to garner political legitimacy and military victory.

The calculus and strategy of the Taliban and its sponsors can be countered with an equivalent three-pronged strategy of the Taliban and their sponsors through an equivalent three-pronged strategy: sustained military pressure, sustained diplomatic and non-military pressure on the Taliban’s foreign sponsors, as well as clearly conveying to the Taliban that pursuing a military victory for them is only a recipe for another war. The post-9/11 generation of Afghans and jihadist groups who have been thus far absent from the theater of war would inevitably join the fight, which would only prolong the misery and complexities of the on-going conflict.

Thus far, the Taliban have not shown any concessions in their talks with the Americans and Afghans. They have proven themselves to be tough negotiators. Many expected that the U.S. envoy and the Taliban would reach an agreement within six months or less, but negotiations currently seem to be deadlocked. Many believe the Afghan Taliban negotiators are playing the long game with U.S. envoy to fail him in his mission and eventually discredit him in the eyes of Trump administration officials and pave the way for his ouster from his job.

Moreover, The Afghan Taliban, together with their foreign terrorist affiliates, have increased attacks on Afghan cities and the countryside battlefields, causing an unprecedented level of civilian and military casualties as compared to yesteryears. During the holy month of Ramadan, Kabul has seen at least seven bomb attacks resulting in over 200 dead and injured. Many of them attributed to the Taliban. They are leveraging military power for incentives on the negotiation table with the Americans and Afghan political elites.

The first intra-Afghan talks held in Moscow was a scene to behold. Taliban negotiators and former officials were in tears while sitting down on a prayer mat hailing their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, for his predictions of an American defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan and proclaiming that they have come true. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses living in the suburbs of the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar tell a telltale of how Taliban preachers go from corner to corner of various quarters and refugee camps reciting the verse “Nasr-u-men Allah e Fath ul Qareeb” which translates into “with God’s help victory is near.” and delivering fiery speeches on U.S. defeat; an echo and déjà vu from the Afghan jihad times when the communist regime in Kabul was on the verge of collapse due to Moscow’s rising domestic issues and war fatigue.

Both Washington and Kabul need to change their approach to negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The current talks have only encouraged them in their quest for the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan along with their foreign terrorist affiliates. We owe it to the many American and non-American men and women who laid our their lives for our security to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven and launching pad for international terrorism, enabled and empowered by a host regime.

The Taliban Peace Calculus was originally published on Global Security Review.

These young men, who live in severe poverty and are without much in terms of economic prospects, are at the forefront of the fight between various ideologies and regional proxy powers. Afghanistan’s urban elites, however, reside comfortably in barricaded homes in city centers, often forgetting there is a broader Afghanistan.

This fact highlights one of the underlying causes of successive regime changes in Afghanistan; inequality and a dangerous rural-urban divide come with a heavy price for any political authority in Afghanistan. The staggering (and growing) levels of inequality in Afghanistan—in terms of wealth, income, political status, and socio-economic conditions—increases the likelihood of regime change.

It was this exploitation of inequality—under the banner of social equality—by the Afghan communist movement that led to the overthrow of King Zahir Shah in 1973 and, subsequently, his cousin the first President of Afghanistan Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978. This was followed by the rise of the Afghan Mujahideen, which fought against the communist regime from 1979 to 1989. The Mujahideen stayed in power from 1992 to 1996, when it was overthrown by the Taliban—a group of rural young men who were tired of the prevailing warlordism and insecurity in the country. These examples of the dangers of rural-urban divide and its consequences for stability in the country.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon remains more accurate today than ever due to the easy flow of foreign aid money and military contracts over the past decade, and a half has created a wealthy urban elite often oblivious of the rural Afghanistan, which in turn has widened the inequality gap in the country.

Today, Afghanistan exists as two countries: the Afghanistan of the haves and the Afghanistan of the have-nots; one of the urban elites and one of the rural tribal chiefs; of conservative rural values and liberal, urban values.

According to the recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey, more than 70% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas, the country’s Gini coefficient is 38.5%, and almost 40% of the population live in poverty—a majority of whom live in rural areas. Only 23.4% of Afghans inhabit urban areas, with the rate of urbanization standing at 5.4%, with income inequality between rural and urban Afghans only increasing.

If history is a lesson to Afghan political leaders and politicians, it is that a succession of Afghan regimes has been toppled by a rebellion that originated in rural Afghanistan as a result of neglect or rapidly-imposed reforms. Furthermore, Afghan politicians, policymakers, and public officials—along with their international allies and partners—forget this divide and mistakenly think of Afghanistan in the narrow sense of its the six major cities.

The real Afghanistan is the remaining 28 out of 34 provinces—which have, over the years, been consistently neglected by successive Afghan regimes. In fact, in multiple instances when a particular administration has come to power with the help of disaffected, rural young men, those in power forget the roots of their plight and end up living relatively comfortable lives in urban Afghanistan. At times, the Afghan urban elite is so oblivious to the conditions of rural Afghanistan that they forget the broader Afghan polity consists of not only the country’s six major cities of Kabul, Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kandahar, but the remaining 28 provinces, as well.

The rural population of Afghanistan makes up the majority (over 70%) of the population and is more conservative, traditional, and mainly lives in absolute or near-absolute poverty. Afghan urbanites, in contrast, are more liberal, are connected to the internet, and enjoy high levels of disposable income thanks to an aid-dependent bubble economy which has provided cash and other unaccounted wealth.
Early on, the Afghan government understood this issue and tried to address it with a rigorous rural development agenda, but lost focus along the way.

Afghanistan’s interim-presidential administration led by Hamid Karzai recognized this threat and designed several comprehensive national rural development programs under the initiative of the then-Finance Minister and current President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani. These initiatives, such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Rural Access Program (NRAP), National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), Microfinance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) amongst others, were intended to provide block grants to self-organized, democratic and self-governed community councils around the country.

These grants would be used to fund the priorities identified by the local councils to improve their communities and improve accessibility to urban centers by building rural roads and providing micro-loans for their household and business needs. However, after almost a decade, none of these programs are sustainable and are heavily dependent on foreign aid and management.

Additionally, these programs were community development projects rather than projects designed to drive nationwide productivity and growth to provide mass employment and serve as important drivers of the rural Afghan economy. More often than not, they have been essential elements of an unsustainable subsistence economy in the rural parts of the country.

The Politics of Inequality: Access to Public Office, Rampant Poverty, Collateral Damage, Discrimination, and Ethnic Politics

Family politics is returning to Afghanistan. Once-thriving under the former King Zahir Shah, years of communist rule and war weakened this institution. One of the main reasons why people sympathized with the two communist factions of Khalq (The People) and Parcham (The Flag) was due to growing frustrations over the increasing monopoly on power and resources by many of the families close to the then-king and his court. Today—by several estimates—the politics, economics, and finances of Afghanistan are in the hands of a few families which enriched themselves through holding high public office, receiving millions of dollars of foreign military contracts, and through exercising a tight grip over the Afghan private sector.

The vast majority of Afghanistan’s wealth is in the hands of a few hundred individuals with strong political ties to the Afghan government. Today, 10% of the wealthiest Afghans control the economy and politics of a country where the majority of the population cannot meet their daily basic needs. Additionally, the social and economic upward and sideways mobility—which is expected in a dynamic economy—is absent in the Afghan context. The Afghan economic and political landscape is increasingly monopolized by a few families, individuals, and political parties with whom one must have a relationship with to enter into public office.

The Economics of Inequality: Foreign Aid and the Dilemma of Balanced Development versus Unbalanced Development

The flow of foreign aid and easy money through foreign military contracts have created a new economic and business elite in Afghanistan. Thus, political and economic power has been concentrated in the hands of the few powerful individuals who maintain links to the Afghan government with substantial control over the Afghan private sector. Meanwhile, the fixed geography of the war in the southern and eastern regions of the country has created huge income, wealth, and economic disparities between the south and north of Afghanistan.

According to the World Bank’s provincial briefs of Afghanistan, the poverty and inequality indicators (poverty rate, depth of poverty, the average consumption of the poor, per capita monthly total consumption and the Gini coefficient) of southern Afghanistan are almost several times higher than those in the northern sectors of the country. In addition, due to persistent insecurity in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report (2012-3013) shows that the percentage of vulnerable population groups at high risk of poverty, malnutrition, and disease (female-headed households, children, women, addicts, and the elderly) are almost double those in northern and western Afghanistan. This intra-regional and provincial inequality, coupled with a lack of access to essential services and economic opportunities, is cause for serious alarm.

Afghanistan’s economy is increasingly moving towards a narco-mafia model where a few families throughout the country control the private sector and public offices both at the national and subnational level. According to a recent report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), nearly all major contracts are won by a few wealthy and well-connected business with ties to senior government officials (ministers, governors, deputy ministers, amongst others). When a senior official then enters a line of business, small businesses tend to voluntarily opt out of the market, be intimidated, or are otherwise forced to quit.

The perception that competing against a political “strongman” is a futile effort is quite common among those who run smaller and medium‐sized businesses. Monopolization also indicates the exclusivity of markets. The market in Afghanistan is run by a limited number of actors, making the Afghan market an oligopoly wherein a few sellers or providers of services dominate the entire market, evidencing the extent of market failure and capture by criminal, mafia, and other corrupt networks.

This evidence points to shrinking business opportunities for both medium and small enterprises in the Afghan economy and the growing monopoly of a few dominant business players over the Afghan private sector.

The Military Consequences of Inequality: The Geography of War and the Mafia Economy

The monopoly on political power, financial resources, and economic opportunities—combined with the developmental imbalances of the country provides an optimal recruitment environment from which insurgents can draw. Insurgents can attract many unemployed and disgruntled youth who believe a few corrupt officials monopolize the country in the top echelons of the country’s political and economic establishments.

Today, the majority of the Taliban’s foot soldiers are unemployed youth from the most impoverished and underdeveloped areas of Afghanistan. Many of these youth are seasonal fighters who work in the fields during harvest season and fight for the rest of the year precisely due to lack of descent employment opportunities and a grudge against the country’s so-called “overnight millionaires” who are seen as American collaborators and incredibly corrupt.

Further marginalizing and encouraging people to distance themselves from the current government is the concentration of power at the subnational level in the hands of rural elites and tribal chiefs with connections to the presidential administration.

Inclusive Institutions, Politics, and Balanced Development: The Difficult Road Ahead

Afghanistan is rapidly moving towards being an oligopoly, with extractive political and economic institutions. The increasing amount of wealth and political power under the control of a small minority of Afghans is increasingly marginalizing the vast majority of the country’s population—largely in rural Afghanistan. Particularly within the country’s historical context, this is cause for alarm. Rural Afghans have often initiated regimes changes due to the negligence of political leaders, policymakers, and politicians in Kabul and other cities who often lose touch with the realities of rural life.

The new Afghan president should make Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) the driver of the Afghan economy and break the tight grip of the few families and individuals have over the country’s economy and the private sector. Balanced development of the country and equitable allocation of financial resources and business opportunities is essential for an inclusive and secure Afghanistan.

The Price of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Negotiations in Doha, Qatar—the location of the Taliban’s political office—were followed by a conference in Moscow where members of the Afghan opposition were met by a Taliban delegation for peace-related consultations. Though the Afghan government was left out of the Doha negotiations and refused to participate in the Moscow conference, the two events—coupled with a new round of talks at the highest level on both the U.S. and the Taliban sides—have essentially rendered a negotiated settlement of the “war on terror” in Afghanistan irreversible.   

However, noticeably absent from the peace talks is any consideration for a post-deal mechanism that can bring the opinions of ordinary Afghans to the table when it comes to finalizing an agreement that will undoubtedly impact them the most. 

Peace negotiations in other countries held in a similar context to those in Afghanistan have included some measure of public engagement—typically in the form of a national referendum. In Colombia, a recently negotiated deal between the Colombian government and the rebel FARC movement, along with the Good Friday Agreement that brought an end to the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland conflict both involved such a step—twice, in some cases.  

Although a referendum may not yield credible results in Afghanistan due to a range of obstacles—a record of rigged elections being one—other mechanisms can be applied to make the peace process more participatory. 

The Loya Jirga

One such mechanism, the Grand Assembly or Loya Jirga, is well known in Afghanistan. The term is a combination of the Pashtu Loya meaning “grand” and the Farsi or Turkic Jirga meaning “assembly.” Enshrined in the 2004 Afghan Constitution, a presidential decree can convene the assembly. Members consist of the presidents of the district and provincial councils in addition to members of the Parliament. District councils, however, have yet to be formed in Afghanistan due to seventeen years of technical drawbacks. This deficit in membership can be rectified by including more women and members of civil society in the event such an assembly is convened. 

In the 2004 Constitution, the Loya Jirga is referred to as “the highest manifestation of the will of the people.”  A Loya Jirga is responsible for decisions on matters such as presidential impeachment or constitutional amendments. The first Loya Jirga in modern Afghan history was convened from 1914-1915 by then-Afghan King Amir Habibullah to decide if Afghanistan should join any of the warring camps in World War I. The 540 delegates opted for neutrality. A Loya Jirga has ratified seven out of eight of Afghanistan’s 20th-century constitutions. 

The election of the first post-Bonn Conference president, Hamid Karzai, went through a Grand Assembly, as did the 2004 ratification of the country’s most recent constitution. There is no reason why an exception should be made for an eventual peace deal that is likely to entail significant constitutional amendments and significantly disrupt the country’s institutions. 

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has suggested a consultative Loya Jirga be convened to discuss the nature of a peace deal which falls well short of an assembly with a binding decision-making power. 

A Loya Jirga should include under its mandate, at the very least, putting individual items in the peace deal under scrutiny by members who are representative of a diverse range of stakeholders—particularly those whose views may be left out in the high politics of negotiations. Specifically, women and members of civil society would be able to steer the fate of a post-deal Afghanistan through such a platform, guaranteeing their continued role in shaping the country’s future. 

The Religious Justification for a Loya Jirga

The idea of a Loya Jirga might find strong support in Islamic politics as well, in that it may help to convince the Taliban to cooperate to some degree—given that the group may not agree to a Colombia-style referendum. The group does not believe in people’s choice as the basis of political authority – a realm reserved strictly for religion and its commandments according to the radical interpretation of Islam the Taliban espouse. 

The notion of Shura or council, however, has been promulgated by the Quran and is the legitimizing basis for deliberative decision-making in politics and society. The Quranic verse calling for holding council adorns the wall above the seat of the Speaker of the House of the People in Afghanistan’s Parliament. Agreeing to a Loya Jirga could be politically beneficial for the Taliban, as the group would demonstrate it is unafraid of views representing a broader perspective from the population, and that it can demonstrate its intentions to adhere to a time-honored national tradition. 

Forgoing a wider participatory process will leave the playing field mostly to a few well-known figures from among the former Mujahidin parties, some new faces (mostly men) who’ve risen in prominence in recent years, and previous members of the Taliban who have joined the peace process. Barring a few, such individuals who mostly made up the attendees at the Moscow conference to meet the Taliban delegation, are closer in terms of ideology and tribal-thinking to the Taliban than Afghanistan’s civic-minded population. These individuals can be persuaded to compromise on important post-Bonn values if a quick peace deal guarantees an end to the ongoing bloody stalemate and brings them recognition.   

Ultimately, the two sides currently engaged in talks have their own priorities. The Taliban insists on a timeline for a withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition from Afghanistan as the main precondition for peace—a demand they have made ever since reemerging as an insurgency in the mid-2000s. The U.S. demands guarantees that Afghanistan will not become a launch-pad for international terrorism following complete withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops. 

U.S. President Donald Trump has noted that he considers military campaigns in the Greater Middle East to be  “dumb wars,” continuing a trend initiated by Barack Obama of shifting attention to more important strategic theaters. In the United States’ own hemisphere, the situation in Venezuela seems ripe for intervention—possibly militarily if the situation deteriorates considerably if one were to believe Trump’s rhetoric.

The many influential voices calling for complete pull-out from Afghanistan, either cautiously or persuasively, easily outnumber the few who believe the ongoing talks with the Taliban is but a means to negotiate the terms of surrender for the U.S.—a Vietnam-style capitulation. Patience for delaying the exit, therefore, may be in serious shortage in Washington. 

U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad hasn’t acknowledged any discussions with the Taliban about a future political system. So far, both sides have acknowledged progress resulting in an agreement in principle for a peace framework, which will require further talks in Doha and subsequent negotiations in Kabul with the Afghan government—should the Taliban eventually agree to such talks that they have thus far rejected, calling the government in Kabul a puppet regime.  

Historical Precedent for Negotiated Settlements in Afghanistan

Amidst the hustle to strike a deal, ordinary Afghans might become victims of a pervasive ostrich effect due to the fatigue of a long conflict. Ironically, this same approach has tragic precedence not long ago in Afghanistan.

Negotiated settlements between the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the Mujahidin in early 1990s sidelined the ordinary population. Later, similar agreements between the many Mujahidin parties excluded any participation by the people. This resulted in political accords that tethered their durability to factional and partisan interests. In the absence of a broader popular base to guarantee them, these agreements lost currency the moment one faction’s interests were threatened, leading to renewed hostilities. 

Absence of genuine belief in public participation in power might be one reason behind a widespread disillusionment among Afghans that they don’t really matter even if the international community make the claim of having brought democracy to the country. It’s either a US-led conspiracy (aided by the British), a dirty gimmick by the Pakistani ISI or political machinations among the elite in or out of the government that runs the country. 

Excluding ordinary people again might hasten the peace process, but it will likely result in the age-old adage of history repeating itself—first as tragedy, then as farce. To ensure that today’s peace won’t result in future instability due to grievances originating in opposition to a deal that undermines aspirations of ordinary Afghans, convening a Loya Jirga with binding authority is necessary. 

In case the Taliban returns to power unilaterally or as part of a coalition and is faced with a popular resistance as it did in the late 1990s and thus fail to assert full authority on the country’s territory, the group’s guarantees regarding preventing Afghanistan from becoming a jihadist hub will carry little weight. The proliferation of power vacuums can provide terrorist groups with much-needed training grounds, including ISIS-affiliated militants who are already present in the country and in loggerheads with the Taliban. 

Give Ordinary Afghans a Voice in Any Peace Deal With the Taliban was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January 2019—in a landmark turn of events—the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted and ordered the immediate release of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy and placed on death row in 2010. While her release was cause for celebration among Pakistan’s political liberals, it greatly angered religious conservatives and those on the extreme right-wing of Pakistan’s political spectrum. 

Clerics like Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) party started demonstrating by blocking roads in Pakistan’s major cities and paralyzing the country, as well as making calls to extremist elements in government and the country’s Armed Forces to mutiny and overthrow or kill judges involved in the verdict, Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa – essentially an open call for sedition. Party workers were also responsible for vandalizing and burning vehicles across the country’s urban areas.

Aasia had been jailed since 2010, on death row for violating Pakistan’s ambiguous blasphemy laws. Anyone who spoke out in support of her, who violated blasphemy laws, or simply spoke out against the laws themselves found themselves under attack from religious conservatives and right-wing extremists. Nobody was safe; in 2011 Salman Taseer, the sitting Punjab governor, was gunned in Islamabad by his bodyguard for speaking out against the court’s verdict. His assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, was hailed by the religious right as a hero. 

The laws themselves are subject to intense criticism by human rights organizations and Pakistan’s Supreme Courts. The laws are ambiguously written and open to interpretation, thus undermining the rule of law. Accusations of blasphemy are enough to warrant mob violence and vigilantism. Indeed, there is a precedent for such violence taking place, especially against minorities. 

Negotiating From a Position of Weakness

These recent events and the protests forced Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government to enter negotiations with the protesters to end the demonstrations— a counterintuitive approach to ending the crisis while maintaining Pakistan’s internal sovereignty and security.

Khan’s government announced plans were to place Aasia on the ECL and for her case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, all to appease the TLP while undermining the judiciary and putting her life in danger. Since those negotiations were conducted, the government denied her exit from the country, despite talks for asylum with the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Recently, however, the petition to have the case reviewed was overturned, meaning that Aasia was (and is at the time of writing) a free woman.

The denial of safe passage for Aasia greatly angered Pakistani liberals while also putting the relatively new PTI government in a precarious position, stripping it of support and legitimacy. Concessions to extremists—let alone the mere act of entering into negotiations—are detrimental to not only the survival of the Khan’s government but to Pakistan’s national security, as well.

There is at least a decade of precedent that evidences the counterintuitive nature of negotiating with extremists. Doing so weakens the state and empowers extremists and militants. To fulfill the demands of extremists is to invite further challenge, which, in turn, requires further concessions to resolve. 

Khan entered into negotiations on the back foot; he approached the TLP to convince them to cease demonstrations, as the blocking of major roads in Karachi and other big cities had paralyzed the country and would adversely impact Pakistan’s already weak economy. Khan was negotiating from a position of weakness, as he perceived the deal as a political necessity instead of restoring social order.

Militant Groups Rarely, if Ever, Uphold Their End of the Deal

This is not the first time the state has attempted negotiation out of necessity. The Swat Agreement is probably the most notable instance of state capitulation in Pakistan’s history. The agreement, signed in April 2009, essentially handed control of the Swat Valley over to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to induce the group to cease hostilities and terrorist attacks. 

The terms of the agreement allowed the TTP, led by Maulana Fazlullah, to set up Sharia courts within the areas of Swat and Malakand, from where the state had agreed to withdraw its troops. Both sides got what they wanted, and a short cessation of hostilities was observed, with emphasis on the word “short.” By mid-April (the same month the agreement was signed), the TTP had forcibly taken over a police station in Swat, breaking the terms of the deal.

The issue with negotiating with non-state actors in Pakistan merely is that it is not possible to bind the militants to the terms of an agreement. They are not a state agency, nor is there any overarching authority governing their actions. Though the TLP are not militants or terrorists, they violate the function of the state by blocking major roads, therefore obstructing commerce, policing, and the public’s general movement. 

Alongside their blockade, TLP followers and workers were seen vandalizing cars and public transport, a clear violation of the Pakistan Penal Code. Given this behavior and based on the TLP’s historical failure to follow through on promises, Khan shouldn’t have entered into negotiations in the first place. 

Negotiation, in this instance, is a poor strategy given the nature of the TLP as an organization. To understand why, one must look at the ideology of the TLP and the teachings of Barelvi Islam. Like Deobandism, Barelviism was developed in India in the 19^th Century. However, unlike Deobandism, there is little to no influence from Salafism or Wahabbism.

The TLP and other Barelvi groups do not share the aims of Deobandi extremist groups like the TTP, such as implementing Sharia Law or creation of a new Islamic state. Barelvis instead preach the prophethood and finality of Muhammad (PBUH). This is a problem.

The Influence of Barelvi Islam on Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan

The TLP and extremist Barelvi preachers can reach and influence more people than their Deobandi counterparts. The TTP’s goal of implementing Sharia law doesn’t resonate with all Muslims in Pakistan, whereas merely preaching about the Prophet will resonate with the core beliefs of a much larger segment of Muslims in Pakistan. This, coupled with the TLP’s hardline anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy-related rhetoric has created a situation where increasing numbers of people are influenced to hold negative views towards Ahmadis and engage in vigilantism against accused blasphemers.

The Barelvi ideology resonates with a large proportion of Muslims and reaches a large population throughout the Indian subcontinent. Because of this, religious minorities are more likely to be subjected to violence, harassment, and discrimination. From a strategic communications perspective, the immense size of the target audience presents a high risk to security in Southeast Asia, as there are more Muslims in the Indian subcontinent than in the Middle East and North Africa.

Negotiation with extremists, violent or otherwise, empowers such groups and harms national security. By negotiating with the TLP, Khan is enabling it and similar groups to engage in extrajudicial murder, terrorism, and a wide range of other criminal activity. Because of the scale of audience that could potentially be influenced by extremist messaging, such groups pose a threat to the long-term security of Pakistan and the broader region.

Negotiating With Extremists Threatens Pakistan’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Taliban held its fourth round of direct talks with the United States in January of 2019. This month the group revealed it will participate in a fifth meeting with the aim of agreeing on a set of issues and to craft a framework for ending the war that began with the U.S. invasion in 2001. The widely-lauded meeting between more than fifty Taliban and Afghan political figures in Moscow this month was simply unprecedented, and an important step forward to ending years of stalemate and creating the conditions for direct inter-Afghan dialogue.

The significance of these meetings can be discerned from their venues, timing, participants, and the progressive nature of the discussions. The presence, involvement and engagement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati representatives—countries with significant influence on the Taliban—have undoubtedly raised the stakes of the events.

The Afghan government, an essential factor in the process, has been left out of any meetings with Taliban on the latter’s insistence. However, if both the U.S. and Taliban proceed with good faith and achieve mutually-agreeable progress, the meetings could ultimately pave the way for direct talks between Taliban and Afghan officials—with increased engagement and support from Afghan political elites.

The U.S. and its coalition partners appear to believe they have exhausted almost all military options that would effectuate an end to the Afghan conflict and thus have come to the conclusion that to withdraw forces—something the Trump administration is seriously considering,—political and diplomatic options that would entail some combination of restraint, compromise, and incentives must be considered.

The United States’ demands of the Taliban are clear: the Taliban must abandon support for global terrorist groups, it must not use Afghanistan as a base from which to stage attacks against the United States or its interests, and it must cease using violence and enter into talks with the Afghan government. There is a greater realization on the part of the Taliban as well that it cannot achieve a decisive victory—let alone overtake the state—despite years of inflicting heavy losses on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and expanding the territory it controls.

The Taliban has every reason to maximize its return from the talks. The resilience of its forces, a strict adherence to a battlefield chain of command, increasingly diversified foreign support, and—most importantly—its operational advantage in the harsh conditions of rural Afghanistan make it simply insurmountable. Yet, the Taliban also has its own calculations and realizes that no matter its leverage in peace talks, the return of the Islamic Emirate is beyond reach. Afghans, including Taliban sympathizers in most rural parts of the country, simply demand better lives than they had under the Taliban for the price they have paid to endure the last eighteen years of conflict and misery. However, the Taliban continues to hold onto its traditional demands which include withdrawal of foreign forces, release of prisoners, lifting of sanctions, changes to the constitution with greater provision for sharia law, and a practical roadmap for its inclusion in power sharing and governance. Furthermore, the Taliban recently asked for a permanent end to U.S./NATO air strikes targeting its fighters.

Then there is the matter of Pakistan, another essential element of the Afghan conflict. Some, including the U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, have stated that Kabul is where the subject of peace in Afghanistan will be decided. Others argue that Islamabad is the ultimate decider. The question isn’t so much about where the key to peace in Afghanistan is, but rather, it is fundamentally one of whether now is the time to use that key.

The reality is that peace in Afghanistan is intimately linked to Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan. If Pakistan has genuinely succumbed to U.S. pressure and is ready to end its rigorously institutionalized support for the Taliban insurgency, and is genuinely willing to cooperate in the peace and reconciliation process, the possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict is more real now than at anytime previously.

As it stands, as agreed in Doha, both the U.S. and the Taliban officials are expected to meet again this month. Assuming that the Taliban and U.S. reach an agreement that includes a timetable for the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces— a non-negotiable precondition for the Taliban—the next step will be an effective inter-Afghan dialogue. Are the two sides ready and able to make peace? Will the Taliban agree to talk with the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG)? Is NUG prepared to reach and implement a settlement that would entail substantial concessions, including significant legislative amendments and political accommodation? More importantly, does President Ghani have the domestic political backing essential to enter into a durable peace treaty with the Taliban and honor certain demands? To consider this and other key questions, a review of the reality on the ground in Afghanistan is necessary.

Is Peace Within Reach?

The Taliban has thus far refused to directly negotiate with Ghani’s National Unity Government, which it views as a puppet of the West with no authority or legitimacy to make decisions or to represent the will of the nation. Instead, it has insisted on first talking only to the U.S. To date, the Taliban has had one meeting with Afghan political leaders, and it is likely they will meet again.

At a conference in Geneva in November of 2018, Ghani presented a five-phase approach for the negotiating process. First, the Afghan government will hold direct talks with the Taliban, followed by discussions with Pakistan and the United States. Then, regional actors and the Arab-Islamic world will be included, and finally, NATO and non-NATO countries. At the moment, what has been happening is precisely the opposite of what Ghani envisioned. The U.S. and the Taliban have had four direct meetings. In between which, U.S. Special Envoy Khalilzad visited Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., India, and Qatar to consult with their officials. Ghani’s government is, so far, not even in the game despite the president’s recent attempts to soften his tone.

According to recent projections by military experts and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)¹ the Taliban controls nearly fifty percent of the territory in Afghanistan. While this figure is contested, the Taliban has an active presence in seventy percent of the country. Afghanistan remains a largely rural country with less than twenty eight percent of its population living in the cities.²

Even though the government predominantly controls the cities and urban areas, the rural territory is either under Taliban control or at best is contested.³ This leaves the Taliban at a distinct advantage as only a small proportion of the rural territory effectively remains in control of the government. In case of a peace settlement, it is highly unlikely the group would be willing to cede any control it has thus far gained and power to a government it ultimately considers to be illegitimate. Unsurprisingly, in response to Ghani’s offer of a Kabul office for the Taliban made during a recent visit to Nangarhar province, the Taliban restated its position that it will not, under any circumstances, talk with Ghani’s government.

It is an open secret that a significant portion of the Taliban’s income that used to run its war machine is generated from illegal taxation, opium, extortion, and ransoms, among other means. Drugs make up at least sixty percent of the Taliban’s income, a figure estimated at between $300 and $400 million each year.⁴ Furthermore, militia groups make more than $50 million annually from the mining industry, which is harvesting talc, chromite, marble and precious stones.

Foreign funding is another significant source of revenue for the Taliban. Although not easy to measure as these transactions are primarily carried out in unofficial and unregulated ways, including the hawala system, most experts estimate this funding to be between $200 to $300 million a year—coming mostly from the Gulf states. The fundamental question is what incentives will the NUG offer to the Taliban? Will the peace dividend for a local Taliban commander match what he currently makes each month as the result of the group’s drug trafficking and criminal activity, it’s myriad of other business ventures, and foreign funding?

Despite describing its direct talks with the United States as highly agenda-driven and articulate, the Taliban seems to lack a clear political objective. Unlike Hizbi Islami, which, at the time of its negotiations with the NUG⁵ had a clearer picture of how it might govern from Kabul, articulating what an end-state might look like and how some of its conditions could be feasibly implemented in a settlement has been a challenge for the Taliban. This is partly because the group realizes the limited degree of its acceptability within mainstream Afghan society.⁶

What is clear though is that the Taliban will demand a clear, comprehensive, and guaranteed plan from the Afghan government for its social, economic, and political needs—even if the group itself is lacking one. At almost every meeting, the Taliban has articulated its now-familiar demands, but beyond that, it struggles with how it sees itself back in the country. What form of a government will work? What specific laws would need to be changed? Will it respect the democratic processes and elections or will it only seek a share power with the existing government? In response to a question in Moscow related to power sharing, the Taliban’s chief envoy Sher Mohammad Abas Stanekzai said, “the Taliban has a clear roadmap for how to work with all political groups in the country to form a government based on the Sharia law.” Obviously, this isn’t enough even if the group had such a plan.

For its part, Ghani’s government is fraught with numerous problems. It might even be incorrect to call it a full and functioning government given that it has never had a full cabinet. For over fourteen months (May 2017 – July 2018), Ghani’s first Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum was in exile; currently, he is dispossessed of his authority and denied permission to attend cabinet and National Security Council meetings. More than half of the government’s twenty-five ministries and dozens of independent bodies have remained without legal heads since his presidency.

Ghani’s closest and top policy-making team is, at its best, made up of many junior, inexperienced individuals with no authority to make decisions. Despite Ghani’s obsession with bringing the country’s younger generation to the government, he has failed to find a practical balance in government recruitment. His administration has had a penchant for disregarding necessary qualifications for some of the most senior positions and has made hasty appointments. This is partly because he is deeply insecure and has a severe trust deficit. Moreover, a textbook micromanager, Ghani involves himself in every detail of the country’s business. This situation has caused serious problems for both the government and the state as a whole.

The security situation within Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. Since the NUG was formed in 2015, More than one million Afghans have fled the country due to a lack of jobs and increasing insecurity and uncertainty. According to UNAMA, from 2015 to 2018, civilian casualties caused by both Taliban attacks and ANDSF operations reached nearly 35,000—the highest number since the civil war in the 1990s—almost half of whom are women, children and elderly.⁷

In a recent interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Ghani admitted that the ANDSF had lost up to 45,000 personnel since he took power.⁸ a figure that still seems modest when one consider the average casualties on a daily basis. Despite massive support from the U.S. and other NATO nations to strengthen the ANDSF, its institutions remain weak, disorganized, corrupt, and void of morale. Most importantly, political stability, the most critical indicator of a nation’s prosperity, is seriously crumbling. Afghanistan’s history has shown that when any leader ignored this element of polity, his demise and destruction was certain.

King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), President Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978), and Mullah Mohammad Omar Hotak (1994-1998) are only few examples of leaders whose individualistic, hasty, and poorly conceived approach to changing the country overnight put the country on the verge of destruction. To their credit, perhaps none of these leaders had any ill intent, rather it was their respective individual characters that led to their downfall. Regrettably, we are seeing similar trends today. While the mainstream political elites may be highly divided, when it comes to their relations with NUG, they have never been so united.⁹

The Afghan government’s foreign diplomacy is in shambles. Ghani’s day-to-day business with some of the most powerful and complicated countries in the region— Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—appears to be guided by books he has read. It has become commonplace these days that when Ghani or his policy team makes a statement on any issue, they then change their minds shortly thereafter. This shows a lack of strategic thinking and experience in the presidential palace. At a time when the future of the country is being debated on the world stage, the NUG’s diplomacy is seriously faltering. The government needs to demonstrate creative diplomacy, statecraft, and political ingenuity now, more than ever.

Recommendations for Policymaking

In light of the above and assuming that the Taliban will ultimately enter into an inter-Afghan dialogue, the following six points may help to guide participants in the Afghan peace process toward a successful and lasting outcome:

1. The government must go beyond a mere plan on paper and demonstrate its readiness to provide concessions based on the fundamental demands of the Taliban. President Ghani has spoken about roadmaps, plans or strategy, but has offered no details or evidence to indicate that a plan is in place. Any peace talks would require a plan that has immediate results and is based on, at a minimum, national consensus building, recognition of the Taliban as a political party, transitional confidence-building measures, a lifting of sanctions, release of prisoners, the reintegration of Taliban fighters and relocation of senior Taliban members along with their families. Ghani’s recent call for a possible Loya Jira (Grand Council) to discuss peace is a welcome step to engage in dialogues with Taliban, although that doesn’t seem to change the Taliban’s calculation about him.
2. At the moment, the biggest challenge for Ghani is securing a strong national support base for peace with the Taliban in Kabul, let alone in the rest of the country. The current situation, beset by a highly fragile political environment and pervasive security threats, calls for thinking beyond daily business. It is time to begin a meaningful national dialogue. Ghani must reprioritize his time and demonstrate leadership by facing reality. Afghans are frustrated with empty promises and by a lack of measurable progress. Every peace has a price, and strong leadership is needed to convince the majority of the country that it is in their interest to shoulder this cost. As such, if the Taliban continue to deny talking with the NUG, but is willing to talk to other Afghans, Ghani must not block it, let the process begin and must instead help a council of prominent Afghan leaders and politicians who can advance the talks. The government can serve as a coordinator of the process and can gradually take a more substantive role as was the case in negotiations with Hizb Islami successfully led by former National Security Advisor, Haneef Atmar, who is now a contender for the country’s presidency.
3. If the Taliban continues its rejection of talks with the Afghan government as a legitimate and trustworthy party with the authority to make a peace settlement work, the upcoming presidential elections may be a perfect opportunity for the group to talk to the new government. The current talks will take time and can be advanced by a future government. The period between now and the formation of the new government will be critical for both parties, however. It will also provide an opportunity for Taliban representatives to reach out to political leaders and, most importantly, potential presidential candidates to understand their visions and plans for peace. For its part, the Taliban can begin to explore its own future reconciliation and reintegration in Afghan society and the resolution of grievances. They must not forget that this war has affected millions of Afghans. Perhaps the biggest challenge for any future government will be to heal the wounds, pains, and suffering of the nation.
4. While Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is unlikely to completely cease in the near future, recent developments give cause for cautious optimism. These developments include the death of Maulana Samiul Haq, known as the father of Taliban, the release of key Taliban leaders including Mullah Berader, former Deputy to the Taliban leader who was recently named by Taliban Supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhund as head of the Taliban political office in Doha; security reinforcement measures by Pakistani military along the Durand Line and the role Pakistan played in encouraging Taliban to meet with U.S. in Abu Dhabi and Doha. If Pakistan is truly committed to resolve the Afghan conflict, there is every reason to expect a settlement, even if talks take a longer amount of time. However, Pakistan needs to do much more in order to gain the confidence of the U.S. and the Afghans. For years, Pakistan has been playing a double game in which it does just enough on the surface to get incentives from the U.S., while still supporting the Taliban in the shadows.
5. There have been talks about forming an interim government with the Taliban to facilitate its full participation in future political activities. The Taliban has, however, denied that it has made such a proposition as many Afghans reacted negatively to the idea calling it a return to the country’s dark times after enduring tremendous sacrifices for so long. While holding timely and successful elections planned for July this year may be a challenging task for the Afghan government and its current weak and incompetent electoral bodies, it still can be the best possible option to show the country is moving ahead. Given the urgency of peace, if the current talks between the U.S. and the Taliban produce results, many Afghans will most likely be ready to accept another delay in elections or continue the talks with a newly elected government rather than having an interim government. Given the country’s history and the widening fractures within the Afghan political elites, it will be a mistake to expect a smooth transition beyond an interim government just like early 1990s. However, if talks do not yield results beyond March, elections will be the only and best way to go in July, yet the current momentum for achieving peace must not be lost.
6. Since President Ghani is running for a second term, he must respect the independence of the electoral bodies and avoid using state resources to manipulate the electoral timeline and process. The international community that supports and observes the Afghan elections must ensure that between now and July both the IEC and the NUG undertake the necessary measures to address the key technical and security concerns. Moreover, to increase confidence and public trust in the outcome of the election, Ghani and Abdullah’s term must officially end by April 20. During the period between April 20 to July 20, 2019, both the NUG and the international partners can focus on issues that can strengthen the capacity of the electoral bodies, in order to ensure they have sufficient technical resources and most importantly improve security and confidence in the country. Meanwhile, the most crucial issue will be to continue supporting peace initiatives—including aiming to achieve and maintain a ceasefire.

¹ SIGAR, Quarterly Reports, October 30, 2018
² World Population Review: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan-population/
cities/
³ There are areas in rural Afghanistan where no one has control. In some of these areas, the government operates for certain hours of the daylight and then Taliban emerge at night or vis versa.
⁴ Interview with Afghan Security Officials, September 2018.
⁵ Afghan government signed a peace accord with the Afghan insurgent group – Hizbi Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in September 2016 after nearly 18 months of negotiations.
⁶ While Taliban will undoubtedly continue to enjoy support of local communities in rural areas, which can be significant in case it enters talks and competes in politics, it will be viewed as the least favourable in the mainstream political scene.
⁷ UNAMA civilian casualty Report, 2018
⁸ CNN Anchor, Fareed Zakaria’s Conversation With President Ghani during World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting (2019) In Davos, Switzerland, January 25, 2019
⁹ Their recent rejection of Ghani’s call for joining the Peace Consultation Board was a clear sign of their distaste of the NUG. Following a presidential decree that formed a peace consultative board comprising of the majority of the influential political and Jehadi leaders, a majority of them rejected the offer or simply ignored it. The leaders who did not attend the board’s first meeting included former President Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, First Vice President Dustom, Professor Sayaf, Hazrat Mujaddadi, Mohammad Asif Muhsini, Mohamamd Younus Qanooni, Ismail Khan, Atta Noor, Sayed Mansoor Naderi and Sayed Hamed Gailani.

The Twin Goals of Peace and Elections in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan’s dream for a sustainable peace remains unmet since the country’s establishment. Amir Habibullah—son of Amir Abdur Rahman, the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan—recognized the need for national reform and reconciliation before his assassination nearly a century ago.

Since then, however, Afghanistan has experienced neither sustainable nor long-lasting peace. At present, the Taliban primary challenge to peace and stability in Afghanistan. All efforts at resolving the current conflict through negotiations have ended without success. These initiatives of the past seventeen years include high-level talks with the Taliban, reintegration programs, track-2, and track-1.5 diplomatic interactions, and local peace agreements. However, the fact remains that the policies mentioned above have not been implemented in a unified, continuous, and integrated manner sufficient enough to be called a process. Instead, efforts have been undertaken in isolation from one another.

My recent study on the peace process includes a nation-wide survey on the peace process for the first time in Afghanistan and indicates that all prior attempts at a negotiated peace have been failures. One might argue that judging the results of the peace process might be premature at this stage, given how the efforts are still ongoing. However, to diagnose the current status, it is important to understand public sentiment towards past efforts. More than 63.3% of the respondents opined that previous attempts at a peace settlement all failed. In this context, female respondents demonstrated a higher tendency (65.6%) than male respondents (61.6%).

Similarly, Uzbeks (73.3%), Tajiks (70.7%), and Hazaras (73.5%) demonstrated a higher tendency to say that peace efforts have failed, when compared to Pashtuns (49.3%). Multivariate analysis also shows that this association was robust and held after controlling for demographic and attitudinal factors. The curve of perception about the failure of the peace process goes up as the level of education increases. Additionally, respondents who said peace is possible were less likely (61.5%) to assess the peace process as a failure, compared to those who said peace is impossible (75.0%).

Similarly, the historical cases of peace agreements in Pakistan involving the Taliban’s sister organization, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), indicates that peace agreements with TTP are failed. The negotiations in Pakistan have some characteristics in common with the efforts made in Afghanistan. First, only a few peace agreements with TTP lasted longer than a few months. Second, after every agreement, TTP demanded further concessions. Third, the agreements led to further empowerment of the Pakistani Taliban. Bushra Gohar, a former Pakistani MP, said that Afghanistan must learn lessons from the failed agreements with Pakistani Taliban during the seventh Herat Security Dialogue. Gohar reiterated that these agreements in Pakistan only resulted in furthering the Talibanization (radicalization) of Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has become increasingly aggressive and has been demanding more concessions. Besides the withdrawal of international forces, the end goal of the Taliban is the replacement of the current political system of Afghanistan with a theocratic regime, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In contrast to the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States have taken a softer approach, and have given in to many of the Taliban’s demands. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban leadership sought amnesty for their terrorist activities. However, just a few years later the group demanded that it be recognized as a party to the conflict in Afghanistan as a legitimate actor, similar to how the PLO is regarded by the international community, rather than as a terrorist organization. Presently, the Taliban’s demands are indicative of the group’s re-radicalization. If the Taliban’s demands are agreed to, it will mean the restructuring of the entire Afghan political order that has been painstakingly constructed post-9/11.

On the contrary, the Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. have experienced setbacks regarding their negotiating position. The first setback was the violation of Afghanistan-owned and led peace process. This principle was violated with the initiation of direct talks between the U.S. and the Taliban alongside the last Moscow Format.

The violation of the three conditions for peace talks with the Taliban was the second setback. Before recent direct U.S. overtures to the Taliban, the international community and the Afghan government had three fundamental conditions for peace with the Taliban. The group must end all relations with terrorist groups; Taliban militants must lay down their arms; and the group must accept the constitutional order of Afghanistan, which has been the basis of political developments over the last several years.

While President Ashraf Ghani made an unconditional peace offer to the Taliban, the proposal highlighted four points: (a) Ensuring rights and duties of all citizens, particularly those of women, based on the constitution; (b) Accepting Afghanistan’s constitution, including its own provisions for amendments; (c) Ensuring activities of the civil services and the security and defense forces based on the law and; (d) Dismantling any armed group which is linked with foreign terrorist networks and transnational criminal organizations. However, it is unclear whether the points discussed above are preconditions or end conditions for the peace talks.

The current talks between the Taliban and the United States were initiated under circumstances where the Taliban has not accepted the legitimacy of the Afghan constitution. Furthermore, the group has failed to denounced terrorism. Similarly, the Government of Afghanistan has announced a 12-member negotiating team and a High Advisory Board for Peace. Both of these bodies substantially lack representation from civil society, women, youth, and academia. Unfortunately, the current scenario will not lead to sustainable peace.

The Peace Process in Afghanistan is a Failure was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commander Alipour—known as “Commander Sword” by his supporters because of his exploits in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan’s inland provinces—was detained because of accusations of human rights abuse. His arrest follows the detention of a powerful police chief in the North, Nizamuddin Qaisari, who was arrested by the orders of President Ashraf Ghani as part of a crackdown on unruly officers behaving like rogue militia leaders. That incident also led to violent protests.

What is worth noting in both these incidents is the overly explicit ethnic fervor shown by the supporters of both the men who were objecting their arrests. The supporters of Alipour and Qaisari were predominantly from Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups, to which Alipour and Qaisari respectively belong. The intensity of the protests forced the government to walk back Alipour’s arrest. In Qaisari’s case, indictment proceedings of current vice president and Uzbek strongman Rashid Dostum on charges of sexual abuse had to be overlooked to let him return to the country from a self-imposed exile in Turkey to pacify pro-Qaisari protests. The unrest had, by then, paralyzed daily life in many northern provinces.

Another individual with a similar reputation as a rogue official, Kandahar’s police chief Abdul Raziq, was left unscathed until he was assassinated by the Taliban in November 2018. Raziq—now hailed as a national hero after his assassination—was no martyr. Although Raziq was spared from the crackdown largely because of his role in ensuring Kandahar’s security against the Taliban—and tacit support from the United States—his being spared from arrest highlights discrepancies in the treatment of individuals of different ethnic groups.

Raziq, unlike Alipour and Qaisari, was Pashtun, as is President Ashraf Ghani and the majority of his aides and advisors. Although the men are members of different Pashtun tribal confederations—Raziq was Durani while President Ghani is Ghilzai—the incident accentuates the privilege Raziq enjoyed due to his belonging to the same ethnic group as the president.

The peace talks with the Taliban have reached a critical juncture.

Zalmai Khalilzad, the veteran Afghan-American diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, has returned as U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy to hasten along the negotiation process. During this critical phase, attention must be paid to the ethnically-charged uproar engulfing Kabul following Alipour’s arrest. This is especially important due to the ambiguity of the situation.

The content of the peace talks remains a matter of debate even between the U.S. envoy and his Afghan hosts in the National Unity Government. The opacity of the negotiations could create anxiety among sections of Afghan society that are wary of giving the Taliban too generous of a deal. The content and nature of any future negotiations remains unknown, both to those involved and to outside observers, according to the head of Washington-based American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann in a recent discussion he attended at the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies.

Bellicose and opportunistic individuals among non-Pashtuns, similar to Alipour and Qaisari, might proliferate and see a boost to their popularity if a peace deal with the Taliban and their return to political dominance in any form put their ethnic groups in potential or actual harm.

What is more at stake—apart from safeguarding the delicate ethnic balance—is sustaining the advancements made by women, the civil society, and Afghanistan’s youth in post-Bonn Agreement Afghanistan. In the words of activist and former government official Shaharzad Akbar, what should be achieved through a deal is “an expansion of opportunities, not their curtailment.” Akbar added “if today a girl in Faryab cannot go to school, if in Helmand a girl is unable to study in a university, we want them to have this opportunity. Not a girl who is already going to school in Bamyan to be deprived of this right.”

A Hastily-Negotiated Peace Deal with the Taliban is a Slippery Slope

In a recent survey of over two thousand individuals from Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 90 percent of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the Taliban’s style of governance. To many who oppose the group’s politics and ideology, the Taliban’s blend of Islamic fundamentalism and tribal hierarchy might be palatable if they form a political party similar in nature to the parties formed by other militant groups from the Soviet resistance era. However, giving over too many concessions may lead to unforeseeable backlash, including by ordinary Afghans.

Over-concession would threaten the advancements in Afghan society made possible by an international commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction that has endured for over seventeen years. The Taliban’s return through an overly-generous power-sharing arrangement made possible by a hasty deal by U.S. envoy Khalilzad—allowing for the U.S. military withdrawal the U.S. president is impatient to achieve—will likely aggravate segments of society that view the group as a tribal outfit and political misfit.

Both the Taliban’s deeds and words do little to reinforce their claims of politico-ideological reform and a move away from the dogmatism demonstrated during the late 1990s. The Taliban’s online rhetoric grows harsher the more it nears what the group perceives as a military victory against the U.S. and Afghan security forces. This perception is reinforced by the constant unidirectional plea for peace from the U.S. and the Afghan governments that emboldens the group. The Taliban swiftly condemns anyone who contradicts their official pronouncements. Early in November, at a conference in Moscow to which the Taliban sent a delegation, the group issued statements demanding respect for the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Such rhetoric should be taken into account when considering whether the Taliban has genuinely reformed.

Any peace deal should include strong guarantees to prevent the Taliban—who’ve shown a penchant for totalitarian rule—from gaining too much power. This is vital for preserving social dialogue on important issues such as women’s rights, freedom of expression, and civic equality—among all ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

A recent statement by the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) gives some reassurance as to such guarantees through an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led negotiation process. The statement reiterates respect to the Afghan Constitution as a fundamental starting point. However, U.S. envoy Khalilzad has so far ostensibly circumvented the government in Kabul by directly engaging in talks with the Taliban’s political office in Doha.

More importantly, there is suspicion regarding Khalilzad himself who is not known for being impartial in his past dealings and has previously expressed favorable views about the Taliban. Members of the main anti-Taliban group, the Northern Alliance, might be reluctant to cooperate with him because Khalilzad has made efforts to politically sideline the group in the past—about which he elaborates effusively in his book, The Envoy. At present, sitting with Khalilzad would be akin to a “fool me twice” scenario for most of these actors.

The U.S. strategy should be depersonalized—with an impartial diplomat essential for doing so. Khalilzad himself could be seen as ethnically biased as he belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group. Any deal struck by Khalilzad, even if it is of sound basis, will be treated with suspicion by other Afghan ethnic groups. Further, nothing endangers the credibility of a peace deal more than a prevailing doubt concerning the intentions behind it. Replacing Khalilzad as U.S. envoy would go a long way in inviting confidence that the interests of all ethnic groups will be taken into consideration.

Projecting respect for equality is paramount to ensure the implementation of a sustainable agreement that won’t result in a civil war in the future. If any one ethnic group is perceived as receiving special treatment, feelings of insecurity will increase among the other groups. Historically—in Afghanistan and throughout the world—such insecurity has led to armed resistance and violence. Should history repeat itself in this way, the current stalemate with the Taliban may be seen in a nostalgic light.

The Political Ramifications of Trump’s Haste to Make Peace with the Taliban was originally published on Global Security Review.

Afghanistan has been plagued with four decades of war and conflict. Afghans are understandably wary of any notion of manufactured peace. It has been understood, to varying degrees, that a cessation of the ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the elected Afghan government can only be brought about by both parties coming to the negotiating table.

In early November in Moscow, Russia came closer to achieving this than any state has previously. The Kremlin hosted representatives from the Taliban and the High Peace Council—the committee formed to oversee such talks on behalf of the Afghan government. Among the representatives in attendance was an observer from the United States embassy, in addition to delegates from Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. Despite that these latest talks resulted in no concluding successes, the fact that both major parties merely came to the negotiating together was a success in-and-of-itself and certainly indicates a more productive dialogue going forward into 2019.

Despite the initial optimism going forward, however, these talks highlight a more disturbing trend, not just for Afghanistan, but for the rules-based global order; revisionism in U.S. foreign policy. Attempts to bring in the less hard-line members of the Taliban was a direct result of President Obama’s Afghan policy in 2011, the strategy was jointly implemented and overseen by the U.S. State Department and General Stanley McCrystal, then-commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has shifted considerably.

The shift in U.S. policy from the policy initiatives of the Bush administration resulted in several near-breakthroughs throughout the campaign, but the Taliban were reluctant to engage with both the U.S. and Afghan governments. The opening of a regional Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar, with US support, was a seen as a positive sign; that the Taliban were receptive to potential discussions.

Before anything more meaningful could take place, however, then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that there would be no talks with the Taliban. The reasoning, according to Karzai, was that the Doha office was flying the Taliban flag with signs on the building’s exterior proclaiming the office to represent the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; a signal not lost on the Afghan government. The perceived representation of Taliban legitimacy, shifting the narrative of the group from terrorists to a potentially legitimate state actor, was an affront to Karzai and the talks stalled shortly thereafter.

Despite the Afghan government’s lack of progress, there have been successful attempts by the U.S. to engage the Taliban through the Taliban’s presence in Doha. These efforts yielded tangible results. The office was instrumental in a 2014 prisoner exchange, when the U.S. transferred five Taliban fighters from Guantánamo Bay to Qatar, in return for captured U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.

Peace talks seemed to resurface over the next few years, culminating in 2018 when U.S. government officials and a Taliban spokesperson acknowledged that bilateral talks had taken place at Doha. This represented a fundamental change in U.S. policy for Afghanistan, which previously adhered to the long-held Afghan government wish that talks, no matter how informal, must include representatives from Kabul.

The Taliban, for their part, have consistently rebuked Kabul’s wishes, maintaining that it fails to acknowledge both the Karzai and subsequent Ghani governments as legitimate. Whilst the Taliban spokesperson described the talks in early 2018 with the US as “very helpful”, Trump has since angered the Quetta Shura by insisting to President Ghani that the Doha office ought to be closed; a move Ghani agrees with in principal, but one in which Qatar is unlikely to relent.

Moscow perceives itself as exploiting receding U.S. influence in the Middle East.

Despite the small but consistent glimmers of hope for a peaceful settlement under President Obama, the balance of power in the peace and reconciliation talks has shifted from Washington to Moscow under President Trump. This shift appears to be the result of two factors: The first is a long-term covert operation conducted by Russia in support of the Taliban, and the second being a withdrawal of U.S. influence and leadership in the region at a time where the U.S. could have been positioned in a way to be the prime actor in any peace talks, enabling Washington to set the conditions for moving forward.

The lack of clear Western leadership on the issue of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan has opened up a window through which Moscow has positioned itself as the key orchestrator of the talks. Paradoxically, the mujahadeen’s former enemy has become its chaperone and patron.

There has been wide speculation in the West that Moscow has been, at worst, supplying arms and cash to the insurgents, or, at best, facilitating their supply through Central Asia into Afghanistan. The Kremlin benefits from these operations as they ensure picking rights at the negotiating table, whilst simultaneously being taking care to avoid a fierce response from the United States. Of course, these allegations have been repeatedly denied by officials at the highest levels of the Kremlin.

At a time when the future of the rules-based global order seems no longer guaranteed, and with the liberal values of the West under threat, the U.S. and its coalition partners were gifted with an opportunity to shape the outcome of peace talks with the Taliban. Instead, Washington has reversed its position and allowed for Moscow to assume the leading role.

As a result of this geopolitical disruption, new questions arise. It remains to be seen how Moscow’s engagement will shape the talks going forward, and how this will this affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the broader region. If Russia is permitted to return to Afghanistan as a key player, facilitating the Taliban’s return to domestic politics, it will only serve to embolden an expansionist and revisionist Russian state in its campaign to degrade the rules-based, liberal world order.

Russia Returns to Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.