Strategic Drivers

There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in Gaza and its persistent pressure on disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.

Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable rifts in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.

Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.

Operational Indicators of Preparation

Mossad has already intensified intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from within Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.

Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force regeneration, given the apparent contradiction between political calls for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.

At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s formation of a National Defense Council under Ali Larijani and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.

Political Leverage and Timing

US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.

Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is coordinating with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.

The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept

Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.

However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah vowed not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.

International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment

Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.

Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.

Forecast and Likely Outcomes

Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.

If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.

While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.

Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.

Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for Global Security Review.

Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains uncertain, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.

In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel launched Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.

This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.

Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos raided an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also captured Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.

Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency stated that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.

However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.

Degraded Proxy Capabilities

In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.

Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.

Israeli operations significantly degraded Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian S-300s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.

Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire economic situation of the country as well as the increasing repression by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.

Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, energy shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.

That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.

Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the installation of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in minimal progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.

Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.

Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.

While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.

Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.

Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.

Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

August 2, 1990: the end of the Cold War and the revival of imperialism in the Middle East. American troops have indisputably experienced the darkest bounds of these wars. Still, no one warned us about the consequences that three decades of missile launches would have on Middle Eastern civilians, their culture, and quotidian lives — except renowned philosopher, diplomat, and scholar — Charles Malik. The former UN Diplomat and General Assembly President faithfully preached for an autonomous  Near East and disapproved of any external engagement that deterred it.

To understand why foreign interference hinders the chances of peace and prosperity in the region, we must first acknowledge its significant effects on its indispensable assets. Malik humbly reminded us that all of humanity culturally and genetically originated within a 900-mile radius around Jerusalem, Beirut, or Damascus — including modern-day cities of Alexandria, Constantinople (Istanbul), Athens, and Mecca. In a 1952 Foreign Affairs piece, he referred to the complex region as the “Cradle of Civilization,” rich in ancient history, culture, and common agricultural staples which advanced human progress.^[1] Malik aimed to synthesize two perspectives that many considered antithetical; the West and Near East are deeply linked, a departure from the perspective that the two civilizations would always clash. Since Malik’s era, the modern dichotomy exacerbated from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism. In our post-9/11 minds, the West seems to perceive the other to be unsaveable.

Malik lived through arguably the most volatile decades of the 1900s, coming from a region stitched with eternal violence and genocide. His bold ideas were unique and challenged powers who sought to define borders according to their interests, including the British and French mandates for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Despite his Christian Orthodox faith, he sided against the British, another Christian Empire, and their century-long occupation that hindered Egyptian sovereignty and its potential to lead the region into a new era of peace and security. Malik particularly disapproved of France’s influence on his Lebanese homeland and the post-World War I Sykes-Picot Agreement that essentially placed its population (along with Syria) under French social and economic control. Though Lebanon declared its independence in 1926, the struggle for complete autonomy would last an additional twenty years.

As Lebanese Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, the thriving scholar embraced his political inclinations when he vocalized without hesitation his disapproval of global powers’ “formula after formula to reconcile imperial interests” and advocated for Arab independence from the West.^[2] Malik promoted Lebanon and the rest of the Near East’s autonomy through his fight for human rights and fundamental freedoms of conscience, reason, and liberal expression. One of his most celebrated contributions to this cause was the adoption of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights when he did not hesitate to vocalize the importance of the rightful hegemony of Cradle countries from external interference.

Malik did not believe in the UN as a replacement authority to fill the vacuum of power within the Post-WWII Cradle of Civilization, rather as the premier mechanism to display how humanity could fulfill its highest ideals. Instead, he looked to the West’s major thinkers and events as a blueprint, cultivating its highest ideas, such as natural rights from the Cradle’s Abrahamic faiths.

Yet much to Malik’s detriment, the British would return for Suez, France would come back for the Levant, the US would send arms to the Israelis, and even the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of various regimes. Nevertheless, Malik still hoped that the Cradle could progress economically, socially, and politically without external interference.

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According to Malik, the American-led West became a shell of what it once was in the name of countering communism. The West had a blueprint for multi-societal civilization to prosper under liberty. Still, it traded its core virtuous idea for short-term gains over lands that it had no legitimate claim to against a rival who also had no legitimate claim.

“The Near East mirrors, by deposit or reaction, the problems of the world. Whatever face the Near East shows today is fundamentally a face the West has shown it; and whatever weaknesses the Near East expresses are largely the weaknesses of the West. Thus, in a deeper sense of the problem of the Near East is the problem of the West.”  – “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

The West’s previously enlightened pursuit of reason, liberty, and progress is expelled in the apparent chase for oriental treasures in the name of power, profit, and geopolitical chess. The above quote, though written decades ago, can be applied today, perhaps even more appropriate. Yet what is most profound, as Malik would point out today, the Post-Cold War West, in search of another superpower foe, thought it could revamp a superpower region, a land which the scholar remarked as “eternal,” the Cradle of Civilization.

Malik’s fight for the right to a peaceful and prosperous life for the Near East is nowhere near its end. Humanity’s genesis from this exceptional region makes today’s Near East issues even more relevant to our daily lives. The West has enjoyed the Cradle’s food, dance, entertainment, and language for decades, romanticizing the unique aspects of its culture while ignoring its most crucial humanitarian issues, such as the genocide and banishment of minorities like the Assyrians.

As Malik would argue today, only when we realize that our connection to its thousands of years of war, migration, and progress lies deeper than the pursuit of superficialities such as power, natural resources, and profit will we realize the staunch impact that our passiveness wields on these pressing conflicts that ultimately affect us all? Charles Malik did not use the term “Cradle of Civilization” lightly, and it is up to us to vindicate its use.

^[1]  Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

^[2] Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

Middle East Versus the West? How a UN Diplomat’s Christian Perspective Resonates with Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote a letter to President Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) asking that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) be designated as a “terrorist organization” in a reciprocal move, a measure already promised by some Iranian lawmakers. Shortly after that, Iran’s SNSC stated that the U.S. government was a “sponsor of terrorism” and designated CENTCOM and all affiliated forces as “terrorist groups.” Now, a new wave of tensions could spread through the region.

Too big a bite for CENTCOM to chew?

Many have argued that the U.S. is retreating from its role as a world leader and is moving in a more isolationist direction. Others point to a need to reconcentrate U.S. resources in response to the oft-mentioned return to “great power competition.”

China—and Russia, to a lesser extent—are engaged in expansionist agendas as the U.S. has been preoccupied with events in the Middle East. Many believe the time, energy, and money the U.S. has spent for nearly two decades in the region would have been better spent countering the influence of the country’s real revisionist threats.

While the U.S. remains involved in a “forever war” in Afghanistan, and with Iraq still reeling from the aftermath of sectarian conflict and ISIS, the U.S. increasingly seems bent on raising tensions with Iran in light of the recent IRGC designation as a terrorist group.

The U.S. presence and the Shiite Crescent

The Iranian proxies in Iraq, known in general as “حشد الشعبی” or Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), whose commanders such as Hadi Al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have close ties to IRGC—and Qasem Soleimani, in particular. In the aftermath of fighting ISIS in Iraq, the PMU is now better organized and equipped.

With the recent designation, these groups, with their close ties to their Shiite Iranian allies, can undoubtedly escalate the level of violence in Iraq. According to The New York Times, the recent move could even push the Iraqi parliamentarians to fuel a proposal limiting the movement and actions of the approximately 5,000 American troops in Iraq.

Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, is arguably the most loyal Iranian proxy group. With approximately 45,000 fighters, having alongside the IRGC in Syria, the Hezbollah militia has proven itself to be a capable force in implementing Tehran’s regional strategy. The PMU and Hezbollah—essentially two foreign branches of the IRGC—will pose challenges for the U.S. forces. While the United States would undoubtedly emerge tactically victorious from any conflict in the Middle East, two questions remain: at what cost, and after how long?

Designating the IRGC as a Terrorist Group: Consequences for U.S. Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the threat from the extremist Sunni group dwindled, Iran-backed militias have been strengthening their foothold in the region. In Iraq, Tehran is working to integrate Shia militia forces into the Iraqi military, cementing its influence over Baghdad. In Syria, the Iranians are reinforcing militia groups as they attempt to cement their presence in the country as a deterrent to Israel. Additionally, Iran is supplying Hezbollah with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and precision-guided missiles.

However, Iran is not without internal complication. Over the past year, the value of the Iranian Rial has decreased substantially and the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and its unilateral re-imposition of sanctions have only exacerbated Iran’s economic troubles. Furthermore, there is a tug-of-war brewing in Tehran between members of the ruling class aligned with President Hassan Rouhani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the reformation of the Iranian economy. In short, domestic affairs and declining revenues will constrain Iranian efforts to strengthen its regional influence in 2019.

Tehran’s Problems Are Washington’s Opportunity

For some countries, however, Iran’s troubles could be perceived as a strategic opportunity. As 2019 progresses, the U.S. will enlist existing allies and forge new partnerships to contain Tehran’s expansionist aims. One such coalition, albeit still in the making, is the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), also known as the “Arab NATO.” Another group of partners is the Kurdish militias in Northwest Iran, with whom the U.S. has cultivated solid ties. Washington could also encourage insurgencies in the Iranian regions of Khuzestan and Baluchistan.

To effectively push back against Iran, however, the U.S. must work alongside allies with which its interests are closely aligned. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates will all readily endorse activities designed to constrain Iranian influence, but will first have to overcome decades of mistrust and hostility.

For the time being, each state will have its own issues to deal with. For Saudi Arabia, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi will cast a long shadow over the ruling House of Saud. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has come under increasing international scrutiny, but any major change in the status quo is unlikely. Beyond the Crown Prince, Riyadh will strive to make progress on its Saudi Vision 2030 initiative, which the government expects will enable it to ease up on austerity measures and promote economic activity in the non-oil sectors.

An End to the War in Yemen?

To the south of Saudi Arabia is the ongoing civil war in Yemen. The conflict has proved increasingly costly for the involved powers, not to mention the millions of civilians who lack access to food, shelter, and medicine. In November 2018, the U.S. Senate voted to move ahead with a bill that, if passed, would end Washington’s involvement in the Yemen War.

Now that the Democratic Party has assumed control of the House of Representatives, the pressure to end the conflict will only increase. In Tehran, there are calls for the country to negotiate with the United States for sanctions relief in exchange for a scaling-down of Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen.

2019 could present an opportunity for the U.S. and Iran to de-escalate tensions, should the interests of both countries align enough—especially when it comes to Yemen. Should a successful agreement be implemented regarding Iranian involvement in Yemen’s civil war, it could serve as a jumping-off point for further engagement.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

In the Levant, Hezbollah has acquired precision-guided munitions from Iran and manufactures them in Lebanon.  For Israel, this presents a strategic threat. Many Israeli policymakers believe a preventive strike against Hezbollah while the group remains preoccupied with the conflict in Syria is necessary.

As such, there is the possibility that, at some point in 2019, Israel conducts one or more offensives against Iranian-Hezbollah supply lines in Syria and Lebanon. Such a strike would likely target storage and manufacturing facilities for guided munitions. In doing so, however, Israel will have to ensure it avoids inadvertently targeting Russian or Turkish assets in an increasingly crowded battle space in Syria.

Setting aside the fact that such a preventive offensive against targets in Lebanon would be a violation of international law, airstrikes alone would likely fail to achieve any meaningful objectives. In the last war with Hezbollah, Israel inflicted enormous damage in Lebanon but ultimately failed to achieve its objective. A similar outcome is likely for a coming air offensive unless Israel is willing to commit ground forces as well.

U.S. Troops to Withdraw from Syria?

In Syria, the war appears to be entering its final phases. In December of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria. However, no deadline or timeline was given for the departure, which will ultimately grant a strategic advantage to Russia and Iran, as well as possibly allow for a reemergence of ISIS or a similar Sunni extremist group.

In the Syrian province of Idlib, the situation will remain particularly volatile throughout 2019. Turkey has pledged to increase its engagement in the region and commit troops. However, there is little agreement between individual Turkish-backed groups which has resulted in growing infighting. At the same time, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has vowed to retake the province, even as Russian, Iranian, Syrian, Kurdish, French, and American forces are situated nearby. Given the number of opposing forces in such a congested area, there is a risk for a rapid and inadvertent escalation.

Managing Tensions Between Turkey and the U.S.

With regards to tensions between Turkey and the United States, the two will likely come to some sort of agreement over how best to proceed in Syria. Although Ankara and Washington are both hostile to Assad, the two disagree over the next phase of the conflict. Washington sees combating ISIS as the top priority; the closest partner for the U.S in this effort mission is the YPG, a Kurdish militant group currently in control of Northeast Syria. Turkey, which sees the YPG as a terrorist group and a threat to Turkish national security, seeks to deny the YPG a safe haven in Syria.

To settle these differences, Turkey and the United States will have to negotiate an agreement. Washington is unlikely to turn its back on the Syrian Kurds as long as ISIS remains a credible threat. Rather, it will likely make minor territorial concessions to Turkey without undermining the security of the Syrian Kurdish militias. President Erdogan’s proposal for a “safe zone” along the Turkish border and in territories controlled by the YPG is one arrangement being considered.

Regardless, Turkey can’t simply walk away from the United States. It depends on the U.S. to balance against Russia. Likewise, the United States needs to maintain its relationship with Turkey, a NATO ally, to counter Russia in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, especially since tensions between Moscow and Washington will likely worsen throughout 2019.

The Middle East will remain susceptible to foreign influence and prone to conflict throughout 2019. The primary catalyst being heightened competition between great powers, along with competition between regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran. Furthermore,  an increasing propensity for unilateral action by a number of players in the region increases the chance for a substantial escalation.

Conflict and Competition in the Middle East Will Persist Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sasna Tsrer, the gunmen behind a bloody 2016 rebellion, are forming a political party and positioning themselves as allies of the new government.

Among liberals, Sasna Tsrer may have the reputation of being a group of violent radicals, but in Armenia’s flamboyant political culture, its leader Jirair Sefilian presents a markedly sober image.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a young liberal democrat, recently threatened to smash his opponents against the wall. The leader of the second-largest faction in Parliament, oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, is a former world arm-wrestling champion who keeps a private zoo with lions. His party chair, Naira Zohrabyan, recently wore a Dolce & Gabbana dress in a farfalle pasta print to the floor of parliament. In Armenia, politics is one the most popular forms of entertainment, on par with football and Bollywood.

In this environment, Sefilian’s self-disciplined figure stands apart. The Lebanese-born military-commander-turned-opposition-figure is the leader of Armenia’s newest political party, Sasna Tsrer. The party takes its name from one of the most notorious episodes in Armenia’s recent history: the 2016 drama in which a group of armed men close to Sefilianseized a police station in Yerevan and held officers hostage; several were killed.

Belying that violent heritage, however, Sefilian himself presents a calm, measured image. He is soft-spoken, and, outside of TV studios – where he appears in a formal suit and white shirt – his sense of fashion can best be described as normcore, a “dad style” channeling deep indifference to all things sartorial.

On TV, Sefilian has two modes: When he speaks about the former ruling regime of presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan – his sworn enemies – he is serious, but never raises his voice. When interviewers ask about his own views and plans, he responds with a wry half-smile.

His plans now include leaving his direct-action days behind and running for office. Sasna Tsrer intends to hold its founding convention on September 29, after which it will formally file the paperwork to become a registered political party. It is a development that would have been impossible to imagine before April, when massive street protests led to Sargsyan stepping down after 10 years in office, and propelled Pashinyan into power.

What significance Sasna Tsrer will have is up for debate. Sefilian and his allies point to fundraising success, fueled by small donors, and a recent, enthusiastic town hall meeting in the city of Martuni, to indicate that they are poised to be the second-leading political force in the country behind Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. “Even our worst enemies consider us number two,” said Garo Yegnukian, a lawyer and activist who is also one of Sasna Tsrer’s leaders.

But others are skeptical. “I think they’re overestimating themselves,” said Mikayel Zolyan, a Yerevan-based political analyst. “It’s not 2016 anymore, when they enjoyed popular support. I don’t expect them to get more than 5 to 10 percent of the vote” in upcoming parliamentary elections.

But Zolyan added that the emergence of Sasna Tsrer as a political party still portends significant political shifts in Armenia. “First, it’s always better to coopt hardliners into the system then leave them out of it,” he said. “Also, Sasna Tsrer brands itself as a force defending Armenia’s sovereignty, and that includes standing up to Russia. This can be convenient for Pashinyan. There’s already a number of pro-Russian actors. [..] If there’s no counterweight, Pashinyan could be forced to make concessions to Moscow.” With Sasna Tsrer in parliament, though, “Pashinyan can become a centrist figure.”

Hrachya Arzumanian, a Stepanakert-based political scientist, echoed this forecast. During negotiations with Russia, Pashinyan “can always point out that there are more radical political forces,” Arzumanian wrote on Facebook. “That gives the new prime minister room for maneuver. He wouldn’t need to advocate radical views and approaches. Sasna Tsrer will do that.”

From Beirut to Karabakh

Sefilian was born in Lebanon in 1967 and fought with Armenian militias in the civil war there. Sefilian still speaks Western Armenian, the dialect spoken among descendants of the Armenians who lived in what is now Turkey; Eastern Armenian is the language spoken in modern Armenia. To Yerevantsis, the dialect sounds like a Southern U.S. drawl to a Londoner: comprehensible, yet deeply foreign. (As a compromise, he writes Facebook posts in Eastern Armenian.)

In 1990, as part of the nationalist group Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Dashnaktsutyun, he went to Armenia, which was just embarking on a war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. With his military experience from Lebanon he served as a military trainer, teaching soldiering basics to local volunteers.

That war, ultimately won by the Armenian side, produced the first generation of post-Soviet Armenian political leaders: former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan were both prominent Karabakh leaders. Even the current Armenian Church leader, Catholicos Karekin II, as a young bishop helped raise funds (and, some say, supply arms) for the cause.

While his former comrades-in-arms were capitalizing on their credentials and concentrating power, Sefilian found himself in a new struggle, this time a political one. “I never wanted to be a politician. I don’t enjoy politics,” Sefilian told Eurasianet in an interview. “But at some point I realized that the country needs people like me to go into politics.”

After Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire in 1994, Sefilian returned to Beirut. He was unable to return to Armenia for several years because the country’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, had banned the ARF. In 1997 he made it back and upon his return he served briefly as a brigade commander in the de facto armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Armenian government was actively working on a peace deal with Baku, which would include the return to Azerbaijan of some territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that the Armenian forces also had seized during the war. Sefilian acted as spoiler, coordinating two initiatives: Defense of the Liberated Territories and Union of Armenian Volunteers. Both sought to mobilize Armenian society against any compromise. “We made our concession to Azerbaijan in 1994, when we stopped our offensive on its request. Otherwise that state would have already fallen apart,” he said at the time. He coordinated efforts to settle the territories in question with ethnic Armenians. He also tried to mobilize Armenians inJavakheti, a region in Georgia with a large ethnic-Armenian population.

Together with a close circle of like-minded nationalist activists, in 2012 Sefilian created a movement they called Founding Parliament, holding hundreds of rallies and traveling the country demanding regime change. While still focused on Karabakh, he also opposed Sargsyan’s domestic agenda, protesting widespread voter fraud and corruption. Successive governments responded by cracking down, and Sefilian has on and off spent more than three and a half of the last 12 years in prison.

Hardline figure

Throughout more than a decade of political activism, Sefilian had repeatedly said that he opposed the use of force. But his long years of nonviolent activism gained him only scant support in the country.

That all changed in July 2016. In April of that year, aresumption of fighting with Azerbaijan resulted in the deaths of 94 Armenian soldiers, including volunteers and reservists. Armenian forces lost three square miles of territory – insignificant strategically, but as the first substantial Azerbaijani advance since 1994, it was a psychological blow. Sefilian accused Sargsyan of downplaying the defeat. (The president said the lost territories were “of no strategic importance.”)

Sargsyan responded by cracking down. Sefilian was arrested and sentenced to over a decade in prison on charges of planning a coup and possessing illegal weapons. Pashinyan, at the time an opposition member of parliament, called the ruling a “a bogus verdict” and argued that Sefilian was a political prisoner.

A month later, an armed group of Sefilian allies calling itself Sasna Tsrer – “the Daredevils of Sassoun,” after an ancient Armenian epic – seized a police precinct on the outskirts of Yerevan. The gunmen demanded that Sargsyan step down. In the scuffle, they allegedly killed three policemen. The group admits to killing only one, saying he had opened fire after disregarding their calls to drop his weapon. (Last week, the father of one of the other officers said that he believed it was the police who killed his son, and not Sasna Tsrer.)

Although the gunmen claimed to act independently from Sefilian, they were known to be close to him and tried to negotiate his release while holding policemen hostage. As a result, his political allies suffered. “That was a weak argument, and the regime used the occasion to arrest me,” Andrias Ghukasyan, one of Sefilian’s former allies and founder of the Armenian Constructive Party, told Eurasianet.

During the crisis, Ghukasyan spoke at rallies in support of the takeover. At one rally, he said that “Yerevan showed that our society supports Sasna Tsrer’s demands. [… Sasna Tsrer] know what they are doing and how they’re doing it. […] Don’t forget who they are. Don’t worry, trust them. I trust them.”

In an interview, however, he expressed regret at his cooperation. Ghukasyan, along with dissidents Paruyr Hayrikyan and Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovannisian had made an alliance in 2015 to try to stop a controversial rewriting of the constitution, but they pledged to oppose the government without violence.

“The police precinct takeover was a violation of our agreement,” he told Eurasianet. Ghukasyan spent nearly two years in prison as a result. “National-revolutionary forces of a particular Middle-Eastern blend are always ready to sacrifice themselves, but also to sacrifice others.”

Today Sefilian embraces the legacy of the takeover. He is confident the gunmen eventually will be acquitted, arguing that their actions qualify as “rebellion against tyranny and oppression” as envisaged in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Asked about those who died as a result, he has said, “Serzh Sargsyan is guilty of bloodshed. This tragedy happened because of the oppressive system he built.”

Uncompromising positions

Since Pashinyan came to power, Sasna Tsrer’s leadership has consistently endorsed the new government and offered full cooperation. But they also have called on Pashinyan to dismiss the constitution, dissolve parliament and form a new provisional government, of which they would be part. In terms of geopolitics, Sasna Tsrer aims to launch a sort of Armexit, or “the liberation of Armenia from Russian colonial rule,” withdrawing Armenia from Russia-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. “Russia can’t be our strategic ally. We can’t be allies. Armenians should understand that,” Sefilian said.

The group instead advocates for a strategic alliance with the West. Armenia should “ally itself with the United States and the West and regain its traditional role as a bridge-mediator for Iran and the region,” the group’s current four leaders said in a 2017 statement. They, however, said they opposed Armenia joining NATO.

The movement also holds irredentist views about Armenia’s borders. Sefilian said that he envisages an Armenia that includes the territories of Nakhichevan – an exclave of Azerbaijan that once had a large Armenian population – and eastern Turkey, or “Western Armenia,” the territories formerly inhabited by Armenians until the genocide of 1915.

Sefilian says that is a long-term goal, but some of his erstwhile allies aren’t so sure. Sasna Tsrer “cannot openly promote launching a new war, so they try to mask their rhetoric in order to avoid looking like the war party,” Ghukasyan said.

“Sasna Tsrer fits into the framework of populist parties on the rise in Europe, sometimes presenting a mix of leftist and nationalist ideas, but in general right-wing,” said Zolyan, the political analyst in Yerevan.

War hero, illegal alien

One significant obstacle to Sefilian’s political ambitions: his citizenship.

Born a Lebanese citizen, he has applied for Armenian citizenship repeatedly since 2003, but says his applications are always denied without explanation. His applications for permanent residency also have been denied, and technically he lives in Armenia illegally. He believes the authorities have been waiting for him to leave the country and then bar him from re-entering. So he hasn’t left Armenia in 18 years.

Sefilian reapplied for citizenship on August 1. In his application, he asked for it to be granted retroactively, overturning previous presidents’ decisions. “Armenian law doesn’t include a provision on issuing citizenship retroactively – but it doesn’t bar authorities from doing so, either,” Yegnukian said.

The decision will be crucial to his political career – one needs to be an Armenian citizen and permanent resident for at least four years to run for parliament. Thus, any outcome of Sefilian’s petition will have political ramifications. Pashinyan has not been shy about awarding Armenian citizenship to other prominent ethnic Armenians, including the Canadian-Armenian actress-director power couple Arsinee Khanjian and Atom Egoyan.

Neither an ally nor a competitor

Pashinyan and Sefilian had a common enemy in the old regime and have made a number of cooperating gestures over the years. In 2008, when Pashinyan first took the national stage to lead protests against fraudulent elections, Sefilian supported his cause in an open letter from jail. But the two have never directly collaborated.

“It was always a respectful attitude from both sides as far as I can remember,” Sefilian said. “We didn’t publicly disagree in those years, but rather tried to understand each other.”

When the two disagreed, it was about tactics rather than principles, Sefilian said. “There are two ways to make change – through elections and through civil disobedience,” Sefilian said. “We supported the second option. Nikol [Pashinyan] always tried to convince us that no, it’s possible through elections. Time proved that it was only possible through civil disobedience. Fortunately, Nikol succeeded in it.”

Sefilian was released this June with the help of a bond signed by thirteen members of parliament, including one member of Pashinyan’s party. Sefilian said he has met Pashinyan once since his release, and there have been a few occasions when he had to call the prime minister’s aides.

At least one vocal Sasna Tsrer supporter now has a high-level government job: David Sanasaryan led rallies in support of the group in 2016 and spent a month in jail as a result. He now heads the State Oversight Service, a watchdog that reports to the prime minister’s office.

“We have a constructive relationship,” Sefilian said of Pashinyan. “But we hope to deepen our relationships. We have to be together until there is a new, legitimate National Assembly.”

He also lobbied for a Sasna Tsrer role in the new cabinet. “We’re ready to be engaged,” Sefilian said, adding that the group envisions itself in the “power bloc” that includes the military, police, and the National Security Service. Another Sasna Tsrer leader, Colonel Varujan Avetisyan, served in different roles at the Ministry of Defense from 1994 to 2013, including as deputy chief of the ministry’s Defense Policy Center.

A spokesperson for Civil Contract told Eurasianet that “the question of collaboration hasn’t been discussed.” An op-ed in TASS, the Russian state news agency, suggested that if Sasna Tsrer joined the cabinet, it could be interpreted as “a move against Russia, which would be followed by an immediate response from Moscow.”

“The fact that he hasn’t stretched out his hand means that he’s afraid of the competition,” said Yegnukian, referring to Pashinyan.

Pashinyan is proving to be a troublesome ally. Not only is he reluctant to engage with new partners, but he has alienated some in his parliamentary faction, who in response have publicly criticized him and hinted that they may withdraw their support.

“Pashinyan now sees other political leaders as not worthy of partnering with him, as marginal figures,” Karen Aghekian, an editor for Hamatext, an online magazine covering Armenian politics, told Eurasianet.

But in the case that Pashinyan decides to build a coalition, it’s still highly unlikely he would invite Sasna Tsrer, Aghekian said. “I don’t think that of all parties, Nikol would associate himself with them. First, they’re vehemently anti-Russian, and some voters reject them based on the bloodshed,” he said, noting that Pashinyan had crusaded against Kocharyan for his use of violence in breaking up protests in 2008, making it tricky to fully embrace Sasna Tsrer.

Political scientist Zolyan agreed: “I think cooperation with Nikol is unrealistic. [Pashinyan] has little to gain from such a partnership.”

With or without Pashinyan, Sasna Tsrer’s leaders say they’re strategizing for the long term. Their headquarters in downtown Yerevan is open for visitors. One recent visitor, a Western official, said the bustling office “felt like Smolny in 1917.” The Smolny Institute was the Bolshevik headquarters during the Russian Revolution.

Armenia’s Hardliners Try Going Mainstream was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commenting on competitive interactions between a weak and a strong state, Thucydides is reported to have stated: “The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”  In assessing Iran’s strategic interactions with the United States, this statement is worth considering.

The United States and Iran have been enemies since the onslaught of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that ousted “America’s Shah” and transformed that country into the Islamic Republic it is today. Even though Iran is a weak power compared to the United States, it is not entirely without options. Some of these options appear promising, in terms of sustaining Iran’s strategic presence throughout the Middle East at a time when the United States is busy lowering its presence in that and other regions.

Weak but not without options

The Arab world post-Arab Spring has become a different region in terms of the ability of several major Arab states to manage the authoritarian systems within their borders.  Libya and Tunisia emerged as weak states—indeed, Libya is frequently depicted as a failed state—regarding political stability.

Gone is the iron rule of both Muammar Qaddafi and Zine al Abideen Bin Ali, which, if nothing else, guaranteed regime stability in Libya and Tunisia respectively.  Even though Egypt reverted to a military rule by ousting the democratically elected president of the Ikhwan, Mohammad Morsi, the political future of that country remains uncertain, with constant skirmishes between the military and ISIS.

In the Persian Gulf region, the Arab monarchies prevailed against any attempts of regime change by reformist/revolutionary groups but remained nervous about the prospects of their long-term survival.  The brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was destroyed by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  What emerged in its place is a weak country, ridden with mounting sectarian Shia-Sunni conflict, and conflict stemming from the mounting aspirations of the Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan.

As a Shia power inside a majority Shia Iraq (where about 65 percent of the population is Shia), Iran enjoys an advantage that no Arab state—all of which are majority Sunni—can match.  In fact, an argument can be made that the Wahhabi ideology of Sunni Islam, assiduously promoted by Saudi Arabia, has emerged as a significant impediment against the escalation of Sunni political influence inside Iraq and Lebanon.

The post-Saddam Iraq also became a place where Iran exercised its powerful presence and influence.  In that capacity, the pro-Iranian militias (aka Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) or Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), along with Sunni militant groups, did their very best to make America’s military presence inside Iraq a highly dangerous option.

When U.S. forces pulled out in 2011, Iran’s emergence as a major power inside Iraq became an irreversible reality.  Even after the decision of President Barack Obama to send some American troops back to Iraq to fight the Islamic State (aka ISIS), Iran’s presence and influence in Iraq remained unaffected.

In Lebanon (where Shias are generally regarded as having a substantial, if not a majority, presence), Iran has equally used Hezbollah adroitly to ensure that the Shia population remains a major player in the sustained power game among the Sunnis, Christians, and Shias.  As a paramilitary/political entity, Hezbollah also makes sure that the Sunni-dominated government in Lebanon is never allowed to have an inordinate influence over the Shia population.

Hezbollah’s role in bringing about the withdrawal of the Israeli occupiers from Lebanon in 2000 was an event that made it a major nationalistic paramilitary/political entity. Then in 2006, Hezbollah’s success in challenging the superiority of Israel’s military and surviving the intense bombing of its forces turned out to be another event enhancing its prestige in the Arab world.  Iran also accrued considerable strategic influence from both of these developments.

Iran’s decision to participate as a pro-Assad entity in the Syrian civil war is a decision whose long-term impact in the Levant will be felt for years to come.  As a pro-Syrian force, all Iran has to do is to ensure the sustenance of the Assad regime, while eradicating all anti-Assad militant forces, especially ISIS.

Advantages stemming from Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict

Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict in September 2015 brought about three developments, all of which were promising for Iran.  First, Russia’s entry elevated the Syrian conflict to the level of great power maneuvering, since the U.S. and its friendly forces were also present in Syria fighting ISIS.  Second, as an important supporter of Assad, Iran expected to have a major say in the future great power endeavors to resolve the Syrian conflict.  Third, Russia’s decision to target ISIS (along with other pro-American Islamist forces, even though Moscow never admitted targeting those forces) was to make Iran’s fight against ISIS considerably easier.

What also helped Russia is the fact that neither President Obama nor President Trump spent any effort in targeting the Assad regime. After ousting Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya from power, the United States seemed to have realized how important it was to leave the Middle Eastern autocrats in power.  The alternative to their rule was nothing but prolonged chaos, as was amply demonstrated in Iraq and Libya.  Russia not only understood that reality but was determined to exploit its strategic presence and influence in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Under the Trump administration, the United States, by deciding to spend its military resources on eradicating ISIS from Iraq (and later from Syria) has also unwittingly strengthened Iran’s presence as a power broker inside that country.

U.S.-Iran nuclear deal

Iran’s nuclear research program had the making of an ambitious plan for its eventual emergence as a nuclear weapons power.  Even though it vehemently denied having such a goal, the United States (along with Israel) was equally vehement in accusing Iran of having latent nuclear aspirations.  This issue had to be resolved in the global arena.

In an impressive show of diplomacy, the Obama administration brought about their fellow P-5+1 nations (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) to the negotiating table.  What emerged on 14 July 2014, was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Under this agreement, Iran reaffirmed that “under no circumstances will (it) ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.”  Still, the fact that Iran could keep its nuclear program appeared to its detractors as a temptation to cheat.

From Iran’s viewpoint, the signing of a nuclear (or other) agreement appeared dubious. This perception is due to the notorious American predilection for regime change as well as a related high suspicion that it cannot be trusted when it promises to be a party to nuclear negotiations, or that it will continue to honor it no matter who is sitting in the White House. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi were two targets of regime change.

In the case of Saddam, even though the administration of President George W. Bush claimed that the Iraqi dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction, no such weapons were found after the ouster of Saddam’s regime.  In the case of Qaddafi, after his renunciation of developing indigenous nuclear weapons, the United States, along with France and the U.K., took military action that eventually resulted in the dismantlement of his regime.

But Iran had no choice but to agree to the JCPOA due to decades of crippling economic sanctions levied by the U.S.

Iran’s options for charting the best course forward

On May 9, 2018, Donald Trump announced America’s withdrawal from JCPOA and promised to reimpose harsh economic sanctions on Iran.  This impetuous action placed the Western alliance system in a state of turbulence.  The U.K., Germany, and France announced their continued backing of JCPOA without the United States.  Still, much of their support depends on how strenuously the United States imposes its economic sanctions on any country that continues to do business with Iran.

Even with the weakening of American global leadership, it holds considerable economic swagger.  More to the point, the European countries appear determined about challenging the United States, but which of them is willing to pay the price, and which one of them is interested in going against the United States to support Iran’s continued observance of it is a question hard to answer.

The accession of Michael Pompeo to the job of Secretary of State and of John Bolton to the position of National Security Advisor, both staunch opponents of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal, also adds further impetus to the Trump administration’s resolve to punish Iran for its ambitious strategic posture in the Levant and for its prolific missile production program. The talk in Washington is that the cancellation of the US-Iran nuclear deal may be a prelude to Trump’s intention to bring about regime change in Iran.

Bringing about a regime change in Iran will be difficult for the Trump administration since it finds itself without allies in Europe and no support from China or Russia. However, even those realities are not likely to stop U.S. military action against Iran, if Trump is willing to pay an exorbitant price in the form of a potential tsunami of instability and turbulence in the Middle East.

Iran may be willing to discuss with the United States its commitment to the development of long-range missiles, but it is not likely to abandon it.  It might also be ready to have a general discussion over its commitment to the Assad regime and its support of Hezbollah of Lebanon.  However, no one can expect an outright abandonment of Iranian support of those two entities either.  In the final analysis, the best course for Iran, for now, is to remain steadfastly committed to observing the JCPOA.

What’s next for Iran after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington and in Israel, there is a growing concern that Iran may soon initiate a military assault against Israel, according to United States military officials who spoke with CNN on May 8, 2018.

The report notes that “intelligence is not clear on when an attack could come and what form it would take…with one official noting that ‘if there is an attack it might not be immediately clear it’s Iran.”

The U.S. State Department has issued an alert for U.S. citizens in the Golan Heights region citing security concerns.

The State Department’s security warning states that travel to the Golan Heights should be carefully considered “until the situation stabilizes.”

U.S. intelligence and military officials haven’t found a direct connection between the announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement (known as the JCPOA or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”

Rapidly Rising Tensions Between Iran and Israel

However, tensions are rapidly escalating in the region following multiple Israeli airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he “fully supports” the United States’ withdrawal, initiated by President Trump, blaming the JCPOA for “increased Iranian aggression.”

Netanyahu stated that “for months now, Iran has been transferring lethal weaponry to its forces in Syria, with the purpose of striking at Israel.”

The Prime Minister continued by saying that “we will respond mightily to any attack on our territory.”

If Iran were to launch an assault against Israeli targets, it would likely be done in retaliation for Israel’s airstrikes. On Tuesday, Syria accused Israel of targeting an area south of Damascus with air strikes.

Israeli Troops Mobilized

Citing “irregular Iranian activity” in Syria, the Israeli military has directed authorities to open and prepare bomb shelters in the occupied Golan Heights region.

Israeli troops are on “high alert for an attack” in the area, according to the military.

According to Israeli media, this is the first time there has been an order to open bomb shelters in the region since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.

According to statements from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), reserve forces have been mobilized in limited numbers, which one IDF spokesperson said was a “specific call-up based on need.”

Furthermore, non-combat reserves—which include those acting in medical or intelligence capacities—were also being mobilized, according to a separate IDF statement.

Could Israel Launch a Preemptive—or Preventive—Strike?

If Iran were to launch an attack against Israeli targets, either directly or with the involvement of a proxy such as Hezbollah, Israel could—and is likely to—respond by significantly escalating the situation.

Israel would likely launch a large-scale aerial—or ground—assault against Iranian or Hezbollah positions in Syria or even within Lebanon if Hezbollah is involved.

Alternatively, Israel could initiate a preemptive—or even preventive—assault against Iranian targets. In a preemptive strike, Israel would be launching an attack in anticipation of immediate aggression by Iran or Iranian proxy groups.

By contrast, a preventive attack would be launched to eliminate (i.e. destroy) the potential threat posed by Iranian or proxy groups, without there being an imminent attack or planned attack on Israel.

Israeli Military on ‘High Alert’ in Anticipation of Iranian Attack was originally published on Global Security Review.

Venezuela’s problems will only get worse as President Nicolas Maduro strips Venezuela’s democratic institutions of their authority while consolidating his power. While government and business elites who have access to petrodollars enjoy overwhelmingly favorable exchange rates, the majority of Venezuelans are going hungry.

Further economic mismanagement will increase already-widespread starvation, illness, and insecurity. The result will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. The Dutch island territories of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao—just 40-80 km off the northern coast of Venezuela—would face a significant number of refugees.

Summary

• Government mismanagement of the oil industry is at the root of Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, as productivity has rapidly collapsed. 
• Hyperinflation has made Venezuelan currency nearly worthless as the prices of essential goods have skyrocketed.
• If the already-dire situation worsens considerably, there will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, and the United States. 
• The number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016.

A massive refugee crisis in the Americas wouldn’t just affect Venezuela’s neighbors.

Already, thousands have fled, and the number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016. As food insecurity worsens for the public and the government steps ups its repression of dissent, there will be a spillover effect regarding migration to the United States from South and Central America.

If the United States is unprepared for such a crisis, the results could have catastrophic implications for American national security. The Venezuelan Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, has been accused of having ties with Iranian and Hezbollah connected individuals and entities. El Aissami has been linked to 173 Venezuelan passports and identity cards that were issued to individuals from the Middle East and Central Asia, including alleged members of Hezbollah.

Holders of Venezuelan passports are afforded visa-free entry to over 130 countries, including 26 European Union member states. While a visa is required to enter the United States, there are likely more lenient standards for accepting applications from holders of Venezuelan passports than for holders of Iranian, Syrian, or Lebanese passports.

The situation in Venezuela is terrible for everyone

For Venezuela, the worst case scenario is a complete breakdown of the central government’s control over the state. If the Venezuelan government is unable to contain the flow of refugees and an overwhelming number cross into neighboring Brazil and Colombia, those governments may be forced to act in the interest of their national security interests.

Given the geographic proximity of the United States to Venezuela, democratic governance there along with adherence to the rule-of-law is paramount for American security in the long-term. Otherwise, the U.S. will undoubtedly face a massive influx of immigrants. Such a flow would not be stopped by a wall, like the one proposed by President Trump along the U.S.-Mexico border. Venezuelans seeking refuge from the humanitarian crisis will utilize air or maritime transport routes to reach the U.S.

Already, over 250,000 Venezuelans have migrated into Colombia in search of greater security and access to food and medical care. Colombia is in the process of finalizing a significant peace agreement with the FARC Rebel group, and a continued mass-migration of Venezuelan refugees could threaten Colombia’s internal stability. Absent a political settlement, which seems increasingly impossible due to the criminal nature of the Venezuelan regime, military intervention may be the only solution.

The Colombian government—possibly in cooperation with Brazil and other regional partners—may decide to pre-empt a mass-exodus of Venezuelans into Colombia by launching a military operation with the intent of deposing the government of Nicolas Maduro.

This would be no easy task. Venezuela, in addition to its military resources, has close security ties with Cuba. An attempt at intervention in Venezuela by a coalition of American democracies could rapidly descend into a much more significant conflict, mainly if hardliners in Havana perceive the operation as an American-led proxy war directed against Cuba and Cuba’s overseas interests.

Forget about North Korea, Venezuela is the next major national security crisis was originally published on Global Security Review.

On December 1, 2017, Israeli warplanes attacked targets in Syria. The raid was intended to convey a political message: that a permanent Iranian military base would never be permitted to be established on Syrian territory.

Reports in Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel Hayom, Maariv, and Haaretz, stated that the raid was preceded by leaked photos of the target (a military base) to the BBC some three weeks earlier.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and the Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, Gadi Eizenkot, have all suggested that an attack might be imminent in recent weeks.

Alex Fishman, a military analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, said that with this raid “Israel has apparently moved from the verbal stage of threatening and warning the Iranians and the Syrians to the stage of action.”

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The raid, according to Fishman, “is Israel’s way of explaining to all sides that if they do not take Israel’s interests into consideration and allow Iran to settle in Syrian territories as a large military force, they will have to pay the price at a military level. Now all the involved parties in the settlement process in Syria, including the Syrians, Iranians, Russians, Turks, Americans, and Europeans, should deal with Israel as a key entity which has the ability to militarily disrupt any settlement.”

Fishman added, “The military base that was attacked yesterday is located in the surveillance area from the Israeli borders (in occupied Golan).” He pointed out that the timing of the raid was not accidental, as it was carried out while this military base is still empty of soldiers, and that the message Israel has conveyed is “I do this before you launch this military base and raise Iranian flags here.”

Israel has drawn a “red line” when it comes to the Iranian presence in Syria

Yossi Melman, a military analyst, wrote in Maariv that the raid was “more a stout Israeli attempt to convey a message to Russia than to President Bashar Al-Assad and Iran … The message is that Israel is serious when it says it will not allow the establishment of Iranian military bases in Syria.”

Melman added that Israel is confident that the Syrian regime will not respond to the Israeli aggression. He wrote: “Assad cannot allow himself to respond to Israel’s violation of sovereignty more than launching ineffective rockets from his air defense system because Israel will respond with greater force. Launching a front against Israel is the last thing Assad wants at this stage.”

According to Melman, Israel has expanded its “red lines” imposed on Syria. Melman stated that the Israeli strike would not prevent Iran from continuing to pursue its strategic goals, including a military presence in Syria, and that Iran “would not give up its military achievements in Syria.”

Amos Harel, a military analyst for Haaretz, also stated that he believed that the raid was a message to Iran, the Syrian regime and the super powerful states as well.

Harel added that the most important question at present is how Iran would behave in the long term; and will it increase its efforts to remain in Syria? Harel continued by stating “Iran has a clear strategic goal of activating a link between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Any military escalation with Israel would not probably be that profitable, but with Iran’s continuous military settlement and the raids attributed to Israel it is possible to say that both sides are walking on the edge.”

Israeli Warplanes Attacked Syrian Military Base to Convey Message to Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The territory in eastern Syria that will be freed of Islamic State control now constitutes the focus of the struggle between the United States and Iran in Syria, as both are striving to seize the area.
• Early June marked the onset of the final phase of the US-led coalition’s offensive to conquer the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, with a combined Kurdish-Arab (though predominantly Kurdish) ground force – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – and air support provided by the international coalition, including the United States, other Western countries, and Arab states.
• At the same time, Iran and its proxies have also started intensifying efforts aimed at shaping Syria the day after the fall of the Islamic State.
• Forces of the pro-Assad coalition are currently trying to expand their control in the Deir ez-Zor region and improve their access to Raqqa and the surrounding area, and also seize critical positions along the Syrian-Iraqi border

Geopolitically, Syria Sits in the Middle of Two Axes of Influence

The race to shape the Syrian arena, which is currently focused on the campaign to conquer Raqqa and defeat the Islamic State, encompasses two main strategic efforts. One, led by Iran, aims at laying the foundation for a Shiite axis land bridge from Iran in the east, via Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon in the west. Its primary mode of operation is the seizure, by Iranian proxies, of significant passage points between Iraq and Syria – with Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the People’s Mobilization Forces) on the Iraqi side of the border and forces of the pro-Assad coalition, including the remnants of the Syrian army under the authority of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias on the Syrian side of the border.

According to Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “a relationship has been forged between the popular forces, the forces of the Iraqi government and military, and the allied forces in Syria. In practice, this is a strategic victory for Iran’s allies and for the ring of resistance to Zionism that begins in Tehran and reaches Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

In a rival strategic effort, the US-led coalition has been operating to create a wedge running north-south to sever the Iranian land bridge and cut off Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and west of the Persian Gulf. This effort is aimed at creating a buffer zone-security strip controlled by US allies, extending from Turkey in the north, via eastern Syria, southward to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Over the past weeks, some attacks have been carried out by US air forces against forces of the pro-Assad coalition along with the southeastern segment of the Syrian-Iraqi border, in the region of the Syrian city of al-Tanf, located near the tripartite border between Jordan-Syria-Iraq.

The United States has declared this area to be a “de-confliction” zone under its influence and will therefore not allow the deployment of forces belonging to Assad or Iranian proxies in the region. On June 18, a Syrian fighter plane was shot down in the Raqqa region of eastern Syria as part of the air cover that the United States is providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting to liberate Raqqa.

Iranian parties have explained that the deployment of forces loyal to Iran along the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border is meant to thwart the US plan to divide Syria. According to the Iranians, the United States seeks to link the northeastern part of Syria that is under Kurdish control to the southeastern section of the country, up to the Jordanian border and has therefore increased its activities and attacks in the Tanf region.

The voices from Iran indicate that their forces aim: (a) to defend Iran’s dominance in Iraq, the survival of the Assad regime, and Iranian strategic depth by means of a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut; (b) to destroy the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi border; (c) to neutralize the US plan to dismantle Syria; and (d) to prevent US-supported forces from establishing control over eastern Syria.

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Iran chose to respond to the Islamic State attack in Tehran by launching six surface-to-surface missiles from Iranian territory at an Islamic State target in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria. In doing so, it demonstrated its potential in the field of ballistic missiles and leveraged its message that it is at war with the Islamic State and is unafraid of operating in a sector in which the United States is working to establish its influence.

Russia’s position in this context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, both the Assad regime and sources in Moscow report that Russia is a partner in the Assad regime’s efforts in eastern Syria, aided by Iran and Hezbollah, to derail the American plan. On May 8, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan, which has close relations with the regime, reported that “massive reinforcements of Syrian and Russian military forces have arrived in the Syrian desert, in addition to the forces of friends, in preparation for an operation to take control of Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border.”

At the same time, there have been reports of coordination efforts in Jordan between US and Russian representatives. There have also been reports that Russia is working to prevent friction between forces of the Syrian regime and its allies and US forces, and strives to reach understandings with the United States and Jordan regarding a de-confliction zone, a de-escalation zone, and mutual attacks in southern Syria.

In response to the intercepting of the Syrian plane in the Deir ez-Zor region, Russia announced that “all aircraft, manned and unmanned, of the international coalition operating west of the Euphrates River, will be identified as targets by Russian air defense systems,” appearing to create a Russian-controlled no-fly zone west of the Euphrates. As part of the struggle for control of southeastern Syria, the United States has deployed two HIMARS multiple launch rocket batteries to the American special forces base near al-Tanf.

In response, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that every entry of a foreign weapon system into Syria requires authorization by the central government in Damascus and that the deployment indicates that the United States is not focused on fighting the Islamic State as its claims to be. The United States was then charged with failing to prevent Islamic State fighters from fleeing Raqqa toward Deir ez-Zor.

The pro-Assad coalition led by Russia and Iran appears to be following the American activity in southern and eastern Syria with great concern. In addition to the establishment of an exclusive security zone north of the Jordanian-Syrian border and attacks on forces supporting the Assad regime, this activity has included use of a training infrastructure for troops of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of US special forces reinforced by artillery support, and an air umbrella provided by the Western coalition.

From an Iranian perspective, and perhaps also from a Russian point of view, this marks a new phase in the US campaign to shape Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State, which is aimed at neutralizing the Iranian presence and influence in Syria.

The Potential for Escalation between the US and Iran in Syria and Iraq

The Trump administration includes elements that are extremely hostile to Iran and are pushing to expand the war in Syria as an opportunity to clash with Iran on a “comfortable” playing field. These elements have apparently suggested the idea of establishing an American-dominated north-to-south running strip through eastern Syria with the aim of blocking and containing Iran’s regional aspirations.

At the same time, Secretary of State James Mattis and US military leaders oppose the opening of a broad front against Iran and its proxies in Syria and regard it as endangering the capacity for a focused effort to advance the primary goal: the dismantling and defeat of the Islamic State. Therefore, at least at this stage, the US military leadership is seeking to avoid friction with the Iranians and Russians.

In the meantime, Iran is resolutely striving to progress toward its goals – i.e., more than other actors in the Middle East. It is checking the limits of US intervention, without any capacity to estimate the intensity of the United States commitment in the race to achieve control over eastern Syria. As a result, there is currently a potential for US-Iranian escalation in Syria that could spread to Iraq – either intentionally or as a result of miscalculated assessments.

Conclusion: The current race for control of territory in Syria appears as if it’s between Iran and the United States

The current race for control of territory in Syria now seems to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes –with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. Thus far, the Syrian arena could be viewed as a game board with multiple squares, with the move of pieces in each square having an impact on the state of affairs in the others.

First, Russia set up its pieces on the board’s central-western sector, between Aleppo and Damascus, including the coastal region. Turkey followed suit, arranging its forces in the board’s northern sector along the Syrian-Turkish border, including an effort to safeguard its interests in the Kurdish region. The United States focused its warfare against the Islamic State primarily in northeastern Syria and is now trying to reorganize its pieces in the southeastern square of the Syria game board.

As a result, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influenced by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late. Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern square of the Syrian game board. Israel and Jordan must also prepare themselves for the possibility that Islamic State fighters fleeing northeastern Syria could move southward and link up with the Islamic State branch at the border in the Golan Heights.

Moreover, Israel must not forget Russia’s influence in Syria and the need to reach understandings with Moscow, at least on a clandestine level, regarding every move in this direction. Syria may have understood as much, which would explain the increased intensity of the pro-Assad coalition’s attacks in the Daraa region over the past few weeks, primarily from the air. Still, Russia understands that Israel possesses the capacity to cause significant damage in Syria, and therefore prefers to maintain understandings with Israel and take Israel’s concerns seriously.

The Race for Syria after the Islamic State was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or an abatement of public anger, Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Rather, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some key differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

Regional Geopolitics and the Venezuelan Crisis

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a very weak government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence. An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence.

Particularly, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

How Likely is a Civil War in Venezuela? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that certain political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, Venezuela’s government would agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and agree to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy requires an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors so as to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a major effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.” There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it’s granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, it typically provides reduced sentences for human rights abusers, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity. Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. an interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela would be the first time that has happened, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Solving the Economic & Security Crisis in Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.