Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These objectives, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, dismissed peace talks with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.

Russia’s Domestic Situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.

Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.

Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.

Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

President Zelensky dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China’s 12-point peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.

However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Geneva talks regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.

Hungary’s attempts to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.

Is Peace Possible?

The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.

Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Crimean Peninsula may have strategic significance for the Russian military, but Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer play the Crimea card at home for political gain. Even though the 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in a sharp increase in the Russian president’s approval ratings, five years on the matter has been overshadowed by widespread economic hardship.

Crimea is heavily subsidized by Moscow, with no hope of becoming economically self-sufficient in the current political climate. Russia has invested billions of rubles into the peninsula but has yet to resolve the most critical issue: water supply. Crimea, especially its northern region, is heavily dependent on Ukraine when it comes to water and power supply.

Following the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Ukraine imposed an economic embargo of the peninsula, cutting off its supply of water and power. The embargo resulted in severe economic and ecological problems for northern Crimea. More recently, Russia has established two power stations to strengthen the peninsula’s energy security. However, Moscow has been unable to ensure a sustainable water supply.

Had Russia seized the whole of southeastern Ukraine—and not just Crimea as some Russian hardliners suggested at the time—the water-supply problem may have been avoided. Since such actions weren’t taken, however, Crimea was without an overland connection to the Russian mainland until 2018, when Russia completed construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait that connected the mainland to the peninsula. 

The Kerch Strait, however, is a strategic vulnerability for Russia. In the event of a conflict, the bridge would be an easy target for sabotage. To hedge against this vulnerability, the Russian military deployed the S-400 integrated air defense system along with additional warships to Crimea in the aftermath of the November 2018 clash between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Kerch Strait.

The Kremlin must also contend with growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region. From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Crimea was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. Today, Crimean Tatars—a Turkic ethnic group—retain strong cultural and religious ties to Turkey. Given that Turkey has been pursuing a more active foreign policy in recent years, it’s likely Ankara will pursue a more proactive role in Crimean affairs in the long-term. In the short-term, however, Turkey is expected to maintain its behind-the-scenes role.

The current geopolitical climate means that Moscow will have to manage Crimea like a suitcase without a handle for the foreseeable future. The Kremlin has invested heavily in integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation, but Western sanctions enacted in response to Russia’s behavior have helped to isolate the peninsula, raising prices and inhibiting economic development.

Despite these difficulties, approximately seventy-two percent of Crimean respondents said that their lives have improved since Crimea’s annexation, according to polling conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM).  However, in the long-run, the economic situation in Crimea and throughout Russia will only deteriorate due to the effects of Western sanctions.

Russia Faces Rising Costs 5 Years After Crimea’s Annexation was originally published on Global Security Review.

When the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Partushev, claimed in mid-January that the continuation of policies “by the Kiev authorities can contribute to the loss of Ukraine’s statehood,” members of the international security community expressed outrage at what appeared to be a blatant threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, impulsive proclamations have overshadowed subtle diplomacy and enabled largely-unnoticed progress between Germany, Ukraine, and Russia to decrease tensions and facilitate a degree of quasi-cooperation.

In light of the November 2018 naval confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian vessels, maritime activities on the Sea of Azov, particularly in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, have exhibited the potential to escalate tensions between the two countries. Recently, however, the Russian government has accepted a German proposal for joint monitoring missions with France to ensure freedom of navigation for shipping on the Azov Sea—a proposal that is very much welcomed by Ukrainian officials. Joint Franco-German monitoring would help to prevent further confrontations between Ukrainian and Russian vessels and counter Russia’s claims to the right to regulate passage of the Kerch Strait.

In December, the Russian government rejected Germany’s initial proposal for monitoring missions by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Russian officials were disinterested in an expansion of OSCE missions beyond the current observations in the Donetsk-Luhansk region. However, with the removal of this stipulation, Russian President Vladimir Putin “immediately agreed” to allow German and French observers to evaluate Russian compliance with international law in the Sea of Azov and at the Kerch Strait, the site of the controversial bridge connecting the Russian mainland with Russian-annexed Crimea. The revised proposal, submitted to the Kremlin by Heiko Maas, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 18th, is intended to ensure Russian activities do not impede shipping through the Kerch Strait and comply with international maritime law.

Given Ukraine’s deep-seated interests in maintaining its freedom of navigation within the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has welcomed the German initiative as assurance against the potential for Russian forces to accuse Ukraine of noncompliance and induce penalties on Ukrainian maritime operations. Germany’s proposal arrives at a critical moment for Ukraine as twenty-four of its sailors involved in the November Kerch Strait incident remain in Russian custody  having been charged with illegal border crossing, which carries a sentence of up to six years in prison.

At a recent press conference, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin eagerly welcomed prospects of an international monitoring mission led by Germany with the caveat that he hopes Russian authorities “don’t manipulate it.” Klimkin further urged that the mission refrain from inadvertently legitimizing Russian activities on Azov and that it explicitly denounce the border between Ukraine and Crimea under international law while also refusing to acknowledge the Kerch Strait Authority.

Official negotiations between German, Russian, and Ukrainian officials have yet to occur as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas have constrained discussions of the mission to separate and private talks with Ukrainian and Russian leaders. However, upcoming talks between Ukraine and Germany to negotiate a “joint vision… to work with the Russian side” appear promising since diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine are, by-and-large, nonexistent. “They are at an absolute minimum – only for protecting our citizens,” Klimkin explained at a Kiev press conference earlier this month. “But we are looking for a formula, as soon as we find it, we will definitely apply it.” Germany’s effort to ensure the stability of the Sea of Azov and monitor the Kerch Strait may very well prove to be the missing variable in this formula.

Germany: The Subtle Mediator Between Russia and Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sanctions were first imposed in 2014 when the United States and European Union imposed visa restrictions and asset freezes on Russian officials in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in Ukraine.

Despite these sanctions, however, there appears to have been no change in Russian behavior. Given that the point of these restrictions was to change Russia’s rogue state mindset vis-à-vis Ukraine and interference in other states, it begs the question of how effective these measures are.

Russia has failed to change its behavior as the result of sanctions.

Russian activity in Syria has increased while Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns in the U.S. and European countries show no signs of decline. In 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, England. Despite the evidence and testimony from chemical weapons experts, Russia continues to deny its involvement in the affair.

Lastly, if there is an event that is clear evidence that sanctions aren’t affecting changes in Russian foreign policy, it is the recent naval confrontation in the Kerch Strait. On November 25, 2018, a Russian Coast Guard vessel rammed a Ukrainian Navy tugboat — resulting in a series of dangerous actions as both Ukraine and Russia refused to back down, behavior that could have rapidly escalated the situation.

If sanctions had been effective, one might expect that such an action (i.e., the ramming of a Ukrainian Navy vessel) would have been deterred. By that logic, it’s reasonable to assume that the U.S. and E.U. would impose even more sanctions if Russia continued its pattern of behavior.

However, sanctions aren’t working.

Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia are targeted at the Russian elite, as a significant portion of Putin’s support base is comprised of then. It is believed that if Putin’s support base — mainly consisting of oligarchs whose fortunes are dependent upon the Kremlin — lost their ability to access funds and travel to Europe and North America — they would then demand Putin take steps to reverse his foreign policy.

However, that strategy doesn’t seem to be working in the way that Western states assumed it would. In fact, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia became the second-largest arms producer this year. Russia’s production rate is up 8.5 percent from 2017, which on an annual basis amounts to approximately $37.7 billion in weapons. India and China, both of which have purchased units of the S-400 air defense systems in the last year, are large buyers of Russian-produced arms.

The logic of Western sanctions fails to account for Russia’s political system.

Western sanctions don’t work because they fundamentally misunderstand the structure of Russia’s political system. In Russia, Putin gives the elites access to funding in exchange for their support and punishes those who step out of line, such as former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Such examples convince Russian elites and oligarchs alike that stepping out of line is not worth it. No matter the annoyances that come from Western sanctions, those are still not comparable to the negative reaction that would arise if they spoke out against Putin.

Companies owned or controlled by dissenting oligarchs could lose state support or funding, with the oligarchs themselves having political corruption and tax-evasion charges brought against them. Furthermore, the non-elite segments of the Russian population perceive sanctions as an aggressive tactic employed by the West to weaken Russia. In essence, Russia’s current political system rewards those who remain in line with the Kremlin — the consequences for speaking out are too high. At their current levels, sanctions will remain largely symbolic and will not lead to a reform of the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Why Russian Sanctions are Ineffective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although Ukraine claims to have informed the Russian coastguard ahead of time, a Russian ship nevertheless proceeded fire upon, and subsequently ram one of the Ukrainian ships, injuring six sailors. Russia accused the ships of acting recklessly and of illegally entering Russian territorial waters.

Tensions have been rising since Russia’s construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge in May 2018.

The bridge, which crosses the Strait to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula serves as an on-demand economic blockade of the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, both of which are located on the Sea of Azov. Ships carrying export goods from either port must pass through the Kerch Strait, and under the bridge, to reach their destinations.

Furthermore, the bridge is too low for some Ukrainian ships to pass under at all. While both Russia and Ukraine routinely accuse the other of harassing their respectively-flagged ships, the Kerch Strait bridge has had an impact on trade from the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Ukraine claims that trade from these ports has decreased by 30 percent since Russia began harrassing Ukrainian ships. While traffic has resumed as of Monday, November 26, tensions remain high.

Ukraine Declares Martial Law

Following the incident, Ukraine called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, demanding increased sanctions. Domestically, Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council recommended imposing martial law for sixty days.

The imposition of martial law is something that has never occurred, despite the past four years of Crimean annexation and continued violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Legally, this makes sense. While Russia never admitted guilt for the Crimean annexation and the violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, Russian actions here are quite public.

Martial law serves Poroshenko in more ways than one. The upcoming Ukrainian presidential election is set for March 31, 2019. Presidential elections cannot be held under martial law. On November 26th, one day after the incident, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favor of imposing martial law, albeit for a period of thirty days rather than the initially proposed sixty.

Furthermore, martial law was imposed in the coastal regions of Ukraine and in the regions bordering Russia and the breakaway Moldovan province of Transniestria (where Russian troops are stationed), rather than throughout the entire country.

As of now, Poroshenko stands in third place in presidential election polls. He is trailing behind former populist prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and the comedian Volodymyr Zelensky. Looked at from that perspective, it's possible that Poroshenko may be looking to increase support for his presidency—or at least decrease support for his opponents—before the election through the imposition of martial law.

Putin may think he also stands to benefit from escalating tensions with Ukraine.

Putin’s popularity in Russia has been declining for the past year. His approval ratings took a particularly substantial hit following the implementation of pension reforms that raised the retirement age.

Putin's party, United Russia, also suffered four election losses in Russia’s countryside recently. Stirring up feelings of nationalism may serve to boost Putin’s domestic approval ratings and act as a distraction for the many Russians who are unhappy with the current status quo.

It does not serve Putin or Poroshenko to engage in a full-blown conflict. Escalating tensions to that extent would result in significant increases in civilian casualties and would almost certainly heighten tensions dramatically between Russia and the West. Raising the stakes—at least in the short term—benefits both presidents' interests.

Escalation in the Sea of Azov Benefits Putin and Poroshenko was originally published on Global Security Review.

The actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin should be easy to comprehend. According to prevailing wisdom, he is desperately attempting to solidify a sphere of influence along Russia’s borders and redeem a state with an aging population and stagnating economy from the humiliations it endured during the 1990s. To many in the West, however, Russia’s actions in the Sea of Azov on November 25th came as a complete surprise.

On Sunday, November 25, two Ukrainian gun-boats, the Nikopol and the Berdyansk, and a tugboat, the Yani Kapu, attempted to transit the Kerch Strait by passing beneath the newly constructed Kerch Strait bridge. However, Russian forces had placed a cargo ship beneath the bridge, blocking passage for any vessel attempting to transit between the Black and Azov Seas. The Kerch Strait is the only access point to the Sea of Azov—waters that are considered to be territory shared between Russia and Ukraine.

Soon after, four Russian FSB Border Guard patrol boats carrying “Spetznatz — the Russian equivalent of U.S. Navy SEALS,” seized the Ukrainian gun-boats and tug for a so-called illegal attempt to enter Russian waters. The four Russian vessels were supported by a smaller coastguard boat and two non-identified helicopters as the vessels repeatedly rammed the Ukrainian vessels, causing damage to them and wounding six sailors.

On the morning of November 26th, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed the developments on the Sea of Azov with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, assuring the latter of “NATO’s full support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its full navigational rights in its territorial waters under international law.” At Poroshenko’s request, NATO convened a Commission at the ambassadorial level in Brussels on Monday afternoon.

Poroshenko has since declared a thirty-day state of martial law and is operating under the assumption that Putin’s actions on Azov indicate a potential intention to fully consolidate Russian control of the Donbass region on the border between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, NATO is working to de-escalate tensions between Ukraine and Russia as we are left waiting for Putin’s next move.

However, the events of November 25th and 26th were not without pretext. Multiple factors have contributed to the tensions between Russia and Ukraine that should have indicated to those of us in the West that a high probability of Russian intervention in Ukraine was pending. Ukraine serves as a strategically significant buffer state between Russia and NATO.

Most Realist scholars of international relations believe that Russian leadership would never “tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West.” Therefore, intentional modifications to Ukraine’s orientation Westward are significant indicators to Russia that its border security may be vulnerable to NATO occupation; such indicators warrant an immediate reaction by the Russian government to decrease such a perceived vulnerability.

Russia Fears Further NATO Expansion to the East

The most recent indicator occurred just two days before the confrontation on the Sea of Azov when Ukrainian lawmakers voted in favor of amending the constitution to include NATO and E.U. membership as a strategic goal. Poroshenko described the vote as a message of Ukraine’s intentions of “parting completely and irrevocably” from Russia.

Given Russia’s keenness to prevent and counteract expansion by NATO and the European Union eastward, such a vote by the Ukrainian parliament sends signals to Russia that there is an increasing possibility that such an expansion may occur. NATO expansion has been considered a strategic threat by the Kremlin ever since the intention of NATO to eventually integrate Ukraine was announced during the 2008 Bucharest summit.

In a press statement after a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Bucharest, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that a “powerful military bloc on our borders… [is perceived] as a direct threat to the security of our country.” Furthermore, when the E.U. attempted to propel Ukraine’s path to membership via an Association Agreement, the Russian government responded with a counteroffer to then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych via a loan of $15 billion and a decrease in gas prices, which Yanukovych accepted. In 2014, Russia then responded to the anti-Russian protests and the subsequent political coup that erupted in Kiev by annexing Crimea and amassing forces along the border with Ukraine’s eastern Donbass Region.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Splits from Moscow

A second significant indicator signifying an intentional reorientation Westward by Ukraine was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s formal intent to separate from Moscow in October. Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, initiated a process to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. The decision, both geopolitical and religious, has been supported by the Ukrainian public since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

The dominance of the Russian Orthodox Church over Ukrainian Orthodoxy is considered by many to be a form of Russian hybrid warfare given the proximity of the Russian Orthodox leadership to the Kremlin. In response to the Patriarch’s decision, the Russian Church has severed ties entirely with the global Orthodox Church. A Kremlin spokesperson justified the separation as defending “the interests of Russians and Russian-speakers … [and] of Orthodox Christians.”

These two developments combined were sufficient to provoke Russian activity toward Ukraine as they indicated increased resolve by Ukraine to integrate Westward. As a strategic buffer state between Russia and the West, Ukraine’s integration is unthinkable to Russian leadership as it is perceived as directly threatening the country’s national security. Nevertheless, NATO membership is not feasible with the ongoing conflict in the Donbass.

Therefore, Moscow will do whatever it takes to maintain the conflict and unpredictability of its armed forces in the vicinity of Ukraine to decrease its perceived vulnerability and degrade NATO’s ability to present a potential security threat. As history has shown in Russia, a potential security threat is a legitimate security threat.

Tensions Between Russia and Ukraine Escalate to Four-Year High was originally published on Global Security Review.

Security is an inherently contested concept, encompassing a wide variety of scenarios, and is commonly used in reference to a range of personal and societal activities and situations.

Security can be distinguished between day-to-day security at the individual level (nutritional, economic, safety), security for favorable conditions (the rule of law and due process, societal development, political freedom), and security against adverse conditions or threats (war and violence, crime, climate change).

The term security is used in three broad segments. The first is the general, everyday use of the term. In this instance, security refers to the desire for safety or protection. Second is the usage of the word for political purposes; relating to political processes, structures, and actions utilized to ensure a given political unit or entity is secure.  The term “security” is frequently used as a political tool to assign priority to a given issue or perceived threat within the broader political realm.

Third, and finally, “security” can be employed as an analytical concept to identify, define, conceptualize, explain, or forecast societal developments such as security policy, institutions, and governance structures.

Politically speaking, the usage of the term “security” increased drastically in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the allied victory that ended World War II, the United States government’s military and intelligence institutions underwent a major restructuring.

The Advent of National Security

The National Security Act of 1947 not only created a “National Military Establishment,” which would later become the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency; the Act established the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as the primary vehicle for coordinating national security and defense policy across multiple government agencies.

The National Security Advisor oversees the U.S. National Security Council. This structure would become a model for other countries; the governments of Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the United Kingdom, to name a few, all maintain NSCs responsible for coordinating policy and advising heads of government or state on national security issues.

The advent of national security as a concept enabled states, and their political leaders, to rhetorically pursue a particular security policy. National security policy is broader than defense policy or military policy, and it is more than merely preparing for armed conflict or responding to security threats.  National security policy encompasses all of the above while also aiming to avoid war.

National security includes both internal and external security, foreign policy, economic development, and education. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put it, “security is development.”

National security policy became a critical tool for states to protect and further their interests within the broader international system. International security policy, which the United Nations was responsible for promoting, was often at odds with the national security interests of individual member states. Thus, the UN lost much of its influence as the world become increasingly divided between the U.S.-led West and the Soviet Union-led East.

It was in this context that the understanding of national security as a concept expanded from being based mainly on defense and military issues to focusing on those matters in conjunction with diplomatic, economic, and political issues, both domestically and internationally. Two major geopolitical blocs competed for global influence, but differently than great powers of the past. The UN provided a forum for the two superpowers to engage with one another to avoid another, likely far more destructive, global conflict.

A Shifting International Security Landscape

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the international landscape changed fundamentally. The previously bipolar world order was restructured under as a unipolar order. The United States, being the sole remaining superpower, was ideally positioned as the global hegemon.

A new international security framework was required when the Cold War ended. The previously bipolar international system became replaced by a unipolar global order dominated by the United States. Globally, the odds of a major war between two great powers were increasingly low. From the 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, major conflicts were asymmetrical. The United States and its allies, with or without a mandate from the UN Security Council, employed the use of force multiple times arguing that they were doing so on behalf of the international community.

Some actions, such as the first Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, enjoyed broad support from the international community. The only time (to date) that Article 5 of the NATO charter has been enacted was following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These operations were authorized by the United Nations Security Council, which has the responsibility of acting on behalf of all UN member states in matters of global security. The threat of significant conflict between two sovereign states substantially dissipated, for a time.

Security is Everything

With a return to great power competition, national security priorities are shifting. States, rather than non-state actors like terrorist groups or insurgencies, are the primary security threat. The idea that security encompasses more than military and defense issues alone has returned, particularly in light of threats posed by rising nationalism and hostile foreign information operations. The security paradigm of the twenty-first century has expanded to nearly every facet of human life.

Rising nationalism is driving ontological and societal insecurity. This trend is fueled, in part, by economic inequality and stagnation, coupled with an influx of migrants and refugees fleeing violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and economic hardship. Unless Western societies implement substantial reforms for integrating immigrants and refugees, existing social divisions will widen, damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions and polluting national identities with xenophobic sentiments.

There is also growing concern over gang violence, radicalization, transnational crime, privacy threats, and human rights violations worldwide. These issues all impact individual or personal security, and the widespread use of social media and other mass-communications technologies only serve to heighten the emphasis individuals and societies place on individual security.

Issues like climate change and pollution are also increasingly regarded through a security lens. These issues jeopardize human security, meaning they pose a threat to both individuals and humanity as a species.

Finally, cyberspace presents a whole host of new security threats. Cyber attacks not only compromise personal data and steal information, they can cause physical destruction, as well. Critical infrastructure like communications, power plants, water treatment centers, and oil refineries are all vulnerable to a debilitating cyber attack. Such an attack could disrupt operations, inflict sabotage, and even destroy the target facility. Cyber operations can be used by state and non-state actors to complement or augment kinetic operations to achieve a political goal. This is exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

In the twenty-first century, the concept of security is all-encompassing. The geopolitical element of great-power competition is further exacerbated by a transnational cyberspace, rapidly developing and increasingly accessible technologies, alongside a global economic system which has created complex inter-dependencies between states. In this new order, the traditional security debate between those who see it as a military and defense matter, and those who subscribe to the broader perspective that everything is security.

In this context, national security objectives can be only be achieved when hard power is seen as a compliment to soft power initiatives such as reducing societal and economic inequities, providing access to education and healthcare, and promoting intellectual and technological innovation.

What is Security? Everything. was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has substantially increased its presence in Black Sea since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Under Russian administration, Crimea plays host to Bastion and Bal coastal defense systems that both employ anti-ship missiles. Conceivably, the Bastion system can reach the Black Sea straits as well as Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish ports.

Russia has also deployed S-400 air defense systems to the peninsula with the capability to target strategic bombers, ballistic, and cruise missiles as well as surface targets. The S-400 system is further enhanced by the Pantsyr S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun system which was provided to the Crimean air defense forces.

Through these measures, Russia has established an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone over the Black Sea. The establishment of this A2/AD zone means Russia has the capability to block NATO access to the Black Sea. Granted, NATO's presence in the Black Sea is limited, but the threat remains nevertheless.

Russia's moves in the Black Sea threaten Ukraine's national security.

While NATO's interests aren't directly threatened by Russian actions in the Black Sea, Ukraine's are. Russian military deployments in the Black Sea region act as a deterrent to other Western forces who might consider assisting Ukraine militarily. Moscow's control over the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula has also resulted in Russian control over the disputed Sea of Azov.

Prior to the Crimean annexation, Ukraine and Russia shared sovereignty over the sea. However, in the wake of the annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that not only was Sevastopol perpetually a part of Russia, but Crimea as well as the Sea of Azov were inherently Russian, as well.

In the case of the Sea of Azov, Russia's actions speak louder than words. Earlier in 2018, Russia completed construction a bridge over the Kerch Strait, explicitly setting it at a height which prevented any Ukrainian commercial ships from transiting the Strait. In doing so, it has threatened the viability of Ukraine's ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Furthermore, Russian officials have illegally boarded Ukrainian ships, essentially preventing Ukrainian usage of the Sea of Azov.

These illegal actions act are parts of a psychological operation to convince the Ukrainian people that Russia has a right to act with impunity in its "near-abroad." In other words, Russia is attempting to persuade Ukraine that NATO and the greater West lack the will to intervene on Ukraine's behalf, despite political rhetoric to the contrary.

Russia finally gets what it wants.

In addition to impeding Ukraine's political shift to the West, Russian objectives in the region include obtaining and maintaining access to and control over a warm water port. The A2/AD zone means that Russia has open access to the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Access to a warm water port has been an objective that has been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy since the days of Gregory Potemkin, an advisor to Catherine the Great.

Potemkin advocated for Russian southward expansion through the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the northern Middle East. With control over the Black Sea, Russia has the capacity to embark on a significant naval buildup. This buildup would give a much-needed boost to Russia's stagnating economy.

Access and control over the Black Sea also gives Russia a springboard from which to project power into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the greater-Mediterranean. Given Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war, this ability to project power could have measurable implications for that conflict.

Russia has also been conducting a soft power offensive in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, and looks to be maintaining its partnership with Armenia. Russia is also taking steps to improve regional tensions, calling for an end to the Syrian war and agreeing to a resolution to the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The consequences of a delayed or minimal response to Russia's increasing control over the Black Sea could be substantial. The Black Sea is but one example of Russia's slow-but-steady consolidation of power and influence across the Eurasian landmass. If the United States and its fellow NATO allies fail to act, it may be too late to reverse shifting power dynamics in a region of major strategic value.

Russia is Consolidating its Control Over the Black Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

America is not alone in projecting itself as an exceptional power and vital force for good in the world. Russia makes the same claim. That sentiment is built upon centuries of defeating invaders, as I explore in “Russia: The Story of War.” And it plays a crucial role in how Russia sees itself in its increasingly tense relationship with NATO and the West.

The birth of Russian exceptionalism

For Russia, its triumph over Nazi Germany in the Second World War is a pillar of national identity. Outsiders don’t often realize that Russians’ belief in their special role in saving civilization from history’s villains predates the war.

In 1812, Napoleon, a tyrant bent on world domination, invaded Russia only to see his army destroyed. It was a tremendous victory and propelled Russia to lead a coalition of allies to liberate Europe from his grip. That campaign ended in 1814 with their occupation of Paris. While Napoleon’s final defeat came at Waterloo in 1815, Russians insisted that they had inflicted the mortal wound.

After the Napoleonic Wars, a volcano of patriotism erupted across Russian society. At its center was the widely shared belief that Russia had saved Europe. Moreover, no other country on its own had repelled an invasion by Napoleon or crushed his army, which had once seemed invincible. Commonly disparaged by Western Europeans as savages or barbarians, Russians could now turn their reputation on its head. As Denis Davidov, a flamboyant leader of partisans declared: “At last, with head lifted proudly, one can say: ‘I am a Russian.’”

Such pride caused many writers and intellectuals in the 19th century to look deeper into history for more evidence of this exceptionalism.

Roll call of invaders

That search led back to the 13th century when the Mongols invaded Europe. Known as “God’s scourge,” their forces advanced no farther than Eastern Europe, allowing Russians centuries later to claim that they had shed their blood to protect the rest of Europe from this dire threat.

Intellectuals advanced subsequent invasions to bolster the argument of exceptionalism. In the 16th century, the Crimean Tatars rode north, leaving Moscow in ashes. In the 17th, the Poles did the same while also deposing the tsar and murdering the head of the Russian Church. In the 18th, the Swedes invaded only to be defeated by Peter the Great.

With Napoleon’s invasion in the 19th, belief in Russia’s indispensable role was secure, and it enjoyed stable currency across the political spectrum. From Fyodor Dostoevsky, an arch-conservative, to Lenin’s idol, the radical revolutionary Nicholai Chernyshevsky – all awarded their nation pedigree status for serving as a shield to defend civilization.

The military, to no surprise, took this idea as an article of faith. At century’s end the head of Russia’s equivalent of West Point, General Nikolai Sukhotin, embraced it as “the key to understanding the special nature of Russia’s experience of war” – something to which, he also added, no other Western nation could lay claim.

Hitler’s attack in the next century – the most significant threat Russia has faced – has cemented its myth of exceptionalism. Just as no country has done what Russia has done to protect others from aggressors, so runs the belief, no other nation has itself also been such a frequent target of aggression.

What war means today

More than anything else, Russia’s experience of war has profoundly shaped its worldview and self-image. That legacy also feeds a national narrative, one nurtured over centuries, not just of epic proportion but of grand persuasion that can serve multiple purposes.

First, and perhaps foremost, it can be invoked whenever Russia is painted as an aggressor. It ensures a presumption of innocence and just cause, no matter the action taken. It even allows for a defensive gloss to burnish Russia’s campaigns of conquest that, by the end of the 19th century, made it the largest contiguous empire, encompassing one-sixth of the world’s landmass.

Defensive expansionism, for example, can be invoked to explain Russia’s annexation of Crimea – both times. The first instance was at the end of the 18th century in order to eliminate the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars who for centuries had raided Russia in pursuit of its most lucrative resource: Russians themselves bound for the slave markets of the Middle East. The second time, of course, was in 2014 when Russia argued it was protecting Russians on the peninsula from an ostensibly hostile Ukrainian government.

Second, it helps underwrite Russia’s suspicion of others that is often decried as overly paranoid or pathological. Here, too, one can go back to the Mongols. When they invaded, how did Russia’s western neighbors respond? By attacking Russia as well.

Also driving this suspicion of the West, besides the sheer number of invasions, is that the invaders have often been coalitions of nations, as if engaged in a collective conspiracy against Russia. Napoleon’s army included, among others, Poles, Italians and Germans, whereas Hungarians, Romanians and others joined Hitler’s ranks. In this reasoning, this is why NATO – especially after its expansion right up to Russia’s border – can be seen through the lens of deja vu, as if Europe once more is ganging up on Russia. Not for nothing do state-sponsored advertisements replay a joke favored by Tsar Alexander III in the late 19th century – but no longer in jest. He would ask, “How many allies does Russia have?” Two, s the punch line: its Army and its Navy.

Third, calling on this legacy plays into the Kremlin’s drive to centralize power. And in the hyper-patriotic climate it has caused, political opposition can be tagged as treason, and foreign entities on Russian soil easily rebranded as foreign agents.

In fact, the legitimacy of the office of president is inseparable from the aura of war. It is no coincidence that inauguration day is May 7, thus pairing it with May 9, VE Day, and the massive celebrations marking the end of World War II. To add effect, the presidential honor guard wears uniforms recalling the Napoleonic age. What else but the backdrop of Russia’s two greatest triumphs to cement the authority of the state with the sacrifices of the people?

Here we see the true function of this civic religion: showcasing a sense of exceptionalism that unites Russians behind an all-powerful center and unifies their turbulent and bloody thousand-year history along with a single continuum as the perpetual victim of foreign aggression. This mythic narrative is high-octane fuel for the engine of Russian nationalism, and today is pumped through all venues of culture and society. And precisely because of its deep roots extending back centuries, it enjoys widespread domestic support.

Nothing but war teaches Russians better that, while at the center of world-shaking events, they are on the side of the good and always come out on top. Nothing raises the ideological scaffolding higher than seeking to make Russia great again following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

“We are history’s makers,” the popular historian Vladimir Medinsky declared shortly before becoming minister of culture. And in this telling, Russians certainly are.

Why Russia Thinks It’s Exceptional was originally published on Global Security Review.

The status of U.S.-Russia relations is often explained by commentators as a “second Cold War.” This, however, is a misstatement. The Soviet Union and the United States were nowhere near as interconnected as Russia and the U.S. today. Even despite Western sanctions, Russia remains deeply integrated into the global trading, financial, and political systems—and it has exploited them.

American (and European) institutions, civil society, and social discourse—at all levels—have been caught almost entirely off-guard by the Kremlin’s strategic exploitation of a rigid military taxonomy.

Failure to accurately conceptualize war threatens national security and risks destabilizing the rules-based global order. Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct—or even mutually exclusive—entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

21st Century Wars Are Fought in all Domains

U.S. leaders have struggled to conceptualize asymmetric measures of influence-projection,  like the Russian concept of nonlinear warfare. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Russian military planners recognized that—a considerable nuclear arsenal notwithstanding—Russia’s conventional forces would have no means of matching NATO in terms of conventional force parity.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. military underwent a restructuring based on its experience fighting mostly insurgents and other non-state actors in the Middle East. Meanwhile, an increasingly emboldened Russia embarked an multi-domain campaign to counter what it perceives as the threat of NATO encirclement.

First and foremost, the U.S. must restructure the civilian and military components of its national security apparatus. Accordingly, the core notions of national security and warfare as legal, practical, and existential concepts that have been maintained for over seven decades are no longer applicable. Policymakers and strategists must regard warfare in an entirely new light.

Western military strategists over-rely on a rigid structure of categories or taxonomies in their effort to build a useful model for various types of conflict. Cyber operations have been treated as a distinct domain—a domain of lower strategic importance than warfare in the traditional sense.

Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

In contrast—to the detriment of U.S. strategic interests—adversarial powers have learned to rely on a nuanced mixture of conventional forces, cyber warfare, and the dissemination of strategic communications (propaganda) through traditional, digital, and social media outlets to deliberately sow confusion and dissent within a target territory or state.

Agile Warfare

With a perpetual “innovation-cycle,” Russian nonlinear tactics are strikingly similar to the Agile development methodology used by engineering teams in the technology sector.

The iterative cycle of establishing a hypothesis, experimentation (also known as a/b testing), analysis, and iterative review, repeated endlessly, has been a remarkably efficient way of creating disorder.

Such chaos makes it difficult for dissenters both outside and inside the country to effectively mobilize their compatriots, overloading social media and data streams with information and traffic from botnets and trolls.

The Age of Nonlinear Combat

Nonlinear warfare has been described by some “the Gerasimov doctrine”—following the publication of an essay by General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff —this is a misnomer. In contemporary parlance, nonlinear warfare is synonymous with hybrid warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense uses the term “hybrid threat.”

The notion of hybrid or nonlinear warfare is also incorrectly associated with the concept of asymmetric warfare, which originated following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the insurgencies that arose in the aftermath.

The U.S. had limited experience with long-term combat against non-state actors and lengthy counter-insurgency campaigns prior to the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The term asymmetric warfare was used to define this new paradigm.

However, the system of classification has, yet again, proved to be the United States’ achilles heel. Without a doubt, the United States possesses insurmountable conventional military strength and continues to pose an undoubtedly credible threat of mutually assured destruction through its strategic nuclear arsenal.

Both Russia and China realized early that technological advancements in the fields of information technology and population or market research and analysis could be effectively weaponized and integrated into a multichannel offensive military strategy that would have far-reaching advantages when it came to confrontations with the less-agile policies pursued by U.S. military planners.

Moscow’s success stems from its total or “all-in” conception of war. The Kremlin has been heavily investing in modernizing its outdated soviet-equipped military. This model depends on the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors, alliances and adversaries; even war and peace.

Starting in 2008, Russian special and conventional forces were assisted by political subversion, information warfare, and other active measures in simultaneous and complementary assault on Georgian infrastructure and territory. As a result, the Georgian state was paralyzed and unable to act to prevent the de-facto secession of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A similar scenario occurred in Moscow’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, with an executed apparatus of plausible deniability using information warfare, insurgent funding, and economic warfare to utilize proxy “local actors” to achieve individual goals. In the Crimean campaign, Russia’s non-kinetic operations—information, economic, and cyber attacks—laid the groundwork for a complementary military operation.

Nonlinear Thought and Military Planning

Linear thinking has long-dominated military planning and has dominated Western military strategy until the end of the twentieth century. In a linear thought model, a strategy is laid out through detailed planning, established processes, step by step detail management tips, and stakeholder expectations.

To combat foreign influence operations, all levels of the private and public sectors must develop and implement strategic plans to protect intellectual property, secure sensitive information, and deter acts of aggression. This requires a substantial degree of nonlinear thought. Nonlinear thought is less constrictive than linear thinking. A nonlinear combatant employs a range of tactics and measures across domains to gauge what is effective and what isn’t.

The ability to project force through a multitude of mediums is tantamount to U.S. national security interests—particularly if those means are utilized by a foreign adversary to subvert or threaten the interests of the United States.

To Counter Hybrid Threats, U.S. Must Redefine Conception of Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Russian flag was raised by residents of Crimea, not Russian soldiers. Russian forces were stripped of any identifying markers or insignia. Cyber attacks launched at Ukrainian infrastructure and internet domains were structured in a manner that obfuscated Russia’s involvement.

It’s widely understood that Russia was responsible for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, the confusion spawned by the disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and unmarked special forces, and the later actions in eastern Ukraine, would see the west committing further inaction allowing the Kremlin to consolidate, and then normalize the acquisition of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

After the conspicuous invasion of Georgia in 2008, the 2014 Crimea operation employed subtle paramilitary and special forces to seize critical points of interest while securing internal order. Russia applied a  broad swath of non-military, hybrid or “non-linear” warfare tactics designed to foster the rapid integration of the Crimean political, security, media, and financial sectors with those in Russia.

The period between the initial “invasion” of information and cyber attacks and the eventual referendum deciding Russian sovereignty over the peninsula was little more than a month.

The military involvement served as a deterrent to Ukrainian troops, while the lack of insignia or identifying features on Russian special forces provided a degree of plausible deniability. Accordingly, the NATO powers in Europe and North America would not have apparent cause to intervene.

Simultaneously, the political, economic, and information warfare campaigns that had been set in motion were masked by the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion in other parts of Ukraine.  Russian troop mobilizations and activity near the Ukrainian border diverted international attention from Crimea while pro-Russian non-military measures were implemented to politically, socially, and economically integrate the Crimean peninsula with Russia.

Having learned the mistakes of overt military action, and the risks that such action has for becoming embroiled in a heated civil war, Russian military strategists employed a mixture of both state-sponsored actors, state actors, and pro-Russian Crimean civilian protestors and militia groups.

All state-actors in Crimea were bereft of identifying marks that would associate Russia with the incursion.

All that was required for the Kremlin to deny any responsibility was for their special forces to show up wearing un-flagged uniforms. Regarding ensuring the viability and legitimacy of their actions in Ukraine, Russia proceeded to launch an aggressive campaign in the United Nations. As they had done before their 2008 invasion of Georgia, their disinformation campaign extended to Russian delegates at the United Nations.

Russia’s ambassador repeatedly—and forcefully—asserted that Ukrainian authorities were threatening and committing acts of violence against ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Superficially, the carefully crafted (artificial) legal context for this argument was structured similarly to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

It must be noted that the latter was to ensure the security and existence of critically vulnerable civilians. This is a stark contrast to the underlying reason for Russian aggression, which is to provide the continued hegemony of Russia in the post-Soviet space.

The efficacy of the Crimean campaign (and Russian non-linear warfare as a strategy) is evidenced by two factors.

One is the degree to which Russia was able to normalize the annexation. The other is the masterful execution of diplomatic and legal rhetoric which rendered the West inability of Western military intervention, to realize a controlled process of de-escalation and normalization.

The ongoing exploitation—and arguably weaponization—of International law and legal framework by State actors posits a critical urgency to reform theoretical conceptualizations of international law governing conflict, especially since purely conventional battles will be the exception in the 21st century. The blending of non-linear tactics with plausibly deniable conventional forces actively threatens the rule of law in the international order.

“Plausible Deniability” in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

While eastern European leaders are certainly justified in their concern, it is the job of military leaders all over the world to ensure that their forces are prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios. Zapad and other large-scale war games are intended to test the readiness of military forces to deal with such situations.

History, and Russia’s military doctrine, tells us that for the Kremlin to legitimately consider the use of force against a sovereign state—under the guise of aiding Russian-speaking separatists, military drills, or otherwise, the Russian military and political leadership must perceive a legitimate threat to Russia’s national interest—largely the interests of its ruling oligarchic elite.

Additionally, the Kremlin must be sure of its ability to prevail in any forceful confrontation or to, a minimum, ensure a stalemate. Neither condition seems present.

Since last year’s strategic Caucasus-2016 exercise, no Russian allies or client states are under greater threat than they were last year. A few, like Bashar al Assad of Syria, have seen threats to their rule decrease in the past year.

How Likely is it that Russia Will Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against the Baltics?

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Western countries were caught unaware as Russia employed hybrid tactics to hide its deployment of forces to Crimea.

NATO has beefed up its presence in its Baltic and Eastern-European Union member countries, further reducing the already slim chances that Russia will want to attempt an incursion in Baltic or E.U. states.

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Preparing for a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

The Russian military has been holding large scale strategic exercises each year of the twenty-first century, as the Russian economics has rebounded from the lows of the early 1990s. Preparing for such a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

It is also worth noting a correlation between Russia’s economic state and its military spending and training. This would imply that the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to train as far because they can afford to.

Until 2015, Russia’s military expenditures and the number of war games it conducted, both large- and small-scale, had been increasing at a faster rate than the rate of economic growth.

Russian Troop Deployments in Military Training Exercises

Russian GDP figures, Military Exercise Data, and Troop Numbers

Given the degree of attention focused on Russia’s military deployments, it’s highly unlikely that that Zapad-2017 will escalate into a full-scale or partial military conflict with NATO.

Even though Russia’s Gross domestic product grew to 2014, its costs grew by 300 percent at the exact same period and the number of war games increased by 157 percent from 2008 to 2014.

It should be noted that this precludes any so-called “black money” that would not appear on a publicly available balance sheet.

Security Analysis: Although Possible; War with NATO is Unlikely.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test responses through other measures, moderate or temporary escalation in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).

Additionally, due to regional geopolitical developments in the Russia-Belarus relationship, Russia may attempt to use “nonlinear” warfare tactics (asymmetric tactics) in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Zapad-2017: Analyzing Troop Numbers & Economic Factors was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russian-propagated disinformation campaigns, psychological manipulation efforts, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, financial and military aid to paramilitary groups, and the deployment of unmarked special forces by Russia in Crimea and later in Eastern Ukraine exemplifies the concept of contemporary non-linear conflict. Rather than proceeding in strategic, iterative steps, the various elements of the Russian strategy worked in tandem to complement one another.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent incursion into eastern Ukraine was launched on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the region. Russian media outlets and pro-Russian media in Ukraine began broadcasting continuous reports of anti-Russian violent demonstrations in Ukraine and that the security of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine was in jeopardy.

The manner with which the Kremlin created the “conditions” for intervention is not dissimilar to those utilized by the Bush Administration prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As the public would eventually learn, the administration had misled the congress and military about the possession of WMDs by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. This mistruth was the impetus for over a decade of bloody conflict that the administration was ill-prepared for.

The invasion was accomplished with great efficiency, but the Bush administration had failed to conceive a viable exit strategy. The occupation forces purged the entire bureaucratic state of the previously ruling Ba’ath party.

This purge created post-occupation conditions rife for corruption, disorder, and insurgency as a result of the critical shortage of experienced politicians and bureaucrats. The dismantling of the administrative and political structures that existed prior to the invasion left the country almost entirely bereft of adequate internal security measures.

By contrast, the Crimean annexation was masterfully executed by Russia; in no small part due to the Kremlin’s plan for integrating Crimea with greater-Russia. As the first wave of the “assault” was underway, the Russian legislature (the Duma) passed legislation that would make federal districts out of the territory of Crimea and city of Sevastopol (the location of Russia’s long-held Black Sea naval base).

In addition to their non-traditional “invasion,” the Russian forces made considerable and effective use of information warfare, cyber warfare, local militia, and protestors, combined with unmarked elite special forces units to foment a political coup within the autonomous territory. The new government then passed a seemingly “democratic” referendum in the Crimean parliament to formally request to join the Russian Federation. Coincidentally, the Parliament was surrounded by Russian “little green men;” special forces in unmarked uniforms.

Photo credit: quapan via VisualHunt / CC BY

Russia’s Justification for the Annexation of Crimea was originally published on Global Security Review.