Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its potential to “service” America’s nuclear enterprise continues to occupy the minds of strategic thinkers on both sides of the nuclear deterrence argument. In her recent opinion piece discussing AI and U.S. nuclear weapon decisions, Dr. Rebecca Grant highlights that “AI is already part of the intense modeling for nuclear weapons design. Nuclear warhead tests are banned, so AI will help the operational check-out before the new B61-13 bombs are sent to weapons storage facilities at Air Force bases.” Dr. Grant also points out the potential benefits of AI in improving targeting accuracy, rapid retargeting, and predictive analysis of battle or collateral damage.
What about potential nuclear weapon employment via the use of the Air Forces’ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)? An unmanned, autonomous, AI-piloted aircraft, the CCA will fly alongside crewed fighters, presumably to fly combat sorties resulting in casualties and battle damage. CCAs are intended to cost-effectively augment and enhance USAF combat capabilities and capacities without aggravating the fighter pilot shortage. These CCAs must be able to operate as loyal robotic wingmen tethered to manned fighter jets, as well as fly untethered with a high level of autonomy and trust when required. The real value of the untethered CCAs is the potential to deliver the most consequential weapons, through the most contested environments, against the most significant of targets without risking aircrew. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) plans to build about 1,000 CCAs by the end of the next decade.
As conveyed by SECAF Frank Kendall in his Sept 5th, 2023 memo to Airmen and Guardians, the Department is “not optimized for great power conflict” and the Department must devise and “implement the changes needed to meet our pacing challenge.” The SECAF’s clarion call to reorganize and reorient the Air Force must also encourage innovative and bold forms of integrated deterrence that include deploying AI-empowered CCAs with appropriate “strategic” capabilities like the new B61-13 intended to hold hard-to-reach targets at risk. Now is the time to begin crafting the prerequisite planning and acquiring to ensure this capability is possible in the future to avoid the much more costly retrofitting after delivery. Hermann Kahn once said, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.” This is essential for maintaining America’s nuclear deterrence and assurance credibility beyond 2030.