In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of Russia’s closest economic partners. At the outset of the war, Germany was criticized for its hesitant offer to Ukraine of 5,000 military helmets, at a time when other European states, especially the Baltic nations, were offering weapons and heavy military equipment to defend against the Russian invasion.

This hesitancy had two facets. First, the belief that military aid would escalate the war to unmanageable levels. Second, the fear that Russia could easily achieve its military objectives. In such a case, it was unwise for Germany to risk its economic interests, particularly its heavy reliance on Russian natural gas.

However, Germany, later, began supplying weapons and other military aid to Ukraine under domestic and international pressures. Later, Germany even supplied heavy military equipment to Ukraine. As of August 2025, Germany is one of the largest suppliers of military aid, amounting to $47 billion worth. This includes air-defense systems, advanced drones, and heavy artillery. German action illustrates how incremental support erodes Russia’s nuclear red lines.

Incremental Steps Eroding the Threshold 

In the Russian conceptualization of deterrence, strategic deterrence (strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye), both nuclear and conventional deterrence merge into one holistically integrated framework. The threat of or actual use of nuclear weapons would deter a conventional attack on Russia, help achieve military objectives, prevent third parties from entering a war, and help de-escalate a war. In the 1990s, when Russia fielded a conventionally inferior armed force, it relied primarily on nuclear deterrence for its security.

However, a nuclear-deterrence-focused security strategy does not consider the erosion of thresholds owing to incremental changes during war (i.e., incremental changes test interwar and intrawar deterrence). After Pakistan became a nuclear power, Pakistan employed sub-threshold tactics (terrorism) against India, assuming that the fear of mutual nuclear vulnerability would prevent India from using kinetic means in retaliation. However, this approach failed when India employed conventional force against Pakistan in 2016, 2019, and, more prominently, in Operation Sindoor (2025). Similarly, Ukraine challenged Russia with its aggressive attacks in response to Russian invasion.

Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine (2024) brought the threshold of nuclear employment to an even lower level than earlier doctrine. This includes “actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure” and “the massive launch […] of air and space attacks means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles).”

Ukraine’s Operation Spyder Web crossed these “nuclear thresholds” set in the 2024 doctrine. Russia’s numerous threats of tactical nuclear weapons use are not taken seriously by Europe any longer. This creates a stability-instability paradox where “conventional balances also reduce the credibility of nuclear threats precisely because there is a conventional alternative to resorting to nuclear weapons.”

One of the implications of the stability-instability paradox in international relations is that while nuclear weapons create stability at the strategic level by deterring large-scale war between nuclear-armed states, they increase the likelihood of smaller, limited, or conventional conflicts. This is reinforced in the Ukraine conflict, where Russia simply cannot use nuclear weapons to deter third-party military help to Ukraine and Ukraine’s counteroffensives.

Nuclear deterrence has limitations and does not deter incremental or conventional actions of lower yields. The costs associated with utilizing nuclear weapons for deterring incremental erosion of thresholds is unimaginable. It is difficult for parties in a war to agree upon thresholds. Thus, resorting to conventional attacks rather than escalating to nuclear use becomes more likely, even after crossing stated red lines. 

States Should Build on That 

For that matter, those states looking to augment their defence preparedness should invest in conventional deterrence capabilities that can guarantee security. This goes beyond just building missile and air-defense systems of a high calibre. Conventional deterrence is not merely about weapons to deter an adversary.

Military thinking needs to go beyond just inventing new weapons and focus on military strategy. States need to go beyond a one-size-fits-all understanding of deterrence, where all states subscribe to the same benchmarks, variables, and conceptualization of deterrence, and have a shared sense of it. Situating deterrence within the fold of strategic culture, how a state’s strategic culture shapes deterrence, is more helpful. For instance, in contrast to the denial versus punishment typology, Russia uses the forceful versus non-forceful scheme for deterrence.

States may need to invest in the re-invention of military doctrines, strategy, and thinking to suit current challenges. It is worth studying how adversaries see the concept of deterrence. It confers two advantages. First, it helps one remain prepared for any incremental utilization of force under the fear of mutual destruction. Second, it allows the defender to assess the opponent’s risk-taking appetite and nuclear threshold in a war. This would confer advantages associated with effectively using conventional means.

At the same time, both parties need to be aware of over-extension, where a misguided action can cause a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Since agreeing on the same trigger point is subjective and difficult, states must study the pace, timing, and intensity of the use of non-nuclear forces to effectively achieve objectives without jumping to the nuclear step on an escalatory ladder.

In the end, preventing nuclear war is critical. Thus, understanding thresholds is important. If war is unlikely to end, ensuring it does not escalate to nuclear use should be a top priority.

Anshu Kumar is a Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Showcases the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.

The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for regional proliferation.

Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the existing arms control framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.

The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.

Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a climate of uncertainty. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.

President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.

This approach stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.

The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by unconstrained proliferation and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hezbollah, now attempting to fend off Israel’s September 30 ground operation, is simultaneously working to adapt its own approach to technology, and, if history is any indicator of the future, the terror group will likely continue as it has, answering Israel’s high-tech efforts with ironically harder to trace low-tech options. That Hezbollah was even using pagers was to avoid cellular detection. And as they adapt, their communications will likely go even more analog, perhaps communicating only through couriers, as Osama Bin Laden was known to do, or using physical handwritten notes and dead drops, as militant Italian anarchist groups did in the early 2000s.

While the idea of a terrorist group obtaining a more technologically advanced arsenal, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or instituting a mass cyberattack is daunting, it is not exactly uncommon due to expense and required expertise. What is far more likely is that Hezbollah and other terrorist groups will downgrade methods, opting for cheaper and easier to implement weapons and methods which are more than capable of lethal outcomes.

Time and time again, society has seen heavy damage wrought on person and property via methods that seem relatively primitive.

In 2021, the Gaza-based terrorist group Hamas increased their use of incendiary balloons when attacking Israel, causing more than 20 fires in southern Israel, straining civilian and IDF emergency service resources, and burning upward of 10,000 acres of farmland over the preceding three years. These “balloons are easily constructed and require little setup to launch compared to rockets, which are expensive and time-consuming to produce” but are still incredibly effective.

In 2013, a US power plant in California was victim of an as yet unsolved shooting attack, damaging multiple transformers. Surprisingly set up with little to no security, the plant’s perimeter was breached and approximately 100 rounds of high-powered rifle ammunition were fired into 17 transformers before police arrived. The damage was severe enough that to avoid blackouts across Silicon Valley power had to be diverted from other areas during the months-long repair.

While these incidents are high profile, given the critical infrastructure connections, they did not result in any fatalities. However, that is not always the goal of terrorists and is hardly the reality for other common low-tech methods. Shootings, bombings, and melee attacks continue to make up the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks. Research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that from 2015 to 2020,  85 percent of terror attacks employed one of these methods, with 12 percent being unrealized threats, 2 percent other, and 1 percent vehicle ramming.

The numbers are remarkably similar for lethal attacks in 2023 according to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index published by Vision of Humanity. Out of the 50 most lethal terrorist attacks, only one, an incident in the Homs Province of Syria, featuring an explosive-laden unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeting a military graduation ceremony which killed 89 people, could be thought of as a high-tech weapon. The other 49 were made up of 43 armed assaults, five bombings, and one explosive projectile.

As terrorist groups get backed into a corner by high-tech counter methods like the Israeli pager attack, it is increasingly likely they will rely on time-proven simple methods. The world may even see them adapting and learning from accidents such as the September 2024 car crash into a gas pipeline in Texas which caused an explosion or the 2017 Hamburg, Germany, airport evacuation which resulted from the accidental discharge of a simple, lipstick-sized can of pepper spray. While these were both accidents, one can imagine the economic and fear-induced impact if a terrorist group were to try to replicate the outcomes.

There are, of course, outliers to the terrorist use of low-tech methods. There is the terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo’s launch of the notorious Tokyo Sarin gas attack in 1995 or drone attacks along the lines of  2023’s drone attack in Syria, as well as other groups’ potential use of commercial drones. But today’s would-be terrorist is likely not resorting to high-tech weapon or communication devices, and more often than not, going for something easy and/or available. To borrow from Chistopher Nolan’s Joker in the Dark Knight, items like “dynamite, and gunpowder, and gasoline [are] cheap” and are going to comprise the bulk of the future threats from terrorist groups.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire was originally published on Global Security Review.

From counterterrorism efforts to geopolitical forecasting, the applications of AI in strategic intelligence operations span a diverse array of domains, shaping national security strategies and global geopolitics alike. However, alongside these transformative capabilities come complex ethical, legal, and policy considerations that necessitate careful navigation.

            Foremost, AI has the ability to continuously monitor news sources, social media feeds, and other open-source intelligence channels in real time, alerting analysts to relevant developments as they happen. Sifting through massive datasets from diverse sources that include both open-source and classified reporting will allow analysts to quickly dismiss the “noise” and more easily discover relevant information that might otherwise be missed by human-driven analysis. Tedious and repetitive tasks, like report generation or data cleaning, can be automated, increasing efficiency and allowing analysts to focus their time and efforts on critical strategic analysis.

Furthermore, algorithms will unearth subtle trends, correlations, and anomalies that traditional analytical methods often overlook. This enhanced capability will empower proactive decision-making based on insights that would have otherwise remained hidden. Algorithms can help identify and mitigate potential biases in human analysis, promoting more objective decision-making processes. AI tools can act as a “smart assistant,” highlighting relevant information, providing summaries, and offering different perspectives to enhance human analysis. This frees up analysts from mundane information-gathering tasks and allows them to focus on higher-order strategic thinking.

Expanding further, the advanced collection and analytical features of AI will greatly assist with gauging potential instability in regions of interest, analyzing competitor activities, patent filings, and market trends, which can be streamlined with AI to quickly identify threats and opportunities. AI can analyze network traffic to detect anomalies indicative of potential cyberattacks, allowing for a faster response to cybersecurity threat detection.

The capabilities of generating and analyzing various potential scenarios based on historical data and current trends, in a fraction of the time needed for humans, provides analysts with a more comprehensive analysis for decision-makers to assess the likelihood of different outcomes and a higher confidence in predicting and understanding the consequences of their decisions. The AI-powered predictive analytical forecasting potential of geopolitical events, economic shifts, or emerging technologies that might create future strategic risks or opportunities for governments is attractive to all states as they leverage advantages to expand influence and power.

Incorporating AI capabilities into the strategic intelligence realm is not without its challenges or concerns. It will be imperative to ensure meaningful human control over any AI systems associated with strategic intelligence. Other national security assets should be considered a high priority at this critical onset of AI applications focused on the establishment of safeguards against autonomous decisions.

Considering AI relies on the accuracy and completeness of data, ensuring effective measures are in place to maintain data integrity and avoid garbage-in, garbage-out scenarios is critical. It is vital that AI models are interpretable so that analysts can understand the reasoning behind recommendations. This builds trust and facilitates better decision-making. Addressing biases in AI models and ensuring algorithms are used in a transparent and responsible manner that aligns with organizational values is also important.

Advancing AI may process vast amounts of data in times of crisis, and do it far faster than humans, though there is understandable concern about the appropriate level of AI involvement in high-stakes decisions where time is of the essence. For example, should AI have any control over nuclear launch decisions, and if so, how much? Errors in AI analysis or reliance on faulty data could lead to miscalculations and unintended escalation.

As intelligence agencies increasingly rely on advanced technologies like AI, there is a need for robust regulation and oversight to prevent abuse of power, misuse of data, and violations of civil liberties. Policies should establish clear guidelines for the collection, storage, and use of intelligence data, as well as mechanisms for accountability and transparency.

The proliferation of intelligence data and the use of advanced analytics pose challenges related to data security and protection. Policies must address issues such as data encryption, secure storage, access controls, and measures to safeguard against cyber threats and breaches.

Given the global nature of many intelligence threats, there is a need for international cooperation and the development of norms and standards governing the use of AI technologies. Policies should promote collaboration among intelligence agencies from different countries while respecting sovereignty and legal frameworks.

AI algorithms used in intelligence operations may exhibit bias or produce unfair outcomes, particularly if trained on biased data or programmed with flawed assumptions. Policies should address these concerns through measures such as algorithmic transparency, fairness assessments, and diversity in data sources and large language model (LLM) development.

The development and deployment of AI technologies can confer strategic advantages to nations or organizations. Policies may need to balance the pursuit of such advantages with efforts to prevent destabilizing arms races or conflicts arising from the use of intelligence capabilities.

The use of AI capabilities, particularly in areas such as cyber warfare or information operations, can raise the risk of deterrence failures or unintended escalation. Policies should seek to establish clear deterrence strategies, rules of engagement, and mechanisms for de-escalation to mitigate these risks. As AI technologies become more sophisticated, intelligence operations will increasingly involve human-machine collaboration. Policies should address issues such as human oversight, accountability for algorithmic decisions, and the ethical implications of human-AI interaction in intelligence activities.

The future of AI and strategic intelligence operations is poised to be characterized by continued innovation, integration, and adaptation to evolving geopolitical, technological, and societal landscapes. Further breakthroughs in AI technologies, including deep learning, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning, will enable intelligence agencies to extract deeper insights from vast and diverse datasets. This will enhance capabilities for predictive analysis, anomaly detection, and decision support across a wide range of intelligence operations.

The integration of AI into autonomous systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), will certainly revolutionize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. These systems will be capable of operating in contested or denied environments with reduced risk to human operators and logistical support assets.

The proliferation of cyber threats and the increasing reliance on information warfare tactics will drive the expansion of cyberintelligence capabilities. Intelligence agencies will focus on detecting, attributing, and mitigating cyberattacks, as well as leveraging information operations to shape narratives and influence adversaries.

The rise of social media platforms and digital communication channels will continue to reshape intelligence gathering and analysis. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and social media analysis techniques will play an increasingly prominent role in monitoring global events, assessing public sentiment, and identifying emerging threats. Intelligence agencies will increasingly collaborate with other government agencies, international partners, and private-sector entities to leverage complementary expertise and resources. Fusion centers will facilitate the integration of intelligence from multiple sources to produce more comprehensive and timely assessments.

Intelligence agencies will need to enhance their resilience and adaptability to rapidly evolving threats, including emerging technologies, geopolitical shifts, and unconventional adversaries. This will require agile organizational structures, flexible operational frameworks, and continuous investment in training and capabilities development.

Overall, the future of AI and strategic intelligence operations will be characterized by a dynamic interplay between technological innovation, geopolitical dynamics, and societal trends. By embracing these trends and addressing associated challenges, intelligence agencies can enhance their effectiveness in safeguarding national security and advancing strategic objectives in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

As the United States intelligence community navigates the complexities of an increasingly interconnected and unpredictable world, the future of strategic intelligence operations will be defined by our ability to harness the power of AI technologies while mitigating their risks and ensuring their responsible and ethical use. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and upholding democratic values, intelligence agencies can effectively confront the challenges of the 21st century and advance the interests of peace, security, and prosperity for all.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own.  

Unveiling the Future: The Convergence of AI and Strategic Intelligence Operations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Diplomatic efforts toward addressing these modern national security challenges can “enhance integrated deterrence, global stability, and international security,” but only if these efforts result in favorable outcomes for America. Therefore, it is crucial that this renamed organization reorients its purpose and metrics accordingly. Pursuing many agreements, even if they are bad, is not a reliable way to measure success. The success of any agreement should only be measured by how effective it is. The three maxims to successful arms control agreements are:

1. Any agreement that does not satisfy the national security needs of the parties will eventually be cheated on and thus fail
2. Any agreement that does not have rigorous and regular verification procedures will eventually be cheated on and thus fail
3. Any agreement that is not symmetrically desired by all parties will yield asymmetric results that benefit one party over another; the perception of any lopsided agreements will eventually be rejected and thus fail

The Bureau’s name change not only addresses “emerging 21st-century national security challenges,” but acknowledges the important role deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence, plays in achieving and maintaining global stability. The National Institute for Deterrence Studies congratulates the ADS’s recognition that it “must modernize [its] approaches and expand [their] thinking to help build a more stable, peaceful world” and we stand ready to assist!

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Has Been Renamed to Acknowledge the Value of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The decentralization of the ability to disseminate information at scale poses a challenge in the event of national and global security threats and incidents like terrorism, instability in post-conflict states, natural disasters, and public health crises, such as the pandemic we are currently experiencing. In all the examples above, without exception, individuals use social media to share opinions, news, photos, and videos of the incident and its aftermath. First responders and the relevant authorities—whether defense, intelligence, national security, law enforcement, and public health agencies—require accurate information in real-time, and can use social media as a tool for such information to assist in planning and response.

While social media is already widely used by law enforcement and national security agencies as to gather and disseminate information, this author argues there is an essential need to advance the use of social media in the public sector as a source of real-time information to enhance situational awareness, crisis preparedness, and disaster response efforts.

Social media is already utilized in counter-terrorism, criminal investigations, threat forecasting, and information operations. However, social networks can be even further harnessed by public sector agencies as a continuous, real-time source of intelligence, if leveraged appropriately, particularly given that improvements in technology applications mean that any individual with a basic camera-equipped smartphone can serve as a source of on-the-ground information at the epicenter of a significant incident.

Many would argue that continuous, in-depth analysis of social media content infringes on civil liberties and is invasive to the privacy of individuals, yet such an argument exposes a double standard relating to the use of information on social networks by public sector agencies. Many social media users share content publicly, therefore, analysis of publicly-available social media content by public sector agencies wouldn’t be a violation of user privacy. In the Intelligence Community, the use of social networks as a source of intelligence falls into the OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) category.

Regardless, whether used by law enforcement, defense agencies, the intelligence community, or the general public, social media is an immeasurably powerful tool for reaching and connecting people at scale. Relevant social media content and “hashtags” trend around the globe within minutes of a crisis event—such as an act of terrorism, political violence, a natural disaster, or a public health emergency—particularly when an incident rapidly escalates and is unpredictable in nature.

It’s therefore critical that defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, maintain and have access to continuous monitoring of social media trends as they develop in real-time. In high priority incidents, individuals on the scene are likely to share photographs, videos, and text updates—information of great value in a crisis. Intelligence gathered from real-time analysis of social networks would include, but not be limited to, preliminary assessments of the situation’s complexity and the response required, as well as forecasting future consequences that could arise.

Citizen journalism and “whistleblowing” over social media can also serve as a critical indicator and a warning sign of worsening situations. A recent example of this was Dr. Li Wenliang, the Chinese doctor who issued a warning in a message shared on the Chinese social media platform Weibo on December 30th, 2019 about a “strange new virus,” which is now a pandemic impacting nearly every country in some way. In hindsight, had his post been viewed by intelligence agencies as an early warning sign, many states may have taken stricter measures earlier on to limit the impact of COVID-19.

In addition to systematic social media monitoring, automated text, and sentiment analysis of publicly shared user posts can provide crucial insights into the attitude of the general public and reactions towards an incident. This would further help first responders and security authorities when communicating with the public in an emergency, such as implementing enhanced security screening, border closures, and evacuations. Moreover, automated analysis of social media posts would assist first responders in their response factoring to avoid contributing to a public panic.

Social media in a crisis is a double-edged sword. As a crisis takes hold, a state’s adversaries are likely to take advantage of the situation and unleash a barrage of online disinformation and propaganda through social media channels in an attempt to foment public unrest. Such campaigns, usually initiated with a political agenda in mind to use the general public as unwitting proxy actors, present an additional challenge that further emphasizes the importance of maintaining continuous, real-time monitoring of publicly available user-generated social media content. Such a capability would effectively reinforce the efforts of first responders on-the-ground, and allow for public sector authorities to better mitigate the consequences of malicious disinformation campaigns.

Furthermore, continuous monitoring of social media platforms by a state’s security agencies enables those agencies to anticipate and counter unintentional misinformation. The spread of inaccurate rumors may have an adverse impact on public safety, a possible reason for the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Ghrebreysus, advocated for urgent measures to be taken to mitigate the fallout from the coronavirus “infodemic.”

Social Media’s Role in Disaster Preparedness & Crisis Management was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Russian flag was raised by residents of Crimea, not Russian soldiers. Russian forces were stripped of any identifying markers or insignia. Cyber attacks launched at Ukrainian infrastructure and internet domains were structured in a manner that obfuscated Russia’s involvement.

It’s widely understood that Russia was responsible for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, the confusion spawned by the disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and unmarked special forces, and the later actions in eastern Ukraine, would see the west committing further inaction allowing the Kremlin to consolidate, and then normalize the acquisition of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

After the conspicuous invasion of Georgia in 2008, the 2014 Crimea operation employed subtle paramilitary and special forces to seize critical points of interest while securing internal order. Russia applied a  broad swath of non-military, hybrid or “non-linear” warfare tactics designed to foster the rapid integration of the Crimean political, security, media, and financial sectors with those in Russia.

The period between the initial “invasion” of information and cyber attacks and the eventual referendum deciding Russian sovereignty over the peninsula was little more than a month.

The military involvement served as a deterrent to Ukrainian troops, while the lack of insignia or identifying features on Russian special forces provided a degree of plausible deniability. Accordingly, the NATO powers in Europe and North America would not have apparent cause to intervene.

Simultaneously, the political, economic, and information warfare campaigns that had been set in motion were masked by the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion in other parts of Ukraine.  Russian troop mobilizations and activity near the Ukrainian border diverted international attention from Crimea while pro-Russian non-military measures were implemented to politically, socially, and economically integrate the Crimean peninsula with Russia.

Having learned the mistakes of overt military action, and the risks that such action has for becoming embroiled in a heated civil war, Russian military strategists employed a mixture of both state-sponsored actors, state actors, and pro-Russian Crimean civilian protestors and militia groups.

All state-actors in Crimea were bereft of identifying marks that would associate Russia with the incursion.

All that was required for the Kremlin to deny any responsibility was for their special forces to show up wearing un-flagged uniforms. Regarding ensuring the viability and legitimacy of their actions in Ukraine, Russia proceeded to launch an aggressive campaign in the United Nations. As they had done before their 2008 invasion of Georgia, their disinformation campaign extended to Russian delegates at the United Nations.

Russia’s ambassador repeatedly—and forcefully—asserted that Ukrainian authorities were threatening and committing acts of violence against ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Superficially, the carefully crafted (artificial) legal context for this argument was structured similarly to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

It must be noted that the latter was to ensure the security and existence of critically vulnerable civilians. This is a stark contrast to the underlying reason for Russian aggression, which is to provide the continued hegemony of Russia in the post-Soviet space.

The efficacy of the Crimean campaign (and Russian non-linear warfare as a strategy) is evidenced by two factors.

One is the degree to which Russia was able to normalize the annexation. The other is the masterful execution of diplomatic and legal rhetoric which rendered the West inability of Western military intervention, to realize a controlled process of de-escalation and normalization.

The ongoing exploitation—and arguably weaponization—of International law and legal framework by State actors posits a critical urgency to reform theoretical conceptualizations of international law governing conflict, especially since purely conventional battles will be the exception in the 21st century. The blending of non-linear tactics with plausibly deniable conventional forces actively threatens the rule of law in the international order.

“Plausible Deniability” in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Domestically, these problems include decreased public trust in institutions, “fake news” proliferating on social media, a growing wealth gap, and technological disruption to financial and labor markets.

On the global stage, there is considerable anxiety about the role the U.S. will play in what seems to be an increasingly multi-polar world order.

The international community will scrutinize the United States’ every move over the next decade.

They will be watching for signs of internal dissent, cooperation, contradiction, and isolationism. Economic policy, ethnic tensions and identity politics, tax policy, and workplace regulations will be areas of focus.

Lack of progress in these areas could signal a broader decline for the United States. This would mean a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, decreased federal authority, and diminished U.S. influence in global affairs. Nevertheless, the United States’ possesses undeniably massive levels of human and security capital. It is deeply entrenched in international political and economic systems, while a clear separation of powers within U.S. government institutions ensures that abrupt withdrawal from foreign engagements remains unlikely.

U.S. influence is likely to remain stagnant or constrained in the short term.

Contradictory rhetoric from the executive branch will impede U.S. credibility abroad and harm American interests. Persistent contradictions from within the administration heighten the risk of U.S. engagement in a significant conflict.While the short-term outlook for the United States’ role as the global leader remains uncertain, in the long-term, the U.S. will continue uniquely positioned to stay at the forefront of the worldwide order.

The United States has weathered hard times before.

The 1970s were a period of high national anxiety but were followed by a robust economic recovery and a greater sense of global leadership. Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

The U.S. Must Manage Domestic & Foreign Challenges in Order to Wield Credible Global Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or an abatement of public anger, Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Rather, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some key differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

Regional Geopolitics and the Venezuelan Crisis

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a very weak government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence. An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence.

Particularly, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

How Likely is a Civil War in Venezuela? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

The Current Situation: Repression, Resource Insecurity, and the Risk of Escalation

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, and the stage was effectively set for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests really different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e. for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Crisis in Venezuela: Economic Collapse, Violent Unrest, and Human Survival was originally published on Global Security Review.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that certain political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, Venezuela’s government would agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and agree to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy requires an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors so as to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a major effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.” There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it’s granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, it typically provides reduced sentences for human rights abusers, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity. Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. an interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela would be the first time that has happened, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Solving the Economic & Security Crisis in Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

China is a rising power. It is agreed that China has the capabilities to eventually significantly surpass the United States regarding global economic and political power. Chinese posturing in the South China Sea is an attempt to gauge and establish its sphere of influence in a region that has been long dominated by the United States.

Relations with the U.S. were tested particularly after Trump’s pre-inauguration phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, which flew in the face of 40 years of diplomatic convention.

Trump’s anti-China stance when it comes to trade is questionable. His businesses have partnered with Chinese investors and banks, and his projects have been built using Chinese steel. It’s unlikely that he would risk jeopardizing his children’s—and his own–long-term business interests.

Some argue that the U.S. and China are on the verge of inevitable conflict. This “Thucydides Trap” says that as one power rises, the other declines and the two are destined for inevitable conflict. Statistically, this isn’t a far-fetched concept; only 4 out of 16 prior great-power transitions have not resulted in war.

Is the Thucydides Trap Inevitable? Not Necessarily.

In this realist view, China is an irresistable force approaching an immovable object—the United States. The U.S.’s commitment
to the Bretton Woods institutions, alliances, and political structures which have supported its global hegemony, it is argued, is proof of the inevitability of this conflict.

The 45th President of the United States, however, may not be so steadfast in those commitments. Nixon’s overtures to China and its subsequent admission to the U.N. marked an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. Anti-Communism was rampant, but the interests of capitalism took precedence over political ideology.

In return for access to Chinese markets, the U.S. recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign authority over China, and supported the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, at Taiwan’s expense.

This rapid departure from the status quo served as a jumping-off point for bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. All the while, Nixon utilized his public abhorrence of communism to distract from his use of realpolitik in a way that sharply contrasted with American ideology.

Trump’s continued self-contradiction and erraticism could serve a similar purpose, however unintentionally. The rhetoric on Chinese economic policy, on the surface, made Trump look tough against China during the election. However, following his taking office, Trump and his advisors have been leaning on China for assistance in dealing with North Korea.

Triangular Diplomacy: a New World Order?

Many have begun to draw comparison’s between the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Nixon’s model of triangular diplomacy. To incentivize Putin, the U.S. would endorse a consolidation of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and parts of central Asia, recognizing a Russian sphere of influence, and support productive bilateral oil partnerships.

A similar strategy would be deployed with regards to China, with the impetus for them being the arrangements created between Trump and Putin. In this scenario, President Trump utilizes American commitments and the existing global power structure as commodities to transact.

Yes, this is a retreat from the current status quo, but it is not isolationism—it is a restructuring of the global order to accommodate a shift in world power—a crude re-establishment of the triangular diplomacy model employed by Nixon and Kissinger with China and Russia.

At present, the United States seems to be in its last days as the leader of a unipolar international order. Rapid technological advancement is contributing to global economic uncertainty, and international security is increasingly threatened. Global influence is becoming increasingly multipolar. Some degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt in the face of changing norms is obligatory.

Trump may recognize this. He may not. Is he a madman theorist, or is he just mad? A comparison to Nixon may not be entirely appropriate, as Nixon was a prolific student of political theory and often read up diplomatic history.

However, madman theory dictates that one’s opponent must be entirely convinced of his opponent’s irrationality. President Trump has even managed to convince long-standing American allies of that. Danish foreign minister Kristian Jensen, when asked about the future of relations with the United States, responded by saying “Donald Trump changes opinions like others change underwear.”

China, the United States, and the Thucydides Trap was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense led by Secretary James Mattis has been given a significant degree of autonomy to operate within. Following a series of missile and nuclear bomb tests in North Korea, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the “era of strategic patience is over,” referencing the U.S. North Korea policy under prior administrations.

In April and May of 2017, the U.S. Navy began increasing its forward-deployed military presence in the region, in a show of force to the North. Concurrently, in attempts to call the United States’ “bluff” regarding a pre-emptive strike, North Korea has taken steps to escalate tensions with aggressive anti-American rhetoric and threats of nuclear war and continued weapons tests in defiance of the UN Security Council.

By May, the U.S. Navy had deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups (formerly referred to as battle groups) to the Korean Peninsula—the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the U.S.S. Carl Vinson carrier strike group.

By June, the Navy confirmed that a third carrier battle group, led by the U.S.S. Nimitz, was en route to the region. Upon its arrival, the United States’ will have three of its aircraft carrier-led battle groups operating in the vicinity of North Korea, almost 30% of the U.S. carrier fleet.

How would war involving the U.S. and North Korea play out?

According to senior Defense Department officials, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be one of the most violent and devastating combat operations in over a generation. Despite that, allied forces led by the U.S. would be victorious. The high levels of projected casualties stem from the proximity of the South Korean capital of Seoul to the North Korean border.

Seoul is one of the most densely populated metropolitan areas in the world. It lies just over 30 miles from the North Korean border and is well in the range of the hundreds of artillery and missile batteries that the North has stationed just north of the demilitarized zone.

South Korea has approximately 625,000 active-duty troops and another 3.1 million troops on reserve. While North Korea has roughly twice those numbers, their equipment is highly outdated, albeit augmented by an asymmetric nuclear capability.

What are the risks and consequences of a pre-emptive strike on the North?

Minor equipment or troop movements on the South Korean border can spark aggression from the North. Therefore, American, South Korean, and Japanese forces preparing to launch a pre-emptive strike would need to do so clandestinely, to catch North Korean forces off-guard.

In this scenario, major military, nuclear research, bunkers, and weapons depots would be targeted, with marines and special forces being deployed from carriers and amphibious assault ships off the North Korean coast. Such an operation would need to be executed swiftly, and with overwhelming force.

Otherwise, risk larger numbers of civilian casualties that would result from an attack—conventional or nuclear—on the Seoul metropolitan area should the North maintain the capability to launch such offense after a pre-emptive strike.

The China Option: Regime Change or Diplomacy

Trump’s attraction to authoritarian heads-of-state could very well lead to a negotiated settlement, or at the very least, some form of detente. China publicly favors a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Alternatively, Chinese political and military leaders may decide that it’s in China’s strategic interest to support or execute a regime change in North Korea.

Economically, the West has much more to offer China than North Korea does. However, China remains wary of uncontrolled destabilization in North Korea as it would likely lead to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with high numbers of refugees flooding into China.

Escalation on the Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.