Now It Can Be Told

With the advent of American efforts to revitalize the nation’s nuclear arsenal, it seems appropriate to review the challenges of the first and most ambitious nuclear weapons program, the Manhattan Project. Current modernization efforts include new intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear bombers, ballistic missile submarines, nuclear warheads, and nuclear production facilities. Comparing and contrasting these programs with the monumental effort to produce the first atomic bombs may well offer insights and ideas for successful execution. In this respect, Lieutenant General Leslie Groves’ book, Now It Can Be Told, offers plenty.

Consider the following observations. Groves remarks early in his memoire that there was a “basic concept—that of always keeping authority and responsibility together.” There was no massive bureaucracy that hampered efforts. He also noted, “nobody who was directly involved ever had any doubt about what he was supposed to do…each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in our total effort.” Groves was clearly focused on the mission and the time constraints under which performance was expected, as was every member of the larger team.

Size does matter, and larger is not always better. According to Groves, “It was undoubtedly one of the smallest headquarters seen in modern Washington. Our internal organization was simple and direct, and enabled me to make fast, positive decisions.” Consistent with this idea was the view that the leadership was, “strongly opposed to large staffs, for they are conducive to inaction and delay…they bury the leaders’ capacity to make prompt and intelligent decisions under a mass of indecisive, long-winded staff studies.” Is it any wonder that the United States has never repeated an accomplishment like the Manhattan Project in the seven decades since. The Department of Defense’s onerous requirements process would never allow such a project.

Groves also discussed picking new leaders when it was necessary. As he notes, “It was a mistake not to have had…a group of [regular] officers who were thoroughly experienced in all the problems…of atomic energy but in all the manifold problems involved in technical and scientific developments that have played such an important part in our national defense since1945.” Another admitted mistake was the absence, early on, of a replacement for Groves. A similar situation occurs today with the dearth of experience in nuclear matters.

Trust is a major factor in performance and execution. Funding the Manhattan Project was “solved by arranging for [Groves] to be paid by the United States $37,500,000… [he]deposited this money in a personal account at the US Treasury… [he made] withdrawals as necessary and deposited the money with Bankers Trust Company of New York. Despite the large sums of money involved, agreements were reached expeditiously and without any quibbling over legal language…[using]…a scratch pad on which we wrote down the various points as agreement was reached.” This description of how the project was funded is almost too fantastical to be believable, yet it is true. The level of trust and flexibility given to Groves is improbable at the present time.

Risk is unavoidable in military operations during peace or war. As Groves writes, “Even today few people are aware of one of the big risks …taken by the United States during the war. It grew out of the possibility that the Germans might use radioactive material to block the cross-channel attack.” When considering current nuclear modernization programs, it is important to reflect on our own risk aversion. Groves and his scientific colleagues took huge risks based on theory and probability.

Success can be squandered by conceit and social liberalism. According to Groves “Widespread public discussion of how the US should conduct its atomic affairs…the most vocal protagonists took…the liberal position…they wished the United States to proceed with full confidence in the Russians.” He added,

The result was that a new and vociferous group of spokesmen arose from among the younger scientific people, few of whom had any experience outside the academic world…. some of whom sought personal prestige and some of whom wished to forward extreme social points of view. The propaganda emanating from these sources was eagerly seized upon by various ambitious political figures, and by a few people in the State Department who seemed to me more concerned about the momentary good will of other nations than about the welfare of the United States.

Groves’ thoughts here are prescient, reflecting some of the same propaganda emanating from disarmament organizations about the value of nuclear weapons today.

Leslie Groves’ Now It Can Be Told contains a wealth of very detailed information—especially the appendices. The sheer magnitude and complexity of the Manhattan Project is difficult to imagine or overstate. Why was Groves able to accomplish so much in such a short time frame? Several reasons exist. First, a focus on the mission was critical. Second, calculated and weighted risk were taken. Third, relentless tenacity allowed Groves to coopt stakeholders.

There is one critique of the book. Its organization left much to be desired, which is ironic considering the organization required to build the atomic bomb. For any member of the nuclear enterprise, this forty-year-old memoir is well worth the read. It is, after all, a window to our own experience.

Col. (Ret) W. Michael Guillot is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.