Justin Lynch
Senior Director, Defense, Special Competitive Studies Project
Emma Morrison
MSFS Candidate, Georgetown University
Published July 2023
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs
The Challenge to Deterrence Strategy
Deterrence strategy, and a state’s ability to effectively employ it, is dependent on the state’s ability to demonstrate capability and credibility and to clearly communicate those signals to a potential adversary. Credibility cannot be achieved without effective detection and attribution. Without detection, would-be deterrers are unable to mount an effective strategy of denial or threaten retaliation as part of a strategy of punishment. Without attribution, defense is possible, though punishment cannot be targeted at a specific actor. While detection and attribution are not the only components of credibility, they are essential.
Russia has come to depend on information operations as its “most effective gray zone tactic”—a tactic that continues “to be well-funded, relentless, and prolific,”[18] as expressed by Moscow’s military doctrine, which scholars have found “frequently equates the strategic impact of information weapons with that of weapons of mass destruction.”
When an adversary manages to ensure that its operations and preparations for those operations avoid detection and attribution, that reduces the probability that targeted countries will adequately prepare to respond. This increases the probability of the aggressor accomplishing its goals and decreases its likely cost of victory, undermining the credibility of deterrence strategies.
As with any strategy, the odds of deterrence achieving its desired effects are dependent on a clear understanding of the world at a given moment.
