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Dynamic Parity: A New Approach to American Nuclear Deterrence

In the evolving strategic environment, where adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are expanding their nuclear capabilities, the United States must alter its nuclear strategy to match the increased threat facing the nation. The pages that follow propose a strategy of “dynamic parity” as a solution for maintaining balance and protecting the American national security. This strategy emphasizes creating a symmetrical balance of nuclear capabilities with the collective capabilities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Historically, nuclear deterrence was central in averting both nuclear war and great-power conventional war. It enabled unprecedented global prosperity. However, the current strategic environment presents significant challenges, with autocratic adversaries aiming to disrupt the American-led rules-based international order. The growing nuclear arsenals of these non-democratic states are intended to coerce and deter American intervention in regional conflicts, necessitating a shift from the existing “business as usual” nuclear policy.

The Need for a New Strategy

The bipartisan Congressional Commission on America’s Strategic Posture highlighted the inadequacy of the current nuclear arsenal in deterring China and Russia. The United States must adopt a dynamic approach to its nuclear strategy to adequately address the increasing threats posed by the combined forces of China, North Korea, and Russia. Dynamic parity is designed to achieve four primary purposes:

1. Balance the American nuclear arsenal against the collective arsenals of China, North Korea, and Russia to prevent the United States from becoming inferior in nuclear capability.

2. Enhance extended deterrence by assuring allies of American commitment to match adversary expansion with comparable capabilities.

3. Create a flexible framework for managing the growth or decline of operationally deployed nuclear weapons in the absence of arms control.

4. Inform American nuclear force configuration, size, and deployment.

About the Author

Curtis McGiffin
Associate Editor Strategic Adversaries | Articles

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.
Read the full bio here

Adam Lowther
Articles

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Read the full bio here.

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