While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

The summit occurred at a notably significant time because the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council may be at stake for the first time since its founding in 1981. The blockade of Qatar, the ongoing war in Yemen, and the diplomatic fallout over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi are a few of the major issues that have overshadowed the summit in Riyadh.

One notable absentee in Saudi Arabia was the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamid bin Hamad Al Thani. One reason for his non-attendance is the ongoing blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. Due to the summit’s location in Riyadh, rather than in a more impartial state like Oman or Kuwait, it is possible the Emir opted not to attend to avoid an incident similar to the purported kidnapping of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017.

The GCC has been under significant strain since the blockade of Qatar was initiated in June 2017. Before the sharp downturn in relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the land border between the two countries was heavily trafficked. Now, however, Qatar’s single land border (the country is surrounded by water on three sides) has been entirely blockaded by three GCC members.

More recently, Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC has further inflamed tensions within the GCC. The Qatari decision to withdraw was due in large part to the country wanting increase gas exports, thus diversifying an economy that remains heavily reliant on oil. For now, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait all seem to believe the GCC can survive the rift in regional relations. However, this remains to be seen.

The GCC was established in 1981 as a multinational organization intended to provide a collective defense mechanism against threats from post-revolutionary Iran. Today, members like Qatar are facing threats from other GCC members within the same bloc. Given the level of discord between the different members of the GCC, the organization may have little relevance remaining. The member countries are vying for different interests and maintain different threat perceptions. The GCC is currently comprised of three different groups. One group is Qatar and Oman (although Oman maintains that is politically neutral), another is Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with Kuwait attempting to play the role of mediator.

A core reason for the success of the GCC has been its provision of the free movement of people and goods between member states, but the future of the organization is in question. The GCC could eventually return to relevancy, but it will remain largely irrelevant for the foreseeable future, given the current state of the current crisis with Qatar. Very little will change as a result of the Riyadh Summit, but the aspirations of a single currency, a joint defense capability, and improved transportation links between member states remain distant ambitions.

The United States wants to see a unified GCC to act as a counter to Iran in the region, but the current Gulf crisis seems to have no end in sight. Since the ascendance of Mohammad bin Salman as Saudi Crown Prince, Saudi policy in the region has become increasingly aggressive. While the Saudis want to hedge against an expansionist Iran, Saudi actions in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon have only served to divide the GCC.

Saudi policies in the Middle East have arguably increased Iran’s influence in the region; Qatar’s increasingly close political and economic ties with Iran being a notable example. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have a close economic and military partnership. Oman or Kuwait could align closer with Qatar, or Qatar could form security and economic alliances with Iran and Turkey. To effectively counter Tehran, Riyadh needs to rethink its foreign policy. Failure to do so could result in a lasting rift within the GCC that would upend the already volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

2018 GCC Summit in Riyadh: An Uneasy Gathering was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commander Alipour—known as “Commander Sword” by his supporters because of his exploits in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan’s inland provinces—was detained because of accusations of human rights abuse. His arrest follows the detention of a powerful police chief in the North, Nizamuddin Qaisari, who was arrested by the orders of President Ashraf Ghani as part of a crackdown on unruly officers behaving like rogue militia leaders. That incident also led to violent protests.

What is worth noting in both these incidents is the overly explicit ethnic fervor shown by the supporters of both the men who were objecting their arrests. The supporters of Alipour and Qaisari were predominantly from Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups, to which Alipour and Qaisari respectively belong. The intensity of the protests forced the government to walk back Alipour’s arrest. In Qaisari’s case, indictment proceedings of current vice president and Uzbek strongman Rashid Dostum on charges of sexual abuse had to be overlooked to let him return to the country from a self-imposed exile in Turkey to pacify pro-Qaisari protests. The unrest had, by then, paralyzed daily life in many northern provinces.

Another individual with a similar reputation as a rogue official, Kandahar’s police chief Abdul Raziq, was left unscathed until he was assassinated by the Taliban in November 2018. Raziq—now hailed as a national hero after his assassination—was no martyr. Although Raziq was spared from the crackdown largely because of his role in ensuring Kandahar’s security against the Taliban—and tacit support from the United States—his being spared from arrest highlights discrepancies in the treatment of individuals of different ethnic groups.

Raziq, unlike Alipour and Qaisari, was Pashtun, as is President Ashraf Ghani and the majority of his aides and advisors. Although the men are members of different Pashtun tribal confederations—Raziq was Durani while President Ghani is Ghilzai—the incident accentuates the privilege Raziq enjoyed due to his belonging to the same ethnic group as the president.

The peace talks with the Taliban have reached a critical juncture.

Zalmai Khalilzad, the veteran Afghan-American diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, has returned as U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy to hasten along the negotiation process. During this critical phase, attention must be paid to the ethnically-charged uproar engulfing Kabul following Alipour’s arrest. This is especially important due to the ambiguity of the situation.

The content of the peace talks remains a matter of debate even between the U.S. envoy and his Afghan hosts in the National Unity Government. The opacity of the negotiations could create anxiety among sections of Afghan society that are wary of giving the Taliban too generous of a deal. The content and nature of any future negotiations remains unknown, both to those involved and to outside observers, according to the head of Washington-based American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann in a recent discussion he attended at the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies.

Bellicose and opportunistic individuals among non-Pashtuns, similar to Alipour and Qaisari, might proliferate and see a boost to their popularity if a peace deal with the Taliban and their return to political dominance in any form put their ethnic groups in potential or actual harm.

What is more at stake—apart from safeguarding the delicate ethnic balance—is sustaining the advancements made by women, the civil society, and Afghanistan’s youth in post-Bonn Agreement Afghanistan. In the words of activist and former government official Shaharzad Akbar, what should be achieved through a deal is “an expansion of opportunities, not their curtailment.” Akbar added “if today a girl in Faryab cannot go to school, if in Helmand a girl is unable to study in a university, we want them to have this opportunity. Not a girl who is already going to school in Bamyan to be deprived of this right.”

A Hastily-Negotiated Peace Deal with the Taliban is a Slippery Slope

In a recent survey of over two thousand individuals from Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 90 percent of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the Taliban’s style of governance. To many who oppose the group’s politics and ideology, the Taliban’s blend of Islamic fundamentalism and tribal hierarchy might be palatable if they form a political party similar in nature to the parties formed by other militant groups from the Soviet resistance era. However, giving over too many concessions may lead to unforeseeable backlash, including by ordinary Afghans.

Over-concession would threaten the advancements in Afghan society made possible by an international commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction that has endured for over seventeen years. The Taliban’s return through an overly-generous power-sharing arrangement made possible by a hasty deal by U.S. envoy Khalilzad—allowing for the U.S. military withdrawal the U.S. president is impatient to achieve—will likely aggravate segments of society that view the group as a tribal outfit and political misfit.

Both the Taliban’s deeds and words do little to reinforce their claims of politico-ideological reform and a move away from the dogmatism demonstrated during the late 1990s. The Taliban’s online rhetoric grows harsher the more it nears what the group perceives as a military victory against the U.S. and Afghan security forces. This perception is reinforced by the constant unidirectional plea for peace from the U.S. and the Afghan governments that emboldens the group. The Taliban swiftly condemns anyone who contradicts their official pronouncements. Early in November, at a conference in Moscow to which the Taliban sent a delegation, the group issued statements demanding respect for the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Such rhetoric should be taken into account when considering whether the Taliban has genuinely reformed.

Any peace deal should include strong guarantees to prevent the Taliban—who’ve shown a penchant for totalitarian rule—from gaining too much power. This is vital for preserving social dialogue on important issues such as women’s rights, freedom of expression, and civic equality—among all ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

A recent statement by the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) gives some reassurance as to such guarantees through an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led negotiation process. The statement reiterates respect to the Afghan Constitution as a fundamental starting point. However, U.S. envoy Khalilzad has so far ostensibly circumvented the government in Kabul by directly engaging in talks with the Taliban’s political office in Doha.

More importantly, there is suspicion regarding Khalilzad himself who is not known for being impartial in his past dealings and has previously expressed favorable views about the Taliban. Members of the main anti-Taliban group, the Northern Alliance, might be reluctant to cooperate with him because Khalilzad has made efforts to politically sideline the group in the past—about which he elaborates effusively in his book, The Envoy. At present, sitting with Khalilzad would be akin to a “fool me twice” scenario for most of these actors.

The U.S. strategy should be depersonalized—with an impartial diplomat essential for doing so. Khalilzad himself could be seen as ethnically biased as he belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group. Any deal struck by Khalilzad, even if it is of sound basis, will be treated with suspicion by other Afghan ethnic groups. Further, nothing endangers the credibility of a peace deal more than a prevailing doubt concerning the intentions behind it. Replacing Khalilzad as U.S. envoy would go a long way in inviting confidence that the interests of all ethnic groups will be taken into consideration.

Projecting respect for equality is paramount to ensure the implementation of a sustainable agreement that won’t result in a civil war in the future. If any one ethnic group is perceived as receiving special treatment, feelings of insecurity will increase among the other groups. Historically—in Afghanistan and throughout the world—such insecurity has led to armed resistance and violence. Should history repeat itself in this way, the current stalemate with the Taliban may be seen in a nostalgic light.

The Political Ramifications of Trump’s Haste to Make Peace with the Taliban was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The government of Saudi Arabia has denied any knowledge of or involvement in the reported killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi security officials. Statements by U.S. President Trump that the consequences would be severe if it is revealed that high ranking Saudi officials or even members of the royal family were involved were strongly rebuffed by the Kingdom.

Saudi official statements have warned that the Kingdom would act in extremis to protect its interests. Saudi rhetoric has since softened, but Riyadh has made clear that it won’t take any backlash lightly. Western media, politicians, and corporations are becoming increasingly worried about the potential fall-out of a real conflict between the U.S.-E.U. and Saudi Arabia. A possible conflict will harm not only international global economic growth but could lead to a shift in the geopolitical balance of power not seen since the end of the 1980s.

In stark contrast to the reaction in the West, the rest of the world has largely remained silent. No substantive responses have emerged from major powers such as China, India, or Russia. At the same time, the Sunni Arab world is showing its full support for Saudi Arabia, pledging their full support for the Kingdom. The Khashoggi case already is no longer a solely Saudi issue. The Kingdom’s partners in the Gulf region; Egypt, the UAE, and others, have indicated their preparedness to stand alongside the Kingdom, and its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the face of mounting international pressure.

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, has openly stated his country’s full support for Saudi Arabia against any attempts at damaging the Kingdom’s regional standing. Even Oman, which has distanced itself from the Saudi-led anti-Iran coalition, has voiced support. A statement issued by Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, condemned the Western media’s reaction as an anti-Saudi campaign. A source from the Arab League General Secretariat voiced a complete rejection of economic threats as a means to achieve political gains, adding that Saudi authorities were fully cooperating with the ongoing investigations into Khashoggi’s disappearance.

It is dangerous to underestimate the severity of and fallout from a Saudi-led retaliation.

Forcing the Kingdom into a corner doesn’t leave Crown Prince bin Salman with many options. Possible economic sanctions or political pressure on Saudi Arabia, as suggested by President Trump, have been repudiated by Riyadh. Saudi officials even have openly stated that any such actions taken will be met by counter actions, which could include the use of the so-called “oil-weapon,” a reference to the OPEC oil embargo in the 1970s, and a possibility that sent jitters through the global energy markets.

A unilateral move by Saudi Arabia to use its oil and other petroleum products as leverage against U.S. or European sanctions would result in an energy crisis, the likes of which haven’t been seen for years. A short-term reduction in oil exports to the U.S. and European markets would result in a severe price increase. The overall effects could even be more extensive if Saudi’s regional partners supported this move. Statements made by U.S. experts that non-Arab oil producers would be more than able to mitigate the adverse effects are unrealistic. To expect U.S., Canadian, Venezuelan, or even Russian oil to serve as a hedge against a possible Arab oil embargo is unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia has other instruments at its disposal.

Economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia could be countered by withdrawing Saudi investments in strategic sectors throughout the U.S. and Europe. Saudi Arabia’s PIF sovereign wealth fund has been actively investing in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. The list is impressive, as the PIF targets high profile companies such as Uber, Tesla, and others. High profile investments of the PIF indicate part of the growing influence of the Kingdom globally. In addition to a range of oil-related projects, the PIF has invested in:

1. SABIC: Value of Investment: $55.1 billion, PIF owns 70% of SABIC.
2. SoftBank Vision Fund: Value of Investment up to $45 billion, PIF is the lead investor in the most prominent technology fund in the world and will consider investing up to $45 billion over the next five years.
3. Saudi Telecom Company: Value of Investment: $25.4 billion, PIF holds a 70% stake.
4. Saudi Electricity: Value of Investment: $20.2 billion,
5. Blackstone Infrastructure Investment Fund: Value of Investment: $20 billion, PIF has an agreement to invest $20 billion in a $40 billion investment fund.
6. National Commercial Bank: Value of Investment: $11.2 billion, PIF currently owns 45% in the bank
7. Saudi Arabian Mining Company: Value of Investment: $7.9 billion, PIF owns 50% of the company.
8. Uber: Value of Investment: $3.5 billion, PIF acquired a 5% stake in the U.S. based ride-hailing service Uber in June 2016 for $3.5 billion, it valued the company at $62.5 billion.
9. Entertainment Investment Company: Value of Investment: $2.7 billion, PIF is looking to revolutionize the entertainment sector in the Kingdom by investing $2.7 billion for the development of the entertainment eco-system through strategic partnerships.
10. Fund Of Funds: Value of Investment: $1.1 billion, PIF has formed Fund of Funds, a new investment vehicle aimed to fund small and medium enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It aims to provide 58,000 jobs by 2027.

The fund has been aggressive in expanding its international holdings. New deals, such as the more than $1 billion investment in electric car start-up Lucid, the $2 billion stake in Elon Musk’s Tesla or the $70 billion sale of its stake in the world’s largest chemical producer Saudi Basic Industries Corp, are just a few of the Kingdom’s recent international ventures. The sovereign wealth fund has also increased its stake in ACWA Power, the country’s largest independent power-plant developer, to about 25 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also invested in a host of high profile European companies. These include Krups, Siemens, ArcelorMittal, and others. Hundreds of millions in dollars are being invested in real estate, especially in the United Kingdom, Germany, and a growing number of other E.U. states. Concurrently, the Kingdom is strategically spending several hundred billion dollars in China, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Russia. In South Africa, the Kingdom is engaged in discussions with the defense firm Denel over a potential deal with Saudi state defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries’ (SAMI). The Saudi government seeks to develop its own domestic defense industry, and with the goal of localizing half of its military spending by 2030, more investments into defense-related projects are to be expected.

If statements published by Saudi newspaper Arab News serve as an indication of the nature of current discussions within the Saudi government, Riyadh has up 30 measures under consideration designed to put pressure on the U.S. if it were to impose sanctions. According to an opinion piece in Arab News, such measures include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 to more than $400 per barrel (which, in reality, is next-to-impossible). Another potential option is to block the arms deals that US president Trump (officially) has been signed during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh indicated that thousands of jobs could be at stake in the U.S. if the $110 billion deal were delayed or even altered. The Kingdom is presently the world’s second largest arms importer, of which 61% comes from the U.S. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $17.5 billion arms deal with the U.S. Companies presently at risk include Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil.

Silicon Valley is also vulnerable.

Since the emergence of MBS as Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest investors in Silicon Valley. After being largely focused on Wall Street companies, MBS has shown an appetite for high-tech and startups. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund has become one of Silicon Valley’s biggest swinging checkbooks. Main investments have been done via Japanese investment vehicle Softbank, mainly via a $100 billion fund Vision Fund, raised by the latter. The fund has already taken multibillion-dollar stakes in promising companies. PIF is presently considering making another $45 billion investment in Softbank’s Second Vision Fund. Major stakes are held in Uber (Saudi is the largest single stakeholder) but also in startups such as Wag, DoorDash, WeWork, Plenty, Cruise, Katerra, Nvidia, and Slack.

At the same time, the list of high profile Silicon Valley hotshots taking part in the Saudi Giga Projects, such as NEOM, is staggering. The pressure here is however growing. Due to the Khashoggi case, several have left their Saudi advisory positions. Former United States energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and Sam Altman (Y Combinator) have suspended their involvement in NEOM in recent days. The impact of these moves is still unclear, but Arabs historically have long memories. In contrast to these leaves, others, such as Marc Andreessen of the famed Silicon Valley investment firm Andreessen Horowitz; the former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick; and the Boston Dynamics CEO, Marc Raibert, are still onboard in NEOM.

Saudi influence in Silicon Valley is even expected to increase substantially, looking at the list attending FII2018 in 1.5 weeks in Riyadh. Lucid Motors CTO., Peter Rawlinson; the Google Cloud CEO, Diane Greene; the Magic Leap chief product officer, Omar Khan; and Vinod Khosla of Khosla Ventures, are still on the speaker’s list. Looking at the Saudi investments, most of them will attend their largest financial beneficiary.

For the next couple of weeks, all eyes will be on Riyadh.

From a devil’s advocate point of view, Riyadh’s current problems on the global scene may be a blessing for some. As some media gurus are stating “No new is bad news, any news is good news.” The potential emergence of a rift or even the appearance of one, between Saudi Arabia and the West will open the doors for more involvement with Russia, Ukraine, China, India, and others.

The position of Saudi Arabia, and possibly its GCC allies and Egypt, is changing dramatically. The global sway held by the U.S. and Europe has eroded since the end of the 1990s. The adverse effects of the 2nd Iraq War, the invasion of Afghanistan and a soft approach to geopolitical power play under the Obama administration has resulted in the current situation. A resurgent Russia, the quiet but dangerous military encroachment of China throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and an aggressive Turkey seeking to consolidate its regional influence has cemented the mindset of the Arab governments. For them, the Arab Spring and Western support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s so-called democratic opposition was the last straw. Economic and military threats on the Kingdom will not be taken face value.

A new Arab pride, based on realism, has emerged. The current mindset of the Arab rulers,  in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, is that they want their place at the table. After decades of having just one option for survival, Riyadh understands it now has options. A slap in the face by the U.S.-led West will not be taken lightly. Putin and other autocrats will be more than willing to step in to fill a void that could present itself the coming months.

For the U.S.. and the West, urgent decisions must be made. If Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo choose to shift their geopolitical alignment, it will be for the long-term. The emergence of Asia and other rapidly-developing regions as future export markets, combined with the decreasing need in the West for Saudi oil are economic factors in this decision. Increased criticism from Saudi’s Western allies and the possibility of punishment will undoubtedly push the Kingdom and its regional partners to consider a political realignment seriously.

A dramatic change in geopolitical alliances will be costly for all parties. Instability will occur in the region, but also for the West. A significant realignment of interests will even threaten European and U.S. economic and military interests. Without allies in Riyadh or Cairo, the Middle East will be out of reach.

Is the Saudi-U.S. Alliance at a Tipping Point? was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to reports in the French newspaper Le Monde, Saudi Arabia has asked the government of France to assist it in preventing Qatar from buying the S-400 system from Russia.

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced air defense missile system, and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements to purchase the S-400 system.

The report states that King Salman of Saudi Arabia expressed his “deep concerns” concerning Qatar’s intentions to purchase the air defense system.

Furthermore, the King specifically threated to take military action against Qatar if the S-400 sale goes forward and the missile system is deployed.

King Salman reportedly stated in the letter that “the kingdom [Saudi Arabia] would be ready to take all necessary measures to eliminate this defense system, including military action.

Qatar and Russia signed a military and technical cooperation agreement on military in 2017.

In January of 2018, the Qatari ambassador to Russia was quoted saying that Qatar’s government was in talks at the “advanced stage” to acquire the Russian S-400 missile air defense system.

Despite Saudi Threats, Russia Indicates S-400 Deal Will Go Forward

A senior Russian politician has said that Russia will supply Qatar with an anti-aircraft missile system despite Saudi Arabia’s reported threats.

Russian Lawmaker Aleksei Kondratyev, a member of the Russian upper house and the deputy chairman of the committee on Defence and Security, said Russia would pursue its own objectives in determining the countries that it allows to purchase its S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

“Russia seeks its own interest, supplying S-400 to Qatar and earning money for the state budget. Saudi Arabia’s position has nothing to do with it, Russia’s plans will not change,” Kondratyev said in remarks to Russian state media, adding that “it is clear that Riyadh plays a dominant role in the region, but Qatar gets an advantage by enhancing its armed forces due to the acquisition of Russian S-400 systems.”

No End in Sight

Saudi Arabia, backed by other regional powers including Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, broke off relations with Qatar in June last year, after harshly criticizing Qatar’s deepening ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s strategic rival in the region, and accusing the Gulf state of funding terrorism throughout the region.

In April of 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir warned Qatar that it faced “imminent demise” unless it provided funding and support for a U.S.-led military presence in Syria.

Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa said in a May interview with a Saudi-owned newspaper that there was no “glimmer of hope” for an end to the crisis.

Saudi Arabia Threatens Military Action if Qatar Purchases Russian S-400 Air Defense System was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may have to resign by the beginning of 2018. A report published by the New York Times comes at a time when the relationship between Tillerson and U.S. President Donald Trump is increasingly strained.  White House officials were cited in a report detailing that a plan is being discussed to replace the current Secretary of State.

According to the New York Times, “The White House has developed a plan to force out Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, whose relationship with President Trump has been strained, and replace him with Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, perhaps within the next several weeks, senior administration officials said on Thursday.” The report added,  “John F. Kelly, the White House chief of staff, developed the transition plan and has discussed it with other officials.”

On Thursday, President Trump responded to questions from reporters by saying, “He’s here. Rex is here.” White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders later rejected the reports in a statement: “There are no personnel announcements at this time.” Sanders added, “Secretary Tillerson continues to lead the State Department, and the entire cabinet is focused on completing this incredibly successful first year of President Trump’s administration.”

In response to media reports, Senator Bob Corker (R, Tennessee), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. Tillerson was “unaware of anything changing.”

What’s the Potential Cause of Tillerson’s Ouster?

Tillerson and Trump diverge sharply when it comes to foreign policy.  The BBC’s Barbara Plett compared the two to ‘chalk and cheese in temperament and the way they work…Mr. Trump is also said to have complained that his secretary of state is too ‘establishment.’”

Their differences in foreign policy have repeatedly come to light. The Secretary of State has sought diplomatic engagement with North Korea but has repeatedly been rebuked by the President.  When Tillerson stated that back-channel engagements with the North Korean regimes had been established, Trump tweeted, “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”

During the GCC crisis, President Trump apparently supported the Saudi-led bloc and said that the blockade against Qatar was “the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism.” Conversely, Tillerson has issued statements warning about the humanitarian impact of the blockade and warned that the embargo against Qatar might adversely affect the fight against terrorism.

The New York Times later reported that “President Trump tweeted on Friday that reports he would soon fire Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson were ‘fake news,’ and that ‘I call the final shots.’ The tweet came just hours after Mr. Tillerson called reports that the White House wants him to resign ‘laughable,’ even as one of his closest aides planned to leave the department.”

White House Signals Secretary of State Rex Tillerson May Be Replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The territory in eastern Syria that will be freed of Islamic State control now constitutes the focus of the struggle between the United States and Iran in Syria, as both are striving to seize the area.
• Early June marked the onset of the final phase of the US-led coalition’s offensive to conquer the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, with a combined Kurdish-Arab (though predominantly Kurdish) ground force – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – and air support provided by the international coalition, including the United States, other Western countries, and Arab states.
• At the same time, Iran and its proxies have also started intensifying efforts aimed at shaping Syria the day after the fall of the Islamic State.
• Forces of the pro-Assad coalition are currently trying to expand their control in the Deir ez-Zor region and improve their access to Raqqa and the surrounding area, and also seize critical positions along the Syrian-Iraqi border

Geopolitically, Syria Sits in the Middle of Two Axes of Influence

The race to shape the Syrian arena, which is currently focused on the campaign to conquer Raqqa and defeat the Islamic State, encompasses two main strategic efforts. One, led by Iran, aims at laying the foundation for a Shiite axis land bridge from Iran in the east, via Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon in the west. Its primary mode of operation is the seizure, by Iranian proxies, of significant passage points between Iraq and Syria – with Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the People’s Mobilization Forces) on the Iraqi side of the border and forces of the pro-Assad coalition, including the remnants of the Syrian army under the authority of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias on the Syrian side of the border.

According to Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “a relationship has been forged between the popular forces, the forces of the Iraqi government and military, and the allied forces in Syria. In practice, this is a strategic victory for Iran’s allies and for the ring of resistance to Zionism that begins in Tehran and reaches Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

In a rival strategic effort, the US-led coalition has been operating to create a wedge running north-south to sever the Iranian land bridge and cut off Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and west of the Persian Gulf. This effort is aimed at creating a buffer zone-security strip controlled by US allies, extending from Turkey in the north, via eastern Syria, southward to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Over the past weeks, some attacks have been carried out by US air forces against forces of the pro-Assad coalition along with the southeastern segment of the Syrian-Iraqi border, in the region of the Syrian city of al-Tanf, located near the tripartite border between Jordan-Syria-Iraq.

The United States has declared this area to be a “de-confliction” zone under its influence and will therefore not allow the deployment of forces belonging to Assad or Iranian proxies in the region. On June 18, a Syrian fighter plane was shot down in the Raqqa region of eastern Syria as part of the air cover that the United States is providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting to liberate Raqqa.

Iranian parties have explained that the deployment of forces loyal to Iran along the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border is meant to thwart the US plan to divide Syria. According to the Iranians, the United States seeks to link the northeastern part of Syria that is under Kurdish control to the southeastern section of the country, up to the Jordanian border and has therefore increased its activities and attacks in the Tanf region.

The voices from Iran indicate that their forces aim: (a) to defend Iran’s dominance in Iraq, the survival of the Assad regime, and Iranian strategic depth by means of a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut; (b) to destroy the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi border; (c) to neutralize the US plan to dismantle Syria; and (d) to prevent US-supported forces from establishing control over eastern Syria.

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Iran chose to respond to the Islamic State attack in Tehran by launching six surface-to-surface missiles from Iranian territory at an Islamic State target in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria. In doing so, it demonstrated its potential in the field of ballistic missiles and leveraged its message that it is at war with the Islamic State and is unafraid of operating in a sector in which the United States is working to establish its influence.

Russia’s position in this context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, both the Assad regime and sources in Moscow report that Russia is a partner in the Assad regime’s efforts in eastern Syria, aided by Iran and Hezbollah, to derail the American plan. On May 8, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan, which has close relations with the regime, reported that “massive reinforcements of Syrian and Russian military forces have arrived in the Syrian desert, in addition to the forces of friends, in preparation for an operation to take control of Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border.”

At the same time, there have been reports of coordination efforts in Jordan between US and Russian representatives. There have also been reports that Russia is working to prevent friction between forces of the Syrian regime and its allies and US forces, and strives to reach understandings with the United States and Jordan regarding a de-confliction zone, a de-escalation zone, and mutual attacks in southern Syria.

In response to the intercepting of the Syrian plane in the Deir ez-Zor region, Russia announced that “all aircraft, manned and unmanned, of the international coalition operating west of the Euphrates River, will be identified as targets by Russian air defense systems,” appearing to create a Russian-controlled no-fly zone west of the Euphrates. As part of the struggle for control of southeastern Syria, the United States has deployed two HIMARS multiple launch rocket batteries to the American special forces base near al-Tanf.

In response, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that every entry of a foreign weapon system into Syria requires authorization by the central government in Damascus and that the deployment indicates that the United States is not focused on fighting the Islamic State as its claims to be. The United States was then charged with failing to prevent Islamic State fighters from fleeing Raqqa toward Deir ez-Zor.

The pro-Assad coalition led by Russia and Iran appears to be following the American activity in southern and eastern Syria with great concern. In addition to the establishment of an exclusive security zone north of the Jordanian-Syrian border and attacks on forces supporting the Assad regime, this activity has included use of a training infrastructure for troops of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of US special forces reinforced by artillery support, and an air umbrella provided by the Western coalition.

From an Iranian perspective, and perhaps also from a Russian point of view, this marks a new phase in the US campaign to shape Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State, which is aimed at neutralizing the Iranian presence and influence in Syria.

The Potential for Escalation between the US and Iran in Syria and Iraq

The Trump administration includes elements that are extremely hostile to Iran and are pushing to expand the war in Syria as an opportunity to clash with Iran on a “comfortable” playing field. These elements have apparently suggested the idea of establishing an American-dominated north-to-south running strip through eastern Syria with the aim of blocking and containing Iran’s regional aspirations.

At the same time, Secretary of State James Mattis and US military leaders oppose the opening of a broad front against Iran and its proxies in Syria and regard it as endangering the capacity for a focused effort to advance the primary goal: the dismantling and defeat of the Islamic State. Therefore, at least at this stage, the US military leadership is seeking to avoid friction with the Iranians and Russians.

In the meantime, Iran is resolutely striving to progress toward its goals – i.e., more than other actors in the Middle East. It is checking the limits of US intervention, without any capacity to estimate the intensity of the United States commitment in the race to achieve control over eastern Syria. As a result, there is currently a potential for US-Iranian escalation in Syria that could spread to Iraq – either intentionally or as a result of miscalculated assessments.

Conclusion: The current race for control of territory in Syria appears as if it’s between Iran and the United States

The current race for control of territory in Syria now seems to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes –with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. Thus far, the Syrian arena could be viewed as a game board with multiple squares, with the move of pieces in each square having an impact on the state of affairs in the others.

First, Russia set up its pieces on the board’s central-western sector, between Aleppo and Damascus, including the coastal region. Turkey followed suit, arranging its forces in the board’s northern sector along the Syrian-Turkish border, including an effort to safeguard its interests in the Kurdish region. The United States focused its warfare against the Islamic State primarily in northeastern Syria and is now trying to reorganize its pieces in the southeastern square of the Syria game board.

As a result, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influenced by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late. Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern square of the Syrian game board. Israel and Jordan must also prepare themselves for the possibility that Islamic State fighters fleeing northeastern Syria could move southward and link up with the Islamic State branch at the border in the Golan Heights.

Moreover, Israel must not forget Russia’s influence in Syria and the need to reach understandings with Moscow, at least on a clandestine level, regarding every move in this direction. Syria may have understood as much, which would explain the increased intensity of the pro-Assad coalition’s attacks in the Daraa region over the past few weeks, primarily from the air. Still, Russia understands that Israel possesses the capacity to cause significant damage in Syria, and therefore prefers to maintain understandings with Israel and take Israel’s concerns seriously.

The Race for Syria after the Islamic State was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last couple of weeks, the Gulf region has been on a rollercoaster ride. Risk analysts are struggling to deal with the dramatically changing geopolitical and financial environment while a direct military confrontation between the Saudi-led alliance and Iran’s proxies is around the corner.

The signals coming from the Saudi capital Riyadh are still the same; Saudi Vision 2030 and the Aramco IPO are on track. The media remains skeptical about the unforeseen crackdown on corruption, a week after the so-called “Davos in the Desert” financial get-together in Riyadh (October 24-26), where 3,500 CEOs and financial wizards convened.

The fallout of the direct attack on Saudi Arabia’s financial moguls and construction giants, such as Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal and the Binladin Group, would put fear in the heads of investors in New York, London, Beijing, and Moscow.

Most agreed that bin Salman overplayed his hand, causing instability in the country and the region.The reality for insiders, however, looks different.

The anti-corruption crackdown by MBS is part of his overall strategy to implement Vision 2030. First of all, the Davos in the Desert meeting showed the financial world’s immense interest in investment opportunities in the kingdom. Considering that 99 percent of the attendees had never visited Saudi Arabia before, while only the speakers already represented a $22 trillion value of assets under management, MBS could tick off another box on his long list to make Vision 2030 a success.

At the same time, the Trump Administration and the UK government tried to woo MBS to list the Aramco IPO on their stock exchanges. Some would have become more lenient towards a flexible approach when looking at the amount of interest, but MBS upped the ante and pushed for new hard-needed changes. The anti-corruption crackdown was carefully considered and timely and served not only to remove corruption in the kingdom but can also be seen as a way to remove remaining opposition to MBS’s future reign.With military precision, MBS removed most of the obstacles still blocking a possible MSCI Emerging Markets Index listing in 2018.

By taking out high-profile businessmen that were already convicted several times for corruption and removing princes that held commanding positions within the armed forces, MBS moved the kingdom towards a more modern economy while consolidating his own power. The inclusion of the kingdom in the MSCI index will bring a multitude of FDI, much larger than the Aramco IPO. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, for example, gives European pension and investment funds the possibility to invest in the kingdom and trade on its stock exchange. The Saudis have reportedly already attracted $9 billion in recent weeks. Some analysts are much more optimistic when looking at the long range of IPOs planned on the Tadawul (Saudi stock exchange).

MBS’s domestic popularity has increased in recent months. The Crown Prince has great support among the youth and has shown to be listening to the majority of his people while being unafraid to make dramatic changes to outdated social structures within the kingdom. Still, MBS understands internal Saudi politics and will try not to completely upset the establishment.

At the same time, regional instability and unrest complicate MBS’s agenda.

The confrontation between Arab nations and Iran has reached a tipping point. And looking at the statements made by UAE’s minister of foreign affairs on November 12 during the Emirates Policy Center’s Abu Dhabi Strategic Debates (ADSD2017) on Sky Arabia shocked the audience. The direct attack and accusations vented towards Iran and Qatar, both accused of promoting instability, financing terrorism, and extremism, were of an unprecedented tone. Gargash also accused both of committing “acts of war”, especially via arming Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah. These accusations are openly supported and repeated by a long list of Arab politicians and leaders.

The war drums are being banged—and this time not as an empty threat, but as a precursor to real military action. Most analysts are looking to Riyadh, as they expect MBS to lead this operation against Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Iranian IRGC; most likely the lead will be taken by the UAE.

Expect military action in the coming weeks, with—or without Washington’s support.

The political show around Lebanese PM Hariri is only part of this. Analysts tend to forget that Hariri’s real power is in Saudi Arabia, where he is the owner of construction giant OGER, currently under investigation as it is in financial trouble. MBS has taken the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone and remove OGER out of the picture in Saudi Arabia while destabilizing Lebanon. This was organized in close cooperation with other Arab leaders. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, a close friend of MBS, will head the anti-IRGC venture, as Abu Dhabi has been doing for years under the radar in Yemen, Syria and especially Libya.

Military action can be expected, with or without the support of Washington. As several Arab ministers and advisors have stated in recent days, it’s time for Arabs to take the future into their own hands. Washington can support, but not lead. If no American assistance is given, others will undoubtedly fill the gap. Moscow has been extremely quiet the last weeks, not indicating any support for Tehran nor trying to mitigate between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis and Iran-Hezbollah. These plans seem to have already been discussed in the respective capitals, as ministers of the said countries have convened in several places.

If action is taken against Iran and its proxies, OPEC and oil prices will be impacted immediately. Oil price increases of $5-10 per barrel a day could be a distinct possibility. An escalation in Lebanon, due to the inclusion of Israel in the action, or maritime traffic attacks in the Gulf, would only push prices up further. After years of low geopolitical risk premiums, risk has returned to the market. This time, however, they are new players, unknown to the majority of risk analysts. MBS and Iran will put volatility back on the market where it belongs.

Saudi Corruption Crackdown Could Permanently Boost Oil Prices was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions are increasing between the Shia-minority and the Kingdom’s Sunni ruling class in the aftermath of the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr. Regional jihadists are attempting to foment sectarian conflict in the kingdom by exploiting the unrest post-execution. In hopes of diluting attention focused on al Nimr, Saudi Arabia decided he’d be executed alongside 46 others, the majority of which were Sunnis accused of having links with Al Qaeda.

Per sentencing protocols, Saudi authorities would not have to give prior notice of the execution.  Security forces were able to suppress low-level actions by activists, but a worrying concern has been the rising number of jihadist suicide strikes taking place not just in the Sunni portions of the country, but in Shiite populated areas.

Shiite extremists are bombing Shiite mosques

Suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques are designed to goad Shiites into retaliating, creating an even more significant security issue for elites, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed a leadership role in Saudi counterterrorism and defense efforts.

Jihadist exploitation of the al Nimr execution would involve strikes on religious targets and security forces, given the difficulties in targeting and disrupting petroleum infrastructure with such attacks. The killing of al Nimr will complicate negotiations for a political settlement in Syria.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to sit down in December when the region’s foreign ministers meet to negotiate on Syria. The two sides disagree over the groups that should be party to a post-Al Assad political solution, assuming all parties can even create the necessary battlefield conditions to engage in a political transition in Syria.

The proxy conflict in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ongoing in Lebanon, where a political agreement on the presidency is contingent on improved Iran-Saudi dialogue.

Saudi Arabia is Fostering a Sunni Coalition

Saudi Arabia isn’t the only Sunni power experiencing tensions with Tehran. As Turkey grows more assertive in the area, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria will be crucial arenas for competition between the old opponents.

Saudi Arabia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Tehran is a test for the Sunni regional coalition that Riyadh has painstakingly tried to gather in the past few years.

Thus far, the states that have followed Riyadh’s lead to Iran protests are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Bahrain, at the heart of the Saudi camp, has already reminded his ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian charge d’affaires in October.

Saudi Arabia has been attempting to foster a tighter relationship with Cairo to underpin its Arab coalition and will be signing grants and loans worth $3 billion for Egypt on Jan. 5 to make apparent the priority Saudi Arabia is giving the relationship.

Egypt will gladly accept the monetary support, but Cairo can be expected to maintain a more balanced approach with regards to contentious cultural disputes in the region. The execution of Al Nimr is a piece of a much more significant regional game.

The United Arab Emirates, which was in close military coordination with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Libya and Syria, downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran by recalling its ambassador and ordered a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats stationed at the Emirates. Sudan that has seen its alliance with Riyadh reinforced while distancing itself from Iran—expelling the Iranian ambassador—has received increased Saudi monetary assistance.

Kuwait, conscious of its Shiite minority, condemned Iran after the attack on the Saudis Embassy but stopped short of severing diplomatic relations. Egypt chose to be more cautious, condemning Iran and avoiding any mention of Mohamed Fathi Abdel Ati, an Egyptian national who had been one of the Sunnis executed in the same group as al Nimr.

Analysis: Saudi Arabia will look abroad for support after lackluster support from Sunni neighbors

Saudi Arabia will focus on securing its oil facilities while dealing with sporadic bouts of unrest and jihadist attacks. While managing these domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia will look overseas for allies at the time of need.

The response will be mixed from its Sunni neighbors, based on how much they rely on security and assistance. The United States and others in the West will meanwhile do their best to maintain their distance from the proxy conflicts which are part and parcel of the changing regional balance of power between Iran and its adversaries.

Increased Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East as the Saudi-Iran Proxy War Heats Up was originally published on Global Security Review.