Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

From the perspective of the United States government and the US Air Force (USAF), awarding the contract to Boeing is a welcome choice since it ensures that there are at least two fighter manufacturers left in the United States; there were dozens at the end of the World War II. This means that the production of fighter aircraft is no longer a seller’s market as when the USAF shortsightedly awarded both the F-22 and F-35 contracts to Lockheed, which effectively gave leverage to that corporation.

Now, by awarding the contract to Boeing, the Trump administration ensured that there will be multiple players in the combat aircraft manufacturing sector. Keep in mind, Northrop Grumman is manufacturing the B-21 stealth bomber. This leaves three prime contractors making combat aircraft.

The decision is also a good one because other nations are developing their own sixth-generation aircraft. The French and the Germans are collaborating on a Future Combat Air System while Britain and Japan are in a partnership to develop their own aircraft. The United States, therefore, could not afford to be left behind in this technological race.

Further, the fact that the F-47, as the plane is designated, is to be mated with a semi-autonomous drone is a welcome outcome because this acts as a force multiplier and gives the country an export drone for partners. For the record, it is time to stop playing to the egos of pilots and labeling drones as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The Russians and Ukrainians have no problems with nomenclatures and, instead, use drones to effectively carry out combat operations.

The Boeing award does not mean Lockheed is now left to languish. The production of the F-35 will, unless terminated, continue into the 2040s. Lockheed also continues to benefit from the excellent record and affordability of the F-16 Viper. Despite attempts to close the production line or move it offshore (India is one favored destination) the jet has proved to be so popular with partner air forces that Lockheed has a backlog of 128 fighters at its Greenville, South Carolina, plant and sees the potential for the sale of up to 300 aircraft worldwide.

While the F-47 is a welcome addition to the future arsenal of the USAF, it will be hugely expensive as it will cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars, thus making a large buy difficult.  One should remember that the original plan was to buy over 800 F-22s but cost escalation led to only 187 aircraft being procured. Thus, it is likely that a small number of these airplanes will be purchased, leaving the USAF to figure out how to maintain its force levels in the face of escalating cost.

The former Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. (Ret.) Charles Brown Jr., had an answer when he suggested that the force needed a high-low mix of aircraft saying that you do not drive your Ferrari to work every day. Brown was calling for a low-end fighter that could carry out the day-to-day missions which are currently fulfilled by the F-16. Yet building new F-16s, he argued, was not an option since it was too difficult to upgrade the aircraft with modern software, hence the requirement for a clean sheet design.

A low-end fighter still makes sense, because the United States must maintain squadron numbers which is difficult to do with expensive aircraft like the F-35 and the future F-47. And this might be a project for Lockheed, giving the company another incentive to remain in the fighter aircraft game.

The problem for many allies is that they cannot afford a fourth-generation-plus fighter. This leaves a hole for the Chinese and Russians to fill. The time has come, therefore, to go back to a 1960s idea of an export fighter. In those days it was the F-5 Freedom Fighter. The plane was sold in Asia and even Switzerland and for decades served in the air forces of these nations.

The United States, in its current arsenal of F-16s, F-15s, and F-35s does not have a plane that could be an affordable fighter. It is developing an excellent candidate to serve in this role—the T-7 Red Hawk trainer. The USAF is committed to acquiring 351 of these aircraft, which will allow for an economy of scale to make the aircraft an affordable fighter for the world. If the aircraft is upgraded with a basic radar and the ability to deliver weaponry, and perhaps a more powerful engine, it would be highly competitive in the global fighter market. Boeing does have plans to convert the plane into an export fighter (provisionally labeled the F-7) but this would require a policy choice by the Trump administration to fund this modification.

The fact is that friendly nations would like to buy American since it helps build the relationship with the United States and reinforces American security interests in some of these countries—Latin American countries are a case in point given their limited military budgets.  Even a country like Brazil with its indigenous aircraft industry could be tempted by an F-7, which would be the low-end complement to its Gripens.

In the end, the F-47 is a welcome development, but the United States needs to look after its allies. They have the requirements for a new fighter but lack the budgets to buy expensive state-of-the-art aircraft.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Sixth-Generation Fighter: A First Step to a New Generation of Airpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

Venezuela kicked 2019 off with a turbulent and fragile political start of the year. President Nicolás Maduro began his second presidential term on January 10th. The May 20th presidential election last year was internationally decried as illegitimate by the United States and the 14-member Lima Group throughout the region. On January 5th, a new face in Venezuelan politics emerged, Juan Guaidó, the 35-year-old newly elected President of the National Assembly.

As public and military support continue to mount, Guaidó is preparing to challenge Maduro and has called for a change of power. At Guaidó’s behest, the first public rally for Maduro to resign took place on January 23rd, with a massive protest against the Maduro government.

Guaidó rapidly emerged as a young new leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. Following his participation in the 2007 student protests of Hugo Chavez, Guaidó began to make a name for himself within the Venezuelan opposition. His involvement in the protests ultimately led him to Leopoldo Lopez, the long-standing leader of the Venezuelan opposition. Lopez ultimately mentored Guaidó through the Voluntad Popular (Popular Will) political party, preparing him to assume the Presidency of the National Assembly.

With Lopez’ continued house arrest and ban from serving public office, Guaidó emerged as the leader of the opposition within the National Assembly. Upon assuming his new position, on January 5, Guaidó became increasingly vocal through his first few weeks in office, declaring Maduro a usurper of the presidency. On January 13, Guaidó was briefly detained by police officers in La Guaira on the way to a town hall rally. A video of the detainment taken by a motorist rapidly circulated social media. Guaidó was soon released, but the detention spread international awareness about the opposition’s struggle and brought Guaidó to the international stage.

Despite Guaidó’s prominence in the National Assembly, his efforts will lead to limited results without the support of the armed forces. While the military command remains under the control of the Maduro regime, personnel have begun to desert their ranks. Voluntad Popular has called on the National Guard to break ranks to help bring about a transition in government in exchange for amnesty. Videos were circulated on Monday of dissident soldiers swearing loyalty to Guaidó in Cotiza. The soldiers in question headed to the special security unit headquarters to commandeer military vehicles and call for a local uprising. On Monday, 27 soldiers of the National Guard were detained for their insubordination in connection to the transgression.

Maduro has overseen a steady decline in his executive power and public approval since taking office. In 2017, protestors took to the streets of Caracas for months, beginning in March and ending in August. Despite their conviction, the protestors were forced to discontinue their demonstrations after six months of continuous protesting and heavy-handed police repression. The repression of political dissent in Venezuela caused many countries within the Lima Group began to question the policy of diplomatic support for Maduro. In August of 2017, a bizarre drone attack was launched against Maduro during an open air rally. The Maduro government blamed the Lima Group for organizing the assault.

Maduro’s consistent response to the decline of the state has been to centralize state authority. Although the Supreme Court remains under the bridle of Maduro, the majority in the National Assembly remains unyielding in opposition of Maduro. In March 2017, the Supreme Court tried to dissolve the National Assembly and engineer a replacement executive-run legislative body called the Constituent Assembly. The Supreme Court ultimately failed to win the legal battle following strong pressure from the international community and fierce opposition from the National Assembly. Yet Venezuela’s highest court remains a central voice in Venezuelan politics — on January 21st, the Supreme Court ruled Guaidó’s leadership and calls to remove Maduro illegal.

Going Global

Debate and politicking over the Venezuelan Crisis is not confined to the domestic space. For years, the United Nations, U.S., Europe, and neighboring states have decried the abuse of executive authority, illiberal governance, and repression of the Venezuelan public. Now, it seems, the world is ready to assume a more active role in countering Caracas.

In the past year, Trump expressed on several occasions that all options remain on the table with the Venezuelan conflict. In September 2018, the New York Times reported that the Trump administration had met with dissident Venezuelan military officers about plans to overthrow Maduro. The meetings proved inconclusive — U.S. officials ultimately decided not to aid the officers in a coup attempt. However, the fact that the U.S. administration actively considered a kinetic engagement to support a regime change in Venezuela at a time when President Trump is scaling back the United States’ military presence in the Middle East underscores the dire threat that Maduro’s grip on power poses to regional stability and the level of engagement that the international community believes necessary to restore democratic governance to Caracas.

As widespread disapproval across the region for a military coup persists and the U.S. government remains mired in its own political showdown, it is unlikely that Washington will sponsor or encourage a military coup d’état in Venezuela. However, Guaidó has already indirectly presented the United States with a way to support the struggling democratic opposition. By amplifying Guaidó’s message and drawing attention to the conflict — Washington has already contributed to Guaidó’s international image and credibility.

The United States and the Lima Group have already voiced public support for Guaidó and backed his denouncement of the Maduro regime as illegitimate. Taking it a step further, on January 15, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence spoke on the phone with Guaidó and expressed the U.S. government’s “unwavering support” for the opposition. That message was then amplified by a public video that the Vice President released on Twitter, expressing the U.S. government and American people’s support for both the Venezuelan opposition and general public.

In the video, Pence affirms that “We will stay with you until Democracy is restored and you reclaim your birthright of Libertad.” In response to the video, Maduro has called for a revision of diplomatic relations with the United States on television and on Twitter, claiming that Pence is overstepping his authority.

Diplomatic reprisals in U.S.-Venezuelan relations are nothing new. In 2008, President Hugo Chávez expelled U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy from Caracas, citing a U.S.-crafted coup plot against his administration. Since then, the United States has been unable to send an official ambassador to Venezuela, relying on Foreign Service Officers to serve as the Chargé d’Affaires. That tenuous diplomatic thread was finally cut last year after Maduro targeted the remaining leadership of the diplomatic mission and expelled the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Todd D. Robinson and the Deputy Chief of Mission Brian Naranjo. Given the current state of relations, it is difficult to see how Maduro can take any meaningful action against Washington short of military escalation, which would immediately undermine his efforts at diverting international engagement.

In addition to the brazen violation of civil liberties and human rights, the U.S. Government has denounced Venezuela’s burgeoning relationship with Russia. The Russian government has become a key ally of the Maduro government, providing aid in the form of debt-restructuring, the creation of the petro crypto-currency, and recently, procurement of military bomber planes. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly criticized American support for the Venezuelan opposition.

Trial by Fire

Regardless of the outcome, these events will prove to be a turning point in Venezuela. Either the opposition will succeed in rallying the people and the military to overthrow Maduro with the support of the Lima Group, or Maduro will demonstrate his unshakable control over Venezuela’s government. The culmination of the opposition’s appeal to the people combined with the gravitas placed upon the outcome by the international community has given the occasion particular weight. The opposition must demonstrate to the Venezuelan people and the international community that they can — and will — bring about a peaceful democratic transition. The time is now, or never.

In a grand gesture, Guaidó timed the widespread protests to coincide with the anniversary of the 1958 ousting of Venezuelan Dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez. Responding to a fellow member of the National Assembly on Twitter, Guaidó proclaimed, “We only have one clear action: to remain united and firm for a democratic and free Venezuela.” The stage is set. Whatever follows will influence Venezuelan politics and governance for years to come.

This article was originally published on The International Scholar.

Trial by Fire: Guaidó Calls on Venezuela to Oust Maduro was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, setting the stage for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e., for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

The worst-case scenario for Venezuela

A prolonged economic crisis and food shortages, coupled with rapidly escalating violence and unchecked arms proliferation could lead to a civil war.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or a decrease in public anger, Dr. McCoy says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Instead, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some fundamental differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

How will the events in Venezuela affect the region geopolitically?

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a fragile government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence. Notably, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

A negotiated political settlement is the best-case scenario for ending Venezuelan political and economic upheaval

Dr. McCoy discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that specific political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, the Venezuelan government would have to agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy needs an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a significant effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.”

There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it has granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, transitional justice typically provides reduced sentences for abusers of human rights, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity.

Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. An interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela has never before occurred, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Venezuela’s Economic Collapse & the Rise of Authoritarianism was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.
• Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.
• The United States is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).
• The European Union’s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.
• The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).

The global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.

This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

 Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.

A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe’s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7’s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.

China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050

While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn’t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.

However, China is projected to be the world’s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.

By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.

Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.

Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.

Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies. 

Today’s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.

Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Venezuela’s problems will only get worse as President Nicolas Maduro strips Venezuela’s democratic institutions of their authority while consolidating his power. While government and business elites who have access to petrodollars enjoy overwhelmingly favorable exchange rates, the majority of Venezuelans are going hungry.

Further economic mismanagement will increase already-widespread starvation, illness, and insecurity. The result will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. The Dutch island territories of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao—just 40-80 km off the northern coast of Venezuela—would face a significant number of refugees.

Summary

• Government mismanagement of the oil industry is at the root of Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, as productivity has rapidly collapsed. 
• Hyperinflation has made Venezuelan currency nearly worthless as the prices of essential goods have skyrocketed.
• If the already-dire situation worsens considerably, there will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, and the United States. 
• The number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016.

A massive refugee crisis in the Americas wouldn’t just affect Venezuela’s neighbors.

Already, thousands have fled, and the number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016. As food insecurity worsens for the public and the government steps ups its repression of dissent, there will be a spillover effect regarding migration to the United States from South and Central America.

If the United States is unprepared for such a crisis, the results could have catastrophic implications for American national security. The Venezuelan Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, has been accused of having ties with Iranian and Hezbollah connected individuals and entities. El Aissami has been linked to 173 Venezuelan passports and identity cards that were issued to individuals from the Middle East and Central Asia, including alleged members of Hezbollah.

Holders of Venezuelan passports are afforded visa-free entry to over 130 countries, including 26 European Union member states. While a visa is required to enter the United States, there are likely more lenient standards for accepting applications from holders of Venezuelan passports than for holders of Iranian, Syrian, or Lebanese passports.

The situation in Venezuela is terrible for everyone

For Venezuela, the worst case scenario is a complete breakdown of the central government’s control over the state. If the Venezuelan government is unable to contain the flow of refugees and an overwhelming number cross into neighboring Brazil and Colombia, those governments may be forced to act in the interest of their national security interests.

Given the geographic proximity of the United States to Venezuela, democratic governance there along with adherence to the rule-of-law is paramount for American security in the long-term. Otherwise, the U.S. will undoubtedly face a massive influx of immigrants. Such a flow would not be stopped by a wall, like the one proposed by President Trump along the U.S.-Mexico border. Venezuelans seeking refuge from the humanitarian crisis will utilize air or maritime transport routes to reach the U.S.

Already, over 250,000 Venezuelans have migrated into Colombia in search of greater security and access to food and medical care. Colombia is in the process of finalizing a significant peace agreement with the FARC Rebel group, and a continued mass-migration of Venezuelan refugees could threaten Colombia’s internal stability. Absent a political settlement, which seems increasingly impossible due to the criminal nature of the Venezuelan regime, military intervention may be the only solution.

The Colombian government—possibly in cooperation with Brazil and other regional partners—may decide to pre-empt a mass-exodus of Venezuelans into Colombia by launching a military operation with the intent of deposing the government of Nicolas Maduro.

This would be no easy task. Venezuela, in addition to its military resources, has close security ties with Cuba. An attempt at intervention in Venezuela by a coalition of American democracies could rapidly descend into a much more significant conflict, mainly if hardliners in Havana perceive the operation as an American-led proxy war directed against Cuba and Cuba’s overseas interests.

Forget about North Korea, Venezuela is the next major national security crisis was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s GDP trajectory over the next 34 years is distinctly separate from its GDP per capita progression, demonstrating that while strong population growth can be an integral driver of Gross domestic product growth, it may also make it more challenging to boost income levels.

Nevertheless, this gap is closing. U.S. Gross domestic product per capita is presently around four times the size of China and almost nine times that of India. By 2050, these openings are projected to reduce to about double China and approximately three times India’s, demonstrating long-term income convergence.

The global economy will slow down with time, with a marked moderation in growth rates following the year 2020. Annual worldwide financial growth will average around 3.5% until 2020, slowing down to 2.7% for 2021-2030, 2.5% for the decade following that, and then to 2.4% for 2041-2050.

This will happen because many advanced economies are experiencing and will experience a marked decline in their working-age population. At the same time, emerging economy growth rates will average out as these economies grow.

Challenges for policymakers in achieving a long-term, sustainable expansion

To realize their full economic potential, emerging market governments must implement structural reforms to improve their macroeconomic stability, infrastructure and institutions, evaluations show the high possibility that emerging economies must grow and thrive in the coming decades.

But to realize this opportunity in total, they must undertake sustained and adequate investments in education, infrastructure, and technology. Worldwide demand growth and falling oil price over latest years have highlighted the significance of savings for long-term sustainable growth. Underlying all this is the requirement to develop political, economic, legal and social institutions to create incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship, making economies wherein to do business.

Looking forward, the global economics faces many challenges to profitable economic growth. Structural developments, like aging populations and climate change, require forward-thinking policies that equip the workforce to be able to make societal contributions later in life while promoting sustainable development.

Falling international trade growth, rising inequality, and increasing economic uncertainties will intensify the need to achieve economies which generate opportunities for everybody in a broad selection of industries. Businesses will need to adopt flexible and proactive approaches to navigate fast-changing and aging markets.

Market developments will create opportunities for business.

These will appear as these economies advance to new industries, to engage with world markets as well as their populations—which will be more youthful on average than in advanced countries—get more affluent.

As these emerging nations develop their institutions, fostering social stability and strengthening their macroeconomics principles, they’ll become more attractive places to conduct business and live, bring talent and investment. These economies are often volatile and quickly evolving, however, so companies will need operating strategies to succeed in them. Businesses should be ready to adjust their brand and market positions to match and preferences.

An in-depth understanding of the local marketplace, policy agendas, and consumer priorities will be crucial. Frequent collaboration with local partners will be essential. One key recommendation is that international companies along with other investors will be patient enough to ride out the short-term economic and political downs and ups which will unavoidably occur every once in a while in markets as they head toward adulthood. However, failure to interact with these markets means missing out on the bulk of the expected global economic development between now and 2050.

Acheiving Sustainable Economic Growth in the E7 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they bill are historical wrongs before economic and demographics headwinds further slow their material progress and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the US geopolitically, and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

National Security and Energy Interests of Rising and Declining Powers

For instance, China views the continuing presence of the US Navy in the Western Pacific, the centrality of US alliances in the region, and US protection of Taiwan as obsolete and representative of the continuation of China’s “one hundred years of humiliation.” Recent cooperation has been tactical and is likely to come back to competition if Beijing jeopardizes China’s dramatic growth has highlighted greater gaps between poor and rich.

Russian interests in Central Asia and as Beijing enjoys options for inexpensive energy supply beyond Russia. Furthermore, it isn’t clear whether there’s a mutually acceptable boundary between what Russia and China consider their natural spheres of influence.

India navigates its path

In the meantime, India’s growing economic power and profile in the region will further complicate these calculations, as New Delhi navigates relations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to shield its own expanding interests. Russian assertiveness will harden viewpoints in the Baltics along with other portions of Europe, escalating the potential risk of conflict.

Russia will seek, and sometimes feign, international cooperation, although openly challenging norms and rules it perceives as a counter to its interests and providing support for leaders of fellow “handled democracies” which promote resistance to American policies and personal tastes.

Moscow has little stake in the rules of the international economics and may be counted on to take actions that weaken the United States’ and European Union’s institutional advantages. Moscow will test NATO and resolve, seeking to undermine Western authenticity; it will attempt to exploit splits between Europe’s both north and south and east and west, and also to drive a wedge between the US and the EU.

Likewise, Moscow will become more active in the Middle East and these areas of the world wherein it believes it can check US influence. Lastly, Russia will Stay dedicated to atomic weapons as a deterrent and as a counter to stronger conventional military forces, as well as it’s ticket to superpower status.

Russian military doctrine allegedly includes the limited use of nuclear weapons in a situation where Russia’s vital interests are at stake to “de-escalate” a conflict by demonstrating that continued conventional conflict risks escalating the emergency to a large-scale nuclear exchange.

The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers was originally published on Global Security Review.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or an abatement of public anger, Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Rather, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some key differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

Regional Geopolitics and the Venezuelan Crisis

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a very weak government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence. An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence.

Particularly, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

How Likely is a Civil War in Venezuela? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Leftist governments have been kicked out in Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala. Venezuela’s left-wing populist government is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to a sharp increase in lawlessness across the country.

Furthermore, while Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s become a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe or  Africa before being routed to Europe. Drug trafficking increases under as the rule of law decreases. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government—lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

Unrest in Venezuela and Regional Security in the Americas

An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence. The United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia would all see massive amounts of refugees fleeing the conflict.

The Venezuelan border with Colombia, in particular, would be the most fragile. Venezuela closed the border with Colombia for a time as thousands of people attempted to cross the Amazon into Colombia to get food and medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela becomes increasingly destabilized, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Colombia is in the process of implementing a domestic peace agreement, so a mass-migration from Venezuela could create a humanitarian crisis with significant political and security ramifications for bordering countries like Brazil and Colombia—and more developed countries in the region like Canada and the United States.

Central and South America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves, the decline of the country’s oil production can be attributed to four major factors: the first, the current absence of qualified extractors that could exploit the heavy petroleum reserves. Nevertheless, as oil prices rose, the government demanded changes to arrangements made with companies to get higher revenues. When companies denied, their assets were captured and expropriated.

Oil Industry Mismanagement

Even when petroleum prices were higher, the government spent the proceeds to finance the country’s social programs, but failed to reinvest properly at all levels from the capital intensive business that is oil production.

The second is the failure of President Chavez’s government to understand the degree of capital expenditure which was needed to continue developing the country’s petroleum. After Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) Workers had gone on strike, they were dismissed and replaced by workers loyal to President Chavez, regardless their lack of expertise. Over 40,000 workers were fired and were replaced with over 120,000—largely inexperienced—workers. This resulted in a substantial decrease in oil production.

Venezuelan Oil Tankers

The next reason is Venezuela’s tankers inability to deliver their freight. Vessels which sail the high seas are obliged by the international maritime law to meet environmental criteria. This usually implies that the tankers must be cleaned before traveling to overseas ports to prevent environmental harm In the port, port facilities or others boats.

For the boats to be cleaned, workers in scuba suits scrub crude oil by hand from the tankers. PDVSA has since failed to pay back the service providers that keep clean and repair the vessels, the accumulation of cleaning invoices that the company can’t pay has caused the tankers transporting oil to be stranded up to two months.
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Global Oil Prices

The last reason is the fall in petroleum prices in the international industry. The decrease in oil prices that began in late 2014, when the overall poor economic performance in China, Brazil, and Europe fuelled a fall in the requirement, while the distribution and production continued to increase. The situation sent Venezuela’s economy to a plunge; the petroleum sector contributed to 95 percent of Venezuelan exports. Even when oil prices were higher, the government spent the proceeds to finance the country’s social programs but failed to reinvest properly from the capital intensive business.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that Venezuela’s inflation rate will increase up to a crippling 720% this past year. The country’s economic catastrophe has further exacerbated deep political tensions, causing a constitutional crisis, mass protests, looting, and civilian casualties with the death toll now in excess of 100. Price controls were intended to keep the essential goods affordable to the poorest inhabitants of the country, however, manufacturers reduced production because of the limit on what they can charge customers.

The crisis has forced people to deal with the shortage of foodstuffs in stores and supermarkets by substituting unavailable products like corn flour and pasta with locally grown plantains and potatoes. Nevertheless, shortages of basic and specialized medications, along in the lack of medical care in virtually all of the country’s health service units continue to be widespread. This has led to looting and massive demonstrations in the streets of Venezuela.

Analysis: The Economic Roots of Venezuela’s Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

The Current Situation: Repression, Resource Insecurity, and the Risk of Escalation

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, and the stage was effectively set for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests really different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e. for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Crisis in Venezuela: Economic Collapse, Violent Unrest, and Human Survival was originally published on Global Security Review.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that certain political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, Venezuela’s government would agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and agree to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy requires an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors so as to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a major effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.” There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it’s granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, it typically provides reduced sentences for human rights abusers, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity. Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. an interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela would be the first time that has happened, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Solving the Economic & Security Crisis in Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.