First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current global pandemic that has affected us all has elicited extensive media attention.  A variety of theories have abounded on how the virus originated, i.e., that it is a biological weapon created in the lab by the Chinese, or by the U.S. military, or that it is fueled by the effects of 5G networks on our immune system. In addition, divergent views have emerged regarding the “hysteria” surrounding the pandemic, some preaching for a strict societal response, and others claiming that the surrounding panic is more detrimental for society than the danger of the virus itself. Leaders have responded differently to the crisis and have received both praise and criticism for their actions. Some leaders responded as soon as they heard warnings from the World Health Organization, which called it a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” in January, while others did not pay immediate attention to warning signs.  Some responded with the concept of building “herd immunity” throughout the society, others called for total lockdown. Some leaders are demonstrating transparency to their citizens and to the world community to tackle the challenge, while others resort to hiding information or disregarding efforts at a global response. All actions and reactions have received immense scrutiny through media platforms, as per the modern-day norm.¹

In this age of mass media, infinite narratives, and political polarization, where “objective” information often becomes blurred as subjective, could this pandemic be shining a light on what “responsible leadership” really means? Could a truth be emerging instead of a subjective opinion? In a public health crisis, conspiracy theories can kill.  Citizens look to their government for protection and are placing their safety in the hands of their leaders.  During such a critical moment, a leader must act in the best interest of the population and the world at large, or else be labeled as a leader who mishandled an epidemic and put lives at risk, something that is never taken lightly.  Even populist politicians, who have shown a general tendency to ignore scientific advice, have heeded policy recommendations from the scientific community to tackle the spread of the virus, demonstrating that denial is not a viable option. The role of the media remains critical in such an instance, as the media have a responsibility to present factual information and constructive solutions to the problem and have a duty to be critical of the mismanagement of leadership rather than encourage the spread of disinformation or politicizing the crisis. This crisis has the potential to reshape the way we view responsible leadership and see the value in constructive journalism and scientific data.

The sharing of information in our world today has evolved dramatically.  Some have coined the term “post-truth world” to illustrate the present-day difficulties of discerning truth from falsehood. We now have access to more information and evidence than ever before, yet facts seem to have lost their power somehow. Furthermore, the popularity of populists these days points to the tendency of people being attracted to what they consider more “genuine” messages as opposed to the narrative from the “establishment,” which has now been categorized as “elitist,” with little regard for the common folk.  Mainstream media, academia, science, and establishment politicians have all been placed in this category. The Oxford Dictionaries define “post-truth” as: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”  Societal trust in institutions has waned, as the general population has grown more inclined to believe that institutions such as academia or the media are simply platforms through which the establishment tries to control the narrative in society. In other words, there is a crisis of confidence. Today in the political West, instead of merely having left-wing versus right-wing politics, we increasingly see the division lying between anti-establishment and establishment political parties. Amidst this crisis of confidence, the current “information age” is a perfect breeding ground for the perpetuation of multiple competing narratives, mistrust, confusion, sensationalism, polarization and creates what seems like a “post-truth” environment.

Social media play an immense role in this “post-truth” concept. On social media, everyone has a voice and a space to share his or her belief system. People enjoy writing their thoughts and sharing comments, receiving attention, and building networks of like-minded people online. But what social media also perpetuate is polarization and sensationalism.²  To take the example of YouTube, its algorithm is constructed on the basis of encouraging the viewer to spend as much time as possible on its platform.  Therefore, when one searches for something specific to watch, videos with similar content appear as recommendations for what to watch next, reinforcing one’s point of view continuously, whether or not it is based on factuality. In addition, one’s activity on social media is recorded as data to which external companies have access.  These companies can then take advantage of one’s tendencies and beliefs to convey a particular world view to specific targets to help certain political campaigns. There have been multiple instances of troll farms creating fake accounts on social media and influencing users to be attracted to a particular viewpoint. Most of the time, this goes on without our even being aware of it.  In other words, we have lost touch with objective reality in some ways, are increasingly polarized, mistrustful, and are giving in to sensationalism, which news media channels have also taken advantage of as a way to increase their ratings. Social media offers impressionable youth and troll factories the opportunity for mischief without consequences. This type of reality is bound to breed, increasing distrust.³

Despite all the misinformation about the virus that is floating around, this pandemic has revealed an interesting twist in the form of an emerging truth.  People can say what they want to say, but the truth is that there is simply no getting around the actual numbers such as the number of cases, number of deaths, needed hospital beds, ventilators required, and witnessing the effects of one leader’s response compared with another on this set of variables. There is no room for downplaying something whose results are visible and affect the whole of society. No amount of denial or refusal to accept scientific facts is going to help in this situation.  Today’s pandemic requires that each leader take responsibility for the crisis to ensure the best outcome for his or her country, state or city, and the world at large.  In a public health crisis such as this one, we cannot ignore scientific expertise.  It is through their advice and assessments that we as a society can fully understand what is unfolding, and it is up to each leader to either heed their warnings or not. We do, however, continue to see politicized narratives and blame games from leaders who may not have reacted quickly enough, who instead attribute blame elsewhere while playing into their constituency’s worldview.  But even this practice has lost momentum and credibility in most places due to the critical nature of the crisis as it pertains to public health and the health of the economy.

China’s response to the virus has proven to be very controversial. Once the situation was made apparent domestically, draconian measures were implemented in the city of Wuhan, and the central government entrusted the scientific community with the handling of the situation, which now appears to be under control. So, on the one hand, the measures that were taken were in tandem with the expert advice of the medical community, and internal misinformation on the severity of the crisis was stopped once the central government took action against the virus. However, there was a significant problem in the handling of the outbreak when it first appeared. The problem initially was that the Wuhan province denied the severity of the virus, denied it was transmissible to humans, and did not share the information fast enough with the local population nor the central government, which allowed the virus to gain a tenacious hold. This original lack of transparency from Wuhan had severe consequences not only for China but for the international community.  Not acting quickly enough does not tame the spread of the virus. At the same time, it is still possible, and not revealing the extent of the problem to the international community doesn’t allow for enough preparation time for what is to come.  Institutions such as the WHO are only as effective as nations will enable them to be.  Its response will only be as successful as the information it receives and to which it has access. U.S. intelligence reports state that China may not have been transparent with the total number of infected cases or deaths that it officially reported, which also does not give the international community a sense of future trends in other countries.  China is now actively lending its help to the international community as a sign of solidarity and cooperation by sending supplies, rallying for global coordination, and hosting video conferences with other countries to share experiences, initiatives that the West is receiving criticism for not leading.⁴ But the international community’s outlook towards China remains distrustful due to their early mismanagement of the crisis and dubious declaration of official counts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and some right-wing media in tandem with Fox News were early on heard downplaying the disease, saying it was a “hoax.” However, once the numbers caught up to them, there was no getting away with that type of rhetoric anymore.  Credibility is lost when one toys with matters of life and death on this scale. Trump has had to listen to medical experts such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has consistently advocated for more robust measures such as imposing more prolonged and stricter lockdowns alongside increasing testing. Even though Dr. Fauci has become the target of an online conspiracy theory that he is trying to undermine the President, Trump has had to follow his advice and apply more appropriate policies.  Dr. Fauci has won the approval of 78 percent of Americans, while just 7 percent disapprove, according to the Quinnipiac national survey.[5] At this current time, Trump’s handling of the crisis is approved by about 41% of Americans.[6] Although the Trump Administration has previously shown a distaste for relying on scientific expertise, it is particularly harmful to do so during a pandemic.  If leadership tries to sow distrust in public health officials during a time when their advice is especially crucial, the results could be disastrous. Evidence shows that Mr. Trump, however, continues to mishandle information. He tweeted that the HHS Inspector General’s reporting on hospital shortages was wrong and fake and is criticizing the WHO for not having dealt with the virus aggressively enough to divert attention away from his own administration’s slow reaction, messages that encourage distrust in the information we receive from public health institutions and medical experts during a critical time. President Trump later decided to cut U.S. funding to the WHO, which is bound to have detrimental effects in nations that heavily rely on support from the organization. The U.S.’s “America First” strategy sends a clear message to the international community that it does not intend to provide global leadership during this crisis as it has done in the past. This also goes for the U.S.’ allies in Europe, with whom no efforts to coordinate the travel ban coming from the E.U. was made. The German view of Trump has been made apparent when a shipment of 200,000 masks destined for Berlin was supposedly re-routed to the U.S. The fact that Germany would even think of blaming the U.S. for this speaks volumes.⁷ Also, international action at the U.N. Security Council has been hampered by the U.S.’s objections over terminology and insistence on calling it the “Wuhan Virus.”⁸  Also, for the same reason, any hope of G7 foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on the fight against COVID-19 was killed.⁹ Trump has also ignored calls to create a global task force for COVID-19. When a leadership vacuum is produced, others rush to fill the void. In this case, it is China, as the U.S. backed away from activating any conventional international consortium to fight the virus with a united front.¹⁰

Narendra Modi, India’s right-wing populist prime minister, has ordered the most extensive lockdown in human history, pointing to the fact that despite one’s inclinations, inaction is simply not an option during this pandemic. Nevertheless, he is still acting irresponsibly in many ways. Modi dismissed the severity of the epidemic at first. When he yielded to the example of others in the international community and ordered the lockdown, he only gave the population of India four hours’ notice. This, in turn, led to mass labor migration across states largely on foot, surely an inviting breeding ground for the spread of the virus.  In addition, instead of actively mitigating the dissemination of misinformation, the government allows for the spread of utterly false information that has no scientific validity on how to cure the virus, such as by drinking cow urine or bathing in cow dung. Modi has also not stopped the politicization of the coronavirus as being a virus that originated from the Muslim communities, which are now the target of Hindu communities who think it is a ploy to destroy them. Hospitals are underfunded and underequipped, and minimal testing is being carried out. The difference is that some provinces in India are faring much better than others, and these so happen to be mostly the ones that are not governed by Modi’s BJP party. A couple of the southern provinces, such as Kerala in southwest India, are doing much better. They are the example of what the federal government should be doing, which is to follow the advice of the scientific community, reject false information, and limit grandiose expressions of misdirected success stories by leadership.

Germany has proven to be particularly responsible in dealing with the crisis. They tested extensively, made people stay home, used a system of early detection of cases, and had time to prepare for the influx of patients in hospitals. Also important to note is the way Chancellor Angela Merkel was very upfront about the seriousness of the epidemic and resisted any urge to sugarcoat anything, thus making people understand the importance of the situation and follow orders from the start. According to a German public opinion survey, 72% of respondents said they are satisfied with the government’s handling of the crisis. Interestingly to note also is that establishment parties in Germany have gained popularity during this crisis, while the popularity of anti-establishment parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has dropped.¹¹

South Korea has so far established itself as one of the more successful models for responding to the virus.  It is regarded as successful because it was transparent with other countries and with its own population from the outset. A combination of extensive testing and meticulous contact tracing allowed them to control the virus spread effectively. Health managers knew exactly what to plan for, and they used science to guide them through every step of the way. Taiwan is another excellent example.  The government acted immediately as of January with border control and the wearing of facemasks.  While they were reacting quickly, other countries around the world were still debating whether to take action or not. Some of the decisive measures implemented were a ban on travel from China, the introduction of strict punishments for anyone breaching home quarantine orders, a ramp-up domestic face mask production, island-wide testing, and punishment for those who spread disinformation about the virus. Most importantly, there was substantial public trust for the medical experts who held daily briefings on the matter.

Brazil is a good example of how the public can react when a leader does not act responsibly in the face of a public health crisis of this proportion. Jair Bolsonaro still hasn’t gotten the memo that distrusting the scientific community and generating misinformation can be dangerous. He has described the illness as a “cold” and has accused the media of manufacturing hysteria. The governors of Brazil have gone ahead and imposed lockdowns using their own powers, but Mr. Bolsonaro has encouraged Brazilians to ignore them. His irresponsibility towards the crisis has stirred a strong reaction from the public. Through his recklessness with the lives of Brazilians, he has hastened the possibility of his own departure on the political scene. Brazil’s Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta’s approval rating soared to 76% over his handling of the coronavirus crisis as he actively informed the population of the current situation and the appropriate measures to take. In comparison, the approval for President Bolsonaro’s handling of the crisis slipped to 33%, a poll by Datafolha showed.¹² Data also showed an increase in support for Brazil’s various governors, who demonstrated to be more in line with the advice of the scientific community than the President. So even part of Bolsonaro’s support base, people who elected the populist leader to reduce the rampant corruption in Brazil, has deemed him irresponsible when faced with this crisis. Bolsonaro later went on to fire the Health Minister after he advocated for a more unified voice from the government on television.

Meanwhile, the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko sneers at the lockdown measures being implemented all over the world. Lukashenko has not imposed a single restriction since the outbreak of the pandemic, claims that the situation is under control and that it suffices to drink vodka and take a sauna to cure the virus. Neighboring countries have expressed concern about his unorthodox response to the crisis. Without much of a state response, the citizens of Belarus have taken on the responsibility themselves to manage the crisis. People have volunteered to raise money for hospitals and needed supplies, private companies have allowed their staff to work at home, and football fans have called for competition to be suspended. The Metro has its carriages cleaned every day, and the Belarusian Orthodox Church has asked people to stay away from churches for now and are holding masses online. According to SATIO, a Minsk-based survey, about 48% of Belarusians stopped attending public events, and many have self-isolated.¹³ Cafes and restaurants have also decided to close or shift towards takeout and delivery. Some parents have stopped bringing their kids to school, which has forced the government to compromise and extend “spring break” by two weeks. That same survey stated that 70% of Belarusians favor a total ban on public events, and more than half would like to see education institutions close and have people work from home.¹⁴  Sixty-two percent of those surveyed feared the health system would collapse in the face of this pandemic.¹⁵ In a country without free media, the average citizen is left confused about the state of affairs and on what the government is doing. Social media has become a platform for citizens to gain awareness. A very influential post by a doctor on Vkontakte depicted the situation in the hospitals as “out of control.”¹⁶ The doctor was later called in by prosecutors.  Citizens of Belarus have taken to social media to criticize the President and his unethical response to the current pandemic under the hashtag #прашчальнаесловапрэзидзента, or “the president’s parting words.”¹⁷

Each of the examples examined has demonstrated that despite regime type or political affiliations, and despite general tendencies of some politicians to ignore science, it is evident that those who respect the advice of the medical community, who do not waste time propagating false information, who remain transparent and who engage in international efforts, have been deemed leaders who are tackling the virus more responsibly. Conversely, those who ignore experts, sow confusion among the public and demonstrate a lack of transparency and willingness to cooperate are seen as acting irresponsibly. Irresponsibility during a public health crisis ultimately leads to more infections, deaths, and general disapproval. There is no room for “post-truth” in the management of this crisis.  Denying it will cause outright danger to society. Mishandling it for political purposes is reckless, and encouraging false narratives steers the goal away from tackling the issue and responding with urgency. There is a clear binary between what is responsible here and what is not. The relative success that some countries have demonstrated in curbing infections has resulted from quick action, trusting the advice of the medical community, executing a sober strategy, and remaining transparent. The case of COVID-19 will show that responsible leadership is needed and that objectivity exists when assessing what is constituted as competent in the management of this crisis.

In this hotly discussed arrival of the “post-truth” era, people may have stopped demanding the truth because they have understood that they are excluded from any decision-making or ability to change their environment. “Infotainment” or information presented as entertainment has become commonplace. But now, during the coronavirus pandemic, faced with questions of life and death, there seems to be more of a demand for truth. The media have an essential responsibility to point out misinformation and deficiencies, ensure the correct dissemination of factual information, and refrain from politicizing a matter of urgency.  The media sources that do this will be labeled as more legitimate, while others who are trying to sow discord will lose credibility.  Trust is found in circumstances where people are seen to work together toward a greater goal. Rebuilding trust in society is going to take a while since our crisis of confidence stems from many complicated structural factors, including the economy and democratic processes. But what this crisis can teach us or at least shed light on is the importance of reliable information, leaders who make it their priority to protect us, and media that want to help us understand what is going on rather than confuse us more or leave us in the dark. If we work together as a society to combat this common enemy and take responsibility, people may feel the return of a sense that they can control their environment and contribute to a greater good – a feeling that would help stabilize our crisis of confidence.  The pandemic is shedding light on what is considered “responsible leadership,” both nationally and internationally.  This development is refreshing and essential in a world that has created so many different versions of the truth.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of the U.S. government or any U.S. government agency.

¹ A previous version of this article was published on April 17, 2020, by Loftus, Suzanne, “COVID 19: Post-Truth Age – Or Facts Making a Comeback?” The Globalist, April 17, 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/coronavirus-pandemic-covid19-media-social-media-misinformation-post-truth-populism/.

² Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

³ Simon Blackburn, “How Can We Teach Objectivity in a Post-Truth Era?” NewStateman, February 18, 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2019/02/how-can-we-teach-objectivity-post-truth-era

⁴ Evelyn Cheng, “Xi Calls for Coordinated Response to Coronavirus at G-20 Meeting,” CNBC, March 26, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/xi-calls-for-coordinated-global-response-to-coronavirus-at-g20-meeting.html.

⁵ Quinnipiac University Poll: https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3658

⁶ Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, “Poll: Majority of Americans Disagree With Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus Pandemic,” U.S. News & World Report, April 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-04-23/poll-majority-of-americans-disagree-with-trumps-handling-of-coronavirus-pandemic.

⁷ Matthew Karnitschnig and Judith Mischke, “Berlin Lets Mask Slip On Feelings for Trump’s America,” Politico, April 6, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-lets-mask-slip-on-feelings-for-trumps-america/.

⁸ https://www.france24.com/en/20200407-un-security-council-expected-to-hold-first-coronavirus-talks-thursday

⁹ Katie Simpson and Alexander Panetta, “G7 Ministers Spike Joint Statement on COVID-19 after U.S. Demands it be Called ‘Wuhan Virus,'” CBC News, March 25, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/g7-covid-19-coronavirus-wuhan-pompeo-trump-1.5510329.

¹⁰ John Haltiwanger, “The U.S. is ‘Not a Global Power’ Thanks to Trump’s Disastrous Coronavirus Response as China Fills the Void, Former U.S. Officials Warn,” Business Insider, April 15, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-chaotic-coronavirus-response-has-created-void-china-is-filling-2020-4?r=DE&IR=T.

¹¹ Sabine Kinkartz, “Coronavirus: Angela Merkel’s Approval Ratings Up Amid Health Crisis,” DW, April 3, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-angela-merkels-approval-ratings-up-amid-health-crisis/a-53001405.

¹² Anthony Boadle and Pedro Fonseca, “Brazilians Scorn Bolsonaro’s Coronavirus Efforts, Back Health Officials: Polls,” Reuters, April 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazilians-scorn-bolsonaros-coronavirus-efforts-back-health-officials-polls-idUSKBN21L1W8.

¹³ Anna Perova, “Uvereny, chto stanet khuzhe. Belorusov oprosili naschet ikh otnosheniya k koronavirusu,” Tut Novosti, April 1, 2020, https://news.tut.by/society/678769.html.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Linas Jegelevicius, “Belarus and Coronavirus: Lukashenko’s Business-As-Usual Approach is ‘Mind-Blowing Negligence,'” Euronews, April 21, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/21/belarus-and-coronavirus-lukashenko-s-business-as-usual-approach-is-mind-blowing-negligence.

¹⁶ James Shotter and Henry Foy, “Belarus Faces Growing Criticism for Dismissive Coronavirus Response,” Financial Times, April 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/925c16e9-bd18-4678-936a-0539588facfa.

¹⁷ Tatiana Zinkovich, “The President without a Plan: Alexander Lukashenko still insists nobody’s going to die from COVID-19. What on earth is happening in Belarus?” Meduza, April 16, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/04/16/the-president-without-a-plan.

COVID-19 and Responsible Leadership in a “Post-Truth” Age was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, that presumably quiet and intense series of talks was matched by more than 1,000 demonstrators in Minsk who rallied against integration with Russia. Many of these demonstrators expressed concern that “politicians are playing with Belarusian sovereignty,” and that they didn’t want their independence on the bargaining table.

Both during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Belarus have shared a close fraternal relationship. Recent negotiations suggest that Russia is invested in an even closer integration of the two countries while Belarus remains wary.

Belarus and Russia Have a Tangled History

In 1997, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement that anticipated close political, economic and military ties. However, this agreement has not come to pass as cleanly as its writers perhaps believed. Regardless, ties between the two countries have always remained close. Belarus is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, the two countries share a free travel area similar to Europe’s Schengen Zone.

Historically, Belarus has relied upon Russia for cheap gas, low-cost loans, and energy. Currently, Russia provides Belarus with around $5 billion worth of subsidies for its Soviet-era economy. This support has allowed Lukashenko to stay in power, where he has stayed for the last quarter of a century.

Negotiations: Why Now?

Ostentatiously, negotiations restarted ahead of the 20^th anniversary of Russia and Belarus’s initial agreement. However, in recent years, Russia also claimed that they can no longer subsidize lower energy and gas prices to Belarus. As a solution, Russian officials have suggested that should Belarus agree to closer economic integration, lower energy prices would follow. In response, Belarus insisted that any further integration must be preconditioned on handling bilateral economic issues.

Belarus objects to paying higher prices for Russian gas and energy than Russian households and businesses. Some documents have leaked suggesting that Belarus and Russia are negotiating a deal that would result in an economic confederation. However, details and confirmation still remain to be seen.

In the days before the most recent set of negotiations, Lukashenko also spoke to parliament. He assured parliamentarians that there was no plan to join Russia, but rather remain as fraternal nations.

What Next?

Despite concern internationally about the union between Belarus and Russia, most of this likely comes from uncertainty. The talks are shrouded in uncertainty with no one leak explaining exactly what the two leaders are discussing. Moreover, Russia and Belarus’s history suggests that many agreements, while present on paper, are not actually fulfilled. In short, many issues that would need to be included in an economic confederation, such as unifying tax codes, would take many years of work rather than a simple agreement by two leaders.

The overarching gap between the two leaders is that while Lukashenko has been only open to integration on the basis of equal treatment, Putin has not been willing to accept that in the past or now. One speculation about the heightened pressure on Belarus and the changing nature of these negotiations, however, is connected to Putin’s presidential term, which expires in 2024. Some claim that full integration with Belarus would provide Putin with a way to stay in power as the head of the proposed new union state. Putin and Lukashenko will meet again on December 20^th in Saint Petersburg.

Belarus and Russia: Fraternal Nations But Not a Union State was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such rhetoric is unusual for the head of state of a country that claims to have brotherly relations with the Russian Federation and is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU or EEU)—but not necessarily surprising.

Belarus and the European Union: Embargoes, Diplomacy, and Slow Progress

Belarus and the European Union have been steadily increasing their cooperation for several years. In 2019, Belarus welcomed the foreign ministers of both Hungary and Austria to the country to assist them in opening embassies. These visits, in conjunction with high-level diplomatic visits to Italy and Poland by Belarusian officials, reveals, more than anything, Belarus’ willingness to work with the West—and hedge against Russia.

While it’s likely that economic matters are pushing Belarus to work more closely with the E.U., the growing state of rapprochement is nevertheless a positive development. Increased trade and investment between Belarus and the E.U. will provide more opportunities for social, political, and economic engagement.

Despite the overall improvement in E.U.-Belarus relations, there’s been little to show in terms of concrete partnership agreements. This primarily has to do with Lithuanian concerns over a Belarusian power plant located close to the city of Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital. Lithuania has repeatedly pushed for the power plant’s closure, citing risks to the safety and well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, some European states continue to impose new conditions in the ongoing negotiations for visa-free travel.

The European Union has a policy of promoting and advocating for human rights and democracy in Belarus. It encourages these values by introducing new mechanisms and so-called “democratic” clauses into negotiations with Belarus to induce changes to Belarusian policies that don’t align with European values. Belarus’ continued use of capital punishment is a particularly contentious issue for the E.U.

Belarus and Russia: An Enduring But Turbulent Relationship

Despite the close bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus, the two countries have recently been increasingly at odds with one another. In January of 2019, Russia began to gradually increase its mineral extraction tax and reduce its oil export duty. While this is undoubtedly financially beneficial for Russia, it means that Belarus will lose one of the main benefits of its relationship with Russia: cheap oil and revenue from Russian oil duties. Over the next five years, Belarus is expected to lose eight to twelve billion dollars (U.S.)—even as it remains dependent on Russian oil and gas.

In spite of this disagreement, however, Russia and Belarus continue to engage in negotiations to further the implementation of the 1999 Union State Treaty, which established goals of introducing a single currency, customs regulations, courts, and legislative chambers for Russia and Belarus.

Where Does This Leave Belarus?

It’s unlikely that Belarus would willingly cede its sovereignty. Perhaps most importantly, entering into a union with Russia would mean giving up much of the power he currently enjoys. Moreover, there is no strong political will for a Russia-Belarus union.

When looking at Belarus’ relationship with the European Union alongside its relationship with Russia, it comes as no surprise that Lukashenko himself is walking a tight rope. On one hand, Belarus’s traditional slant has always been towards Russia and Eurasia. However, the E.U. can offer much in the way of trade, energy, and economic diversification—and is a way for Minsk to hedge against deterioration of its relationship with Moscow. For two decades, Belarus has played a game of “Monkey in the Middle.” Amidst increasing tensions between Russia and the West, however, it remains to be seen how much longer it can continue to do so.

Belarus: The State in the Middle was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of Ukrainian state capture, Russian corruption, and bribery in other Eastern European and Central Asian states are on the rise. In all of the countries survey, only one country scores over 50 out of 100 points, with the average of countries only averaging a score of 35.

What’s the relationship between corruption and security?

Corruption undermines democratic consolidation and leads to voter disenfranchisement. This results in an overall lack of political will to combat illicit behavior in the public sector. In many Eastern European countries, history has provided few institutional checks and balances.

According to Transparency International, “one of the biggest impediments to fighting corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is state capture, where powerful individuals or groups seize control of national decision-making and use corrupt means to circumvent justice.”

It is unlikely that Eurasia will see widespread democratic stability in the near future, with countries like Azerbaijan (scoring 25), Russia (28), Kazakhstan (31), Kosovo (37), Serbia (39), and Montenegro (45) dropping in rank or continuing to stagnate.

While there are exceptions such as Ukraine’s increase from 30 in 2017 to 32 in 2018, given Ukraine’s weak enforcement of anti-corruption reforms enacted in 2014, any improvement is more superficial than it is long-lasting.

What’s wrong with the status quo?

For many, state capture and corruption have been everyday factors of life for the past two decades. Some see the status quo as essential for maintaining stability. Implementing a more equitable system carries a host of risks—from public trials to long-term imprisonment. For many in the ruling class, retaining current systems of informal governance seemingly carries zero cost.

However, the populist wave of 2018 might say otherwise. As voter frustration with corruption continues to rise, so too will their impatience with those currently in power. Leaders that rode those waves of anti-corruption legislation—such as Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan—must now follow through on their campaign promises, lest they risk being thrown out themselves.

Even countries like Russia, which have more entrenched systems of corruption, are beginning to see popular discontent. According to Russian’s Public Opinion Research Center, trust in Russian President Vladimir Putin has fallen to an all-time low since 2006.

While much of this can be attributed to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, observers must also take into account public disapproval over an increase in the retirement age and growing frustration with U.S. and European sanctions.

Corruption isn’t just a domestic concern—the extent to which corruption dictates domestic policies inherently affects domestic and regional stability and security. Therefore, endemic corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia doesn’t bode well for democratic cohesion and international support for human rights.

Corruption in Eastern Europe & Central Asia Is On the Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

These trends are particularly evident in Europe, where elections, treaties, and other events will reshape the continent. Before the end of 2018, the Italian government and the European Union were locked in a dispute over Italy’s budgetary plans. The European Commission sharply criticized the spending plans due to concerns that Italy’s approximately $3 trillion in debt combined with higher public spending could lead to a banking crisis that could spread to other countries in the Eurozone. While Rome did pass a revised budget to appease E.U. officials in Brussels, the ordeal has sewed divisions within Italy’s populist coalition government which are likely to persist throughout 2019. Tensions between Rome and Brussels will also continue, and possibly escalate.

The United Kingdom is scheduled to formally withdraw from the European Union on March 29, 2019. However, no agreement has been approved by the U.K. parliament that would avert a potentially catastrophic “no-deal” or “hard” Brexit. British Prime Minister Theresa May has come under considerable criticism from within her party over the tentative agreement her government negotiated with the E.U., but no alternative plans have been put forth. Regardless of the outcome, the U.K. will continue to strengthen bilateral relations with E.U. member states such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland.

In May, European Parliamentary elections will take place, while E.U. member states will appoint a new President of the European Commission in October. Despite a rise in nationalist and euro-skeptic parties, pro-European factions are expected to maintain overall control. A divided political landscape will make it difficult for the E.U. to implement any significant reforms. Furthermore, E.U. member states are divided when it comes to fiscal policy. Southern states like Italy, Portugal, and Spain are pushing for higher spending and greater risk-sharing, whereas northern states led by Germany are calling for greater fiscal responsibility in Frankfurt.

Ongoing Political Divisions in the E.U. and its Member States

E.U. member states after the U.K. withdrawal) to focus inwards. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced that her current term will be her last and resigned as leader of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party. The CDU elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbaur as party leader in the latter part of 2018. However, the party is divided over a range of policy positions. Furthermore, the CDU’s coalition partner is facing an identity crisis of its own, which has already weakened the coalition government. Further disagreements and intra-coalition infighting could lead to early elections in Germany.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s institutional and economic reforms have fueled substantial, and in some cases, violent opposition. Large-scale protests have erupted throughout France. 2019 will see continued opposition to Macron’s reforms, opposition stoked by groups on both the far-right and the far-left ends of the political spectrum. Some of Macron’s economic reforms will succeed, but French citizens will be increasingly vocal in their rejection of his attempts to revitalize the French economy.

Domestic political concerns will require greater attention from both Paris and Berlin, decreasing both powers from critical external affairs. Political divisions will hamper initiatives to achieve greater strategic autonomy through the implementation of increased European military integration and the promotion of the Euro over the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve currency. Therefore, it is unlikely these major initiatives will see substantial progress in 2019.

Trade and China

Trade will be a significant area of focus. If the U.S. imposes higher tariffs on European-manufactured vehicles, for instance, approximately 10% of total U.S.-E.U. trade will be affected. In such a scenario, the E.U. would be forced to respond in kind, leading to a greater rift in transatlantic relations. Automobile tariffs would disproportionately affect the German auto industry, which manufactures one in every three cars produced in Europe. However, trade disputes will not lead to the collapse of the transatlantic alliance, as both the U.S. and E.U. have concerns over unfair Chinese trade practices.

Aside from trade, Europe has other concerns with China. Led by the governments in Berlin and Paris, policymakers across Europe are increasingly wary over Beijing’s economic activity on the continent. As a result, Europe has begun to exclude China from investing in critical infrastructures such as ports and telecommunications networks. China filed suit against the E.U. in the WTO, arguing that Beijing should be treated as a market economy. The case will come to a resolution in 2019, and the outcome will have a significant impact on the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S., the E.U., and China.

The complicated bureaucratic system of rules and regulations, however, put poorer or smaller member states at an economic disadvantage. As such, these states are more welcoming to Chinese investment and lending. Those states that are receptive to Chinese economic activity in Europe will likely continue to lobby against Berlin And Paris. The European bloc’s position towards China will be ambiguous, leading to more vocal action by those states that are concerned about China’s economic activities.

Escalating Tensions Between Russia and the U.S.

The relationship between Russia and the United States will continue to deteriorate. The U.S. is set to formally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans intermediate-range missiles. Washington has cited Moscow’s noncompliance with the treaty as the justification for its withdrawal. The collapse of the INF treaty will heighten tensions in Eastern Europe, leading to a military buildup. This will be particularly visible in Poland and Romania, both of which will continue to lobby the U.S. for increased military commitments. Moscow will continue to build up its military forces in Kaliningrad, and the Crimea, both of which will likely play host to Russian intermediate-range missiles should the U.S. decide to deploy its own in Europe.

U.S. discussions with Poland regarding a possible permanent deployment of U.S. troops will continue throughout 2019. The Kremlin, citing what it perceives as “NATO-encirclement” will maintain, or even increase its efforts to interfere in the domestic politics of European states through malign activity in cyberspace, possible covert actions, and support for Euro-skeptic and nationalist factions across the E.U. The European parliamentary elections in May will provide Moscow with an opportunity to bolster the ranks of nationalist and Euro-skeptic groups, further sewing divisions within the E.U.

It is also possible that Moscow will open a military base in Belarus, as had previously been hinted by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. However, Lukashenko has made increasing overtures to the E.U. and the U.S., which could lead to increased hostility from Moscow. Russia’s efforts to undermine the integrity of NATO and the E.U. will be particularly visible in the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

High Stakes for Ukraine as the Kremlin Deals With Domestic Challenges of its Own

Ukraine will face considerable challenges throughout 2019. Both the TurkStream and NordStream 2 natural gas pipelines are set to become active. The pipelines will circumvent Ukraine, providing Moscow with enormous economic leverage over Kiev. Ukraine will be deprived of substantial transit fees that it will now lose as the two pipelines exclude Ukraine from Russia’s natural gas supply lines.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated in the aftermath of Russia’s seizure of three Ukrainian Navy vessels in the Sea of Azov, and tensions are expected to continue throughout 2019. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine will continue, and Ukraine is set to hold presidential elections in March. Depending on the outcome, negotiations could reopen between Moscow and Kiev, however, it is unlikely the two parties will come to a resolution. It is in Russia’s interest to maintain a state of low-grade or frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which effectively prevents the former Soviet republic from joining NATO.

Russia, however, will face its own domestic challenges in 2019. The Kremlin has announced controversial economic reforms, including increasing the retirement age, raising the value-added tax (VAT), and imposing new taxes on certain consumer products and the tourism sector. The reforms are designed to bolster the government’s revenue but have generated considerable backlash from Russians across the country. It is the working class that will be hardest hit by the measures, which are due to come into effect this month. As such, there is likely to be a degree of social unrest. Meaningful changes are unlikely, however, as there is presently no viable opposition party capable of threatening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.

Overall, 2019 will be a year of volatility in Europe. Diplomatic, trade, and economic disagreements will persist between Europe and the United States, and within Europe itself. Tensions between Russia and NATO heighten anxiety for Eastern European states, which will lead to a buildup of military capabilities on both sides.

Political Uncertainty Will Plague Europe Throughout 2019 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Earlier in the negotiation process, Radio Free Europe reported that Hungary additionally wanted to include helicopter spare parts to the exemption list along with biathlon rifles and small caliber sports guns. However, this was later taken off the table. With these two exceptions, both Hungary along with Slovakia see the potential for the small arms market in Belarus. Sports hunting is popular in the post-Soviet country; both small caliber guns and biathlon rifles are popularly used.

Why the embargo?

The arms embargo was initially announced in 2011 after Belarusian officials initiated a violent crackdown on protestors in the 2010 presidential election. This election brought Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko another term in office, an office he held which he’s held since 1993. Four Belarusian companies had their assets frozen and access to EU visas restricted. Also, 174 individuals, including President Lukashenko, were sanctioned.

EU-Belarusian relations were somewhat tarred with the feathers of human rights violations, and the rule of law violations and a lack of press freedom. That all began to change in 2015 when Belarus released the country’s final remaining six political prisoners. Why bother? As a dictator, what could motivate Lukashenko to don a mantle of European civility?

The answer is Russian leverage. Lukashenko was under pressure to allow a Russian airbase to be constructed in Belarus. In the background of this Russian move towards a more concrete show of their power was the fear of NATO beginning to reach eastward. Rather than agree with Russia, however, Lukashenko believed that the construction of such a base would exacerbate tensions. So, when Belarus began to court the European Union, the reasoning was not so difficult to understand.

Two years ago, in February of 2016, the EU removed four companies and 170 individuals from the sanctions list, leaving four individuals remaining. The rationale given was that the human rights situation in Belarus had improved. However, the four individuals remain on the sanctions list. The EU claims that these four individuals played roles in the unresolved political disappearances of four Belarusians in 1999-2000. They consisted of opposition politicians Yuri Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar, businessman Anatol Krasouski and journalist Dzmitry Zavadski.

So, who is still sanctioned?

• Former Interior Minister Uladzimir Naumau
• Former Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Sheiman
• Former Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakou
• And Former Commander of the Special Forces Brigade of the Interior Ministry Dzmitry Paulichenka

It’s an interesting list—particularly given that Uladzimir Naumau, Dzmitry Paulichenka, and Yury Sheiman are also included on the list of sanctions in the United States. Though given their role in the earlier repressive steps taken by the Belarusian government, it’s not surprising. Their continued lack of ability to travel to Europe and the United States as well as their overseas assets being frozen is business as usual.

The arms embargo today is more a symbolic statement, a sign that the European Union is promoting democracy and human rights, even in countries with which they share a border. But if the tendency to add more and more exceptions continues to grow—it won’t be surprising if all that remains is the four individuals associated with political disappearances. After all, more often than not, economic gains rates higher on the scale of political choice than the idealistic urges of human rights advocates.

European Union Extends Arms Embargo Against Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo. Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it.

For China, Pyongyang’s behavior recalled memories of 1994, when Beijing sent a delegation to Pyongyang to notify the then-Kim Il Sung (the grandfather of current leader Kim Jong-Un), that China would be initiating official diplomatic relations with South Korea.

A furious Kim Il Sung threatened Chinese officials that North Korea would develop diplomatic ties of their own with the Republic of China—Taiwan—in retaliation. Nevertheless, Pyongyang neglected to carry out that threat, and China continued in its plans to normalize relations with South Korea.

Where China Withdraws—Russia Steps In.

Many in China are wondering why North Korea thinks it can get away with criticizing China in such a public manner. The answer, it seems, lies with China’s “strategic partner,” Russia.

In January 2017, the Chinese authorities found that Pyongyang had shipped out its first wishes for a happy New Year in Moscow, not Beijing. As China has stepped up economic pressure on North Korea by cutting off coal exports and implementing restrictions on doing business with North Korea, Russia has stepped in to exploit the situation and to fill the gap. Russia is now Pyongyang’s top coal provider.

Furthermore, North Korea has been importing crude oil from Russia to reduce its energy dependence on China. Early this year, Russian authorities representatives visited Pyongyang to talk about railroad transportation cooperation.

Is North Korea Getting Help on its Missile Program?

In the summer of 2017, in the wake of one of North Korea’s ballistic missile test launches, Ukraine was cited as a source of North Korean missile technology.

However, the Ukrainian government vehemently denied the allegations. Objectively, Ukraine would have little to gain from providing North Korea with weapons technology, as it would significantly hinder their efforts to increase U.S. support for their fight against Russian-backed separatists.

Analysis: Chinese-Russian Divide Over North Korea Reveals Greater Tensions to Come

China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo while Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it. China desperately wishes to avoid a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. It fears a U.S.-allied and unified Korea, on its border, and would inevitably have to manage a massive humanitarian crisis on its doorstep.

Russia, however, sees opportunities in stoking tensions on the Korean peninsula. Increased international and U.S. attention on North Korea means less focus on Russia’s military engagements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Moscow could very well be encouraging further North Korean belligerence to divert attention away from a large-scale military operation in Ukraine or Belarus in the wake of its Zapad-2017 war games, which reportedly saw the deployment of over 100,000 Russian, Belarussian, and CIS troops across Russia’s and Belarus’ eastern borders.

The divide over North Korea reveals that the China-Russia “strategic partnership” is flawed. In the coming decade, it is likely that the two countries will find themselves at odds over their respective national interests.

North Korea Crisis Reveals Fractures in the China-Russia Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a rare televised interview on September 3rd, 2017, Vasyl Hrytsak, the head of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of carrying out terrorist attacks in Ukraine.

Hrytsak proceeded to allege that these attacks were designed to destabilize the situation in Ukraine further, to give the pretext for a full-scale invasion by the Russian military. Directly addressing Aleksandr Bortnikov, the director of Russia’s FSB, Hrytsak accused the FSB of violating the fundamental rules of war by carrying out terrorist attacks designed to strike fear into the populations of Russian-majority regions of eastern Ukraine.

“I appeal to you as an officer,” Hrytsak said in the interview on Ukraine’s Priamy television network. “There are rules even in a war which should not be broken by secret service agents. You have transgressed all of these rules.” Hrytsak continued:

“You and I both know Russian secret service agents were involved in terrorist attacks committed in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson, and other cities. Dozens of people died as a result. But this time you have broken all of the rules and are prepared to destabilize the situation in Russia in order to justify invading Ukraine in a massive military campaign…You were ready to blow up your own Russian citizens in order to destabilize the situation in Russia and give grounds for invading Ukraine, to launch a full-scale invasion.”

The FSB has a history of executing false-flag “terror” attacks.

The “terrorist attacks” that Hrytsak referenced were riots and violence in Odessa that killed 48 in May of 2014, a February 2015 bombing in Kharkiv that resulted in four deaths, and a Kherson car bombing in April 2016 that killed one. The SBU believes all—alongside U.S. intelligence officials—to be the handiwork of the Russian FSB. John Schindler, a former NSA analyst, quotes a senior U.S. intelligence official as saying that there is “absolutely no doubt” the FSB was behind these specific attacks inside Ukraine.

This wouldn’t be the first time Russian security forces executed a false-flag terrorist attack to create the pretext for broader military action. In 1999, four apartment buildings in Russia were bombed, killing nearly 300 civilians. Moscow accused Chechen terrorists of carrying out the deadly attacks and was given the green-light of renewing its bloody campaign against Chechen separatists. However, little evidence supported the Kremlin’s claims, while there was considerable evidence that pointed to the FSB as being behind the attacks.

Analysis: Heightened Risk for Escalations in Russia-Ukraine Conflict

These accusations, if true, point to a doubling-down of Russian efforts to justify further engagement in Ukraine. Leaked emails that were hacked from a top Kremlin official detail a secret plan to decrease the influence of pro-Western Ukrainian politicians in Kiev and simultaneously create conditions that would justify further interference by Russia.

The SBU head’s statement was delivered just as Russia was gearing up for its massive Zapad 2017 military exercises with neighboring Belarus, directly on Ukraine’s northern frontier. In the short-term, there is a high possibility of increased hostilities in Eastern Ukraine. Of particular concern is the in the region separating the Crimean peninsula from the Russian mainland.

How to Justify an Invasion: Russia’s FSB Accused of False-Flag Terrorist Attacks in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s annual strategic “Zapad” (запад; Russian for west) military training exercises—held in Russia’s Western Military District and regions of Belarus—began on September 14. Troops from neighboring ally Belarus joined alongside Russian forces in the week-long demonstration of military force.

Historically, Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has maintained a habit of conducting offensive operations under the guise of training exercises. The drills will reveal the Russian military’s tactical capabilities and provide indicators on the threats it is focused on.

How Moscow could use the exercises to its advantage

Moscow could use the exercises to boost its presence in states along the front line with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and to increase its military assets in Belarus.

The two nations have partnered in the drills ever since 2009. Within their 1st year as a collaborative endeavor, the drills had been the biggest joint exercises Russia had conducted in the post-Soviet era. Official statements announced that 12,500 military personnel Participated In the 2009 exercises, which included 100 combat, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery airplane and 20 warships.

These drills took place in the crucial Area surrounding the Baltic area and mimicked not only the invasion of Poland but a strategic nuclear strike on Warsaw, increasing concern among NATO member countries.

Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

Russia and Belarus held the next Zapad exercises in September 2013. Expanded to include all branches of Russia’s army As well as rapid response Units of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the drills likely were considerably bigger than the previous exercises, even though the exact numbers are up for debate.

The exercises simulated an assault by Baltic terrorists on Belarus which resulted in a mixed air, naval forces, and urban warfare response. And as had become custom by that time, they ended with a mock atomic attack, this time against Sweden. More important, Russia employed a number of the same approaches it tried in the 2013 Zapad exercises, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, when it got involved with battles In Ukraine and Syria during the following two years.

Moscow isn’t happy with Minsk.

Belarus and Russia entered into a formal “Union State” in 1999 to promote trade and other policies, but the goal of a single currency was never realized. Some experts suggest Putin could use the financial component of the “Union State” arrangement as his legal justification in annexing Belarus.

Putin has been growing uneasy with the West warming to President Lukashenko of Belarus since 1994. The U.S. has sought to get closer to Belarus by lifting some sanctions it imposed to encourage political forums. Last year, The European Union also lifted its five-year sanctions on Belarus, a country with about 10 million people.

Moscow also isn’t happy that Belarus continues to depend on Russian subsidies because the collapse in oil prices has made Moscow cut back on spending. Moreover, Lukashenko’s ties with Moscow worsened when he positioned himself as a neutral mediator for the Ukraine peace talks.

At the same time, there’s a chance Belarusian’s officers might side with Russia in a military conflict. Some of the officers were trained in Russian military schools and are paid less than their peers in Russia. Belarusian troops realize that if Belarus gets annexed by Russia, they’ll be better paid—with the bonus of serving in the armed forces of a nuclear-armed power.

Russia, meanwhile, beefed up its own forces along the borderlands and boosted its security support to regional allies and breakaway territories. Now that Washington has expanded its sanctions against Moscow — and the Kremlin has promised an “asymmetrical” response — Russia is looking to use this year’s military drills to send a message to the West.

Heightened Tensions between Russia and the West

The United States and NATO built up their forces along the European borderlands after Russia annexed Crimea and began backing Ukrainian separatist forces in 2014. The West deployed continuous battalion rotations of 1,000 troops to the Baltic states and Poland and increased its presence in the Black Sea.

Held along the Europe’s borders with Belarus and Russia, Zapad-2017 has emerged as an item of skepticism for governments and media outlets in Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Heletey commented that the 2017 Zapad exercises could be a prelude to an assault on any “country of Europe that shares a border with Russia.” This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements.

This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements. Those skeptical about Russia’s intentions will point out that Russian partners can be underreporting numbers since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s so called Vienna Accord require OSCE nations to permit in observers for particular activities between 13,000 troops or more.

Analysis: Biggest risk comes from non-transparency and Russia’s displeasure with Belarus

The 2017 Zapad exercises are drawing attention because Russia can avoid the need for official outside observer nations by claiming it will have less than 13,000 soldiers in the drills. However, several smaller exercises will be conducted simultaneously, allowing Moscow to avoid the conditions put forth in the Vienna Accord.

Western intelligence and military agencies believe that over 100,000 troops could be deployed. According to statements from the U.S. Department of Defense, Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test response  through other measures, escalations in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia), or attempts to use nonlinear/hybrid warfare tactics, or asymmetric tactics,  in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Could Russia Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against Belarus? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The drill exercised combat scenarios recently used in Ukraine and tested the compatibility of the Belarusian army with Russian forces.

Politicians from Poland, Ukraine and Baltic states viewed the exercise as aggressive as they mistrust the Kremlin and fear possible security threats in the region. They used the drill to justify the ongoing “social militarisation” of their respective countries.

This is primarily a rise of state support or enthusiasm for voluntary defence organisations which are sometimes armed, committed to “national causes” and often have roots in right-wing political groups.

Is the “Russian threat” the sole reason why right-wing politicians in the region want to militarise their societies?

Training for war

With the post-1989 transition to liberal democracy and NATO accession, Central Europe began a gradual process of social demilitarisation towards a Western model of civilian states. Slowly but steadily armies were reduced in size and professionalised.

In recent years, however, this model of statehood and citizenship has been seriously challenged in Central Europe.

The region has experienced a significant rise in the number and visibility of grassroots paramilitary actors ranging from anti-refugee vigilantes in Bulgaria and Hungary through pro-Kremlin militias in Slovakia and the Czech Republic to a civilian component cooperating with the armed forces in the Baltics and Poland. By 2019, Poland expects to have trained 53,000 people for its Territorial Defence Forces, a new volunteer segment of the army built entirely of local citizens – many of them members of already existing paramilitary groups.

Military picnics

Normalisation of the paramilitary sector goes hand in hand with a diffusion of military values and practices to everyday life. For example, in Poland, the teaching of history is increasingly centred around military events. WW2-themed clothing and accessories are growing popular too, and families can be seen attending military-themed picnics featuring shooting ranges and weapons displays. The visibility of military uniforms in the public sphere has become too. In Estonia, meanwhile, people are signing up for weekend training sessions with volunteer paramilitary groups.

This ideological shift became evident when the Polish minister of defence Antoni Macierewicz made an appearance on a morning television programme for children. Sitting among a group of youngsters over bowls of army-style pea stew, he talked to the children about the importance of fighting for sovereignty.

Children are also being courted by the Hungarian governing party FIDESZ. Its officials are currently implementing a broad patriotic and national defence programme beginning in kindergarten. They are contemplating including shooting classes and military training in schools. Following the path of his Estonian and Polish counterparts, the Hungarian minister of defence, István Simicskó, has praised volunteer territorial defence forces. He is also endorsing the idea to build state-owned shooting ranges in each county to popularise military skills.

Towards militarised governance

Central European leaders claim their societies need to be prepared to face challenges brought about by the refugee, terrorist and Ukrainian crises. Wide-scale societal militarisation has stirred concern among both military officials and civil society.

Many see it as part of the illiberal political transformation which is underway in the region and aims to popularise an alternative model of governance which combines democratic procedures such as multi-party system and general elections with a disregard for human rights and constitutional limits to power.

In Poland and Hungary, civil society activists are portrayed as enemies and national traitors. There are also extraordinary measures against perceived threats, such as activists and journalists increasingly face financial penalties and even direct violence.

‘Remasculinisation’

Right-wing ideologues also wish to regenerate the society that they consider broken and morally corrupt. In their narrative, the journey towards liberal democracy and global governance is told as a story of emasculation of men and loss of their agency over their lives and their countries.

As argued by panellists of the National Congress of Families held in Warsaw in 2017, militarisation is the solution to a crisis of masculinity in Poland.

In the words of former MP of the ruling Law and Justice party Marian Piłka – the militarised “New Man” has character traits which are needed to advance the country’s international standing as well as forge a “new form of Polishness” capable of overcoming “post-communist mediocrity”.

Members of Territorial Defence Forces are to receive €125 monthly along with additional financial rewards for completing all training. They also enjoy the special protection of labour contracts preventing employers from firing them while in service.

Families benefiting from such programmes could contribute to the emergence of a substantial new patriotic middle class.

Can the civilian state be saved?

In 2012, hopes were raised of a future without military violence when the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for the “advancement of peace and reconciliation” on the continent. Today in Central Europe, the civilian state is trembling.

Objective security challenges such as the terrorist threat or the Kremlin’s superpower ambitions certainly play a role in boosting nationalist militarism. But the public attractiveness of the militarised model of governance and citizenship has as much to do with severe social costs and unfulfilled promises of the post-1989 transition.

Therefore, to save European civilian states, advocates will need to take the underlying causes seriously fuelling militaristic sentiments. One of them is the unfulfilled need of individuals for security, well-being and upward mobility. Another is a sense of being left out and deprived of control over their economic future. If these genuine issues are not addressed progressively, nationalist militarism will continue to seem like a legitimate answer.

“In Central Europe, militarised societies are on the march” was originally published on The Conversation. 

In Central Europe, Militarized Societies are on the March was originally published on Global Security Review.

While eastern European leaders are certainly justified in their concern, it is the job of military leaders all over the world to ensure that their forces are prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios. Zapad and other large-scale war games are intended to test the readiness of military forces to deal with such situations.

History, and Russia’s military doctrine, tells us that for the Kremlin to legitimately consider the use of force against a sovereign state—under the guise of aiding Russian-speaking separatists, military drills, or otherwise, the Russian military and political leadership must perceive a legitimate threat to Russia’s national interest—largely the interests of its ruling oligarchic elite.

Additionally, the Kremlin must be sure of its ability to prevail in any forceful confrontation or to, a minimum, ensure a stalemate. Neither condition seems present.

Since last year’s strategic Caucasus-2016 exercise, no Russian allies or client states are under greater threat than they were last year. A few, like Bashar al Assad of Syria, have seen threats to their rule decrease in the past year.

How Likely is it that Russia Will Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against the Baltics?

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Western countries were caught unaware as Russia employed hybrid tactics to hide its deployment of forces to Crimea.

NATO has beefed up its presence in its Baltic and Eastern-European Union member countries, further reducing the already slim chances that Russia will want to attempt an incursion in Baltic or E.U. states.

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Preparing for a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

The Russian military has been holding large scale strategic exercises each year of the twenty-first century, as the Russian economics has rebounded from the lows of the early 1990s. Preparing for such a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

It is also worth noting a correlation between Russia’s economic state and its military spending and training. This would imply that the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to train as far because they can afford to.

Until 2015, Russia’s military expenditures and the number of war games it conducted, both large- and small-scale, had been increasing at a faster rate than the rate of economic growth.

Russian Troop Deployments in Military Training Exercises

Russian GDP figures, Military Exercise Data, and Troop Numbers

Given the degree of attention focused on Russia’s military deployments, it’s highly unlikely that that Zapad-2017 will escalate into a full-scale or partial military conflict with NATO.

Even though Russia’s Gross domestic product grew to 2014, its costs grew by 300 percent at the exact same period and the number of war games increased by 157 percent from 2008 to 2014.

It should be noted that this precludes any so-called “black money” that would not appear on a publicly available balance sheet.

Security Analysis: Although Possible; War with NATO is Unlikely.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test responses through other measures, moderate or temporary escalation in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).

Additionally, due to regional geopolitical developments in the Russia-Belarus relationship, Russia may attempt to use “nonlinear” warfare tactics (asymmetric tactics) in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Zapad-2017: Analyzing Troop Numbers & Economic Factors was originally published on Global Security Review.