With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. Dr. Christopher Yeaw, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around 2,000 warheads and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear powered Poseidon torpedo, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.

Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a major nuclear actor, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next four to five years and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, which was roughly 200 at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s CFR-600 reactors, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.

The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the P5 forum where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under an obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.

In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess 80 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.

The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.

In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.

Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Introduction

Russia’s recent deployment of a conventionally armed, diesel-powered submarine to Indonesia should not be dismissed as routine naval activity. It is a calculated strategic signal. One that highlights a growing challenge for Australia and calls into question the resilience of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. While such deployments fall below the nuclear threshold, they reveal an emerging approach to strategic competition. The use of advanced conventional capabilities can undermine the systems that enable nuclear deterrence.

At the center of this challenge is the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt, are integral to this architecture. They support early warning, signals intelligence, and communications with nuclear forces. As such, they are not only strategic assets but also potential targets. Modern diesel-electric submarines—quiet, survivable, and increasingly capable—can operate in Australia’s northern approaches and threaten these critical nodes with precision strike options or intelligence-gathering missions that enable future disruption.

The Gray Zone Effect

This development reflects a broader shift in adversary strategy. Rather than relying on overt nuclear coercion, states such as Russia are exploring how to achieve strategic effects through conventional means. By targeting NC3 infrastructure using submarines, cyber operations, or long-range precision strike, adversaries can degrade the credibility of nuclear deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. This approach exploits the grey zone between peace and war, complicates escalation dynamics, and introduces ambiguity into alliance responses. It is not escalation dominance in the traditional sense, but escalation manipulation, and shaping the environment so that nuclear deterrence becomes less certain, less credible, and therefore less effective.

Recent Chinese naval activity reinforces this concern. The PLA Navy’s circumnavigation of Australia should not be viewed as routine presence or symbolic signaling alone. Rather, it demonstrates an emerging capacity to operate persistently along Australia’s littoral approaches and key maritime choke points—areas proximate to critical infrastructure that underpins U.S. and allied NC3. Such operations enable the mapping of undersea terrain, surveillance of communication pathways, and potential identification of vulnerabilities in systems such as subsea cables and relay nodes. In a crisis, these capabilities could be leveraged to conduct limited, deniable disruption of NC3 functions that degrade communication, delay decision-making, and complicate alliance coordination without crossing the threshold of armed attacks. In this sense, China’s activity mirrors and reinforces the broader trend: the use of conventional means to hold at risk the foundations of nuclear deterrence.

For Australia, the implications are significant. The traditional model of U.S. extended deterrence, anchored in the threat of nuclear retaliation, assumes that nuclear forces remain survivable, communicable, and politically usable. However, if NC3 systems are degraded or disrupted, that assumption weakens. Deterrence begins to erode not because nuclear weapons are absent, but because their employment becomes uncertain or delayed. In such a scenario, adversaries may calculate that they can act with greater freedom at the conventional level, confident that escalation can be managed or avoided. 

Policy Recommendations

This evolving threat environment demands a recalibration of Australia’s defense and deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. It must be reinforced by a comprehensive strategy that integrates conventional resilience, grey-zone competition, and a more explicit recognition of the role nuclear forces play in underpinning deterrence across all domains.

First, Australia should prioritize the hardening and resilience of NC3-related infrastructure on its territory. This includes enhancing physical protection, investing in redundancy and dispersal, and strengthening cyber defenses. Facilities such as Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt must be able to operate under contested conditions, ensuring continuity of communication and decision-making even in the face of sustained disruption. This may also require the development of alternative communication pathways, including space-based and mobile systems. Resilience is not merely a defensive measure; it is a core component of deterrence, signaling to adversaries that attempts at degradation will not succeed.

Second, Australia must significantly expand its undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ability to detect, track, and, if necessary, neutralize hostile submarines in Australia’s maritime approaches is critical to protecting strategic infrastructure. Investments should focus on integrated undersea sensor networks, maritime patrol aircraft, autonomous systems, and closer operational integration with allies. A persistent and credible ASW posture will complicate adversary planning, increase operational risk, and reduce the feasibility of covert operations targeting NC3 nodes.

Third, Canberra should deepen strategic dialogue with Washington on the role of Australia within U.S. nuclear deterrence architecture. This dialogue must move beyond general assurances and address specific contingencies, including how attacks on NC3 infrastructure in Australia would be interpreted. Greater clarity around escalation thresholds, attribution challenges, and response options will reduce the risk of miscalculation and strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. This should include regularized nuclear consultation mechanisms and scenario-based planning.

Fourth, Australia should take the lead in advocating for the development of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. Such a framework that brings together the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia, would formalize shared deterrence responsibilities and strengthen collective resolve. While politically sensitive, this arrangement could include elements of nuclear consultation, planning, and burden-sharing, similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. By distributing deterrence functions and signaling unity, such an alliance would complicate adversary calculations and reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence across the region.

Fifth, Australia must engage India more directly on the implications of Russian strategic behavior. As a key regional power with longstanding ties to Moscow, India occupies a unique diplomatic position. Canberra should clearly communicate its concerns regarding Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including the risks posed to critical infrastructure and regional stability. In parallel, India should be encouraged to consider the broader consequences of a hypothetical Russian attack on Australia, not only for bilateral relations, but for its strategic partnerships with both the United States and Australia. This dialogue would not seek to force alignment, but to underscore the interconnected nature of regional security and the potential costs of strategic ambiguity.

Sixth, Australia should explore options to visibly anchor U.S. nuclear deterrence in the region. This necessitates a proactive approach to alliance integration. Mechanisms such as enhanced consultation, increased transparency around nuclear policy, and potential participation in nuclear planning arrangements could reinforce deterrence by demonstrating resolve and cohesion. Initiatives under AUKUS provide a foundation for this deeper integration and should be expanded to include broader deterrence considerations.

Seventh, Australian defense policy must explicitly recognize the interdependence of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Investments in long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare are essential, but they must be understood as part of a broader deterrence framework. These capabilities contribute to resilience and denial, but they are ultimately underpinned by the threat of escalation. Ensuring that this relationship is clearly articulated in strategy and doctrine will strengthen deterrence coherence and improve signaling to adversaries.

Finally, Australia must broaden its strategic focus to account for multiple nuclear-capable adversaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. While China remains the primary focus of defense planning, Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia underscores the need for a comprehensive approach. Strategic competition is no longer confined to a single actor or domain. It is multi-faceted, simultaneous, and increasingly coordinated. Australia’s deterrence posture must reflect this complexity.

Conclusion

The central lesson is clear. Deterrence in the 21st century cannot be treated as a layered system in which nuclear weapons sit passively at the top. Instead, nuclear deterrence must actively underpin and reinforce every level of conflict, including the conventional and grey-zone domains. Adversaries are increasingly seeking to exploit gaps between these layers, using conventional means to achieve strategic effects without triggering nuclear retaliation.

To respond to this challenge, Australia must take seriously the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on which it relies. This means investing in the resilience of critical systems, strengthening conventional capabilities, and engaging more deeply with allies and partners on the role of nuclear alliances and forces in regional security.

In an era defined by ambiguity and threshold management, the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on integration, clarity, and resolve. By advancing new nuclear alliance structures, deepening strategic dialogue, which includes India, and reinforcing both conventional and nuclear pillars of deterrence, Australia can ensure that sophisticated conventional threats do not undermine the stability of the broader strategic order.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Silent Signals: Russian and Chinese Conventional Threats to NC3 and U.S. Extended Deterrence in Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.

This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against manned armored vehicles which are now routinely labelled as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several rudimentary measures like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted jammers have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.

Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as cost effective alternative vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, torpedo, and even smaller drones, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan innovatively employed aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression & Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.

However, the inherent limitations of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption and have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.

In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides sinking multiple Russian warships in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an underwater suicide drone. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.

Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled American, British, French, and German warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in pre-mature withdrawal. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.

Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian Andrea Doria class destroyer shot down an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using DART projectiles fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, high-energy lasers (HELs) onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, soft-kill measures such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.

In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to outclass adversary air-defenses, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.

The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.

Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.

Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

The amalgamation of emerging technologies and nuclear weapons systems is significantly impacting the landscape of strategic stability. The primary problem associated with such technologies is their dual-use nature, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyper sonics, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. These technologies are evolving more rapidly than the treaties meant to regulate them.

The most significant emerging technology is Artificial Intelligence (AI), a prominent dual-use disruptor. In the civilian domain, it can help process large amounts of data based on its training. Meanwhile, in the nuclear domain, it affects among other things, the nuclear decision making process.

The U.S. is currently considering incorporating AI into its NC3 modernization process while maintaining a human-in-the-loop policy for launches, using AI to monitor abnormal patterns in adversary movements. Russia, on the other hand, is developing AI-driven upgrades to its automated retaliatory strike system to ensure that if the country’s leadership is decapitated, the system can autonomously verify a nuclear strike via seismic and radiation sensors before launching a retaliatory strike. These change decision timing and the deterrence dynamic.

The incorporation of hypersonic technology into delivery vehicles has revolutionized the exchange of weapons in warfare. The speed at which hypersonic systems travel can exceed Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound), potentially inducing miscalculation for an adversary, since it compresses the time window to clearly assess whether a missile is conventional or nuclear. In late 2024 and early 2025, India tested its Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) technology. Since these vehicles travel at such high speeds and at low altitudes with the ability to maneuver, it impacts the deterrence strategy between two nuclear countries. In response, Pakistan accelerated the Fatah series missiles, which are designed as flat-trajectory rockets. The geographical proximity of India and Pakistan compresses the decision-making window during a crisis.

The world’s largest naval force, the U.S. navy, is currently integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic system onto Zumwalt-class destroyers. A Zumwalt-class ship may appear as a nuclear threat on radar but carries conventional weapons, risking warhead ambiguity for an adversary who might launch a nuclear strike if provoked. The recent exchange of delivery vehicles during the Iran and Israel conflict of 2024-2025 has shown the effect of hypersonic missiles in military operations. Iran used the Fattah-2 hypersonic missile, capable of Mach 5+ speeds with mid-flight maneuverability. Such weapon-delivery systems create strategic ambiguity for the adversary because they provide only a few seconds’ window to decide whether to retaliate with conventional or nuclear missiles.

Advancements in quantum computing change warfare by providing more powerful algorithms producing vulnerabilities in secure systems. Nuclear launch codes, for example, are considered among the most secure encryption systems, which cannot be broken by classical computer methods. However, with advanced quantum computing methods, they become more vulnerable to hacking.

Additionally, Quantum sensing, which is facilitated with quantum electronic systems, allow for detection of minute changes in gravity or magnetic fields, which could produce systems that detect submarines, reducing their element of surprise. For example, China has made a huge leap by developing Quantum SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) sensors. These devices may be able to detect the magnetic signature of US Ohio-class stealth submarines from miles away, threatening the ultimate nuclear deterrent.

Cyber warfare has recently moved to the forefront of modern warfare tactics with potential impacts on nuclear deterrence. Cyber warfare may produce uncertainties due to disruption of detection mechanisms and nuclear command and control that could produce unstable strategic situations. The classic Cold War model of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was based on the visible, slow-moving, threat of nuclear weapons exchange. Cyber warfare introduces complexity and confusion. Thus, the deliberate nature of threats; instead, may instigate miscalculations driven by algorithms or false cyber signals.

A good example of how cyber operations can offset traditional military operations was the venture to physically damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges using malicious software (malware). The operation was carried out using Stuxnet malware installed from a USB drive that destroyed centrifuges without a single kinetic device. Similarly, Russian hackers have been carrying out cyber-attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and government agencies since 2015. Vis-à-vis in 2025, during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian intelligence conducted a cyber-operation shutting down the Russian railway and affecting digital infrastructure.

A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. During the height of the May 2025 crisis between the two South Asian rivals, cyber operations were at their peak. Consequently, in the post-crisis scenario, India is enhancing its cyber deterrence. In future conflicts, any state’s cyber space will be one of the primary targets; in a scenario where lines are already blurred, a single attempt to disrupt the cyber space of NC3 could be the initiating point of nuclear escalation.

The evolution of dual-use emerging technologies is fundamentally changing the traditional pillars of nuclear deterrence by compressing the action/reaction time required for rational decision-making. A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. In the volatile context of South Asia, dual-use technologies appear to destabilize a fragile strategic stability.

Ultimately, as machines outpace human thought in the decision loop, there is a danger that the resulting disruption is not just a technological arms race but the erosion of human-centric control, creating the risk of an accidental, algorithmically driven nuclear escalation as the defining strategic challenge of the future.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta. He can be reached at: usama.khalid.uk456@gmail.com. The views of the author are his own.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. New START, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this bilateral architecture. Its limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, combined with an intrusive verification regime, helped sustain stability even as geopolitical relations deteriorated.

However, Russia’s suspension of participation in 2023 and the treaty’s expiration in 2026 mark a significant turning point. The breakdown of the broader arms control framework—evident in the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020—suggests a structural shift in the valuation of negotiated restraint. Assessing the prospects for post–New START arms control, it is important to consider these developments within both the historical context of bilateral relations and the shifting dynamics of current great power competition.

Academic debates on arms control offer a helpful context for understanding the current impasse. Traditional arms‑control theory, rooted in rationalist models, views treaty agreements as tools for reducing uncertainty, preventing arms races, and stabilizing deterrence. From this perspective, verification mechanisms and numerical limits mitigate the security dilemma by reducing incentives for worst‑case planning. While other scholars emphasize the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and leadership perceptions. Arms control agreements often reflect internal political coalitions, institutional preferences, and the ideological orientation of decision makers. The current U.S.-Russian environment, which is characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalist rhetoric complicates the formation of pro-arms control coalitions. Moreover, constructivist analyses highlight the normative dimension of arms control, arguing that treaties shape expectations, legitimize restraint, and embed cooperative practices. The erosion of these norms over the past decade has contributed to a broader delegitimization of negotiated limits.

These theoretical perspectives underscore that the challenges facing post–New START arms control are not merely technical but deeply embedded in political and normative contexts. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s framing of the conflict as a confrontation with the West, combined with U.S. and allied NATO support for Ukraine, has created a political environment in which formal negotiations are viewed as strategically risky or politically unacceptable.

The U.S. seeks to address Russia’s large arsenal of non‑strategic nuclear weapons and its development of novel systems such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia, in turn, prioritizes constraints on U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional strike capabilities. These asymmetries complicate the search for mutually acceptable trade-offs. Furthermore, verification has long been a cornerstone of bilateral arms control. Russia’s suspension of inspections and data exchanges under New START has undermined transparency and raised questions about the feasibility of future verification regimes. Designing agreements that satisfy both sides’ security concerns will be a central challenge.

The U.S. increasingly argues that future arms control must account for China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Russia rejects trilateral frameworks, viewing them as attempts to dilute U.S.–Russian parity. Thus far, China shows little interest in formal arms control negotiations. This triangular dynamic introduces new complexities absent from earlier bilateral negotiations.

Despite the hostile political environment, arms control still matters. The strategic reasons for arms control include specific factors that deserve attention from states. Agreements reduce incentives for preemption and miscalculation, which can increase crisis stability. Data exchanges and inspections improve transparency by reducing uncertainty and reliance on worst-case assumptions. Arms races can impose significant economic burdens, even for the U.S.’ trillion-dollar defense budget and Russia’s constrained economy. Finally, U.S.–Russian cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime. These lasting incentives suggest that both states have structural reasons to pursue at least minimal engagement.

So, what are the pathways for Post–New START arms control? Political commitments to maintain New START limits, even without a formal treaty, could involve both sides making parallel political statements to uphold New START’s numerical limits. While these have no legal force, such commitments could help prevent rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and maintain stability and predictability.

Other paths could include more Issue‑Specific or Modular Agreements. Rather than pursuing a new comprehensive treaty, negotiators could focus on discrete issues, such as notifications of major strategic exercises, transparency measures for new strategic systems, and agreements to avoid dangerous military incidents. These modular arrangements could serve as building blocks for more ambitious frameworks. Next, revitalizing crisis‑management mechanisms by reestablishing military-to-military communication channels could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Such mechanisms do not require treaty-level negotiations and can function even amid broader political tensions. Finally, promote multilateral and norm-building initiatives such as broader dialogues involving China, NATO allies, and other nuclear-armed states to help shape norms around transparency and risk reduction. Multilateral workshops, data exchange initiatives, or voluntary reporting mechanisms may be more practical than formal treaties.

The expiration of New START marks a critical turning point in the history of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control. The structural, political, and technological challenges facing a successor agreement are formidable, and a new comprehensive treaty is unlikely in the near term. Yet the logic of arms control, rooted in the need to manage existential risks, remains important. Incremental, issue-specific, and politically binding measures offer a pragmatic path forward, preserving essential elements of strategic stability until conditions allow for more ambitious negotiations. The future of arms control will depend not only on geopolitical developments but also on policymakers’ ability to adapt traditional frameworks to a more complex, multipolar nuclear landscape. Without some form of negotiated restraint, the world risks entering an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time in over half a century.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Published: April 2, 2026

On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.

Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard testified in 2020, “We do not seek parity.”

That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.

The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.

Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.

Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.

Deterrence needs a similar framework. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. Dynamic Parity offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.

Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.

Skeptics argue that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.

Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.

Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.

Here is what that would look like in practice:

• Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.
• Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
• Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.

This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.

Execution is the signal. Russia’s 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.

Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.

Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.

Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific increasingly occurs in the grey zone, the space between routine statecraft and open armed conflict. China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran employ a range of coercive tactics designed to alter the strategic environment without triggering a conventional military response. These activities include cyber operations, maritime harassment, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and limited military provocations. Because these actions remain deliberately below the threshold of war, they often exploit the reluctance of states to respond with force. As grey zone competition intensifies, the question confronting policymakers is not only how to deter such activities, but also how to ensure that responses to them are credible. In this context, a nuclear alliance could serve as the ultimate strategic backstop for military responses to persistent grey zone coercion.

Grey zone strategies rely heavily on ambiguity and escalation management. The states that employ these tactics understand that their adversaries—particularly democratic states—are cautious about escalating disputes into major military confrontations. By operating just below the threshold of armed conflict, grey zone actors seek to gradually erode the strategic position of their opponents while avoiding a decisive response. Maritime coercion in disputed waters, persistent airspace incursions, cyber intrusions, and limited military demonstrations all serve this purpose. Over time, these actions can reshape the operational environment, undermine alliances, and weaken the credibility of deterrence.

The difficulty lies in crafting responses that are both proportionate and credible. Conventional military responses to grey zone activities risk escalating a crisis if they are perceived as excessive, yet insufficient responses can embolden further coercion. This dilemma has led analysts to argue that deterrence in the grey zone requires a layered approach that combines political, economic, and military tools. However, even robust conventional responses may prove insufficient if adversaries believe that escalation dominance ultimately rests in their favor. It is in this context that nuclear deterrence retains enduring strategic relevance.

A nuclear alliance would not be designed to deter grey zone activities directly. Nuclear weapons are instruments of last resort intended to deter existential threats and large-scale conventional aggression. Nevertheless, the presence of a credible nuclear backstop fundamentally shapes the broader strategic environment in which grey zone competition occurs. By reinforcing the credibility of allied military responses, nuclear deterrence can prevent grey zone crises from escalating into major wars while simultaneously discouraging adversaries from testing the limits of conventional deterrence.

In practical terms, a nuclear alliance would strengthen escalation management in the Indo-Pacific. If regional states believed that their security rested on a collective nuclear deterrent, they would be better positioned to respond firmly to grey zone provocations. Maritime patrols, cyber countermeasures, and limited military deployments could be undertaken with greater confidence that adversaries would hesitate to escalate beyond the conventional level. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a strategic umbrella under which lower-level military responses can occur without triggering uncontrolled escalation.

The experience of the Cold War offers a useful historical precedent. During that period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relied on nuclear deterrence to prevent large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union while simultaneously engaging in conventional competition across multiple domains. Although grey zone tactics—including espionage, proxy conflicts, and political interference—were common, the presence of a credible nuclear deterrent helped ensure that such competition did not escalate into direct war between nuclear powers. A similar logic could apply in the Indo-Pacific today.

In the contemporary regional context, a nuclear alliance could involve close coordination among the United States and key Indo-Pacific partners. Such an arrangement would not necessarily require the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, it could mirror existing extended deterrence frameworks in which nuclear-armed states provide security guarantees to non-nuclear allies while maintaining operational control over nuclear forces. Through mechanisms such as joint planning, strategic consultation, and integrated command structures, allied states could strengthen the credibility of collective deterrence without undermining existing non-proliferation commitments.

Importantly, a nuclear backstop would also reinforce political resolve among allied states. Grey zone strategies often aim to exploit divisions within alliances by testing whether partners will respond collectively to incremental coercion. If adversaries perceive hesitation or disunity, they may conclude that the risks of escalation are manageable. A formal nuclear alliance could signal a high level of strategic commitment among participating states, thereby increasing the perceived costs of continued grey zone pressure.

Critics may argue that linking nuclear deterrence to grey zone competition risks lowering the nuclear threshold or introducing unnecessary escalation dynamics. These concerns highlight the importance of clearly defining the role of nuclear weapons within a broader deterrence framework. The objective would not be to threaten nuclear retaliation for minor provocations, but rather to ensure that adversaries understand that attempts to escalate beyond the grey zone could encounter a unified and credible deterrent response. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a stabilizing force that sets clear limits on how far coercion can be pushed.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the central arena of strategic competition, the persistence of grey zone tactics will continue to test existing security arrangements. States that rely solely on conventional responses may find themselves locked in a cycle of incremental coercion that gradually shifts the balance of power. By contrast, a nuclear alliance would provide a strategic foundation that reinforces the credibility of allied military responses across the escalation spectrum.

Ultimately, understanding grey zone actors and the tactics they employ is essential for effective deterrence. Yet deterrence also requires credible escalation management and the assurance that adversaries cannot exploit the space between peace and war indefinitely. In the Indo-Pacific, a carefully structured nuclear alliance could provide the strategic backstop necessary to ensure that responses to grey zone coercion remain both credible and effective while preventing escalation into catastrophic conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 3: A Nuclear Alliance as the Ultimate Backstop to Grey Zone Coercion was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is entering a far more dangerous strategic era. Military modernization, grey-zone coercion, and rapid nuclear expansion are reshaping the regional balance of power. Most notably, China is undertaking a historic expansion of its nuclear arsenal, investing in silo fields, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and dual-capable systems. Simultaneously, Russia’s willingness to use nuclear threats in Europe demonstrates that nuclear coercion is once again central to great-power competition.

In Washington, proposals such as Ely Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact reflect recognition that the current security architecture is insufficient. A more formalized collective defense structure in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.

However, this is not sufficient. A conventional Pacific Defense Pact does not fully address the most dangerous level of escalation to large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack. What the region now requires is a narrowly defined Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

A Narrow, Explicit Purpose

This would not be a sweeping defense pact covering every maritime incident, border clash, cyber intrusion, or grey-zone coercive act. It would have a clear and carefully delimited purpose. That is to deter large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack against member states.

Its clarity would be its strength. That clarity performs a second vital function. It minimizes the risk of entrapment by ensuring member states are not dragged into escalation over actions below the threshold of war. By explicitly excluding grey-zone coercion and limited crises from its nuclear remit, the alliance would reassure leaders that only truly existential threats trigger its highest-level commitments.

Participation becomes politically sustainable and strategically credible because it avoids automatic escalation over incremental provocations. The alliance would draw a line at catastrophic strategic aggression.

The Historical Record: Why Nuclear Deterrence Matters

The case for a nuclear alliance is not theoretical. It is grounded in historical experience. During the Cold War, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented direct large-scale war and nuclear attack in Europe. Despite ideological confrontation and proxy conflicts, neither side attempted a conventional war or nuclear attack on the other’s core territories. Nuclear weapons imposed restraint. They deterred not just nuclear use, but overwhelming conventional assault.

Similarly, within NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear guarantees has prevented full-scale Russian conventional attack on Alliance territory. Moscow has tested boundaries through

hybrid tactics and coercive signaling, but it has not launched a large-scale attack on NATO soil. Nuclear deterrence at the alliance level raised the costs to an unacceptable threshold.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict further illustrates how nuclear capability constrains escalation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear superiority allowed it to signal credible threats, while China’s emerging nuclear capability and mobilization signaled resolve. Mutual fear of escalation compelled negotiation, including intervention through U.S. triangular diplomacy. Nuclear weapons shaped behaviors without being used.

The India–Pakistan experience is equally instructive. Prior to overt nuclearization, the two states fought multiple full-scale wars. Since their nuclear tests in 1998, crises have erupted, but they have remained limited. Missile strikes, cross-border skirmishes, and periods of great tension have not escalated into all-out conventional war or nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence imposed a ceiling on the conflicts.

Contrast this with the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s and now confronts a nuclear-armed Russia without possessing its own nuclear deterrent. The result has been a prolonged and costly conventional war of attrition. The absence of mutual nuclear deterrence has made sustained large-scale conventional war possible. By comparison, Russia has not launched a direct assault on NATO territory precisely because nuclear deterrence underwrites NATO’s collective defense.

The pattern is clear. Where credible nuclear deterrence exists between adversaries, large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack is sharply constrained or avoided. Where it does not, prolonged and devastating large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack becomes more likely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategic Gap

The Indo-Pacific currently relies on a patchwork of bilateral extended deterrence arrangements centered primarily on Washington. These remain essential, but they are increasingly strained or at risk of being fractured by China.

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal complicates escalation management. A larger and more survivable force reduces the credibility of assumptions that escalation will remain controlled or asymmetrical. Meanwhile, the region contains multiple flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the India–China border where conventional conflict could rapidly climb the escalation ladder.

Frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad strengthen capabilities and coordination, while the proposed Pacific Defense Pact aims to guarantee that the U.S. and its allies can act in concert during crises or conflicts. But they are not structured as nuclear deterrence mechanisms. They do not institutionalize shared nuclear declaratory policy, crisis consultation at the strategic level, or joint planning for high-end escalation management. A nuclear alliance would fill that gap.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact

A Pacific Defense Pact, as envisioned in conventional terms, strengthens interoperability and signals unity. But without an explicit nuclear dimension, it leaves ambiguity at the highest rung of escalation. That ambiguity can invite miscalculation.

A nuclear alliance would not broaden commitments; it would sharpen them. It would: (1) establish shared declaratory policy on deterrence of large-scale war and nuclear attack, (2) institutionalize strategic consultation mechanisms during crises, (3) coordinate planning to ensure credible escalation management, and (4) reinforce extended deterrence while discouraging independent nuclear proliferation.

Importantly, such an alliance need not require additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Like NATO, it could rely on extended deterrence commitments and nuclear-sharing with structured burden-sharing and planning arrangements. Nuclear forces may remain nationally controlled, but alliance cohesion amplifies deterrent credibility. 

Clarity as Stability

The objective is not confrontation. It is clarity. By defining a narrow and explicit threshold—large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack—the alliance reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. It signals to potential aggressors that existential aggression will trigger unified strategic consequences.

Simultaneously, it reassures members that lower-level competition will not automatically escalate to nuclear commitments. This dual clarity strengthens deterrence at the top end and stabilizes politics at the lower end.

A Necessary Evolution

The Indo-Pacific is now the central arena of 21st-century strategic competition. Nuclear modernization is accelerating. Multi-nuclear dynamics are emerging. Escalation timelines are compressing.

History shows that nuclear weapons, and when embedded within credible alliance structures, deter catastrophic war. They prevent large-scale conventional war and nuclear attacks not because they are desirable tools of war, but because they impose unacceptable costs on those who contemplate it.

A Pacific Defense Pact is a step forward, but in the current strategic environment, it is not enough. To deter large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack in the Indo-Pacific, the region must move beyond a Pacific Defense Pact. It must build a nuclear alliance.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact: Why the Indo-Pacific Requires a Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

What Is the Third Nuclear Age?

The world can be divided into three eras of nuclear weapons history, each defined by distinct weapons dynamics and geopolitical relationships, and distinguished by major proliferation or treaty events of its time.

The first nuclear era was characterized by a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1980s. At its peak, the number of warheads held by both countries is estimated to have reached around 60,000 in 1986. This era was marked by limited arms control agreements and significant arms racing.

The second nuclear era, spanning from 1991 to 2013, saw significant disarmament through bilateral U.S.–Russia treaties such as START I and New START, which reduced global warhead numbers by a considerable amount. However, this period was also marked by nuclear proliferation efforts by regional actors, including the nuclearization of South Asia, particularly India, followed by Pakistan, and then North Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

Beginning in 2014, the third nuclear era emerged, typified by the current, chaotic, multipolar environment. Russia has unilaterally suspended participation in New START monitoring and verification, a treaty that expired on February 5^th, 2026. Both the United Kingdom and France have commenced modernization and expansion of their nuclear forces. China is rapidly nearing an estimated 600 warheads, North Korea continues to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Russia has modernized its weapons systems and deployed short-range nuclear weapons in Belarus. Iran continues to signal that it is nearing the nuclear threshold, opacity persists regarding Israel’s nuclear capabilities, and the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan has created multiple additional flashpoints, all of which underscore the need for new international multilateral guardrails.

Current Global Nuclear Trends

The United States has initiated a $1.7 trillion nuclear triad modernization plan, which includes submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Russia has been testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as Burevestnik, while China is expanding its nuclear weapons capability at a rapid pace amid rising tensions over Taiwan.

In addition, strategic non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic systems, AI-driven command structures, and missile defense, are contributing to an escalatory environment in which the nuclear ladder has become increasingly slippery to climb and equally difficult to descend. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has set its “Doomsday Clock” at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been since 1947, reflecting its assessment that the erosion of arms control, the expansion of nuclear capabilities, and the persistence of conflict have significantly increased the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

Escalating Global Nuclear Challenges

The U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have ceased over Ukraine, and President Putin has reduced stated nuclear use thresholds. At the same time, U.S. military strikes against Iran have alarmed some observers who argue that such actions undermine norms governing sovereignty. NATO countries are increasingly exploring their own European deterrence capabilities.

A defining feature of the third nuclear age is the growing complexity of the strategic environment and the inability to manage global risks through simple bilateral frameworks.

Technological advancements that accelerate escalation risks include hypersonic weapons that challenge missile defense systems, artificial intelligence that may misinterpret launch indicators, and cyber operations that could inadvertently contribute to nuclear escalation—echoing historical false-alarm incidents in 1983. Meanwhile, China’s evolving relationship with Russia further complicates U.S. efforts to deter aggression across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

The Way Forward

With New START having expired, significant future limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by major powers appear unlikely, accelerating competition and instability. By the mid-2030s, the convergence of nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities may become normalized as tools of coercion rather than deterrence, while additional states may seek nuclear weapons should nonproliferation barriers erode. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has identified the emergence of the “third nuclear age” as the top global risk in 2026.

Accordingly, new mechanisms for arms control and nuclear disarmament consistent with commitments made by major nuclear-weapon states under the NPT framework are urgently required. These include enhanced verification technologies, AI-assisted monitoring, restraints on the development of destabilizing new weapons, and sustained strategic-stability dialogue aimed at separating and disentangling nuclear and conventional escalation pathways. Additional measures to promote norms of responsible nuclear behavior are also necessary, although opposition from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remains a significant barrier to progress. Ensuring the global security of radioactive materials must remain a priority.

The third nuclear age has placed humanity in unprecedented danger. Existing disarmament mechanisms have proven ineffective as new rivalries emerge, and technological changes accelerate. History demonstrates that diplomacy can work: New START reduced nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the early years of the first nuclear era. Today’s leaders must again prioritize cooperation and restraint, or risk allowing miscalculation to turn expanding arsenals into catastrophe. The alternative is too terrible to ignore.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

This pattern has direct relevance for the Indo-Pacific region. Deterrence depends not only on forward-deployed forces and advanced capabilities, but also on the sustained ability of allied military institutions to function under pressure. Long-duration crises test personnel systems, logistics governance, and civil–military coordination in ways short conflicts do not. Joint operations across multiple states rely on interoperability, shared intelligence, and coordinated command structures that may degrade under stress. Failure of these institutional mechanisms can be as decisive as battlefield defeat. The Indo-Pacific presents additional challenges, including vast maritime distances, diverse political systems among allies, and critical chokepoints such as the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, which amplify the consequences of institutional stress.

Logistics is often the first system to degrade in prolonged conflict. Early wartime adaptation can mask structural weaknesses, but logistics networks become brittle over time. Sustained disruption, infrastructure damage, and competing civilian demands reduce flexibility. Recent high intensity conflicts demonstrate that logistics effectiveness often declines due to cumulative friction across transportation, maintenance, and energy supply chains. These vulnerabilities are particularly pronounced in maritime and air domains, where long supply lines and port dependencies create operational risks. For Indo-Pacific states, heavy reliance on maritime transport and civilian infrastructure further intensifies these challenges. Deterrence credibility therefore depends not only on stockpiles, but on whether logistics governance can function after months of sustained pressure.

Energy infrastructure resilience is intricately linked to logistics sustainability. Sustained strikes on energy systems rarely halt operations immediately, but they gradually erode institutional capacity. Power instability affects command systems, maintenance cycles, training pipelines, and civilian support networks. Over time, these disruptions degrade operational tempo and decision-making quality. Many Indo-Pacific states rely on centralized power generation, imported fuel, and dual-use infrastructure, increasing their vulnerability to prolonged disruption. Such stress would not only affect military units, but also civilian resilience, intensifying friction between defense requirements and societal tolerance. Extended deterrence relies heavily on political cohesion, making energy resilience a strategic factor. States with diversified energy networks, redundant supply routes, and hardened civilian-military interfaces are better positioned to sustain military effectiveness.

Personnel systems represent another critical late-phase vulnerability. High-intensity conflict places sustained demands on trained personnel that are difficult to replace. Initial mobilization often creates an illusion of depth, but over time training quality declines, leadership fatigue accumulates, and institutional knowledge erodes. These effects are gradual and frequently overlooked until they become operationally decisive. Demographic constraints further complicate personnel sustainability across Indo-Pacific allies, many of which face aging populations and limited mobilization pools. Prolonged conflict would force trade-offs between force quality and quantity. Effective deterrence planning requires realistic long-duration personnel strategies, including force rotation, cross-training, and preplanned personnel pipelines that preserve institutional knowledge under operational stress.

Civil–military coordination also deteriorates during prolonged crises. Early conflict phases typically produce strong political consensus and public support. Over time, however, economic strain, infrastructure damage, and social fatigue create competing priorities. Decision-making processes slow, risk tolerances shift, and coordination mechanisms weaken. These dynamics have direct deterrence implications because adversaries observe not only military deployments, but also institutional coherence. Prolonged stress that reveals political fragmentation or administrative paralysis can undermine deterrence credibility. In the Indo-Pacific, where extended deterrence relies on alliance unity and sustained commitment, maintaining institutional cohesion is strategically essential. Regular joint exercises, wargaming, and civil–military education can strengthen resilience before conflict emerges.

Technological developments and emerging threats intensify these challenges. Hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems, cyber operations, and space-based surveillance increase operational tempo and reliance on interconnected networks. Disruption in one domain can cascade across others, magnifying institutional stress. Attacks targeting space-based command-and-control or satellite navigation systems would degrade precision strike capabilities, logistics coordination, maritime awareness, and joint operational planning. Although technological superiority remains important, it cannot compensate for institutional degradation during prolonged conflict. Resilience in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity frameworks, and redundancy planning therefore represents a decisive late-phase determinant of military effectiveness.

Space and cyber capabilities are especially significant for extended deterrence. American space-based sensors, missile warning networks, and communications satellites provide critical detection and coordination advantages. However, these systems rely on both technical redundancy and organizational resilience. Sustained disruption would test alliance coordination and operational cohesion as much as physical hardware. Prolonged conflict would reveal whether allied institutions can maintain effectiveness under persistent technological and informational pressure. Cyber operations are particularly concerning because they can gradually degrade institutional functionality without provoking overt confrontation, underscoring the importance of integrated defensive architectures and rapid recovery mechanisms.

Nuclear deterrence is similarly shaped by institutional endurance. Adversaries observing strain in logistics, personnel systems, or civil–military coordination may question the credibility of extended deterrence commitments. Modernization programs that enhance survivable nuclear forces and resilient command-and-control systems remain essential, but their effectiveness depends on institutional capacity to operate under sustained stress. Endurance therefore emerges as a strategic variable equal in importance to platforms and weapons systems. Deterrence credibility is continuously tested by the ability of institutions to project capability during protracted crises.

For deterrence planners, the central lesson is clear: prolonged conflict transforms military effectiveness from a function of platforms into a function of institutions. States that plan for short, decisive engagements risk strategic failure if conflicts extend beyond expectations. The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies must rebalance deterrence planning by emphasizing late-phase resilience. Priorities should include logistics governance under disruption, energy system adaptability, personnel sustainability, durable civil–military coordination, and protection against emerging technological threats. These factors determine whether deterrence remains credible over time rather than only at crisis onset.

Prolonged conflict is not an anomaly but a plausible future condition. Strategies that overlook institutional endurance risk failure not at the outset of war, but after sustained operational pressure erodes recovery capacity and strategic credibility. Integrating late-phase considerations into readiness assessments, modernization programs, and alliance coordination is therefore essential. Ultimately, the credibility of extended deterrence rests less on platforms alone and more on the ability of military and political institutions to withstand the cumulative stress of prolonged conflict.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Late-Phase Failure and the Erosion of Military Effectiveness in Prolonged Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed – in paraphrased terms- that the atom bomb be given to those who can “strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.” Commonly referred to as the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech, Eisenhower’s words launched an International Atomic Energy Agency and a generation of research into nuclear energy. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s relationship with nuclear power has attracted less attention, but the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution is forcing the United States to take a “new look” at its power grid.

Throughout 2025, senators, think tanks, and federal commissions likened the pursuit of better AI to the Manhattan Project that built the bomb. The vast sums of energy required to fuel such a task, however, may need its own project. Although President Donald Trump issued an executive order to reinvigorate the nuclear industrial base last May, these energy demands have been overshadowed by mounting fascination with the need to win a technology race with China. Considering U.S. public opinion toward atomic energy reached a near record high last year, there is no better time to expand the atom’s role in support of a coherent AI strategy.

The Dawn of a Nuclear Renaissance

During the early Cold War, nuclear technology drove a revolution in energy generation, powering everything from American cities to aircraft carriers. The skyrocketing number of AI data facilities in the United States, on the other hand, represents a potential crisis in energy consumption. When asked if the country can support the growing demands of its data centers, former President of Energy at Microsoft Brian Janous responded: “No. Utilities have not experienced a period of load growth in almost two decades and are not prepared for—or even capable of matching—the speed at which AI technology is developing.” The White House is exploring nuclear options to meet this challenge, yet its AI strategy released last July only mentions nuclear power briefly on page sixteen. This point deserves more attention.

America’s 94 reactors currently supply twenty percent of its energy with 97 gigawatts (GW), and the largest of them—located in Georgia—has a generating capacity of 4.5 GW. A recent Goldman Sachs report projected that the United States needs 47 GW of additional energy to power its AI centers through 2030—the equivalent of half the country’s nuclear capacity. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has taken notice. In January, he secured a series of nuclear energy deals to power his 6.6 GW AI compound under development in Ohio. Companies that did not exist twenty years ago, such as Meta and OpenAI, could soon demand more than ten percent of the nation’s power grid, and the needs are only increasing.

Professor Joohyun Moon of Dankook University suggested recently that small modular reactors (SMRs)—automobile-sized nuclear batteries—could offer energy solutions for national security purposes in forward areas, such as the Indo-Pacific. Although the United States approved its first SMR design in 2022, it will not be operational until 2029, and only three SMRs are currently active in Japan, China, and Russia. Some studies cast doubt on the affordability of SMRs and question whether they would increase the risk of proliferation given the enriched uranium they need to operate. Moreover, these reactors only generate up to 300 megawatts, so while they could be useful in certain military contingencies, their output pales in comparison to the forecasted energy demands of AI.

Microsoft alone plans to build at least six data centers in Texas, each of which might consume enough energy to power more than 100,000 homes. Once Meta completes its Ohio facilities, it will have at its disposal energy reserves capable of powering roughly five million homes. Data centers in the United States could therefore devour nearly one quarter of the energy used by all American households before 2030. Without tighter integration between a national AI strategy and America’s nuclear sector, these numbers appear unsustainable.

Reversing the Ship

Going all in on nuclear energy also requires sustainable solutions to disposing of spent nuclear fuel and investing in high-capacity pressurized water reactors, but such solutions have not been forthcoming. President Barack Obama’s administration slashed funding for Nevada’s Yucca Mountain disposal facility in 2009 and suspended development of a nuclear waste repository there. Despite the first Trump administration’s requests to fund the disposal program between 2018 and 2020, Congress has yet to approve a plan. Any rapid increase in nuclear energy must be accompanied by a commensurate spike in disposal capacity.

In addition to these concerns, the United States closed thirteen reactors between 2013 and 2022, which has encouraged the current administration to reverse course. Last year, the Department of Energy pledged to quadruple America’s nuclear output from 100 GW to 400 GW by 2050. President Trump also issued an executive order to unburden AI companies of federal regulations and requested that they shoulder the burden of energy costs. The next step is to fuse these developments with a theory of success that explains what “winning” the AI race looks like and then align that vision with the energy requirements needed to support it—much of which will be nuclear.

The Long Shadow of 1945

In her historical account of U.S. citizenship during the early atomic age, Sarah Robey explains how “American culture has never truly partitioned the difference between ‘atoms for peace’ and ‘atoms for war.’” Over the last eighty years, these blurred lines generated both hyperbolic and apathetic responses to the nation’s relationship with nuclear power. The atom became equal parts provider and destroyer, but these conversations disappeared once public fears of a Cold War going hot subsided. With American optimism toward nuclear energy now sitting at 61 percent, there is no better time to reignite the discussion about the atom’s role in American society.

Despite the Trump administrations’ efforts to break ground on new nuclear plants over the last ten years, AI theory has outpaced the long-term realities of AI application, especially regarding the energy equation. Advancing AI research will force western societies to embrace the atom for the purpose of sustaining life rather than destroying it much as Eisenhower theorized in 1953. Accepting this reality by establishing deeper connections between energy generation and AI strategy is the first step toward finding sustainable solutions to AI’s role in war and peace.

MAJ Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army, is an instructor in the Department of History and War Studies at the United States Military Academy and a Ph.D. student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Specializing in early Cold War history and nuclear strategy, he has published several dozen articles and columns on a wide range of topics. His latest research appeared in the International Journal of Military History and Historiography and Texas National Security Review. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the policies or position of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of War, or the U.S. Government.

Learning to Love the Atom Again: Why the Future of Artificial Intelligence is Nuclear was originally published on Global Security Review.

Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence does not rest solely on possessing nuclear weapons. It also depends on the assurance that those weapons cannot be neutralized, constrained, or rendered ineffective by an adversary’s ability to maneuver, surveil, or strike first. Geography, therefore, matters. In the emerging strategic environment, Greenland occupies one of the most consequential geographic positions in the world.

Denial as the Foundation of Nuclear Survivability

The survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is the cornerstone of strategic stability. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the most secure retaliatory capability precisely because they operate undetected at sea. But stealth is not automatic. Submarines must transit known maritime corridors to reach patrol areas, and those corridors create opportunities for adversary interference.

For U.S. and allied forces operating in the Atlantic and Arctic, two choke points are decisive: the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Greenland and Svalbard. These routes connect the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic and serve as the primary pathways for submarines moving between bastion areas and open-ocean operating zones.

If Russian or Chinese submarines could transit these gaps freely, they would be able to threaten NATO SSBNs, target transatlantic sea lines of communication, and position themselves for nuclear or conventional strikes against NATO territory and U.S. nuclear forces. Denying that access—rather than reacting after the fact—is what preserves nuclear survivability. Greenland makes such denial far more feasible.

Greenland as a Strategic Gatekeeper

Greenland’s location enables persistent surveillance, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare operations across the Arctic–Atlantic interface. Sensors, airfields, space and radar infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes associated with Greenland enable the United States and NATO to monitor adversary movements and constrain their ability to maneuver undetected.

This is not about tactical confrontation; it is about strategic denial. Greenland’s geography makes it exceedingly difficult for Russian or Chinese forces to move quietly from the Arctic into the Atlantic, increasing the likelihood that such efforts would be detected, tracked, and, if necessary, intercepted. When combined with American technology, Greenland adds uncertainty, constrains their options, complicates operational planning, and reduces incentives for escalation.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy and the Olenya Complex

Russia’s own posture reinforces Greenland’s importance. Moscow has invested heavily in the Arctic, operating 32 bases, expanding air and missile defenses, and increasing submarine activity across the High North. The Kola Peninsula hosts a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear forces, supported by infrastructure such as the Olenya nuclear weapons storage facility, which underpins long-range aviation and missile operations.

Russia’s objective is twofold: to shield its own nuclear forces within a protected Arctic bastion, and to enable submarines and aircraft to push outward into the Atlantic when required. Those outward movements would be designed to threaten NATO’s reinforcement routes, hold allied territory at risk, and directly threaten U.S. strategic forces and American cities.

By enabling the U.S. and NATO to better monitor and deny access through the Arctic gaps, Greenland limits Russia’s ability to mobilize and deploy 40 percent of its submarine force. This denial mission directly strengthens Euro-Atlantic security by reducing the coercive value of Russian nuclear signalling or capacity for destruction.

China, the Arctic, and Global Deterrence

Although China is not an Arctic power by geography, it increasingly behaves like one strategically. Beijing’s naval expansion and interest in Arctic routes reflect its ambition to operate on a global scale. Chinese submarines operating in cooperation with Russia, or benefiting from shared intelligence and surveillance, could complicate the maritime balance in the North Atlantic.

Preventing Chinese submarines from accessing these waters is therefore as important as containing Russian forces. Even a limited Chinese presence would require diverting allied assets and introducing new strategic risks. Greenland helps pre-empt that outcome by reinforcing allied control over Arctic approaches and denying adversaries the ability to open a northern axis of competition.

This denial function links Greenland directly to Indo-Pacific security. The same U.S. nuclear forces that deter conflict in Asia depend on freedom of manoeuvre and survivability in the Atlantic and Arctic. If those forces are threatened in one theatre, credibility erodes in all others.

Air, Missile, and Early Warning Dimensions

The Arctic is also a critical domain for air and missile operations—America’s planned “Golden Dome.” Long-range bombers and ballistic missiles generally follow polar trajectories to maximize range and payload and minimize warning time. Greenland’s position enables early detection, tracking, and integration into broader air and missile defense architectures.

By denying adversaries access to Arctic airspace, Greenland reinforces strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strike calculations over the North Pole. This capability is essential in an era of increasingly compressed decision timelines.

Conclusion

Greenland matters because it enables strategic denial by denying Russian and Chinese submarines, aircraft, and missiles access through the Arctic and North Atlantic gaps that connect global theatres. That denial preserves the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, protects allied homelands, and sustains the credibility of extended deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

In an age defined by competition over access and geography, Greenland is not peripheral but essential to maintaining the balance of power and preventing great-power conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Greenland, Strategic Denial, and the Survivability of U.S. Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the technological details are simplified in the movie, its strategic intuition is right on point. A ballistic missile —possibly a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) attributable to North Korea—creates a uniquely destabilizing crisis. The alert time is compressed, attribution gets ambiguous, and U.S. homeland missile defense becomes both the first and last line of defense. However, such a situation should not be a U.S. only issue especially in a West Pacific launch scenario, originating from the Sea of Japan or an adjacent maritime area. Both Japan and South Korean alliances present capabilities already in place or being actively pursued which could change the outcome.

Why SLBMs Create a Distinct Crisis?

SLBMs raise more profound challenges for interception than a land-based missile launched deep inside North Korean territory. The launch location is uncertain, early warning alerts could be delayed, while a credible trajectory may only be acquired after the boost phase. This compresses the U.S. leader’s decision-making cycle and complicates attribution at precisely the moment when clarity matters most.

Japan’s Role: Forward Maritime-Based Defense

Japan already fields many of the relevant capabilities to address . The Japanese Maritime SDF operates Aegis destroyers that are armed with SM-3 interceptors, including the SM-3 Block IIA variant that is co-developed with the United States. Under controlled experimental conditions, this interceptor has verified its ability to intercept ICBM-class targets, indicating that its strategic relevance goes beyond regional missile defense.

More importantly, Japan is moving towards a maritime-oriented ballistic missile defense posture. The planned Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs)—built around the SPY-7 radar—are designed to provide continuous BMD coverage without diverting multi-mission destroyers. Expected to be deployed in the late 2020s, these vessels would function as constant BMD platforms.

In an SLBM launch scenario in the Sea of Japan, such vessels could be ideally poised to detect, track, and intercept an SLBM that is transiting the Northern Hemisphere. Such forward deployment expands the interception theater, creating an opportunity for an early engagement before activating the missile defense situated in the continental United States. Therefore, Japan’s contribution is geometrical, not symbolic, shortening the initial time of engagement. 

South Korea’s Emerging Contribution

Similarly, South Korea is preparing to add the second crucial defense layer. Seoul is proceeding with the procurement of SM-3 missiles, reflecting the understanding that missile defense can no longer be restricted to terminal-phase defense on the Korean Peninsula. While South Korea’s existing air and missile defense system is centered on short- and medium-range threats, SM-3 introduces a new mission: sea-based midcourse interception.

South Korea’s Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3s can operate in partnership with the Japanese defense forces in a complementary manner, creating azimuth diversity in intercept geometry. Multiple engagement opportunities from different angles to complicate an opponent’s countermeasures and lower the dependency on a single interception attempt. This is not mere redundancy, but resilience under uncertainty.

Another important element is South Korea’s push for a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN). Although an SSN does not intercept a missile, it influences the very unstable factor in this scenario: The North Korean submarine itself. While diesel-electric submarines rely on limited endurance and predictable operational patterns, SSNs can loiter, sprint, and conduct continuous operations across vast maritime areas. This makes it extremely difficult for North Korean submarines to reach actual launch areas undetected. In that sense, South Korea’s SSN ambition represents a denial strategy that could prevent the crisis from emerging, rather than serving as mere prestige or a symbol of a blue-water navy.

A Trilateral Layered Response

Pre-crisis posture is decisive. Japan’s ASEVs or Aegis destroyers should maintain BMD patrol points somewhere in the Sea of Japan, while South Korean Aegis destroyers could be operated near Korean waters in complementary sectors. Real-time information sharing through trilateral missile alert mechanisms should be a standing arrangement rather than an ad hoc measure.

At launch, forward sensors and shipborne radars could track earlier than what is portrayed in the movie—and if geometric conditions are met, Japanese naval vessels could attempt the first interception through SM-3 during early midcourse. Sequentially, South Korean destroyers could conduct a second round of engagement from different azimuths. To be sure, these attempts do not guarantee interception. Nevertheless, they reshape the problem from a terminal-phase gamble into a layered contest.

Only when these attempts fail would the engagement fall back to U.S. homeland defense; in this case, GBIs serve as the last line of defense rather than the sole response. At that juncture—when the U.S. must launch its GBIs—decision-makers would have more information, higher attribution credibility, and greater room for diplomacy to manage further escalation. The objective is not interception certainty, but the expansion of decision space under extreme uncertainty.

Policy Implications

If The House of Dynamite is a warning, the response should be concrete. Japan should recognize ASEVs as the backbone of regional BMD rather than as a peripheral capability. Meanwhile, South Korea should invest in the training, doctrine, and readiness required for sustained SM-3 operations. To be sure, together with the U.S., the three countries should institutionalize exercises that explicitly rehearse ICBM-class scenarios.

Although The House of Dynamite is a compelling drama, it is not destiny. The decisive factor is not technology itself, but alliance design, specifically whether Tokyo and Seoul are already in the fight when the crisis begins.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a President at the Security Management Institute, in the South Korean National Assembly. He holds a doctoral degree in international relations from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, a master’s degree in conflict management from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a degree in public policy from Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA). The views of the author are his own.

Fixing the House of Dynamite – An SLBM Crisis in East Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most the world’s approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately 5,500 and the US holding approximately 5,177, declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated 600 operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.

These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.

Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.

Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel’s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.

Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a “crucial year” for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.

Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.

In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own.

The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

India is the third-largest energy-consuming country in the world, with a rapidly growing population and major developing industries. A significant amount (80 to 85 percent) of India’s needed energy comes from coal and crude oil, which are nonrenewable energy sources and more cost-effective than wind and solar. To acquire cleaner and cheaper energy, India sees nuclear energy as the best available option.

India intends to produce 100 gigawatts of electricity solely from nuclear power by 2047. The uranium deal with Canada, therefore, will help to fuel India’s existing fleet of pressurized heavy-water reactors. However, the uranium supplied under this deal has the potential to aid civilian purposes, but it also can serve military purposes. While keeping the contentious past of India’s uranium misuse, one can predict that India can divert this material to military purposes as it has done by managing to divert plutonium produced in the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor Utility Services) reactor.

The CIRUS reactor was a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor that Canada supplied to India in the 1950s for peaceful purposes. It later produced weapons-grade plutonium for the 1974 “Smiling Buddha” test and enough material for dozens of warheads by the time it shut down in 2010. India’s Dhruva reactor, modelled on CIRUS, has operated since 1985 and continues to produce 20–25 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually outside full safeguards. Canada no longer builds reactors in India and will only supply uranium for safeguarded civil reactors. Still, this agreement can free up India’s domestic uranium holdings for its unsafeguarded, military-linked facilities.

As a signatory to the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada was shocked to discover its reactor supported the Indian nuclear weapons program, ending a nuclear relationship with India that had been ongoing since the 1950s. However, Canada quietly restarted a relationship with India in 1989 at the behest of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and the CANDU Owners Group.

Although still staunchly opposing proliferation, Canada has relaxed certain restrictions in its relations with India to expand overall trade between the two countries to $30 billion by 2030. This was likely one such response to smooth over numerous diplomatic disputes between the two countries, resulting from allegations that India had been involved in the death of a Canadian citizen. Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and Sikh separatist activist, was shot and killed outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia in June 2023. A few months after Nijjar’s assassination, former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said agencies were investigating “credible allegations” of possible involvement by Indian government agents.

Despite India and Canada expelling each other’s diplomats after the killing, the new uranium deal shows that economic interests generally outweigh political interests over time. The uranium agreement further illustrates the double standard in many global nuclear arrangements: many large countries often temporarily or permanently suspend or relax the rules for their favored trading partners. Although India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has received support from many states to join the multinational Nuclear Suppliers Group.

India is also pursuing thorium and small-modular reactors (SMRs) to tap its vast thorium reserves in its three-stage nuclear program. While thorium is touted as more proliferation-resistant—thorium itself is non-fissile and only breeds the fissile isotope uranium-233 while in the reactor core— India’s reprocessing expertise and unsafeguarded facilities could extract the material from spent fuel for military users. SMRs will increase risk through mass deployment across Indian sites that have spotty oversight being a non-NPT state; therefore, expanding dual-use options rather than limiting them.

Even though the new uranium agreement between New Delhi and Ottawa aims to enhance India’s energy policy, several challenges and concerns remain regarding stability in South Asia. Namely, India is continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal. The international community should play a role in promoting greater balance: real non-proliferation means the equal and consistent application of non-proliferation policies, not the selective and convenient exemptions granted to India. By fostering greater equality among states, the risks associated with an unstable nuclear order can be reduced.

Musavir Hameed Barech is currently serving as Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network, Quetta, Pakistan. He can be reached at his email: musavirkhan88@gmail.com. The views of the author are his own.

India and Canada Thaw Frosty Relationship to Push Uranium Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

In May 2025, Pakistan shot down seven Indian warplanes, a claim backed by later credible reports. U.S. sources confirmed Chinese-built J-10C fighters shot down Indian Rafales, and Pakistan’s Air Chief Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu publicly tallied the Indian fighters destroyed in combat. Multiple reports also identified wreckage of an Indian Rafale and Mirage-2000 at Pakistani strike sites, reinforcing Pakistan’s account. India provided no evidence to dispute these claims.

India’s response to those losses has been to extensively enlarge its LR-ASM arsenal. In the May war, the Indian Air Force (IAF) used its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, French SCALP/Storm Shadow, and Rampage missiles to strike targets from its own territory. Now India openly seeks even longer reach. Reports say India is in talks to procure the Air-LORA long-range missiles from Israel and is also field-testing an 800 kilometer (km) range BrahMos. Almost two years ago, India contractually signed its largest-ever BrahMos procurement (220 missiles, approximately $2 billion) and approved 110 more air-launched BrahMos.

Longer-range missiles enable Indian jets strike “from safe distances,” beyond Pakistan’s air defence zones, including advanced Pakistani air-to-air weapons like PL-15. Each new LR-ASM thus allows India to hit targets deep from its own soil. After the May war, India is changing its tactics: attack Pakistan without risking aircraft losses. Thus, in the next conflict, Pakistan will also retaliate equally, and this might take the crisis up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Every extra kilometer of range brings Pakistan’s “red lines” closer. For Islamabad, even a strike from hundreds of kilometers away could look indistinguishable from a major attack. Analysts note that with 800 km range missiles, all Pakistani cities, from Islamabad to Karachi, lie within reach of Indian jets flying entirely from Indian territory. Some analysts warn there is now almost no conventional buffer: any use of these missiles could be conflated with a strategic attack.

Pakistan’s doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence” is designed to deter threats “at all rungs” of that ladder. In practice, using LR-ASM will make any deep Indian conventional counterforce strike against Pakistan more feasible, and this will be treated in Pakistan as an existential threat. These novel weapons will also cause an illusion of security in India since they will feel that they can launch attacks with no major reprisal by the Pakistani side, or if there is any, then it will be countered. Due to this expansion, India has made limited strikes a more attractive coercive instrument and bargaining an increasingly risky game of brinkmanship. LR-ASM enables an attacker to impose rapid, precision costs on an adversary (targeting runways, command-nodes, air-defences, logistics) without risking pilots, so political leaders can credibly threaten or carry out deep strikes short of general war. This kind of weapon also compresses the decision-making time windows through which India can compel Pakistan’s actions and shift the onus of responsibility of escalation onto Pakistan.

The consequences for deterrence are also stark: a limited conflict in future may have a much higher probability of escalation. Modernization and high-alert postures already leave “little margin for error” in South Asia. When India can hit sensitive targets from 800 km away, and Pakistan retaliate back via its quid-pro-quo-plus (QPQP) strategy, multiple rungs can be skipped, potentially leading to a full-scale war. In such a scenario, Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command and the Pakistan Air Force’s long-range unmanned systems would form part of Islamabad’s broader retaliatory and signalling toolkit. Indian strategists may view a layered mix of BrahMos, Rampage, and Air-LORA as a route to “escalation dominance” by pressuring Pakistan while minimising their own vulnerabilities. Yet the May 2025 losses only deepen this appetite for so-called risk-reducing stand-off capabilities, even though classic Kahn and Schelling deterrence theories warn that such confidence in controllable escalation is often an illusion.

LR-ASM expansion after the May 2025 war will generate an illusion of dominating the escalation ladder in the Indian psyche. This increases the possibility of a conventional strike, which would compel both states to skip multiple rungs of the escalation ladder and risk a more dangerous crisis. The May 2025 war demonstrated exactly how LR-ASM capabilities increased the dangers of escalation. In the absence of force posture transparency, plausible restraint signalling, and a solid mechanism of crisis handling, the deterrence equilibrium will be more fragile in the region with major consequences of potential nuclear involvement.

Abdul Wassay is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, Lahore. He can be reached at info@casslhr.com. The views expressed are those of the author.

India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles was originally published on Global Security Review.

Policy planning reflected that belief. Governments prepared for escalation management, energy disruption, and post-conflict instability not for sustained deterrence or a prolonged, high intensity war. This failure was neither accidental nor confined to a single capital or political party. It was the result of long-standing policy choices, alliance design decisions, and a shared belief that restraint could substitute for credible deterrence.

A Long Arc of Under-Resourcing

The NATO alliance arrived at this moment after more than a decade of deliberate under-investment. Under Presidents Barack Obama and later Joe Biden, U.S. defense policy emphasized escalation avoidance, fiscal restraint, and risk management over capacity, readiness, and industrial depth. Deterrence became a matter of signaling rather than a consistent force structure.

This trajectory did not change meaningfully during President Donald Trump’s first term. Budgetary turbulence, government shutdowns, continuing resolutions, and inherited top lines constrained structural change. Europe took its cues from Washington as strategic restraint aligned with European politics. Risk aversion, energy accommodation with Russia, and the belief that diplomacy could compensate for declining hard power. This was publicly validated when Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, not for altering U.S. strategy, but largely for reaffirming a posture Europe favored. The signal was unmistakable: restraint would be rewarded, not penalized.

Alliance Design and the Shock of 2022

NATO functioned exactly as designed. After the Cold War, the United States explicitly asserted its leadership and structured the alliance accordingly. Command arrangements, rank hierarchies, and decision-making processes ensured that Washington always held the most senior voices in the room—and an effective pocket veto.

The shock in 2022 was not that Europe took the lead, but that President Biden was so timid as to reinforce Russian risk assessments. Escalation anxiety, combined with under-resourced deterrence, produced caution when decisiveness was needed. Europe, constrained by years of deferred defense investment and structural energy dependence, lacked both the capacity and the political will to move faster than Washington. The result was paralysis by design: American restraint set the ceiling, European limitations set the floor, and the Western alliance’s action was trapped in between.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders deserve credit for attempting to break the paralysis when the scale of Russian aggression became unmistakable. Boris Johnson effectively accelerated the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by signing bilateral security guarantees that would have placed NATO forces on the ground and triggered Article 5 through cascading alliance obligations. It was a brilliant realist move, anchoring deterrence in forward commitment rather than process. Overcoming a Europe constrained by alliance structure, capacity, and the limits of American political cover.

Energy Sovereignty as a Deterrence Variable

A critical and under-appreciated failure was Europe’s abandonment of energy sovereignty. Years of policy choices have left European economies structurally dependent on Russian hydrocarbons at precisely the moment when deterrence required resilience. In 2024, the EU bloc purchased approximately €21.9 billion ($23.5 billion) worth of fossil fuels from Russia—exceeding the €18.7 billion ($20 billion) it reported allocating to Ukraine in financial aid over the same period. Climate change was elevated as the dominant strategic threat, displacing hard-power competitors such as Russia and China in threat prioritization and in efforts to defend Ukraine from Russian invasion. That disordering of risk mattered.

Europe compounded its vulnerability by dismantling reliable nuclear capacity before a dependable replacement baseload was in place. Rather than sequencing decarbonization alongside firm alternatives, several states removed nuclear generation while relying on Russian gas to bridge the gap. This was not a technical error but a strategic one.

Deterrence is weakened by dependence and strengthened when leverage is denied. The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines did not create Europe’s vulnerability; it exposed and accelerated its resolution. It removed Russia’s most potent instrument of coercive leverage over Europe. The act dismantled a dependency that had distorted European decision-making and narrowed the range of credible responses.

The Burden-Sharing Reality

The deeper problem exposed by the war is not under-spending, but misaligned responsibility. Europe accounts for nearly 44 percent of NATO’s combined GDP yet contributes 32 percent of alliance defense spending and a smaller share of high-end industrial capacity. That disparity was sustainable only so long as American support was unconditional and inexhaustible. It is not.

Fixating on President Trump’s demand for fairness obscures this structural reality. Trump did not create alliance stress; he exposed it. The core issue is that NATO has evolved into a system in which the United States bears disproportionate escalation risk while Europe enjoys disproportionate security benefits. In any conflict in which U.S. and European equities are asymmetric, that imbalance creates credibility problems—and adversaries can see them clearly.

Europe has begun to wake up. Defense budgets are rising, industrial capacity is being rebuilt, and strategic rhetoric has hardened. However, it took Vladimir Putin’s war—his willingness to use force at scale on Europe’s borders—to force a reckoning that European leaders had long postponed.

Interests, Narratives, and Credibility

Deterrence rests on perception of strength and credibility. When responsibility, risk, and capability are asymmetric, resolve is questioned. Credibility erodes quietly, long before it collapses publicly.

The uncomfortable truth is that U.S. and European interests are not perfectly aligned. Europe increasingly speaks the language of realism. Deterrence, balance, and forward defense, while framing policy through a liberal narrative of norms, process, and institutional legitimacy. That mismatch is not illegitimate, but it becomes dangerous when it masks unequal contributions and obscures who bears the true costs of failure.

Necessary Correction

The solution is neither retrenchment nor recrimination. It is a shift toward genuine Regional Shared Deterrence: a model in which European states meet NATO obligations proportionate to their economic weight, rebuild industrial capacity at scale, restore energy sovereignty, and assume visible responsibility for regional defense outcomes. That, in turn, would allow the United States to lead decisively without carrying the alliance alone—restoring credibility through aligned incentives and shared risk.

Ukraine did more than halt a Russian invasion. By refusing to collapse, it shattered Western assumptions and disrupted plans built around convenience rather than genuine deterrence. That disruption has exposed a simple truth: deterrence that is under-resourced by design and shared only in rhetoric will fail when tested. Whether this moment produces a strategic correction—or merely another cycle of improvisation—will determine the next crisis long before it arrives.

Kirk Fansher is a retired Colonel, Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Editor at Global Security Review. A Yale graduate and U.S. Naval War College alum, he has published extensively on nuclear posture, extended deterrence, and burden sharing. The views expressed are his own.

Ukraine and the Failure of Western Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

That contradiction has come into sharp relief during the presidency of Donald Trump, whose blunt interest in Greenland exposed what European diplomacy had long obscured. The controversy was framed as eccentricity or provocation, but the underlying grievance was familiar. For decades, the United States has underwritten European security while European governments reduced their defense investments in favor of generous welfare systems and subsidized industry, confident that the American half of the alliance would absorb the risk. The Greenland crisis has simply made that imbalance visible.

Greenland’s Strategic Reality

Greenland occupies a unique strategic position. It sits in the western hemisphere astride the Arctic approaches to the “GIUK Gap,” hosting critical space and missile-warning infrastructure essential to NATO’s early-warning architecture. The 2004 Defense Greenland Agreement between the United States and Denmark, Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, explicitly limits the US defense area in Greenland to Thule (Pituffik) Air (Space) Base only.

With Arctic sea lanes opening and undersea infrastructure becoming a focal point of competition, Greenland’s strategic importance is no longer peripheral but central. The question now confronting Europe is whether the small Kingdom of Denmark and, by extension, Europe, can demonstrate even minimal sovereignty over a territory it insists is non-negotiable but has left undefended for some 250 years.

Article 3 of the NATO Treaty states: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Put plainly, Denmark is obligated to maintain—on its own and on a continuous basis—the capacity to defend all its territory. By that standard, Denmark has failed to meet its Article 3 responsibilities for a very long time, if it ever has.

Despite its strategic importance, Greenland remains vulnerable and economically neglected. This is not an accident or a bureaucratic oversight. It is the result of a long-standing assumption—that the United States would indefinitely guarantee European sovereignty and sustain its social-economic model. That assumption no longer holds. Strategic competition is shifting away from open confrontation toward constant pressure, probing actions, and fait accompli. In this world, sovereignty is not something you can merely declare. It is something you must demonstrate.

Trump, Europe, and the Sovereignty Question

Trump’s narrative about Greenland was widely dismissed as transactional or unserious. Stripped of tone, however, the message was structural: As the Arctic presents opportunity, Greenland is even more strategically vital to North American security than ever before, and someone must take responsibility for securing and developing it.

This tension among NATO allies reflects a broader post–Cold War pattern. Europe expanded its regulatory, economic, and political influence while allowing NATO military funding and capability to atrophy. The resulting system elevated process, norms, and legalism over hard power security, sovereignty, and deterrence.

The renewed United States demand for Greenland exposes the limits of that model. If Denmark cannot even mount a minimal defense of its own territory, the problem is not American overreach, but European credibility.

The UK Corollary

In a striking act of geopolitical idealism, the United Kingdom has agreed to cede sovereignty over Diego Garcia to Mauritius—an “own goal” that harms US interests. Long regarded as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Diego Garcia has been a cornerstone of US and UK power projection across the Middle East, East Africa, South Asia, and beyond for decades.

After years of legal and diplomatic pressure—culminating in adverse rulings from international courts and the United Nations—the UK concluded that continued unilateral control of the Chagos Archipelago was politically unsustainable in this rules-based international order. In 2024, London agreed to transfer sovereignty to Mauritius, a state increasingly influenced by Beijing, while attempting to preserve military access through a long-term, UK-funded lease.

On paper, operations continue. Leverage shifts from occupant to owner. Sovereignty matters: once surrendered, access rests on political permission rather than power. A future Beijing-aligned Mauritius could abrogate agreements or revoke leases, leaving the US and UK strategically stranded, “out of runway” and out of business in the Indian Ocean.

Like Diego Garcia, Greenland’s strategic value lies in assured access. Trusting that allies will always act in America’s best interest is folly. Access without ownership is always conditional; sovereignty without power is fragile. Both cases reveal the same risk—vital territory left exposed at a moment when great-power competition demands clarity, presence, and resolve.

Sovereignty Requires Adequate Organic Defense

Defending Greenland does not require national militarization on Cold War terms. It does not require large permanent formations or aggressive posturing. But it does require capability, presence, and integration of real forces tied to real geography. The fantasy of the [European] Liberal [global] Rules-based order is no longer sufficient alone.

A credible defense posture requires permanent ground, air, and naval forces. Presence must be sufficient to assert territorial control, secure the Arctic approaches, and protect key infrastructure. Additionally, it requires fifth-generation airpower, supported by NATO enablers sufficient to project air sovereignty and assert control over the airspace of the GIUK, along with integrated maritime and subsurface awareness to control approaches, advanced air and missile defense for critical nodes, and the logistics infrastructure required to sustain operations in an Arctic environment.

This is not an escalation; it is the minimum viable defense posture for the territory Denmark claims sovereignty over, NATO depends upon, and the Western Hemisphere demands. Anything less than that is not restraint; it is abdication.

What Denmark Can Do

For Denmark to retain its kingdom, it must fervently acknowledge that China and Russia are expanding their Arctic ambitions and that continuing to ignore or neglect this threat risks losing Greenland to another great power’s orbit. Denmark does not need to defend Greenland alone, but it must lead and meet its Article 3 responsibilities. Sovereignty cannot be subcontracted. First, Denmark must accept that a visible, persistent presence is non-negotiable. A battalion-sized force and a fighter squadron on Greenlandic soil are not a burden; they are a declaration of responsibility.

Second, Denmark must align force posture with geography. Arctic defense is not a side mission; it is central to Denmark’s strategic responsibilities and credibility. That requires prioritizing basing, sustainment, and readiness over symbolic deployments there or elsewhere.

Third, Denmark must integrate defense with economic development. Resource extraction, energy production, and infrastructure are not separate from security; they are its foundation. Without an economic base, defense remains episodic and less affordable. For the collective West, energy and critical element security is national security. If Denmark cannot execute these steps—even with allied support—then sovereignty is no longer exercised; it is merely asserted.

How Europe Can Contribute Without Posturing

Greenland offers Europe an opportunity to demonstrate what regional shared deterrence looks like. Contributions need not be equal in scale, but they must be meaningful in effect. Rotational air defense units, maritime patrol aircraft, icebreaking capacity, logistics support, and infrastructure investment tied directly to defense requirements would materially strengthen deterrence without grandstanding.

This is where Europe’s economic power must finally align with its strategic claims. Shared deterrence is not about symbolism or declarations. It is about complementary capability and sustained commitment.

Can Europe Move Fast Enough?

The decisive variable is time. Ten-year roadmaps and aspirational targets are irrelevant. Greenland’s exposure is immediate. The longer Europe delays, the more it reinforces the perception that sovereignty exists only on paper. Delay only serves to validate President Trump’s strategic demand.

Credible deterrence must begin within weeks, not months or years. Initial deployments need not be perfect, but they cannot be symbolic political statements devoid of the credible military capacity required for the mission. They need to be visible, permanent, and expandable.

The Consequences of Failure

Failure in Greenland would reverberate far beyond the Arctic. If Denmark cannot defend Greenland with allied assistance, then European claims of strategic autonomy collapse and NATO’s credibility fractures geographically. The United States will either act unilaterally or disengage selectively. Resource development will proceed without European leverage. Most damaging of all, failure would confirm a lesson Europe can no longer afford: that idealism and process cannot substitute for balance-of-power realism, and that international norms cannot enforce themselves. Where previous US presidential administrations relied on alliances, basing agreements, and quiet influence, President Trump has framed the issue in transactional terms: if Greenland was strategically vital, someone had to take responsibility for securing and developing it.

Conclusion

Greenland is not a crisis invented in Washington. It is the result of allied neglect and free riding. Persistent underinvestment in defense, miscalculation of threats, and a readiness among many allies to subordinate their sovereignty to international norms have produced a growing crisis of confidence in the United States. This can only be reversed with real power projection and a NATO commitment to peace through strength.

Denmark does not need to match American power. It needs to demonstrate agency, urgency, and empathy. Denmark and greater NATO must listen to its most powerful ally and address its security concerns with great alacrity. Rather than escalating the rhetoric, Denmark should admit its negligence and mitigate the shortfall now. Europe does not need to replace the United States or drive it out of the alliance. It needs to stop pretending that sovereignty is cost-free or that it can be reliably substituted with treaties in perpetuity.

This President demands more of the alliance to defend America’s northern approaches. If Denmark and the rest of NATO cannot meet that demand, the United States will. What is being asked is reasonable. The Arctic is now NATO’s second front. If Europe cannot meet that demand here, it has become sovereignty insolvent and should stop speaking of autonomy elsewhere. Because in the end, reality does not respond to intention, only to real and persistent power.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Can Denmark Defend Greenland from Trump? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a brief background, Deng Xiaoping’s legacy of “reform and opening up” has long underpinned CCP legitimacy, emphasizing pragmatism, collective leadership, and economic decentralization. Hu Yaobang, associated with political openness and intra-party tolerance, has historically been sensitive to commemoration owing to his connection to the late-1980s liberalization debates. Amid economic slowdown and external pressure, symbolic gestures toward reform-era figures are closely scrutinized by domestic and international audiences.

Now, rather than openly rejecting Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, Xi appears to be engaging in a “soft burial” of the Deng era. Instead of banning Deng’s legacy, Xi repackages the narrative, cultivating ambiguity and shifting focus toward party virtue and centralized authority rather than ideological pluralism or decentralized leadership. Instead of purges or denunciations, Xi is layering new historical narratives to diminish the centrality of Deng’s reformist legacy without breaking existing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) taboos. Conversely, the phrase “soft burial” is significant: it underscores a non-confrontational but effective approach to ‘ideological succession’. Rather than disavowing Deng (which could destabilize party legitimacy), Xi subtly redirects the historical narrative to enhance the legitimacy of “Xi’s New Era” framework. Through this process, the meaning and influence of Deng’s “reform and opening up” are being diluted.

To reframe Hu’s legacy, it has been sanitized and stripped of its more politically sensitive elements, such as his association with political openness. Official portrayals emphasize his loyalty and personal integrity rather than his liberal impulses. This reframing allows Xi to appropriate Hu’s symbolic value while neutralizing his appeal and utility for liberal critics.

On the other hand, Xi’s current style can be seen as undermining Deng’s historical monopoly. Note that Deng’s narrative of China’s modernization and economic reform has long been foundational to CCP legitimacy. Xi is challenged by this because Deng’s legacy anchors a different political model (collective leadership, economic pragmatism). Additionally, Xi seeks his version of legitimacy, his so-called “New Era” leadership, centered on his thought and authority. By selectively and strategically elevating Hu, Xi reframes reform as a generational relay rather than Deng’s unique achievement, subtly reducing Deng’s doctrinal dominance and influence.

While leaders’ deaths usually grieve their families, they also serve broader political goals. The CCP often uses the memories of fallen leaders as political assets to bolster its ideological legitimacy. Xi’s handling of Hu’s commemoration illustrates this control over symbolism and history. It subtly owns memory and political history, framing it as narrative management. Xi’s tribute is strategic, not a policy change, rebranding Hu as loyal to the party. This shifts historical memory to support Xi’s political aims.

Not Market-Oriented Redirection

Contrary to some speculation in the democratic West, this is not a signal of imminent liberalization or return to market-oriented Deng-style reforms. This cautions against reading ceremonial gestures as evidence of substantive policy change. Meanwhile, here are some implications that can be drawn from the recent event. First, the strategy of legitimacy consolidation reinforces Xi’s ideological authority while preserving historical continuity, thereby reducing internal resistance. Second, it reshapes reform discourse by co-opting reformist symbolism, allowing the CCP under Xi to neutralize historical references commonly invoked by liberals and dissenters. Third, it creates a risk of foreign misinterpretation, as international analysts may mistake symbolic gestures for substantive policy shifts if they focus on form rather than underlying narrative content. In other words, Xi Jinping’s high-profile commemoration of former CCP leader Hu Yaobang should not be interpreted as a signal of political or economic liberalization. Instead, it reflects a deliberate strategy to reshape historical memory in ways that weaken Deng Xiaoping’s reform-era monopoly over CCP legitimacy while reinforcing Xi’s “New Era” authority. By selectively rehabilitating Hu’s image, emphasizing loyalty and moral rectitude while erasing his reformist associations, Xi is managing ideological succession without destabilizing the Party. This approach consolidates power, narrows reform discourse, and increases the risk of misinterpretation by foreign observers.

Domestically, the commemoration reinforces centralized leadership and ideological discipline while narrowing the space for policy pluralism or elite contestation rooted in reform-era precedent. Therefore, observers must be keen on probable indicators. For example: (1) changes in official historiography or Party education materials referencing Deng Xiaoping; (2) expanded use of reform-era figures framed primarily around loyalty and discipline; and (3) continued elevation of “Xi Jinping Thought” as the primary interpretive lens for past and future reforms.

Understanding how the CCP manages historical narratives is crucial for interpreting China’s long-term strategic posture, including economic policy, party governance, and diplomatic signaling. This narrative shift is less about immediate reforms and more about “ideological control” and “power legitimacy” within a one-party system. As independent analysts, we must be reminded not to infer market or government liberalization from symbolic gestures toward reform-era figures. Instead, we must focus our analysis on structural policy signals rather than commemorative politics.

Xi Jinping’s approach does not reflect reformist revival but ideological succession management. By quietly and subtly burying Deng Xiaoping’s legacy of “reform and opening up” without repudiating it, Xi is reshaping the foundations of CCP legitimacy to sustain centralized authority well beyond immediate economic or political cycles.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, & political analyst and a university lecturer at the at De La Salle University in the Philippines. He has worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Office of Civil Defense, the National Security Council-Office of the President, and is currently in the Department of National Defense. He is the co-author of the books titled: Disruptive Innovations, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Terrorism Handbook, and Global Security Studies Journal (Springer Link, United States). Ideas and/or views expressed here are entirely independent, and his own and do not in any form represent the author’s organization and affiliation.

Xi Jinping’s Political Psychology, Memory, and ‘New Era’ Leadership: ‘Political Optics’ as Camera Obscura in China’s Next Strategic Direction was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of interest these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.

While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist Dr. William Van Cleave, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “Team B.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.

Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.

The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who advocated for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.

Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. Designed by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists arguing the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.

Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be vastly reduced using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.

The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports of a crackdown, clashes with the security forces, and rising casualties among protestors indicate that Iran’s rulers are facing a serious threat to regime survival—the second such event since the 12 days of war with Israel in June 2025. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei branded the protesters “rioters” and “mercenaries,” who were instigated by the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump is openly backing the protests and has made it clear that if the Iranian authorities kill protestors, the United States will intervene militarily to protect them from Tehran’s reprisals, with the latest reports saying that the U.S. President has even been presented with possible strike options.

At the same time, Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Iran’s last shah, and his backers are trying to hijack the protests and brand them as a popular demand for his return to the country and restoration of an absolute monarchy. However, Reza Pahlavi has a very poor reputation among Iran’s non-Persian ethnic minorities, who make up at least 50 percent of the population of the country. Having faced discrimination for over a century from the former Pahlavi and the current Islamic Republic regimes, Iran’s Azerbaijanis are mainly sticking to their national slogans such as “Freedom, Justice and National Government.”

Iran’s Azerbaijanis Reject Both Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic

There are estimated to be 25-30 million Azerbaijani Turks in Iran, making them the second largest ethnic and linguistic group after the Persians. Historically, Azerbaijani Turks have played a significant role in Iran’s politics, not only providing the successive Turkic dynasties that ruled what is today Iran for centuries, but also shaping political thought and spearheading political changes, such as the 1906-1911 Constitutionalist Revolution. Azerbaijanis are primarily concentrated in the northwestern regions of Iran, where they constitute the world’s largest Azerbaijani community—bigger than the one in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

As part of the Pahlavi regime’s forced homogenization policies to create a Persian-centric Iranian supra-national identity, Azerbaijanis suffered systematic erasure of their identity, such as a ban on the Azerbaijani Turkic language in print media, education and theatres. Reza Shah’s policies of forced assimilation and the promotion of the Persian language, accompanied by the suppression of non-Persian languages, became a defining state initiative. This was part of the Pahlavi monarchy’s promotion of centralism, modernism, and secularism to create an Aryan European nation-state.

Reza Shah’s centralization policies resulted in the decline of Azerbaijan’s significance within Iran, the reallocation of state resources, and changes in economic development trends. In his book Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, Rasmus Christian Elling asserts that the diminishing status of Azerbaijan was accompanied by restrictions on Turkic elements of Azerbaijani culture and initiatives aimed at promoting Persian as the only language of Iran. New provinces were established to fragment Azerbaijani strongholds, important locations were renamed in Persian, and Persian names were promoted for Azerbaijani children.

The short-lived 1945-1946 Autonomous Azerbaijan People’s Government, which demanded self-determination within Iran and recognition of Azerbaijani rights, was violently suppressed in December 1946 by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s army. More than 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed. Even the Iranian army’s records, which downplayed the numbers, reported that 2,500 individuals were executed, 8,000 were imprisoned, and 36,000 were expelled from the Azerbaijan province.

State-level discrimination against Azerbaijanis continues to this day, as the provision for education in their mother tongue for Iran’s minorities, set out in Article 15 of the Constitution, remains on paper only. Azerbaijani rights activists are subjected to arbitrary arrests and punishments for trying to raise awareness of their identity and language and for protesting against the environmental disaster of Lake Urmia, which has completely dried up because of the Islamic Republic’s mismanagement. The Islamic Republic’s ethnic discrimination is still visible in cases of parents being denied the right to give their children Azerbaijani Turkic names. The Islamic Republic’s use of Shia Islam to override ethnic differences and forge a homogenous Persian-centric Iranian identity is a continuation of the Pahlavi-era policies.

Security Threats for the Azerbaijan Republic

As the protests grow and U.S. military intervention looms, the Azerbaijan Republic needs to be prepared for possible security risks from the chaotic political environment in Iran. The Iranian regime has been an existential threat to Azerbaijan’s security over the years with its support for the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan, export of Khomeinist political Islam and instigation of radical Shia elements against the secular Azerbaijani state, killing of Azerbaijani citizens, creation of a terrorist proxy called the Huseyniyyun brigade under Soleimani’s supervision, and pouring of narcotics into Azerbaijan on an almost daily basis.

In a scenario of regime collapse, Azerbaijan needs to formulate a proactive policy by engaging with Israel, the U.S., and Turkey to be ready to prevent any bloodshed against Iran’s Azerbaijanis, considering that the PKK-linked Kurdish PJAK militants, who are armed and have territorial claims on Iran’s Azerbaijani cities such as Urmia. A second threat might emerge if the regime or an alternative central authority engages in a bloody crackdown against the Azerbaijani minority, which also needs to be prevented. Overall, in a chaotic environment, the primary target should be the prevention of armed attacks by the PJAK militants or a violent crackdown on Azerbaijanis.

A change in Iran from theocracy to secularism is also in Azerbaijan’s national interests and might help to mend the ties between the countries. A strong Azerbaijani role in Iran’s future as equals is essential to curb pan-Iranist inclinations towards imperialism and denying Azerbaijani identity. Further exasperating this is Russian imperialism, which has re-emerged following the Soviet Union’s collapse and has become deadly under Putin. A democratic and decentralized Iran is in the interests of the world.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Iranian Collapse Poses Security Risks for the Azerbaijan Republic was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s January 2026 use of a hypersonic Oreshnik missile was not primarily about destroying a target. It was a strategic message delivered through speed and proximity rather than words. Western reporting confirms the strike occurred near Ukraine’s western border during a broader missile and drone attack and was widely interpreted as a deliberate signal toward NATO rather than a battlefield necessity.

This is how the conversation begins. Russia speaks first, not with a declaration, but with a capability demonstration. Hypersonic systems like Oreshnik reportedly exceed Mach 10, compressing detection and decision timelines and complicating interception by existing missile defense architectures. The message is implicit. If this can reach here, it can reach farther. Geography does the rest of the work.

From a battlefield perspective, the strike changed little. Ukraine has endured far heavier damage from conventional missile campaigns. Infrastructure effects were limited relative to scale. That is precisely why the strike matters. Hypersonic weapons derive much of their value not from explosive yield but from psychological and strategic effects that shape decision-making under uncertainty.

Hypersonic systems sit in an uneasy space between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Their speed and maneuverability reduce warning time, while their dual-use potential introduces ambiguity about intent and escalation thresholds. This ambiguity is destabilizing by design. It forces worst-case assumptions and heightens coercive leverage without crossing overt nuclear red lines.

The timing of the strike matters. It occurred amid active European debates about long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. Russia has consistently opposed deeper Western involvement, and analysts note that demonstrations of advanced strike capabilities often coincide with diplomatic inflection points to influence allied decision-making. Poland was not targeted, yet proximity alone conveyed risk. That was sufficient.

This brings the conversation directly to deterrence and national strategy. The most recent United States National Defense Strategy identifies Russia as an acute threat and emphasizes integrated deterrence across domains, allies, and instruments of national power. The document explicitly recognizes the challenge posed by advanced missile threats and highlights the need for resilient command and control, integrated air and missile defense, and close coordination with allies.

However, the Oreshnik strike exposes a gap between strategic acknowledgment and operational specificity. The National Defense Strategy speaks clearly about the importance of integrated deterrence, yet it remains largely high-level in addressing how compressed decision timelines created by hypersonic weapons affect escalation management in Europe. While the strategy calls for investments in missile defense and sensing, it does not fully grapple with the psychological and political effects of hypersonic ambiguity on alliance cohesion crises.

Deterrence by denial becomes harder to sustain when allies know that some threats may penetrate defenses regardless of investment. Hypersonic systems challenge assumptions that reassurance can rest on interception alone. NATO and U.S. strategies increasingly emphasize deterrence by punishment and resilience, yet the National Defense Strategy stops short of articulating how allies should respond politically and militarily when warning time collapses, and attribution is immediate, but intent remains unclear.

This does not mean the strategy is wrong. It means it is incomplete. Integrated deterrence remains the correct framework, but hypersonic weapons demand greater emphasis on crisis decision-making, distributed command structures, and alliance-level exercises that assume ambiguity rather than clarity. Analysts have long warned that hypersonic systems stress deterrence not by making war more likely, but by increasing the risk of miscalculation during moments of political tension.

Russia’s hypersonic signal near NATO’s border, therefore, becomes a practical test of whether strategic documents translate into a credible posture. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges the problem. The question is whether implementation moves fast enough to match the physics involved. Deterrence must function even when seconds replace minutes, and ambiguity replaces certainty.

The Oreshnik launch did not redraw Europe’s security map overnight. It changed the tone of the room. It reminded policymakers that deterrence is not static, and that technology can erode comfortable assumptions faster than doctrine adapts. Hypersonic weapons are not the end of deterrence. They are a stress test of whether national strategies and alliances can remain credible when clarity disappears.

When the screens go dark in that briefing room, the real discussion begins. Not about panic or retaliation, but about adaptation. Deterrence endures not because threats are fast, but because responses remain coherent under pressure. Russia spoke in velocity. The enduring question is whether strategy, alliance resolve, and execution can keep pace.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Conversation Europe Never Wanted: Hypersonic Tensions and U.S. Defense Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether knowingly or not, these headlines promote a false narrative that China wants the world to believe. As an example of complex psychological warfare, the narrative aims to weaken the will of the Japanese public and the international community at large to defend Taiwan against a future Chinese attack. To prevent the weakening of deterrence, it is necessary to set the record straight regarding Japan’s policy towards Taiwan.

The 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué

The previously cited news reports mischaracterize a comment made by Prime Minister Takaichi, who told lawmakers, “The Japanese government’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, and there has been no change to this position.” Specifically, she is referring to paragraph 3 of the 1972 communiqué: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

Importantly, the communiqué does not say that Japan “affirms,” “recognizes,” “endorses,” or “agrees with” the viewpoint of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the communist regime that governs the country today. The communiqué states only that Japan “understands and respects” the PRC’s position.

When the United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC, it used similar language. Paragraph 7 of the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué states, “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” In this context, the word “acknowledges” performs the same function as the phrase “understands and respects” does in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.

A key legal distinction lies in whether a government uses the word “recognize,” which then constitutes formal acceptance of a claim’s legal validity. Japan and the U.S. both stated that they “recognize” the PRC as the “sole legal government of China.” By recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China, Japan and the U.S. were adopting a “One China” policy.

A crucial aspect of the “one China” policy adopted by both Japan and the U.S. is that neither recognizes the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China; they merely take note of the PRC’s position. Where the American and Japanese policies differ is Japan’s insistence that it “firmly maintains” its stance under Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Unpacking the meaning of Japan’s reaffirmation of Potsdam requires a review of multiple related declarations and treaties.

Shimonoseki to Cairo to Potsdam

Several treaties and declarations over the last century have shaped how the international community manages the Taiwan situation. Following the First Sino-Japanese War, China’s Qing government ceded, “to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty,” the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, as stated within the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Fast forward to before the end of World War II, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Kai-shek issued the 1943 Cairo Declaration, promising the return of territories like Taiwan and Manchuria to China.

At the time, the PRC did not exist. The ROC government replaced China’s Qing government in 1912 and continued to govern China until it was forced out by the Communists in 1949, at which point it took refuge in Taiwan, Penghu, and various other minor islands along the Chinese coast.

Days before the end of the war, the major allies of the U.S., the UK, and the Soviet Union held the Potsdam Conference and issued the Potsdam Declaration, preparing the terms of Japan’s surrender. Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement states, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

Following the devastation from the atomic bombings, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender at the end of World War II, agreeing to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith” and “take whatever action may be required…for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.”  Japan transferred administrative control of Taiwan and Penghu to the ROC in 1945. Only a few years after the end of World War II, civil war broke out between the ROC and the PRC on mainland China, leaving Japan no opportunity to formally cede the islands to either rival government. Although the ROC continues to govern those islands to the present day, it never acquired legal sovereignty over them. This is why Taiwan’s status is still often described as “undetermined.”

An International Matter

The Cairo Declaration cannot be implemented as originally intended because the ROC no longer governs China, and even if it did, Japan no longer has the legal capacity to transfer sovereignty. In short, Japan has never recognized Taiwan as part of China. Since 1972, it has acknowledged the PRC’s position without endorsing it, while reaffirming its postwar obligation to comply with the terms of Potsdam and Cairo.

As part of re-establishing relationships with the allies, Japan renounced “all right, title, and claim” to Taiwan and Penghu without designating a recipient through the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Neither the ROC nor the PRC governments were invited to participate, nor were they even mentioned within the treaty.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the latest legal document to leave Taiwan’s status unresolved, transforming it into an international problem rather than a settled matter of China’s domestic sovereignty. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent remarks reaffirmed Japan’s longstanding position, which is essentially a position of neutrality. Claims to the contrary misread the Japanese Prime Minister’s words and the legal history behind them.

Lindell Lucy is based in Honolulu, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Harvard Extension School.

Not Part of China: An Explanation of Japan’s Taiwan Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Western Hemisphere is the de facto core position for undisputed U.S. power, integrity, and uncompromising sovereignty. While the U.S. commitment to Europe remains, European nation-states must step up to the plate and take charge of funding and leadership of their own defense. The segment on “civilisational erasure” is directly aligned with the position already made explicit by Vice President JD Vance in early 2025 at the Paris artificial intelligence conference in France and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.

One of the most meaningful merits of the NSS is its call to reposition economic security, industrial renaissance, and technological leadership at the heart of the U.S. strategy to deter and prevail in the event of military conflict. The NSS refrains from mentioning “major power competition,” opting instead for an acknowledgement of spheres of influence.  The NSS does not antagonizes China, instead framing it as an economic and technological competitor, rather than an ideological one. Sustaining American reshoring, reindustrialization, industrial base funding, technological edge, manufacturing supply chains, and access to critical materials, is what underwrites how the U.S. deals with China, deterrence postures notwithstanding. A clear focus on economic competition allows the NSS to remain as vague as possible on the potential for military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific.

Economy, Industry, Technology

In the 2025 NSS, the terms “economy/economic” are used 66 times and “industry/industrial” 19 times, including under “industrial base,” “industrial production,” and “industrial supply chains.” As for “technology/technological,” they appear 17 times. The core meaning of a dozen such mentions is captured as follows:

U.S. military power and diplomatic influence rest on a strong, resilient domestic economy. National security depends on rebuilding America’s industrial base, restoring economic self-reliance, and securing critical supply chains. Economic and technological competitiveness over the long term is essential to preventing conflict and sustaining global leadership. Further, the United States will actively protect its workers and firms from unfair economic practices.

American power requires an industrial sector able to meet both civilian and wartime production needs. Reindustrialization is a top national economic priority, aimed at strengthening the middle class and regaining control over production and supply chains. The U.S. will reshore manufacturing, attract investment, and expand domestic capacity, particularly in critical and emerging technologies. Hence a credible military depends on a robust and resilient defense industrial base.

Preserving merit, innovation, and technological leadership is essential to maintaining America’s historic advantages. Strengthening the resilience of the U.S. technology ecosystem, especially in areas such as AI, is a national priority and a foundation of global leadership. Thus, long-term success in technological competition is central to deterrence and conflict prevention.

Economic Security First

The 2025 NSS references industries primarily through a national-security lens, rather than civilian market categorization, including defense (industrial base, munitions production, weapons systems manufacturing, military supply chains), manufacturing (re-shored industrial production, domestic manufacturing capacity, wartime and peacetime production), energy (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) and its infrastructure and exports, strategic supply chains (critical materials, components and parts manufacturing, logistics and production networks), infrastructure, both physical and digital to be built at industrial-scale, and strategic technologies.

The 2025 NSS strategic technologies are artificial intelligence, explicitly cited as a comparative U.S. advantage; other critical and emerging technologies such as dual-use and strategic technologies tied to national power; defense and military technologie integrated with industrial and innovation advantages; intelligence and surveillance technologies such as monitoring supply chains, vulnerabilities, and threats; cyber technology including espionage, theft, and protection of intellectual property; industrial and manufacturing technologies aiming at re-shoring, reindustrialization, and advanced manufacturing; energy technologies directly linked to economic and national security; and sensitive technologies protected via aligned export controls.

The 2025 NSS treats economic power, industrial superiority, and technological edge as inseparable pillars of national security. Technology is framed less as a civilian growth driver and more as a strategic asset, a competitive weapon, and a deterrence multiplier. Civilian industry is subordinated to national resilience, mobilization capacity, and deterrence, reinforcing the 2025 NSS’s broader fusion of economic security, industrial policy, and military strategy. This constitutes an optimal response to the Chinese “civilian-military fusion” and “unrestricted warfare” model.

Space

While a mention of “space” appears only once on page 21 of the NSS, the second Trump administration published on December 18th an Executive Order “Ensuring American Space Superiority“ prioritizing lunar basing and economic development by 2030 with a clear focus on Artemis, cislunar security as a theatre, and space nuclear power on a schedule. To secure U.S. assets and interests from Earth orbit through cislunar space to the Moon, integrating commercial capabilities into the defense complex, reforming acquisition, and modernizing the nation’s military space architecture become paramount. Space traffic management and space situational awareness services are no longer solely provided by the U.S. government for free.

Repositioning the U.S. as an unrivalled economic-industrial-technological leader provides valuable opportunities to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific and Europe-Middle-East-Africa regions: “The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.” After 35 years of the West divorcing itself from Reality, we now face a technology-savvy tripolar world. The NSS, complemented by the Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority, merely reflects a long overdue readjustment to 21st-century geopolitics. These are fundamentally the space, nuclear, and disruptive industries, focused in ways that achieve techno-strategic power.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

As of today, ChatGPT-5 Pro is said to have an IQ of 148, as tested officially by Mensa Norway. It is now significantly smarter than most adult humans in the United States (who average 99.7). Grok 4 may be weeks away from becoming even smarter, but the progress at which AI reasoning inches ahead matters little when humans write code for these programs. However, AI has started to write its own code. In tandem, Mark Zuckerberg is building a super team dubbed the “superintelligence AI” lab and he offered a single person, Daniel Francis, $1.25 Billion for a four-year contract (or a $312 million per year salary). Further, Zuckerberg has gone on to poach the top AI talent from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, nearing 24 people in total out of a team of only 44.

Unfortunately, U.S. companies are also allowed to funnel money into Chinese AI companies, in part because it is a less expensive alternative than U.S. developed AI. China, as a near-peer adversary cannot be allowed to reach superintelligence first because whoever wins the AI race to superintelligence will have nearly unlimited computing ability and will be able to launch devastating cyber-attacks with ease.

If there are two teams approaching the finish line in a winner-take-all superintelligence race, then there is also a direct implication for long-term deterrence on global war. Imagine the following scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The U.S. is ahead in the race to superintelligence, but China works diligently to steal code, launch cyber-attacks, and intimidate U.S. scientists. Eventually, China assassinates critical AI scientists, prompting the U.S. to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China to stop its attacks. Yet, just before all-out war, China ceases its efforts, having become successful in its bid to cripple the U.S. AI industry so it can reach superintelligence first.

SCENARIO 2: The U.S. is ahead, but China is only barely behind. China uses its innovative AI models to wargame nearly unlimited sequences and calculates what it believes is the perfect attack to prevent the U.S. from reaching superintelligence first. In this scenario, the attacks never ramp up. Instead, it results in a massive, unprovoked first strike that incapacitates the U.S. This might be a nuclear strike or simply an EMP strike that decimates the U.S. power grid. Either way, China wins again.

SCENARIO 3: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress. Public companies continue progressing toward superintelligence, but one or both achieve it in a military or national laboratory behind closed doors. They ponder the best way to use it, leveraging it like the nuclear football in global diplomacy (i.e., setting the briefcase on the floor next to the President). They may have accessed superintelligence but lack confidence in the technology to use it for the near future.

SCENARIO 4: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress, and both achieve superintelligence behind closed doors. Then one day, one of them launches an attack on the other, prompting the other side to launch its own superintelligence response. The two AI agents battle across every sector of society, arm-wrestling for control. Seemingly trivial differences between one model and another let one win in one sector and the other win in another.

This article does not presume that the outcome of a superintelligence race is represented in one of these four scenarios. Rather, it argues that AI will inevitably complicate the landscape of deterrence as it may give confidence of victory in otherwise stable situations. This moment in history is nothing less than the moment when scientists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein wrote President Roosevelt to warn of the potential use of fission in bombs.

The United States government must think carefully about the current state of AI in the world and what it will mean for deterrence strategy. We need to have a planned response if a superintelligence cyberattack is launched against the U.S. This includes physically isolating our command-and-control systems and planning for surprise attacks, itself planned by another country’s AI technology. Worse yet, military planners need to consider how to detect and respond to multiple grey zone micro-attacks that may be a component of a larger cascading attack.

We are amid our generation’s Manhattan Project moment. The 2023 Oppenheimer movie culminates in the detonation of the 1945 Trinity test. Perhaps if the United States plans well, in 80 years, we may all be able to enjoy a movie about Zuckerberg forming his superintelligence lab.

Rob Kittinger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The AI Revolution’s Outsized Impact on Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The national security strategy outlines the president’s strategic vision and serves as the closest approximation to a U.S. grand strategy. It orients the POTUS’ goals and associated efforts in foreign and defense policy within the executive branch and informs Congress of the POTUS’ priorities and direction. The NSS declares what is important to America—its national interests, goals, and priorities—and emphasizes how the President envisions the use of America’s diplomatic, informational, economic, military, and technological instruments of power to achieve or service those interests. The 2025 National Security Strategy is not the most comprehensive ever produced; that distinction belongs to the President’s first NSS in 2017.

The 2025 NSS identifies three core national interests that collectively shape U.S. strategy. First, it is the “balance of power,” which focuses on U.S. security and emphasizes preventing any rival from gaining regional or global dominance that could threaten U.S. sovereignty or freedom of action. Second, a predisposition to non-interventionism, which reflects a desire to limit U.S. involvement in long-lasting or discretionary foreign wars, emphasizing restraint, burden-sharing, and deterrence over “fruitless ‘nation-building’ wars.” Third, economic security, a key strategic goal, which requires the United States to maintain its position as the world’s leading economy through balanced trade, secure access to essential resources, reindustrialization, energy security, and mutually beneficial economic ties with other countries. Collectively, these interests reveal a strategy that prioritizes American strength and strategic stability over “forever wars,” while recognizing that economic vitality and security are inseparable from national power.

Only a strong nuclear deterrent will ensure these core national interests are both protected and advanced. The core idea of 2025 NSS is “peace through strength,” asserting credible military power and the fear it projects as the best safeguard against conflict amid geopolitical turbulence and great-power competition. This NSS espouses a more realist disposition, unapologetically relying on deterrence to project strength in a world fraught with nuclear weapon expansion. President Reagan reminded us in 1986 that “Nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.”

The 2025 NSS clearly states on page three, “We want the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent.” This is the engine of a U.S. balance of power policy—acting to prevent other states or coalitions of states from achieving dominant power over the U.S., thereby maintaining a balance between stability and security. Moreover, the NSS emphasizes that deterrence depends on maintaining U.S. military “overmatch.” An abundant, modern, and resilient nuclear arsenal not only provides the military advantage sought but also does so at a lower cost than a conventionally armed force with equivalent destructive capability.

Next, instead of open-ended overseas wars or nation-building, the 2025 NSS frames military engagement as justified only when U.S. core interests are directly threatened. This predisposition to non-interventionism requires maximum deterrence strategies to prevent regional conflicts from escalating into large-scale wars that could “come to our shores, [which] is bad for American interests.”

Moreover, empowering and enabling allies and partners—removing imperial perceptions of American behavior—by letting them lead, investing in their capabilities, and treating them as co-architects rather than subcontractors signals that America is not trying to dominate outcomes but to share responsibility. This creates economic value through burden sharing and arms sales, while fostering an equally shared commitment to security goals and deterrence. Capacity building is not short-sighted; it is a long-term investment in partnerships that advance the balance of power without relying solely on American taxpayers.

The 2025 NSS further stresses that economic security and vitality—one of President Trump’s central goals—requires a sustained focus on deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. By creating the strategic space for economic expansion, successful deterrence enables reinvestment in the very capabilities that preserve it. This dynamic not only offers a long-term sustainment pathway for America’s nuclear deterrent force but also reinforces deterrence as the essential buffer between competition and conflict.

Finally, the NSS contends that durable deterrence rests as much on economic and technological dominance as on military power. By preserving America’s lead in high-tech innovation, increasing its industrial capacity, ensuring energy dominance, and securing reliable access to critical minerals, the United States reduces adversaries’ incentives to challenge it militarily while incentivizing a realignment of countries toward U.S. interests. At the same time, the strategy underscores that economic strength alone is insufficient; it must be coupled with a military that is rigorously recruited, trained, equipped, and modernized to remain the world’s most lethal and technologically advanced deterrent force, protecting U.S. interests and preventing conflict.

The 2025 NSS is far from “business as usual.” It embraces sovereignty, fairness, and balance of power, asserting that peace rests on strength—not wishful thinking, unchecked interventionism, or self-imposed restraint. The strategy states that “in the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict,” thereby framing deterrence not simply as a matter of nuclear or conventional force posture, but as the cumulative product of industrial capacity, innovation, and sustained national investment. Within this logic lies a clear call to expand and emplace a robust, modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear arsenal capable of deterring nuclear attack, averting major war, and safeguarding America’s national interests.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The Case for Deterrence: What the 2025 NSS Gets Right was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cyber Shockwaves

Imagine a simple piece of computer code shutting down nuclear power plants, paralyzing transportation networks, and disrupting vital military systems. For more than a decade, cyberattacks against critical infrastructure have been more than just intrusions; they can have effects comparable to those of conventional acts of war, and threatening global stability. For nuclear democracies, the question has become crucial: at what point does a digital incident cross the threshold of severity required to trigger deterrence calculations, or even justify a nuclear response?

Cyberspace is now a theater of constant confrontation where adversaries seek to undermine each other’s trust, disrupt economies, and test resilience. This invisible competition weakens traditional deterrence mechanisms, which rely on clear signals. In cyberspace, nothing is clear, with uncertain effects and often unintentional escalation. Yet, the potential damage of a sophisticated cyberattack against an electrical grid or supply chains could exceed that of a conventional bombing. The problem stems from three major developments.

Critical Weak Spots

The first development is the increasing vulnerability of critical infrastructure, whose technical complexity creates countless points of weakness. Hospitals, refineries, water distribution systems, and railway networks rely on technologies that are sometimes outdated and rarely protected against determined state and non-state actors. A coordinated and simultaneous attack against multiple sectors could severely paralyze a country for weeks to months, causing economic chaos and widespread social disruption.

The second development concerns the strong integration of cyberspace and nuclear power. Command, control, and communication systems have become more digital than ever, and thus more exposed to cyberattacks. Even a non-destructive intrusion, subtly targeted and difficult to detect, could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the capacity to retaliate. In such cases, the precise or approximate perception of risk becomes as dangerous as the attack itself, amplifying the potential for misunderstandings and unintentional escalation.

The third development, finally, is the bolder behavior of adversaries of democratic regimes, who use cyberspace as a tool for exerting pressure without incurring significant costs. Who would doubt that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran regularly demonstrate their ability to disrupt the institutions of democratic regimes? The relative success of their operations encourages them to push the boundaries even further, as they are aware of the existence of a “gray zone” where traditional deterrence does not fully apply.

These major transformations lead to a fundamental question: should democracies clarify as quickly as possible that certain cyberattacks could cross a threshold triggering a major military response, including nuclear? The objective of a new doctrine would then not be to lower the nuclear threshold, but to re-establish a credible and robust level of deterrence. Because if adversaries believe that cyberattacks are “zero-cost,” they will continue to systematically target vital infrastructure, exploiting critical vulnerabilities with impunity and minimal risk to themselves.

Strategic High Stakes

A first argument for clarifying the doctrine rests on proportionality: a massive cyberattack targeting critical infrastructure could have consequences comparable to a bombing. In this context, it would be consistent to specify that the response is not limited to conventional means. Analysts point out that U.S. nuclear doctrine already considers the possibility of devastating consequences from non-nuclear strategic attacks, and they believe that the nuclear threat is not explicitly excluded, even if the no-first-use scenario remains dominant.

A second argument concerns strategic stability. Today, adversaries regularly stress the defenses of democratic regimes in the “gray zone,” without immediate risk of escalation. Clarifying the rules of engagement and explicitly integrating cyberspace into strategic thinking could strengthen deterrence and limit adversarial gambles in this gray zone. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France could thus reduce uncertainty regarding the potential consequences of sophisticated cyberattacks, one form of irregular warfare, while emphasizing that any major offensive would have significant repercussions.

A third argument concerns the protection of nuclear command. Even a limited attack on control systems could be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize the second-strike capability, creating an extreme risk of miscalculation, especially with the increasing use of artificial intelligence. By clearly announcing that such an intrusion would be considered a serious and unacceptable act, democratic regimes would strengthen their strategic stability, discouraging any hostile action and reducing the risk of unintentional escalation during times of international crisis.

Perilous Lines

This doctrinal shift, however, carries significant risks, notably the unintentional lowering of the nuclear threshold. Even if the clarification primarily aims to strengthen deterrence, it could be perceived as an excessive threat by non-democratic States, prompting them to rapidly modernize their nuclear arsenals or develop sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities. The proliferation of cyber threats with potentially physical effects creates a low-profile but ultimately strategic space for competition, paradoxically exacerbating tensions and instability.

Responding to a cyberattack with a nuclear strike requires absolute certainty as to its true perpetrator. Yet, operations in cyberspace often involve proxies, opaque international relays, and technical masking of the source. An attribution error could have profound consequences. Additionally, a cyber intrusion seen as preparation for a major attack might provoke an overreaction during a crisis. Any doctrine that includes the possibility of a nuclear response must therefore incorporate rigorous deconfliction mechanisms, otherwise the worst will happen.

However, these risks should not obscure a strategic reality: current doctrine dates to a time when cyberattacks could not paralyze a country in minutes. This is no longer the case. Adversaries of democratic regimes have understood that cyberspace offers them a means of inflicting considerable damage while remaining below the threshold for a nuclear response. Doing nothing would amount to accepting a structural vulnerability, especially since middle ground is emerging. This involves explicitly defining two categories of cyberattacks likely to trigger an appropriate military response:

1. Attacks causing massive impacts on the civilian population or critical infrastructure (hospitals and emergency services, water distribution networks, etc.).
2. Intrusions targeting the command systems of the armed forces, even without destructive effects, with the aim of degrading a country’s decision-making capacity.

Though it would not directly reference nuclear weapons, this clarification would connect strategic cyberattacks to potential responses, giving decision-makers flexibility while clearly warning adversaries. A more explicit doctrine should reduce the risks of accidental escalation and limit the audacity of State and non-State actors willing to test the nerves of democratic regimes, in line with recent analyses on the evolution of the U.S. nuclear posture in the face of new strategic threats that the war in Ukraine has only exacerbated.

About the Author

Gilles A. Paché is a Professor of Marketing and Supply Chain Management at Aix-Marseille University, France, and a member of the CERGAM Lab. His research focuses on logistics strategy, distribution channel management, and military studies. On these topics, he has authored over 700 scholarly publications, including articles, book chapters, and conference papers, as well as 24 academic books. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hacking the Apocalypse: How Cyberattacks Could Trigger Nuclear Escalation was originally published on Global Security Review.

The methods of modern economic espionage are a complex mix of traditional human intelligence operations and cutting-edge cyber techniques. Foreign intelligence services, often with government support, actively seek to illicitly acquire sensitive information from key industries, including advanced computing, pharmaceutical, aerospace, and energy.

Traditional methods include recruiting corporate insiders who, through financial incentives, ideological persuasion, or blackmail, gain access to a company’s most sensitive data. These operations may also involve physical infiltration of a company’s facilities, such as placing an agent in a surreptitious role within the supply chain to obtain proprietary information. On the cyber front, the threat is even more pervasive. Adversaries employ sophisticated spear-phishing attacks to access corporate networks, deploy advanced malware to exfiltrate data covertly, and conduct supply-chain attacks that compromise software or hardware during manufacturing. This combination of physical and digital tradecraft allows foreign intelligence services to bypass traditional security measures and access vital research and development data, manufacturing processes, and business strategies at a fraction of the time and cost it would usually take to develop them organically.

In this context, the role of counterintelligence in managing and executing insider threat mitigation programs is a critical element of national security in the burgeoning era of global great-power competition. These programs move beyond simple security protocols to adopt a holistic, risk-based approach to deterring, detecting, and mitigating threats posed by a company’s employees. Rather than focusing solely on a small number of spies, modern programs are designed to identify individuals on a “critical pathway” to becoming a threat by using both technical indicators (e.g., unusual data downloads, anomalous network activity) and non-technical, behavioral cues (e.g., unexplained affluence, foreign connections, or indicators of personal stress). The goal is to intervene early, assisting at-risk employees before a foreign intelligence service can exploit their vulnerabilities. This proactive stance is essential because, in an environment where state-sponsored actors relentlessly target a nation’s innovation base, the greatest risk often comes from within.

A robust insider threat program serves as the first line of defense against the human element of foreign espionage, thereby preserving a company’s competitive edge and, by extension, a nation’s technological superiority.

To counter this multifaceted threat effectively, a robust public–private partnership is no longer a luxury but a necessity. Government counterintelligence agencies possess unique authorities and global visibility that enable them to identify the motives, capabilities, and tactics of foreign intelligence services. Yet most sensitive intellectual property resides in the private sector, which lacks the legal mandate, resources, and authority to conduct proactive counterintelligence operations. This asymmetry creates a critical national vulnerability. An effective public–private partnership seeks to close this gap by enabling the secure, timely sharing of threat intelligence from government agencies to at-risk corporate firms. Collaborative successes have included joint task forces and intelligence-sharing portals that provide companies with actionable warnings about specific foreign threats.

Despite these actions, significant challenges remain. Legal and ethical constraints, particularly those related to privacy protections and the handling of classified information, often impede intelligence flows. Firms may also hesitate to report breaches due to concerns over reputational harm, investor confidence, and legal liability. Compounding these issues, the speed and scale of cyber-enabled espionage frequently outpace the bureaucratic processes governing efficient and practical cooperation. Addressing these gaps requires a unified national strategy that streamlines information-sharing mechanisms, clarifies legal authorities, and directly confronts insider threats and commercial espionage to mitigate their economic and national security consequences.

The protection of economic and corporate interests has become a core mission of modern counterintelligence. The convergence of traditional espionage and cyber operations has produced a complex threat environment that state security services cannot confront alone. As a result, the future of national security and economic prosperity hinges on resilient public–private collaboration, particularly through the implementation of robust insider-threat mitigation programs. By fostering trust, establishing clear and reliable communication channels, and adopting a unified national strategy, governments and industry together can build the defenses necessary to protect innovation, preserve strategic advantage, and sustain long-term economic competitiveness in an increasingly contested global environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and insider risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Role of Counterintelligence in Protecting Economic and Corporate Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

Air-launched ballistic missiles are an integral part of Israel’s long-range strike capability. Without long-range bombers and contested airspace on its borders, Israel must rely on innovation to conduct long-range strikes. Air-launched ballistic missiles enable Israel to turn a fighter aircraft into a mobile missile launcher with the range to hit Israel’s most powerful enemies while avoiding contested airspace.

The capability that ALBMs give the Israelis is best demonstrated by their first publicly announced strikes on Iranian territory on October 26, 2024. Israel struck approximately twenty targets, including missile production facilities and air defense sites. Satellite imagery and reporting from Reuters, Forbes, and the Economist indicate that air-launched ballistic missiles were Israel’s primary standoff weapon.

Debris found in Iraq matched components consistent with an Israeli ALBM, possibly tied to the still-unconfirmed Golden Horizon program referenced in Israeli and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) reporting. This strike proved that Israel could bypass the dense Syrian air defense belt by launching ALBMs from within its own airspace, or over the Mediterranean, and allowing the missile to climb, coast, and descend into Iran.

ALBM’s offer four exquisite capabilities: extended range, short flight time, unexpected launch angles, and precision accuracy. These weapons can hit an air-defense battery in a few minutes, from virtually any point in the air. For mobile air defenses and high-value targets, ALBMs provide a significant advantage over gravity bombs and cruise missiles. The air-launched nature of ALBMs also gives it survivability and accuracy advantages over ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) used by Iran, Russia, and China.

ALBMs are not just employed by the Israelis; Russia and China both possess them. As an example, hypersonic missiles like Khinzal are in reality maneuverable ALBMs. Khinzal is proving challenging for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept and enables Russia to conduct accurate strikes from deep within Russian territory. Early warning and midcourse tracking are key challenges for Ukraine because ALBMs have low plume density and travel on the edge of space, compressing decision time and making tracking difficult.

Russian and Chinese ALBMs are dual-use systems with the capability to have a nuclear or conventional warhead. The short time between detection and impact poses a difficult challenge for intelligence analysts in the scenario of a launch against American or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. The mobility of these systems also makes attribution difficult.

These weapons pose new challenges for air defenses and NATO’s current theater nuclear posture, particularly in Europe. The United States currently lacks an air-launched ballistic missile or comparable prompt-strike capability analogous to Russia’s Kinzhal. American B61 nuclear gravity bombs, while credible, cannot match the speed of a potential Khinzal launch. One of the few credible prompt options within 10 minutes is a W76-2 from a Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a weapon likely used in a large-scale attack. Relying on a submarine-based capability for theater-level deterrence complicates escalation dynamics and highlights a gap in the NATO nuclear mission’s posture.

As ALBMs become more useful in extending conventional strike capability and obfuscating integrated air and missile defenses, the US must field a similar capability. Without the ability to respond to a Russian theater strike in a short timeline, or to threaten a comparable attack, the US and NATO are at a disadvantage.

A ground-launched hypersonic, like Dark Eagle or the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), is a promising capability to fill this gap; however, it misses the nuclear and airborne elements. An air-launched version of either of these systems would provide an adequate analog. A dual-capable air-launched Dark Eagle would enhance the effectiveness of the NATO nuclear deterrent by providing NATO with a flexible prompt-strike theater-level capability.

As long-range strike technologies proliferate, ALBMs have emerged as one of the most disruptive systems in modern warfare. Adversaries can now deliver precise, rapid strikes from unexpected launch angles, while NATO lacks a comparable prompt-strike option. This imbalance increases escalation risk and undermines American credibility in a crisis. To close this gap, the United States should pursue an air-launched, dual-capable system that matches the speed and flexibility of its competitors.

Dylan Gottesman is a sophomore in nuclear engineering at Purdue University. As Director of the Purdue National Defense Society’s OSINT team, he leads the development of white papers and analytical research on nuclear deterrence, geostrategy, and missile defense. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles and the Theater Nuclear Gap was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current approach, developed during a period of adherence to global norms, reached its limits amid intensifying great power competition, the expansion of authoritarian nuclear arsenals, the growth of regional nuclear warfighting doctrines, and disruptive technological shifts. Effective deterrence demands that adversaries fear the consequences of violating the status quo.

Preventing aggression by one or more nuclear-armed adversaries requires an American nuclear strategy supported by a strong, credible force structure that can inflict devastating costs—not merely deliver minimal retaliation. To achieve this, the Trump administration and the Department of War need to embrace a culture of deterrence that values, rather than downplays, America’s nuclear edge.

The 2023 report by the Strategic Posture Commission, America’s Strategic Posture, underscores the urgency of such a shift. It calls for a revised strategy capable of protecting vital interests and maintaining stability with China and Russia, warning that critical decisions cannot be deferred any longer. The report’s recommendations, particularly its insistence that the United States be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat China and Russia simultaneously, requires a strategy for implementation, not passive admiration.

Peace Through Strength: Renewing America’s Nuclear Deterrent, a Proposed Nuclear Posture Review for 2026, by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, provides a decisive model of maximum deterrence. It promotes tailored, full-spectrum strategies and rejects outdated minimum-deterrence concepts that no longer reflect geopolitical reality. This framework strengthens general and immediate deterrence, addresses the nuclear threats from rivals, improves American escalation management, increases the resilience and survivability of the nuclear force, and strengthens extended deterrence through forward-based regional capabilities.

This deterrence framework is founded on six core pillars. First, it offers a national deterrence strategy that reflects the Department of War’s mission, “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation’s security,” and supports a peace-through-strength doctrine that prioritizes American security, prosperity, and independence. Second, it advocates survivability enhancements that ensure a credible second-strike capability—beyond reliance on the submarine leg of the triad. Third, it seeks urgent nuclear modernization and expansion consistent with the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendations. Fourth, it advocates deployment of hedge capabilities from the nuclear stockpile. Fifth, it proposes strengthening forward-deployed regional nuclear deterrent assets. It requires deployment of robust non-strategic nuclear forces, empowering allied burden-sharing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Sixth, it advocates clear and credible declaratory policies as a means of deterring asymmetric non-nuclear attacks on the homeland, space assets, and critical cyber infrastructure.

Nuclear weapons provide the highest strategic leverage at the lowest expense. The Department of War is projected to spend about $8.5 trillion on conventional military capabilities over the next decade, while dedicating only $946 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent. This focus on conventional military spending long supported failed interventionism and a fragile status quo. At six to seven percent of the annual defense budget, the cost of deterrence remains relatively cheap, even if nuclear deterrence spending rises significantly.

Nuclear deterrence, like home insurance, is affordable but only seems a wise decision after a disaster strikes. A house can be rebuilt, but a devastated nation cannot. Hence, the “premium” for maximum nuclear readiness is not just affordable, it is indispensable. The cost of not having a strong nuclear deterrent might exceed $10 trillion if an undeterred China tries to forcefully unify Taiwan. Pursuing the nuclear posture offered here will cost less than one tenth the cost of losing Taiwan and may prevent such a conflict from ever happening.

This proposed Nuclear Posture Review strengthens America’s deterrence by replacing outdated strategies with an approach tailored to modern nuclear competition. It emphasizes credible capabilities, improved burden-sharing, and bold new designs to deter adversaries who are rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals.

Their build-ups serve one purpose, coercing American foreign policy. Tolerating such destabilizing actions only encourages more. A well-prepared American nuclear deterrent is crucial to restraining autocratic ambitions. Strategies that were once focused on risk reduction and arms control are now unintentionally fostering instability. In today’s volatile environment, maximum deterrence is essential to maintaining peace.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. James Petrosky, PhD is the President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Arming for Deterrence: A Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

For advocates of renewed nuclear weapons testing, stop packing for the journey to the Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS). No mushroom cloud or subterranean detonation is soon to take place. Anti-nuclear protestors should also stay home.

The truth is less exciting. No real changes will happen “immediately” that “light up the sky and shake the ground.” This is not to say that the announcement had no effect. In fact, the statement was indeed monumental and incredibly significant.

Contrary to public perception, the US has never ceased testing its nuclear weapon systems. What has changed since the 1992 self-imposed moratorium on high-yield explosive testing is the nature of those tests.

Before 1992, the US conducted 1,054 nuclear weapon test explosions. The country detonated 839 of those warheads underground, mostly at the then-named Nevada Test Site, where the last halted test, Icecap, still stands as a memorial to the explosive testing days.

Several scientists involved in Icecap acknowledge that, owing to the extensive preparations undertaken, such as instrumentation, computational simulation, analysis, and test rigging, the most significant insights were gained from the limited number of unsuccessful tests. In other words, there is still great confidence in the performance and reliability of the American nuclear arsenal. It is this kind of “testing” to which President Trump’s declaration is likely referring.

Since 1992, testing has been through proxy systems that simulate a nuclear explosion’s unique energy output and then uses the results to validate physics models on advanced computer systems, known as physics-based modeling. This approach provides a way to validate the physics and predict the performance of a nuclear explosion under conditions that were never known in an underground test.

Scientists continuously conduct these tests, improving and refining them as added details are learned. They often report that scientists know much more now than possible from explosive testing.

Despite the president’s directive that testing “will begin immediately,” experts agree that resuming full-scale nuclear explosive testing is a complex and time-consuming endeavor. According to the Arms Control Association, it would take at least 36 months to prepare the Nevada Test Site for contained underground detonations.

This includes environmental assessments, infrastructure upgrades, and political approvals. This does not mean that explosive testing is impossible, but it represents a clear change in policy and a national effort to move nuclear weapons to the forefront of national strategy through an active nuclear explosive testing program.

The phrase “on an equal basis” is particularly provocative. It implies that nations like Russia and China may already be conducting nuclear explosive tests or at least advancing their capabilities in ways that challenge the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Either of these should sound alarms and rightly must elicit a response.

The president has chosen precisely the response as outlined in the National Institute for Deterrence Studies’ (NIDS) Dynamic Parity report, where a response matches the activities of adversaries, giving them the option to continue expanding their nuclear capabilities, knowing how America will respond, or cease and return to the table to negotiate for a more stable relationship.

The announcement of an “immediate” resumption of (explosive) testing is monumental because of its effect on deterrence. In his international policy book, The Necessity of Choice, Henry Kissinger writes that deterrence is the (mathematical) product of will and capability. Few would question that the US has a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems that can cause incredible damage and harm. However, there is growing criticism and concern that the US lacks resolve to deploy its nuclear weapons even if an existential crisis arises.

Without clear signals of resolve, adversaries may doubt American willingness to act, weakening deterrence. This declaration supports that resolve without making a direct threat to any adversary. It simply puts them on notice.

Whether President Trump’s message leads to actual detonations or remains symbolic, it marks a turning point in American nuclear policy. It also aligns with the Dynamic Parity framework advocated by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, which calls for symmetrical deterrence and strategic clarity.

President Trump is demonstrating resolve, assuring allies, and highlighting American commitment to nuclear deterrence. The path forward should prioritize modernization, transparency, and diplomacy—not a return to the destructive rituals of past decades.

James C. Petrosky, PhD, is the President and Co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor Emeritus of the Air Force Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are the authors own. 

“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast! was originally published on Global Security Review.

During his first term, Trump engaged in other symbolic actions that upended the status quo, such as when he moved the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, declaring, “We finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital.” He also became the first sitting US president to meet with a North Korean leader, smashing decades of diplomatic norms.

Given Trump’s willingness to talk to anyone, to call it like he sees it, and to use symbolism to project American strength, it should come as no surprise that he is unafraid of reconsidering policies related to China and Taiwan. He has already done so.

By almost every measure, Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country. Thus, upgrading the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto embassy, to an official US embassy is worthy of consideration, even if it would mean a fundamental change to American Taiwan policy.

Such a move would undoubtedly cause a Chinese backlash, but it would likely make it harder for China to claim that Taiwan is a rebellious province—a position unsupported by history. Taiwan is Taiwanese. Eliminating names like Chinese Taipei at the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics is a good idea and recognizes Taiwan for what it is—an independent country.

If shaking hands with a North Korean dictator is okay, then shaking hands with a Taiwanese president should also be acceptable. Kowtowing to China is the wrong answer. The truth is, the US is preparing to militarily defend Taiwan. Restoring the formal alliance with Taiwan is a natural step. Sacrificing Taiwan for cheap Chinese goods and a more powerful China is a bad idea.

Trump once famously claimed, “I alone can fix it,” referring to America’s broken system of governance. In the special case of US-Taiwan relations, he may be correct.

As part of his quest to “make America great again,” Trump could begin reversing the damage done by former President Jimmy Carter, who abrogated the alliance with Taiwan in 1979. That was a mistake that deserves correcting.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) recently argued that Trump would deserve a Nobel Peace Prize if he could convince Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan. This would presumably entail the repeal of China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, if not China’s formal recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.

To have any chance of success, Trump would need to give Xi a compelling reason for choosing peace. He would need to give Taiwan a credible way to deter an invasion, at least until China proved trustworthy.

Nuclear weapons are currently the only weapons terrifying enough to accomplish these objectives. This is a fact underscored by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who last year told a European Council summit, “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons and that will be our protection or we should have some sort of alliance [such as NATO].”

One thing that Trump and Xi have in common is that they both wish to go down in history as the greatest leaders of their respective countries. Until now, Xi has aimed to achieve greatness by conquering Taiwan—something no previous Chinese communist leader did.

Invading Taiwan would be a costly gamble, risking trillions of dollars and millions of lives, with an uncertain chance of success. On the other hand, committing to peace is simple and costs nothing. Finding a way for China to preserve “face” is the critical hurdle for the US.

President Lai did not mention it, but if the Nobel Peace Prize were awarded to Trump, then Xi would be a co-recipient. That may be a point worth considering.

Imagine two versions of the future, one in which Xi orders the invasion of Taiwan and one in which he wins the Nobel Peace Prize for recognizing Taiwan’s independence. It is the latter scenario that would ensure both Xi and Trump go down in history as great leaders.

That is a conversation worth having in future meetings between Trump and Xi. China is fundamentally an aggressive nation, but that aggression can be checked while still ensuring that the Chinese Communist Party maintains international respect.

Lindell Lucy lives in Honolulu. He has a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Harvard Extension School. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

How Taiwan Could Earn Trump a Nobel Peace Prize was originally published on Global Security Review.

In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chris McInnes is Executive Director at the Air Power Institute. He is an air power and national security expert with 25 years of experience in the military, government, and industry and is also a frequent commentator and speaker at defence seminars here in Australia.

Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Australian Air Power and Deterrence with Chris McInnes was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military defines deterrence as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” From this, readers can deduce that deterrence is a state of mind and a product of rational decision-making.

Basing security policy on either of these assumptions is foolhardy. It is challenging to calibrate deterrence. This requires distinguishing enough deterrence, where credible fear of counteraction keeps the peace, from too much deterrence, where credible fear of an opponent’s motives can lead to a preemptive attack.

First, some practical examples. Returning to October 7, 2023, it is possible to say Israeli deterrence failed. Since 1948 Israel has sought to maintain a level of strength and preparedness sufficient to prevent its enemies from planning and executing attacks, using the threat of overwhelmingly force to maintain deterrence against its enemies.

The first major sign of trouble with this approach came in 1968, months after Israel’s defeat of its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War, when Egypt began preparing a response. This came in October 1973 with Operation Badr, the attack which kicked off the Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Hamas began planning its 2023 attack immediately after a major defeat nine years before in the Gaza War of July–August 2014.

In both cases, deterrence failed years before the actual attacks. Israel’s overwhelming military superiority simply delayed the inevitable response to a situation its adversaries saw as absolutely unacceptable. Israel, overconfident in its deterrent capability, discounted the danger when intelligence assets began to report trouble. Thus, a single-minded reliance on deterrence actually led to future conflict.

So much for recent practice. On the theoretical side, scholars and practitioners alike have sought to chart the proximate triggers of war. The Athenian general Thucydides offered a multi-dimensional explanation in his History of the Peloponnesian War. He believed conflict resulted from three factors: Phobos (fear), kerdos (self-interest), and/or doxa (honor or reputation).

Deterrence, as we have seen, relies on threats of force which induce phobos, and therein lies a huge problem: it ignores the crucial elements of self-interest and honor or reputation. Thucydides named phobos as a principal trigger for conflict, even as definitions of deterrence, the current paradigm for conflict prevention, cite its reliance on instilling phobos. As the French might say, not only does deterrence fail in practice, but even worse, it does not work in theory.

Nuclear Deterrence and Global Devastation 

The shortcomings of conventional deterrence are well documented. Then there is its younger brother, nuclear deterrence. The story there is much simpler. Recent research on nuclear winter has lowered estimates of the megatonnage of nuclear detonations needed to trigger the phenomenon. Significant global effects leading to the starvation of over a billion people could be triggered by the use of as few as one hundred “small” Hiroshima-sized (total 1.5 megatons) explosions over urban targets.

This is extraordinarily bad news for the nuclear weapons priesthood, which has been chanting slogans of escalation dominance in government ears since the 1960s. The only rational nuclear deterrence that can be relied upon, it now seems, is self-deterrence, where a conflict which seems unwinnable by conventional means is now far more likely to appear unthinkable in nuclear terms.

Seeking a Realistic, Effective Alternative

Eliminating all nuclear weapons is clearly a necessary part of the journey towards lasting peace. But focusing on particular weapons is miscasting the problem and thus misunderstanding the nature of the solution. The world needs a transition away from the deterrence-based para bellum paradigm, the idea that achieving peace requires constant preparation for war, toward a new way of looking at conflict. This article proposes a radically different paradigm, Trinitarian Realism, which rests upon three principal assumptions.

First, in a concept borrowed from the Christian Trinity, one’s individual confession (peccavi) is important, but the collective and universal confession (peccavimus) is crucial in international peacebuilding. All need to recognize that each has sinned and fallen short, that no one comes to the table, any table, anywhere, with completely clean hands. Second, readers must truly grasp Carl von Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” in war, combining the irrational (war moves a citizenry to violence, hatred, and enmity); the non-rational (commanders face “the play of chance and probability”); and the über-rational (governments attempt to “subordinat[e war] as an instrument of policy”).

This guarantees wholly unknowable results. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb points out, “What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it. This is all the more worrisome when engaging in deadly conflicts; wars are fundamentally unpredictable (and we do not know it).” Finally, that the July 16, 1945, Trinity event at White Sands, New Mexico, the first nuclear explosion, introduced a global catastrophic risk arising from the multiple and wide-ranging ecological effects of nuclear winter.

A transition away from deterrence can begin by not reflexively demonizing anyone with whom there is a serious disagreement. Softening morality projections and focusing judgment on a better understanding of complex collective emotions is also helpful. We can do this with far greater humility, including recognition that we will get our assessments wrong.

Writing of diplomatic historian and Christian apologist Herbert Butterfield, political scientist Paul Sharp provided the bare bones of a three-dimensional replacement for deterrence which we call strategic compassion: “Butterfield’s writings on Christianity and international relations suggest…the moral principles of self-restraint [as antidote for fear/phobos], empathy [honor/doxa] and charity [self-interest/kerdos] upon which an effective diplomacy should be based.”

Finally, we believe that nations must abandon their attachment to nuclear deterrence postures for the reasons outlined above and must accept the eradication of all nuclear weapons—before they eradicate all of us.

Paul Ingram is a Research Affiliate and former Academic Programme Manager with the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) at Cambridge University. Edmond E. (Ted) Seay III is a retired Foreign Service Officer with 26 years’ experience in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. His final assignment was as principal arms control advisor to US NATO Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council Ivo Daalder.

Deconstructing Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The reality is that Americans live in an increasingly complex threat environment, and the credibility of the nuclear deterrent ultimately depends on America’s ability to respond to technical or strategic surprise. That includes being ready, if necessary, to conduct a nuclear test.

There are multiple and specific conditions under which the US might be compelled to resume underground nuclear testing, each involving serious strategic or technical concerns that cannot be resolved through non-explosive means as directed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program obligations.

From an American strategic perspective, it is possible that a future administration or Congress could determine that the long-standing moratorium on nuclear testing no longer serves American interests. For example, if credible intelligence revealed that an adversary, such as China or Russia, were conducting yield-producing tests, particularly to develop new capabilities or gain strategic advantage, then confidence in the existing deterrence balance could be undermined.

Adversary behavior is a factor the United States cannot ignore. China and Russia maintain active test sites and appear to be positioned to resume testing on short notice. If either nation were to conduct a low-yield test that altered the strategic balance, the US would need to respond—not necessarily by testing, but by demonstrating that it is able. Detecting and interpreting data from these tests may result in the restoration of confidence in the status quo.

Should a nuclear-armed adversary employ or threaten limited nuclear use, a carefully calibrated test could be used to demonstrate resolve, reassure allies, stabilize the situation, and deter further escalation. Such signaling would carry substantial diplomatic consequences and would only be contemplated under extraordinary circumstances.

In addition to strategic drivers that might lead to the resumption of nuclear testing, various technical issues might force America’s hand. For instance, the inability to certify the stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as technical issues with weapons or their components, might also be a driver to resume full-scale nuclear testing.

One such condition would be the emergence of significant doubt about the reliability or safety of an existing warhead type. As the stockpile ages, performance uncertainties can develop in critical components such as plutonium pits, high explosives, or firing systems. If these concerns cannot be resolved through laboratory experiments, modeling, or subcritical testing, a nuclear test might be required to validate performance or ensure safety margins. Such a step would follow a determination by the Nuclear Weapons Council and the national laboratories that non-testing alternatives are insufficient.

A second issue involves the development and certification of new warhead designs. While current policy emphasizes life-extension programs using legacy designs, future geopolitical or technological developments could prompt the US to pursue novel nuclear systems. For example, if the Department of Defense sought a warhead optimized for hypersonic delivery or deeply buried targets, such a design might require full-scale testing for certification—particularly if it deviates from previously tested architectures.

Lastly, there is also the possibility of future weapon development. While current policy focuses on life-extension programs, emerging mission needs may eventually require new designs. If those designs fall outside the range of previously tested systems, the US may have no choice but to test them to certify performance.

Should the United States confront a situation where confidence in warhead reliability or safety can no longer be assured through non-explosive means, or where geopolitical developments erode the credibility of deterrence, a timely and technically sound return to testing may become necessary. However, should the US resume testing for any reason, a great number of challenges will need to be met and overcome.

During the four decades of active nuclear explosive testing, the US developed a strong and thorough testing infrastructure and mindset. As nuclear explosive weapon technology evolved, so did the methods of executing tests and measuring the performance of devices. Facilities, mostly in Nevada, were built and staffed to provide an environment capable of supporting test activities and all the personnel required to perform the tests.

These tests required the expertise of scientists from multiple disciplines, engineers of various specialties, program managers, environmental control technicians, and a wide array of support staff. In addition to the technical workforce, entire teams were responsible for sustaining day-to-day life at remote test sites—providing essential services such as food, water, housing, sanitation, medical support, and logistics.

A rough estimate of the numbers of personnel required to execute an active testing program can be found in a 1981 Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Newsletter. There were 240 federal employees, 7,100 contractors (laboratory and university personnel), and 11,300 southern Nevada support jobs. Unfortunately, just bringing together the wide variety of personnel needed to execute and support testing is only meeting an obvious challenge. A more subtle challenge is relearning how to keep any explosive test from eaking out of the ground and into the atmosphere.

A resumption of testing would still require the US to meet the obligations of two in-force international treaties; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limits the explosive yield of any test to 150 kilotons (kt), and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which bans all above ground and underwater tests. Compliance with the 150 kt limit on explosive yield can be easily maintained because scientists from the national laboratories can confidently ensure the magnitude of the yield will not exceed the limit.

Compliance with the obligations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty presents a different challenge. The cadre of scientific, engineering, and technical experts who would conduct the test are unlikely to have ever faced the challenges of nuclear testing—ensuring the energy and radioactive debris is “contained” in the underground environment.

The cadre of experts who last tested a nuclear weapon, almost 35 years ago, had to “learn” how to meet this unique challenge. Most likely, none of the current cadre has ever been asked to deal with such a large amount of energy released in such a small time increment. Keeping a test contained underground is a vital national interest as a leak of radioactive materials from a nuclear test would cause significant harm to the nuclear enterprise.

Any resumption of nuclear explosive testing would represent a fundamental policy shift with far-reaching implications. A return to testing would affect arms control dynamics, global nonproliferation norms, and the strategic behavior of both allies and adversaries. For these reasons, the threshold for testing remains extraordinarily high, but it is not absolute. Given the challenges facing the United States, dramatic change may come when least expected. A requirement to test a nuclear weapon for strategic or technical reasons may be a part of that change.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joel Karasikis a contractor for the Defense Nuclear Weapons School.  The views expressed are their own.

It Is Time to Test Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

The credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, is inextricably linked to domestic well-being. Economic prosperity, social cohesion, and the trust citizens have in their institutions are all part of that amorphous concept. Adversaries like Russia and China understand that it is in their interest to undermine American societal health; it is time Americans realize the challenge facing the nation.

For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence rested on a triad of capabilities, credibility, and communication. The United States fielded the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal and communicated credibility effectively. But credibility—the unwavering belief in America’s will to act—is the lynchpin.

This is where the home front becomes the front line. A nation that is prosperous, unified, and optimistic possesses the strategic endurance to maintain its commitments. Societal well-being is not a “soft” issue separate from “hard” power; it is a foundational strategic asset that fuels long-term political resolve.

The mechanisms connecting a healthy society to a credible deterrent are not merely theoretical. They are etched into recent history. Consider the 1980s under President Reagan. An economic resurgence and a renewed sense of national confidence provided the political capital and financial resources for a sweeping modernization of nuclear forces that saw the Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 stealth bomber enter service.

This was not just a military build-up; it was a clear signal to the Soviet Union, born from a nation that had the resources and the will to compete over the long haul. High public trust, buoyed by economic stability, sustained the political commitment for these massive, multi-decade investments.

Contrast this with the period following the 2008 financial crisis. The ensuing economic pain, political polarization, and public discontent led directly to the Budget Control Act and sequestration, which imposed punishing cuts on the defense budget. Allies and adversaries alike watched as Americans debated whether they could afford to modernize an aging nuclear triad. The signal was one of constraint and introspection, raising quiet questions in foreign capitals about the long-term reliability of America’s security guarantees. A nation struggling with internal economic and social crises inevitably projects an image of distraction and dwindling resolve.

Adversaries did not miss this lesson. They astutely integrated America’s domestic vulnerabilities into their national security strategies. China and Russia are engaged in a relentless campaign of information warfare designed to exacerbate our societal fissures. State-controlled media outlets like CGTN (Chinese) and RT (Russian), amplified by armies of bots and trolls on social media, relentlessly spotlight American inequality, racial tensions, and political gridlock.

Their goal is twofold: erode the confidence of Americans in their own democratic system and persuade the world that the United States is a chaotic, declining power whose deterrence is brittle and promises are hollow. By turning societal metrics into weapons against Americans, adversaries aim to achieve strategic gains without firing a shot.

Of course, the relationship between societal health and defense is not without its complexities. A valid counterargument holds that a society enjoying high well-being might become complacent, preferring to spend its “peace dividend” on social programs rather than defense. The post–Cold War era saw this exact debate, as calls to shift funding from “guns to butter” grew louder.

This presents a genuine leadership challenge that requires articulating why investments in national security are essential to protecting the very prosperity and stability Americans enjoy. The choice is not always between a new healthcare program and a new submarine. A strong, healthy, and educated populace, free from economic precarity, is the very foundation that allows a nation to project power and afford the tools of its own defense. A robust social safety net and a powerful military are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing pillars of a resilient state.

This calculus extends to the nation’s most critical strategic advantage: America’s network of alliances. The strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, is not purely a measure of its combined military hardware. It is rooted in a collective commitment to democratic values and the shared societal well-being of its members.

A stable, prosperous, and unified America reassures allies and strengthens collective deterrence. Conversely, an America seen as internally fractured and unreliable invites doubt, weakening the very alliances that magnify American power. When allied societies are confident in American leadership, collective credibility soars.

Therefore, Americans must rethink national security for the twenty-first century by placing American well-being at the very heart of our strategic imperatives. Bridging the economic divide not only broadens our tax base but also strengthens social cohesion, enabling sustainable defense budgets without overburdening taxpayers. Revitalizing education fuels scientific breakthroughs and cultivates the skilled workforce needed to modernize our nuclear command, control, and delivery systems. Upgrading infrastructure, from critical ports and highways to resilient cybersecurity networks, enhances our logistical agility, accelerates force deployment, and bolsters the credibility of our deterrent. By fostering political unity, we project resolve to allies and adversaries alike, inoculating our society against foreign information warfare and ensuring decisive, coordinated responses in times of crisis.

The defining contest of this century will not be waged on traditional battlefields but in a struggle of systems: our free, prosperous, and cohesive society versus an authoritarian model of centralized control. To secure our peace, we must fortify America’s Silent Shield at home. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, by extension, our global leadership, will always mirror the resilience and unity of the nation it protects.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

American allies are unanimous in rejecting extended deterrence that does not include the potential use of nuclear weapons. NFU would give a nuclear-armed adversary, such as Russia, a sanctuary from which to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Removing American nuclear forces as a credible deterrent cedes all bargaining power to Moscow, China, and any other would-be nuclear or conventional adversary.

Associated with this campaign is an effort to remove the president’s authority to employ nuclear weapons without at least two additional officials supporting such a decision. They also claim the president would have very little time to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should the US face a nuclear first strike. Of course, ending the president’s “sole authority” would only exacerbate the challenge.

There is a false argument often repeated that American nuclear weapons are on “hair trigger alert” and the president might make a reckless decision to launch, given the assumed minimal time available to determine whether a nuclear response is warranted. It is of course clear how such a decision-making process is significantly impeded if the president must receive concurrence from other officials to make a decision. Such a move reduces the credibility of American deterrence in the minds of adversaries.

Three other factors are also being brought to bear in this campaign to adopt a NFU strategy. First, there is an assertion that the president could be reckless and impetuous and might unnecessarily order the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is an assertion that a president’s order may be illegal and thus having a “second confirmation authority/opinion” is a good thing. Third, there is an assertion that American deterrence strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons against cities and urban areas—with the objective of killing millions of civilians.

All three assertions are false. The first assertion is belied by the fact that every president understands the dangers of nuclear war. President Donald Trump made several statements to this effect, so the notion he, or any president, would be “reckless and impetuous” does not bear scrutiny. His administration’s major investments in deterrence illustrate the seriousness with which the country seeks to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

The second assertion on the “illegality” of ordering nuclear use ignores the constitutional role of the president as commander in chief. States wage war regardless of whether the United Nations says it is illegal. Nuclear weapons are merely tools of war. They are not special. They simply pack more explosive energy in a smaller package than a conventional weapon.

The third assertion ignores the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which explicitly states that attacks against unarmed civilians and non-combatants violate just war principles and are prohibited. American nuclear deterrence strategy explicitly rules out the purposeful targeting of civilian populations and cities, a posture many nuclear abolitionists oppose as they advocate city busting.

Given US deterrence strategy strictly forbids the targeting of cities and civilian populations, there is no basis for believing that carrying out the president’s order to employ weapons will be or be seen as illegal by either civilian or military officials. Thus, there is no need for multiple individuals involved in releasing weapons, all while the president is working through an already compressed and stressful timeline.

A recent “study” by the University of Massachusetts and the Human Security Lab cooked the books by asking both military and civilian officials whether they would oppose an “illegal” presidential order requiring the US to launch nuclear weapons against civilians. Many respondents, having been coached to believe such orders were realistically probable, said they would oppose such orders or at least seek to question the orders. These results were then hijacked to create a false narrative that even military officials now doubt President Trump’s leadership and would not obey the commander in chief if ordered to employ nuclear weapons. Given the survey was conducted during the Israel and US military strikes against Iran, the results were designed to call into question the reasonableness of conventional strikes on Iran.

The campaign to call into question American deterrence policy is based on a willful misrepresentation of states policy and strategic reality. Annie Jacobsen dramatized this misinformation in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario, in which she described US nuclear deterrence strategy as crazy. She proposed jettisoning the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, whether used first or second, and taking such capability completely off the table. When asked what replacement she recommended, Jacobsen claimed such a question was beyond her expertise.

Leaving the nuclear deterrent off the table is part of a concerted disarmament campaign pushed by nuclear abolitionists. These groups were able to ensure the United Nations passed a treaty that bans nuclear weapons, which is as valuable as a treaty which bans war. While 73 nations signed the treaty, none are nuclear weapons states.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is seeking to stop nuclear modernization in the United States, which is strange considering Russia and China are in the midst of major modernization programs. There is nothing less effective than taking a knife to a gunfight, which is exactly what advocates of nuclear disarmament would impose on the free world. For nearly 80 years the US has made sure the nation fields the systems needed to ensure deterrence works. Now is not the time to abandon a successful strategy for the sake of feel-good activism.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Campaign to End Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s missile development began in 1988 with the short-range Prithvi (150–350 kilometers), followed by the medium-range Agni in 1989 (1,200–2,400 kilometers, nuclear-capable). By 1997, India deployed 24 Prithvi missiles near the Pakistan border—remarkably, without facing US sanctions.

India’s missile arsenal comprises ballistic, cruise, and anti-ballistic systems across all ranges. While its short- and medium-range missiles primarily target Pakistan, India can already reach all of China. India’s development of longer-range systems includes the Agni-V (5,000–7,500 kilometers) and the Agni-VI, which has a potential range up to 10,000 kilometers and is reported to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and is usable as a fractional orbital bombardment system. It also has sea-based options like the K-4 and K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

These capabilities signal India’s broader ambitions for global power projection and prestige. Its capabilities now include operational intercontinental ballistic missiles, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and anti-satellite weapons, marking a shift from regional defense to strategic reach.

Since the formation of the Indo-US strategic partnership in the early 2000s, convergence of strategic interests between Washington and New Delhi has allowed India to benefit from the global nuclear framework, mainly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. India, like Pakistan, is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has developed its nuclear capabilities independently.

While Pakistan is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, India has been since 2016. Through an exemption to non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime membership is helping India to advance its missile program by providing access to advanced missile technology. Similarly, in 2008, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver, India increased its nuclear production capacity.

The world powers, especially the US, continue to turn a blind eye toward these perilous developments in the region and beyond. Overlooking New Delhi’s global reach with nuclear-capable missiles could be a strategic mistake by Washington. India may, at some point in the future, reassess its strategic alignment with the United States and determine that the partnership no longer aligns with its national interests, raising the possibility that India could emerge as a challenger to American interests, or worse, align with China.

In retrospect, the US and China supported the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, though they did not coordinate their efforts. Later, China would emerge as a competitor to the US globally. Similarly, supporting India against the Chinese threat in the future could become a threat to the US.

The same blind eye on the development of India’s missile programs might hit American interests in the region hard. To give credence to these facts, a plethora of credible think tanks, including Goldman Sachs, the world’s second-largest investment bank, predict that India will have the world’s second-largest economy by 2075. As a result, India will emerge as a direct economic threat to the US, which could translate into a future military challenge.

Checking India’s missile program is not only in the interest of the US but, more importantly, good for global nuclear governance. It is currently marked by ineffectiveness due to the discord between nuclear “haves and have-nots.”

American policy on South Asia continues to overlook key regional developments, focusing instead on Pakistan’s missile program despite broader nuclear trends. Former Biden administration officials like Vipin Narang, Pranay Vaddi, and Jon Finer raised alarms about Pakistan’s pursuit of a long-range missile, labeling it an emerging threat—despite Pakistan’s India-centric military posture and lack of global targeting ambitions.

It is important to investigate the historical and security dynamics in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile program began in the late 1980s after India began to demonstrate its missile capabilities. Pakistan’s missile program represents the country’s India-centric and defense-oriented approach.

For instance, the short-to-medium-range systems (70–2,750 kilometers) are capable of targeting India from within Pakistani territory. The development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle capability by Pakistan aims to penetrate India’s advanced missile defenses, thereby strengthening deterrence. The Shaheen-III missile, with a range of 2,750 kilometers, meets Islamabad’s requirement to have full coverage of India, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

In the same way, the development of tactical nuclear weapons was in response to India’s Cold-Start Doctrine. This aims to deter conventional incursions with battlefield nuclear use. Thus, acquiring an intercontinental ballistic missile capability is not in Pakistan’s strategic interests.

The silence of the international community on this urgent matter is resulting in the erosion of global nuclear governance. Amidst rising tensions between nuclear states, the world is seeing recurring violations of established rules and international norms. The international community cannot move toward effective arms control arrangements that are aligned with evolving threats, disarmament, and strategic restraint under these conditions. Efforts for global peace and security can never be meaningful until threat perceptions and security challenges are addressed, including the resolution of long-standing disputes between archrivals.

Sher Ali Kakar is the Associate Director Research at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), and Musavir Hameed Barech is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN).

How the World Is Ignoring a New Nuclear Trajectory in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Adam, Curtis, and Jim tackle a bold and unsettling question:
After America’s successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, is the U.S. truly prepared to defend its nuclear arsenal?

This conversation dives deep into the heart of nuclear strategy and deterrence:

• The critical role of airborne alert systems and the lessons of the Looking Glass mission.
• The tension between traditional deterrence systems and emerging technologies.
• Why visibility, command, and control remain the pillars of credible nuclear deterrence.
• How modernization of nuclear forces shapes the future of U.S. security.

In an age of rapid technological change, understanding deterrence isn’t just for policymakers—it’s vital for anyone who values global stability.

Listen now to uncover why the strength of deterrence rests not just on weapons, but on resilient systems and clear strategy.

#NuclearDeterrence #NationalSecurity #Modernization #CommandAndControl #StrategicStability #DefenseInnovation

Watch now.

Is America Prepared for a Strike Against its Nuclear Command and Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The talk challenges conventional thinking and calls for renewed strategic clarity in deterring nuclear proliferation threats.

Huessy Seminar: After Iran, What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? with Henry Sokolski was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined.  Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

There also remained unsettled issues relative to American and allied strategy going forward. The Trump administration’s declaratory policy wants to draw a line between going to war with Iran, on one hand, and neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and potential, on the other.  This is a fine line to draw and Iran response, and follow-on condemnations, suggest they see the American position as a distinction without a difference.

Ater the strikes, President Trump indicated that Iran should come to the diplomatic table and negotiate the status of its nuclear future. Iran rejected further negotiations. This left the American and Israeli defense communities to await whatever diplomatic or military response the Iranians offered, including possible military attacks against American forces deployed in the Middle East.

Based on experience, Iran would likely respond with continuing missile strikes against Israel and asymmetrical warfare against the United States. With regard to the latter, Iran’s options included: (1) disrupting the flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; (2) committing cyberattacks against American military or societal targets; (3) committing missile or insurgent attacks against American military personnel in Iraq or elsewhere in the region; (4) supporting protest demonstrations or terrorism in the American homeland, perhaps making use of prepositioned cells made up of illegal aliens; and/or (5) encouraging Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to further harass American, Israeli, and allied interests.

Thus far, Iran limited its response to employing a small number of missiles against Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, even giving the Americans advance warning of the strike. For the Trump administration, this is the best possible outcome. Already, imagery intelligence suggests Iran is digging out its capabilities at Fordow and Esfahan. What the future may hold is uncertain. Whether Iran is simply buying time and learning lessons for future success or whether the regime truly desires peace is up in the air.

Future options for Iran have their positives and negatives. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy, which needs the infusion of cash from oil sales to China.

Cyberattacks are a low-risk, low-cost option that may appeal to Iran in the near term, but they present a more serious potential threat to civilian targets compared to more heavily defended military ones. They will also draw severe reprisals from very competent American and Israeli cyber forces.

Additional attacks against American military personnel and facilities in Iraq are an option, as are missile or unconventional warfare against other regional states hosting American military bases. However, this path was not successful the first time.

Support for antiwar demonstrations or outright terrorism in the American homeland, including “lone wolf” terrorists recruited online, are still a possibility. New stories of Iranian illegal aliens arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are almost a daily occurrence.

As for Iranian proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah are on the ropes, momentarily, due to prior engagements with Israel, but the Houthis declared their intention to plus-up their disruptions of commerce in the Red Sea in the wake of Midnight Hammer. Whether this is possible is yet to be seen.

With respect to Iran’s future nuclear options and American responses, they may proceed in one of three ways: (1) a continuing “whack-a-mole” competition in which Iran continues surreptitious enrichment and the US and Israel continue to monitor its progress and, if necessary, repeat Midnight Hammer, or worse; (2) Iran undergoes a change of regime due to domestic opposition, leaving uncertain for a time exactly who is in charge and who controls the supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear infrastructure, never mind the armed forces and security police; or (3) Iran agrees to negotiate with the US and representatives of the international community another deal to limit its stockpiles of fissile material and its levels of enrichment.

These are possible options, but by no means the only options. Iran may pursue an unexpected path in an effort to outthink the United States and Israel. Whatever the future holds, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must keep a close eye on a regime that is built on destroying both countries. Hope is critical to human perseverance, but it is not a strategy.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine. He is currently a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Midnight Hammer and After was originally published on Global Security Review.

The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs pointed out that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons undermine peace and security at the national, regional, and global levels.

Conflict often revolves around identity politics, where one group views another group with hatred, resulting in conflict. Violence often stems from perceptions of who is inside or outside the group, especially when survival is at stake. When a group of people attaches meaning to political and economic forces and considers compromise and disagreement unbearable, it erupts into violence, making conflict resolution a formidable challenge.

In this volatile situation, the presence of light arms and small weapons only worsens the situation. One of the main reasons for having guns is that they bring safety. The existing relationship between safety, survival, and weapons, especially in developing states, makes the differences deadly. According to “The Psychology of Guns,” the availability of weapons can drive aggressive behavior, leading to violence. In this regard, the proliferation of small arms and light weaponry needs to be checked.

Armed conflicts are ubiquitous, and those based on ethnic and tribal lines are often the most brutal. One estimate suggests that around 3.8 million people died in such conflicts between 1989 and 2023.

For instance, in South Sudan, two groups, Dinka and Nuer, felt threatened by each other and launched into a violent war. It is important to understand the identity-borne roots of this dispute. Land and cattle hold significant prestige in South Sudanese society. With limited resources, achieving political power becomes a top priority.

In a bid to maintain political power and control over resources for one ethnic group, a political conflict between two leaders turned into an ethnic war, which resulted in the killing of nearly 400,000 people. It is important to note the destructive impacts of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the civil war in South Sudan.

Likewise, the ethnic unrest of the Kurds in the Middle East illustrates how the combination of small arms proliferation and ethnic grievances can burst into conflict. The struggle for autonomy, a free Kurdistan, is driving a war against Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

The region has witnessed chaos, with over 40,000 deaths in an insurgency against Türkiye. The presence of smuggling routes across the Iran-Iraq and Türkiye -Iraq borders aids in weapon proliferation. The recent decision to lay down arms by the Kurdish insurgents in Türkiye is a welcome step towards conflict resolution. The warring parties realised the economic and human cost of the conflict.

Hiruni Alwishewa notes that the international regime to control the proliferation of small arms exhibits serious dichotomies. For example, the Firearms Protocol and the European Union’s Programme of Action lack regulatory distinction between legal arms exports and illegal transfer of arms, so even legal transfers end up as illicit ones.

Likewise, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of the West African States failed to address the proliferation of small arms. It is because both agreements do not scrutinise military aid, which flows undetected, causing arms proliferation. Similarly, the Arms Trade Treaty and United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) lack definitional clarity between small arms and firearms, thus hampering any substantial effort to curb the proliferation of small arms.

In resolving identity-based conflicts, a needs-based approach is an important tool because it works to build trust. It focuses on accepting needs, based on ethnic, religious, and resource-related issues that parties in conflict believe essential to their survival. Repression and tyranny only worsen a conflict.

Unlike other disputes, conflicts sparked by ethnic and religious differences cannot be settled by contractual arrangements. They rest on bringing structural reforms that involve either power redistribution or changing the political and economic systems to benefit all parties. Such efforts ensure that understanding and accepting diverse cultures run in tandem with each other.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, regionalism received significant attention in the form of trade agreements, economic integration, and increasing interdependence. Regional initiatives such as coordinating between border states to curb illicit arms transfer, strengthening national laws, and promoting transparency were useful in controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons.

Understandably, effectively controlling small arms is a challenging task. In this regard, significant attention must be given to improving the international structure of arms control. Theoretically, arms control agreements cover all weapons, but, practically, nuclear weapons are the primary focus. In this regard, these agreements must be revisited to fill the existing gaps. This includes removing definitional gaps and bringing military aid under scrutiny.

Similarly, artificial intelligence (AI) can be utilized to effectively trace and detect light weapons. AI’s utility in data analysis, detection, and surveillance makes it useful in controlling arms proliferation.

For example, AI-based weapon detection software combines video analysis, learning, and object recognition. This software can be used to identify and track weapons, which will be useful in controlling the proliferation of small arms.

In the end, the goal is to reduce needless casualties in needless conflicts. It is possible to undertake intelligent measures that deter arms traffickers from providing the weapons sowing so much death in the world today.

Kumail Mehdi is a researcher at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution was originally published on Global Security Review.

Engineering & Intelligence Combined
What began in 2009 with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s monitoring of Iran’s Fordow site evolved into a cutting-edge capability. The 30,000‑lb GBU‑57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) was precisely engineered—tested hundreds of times and customized in fuse timing and impact parameters—to penetrate deeply buried facilities

Strategic Collaboration & Planning
This achievement isn’t just about hardware. It reflects 15 years of close collaboration between military planners, intelligence analysts, and industry leaders—including Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Capability program

Execution with Precision
On June 22, B‑2 stealth bombers launched Operation “Midnight Hammer,” striking Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites with surgical accuracy. The MOP penetrated as planned—leaving minimal surface signatures while delivering deep destruction

What This Means for National Security
This operation showcases how sustained investment in R&D, intelligence integration, and interagency coordination can yield mission-defining capabilities. It exemplifies the strategic patience and partnership necessary for complex, high-stakes operations.

Key Takeaways for Defense & Tech Leaders:

1. Vision Meets Execution – Long-term defense projects require a clear vision, persistent funding, and cross-disciplinary alignment.
2. Testing & Validation – MOP’s success was no accident—it was the result of rigorous modeling, simulation, and live testing.
3. Partnership Power – Defense agencies, military services, and industry must collaborate seamlessly over years to deploy such capabilities.
4. Strategic Deterrence – Precision technologies like the MOP expand strategic options, offering alternatives to broader or more escalatory responses.

As our world grows more complex, this operation demonstrates that when foresight, perseverance, and technological excellence coalesce, they can deliver decisive outcomes.

Let’s discuss: How can lessons from this mission inform future innovation in defense tech and strategic deterrence?

15 Years in the Making: U.S. Precision Strike on Iran’s Fortified Nuclear Site  was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite India’s conventional superiority, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) shot down five Indian fighter jets, including its three French Rafales, one Russian MiG-29 and one Su-30, and a Heron surveillance drone. The interception and neutralization of the drone, and the shooting down of the fighters about 17 miles from the line of control (LOC), highlighted the Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) expeditious response to Indian missile strikes.

The Rafale, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet, which is capable of performing interdiction and aerial reconnaissance, is one of the reasons for India’s muscle flexing in the region. Although the Rafale is not a stealth aircraft, it does have a smaller radar cross section. The Rafale was also touted as a game-changer for the Indian Air Force (IAF), boosting the country’s technological edge over its regional adversaries especially Pakistan.

However, the successful shoot down revealed New Delhi’s low operational efficacy and false perception of Indian air superiority. The MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter jet designed for air combat, was also believed to be shot down. With features like advanced avionics and radar systems, the loss of such aircraft was unexpected.

Likewise, the downing of India’s primary frontline fighter, the Russian SU-30, which is known for its maneuverability, indicates weaknesses in Indian operational tactics and a clear vulnerability to Pakistani air defense forces. Contrary to common belief, the PAF historically outperforms the IAF aerial engagements. The excellence of PAF was first made evident when it defeated the IAF on the ground and in the air during the first full-scale war with India (1965). In 2019, the IAF conducted airstrikes in Balakot in response to the Pulwama incident, accusing Pakistan of involvement in the terrorist attack. The following day, the PAF retaliated with an airstrike in the Rajouri sector of Jammu, downing an Indian MIG-21 and capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman in the process.

In the latest example of conflict between the two countries, Pakistan responded with its best fighters, the Chinese-made J-10C, which is a multirole fighter and was unproven in combat until these events. With the shoot down of Rafale fighter jets, shares of Dassault Aviation declined by 6 percent. The PAF response to Indian airstrikes displays its enhanced air combat capabilities.

According to the Indian Ministry of Defense, Operation Sindoor was India’s effort to punish the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. However, Pakistan, which has denied any involvement in Pahalgam, deemed these strikes “unprovoked.” Beginning on May 6, 2025, Indian officials undertook drills and exercises in preparation for their attack. This “show of strength” was designed to send a clear message to the international community that India can employ conventional force under a nuclear shadow. However, the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the dispute served as a concern for the Trump administration, which ultimately aided in ending military clashes.

On May 9, 2025, India fired air-to-surface missiles at three air bases in Rawalpindi, Chakwal, and Shorkot, as well as Rahim Yar Khan airport, normalizing escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan deemed these missile strikes an “act of war,”  authorizing the military to take corresponding military action against India.

In response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos after four days of Indian strikes. These strikes targeted wide swaths of Indian territory, including military bases in Udhampur, Pathankot, Drangyari, Nagrota, Adampur, and Buj Air Base. As the escalation veered from the disputed state of Kashmir towards the brink of nuclear escalation, the United States, shifting from its previous stance of non-interference, brokered a ceasefire between Pakistan and India.

Vice President JD Vance initially remarked on May 8, 2025, that the latest escalation between Pakistan and India is not the United States’ business. The situation changed after Indian missile strikes hit Pakistan’s Nur Khan Airbase in Rawalpindi, fearing potential nuclear escalation. Nur Khan serves as a key transport and refueling hub for the PAF, lying just kilometers from the strategic plans division, which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Before the situation expanded into widespread conflict, the United States announced an immediate ceasefire between the two states, offering assistance for resolving the Kashmir issue. The efforts of President Trump, an advocate of peace, led to the 2025 ceasefire and are a notable diplomatic achievement for the US. However, the success of this ceasefire rests upon a fragile equilibrium. In absence of institutions and channels of communication for resolution of key disputes between Pakistan and India, peace and stability of South Asia will remain uncertain. Without addressing structural issues like the dispute over Kashmir, the region will remain locked in cyclical deterrence failures, with the future of peace less likely than escalation.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor was originally published on Global Security Review.

Topics include:

• China’s military space doctrine
• Counterspace threats from kinetic to cyber
• The limits of traditional deterrence theory
• Strategic recommendations for U.S. space policy

Real Space Strategy Live with Christopher Stone: Deterring Chinese Aggression in Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

The article emphasizes that a U.S. withdrawal of conventional forces from Europe, intended to prioritize the China threat, would be counterproductive. It argues that maintaining a strong U.S. conventional presence in Europe is crucial for effective deterrence against Russia, maintaining NATO cohesion, and ultimately supporting U.S. efforts in competing with China. The author contends that relying solely on nuclear deterrence in Europe would undermine credibility and could lead to a scenario that diverts resources away from Asia.

The team debates the actual impact that potential troop reductions in Europe might have compared to America’s pivot to Asia, amid financial constraints affecting defense spending and the necessity for prioritization in military strategy and accountability in political decisions.

What’s America’s Priority, Europe or Asia? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The most significant avenue of cooperation between Pakistan and the US in recent years was counterterrorism. Despite diplomatic challenges, Pakistan facilitated American counterterrorism efforts time and again. The arrest and extradition of the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist, Sharifullah, the man behind the August 26, 2021, attack on the US Marines, highlights the significance of the US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership. This cooperation, between CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence services over Sharifullah’s capture, who was accused of planning the Abbey Gate bombing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, serves as a reminder for the Trump administration that Pakistan remains central to the US counterterrorism efforts.

The provision of security assistance to the Trump administration could be Pakistan’s strategic move, but its long-term cooperation with the US depends largely on shared interests and mutual trust. In this regard, past experience demonstrates that security cooperation alone does not ensure a viable long-term partnership. For a sustainable relationship, security collaboration must be complemented by economic partnership, technological exchanges, and diplomatic engagement. Otherwise, history might repeat itself as a sporadic pattern of bilateral interaction.

While formal alliance and strategic partnership may not be on the table, Pakistan and the US could tap into potential areas of cooperation. This is especially true in key areas of mutual benefit like critical minerals and information technology (IT).

Sharifullah’s arrest serves as a reminder that Pakistan and the United States will remain intertwined in a need-based relationship when it comes to counterterrorism. As terrorism surges regionally, and as the Islamic State (IS) and its regional factions continue to function as the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, Pakistan will remain crucial to global counterterrorism efforts. However, intelligence sharing with the US could become a double-edged sword, exposing Pakistan to retaliatory attacks. Therefore, a robust, well-fashioned, and coordinated counterterrorism strategy must be pursued by both states to mitigate the menace of terrorist attacks.

Besides cooperation in counterterrorism, both Pakistan and the US are collaborating to serve economic interests of each state. Pakistan is a large export destination for the US.  The US also invests in Pakistan’s key sectors like energy and technology. However, President Trump’s desire to balance trade could undermine Pakistan’s exports. Uncertainty regarding the US-Pakistan Green Alliance—the climate resilience initiative—highlight differences between the current administration and its predecessor.

To broaden the bandwidth of relations between Pakistan and the US beyond security issues, Pakistan needs to diversify its exports market away from textiles. Investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could provide the US with a chance to have access to critical minerals for its products, while reducing its dependency on China for supply of critical minerals. Given considerable untouched mineral resources, Pakistan could offer a stable supply of critical minerals.

Given Pakistan’s stable supply chain, investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could be cost effective for the US. However, the United States ignores such an opportunity, carrying out resource planning without considering Pakistan. As the US negotiates with Ukraine for critical mineral mining rights, it is wise to keep Pakistan in mind. The trade dispute with China makes such an approach a particularly good idea. Given the much lower labor cost in Pakistan than in Australia or Canada, Pakistan’s untapped mineral wealth could be a boon for the United States beyond rare.

Since World War II, Pakistan has enjoyed significant benefits from American educational opportunities like the Fulbright program. The US government, through its educational exchange programs, brings almost 800 Pakistanis to the United States every year in pursuit of knowledge and cultural exchange. This strengthens people-to-people ties and nurtures enduring Pakistan-US relations.

However, the suspension of US Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and the unilateral imposition of sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) undermine the stability of Pakistan-US relations. Policies that isolate key partners prove counterproductive, especially when global security challenges demand multilateral cooperation. To maintain stability in South Asia and beyond, the US must adopt policies that strengthen rather than weaken its relations with Pakistan.

Pakistan-US ties are shaped by a complex interplay of collaboration, alignment, and friction. To ensure stable relations, a comprehensive strategy that encompasses diplomatic, security, economic, and regional issues must be formulated. The future of Pakistan-US relations can be more fruitful if commercial and economic matters take precedence over security concerns.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Pak-US relations: Areas of Engagement beyond Security Cooperation was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 Raider, the nation’s first sixth-generation aircraft and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America’s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers, the US Strategic Command commander recently testified that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”

Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is presently on track regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure 1,087 missiles, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.

Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The F-35 is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.

The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines than initially projected. Nevertheless, the program is not “off the rails” and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform’s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform going into the second half of the 21^st century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with additional B-21 bombers.

Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying some 7,000 miles of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the escalating cost of rebuilding the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, describes the Sentinel ICBM project as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”

The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!

As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once affirmed, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

The Air Force’s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.

On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.

The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.

Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.

Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.

Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.

The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.

Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.

Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, Iran’s broader regional influence and its destabilizing activities remain a fundamental concern—one that is unlikely to be addressed through an agreement focused solely on its nuclear capabilities. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling its nuclear infrastructure, or even restricting its ballistic missile program does not, on its own, resolve the underlying challenge posed by Tehran’s regional behavior.

What Is Iran’s Influence Based On?

Iranian influence in the region is grounded in three main pillars. First, Iran relies on Shiite religious ideology. Iran positions itself as the leader of the global Shiite community. This sect has a social and political base in several Middle Eastern and surrounding countries. Through Shiite populations and affiliated groups, Iran infiltrates states and establishes loyal militias, enabling it to exert significant influence over these countries—or parts of them—effectively weakening their sovereignty and transforming them into subservient states.

For example, Iran wields significant influence in Iraq through the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Lebanon through Hezbollah, in Yemen via the Houthis, and in Syria, where influence was exerted through Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite-led regime. Additionally, Iran has formed Shiite militias from the Shiite populations of Afghanistan, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and Pakistan, the Zainabiyoun Brigade. Through these efforts, Iran has constructed the “Shiite Crescent.”

Second, Iran exploits broader Islamic issues. Iran strategically champions causes with Pan-Islamic appeal, most notably the Palestinian issue, to extend its influence beyond Shiite groups and into Sunni communities. Despite historical sectarian divides and conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, Iran has successfully co-opted or allied with key Sunni movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, expanding its influence into Gaza and presenting itself as the principal defender of the Palestinian cause. This position garners support not only from across the Muslim world but also from segments of the Western left. By uniting Shiite militias (the “Shiite Crescent”) and Sunni militant groups under a common anti-Western and anti-Israel banner, Iran has forged what it calls the “Axis of Resistance.” This alliance played a central role in the outbreak of the October 7, 2023, war, which continues to this day.

Third, the regime exercises a repressive domestic grip. Maintaining and managing this vast regional network requires immense and sustained financial and military support. Despite facing long-standing and severe international sanctions and domestic economic hardship, Iran continues to fund and arm its proxies. A key factor enabling this is the authoritarian nature of the regime, which extracts national wealth and redirects it to foreign operations, while the Iranian population endures poverty, inflation, and public service failures. Popular discontent is suppressed through systematic repression, especially targeting marginalized ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs, who face both economic deprivation and political persecution. This repressive apparatus prevents domestic uprisings and sustains the regime’s ability to project power abroad.

Therefore, Iranian influence in the region is not primarily based on its nuclear program or ballistic missiles. Iran was able to extend its influence over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza without resorting to ballistic missile attacks or explicit threats involving its nuclear program. However, when Iran did employ its ballistic missiles and military power, most notably during its direct attacks on Israel on April 13, 2024, and October 1, 2024, this coincided with a period of declining regional influence. During this time, Iran experienced significant setbacks, losing ground in Syria and Gaza and suffering major blows in Lebanon and even within its own borders.

In other words, the golden age of Iranian influence occurred during a time when it refrained from directly using its ballistic missiles or overt military force. Its later use of such power came at a moment when its regional axis was already weakening. This suggests that Iran’s true influence lies not in its nuclear program or missile capabilities, but in other, less tangible sources of power—ones that are far more difficult to constrain through formal agreements. Therefore, to effectively counter Iran’s regional influence and threat, the United States must begin by addressing the three key factors discussed above.

The Shia Principle of Taqiyya

Iran is constitutionally defined as a Shia state, and its ruling regime openly adopts and promotes Shia ideological principles. One of the most well-known concepts in Shia Islam is Taqiyya, a principle that permits the concealment of one’s beliefs or intentions when facing danger, threat, or coercion. Traditionally, Taqiyya is understood as a form of self-protection in times of persecution, allowing individuals to lie or withhold the truth to preserve life and religious identity.

In the context of the Iranian regime, Taqiyya has evolved beyond personal religious practice into a broader political doctrine. It is sometimes employed as a strategic tool to justify diplomatic flexibility, ambiguity, or deception, particularly in times of weakness. As a result, securing Iran’s full compliance with international agreements may be especially challenging. The regime may commit to agreements under duress or strategic necessity, only to abandon or reinterpret those commitments once it perceives a restoration of strength. Thus, Taqiyya is not merely a religious principle but has become a core aspect of the regime’s political behavior and strategic calculus.

What Is the Solution?

One of the key factors behind Iran’s continued expansion of influence and regional destabilization is its perception that the United States is unwilling to launch a military strike against its territory. This perception significantly reduces the credibility of diplomatic pressure and sanctions. To alter this strategic calculus, a limited and targeted military strike on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities, followed by the negotiation of a specific and enforceable agreement, may be necessary.

Such a calibrated use of force would serve not only to degrade Iran’s capabilities but also to demonstrate clear consequences for noncompliance. In this context, Iran may become more amenable to concessions and more committed to upholding agreements, as it would recognize that failure to comply carries the real risk of further military escalation—potentially threatening the survival of the regime itself.

Ranj Tofik is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Policy Council, and a PhD researcher in political science at the University of Warsaw, Poland.

US–Iran Talks: Unlikely to Succeed Absent a Military Strike was originally published on Global Security Review.

While certification is contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its own submarine production rate, which is struggling to meet the planned two Virginia-class submarines per year, Australia would benefit greatly from their acquisition. Overall, it is worth noting that AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II are likely to significantly enhance US undersea capabilities in the long term. Pillar I includes the rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, from 2027. HMAS Stirling provides the United States with greater access for the forward presence of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific access is further expanded via the new submarine base that is planned for the east coast of Australia by 2043. The authorized consolidated Commonwealth-owned Defence Precinct at Western Australia’s Henderson shipyard will provide contingency-docking and depot-level maintenance for AUKUS submarines by 2033, potentially alleviating some of the burden on US-based maintenance facilities. Pillar II will provide the advanced technology necessary to enhance US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities, particularly for longer term advantages in mobility, survivability, lethality, and sustainability of allied forces.

Conversely, the SLCM-N is likely a significant factor in retaining American undersea capabilities. The SLCM-N will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly as the US needs to provide extended nuclear deterrence to 32 NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea. There are three options to consider when attempting to deter China, North Korea, and Russia.

First, the United States can provide Australia three to five conventionally armed Virginia-class submarines. This option is likely to significantly degrade American undersea capabilities through a lack of flexible response options for strategic deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Plus, Australia will need to manage three classes of submarines: the Collins-class, the AUKUS-class, and the SSN-AUKUS under this option.

Second, Australia can field a dual-capable submarines (DCS) mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. This option requires the establishment of a nuclear planning group (NPG) to plan for a DCS mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. These submarines would be capable of carrying the SLCM-N. This nuclear-armed option is unlikely to degrade US undersea capabilities, as Australia could support some US missions in the Indo-Pacific and provide flexible deterrence options. Australia will still need to manage three submarine classes under this option.

Third, the United States does not sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia, but instead bases submarines armed with SLCM-N in Australia, either on a permanent or rotational basis. This option does not degrade US undersea capabilities. However, under this option Australia should negotiate for extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. This option is not the end of AUKUS, but Australia will need to build sovereign SSN-AUKUS submarines to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines when they are retired.

Policymakers should not be afraid to consider a flexible nuclear-armed option in light of recent and historic Russian and Chinese rhetoric on AUKUS, especially when this rhetoric concerns “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability.” Having a nuclear-armed option would provide enough flexibility to backstop and limit conventional war.

On April 18, 2025, Russia’s envoy to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, defended military ties with Jakarta and did not deny claims that Russia seeks to station long-range military aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor, about 1400 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. Russia asserted that AUKUS is more of a threat to the Asia-Pacific than Russian ties with Indonesia, which are “not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Tolchenov added that challenges to regional stability

are more likely to arise from the rotational deployment of large military contingents from extra-regional states on Australian territory, including the provision of airfields for the landing of strategic bombers and port infrastructure for visits by nuclear-powered submarines. Particularly alarming are the currently discussed plans to deploy the US intermediate-range missiles in Australia, which would put ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, including Indonesia, within its range, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership.

These comments are consistent with Putin’s rhetoric against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This is not the first time Russia and China accused the US, UK, and Australia of risking an intensified arms race and military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. A report by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Centre stated, “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.” The report goes on to say that “[w]hile current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.” The report further criticizes AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation, which the report suggests will trigger a regional submarine arms race.

Chinese and Russian threats should not limit or contain AUKUS to non-nuclear options. This is particularly true when the US has historically provided non-nuclear long-range precision-strike capability. In the past this included the F-111 Aardvark, F/A-18F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II.

Under the UN Charter, members have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Hence, Australia and its allies should stand by the expression, si vis pacem, para bellum. Australia and its AUKUS allies should not back down from non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability or nuclear-armed deterrence options that provide more flexible responses.

Although, the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement may be contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its submarine production rate. It is worth noting that American undersea capabilities, particularly in the long term, may be greatly enhanced through other means under AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II.

In the new era of nuclear disorder, the key to maintaining American undersea capabilities will likely be the SLCM-N deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines. The SLCM-N will provide AUKUS flexible deterrence options and limit risk of conflict in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Natalie A. Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. She is the Australian Company Director of Alpha–India Consultancy. Natalie formerly contracted to the Australian Department of Defence. Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of any organization, employer, or affiliated group.

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is no diplomatic disagreement, it’s a brewing storm cloaked in trade deals and technology theft. Viewed through the unforgiving lens of a new Cold War, their discussion exposes the economic fault lines, ballooning trade deficits, strategic supply chain vulnerabilities, and the silent hemorrhaging of American innovation through intellectual property theft. As they unearth Cold War-era playbooks and contrast them with China’s modern hybrid strategies, a chilling pattern emerges: the past isn’t repeating, it’s evolving.

They delve to the heart of deterrence, revealing a precarious global balance that demands more than policy; it demands resolve. If America misreads the moment, it may sleepwalk into strategic irrelevance.

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Navigating the US-China Relationship: Myths and Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.

The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for regional proliferation.

Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the existing arms control framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.

The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.

Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a climate of uncertainty. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.

President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.

This approach stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.

The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by unconstrained proliferation and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nuclear incidents could lead to catastrophic radioactive contamination and a global emergency. In this regard, the South Asian model for the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement is a milestone achievement in nuclear risk reduction. It was a breakthrough agreement that prevented two arch-rivals from attacking each other’s nuclear sites despite several intense standoffs. It played a crucial role in ensuring nuclear facilities remain off-limits by preventing catastrophic escalations and reinforcing stability.

Contemporary conflicts are increasingly defined by disruptive and cutting-edge technologies, such as drone and cyber attacks that introduce a new dimension to conflict and exposed nuclear infrastructure to unprecedented vulnerabilities. It is thus time for P-5 states and the IAEA to formulate an international non-attack agreement to ensure nuclear restraint. The world cannot afford another nuclear disaster due to the negligence of the international community and the absence of a proper enforcement mechanism.

After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha. Pakistan sensed a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear research labs. The rivalry got more intense when India hedged against blowing up Pakistan’s Kahuta Nuclear Research Laboratories. In return, Pakistan assured India that any attack on Kahuta would evoke a retaliatory strike on its Bhabha Atomic Nuclear Plant.

To avert such future scenarios, both states agreed to sign the bilateral accord. Since doing so, and despite several conflicts like the Kargil conflict (1999), the 2001–2002 military standoff, and the Pulwama-Balakot crisis (2019), neither state has targeted the other’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement’s successful implementation in a highly volatile region, where nuclear-armed neighbors are eyeball-to-eyeball, sets a precedent that serves as a model for other states to follow.

The provisions of the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement, require that both states refrain from “undertaking, encouraging, or participating in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.” This is a model for a global nuclear security non-attack commitment. The agreement clearly defines nuclear installations to include research reactors, uranium enrichment plants, reprocessing facilities, and storage sites for radioactive material.

The second provision of the agreement is the Classification of Protected Sites. The Annual Exchange of Nuclear Facility List is the most important clause. Under this clause India and Pakistan exchange lists of their nuclear facilities every January 1, ensuring transparency, avoiding miscalculations, and implementing risk mitigation. This agreement sets the ground rules that even hostile states can uphold nuclear restraint, and the international community must take a lesson from this model to formulate an international nuclear non-attack agreement.

Moreover, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 is a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of nuclear incidents, with radiation leaks contaminating large areas and causing long-term ecological and health crises. While commenting on an attack, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that a drone hit the concrete shelter, sparking a fire that caused significant damage, but radiation remained under control. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials released their respective statements, denying the responsibility for the drone strike.

The pertinent question here is not who is responsible, but rather the safety and security of nuclear facilities during conflict and the need for militaries to exercise restraint. The war might end one day, but the hazards of nuclear radiation persist far longer. Meanwhile, existing international laws provide some protections for nuclear sites, but they lack enforceable mechanisms to deter attacks. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (1977) classify nuclear power plants as civilian objects that should not be targeted. However, these clauses are not binding under all circumstances, leaving loopholes for states to exploit during wartime.

Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard protocols primarily focus on nonproliferation and the safety of nuclear materials, rather than averting military strikes on nuclear sites. Here the absence of clear, legally binding enforcement mechanisms in international law means that states can act with impunity while targeting nuclear sites in conflict zones. Hence, the Chernobyl drone attack demonstrates the urgency for a comprehensive and enforceable global agreement.

The new international nuclear non-attack agreement should essentially address the weaknesses in existing laws. The P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and the IAEA must spearhead a legally binding comprehensive treaty prohibiting any form of attack on nuclear infrastructure. This new agreement should explicitly include these several nuclear restraints. Starting from the military restrictions that should prohibit all military operations in the vicinity of designated nuclear sites. This includes ground forces, aerial strikes, reconnaissance missions, and drone activities near nuclear installations.

Further states must ensure annual transparency measures to prevent miscalculations. Each party must be required to exchange lists of their nuclear facilities annually, similar to the India-Pakistan model.

Most importantly, there must be severe consequences if any state violates the agreement by conducting a strike, covert operation, or cyberattack on nuclear facilities. Such a state must face severe economic sanctions, diplomatic consequences, and potential designation as a rogue state. Finally, there must be a prohibition on cyber and non-kinetic attacks.

The UN Security Council and leading nuclear powers, the P5 states, should take the responsibility of drafting and enforcing the agreement. These nations must set aside geopolitical rivalries and recognize that the threat of nuclear facility attacks endanger global stability. Additionally, the IAEA must play a more proactive role in integrating nuclear facility protection into global conflict prevention strategies.

The Chernobyl drone strike and the volatile situation in Zaporizhzhia is a wake-up call, a warning that nuclear security cannot be taken for granted in modern warfare. As conflicts become increasingly complex, nuclear sites will remain vulnerable unless strong, enforceable international agreements are put in place. The world cannot afford to wait for another disaster before taking decisive action.

Sana Ahmed is an MS scholar at the Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST, and a researcher at the Islamabad-based independent think tank Strategic Vision Institute (SVI).

A South Asian Blueprint for Nuclear Risk Reduction was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, authoritarian regimes without succession plans often face power struggles when the leader eventually dies, retires, or is overthrown. The absence of a designated heir could lead to internal conflicts within the CCP when Xi is gone.

The only possible threat to his authority could emerge from within the security apparatus. Furthermore, his grip on power is not static; it is continuously reinforced through persistent anti-corruption efforts and CCP rectification campaigns. In other words, Xi Jinping’s entrenched control over China’s political system and the mechanisms he employs to maintain power was and remains prominent.

Political Variables

The lack of a clear successor suggests that Xi intends to rule indefinitely, breaking with the leadership norms established after Mao Zedong’s era. This raises concerns about political stability in the long term, as the absence of a transition plan increases the risk of a power struggle when he eventually leaves office.

Also, it means a weakness of political opposition that emphasizes that opposition within China has largely disappeared, with dissenters either forced into exile or silenced through political repression. This suggests a highly controlled political environment where resistance is ineffective. While this strengthens Xi’s immediate grip on power, it does not necessarily eliminate discontent. Rather, it forces opposition underground. If economic hardships or political scandals arise, suppressed grievances could resurface, potentially destabilizing the regime—meaning that discontent is potentially creating instability in the future.

Although Xi appears unchallenged, the security apparatus is a possible source of opposition. Security forces are crucial to maintaining authoritarian rule, and, if internal divisions emerge, they can pose a serious threat to his leadership. Thus, if divisions emerge within China’s security forces whether due to policy disagreements, economic struggles, or leadership disputes, Xi’s position could be at risk.

While there is no clear indication of this happening, it suggests that control over the military and intelligence agencies remains a key factor in his rule. To wit, in authoritarian regimes, the military and intelligence agencies are often the key enforcers of the leader’s rule, but they can also become sources of internal opposition. However, so far, he has maintained tight control over the military and state security agencies through purges and loyalty tests.

There is also a role of anti-corruption and party rectification campaigns in Xi’s bureaucracy and leadership. Rather than merely consolidating power in a passive way, Xi actively reinforces his authority through continuous anti-corruption drives and ideological campaigns to eliminate political rivals and maintain loyalty within the CCP. While these measures strengthen his rule, such campaigns may also create resentment among officials who fear they could become targets.

Aging Political Leadership

The top leadership is tilted in Xi Jinping’s favor. However, this top leadership is aging. An aging leadership also means that many of Xi’s key supporters may retire or pass away, potentially opening room for new political dynamics that he may not fully control.

In 2027, the current Politburo will have an average age above 68. Should they be renominated then, the average age of Politburo members would be above 73 on the eve of the next Party Congress and current Central Committee members are not far behind. Their time horizon will become shorter, and if no potential successor appears, their political position will become increasingly vulnerable. Again, a defining feature of Xi’s leadership is the lack of a designated successor, breaking from previous CCP norms that aimed to ensure stability through planned transitions. Without a clear heir, uncertainty will grow among the party elite, increasing the risk of political maneuvering or factional struggles as different groups seek to position themselves for leadership roles. This uncertainty could weaken Xi’s grip on power over time, especially as leaders begin to consider their own political futures beyond his rule.

As the current leadership ages and their career time horizons shrink, their incentives may shift. Rather than unwavering loyalty to Xi, some officials might begin looking for alternative paths to secure their personal or factional interests. If no successor emerges, competition among different factions could intensify, creating a fragile political environment. Additionally, older officials may become less effective in governance, potentially exacerbating policy stagnation or mismanagement, further weakening the regime’s overall stability.

Unless Xi Jinping changes his basic formula to ensure support and discourage any debate, his power will become brittle, and the likelihood of a succession crisis will increase. His leadership strategy requires grooming a successor or adjusting his approach to elite management. While his current control appears strong, the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms makes a future power struggle more likely. Historically, power vacuums in authoritarian regimes often lead to internal conflicts, and China could face a similar scenario if Xi does not prepare a clear transition plan.

There are also nuanced views of Xi Jinping’s governance style, highlighting both his consolidation of power and the underlying complexities within China’s political and economic landscape. Despite Xi’s centralization of power and strong grip on influence, Chinese bureaucracies remain highly fragmented, with institutional silos, rival factions, and competition among individuals. This contradicts the idea of a fully unified authoritarian system, suggesting that power struggles still play a role in policy decisions.

Clearly, there is Xi’s ability to enforce policy shifts while maintaining ideological rigidity, as well as the role of elite competition in shaping China’s future. Additionally, the influence of princelings (descendants of revolutionary leaders) remains significant, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions. While the next leader may not necessarily be a princeling, elite clans could act as key power brokers, determining leadership transitions behind the scenes.

At a deeper level, there is a pattern in Xi’s governance. Initial inflexibility followed by strategic reversals or rigidity then with certain pragmatic adjustments. When policies face resistance or cause unintended consequences, this would be addressed through a “pullback pattern” or “rear-view mirror approach” that are evident in key crises, including: the 2015 stock market crisis, the COVID-19 lockdowns, the 2020 real estate crash, and the Sino-American trade war.

This suggests that Xi is a risk-taker but not reckless; meaning, he is willing to implement bold policies but is also pragmatic enough to change course when necessary. However, these reversals are often framed in a way that protects his authority, shifting blame onto subordinates or external factors.

Xi’s political capital plays in a “selective policy flexibility versus ideological rigidity.” While Xi shows pragmatism in adjusting economic policies, his core ideological agenda remains unchanged. His governance remains centered around: reinforcing ideology; promoting “struggle” (斗争); and maintaining a strong international posture. Even in areas where Xi has shown flexibility such as real estate bailouts or fiscal stimulus, shifts are constrained by his broader ideological commitments.

Xi is also deepening policies that predated his rule. He has an affinity for the self-strengthening movement of the Qing empire, summed up by the famous maxim, “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical use” (中学为体, 西学为用). Republican China sought help from Germany to modernize its arms industry and sent students on scholarships to the United States. The best-known case of this is rocket scientist Qian Xuesen who, after leaving the United States in 1955, led China’s ballistic development.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty was the basis for what is called the largest technology transfer in history. Much of this focused on industry and infrastructure, but it also involved education and the training of scientists, including in the nuclear field.

The Sino-Soviet rift inaugurated a period of closure, but Mao Zedong nonetheless launched several “big projects” during the Great Leap Forward. They are recalled today to justify the present large-scale policies.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai, followed by Deng Xiaoping, hailed the “four modernizations” (四个现代化) that put the accent on big science again. Since the early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never ceased from engaging in research and development on new weapons, serving as a harbor for scientists in times of political turmoil or during more recent anti-corruption campaigns.

A chief aim of China’s normalization with the United States was to acquire key technologies. From former US Presidents Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter’s presidency, which was the heyday of the US convergence with China against the Soviet Union, supercomputers (supposedly for climate predictions), nuclear knowledge, radar installations, and many other dual-use technologies were shared. Large contingents of Chinese students underwent education and training abroad, mainly in the United States.

Successively, we can observe that Xi’s foreign policy adaptations are evident with strategic pauses. There is a pattern of assertiveness followed by recalibration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once a cornerstone of China’s global strategy, has seen a decline in outward investments and loans, possibly due to economic slowdowns and concerns over debt sustainability. Additionally, in response to changing global dynamics, particularly under a potential Trump second presidency (2024–2028), China appears to be cautiously reassessing its relationships with key nations, including India, Japan, and the UK. This suggests that while Xi projects strength internationally, he is also willing to adjust diplomatic strategies to navigate shifting geopolitical realities.

Implication and Conclusion

Per its implication, while Xi’s control appears secure for now, the long-term consequences of his rule remain uncertain. The suppression of opposition, lack of a succession plan, and reliance on internal purges could make the political system more fragile over time. If economic challenges or elite divisions intensify, his grip on power may face unexpected tests.

Xi’s leadership is characterized by strong, centralized control, but his dominance is not necessarily permanent. His reliance on security forces, ideological campaigns, and repression keeps him in power, yet these same factors could generate internal tensions. Whether his rule remains stable or faces future challenges depends on how well he navigates potential economic, political, and internal security risks.

While Xi Jinping maintains firm control over the CCP, the aging leadership and the absence of a succession plan introduce long-term vulnerabilities. If these issues remain unaddressed, they could lead to political uncertainty, elite fragmentation, and a potential succession crisis. Xi’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine the long-term stability of his rule and the CCP’s future.

Xi Jinping’s leadership is characterized by a mix of ideological rigidity and strategic pragmatism. While he has consolidated power, elite competition, bureaucratic infighting, and security apparatus tensions remain underlying factors in China’s political landscape. His policy approach follows a recognizable pattern: firm initial positions, followed by controlled reversals, when necessary, which helps him maintain authority while adapting to challenges. However, as China faces economic pressures, elite power struggles, and an evolving international environment, the long-term sustainability of this governance model remains uncertain.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines.  The ideas are the author’s own.

Xi Jinping’s Bureaucracy in 2025: A Critique was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest round of sanctions showed the Biden administration’s disregard for Pakistan’s long history of cooperation with Washington. Islamabad always sought to engage diplomatically with the White House in a constructive manner—aspiring to nurture its relationship with the United States. However, the sanctions imposed on Pakistan’s missile program by the US, grounded in doubts and assumptions, do not bode well for the overall stability of the relationship.

When Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the 1950s and supported American strategy in the region, especially during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan took significant risk both domestically and with often unfriendly neighbors. Pakistan valued the relationship and made significant strides in fostering a partnership. However, it still struggles to preserve peace and stability in the region after a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The recent spate of American allegations against Pakistan not only increase mistrust between the two states but also undermine the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current sanctions tend to create an imbalance in the strategic calculus of South Asia, shifting the balance of power towards Pakistan’s adversary, India. New Delhi’s military and nuclear modernization is already destabilizing South Asia.

            Washington’s favoring of New Delhi furthers the augment that there is an increasing gap between India and Pakistan, which could reignite an arms race. Historically, the US played a constructive third-party role in easing tensions between Pakistan and India. However, growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US could limit its leverage to act as neutral mediator in any future crisis. Such a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan could undermine regional stability in South Asia.

With New Delhi’s evolving missile capabilities, Pakistan considers its strategic capabilities crucial for deterrence. This ensures that the country does not face an existential threat from across its border. Islamabad maintains that its missile and nuclear program are intended to counterbalance India’s growing conventional and nuclear superiority.

According to the former US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Jon Finer, Pakistan has pursued “increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” If that continues, Finer said, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further said that the advancement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile systems could pose a direct threat to global security, enabling Pakistan to target countries far beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In response Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MOFA) commented on Finer’s statement and said that the perception of an alleged threat was “unfortunate.” These sanctions which are imposed under Executive Order 13382, are based on mere doubts and suspicions devoid of any substantial evidence. In its statement, the MOFA said that “Pakistan has also made it abundantly clear that our strategic program and allied capabilities are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.” With such clarity in Pakistan’s strategic approach, the American sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program are nothing more than misplaced concerns.

The US is turning a blind eye towards Indian nuclear expansion and is strengthening its strategic partnership so that it can serve as a counterweight to China. Because of this strategic cooperation, the US aids India with the transfer of high-end defense technologies. Agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and the Communications Capability and Security Agreement (COMCASA) are critical to Indian development. Under the framework of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), India also benefits.

In 2008, the United States pampered India with a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions, exempting it from obligations that apply to nuclear export controls for states outside the scope of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).This mutual defense cooperation between the US and India augments Indian military capabilities, accentuating military asymmetries in South Asia.

While maintaining silence on India’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, with a manifest range of above 5,000 kilometers, American officials raised misleading concerns regarding Pakistan’s capabilities. In reality, the longest-range ballistic missile of Pakistan, the Shaheen III, demonstrated a range of 2,750 kilometers, explicitly designed to deter only India. The country’s ballistic missile program has no intention of endangering the sovereignty of any other state, including allies of its long-standing partner, the United States.

To overcome this trust deficit, Pakistan and the US must take the initiative and forge a comprehensive security dialogue that aligns their strategic interests. This security dialogue would provide an avenue to discuss common security objectives, including regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and transnational threats. Furthermore, mutual collaboration in intelligence-sharing will augment the effectiveness of both nations’ security apparatus. Constructive communication between Pakistan and the US is crucial to building a more stable and cooperative future, which would not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also contribute to peace and security in South Asia and beyond.

While the Biden administration expressed concerns about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, Islamabad maintained, then and now, that these measures are purely defensive in nature. They are designed to safeguard national security amidst evolving regional tensions. It would be fruitful for both nations for President Donald Trump to correct the mistake of the Biden administration, acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and engaging with a willing ally. Collaboration rather than coercion is necessary for Pakistan and the US to address shared challenges.

Nawal Nawaz is a research assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

A decade ago, Paul Bracken warned of such possibilities in his book, The Second Nuclear Age. Because deterrence theory went out of vogue for so long in the West, analysts are now woefully unprepared to think about these challenges and their implications. Today, all possible threats to our Western notions of peace and stability have been jumbled into one giant intellectual recycling bin of deterrence theory. It is time to talk much more seriously about (1) the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and (2) the role of nuclear deterrence in a new era of nuclear disorder in the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear weapons play a unique and unprecedented role in how nations think about geopolitical order. They have fundamentally altered how countries think about alliances and the nature of international order. William Walker wrote about the establishment, in the late 1960s, of a nuclear order based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system “whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound,” and in which there was a degree of familiarity in essentially dyadic deterrence relationships.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system “whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits,” concomitantly with the provision of nuclear umbrellas and a stable Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession, but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems would provide the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for states to rely on the US for their national survival.

There are several elements that gradually developed after the second world war that characterized this nuclear order—dissuading countries from developing nuclear weapons. First, the number of nuclear weapon states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered merely bigger and better conventional weapons. Third, there are strong norms against possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no direct and immediate military threats to US allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely.

This and the prospects for nuclear proliferation are relatively limited. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) proposed in the late 1960s eventually attract more and more states, thus contributing to a norm against nuclear proliferation. It also contributed to nuclear and conventional arms control as concepts and policies in the international community. The world was able to more easily navigate crises and confrontations as thinking evolved about strategic theory and concepts and their application to real world politics and diplomacy.

The international (nuclear) order held together. It is now slowly eroding. China is modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces, all while growing increasingly bellicose and regularly threatening to invade Taiwan.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The West did nothing and never imagined this would be followed by a full-scale invasion eight years later—with regular Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Now, Australian academic Peter Layton is writing about “this nuclear threat business.” Until recently, this behavior was reserved for rogue states like North Korea. Such behavior was beneath great powers such as Russia and the United States. Not only does the West have to think about deterrence in a multipolar setting, but it must face nuclear dictators.

Nuclear arsenals in Asia are also expanding. From China’s rapid nuclear expansion to questions about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, the future is uncertain. There are renewed questions about the future of South Korea and nuclear weapons.

Arms control is also breaking down. Much to the chagrin of arms control careerists, who argue for unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral nuclear arms control as a public good sui generis, arms control is not carrying the day. Bereft of the intellectual foundations of deterrence that guided impressive negotiations in SALT I and II, and even START I, discussing nuclear strategy is now taboo in the West.

The nuclear order that existed during the Cold War and the post–Cold War peace dividend, especially in the Asia-Pacific, is eroding rapidly. For many nuclear historians, this trend is not new. Now is the time to grieve the loss of the utopian dream and think seriously about how to navigate this new era of disorder and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and promoting peace.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Order and Disorder in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Not Today Satan” is a song (questionable by my earlier generation) by KB and Andy Mineo, drawing on the roots of one’s faith and the daily battle of one’s temptations (my words, not theirs). But breaking down the lyrics can teach us a ton about the world of deterrence.

Deterrence, in general, draws back to the earliest battles recorded in history. Being able to create an opposing force without ever lifting a sword is often how I think of deterrence. Having a force that is willing, alongside a proven capability, is a powerful pair, and one that makes up today’s most reliable deterrent—the American nuclear triad. But the triad’s effectiveness goes beyond what I know it can do. Others must know and understand its value as well. This is where KB steps in with some relevant lyrics:

Yeah, I live my life on the regular
But his attacks are perpetual
Forbidden fruit seem so edible
You try to resist like ellipticals.

An understanding of our world is an interest of mine. As I walk through KB’s lyrics, I cannot help but see the parallel he paints for his listener. We are all regular people under consistent attack. Though carefully crafted, this “attack” does not appear as an attack. The subtle convincing, or slight shifts in one’s core belief about a topic is altered with ease, slowly manipulating a person’s core understanding, while creating a heavy load of resistance against what and how one might think, slowly shifting what we believe.

As a nation, better yet, a human race, we must understand the truth behind nuclear deterrence. What lives on our social feeds and livestream networks will not highlight these truths. Much of what is pushed today is developed using your search data, often repurposed with a subtle undertone and agenda, luring you in to want more; making the information you absorb feel like, in the words of KB, “forbidden fruit” appearing “so edible.” Unfortunately, this information can be misleading, luring the reader to believe a message that is untrue.

The genesis of deterrence is found in some of the greatest writings of military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. How nations prepare and think about war began on the rumination of the words muttered by these men and their predecessors. Beyond the expert understanding required by men and women who wear the uniform, the people that deterrence serves must also understand how it works and why it exists.

Today’s nuclear deterrence is not mere jargon. In fact, it is the opposite. Just as KB and other lyricists carefully craft the words in a song, senior leaders, strategists, and policy developers carefully craft deterrence strategy and deliver capability that, like a good song, speaks to the emotions of the intended audience.

For American deterrence, it is not merely the ability to tug at the heart strings of the listener that is its power, unlike a song. Instead, it is the new B-21 raider, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that make it effective.

These three legs of the nuclear triad work together to make deterrence effective, just as the combination of KB’s lyrics, instrumentation, and beat work together to make a song great.  With impeccable timing, these assets deliver the desired effects. Just as a musician must deliver a performance for an audience to experience the desired emotions, sailors and airmen must perform as expected to make these systems effective in conveying their message to the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians.

Keeping with the music analogy, effective deterrence requires the American military to offer a daily performance similar to Queen’s performance at Live Aid in 1985—often considered the greatest performance of all time. As a country, the United States seeks to protect an international order where democracy and personal freedoms thrive and allow artists like KB to create the kind of music that moves listeners.

In doing so, the United States must understand how to deter those who seek to challenge that order. If Americans do not want to see “Satan today,” as KB’s lyrics say, we better understand what it means to keep the adversary away. It is not moving lyrics or a great performance that will accomplish this goal, but a ready nuclear arsenal and the willingness to employ its weapons that keeps the peace.

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ben Burdette was a missileer in the United States Air Force. He is the founder of Networth and an executive coach. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.  

Not Today: A Nuclear Deterrence Analogy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current challenges include the disparity in nuclear capabilities, with Russia’s projected 7,500 warheads and China’s rapid buildup to 3,500 by 2035. The U.S. TRIAD faces maintenance issues, necessitating immediate investments in updated systems to avoid strategic vulnerabilities. Recommendations highlight the need to accelerate programs like the Navy’s nuclear-armed cruise missile initiative, expand the B-21 bomber fleet, and consider additional Columbia-class submarines. These steps are presented as crucial to addressing the growing threats from adversaries while ensuring strategic balance.

The report underscores the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent to sustain global power and uphold international credibility. Strategic insights from leaders like General McMaster and Secretary Frank Kendall advocate for overcoming budgetary constraints and reinforcing the defense industrial base. The document also highlights broader geopolitical concerns, such as the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, framing modernization as a central pillar of U.S. security policy.

ICBM EAR Report 13 Jan 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains uncertain, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.

In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel launched Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.

This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.

Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos raided an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also captured Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.

Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency stated that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.

However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.

Degraded Proxy Capabilities

In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.

Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.

Israeli operations significantly degraded Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian S-300s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.

Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire economic situation of the country as well as the increasing repression by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.

Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, energy shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.

That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.

Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the installation of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in minimal progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.

Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.

Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.

While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.

Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.

Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.

Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Arms control and disarmament advocates differ with this view, seeing the deterrent as a risk that must be reduced in size and function via various forms of diplomacy that range from one-party declarations and codes of conduct to formal arms control agreements. These sorts of undertakings are currently moribund within officialdom, though enjoying an eternal spring of hope among the single-issue think tanks, academics, and commentators who strive to sway government.

Paradoxically the current surge in hostilities between the United States and the axis of autocracy (China, North Korea, and Russia) could furnish the spark that revives official efforts at both improving deterrence and renewed arms control. For instance, an updated Budapest Memorandum might form one component of a settlement or freezing of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An Iranian “regime change” may also offer a path for a true and verifiable non-nuclear-weapon Iran.

The modality of any future arms control arrangement could vary greatly. Not all arms control arrangements are treaties. Given the current international situation among nuclear-armed states, treaties might indeed be the least likely of modalities. Some modalities that future arms control arrangements could take include unilateral American declarations, American-backed codes of conduct, American-backed norms, agreement within NATO (such as the Committee on Proliferation or the Nuclear Planning Group), unilateral American renewal of earlier Negative Security Assurances (such as those deposited with the United Nations), bilateral or multilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral memorandum or other agreed instrument short of a treaty, and/or bilateral or multilateral treaties.

The Process of Arms Control

All these arms control approaches present challenges to American and NATO forces. They also present opportunities to refine force posture and employment options. Three concrete steps are useful in ensuring American and alliance leadership receives constant feedback with operational decision-makers.

First, it is important to sustain collaboration. As government and American allies contemplate arms control arrangements, nuclear-force commanders should offer information on the challenges and opportunities that various permutations of an arrangement present to force posture and operations. Not all ideas are operationally possible.

Second, highlight the challenges that an arrangement poses to fielded forces. As part of any discussions, commanders should relate how they would adjust operations as nascent arrangements move toward implementation. This would likely be a stepwise evolution of operations in reaction to implementation of disclosures and intrusion that could accompany various forms of arms control measures. Policymakers rarely understand what their aspirational objectives mean for operational forces.

Third, highlight opportunities an arrangement creates for forces. Similarly, commanders should monitor the evolution of arms control arrangements and be on the lookout for arrangements that permit gleaning information about adversary forces—information that is useful in crafting the best force posture, plans, and operational tactics.

These feedback loops would evolve in phases over the time that an arms control arrangement is contemplated, refined, and implemented (or rejected).

The Phases of Arms Control

Any future arms control agreement should have six phases:

Phase 1 takes place during internal American contemplation of potential arms control arrangements. Classified analysis of changes to operations that an arrangement might necessitate are discussed. When inspections are proposed, any detrimental effects to operations from various forms of inspection are discussed. Discussing the benefits of inspecting adversary installations is also an important consideration. 

Phase 2 occurs during outreach with adversaries and third-country parties. Internal “food-for-thought” papers from the operational community are prepared for negotiators and strategic-communications personnel. Deliberate public statements such as editorials and conference presentations serve a useful purpose in explaining American interests.  

Phase 3 takes place during formalization of an arms control arrangement. When requested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, the president, or other officials, public statements are made for adversary consumption. 

Phase 4 is the implementation phase. This is the period in which an arms control arrangement comes into effect by treaty agreement or as a unilateral/bilateral/multilateral action. Classified reports on implementation progress of the new arrangement are prepared. When inspections are part of the arrangement, coordination between government agencies occurs.

Phase 5 is focused on sustainment. During this period an arms control arrangement is in effect. Classified reports address difficulties from the arrangement. 

Phase 6 is the sunset period. This is when the arms control arrangement ends or appears to be faltering. Analysis of the operational steps, timeline, costs, equipment, and personnel necessary to terminate the arms control arrangement is conducted. Classified reports on progress toward ceasing any earlier changes to operations and capabilities, necessitated by the arrangement, are conducted.

Conclusion

Arms control for the sake of arms control was always a bad idea. The United States is no longer in a position where it can enter into arms control agreements because it furthers an idealist ambition to promote peace. Today, arms control is only useful if it furthers American interests.

Taking a hard-nosed look at arms control in its various forms is necessary, but it must be acceptable for the answer to be no. The United States is no longer in a position to act altruistically. Russia is a superior nuclear power, and China may reach a similar status within a decade. The world has changed and American leaders must accept that its adversaries are no longer willing to follow America’s lead.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a professor at Penn State-Brandywine. Views expressed are his own.

An Uncertain Future for Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.