Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The NIDS View Podcast: Regional Security Under Pressure: Japan, Taiwan, and the Future of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

The simulated conflict ended without regime change in Pyongyang, allowing Kim Jong Un to claim a political victory. While avoiding nuclear escalation may seem prudent, such an outcome could deal a lasting blow to the credibility of America’s extended deterrence in East Asia.

The Guardian Tiger scenario should not be dismissed as an academic exercise. It reveals a critical vulnerability in the psychological foundation of deterrence: the perception among adversaries and allies of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of its partners. If allies conclude that Washington will not cross the nuclear threshold even after a nuclear attack, they may question the value of the nuclear umbrella. Adversaries, meanwhile, may learn that nuclear coercion, carefully calibrated, can succeed.

In the simulation, North Korea escalated to a tactical nuclear strike against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the East Sea (Guardian Tiger I) and later against the Chinhae naval base (Guardian Tiger II), home to the Republic of Korea Navy’s Submarine Force Command and occasionally used for allied submarine visits. According to the report, American leaders debated nuclear retaliation but settled on conventional “pulsed” strikes.

In a real-world scenario, such strikes could plausibly involve precision-guided munitions from long-range bombers like the B1-B and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aimed at targets such as missile transporter-erector launchers, hardened artillery positions along the DMZ, and command-and-control facilities near Pyongyang. In the exercise, the US stopped short of regime change, seeking to avoid further nuclear escalation and prevent a direct war with China—a decision that would have allowed Pyongyang to absorb the damage, count the survival of its regime as a strategic win, and enter negotiations from a stronger position.

Extended deterrence depends on more than military capability. It is rooted in the belief, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that the United States is willing to defend its partners by all means necessary, including nuclear weapons. An American failure to respond in kind to North Korean nuclear use would plant seeds of doubt. Japanese and South Korean leaders could begin to question whether Washington would truly “trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul” if the stakes involved limited nuclear use rather than an existential threat to the United States.

That doubt could trigger cascading effects. Calls in Seoul’s National Assembly for indigenous nuclear weapons, expanded production of the Hyunmoo‑4 ballistic missile, and pressure on Tokyo to more seriously pursue nuclear sharing arrangements have already entered the political debate.

This concern is amplified by North Korea’s 2022 nuclear weapons law, which openly authorizes preemptive nuclear strikes in scenarios ranging from an imminent attack on leadership to undefined overwhelming crisis situations. Analysts note that the law’s language effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use, implying tactical employment to repel invasion and seize the initiative in war. Rather than viewing nuclear use as a desperate last resort, Pyongyang now appears willing to employ such weapons early. For example, a low‑yield detonation against South Korean or American forward-deployed forces to shock Washington and Seoul into political concessions.

The challenge grows sharper in the event of a dual contingency: simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Guardian Tiger II simulated such a scenario, with China launching a multi-domain assault on Taiwan while North Korea escalated on the peninsula. In such a real-world situation, US Indo-Pacific Command could be forced to divert the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from Yokosuka to the waters east of Taiwan, deploy B‑52H bombers to deter Chinese operations, and even consider repositioning some Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile defense batteries from South Korea to protect American assets in Okinawa and Guam.

Such shifts illustrate how a stretched American posture could reduce missile interception capacity on the peninsula and temporarily remove some nuclear-capable platforms from immediate Korean defense. North Korea could calculate that Washington, already balancing a larger confrontation with China, would avoid nuclear escalation in Korea to conserve resources and limit the risk of an all-out US-China war.

The political and strategic consequences would ripple across the region. In Seoul, public and elite opinion could shift sharply toward developing an independent nuclear arsenal—something 71 percent of South Koreans already support. South Korea’s nuclear latency, widely assessed by proliferation experts, suggests it could potentially produce a weapon in as little as 6 months if political consensus formed.

In Tokyo, the debate over counterstrike capabilities, missile defense expansion, and potential nuclear sharing with the United States would intensify, potentially accelerating deployment of Tomahawk missiles and further integration of F‑35A fighters, which, in the US fleet, are being certified for B61‑12 nuclear bombs, into allied defense planning. Beijing, meanwhile, could seize the opportunity to position itself as a stabilizing broker, offering to mediate between Seoul and Pyongyang while shielding the latter from full international accountability, further eroding American influence.

Avoiding nuclear escalation in a limited-strike scenario is understandable, but Washington cannot afford such a decision to be interpreted as weakness. Strengthening deterrence credibility in Northeast Asia will require more than declaratory statements. Clear and credible red lines for nuclear use must be communicated both publicly and privately. Integrated nuclear-conventional planning with allies should ensure that flexible response options, from proportionate nuclear strikes to overwhelming conventional retaliation, are executable on short notice. Contingency planning must explicitly account for simultaneous conflicts in Korea and Taiwan, with pre-positioned munitions, dispersed basing arrangements for nuclear-capable aircraft, and rotational deployments of dual-capable ships and submarines to maintain strategic presence even under force diversion.

Equally important is sustained alliance signaling. These include high-visibility joint exercises like the US-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, regular port visits by nuclear-capable submarines, and trilateral missile tracking drills with Japan. These measures reassure allies, complicate adversary calculations, and demonstrate that any nuclear use will incur unacceptable costs.

The Guardian Tiger exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how quickly deterrence can fray in the fog of crisis. A single decision to refrain from nuclear retaliation, however understandable at the time, could reverberate for decades and reshape the strategic balance in East Asia. In the nuclear age, preserving deterrence means guarding against both uncontrolled escalation and the perceptions of hesitation that could invite it.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

A Nuclear Umbrella in Peril: Lessons from North Korea’s Escalation Scenarios was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this still frequently neglected or covered-up existential rivalry, the two sides face equally monumental but decidedly asymmetrical consequences. Should Beijing lose, the CCP will likely fall and fade. The Chinese nation, people, and state, even with the same name, will survive and likely thrive. Should Washington lose, however, not only will the American system of government likely fail, but the American way of life and national independence will diminish as American power and influence is superseded by a domineering PRC.

After long delays, hesitations, and self-delusions, a rare American consensus emerged to focus on the epic PRC-USA competition and fending off China’s effort to spread illiberal Chinese power. Given its vast well of resources, extensive network of alliances, great pool of talent, still functional democratic decision-making mechanism, and vibrant marketplace of ideas, the United States is coming up with cost-effective measures to win this competition, likely cheaper and more peaceful than what was required during the Cold War.

Critically, the United States should aim to achieve three hierarchical objectives in the PRC-USA race. They are ranked in descending order of importance. First, prevent the CCP from reordering the world by taking over global leadership. Second, prepare for but deter an all-out war with the PRC. Third, work toward a sociopolitical and ideological transformation of the PRC into a constructive peer. In the end, the US must ensure that Beijing is unwilling and/or unable to replace American leadership in the world.

The United States and its allies should curb the idealistic but toxic enthusiasm for globalization and world governance. The evolving ideals of the right to intervene (RTI) in other sovereign countries for the responsibility to protect (RTP) other country’s citizens, for example, should remain an inspiring ideal rather than a legal norm. Extremely rare and absolutely necessary cases of RTI and RTP are acceptable.

Americans must unapologetically strengthen the United States by maintaining dominance in economics, military power, education, and innovation. It must also remain a nation that is admired for its freedoms at home. It is in the greater interest of the world (including the Chinese people) to put America First, make America strong, rebuild America back better, and let America lead again. These campaign slogans were not only useful for presidential campaigns in 2016, 2020, and 2024, but they are important in reminding the rest of the world what is in their own best interest—a strong America.

These ideas should be delinked from the shortsightedness of isolationism and disassociated from any particular politician. The US must succeed in the international competition for power. It must also use its immense power judiciously to be ever more cost-effective.

A quick look at Taiwan may be a good illustration. Taiwan is critical for Beijing and the primary point of contention in the PRC-USA rivalry. The ROC (Republic of China) was a major US ally after World War II. However, the ROC’s international status was literally traded away by the United States over 40 years ago. The desire to enlist the PRC in the fight to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union proved more important.

Taiwan subsequently evolved to become the first democratic Chinese polity of and, in many ways, a leader across Asia. It has also drifted away from the monolithic Chinese world, to seek its own self-rule, autonomy, and independence.

The CCP, for its own political interest rather than the Chinese national interest, desires to absorb Taiwan with bribery, tricks, intimidation and force. Should Beijing accomplish that goal, it would achieve a major objective of its “great power” strategy, making a giant leap to dominate the Asia-Pacific and score a significant victory over the US and its allies.

The United States must not let Taiwan fall to Beijing. This is not because of the island’s beauty (its old name Formosa means beautiful island in Portuguese). Nor is it because of the advanced microchips that Taiwan makes. It is because the United States cannot allow the CCP to win the PRC-USA rivalry. American interests and the interests of a free world dictate that the US must ensure Beijing does not take Taiwan over the will of the Taiwanese people.

Without fundamental sociopolitical reform at home, even peaceful unification of Taiwan and the PRC should be objectionable to the United States. It sends the wrong signal to every nation watching the outcome of this competition. Winning the PRC-USA rivalry is much more important than the Beijing-Taipei dispute.

The United States must use its power well in defending Taiwan against the PRC. Between peaceful unification of the island with the Chinese Mainland in a framework of democratic federation on the one end, and Sino-American military conflict in response to an invasion of an independent Taiwan on the other end, there are many options. The US can employ numerous and inexpensive options like destroying the “Great Firewall of China,” providing smart weapons to Taiwan, fighting at the time and place of American choosing, and altering the nuclear balance in East Asia. The list can go on.

Imagination, wisdom, persistence, and perseverance, more than mere force and material power, will enable the United States to safeguard world order. The Taiwanese people are counting on an American victory in the PRC-USA rivalry.

Fei-Ling Wang, PhD, is a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The PRC-USA Rivalry and Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

China adopted a policy of no first use upon testing its first nuclear weapon in 1964. From a theoretical perspective, proponents of no first use believe such declarations limit the likelihood of nuclear war. By promising only to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack, intimidation with nuclear weapons is minimal and thus escalation is controllable. This, however, seems to be the opposite direction China is heading.

When the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong, declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, he faced an increasingly difficult environment for his new nation. Amid ongoing tensions, following the Chinese Civil War, Mao faced the Kuomintang (Chinese nationalists) in Taiwan. The KMT still promised a victory over the communists and was aided by the West. In the years that followed, Mao and the CCP leadership watched, what they deemed, bullying from the nuclear weapons states—the US and Soviet Union. Finally, due to a strained relationship with the Soviet Union, China founded the China National Nuclear Corporation in 1956 to build its nuclear weapons program. After fielding a small nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, China largely downplayed the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese foreign policy and never sought an arsenal to rival the US or Soviet Union.

Today, however, that is rapidly changing. Within the varied set of tools that China has used for coercing its neighbors under gray zone tactics, there is one tool it has not yet tried: threatening the use of nuclear weapons—with the exception of threatening Japan. Premier Xi Jinping called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” transforming institutions and norms in ways that will reflect Beijing’s values and priorities. China’s approach to achieving its strategic goals in the region may transition toward the inclusion of nuclear weapons into its framework of political threats, intimidation, and even the use of force to achieve its international goals.

Today, the PRC is fielding new, more mobile, and more accurate nuclear weapons, while simultaneously enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The PRC completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which cumulatively contain at least 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, with intelligence suggesting those silos are now filled. China’s new strategic plan also includes road-mobile ICBMs that carry at least three multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The US first agreed to eliminate MIRV’d missiles from ICBMs with the signing of the START II treaty despite the agreement’s failure to enter into force. Nations like China and India do not believe themselves to be beholden to the same restrictions, regardless of moral condemnation from the arms control community.

In addition to the growing numbers of China’s coast guard fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is also enhancing and producing more advanced surface ships as these become key components of the PRC’s goal of unmitigated regional expansion. The PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of at least 370 ships and submarines, in addition to over 140 major surface combatants. The new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine will carry third-generation JL-3 ballistic missiles designed with a range of greater than 10,000 kilometers, more than capable of striking the American homeland.

To counter this pacing threat, the US needs to think strategically and long term to compete with China’s decades-long expansionist plans. During the Cold War, NATO was formed to prevent a likely invasion of Europe on its eastern front by the Soviet Union. NATO’s structure of strong defensive and ideological commitments, aided by the assistance of the American nuclear umbrella with a high level of credibility, prevented that catastrophe from happening. A similar approach should be developed in Asia. The case of Taiwan is increasingly vital because a failure to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression may signal the end of American global leadership.

China’s nuclear arsenal, born in 1964 as a small, purely defensive achievement, is now reaching for parity with the United States. The growing power of its nuclear capabilities indicates that PRC leadership intends to update its nuclear policy, moving from a no first use to an active and credible deterrent.

The US should consider at least two strategies to cope with this inevitability: build a stronger political commitment with allies in the Indo-Pacific and continue to counter the Belt and Road Initiative. Regardless of the time it takes for China to declare a new nuclear strategy, preparations within the American government must now begin as if this change has already occurred.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral student at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

China’s Growing Power and the Inevitable End of “No First Use” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, testified, “The Chinese will continue to develop weapons that they believe have advantage and deliver vulnerabilities to the United States.” What is interesting here is how, in less than a year, Admiral Aquilino’s discourse evolved from a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis China, to downright alarmist, albeit realistic, warnings.

As the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Aquilino leads the nation’s oldest and largest combatant command, responsible for US military activities in the Indo-Pacific region. The command includes over 380,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, coast guardsmen, and Department of Defense civil servants. When, back in May 2023, Admiral Aquilino delivered a keynote address to the National Committee on US-China Relations, his exchanges with the audience focused on Sino-American military policy in the context of the overall bilateral relationship. They followed the diplomatically conciliatory script “that conflict is not inevitable and that both countries seek peace and prosperity.”

Emphasizing peaceful relations and cooperation between the US and China, the admiral highlighted the importance of dialogue and adherence to international rules. He expressed concerns over China’s actions that undermine the rules-based international order, particularly regarding the law of the sea and attempts to replace it with self-defined rules.

While advocating for military exercises, Aquilino insisted on the need for collaboration and communication to manage competition responsibly and prevent potential conflicts. The discussion, which also covered surveillance flights and cooperation in humanitarian efforts and climate change, was replete with calls for transparency and adherence to international norms. The discussion on surveillance and military dialogue further underscored the importance of risk mitigation and crisis management to avoid escalations in regional tensions.

Fast forward to the March 2024 House Armed Services Committee hearing and Aquilino struck a much different tone. China, Aquilino suggested, is investing in military technologies to exploit American vulnerabilities and assert dominance. This is taking place while China focuses on assimilating Taiwan (peacefully, if possible, through force, if necessary). China is also actively attempting to displace the US as the world’s leading superpower.

China keeps increasing its defense budget despite a relative economic decline, further investing in nuclear and hypersonic weapons. There are concerns about China and Russia cooperating. This adds pressure on the US and its allies on several fronts. Aquilino warned Congress about potential challenges to American deterrence efforts against the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Having assessed the intensifying competition between the US and China in military capabilities and strategic influence, Admiral Aquilino focused on the enhancement of US conventional and nuclear defense capabilities to counter hypersonic weapons and the rapidly growing Chinese nuclear arsenal. If diplomatic efforts are to succeed, strengthening alliances and partnerships mitigating the influence of the China-Russia cooperation, increased attention must be paid to Taiwan’s security and to strategies to deter Chinese coercion without escalating into conflict.

While the continuous monitoring and adaptation of defense policies to address evolving threats from China and its partners is warranted, Admiral Aquilino concluded that “we need to negate those vulnerabilities, and we need to take advantage of our capabilities that outmatch theirs.” Indeed, China aims at more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and has already increased its arsenal from at least 300 to 500 weapons.

There is nothing particularly disruptive in what Admiral Aquilino advocates. He echos what a congressional commission concluded in 2023: that the US should work to expand and enhance its nuclear arsenal to compete with the combined threat posed by China and Russia. The Biden administration and its successor need to respond positively to multiple recommendations to modernize and expand the American nuclear arsenal. While this in itself is not sufficient, it is absolutely necessary, lest the nation allow American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific to falter, and, ultimately, American global leadership to unravel. The clock is ticking.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Indo-Pacific Command: US Must Improve Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In nuclear deterrence, where the stakes are high and the consequences of failure are catastrophic, narratives play a crucial role in shaping strategy and influencing outcomes. Narratives surrounding nuclear weapons have profound effects on perceptions of credibility, intentions, and, ultimately, shaping the behavior of states. Understanding the role of narratives in nuclear deterrence is essential for policymakers and strategists seeking to navigate the complexities of nuclear politics.

Role of Narratives in Shaping Perceptions of Credibility

Narratives are important in nuclear deterrence strategy in shaping perceptions of credibility. The credibility of a state’s nuclear deterrent is essential for its effectiveness in deterring potential adversaries. States that possess clear escalation dominance and nuclear superiority will hold an advantage in perceptions of resolve and strength. However, credibility is exclusively tied to a state’s willingness to use the bomb.

In the United States, the president is responsible for influencing the perceptions of his adversaries through crafting a compelling narrative that will properly induce fear into his enemy. Narratives that emphasize a state’s willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons can enhance its deterrence posture, dissuading others from taking aggressive actions. The only other way to enhance credibility beyond strategic narratives is to employ nuclear weapons in some capacity. Such acts are unpalatable for moral and ethical reasons, which leaves crafting convincing narratives as the preferred means of influencing an adversary.

Influencing Perceptions of Intentions

Narratives also influence perceptions of intentions. States often use narratives to signal their intentions and clarify their strategic objectives. For example, a state may adopt a narrative of minimum deterrence, emphasizing its nuclear arsenal’s defensive nature and its commitment to avoiding nuclear conflict. China is the prime example.

The inverse strategy to a narrative of minimum deterrence would be a narrative of maximum deterrence. In this approach, Russia, for example, emphasizes the offensive capabilities of its nuclear arsenal and its readiness to employ nuclear weapons in a wide range of scenarios. This narrative seeks to maximize the perceived threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Unlike the minimum deterrence narrative, which emphasizes restraint and a defensive posture, the maximum deterrence narrative emphasizes assertiveness and a willingness to escalate to achieve strategic objectives. Such narratives can help reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing clarity about a state’s nuclear policy.

Shaping Perceptions of Capabilities

Narratives also play a crucial role in shaping perceptions of capabilities. States often use narratives to convey information about their nuclear arsenal’s size, sophistication, and survivability. These narratives can influence how other states perceive the balance of power and make strategic calculations. For example, a state that portrays its nuclear arsenal as modern and reliable may be seen as more credible and capable of deterring potential adversaries.

Additionally, the concept of secure second strike is fundamental. This capability refers to a state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a devastating counterattack after absorbing a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory arsenals, which encompass a variety of delivery systems such as submarines, land-based missiles, and strategic bombers, are critical components.

Narratives surrounding second-strike retaliatory arsenals are designed to convey specific messages about a state’s nuclear capabilities. By highlighting the sophistication and survivability of their arsenals, states seek to deter potential adversaries by signaling that any attack would result in a devastating response.

Limitations of Narratives

Narratives in nuclear deterrence strategy are powerful tools, but they also have inherent limitations. One major limitation is the potential for misinterpretation or manipulation. Different states may interpret the same narrative in different ways, leading to misunderstandings and increased tensions. Moreover, narratives can be undermined by actions that contradict the message being conveyed. When China emphasizes its commitment to peaceful coexistence but then takes provocative actions, such as conducting aggressive military exercises near Taiwan, the credibility of its narrative is eroded. This is known as the credibility-action gap, where actions speak louder than words, undermining the narrative’s intended message.

When leaders openly talk about a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, expressing a moral revulsion to using them even in extreme circumstances, it can inadvertently weaken the state’s deterrent posture. Adversaries may perceive this as a lack of resolve, believing that the state would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons even if its survival was at stake.

Importance of Narrative Control

In the context of nuclear deterrence, narrative control is not just a strategic advantage but a fundamental necessity. It is through narrative control that states can shape perceptions, manage crisis situations, and ultimately enhance their deterrence posture. This is important for four reasons.

First, narrative control allows states to shape how their nuclear capabilities are perceived by others. By crafting a narrative that emphasizes their resolve, states can deter potential adversaries by conveying a clear and credible message. This perception can influence how other states make strategic calculations and may deter them from taking aggressive actions.

Second, during a crisis, narrative control can be crucial in de-escalating tensions and preventing misunderstandings. A carefully crafted narrative can provide clarity about a state’s intentions and actions, helping to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to escalation. By shaping the narrative surrounding a nuclear incident, states can help manage crisis situations and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.

Third, narrative control is essential for enhancing the credibility of deterrent threats. A state that successfully controls the narrative can convey a clear and credible message about its willingness and capability to use nuclear weapons, if necessary. This can enhance the credibility of its deterrent threats, making them more effective in deterring aggression.

Fourth, narrative control can help reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. By shaping perceptions, managing crisis situations, and enhancing credibility, states can deter potential adversaries and maintain peace and stability in the nuclear age.

Conclusion

With China and Russia growing increasingly assertive in the pursuit of their interests, nuclear deterrence is once again growing in its importance to the United States. The narratives surrounding nuclear weapons are pivotal in shaping perceptions of credibility, intentions, and capabilities. Crafting convincing narratives is thus crucial for President Biden and future presidents. As a free nation, the United States has never quite mastered the art of narrative creation because it can often seem antithetical to American values. It may seem too much like propaganda.

However, the time has come to reconsider this view. For the United States to effectively deter not only China and Russia, but also North Korea and a nascent nuclear Iran, an effective narrative is an important tool in the toolkit. This is particularly true as the American nuclear arsenal declines relative to those of China and Russia.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Narrative of Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping Strategy in an Uncertain World was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a security climate where problems must be tackled in weeks, months, or a year rather than decades or centuries, decision-makers need to prioritize and focus on end-states that are delivered in a finite time horizon with a limited budget and achievable outcomes. A Sum Greater Than Its Parts: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition, a recent report by MITRE and the Aspen Strategy Group, addresses this issue.

The abstract is promising, claiming that integrated deterrence offers a strategy for “managing strategic competition, maintaining peace, and, if necessary, prevailing in conflict” during competition with China. The report also promises “actionable recommendations for policymakers, military leaders and private sector stakeholders” and delivers a laundry list of 31 major initiatives to enhance deterrence.

While a few of the recommended initiatives are sensible and would be useful for deterring China, like modernizing military capabilities to provide assurance and demonstrate resolve, several others are unproven and their implementation could distract from a laser-focused deterrence strategy needed for China. Indo-Pacific nations are acutely affected on a regular basis, either by economic coercion or the looming possibility of conflict over Taiwan or other contested territory. As a result, effective deterrence of China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior must initially rely upon regional solutions to limit China’s most dangerous ambitions.

For a document proposing a China strategy, there is a strange obsession with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European issues. The term NATO appears nine times in the report, including a recommendation to consider internal dynamics in the alliance, while front-line allies in the Indo-Pacific that are key to deterrence (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) are mentioned as mere afterthoughts.

While there are good reasons to consider NATO, as part of any global strategy that includes deterring Russia, the emphasis on NATO seems misplaced given likely targets of Chinese aggression. The report also focused a large set of recommendations on developing public-private partnerships for deterrence, going as far as to “encourage all companies from allied nations to actively participate in strategic initiatives.” While portions of the private sector play a critical role in national security initiatives, it is unclear how a restaurant owner in Latvia could actively contribute to deterring Chinese aggression, for example.

Another group of recommendations suggests the broader use of economic levers including the use of “economic warfare” to undermine an adversary’s willingness to wage war. This ignores the fact that a broad range of economic measures aimed at isolating Russia had a limited impact on the Russian economy and proved to be an abject failure in deterring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The utility of economic sanctions in deterring adversaries has historically proven to be questionable. One study shows the use of sanctions leads to a higher probability of future conflict for democracies, as sanctions tend to signal weakness rather than strength. The utility of economic sanctions and other types of economic warfare to deter remains unproven.

The final grouping of recommendations in the report proved the most useful, suggesting that we must understand the adversary, define clear objectives, and build a grand strategy to win a strategic competition with China. MITRE needed to lead with clear objectives and an understanding of China’s goals and decision calculus. Instead, a long list of potential actions that might deter China is presented without sufficient links to China’s objectives. Rather than utilizing a strategy-to-task framework that links ways and means to the ends in a logical fashion, the report presents a broad range of ways and means primarily focused on integration.

Allies and diplomatic measures should play a crucial role in the realization of integrated deterrence, but policymakers must have clear and pragmatic options available. Prioritization of resources and initiatives to maximize deterrence requires a strong appreciation for the Indo-Pacific region, its unique dynamics, and China’s role in the region. Allies and partners must work bi-laterally and multi-laterally to operationalize deterrence in the region.

China is a significant and well-resourced adversary. To compete with and deter China effectively, the United States and its allies must be thoughtful about what initiatives are pursued and what resources are expended. Integration can improve outcomes, but only when it improves outcomes as part of a unified deterrence strategy. In a world where deterrence of China is urgently required, proven and effective measures that deliver deterrence must be brought together under a unifying strategy. This is the type of integration which should be implemented.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

 Leigh Ramsay is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

The views of the authors are their own.

Integrated Deterrence: Which of These Two Words Is More Important? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts to conventionally deter Iran failed with Iran-inspired fighting spreading from Gaza to the Red Sea, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Recently, three American soldiers were killed and 34 wounded in a drone attack by Iran-backed militants in northeastern Jordan, according to US Central Command. The Pentagon has reported more than 160 attacks by Iranian-linked militia groups on American bases and forces in the Middle East since Israel was attacked on October 7, 2023. These actions place immense pressure upon President Joe Biden to strike the sovereign territory of Iran, which Iranian leaders may view as an act of war.

Moreover, recent political decisions render the threatened use of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program impotent. In February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded President Trump’s United Nations (UN) sanctions restoration. This was followed by President Biden’s decision to release $6 billion “in exchange for the release of five Americans detained in Iran” and another $10 billion in a sanctions waiver that grants Iran access to money from Iraq in exchange for electricity purchases.

Recently, Maj Gen Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, said the country is not seeking war with America, but is not afraid of it either. Iran’s aggressive behavior certainly lends credence to the statement. Iran is emboldened by its allies and empowered by its proxies. This, of course, is backstopped by an eerie sense of confidence that Iran may soon become a nuclear power. In May of 2022, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that “Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb,” with a uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent that had grown four times in just 90 days.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and founder of the US Institute for Science and International Security, said that if Iran continues producing enriched uranium at the same rate, the regime will have enough weapons grade material to make 12 nuclear bombs within five months. Meanwhile, Iran successfully launched three satellites into space using a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket. This achievement undoubtedly accelerates Iran’s ability to perfect and field a future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), likely the regime’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery system.

The United States is now experiencing coordinated aggression. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”

Furthermore, the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board recently warned in their Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity that the United States must be concerned that adversary states could engage in opportunistic acts if or when the United States is engaged in other conflicts.

The bipartisan America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also advised that the possibility of opportunistic or simultaneous multi-state aggression should no longer be construed as improbable. According to the report, “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Opportunistic aggression can translate to other hostile states like Iran and North Korea in league with Russia and China if they perceive American limitations in capability, capacity, or the will to fight with enough ferocity as to induce the fear to attack in the first place.

It appears that Iran is taking advantage of an already beleaguered United States that continues to support Israel in its war with Iranian-backed Hamas; exports arms, munitions, and intelligence to Ukraine; deters a hostile North Korea; and must endeavor to discourage Iran’s top oil importer (China) from invading Taiwan. All of these “fronts” are collectively testing American diplomacy, burdening the American taxpayer, challenging the American defense industrial base, negatively impacting military readiness, and now producing American casualties.

Killing Americans is a clear escalation and yet another indication that Iran remains undeterred by the current threat of American power. These acts are timed to take advantage of an overburdened America and are designed to frustrate American efforts within the region and ultimately convince the United States to abandon its Middle East interests and allies. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s untimely proclamation on September 29, 2023, that “[t]he Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades” was a complete misreading of the region.

Successful deterrence requires the consistent application of power. Deterrence messaging must not be muddled or muted. It must be clear, powerful, and credible. How is this done?

First, the Biden administration must immediately end sanctions relief of Iran. The United States can never fund its adversaries.

Second, the United States must take a systematic approach to eliminate the weapons, command and control, and supplies of Iranian proxies. They must not be allowed to threaten American and allied forces across the region.

Third, the United States must credibly communicate through strength by moving nuclear assets closer to the region. The United States seems content to use ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) to deter North Korea. An SSBN in the Arabian Sea would communicate a similar deterrence message.

Fourth, America must heed the warnings of opportunistic multi-state aggression and prepare a robust capability to address this very real and demonstrated threat. To do otherwise risks abandoning regional allies in conflict.

Fifth, America must not attack Iranian targets within sovereign Iranian territory unless President Biden and Congress are ready to declare war. What may be a regional conflict for the United States is a fight for survival for the Mullahs in Tehran.

Iran and its proxies are not deterred from attacking American forces, whether motivated by opportunistic aggression or existential circumstances. It is time to create a real sense of fear within the Iranian leadership. They must dread economic isolation, the destruction of proxies, and potential attack on what Iran holds most valuable—themselves and their nuclear facilities.

However, unless prepared to declare war, the United States must limit its retaliation to targets outside sovereign Iran. To attack Iranian soil would be a clear indication that deterrence has failed and could potentially lead to an all-out war. Restoring deterrence after such an event would come at a much higher cost.

Deterrence aims to make the adversary afraid to attack by creating a preferable condition of war avoidance. The goal is to convince the adversary that maintaining a peaceful status quo is the best option. Starting a war to prevent another war is a bad strategy, and it does not qualify as deterrence.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterrence Is Failing in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the Cold War, the Navy contributed significantly more to the nuclear arsenal. The current limitation is traced back to the George H. W. Bush administration’s response to the successful outcome of the Cold War. President Bush recognized that with the end of the Cold War the United States needed to draw down its nuclear forces as the Soviet threat receded into history. Pushing for more arms control and assurance measures to allow for the new world order to take shape made strategic sense.

The Soviets were no longer a threat, the Chinese did not have sufficient capability to harm the United States, and there was no other rising nuclear power. Thus, the Bush administration eliminated all tactical nuclear forces from the Navy’s inventory. However, today’s geopolitical realities are very different.

The Current Challenge

The Trump administration recognized the deficiency in nuclear strategy and capability. Trump both sought to develop the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and fielded the W76-2 low-yield warhead for the Trident D5. Whether the W76-2 is a tactical weapon or a low-yield strategic weapon is debatable, but its purpose was to offer an alternative to the limited capability of Europe-based nuclear-armed dual-capable fighter aircraft.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the administration’s goal with the SLCM-N was to diversify nuclear delivery platforms that would not rely on allied support and hedge against any so-called breakout scenarios by adversaries, which is exactly what the Chinese began by the end of the Trump administration. Recognizing the risks from emerging threats and additional nuclear powers, President Trump’s SLCM-N proposal offered a credible means to deter multiple hostile nations while continuing to provide assurances to allies and partners.

Indeed, with China and Russia modernizing their strategic deterrent and seeking unique delivery means that undermine arms control agreements and North Korea making significant gains in its nuclear arsenal, it now makes strategic sense for the Biden administration to not only pursue SLCM-N, but also additional nuclear capabilities—to prevent conflict.

There are many in the arms control community that object to adding any new systems.  Some argue that new weapons would lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, particularly if they are considered theater or tactical nuclear weapons. They argue such a move turns deterrence into warfighting. The Congressional Research Service also claims that the Navy would sacrifice conventional capability and introduce unneeded friction into ally operations and cooperation.

Yet there are other issues that nuclear strategists should consider. Since the elder Bush eliminated tactical nuclear weapons from the Navy’s arsenal, the surface fleet and naval air forces do not possess the knowledge or means to deploy nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict where it becomes a necessity. Such a requirement generates significant need for training and certification of surface combatants and air assets. Nuclear weapons handling, storage, security, and employment are all part of the equation. Today, the Department of Defense and the Navy lack a feasible and suitable plan to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into the surface fleet and among assets, if required, which escalation over Taiwan could generate. With the Biden administration scrapping the SLCM-N in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, it appears that the status quo for the Navy will see no expansion of the sea leg.

However, it is time for the United States and the Navy to take a hard look at the capabilities required to both deter and, if necessary, defeat the Chinese in a Pacific conflict.  Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are all growing increasingly belligerent and seeking to change the American-led world order to one that better suits their authoritarian goals. This is nothing new.

Nuclear weapons are becoming the go-to means to deter the United States and America’s allies. To address the challenges discussed, reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons into the Navy makes strategic sense. This is not to “mirror” the adversary, but to give decision-makers more options for both deterrence and warfighting. A good start is to field SLCM-N in the Navy arsenal, but this is not the only system nuclear strategists should consider.

Additional Recommendations

Two additional recommendations are worth noting. First, as the B61-12 and B61-13 come available, returning a fighter-delivered gravity bomb to naval air wings is worth examination. Given their variable yield and short range, they have the ability to meet specific targeting needs in naval warfare. The very fact that that they are deployed to the fleet may also prove a sufficient deterrent to prevent conflict in the first place.

Second, the long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile may also be useful for deployment on surface ships. These weapons may also have a similar effect in convincing an adversary that the complexity of the deterrence calculation, and its failure, is not worth the risk.

As Paul Giarra writes, the Cold War Navy’s deployment of nuclear weapons across the fleet had a “sobering effect” on the Soviets. That effect deterred conflict. It is time to apply the lessons of the Navy’s past experience to the growing Chinese naval threat. It may aid in deterring conflict over Taiwan.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The US Navy’s Nuclear Posture: Fit for Purpose was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s notion of the “Middle Kingdom” is not just a historical concept; it is a guiding force shaping the nation’s foreign policy. Seen in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and military expansion, it portrays China as the cultural, political, and economic epicenter of the world. This intentional effort to shape the global system involves territorial disputes, diplomatic pressures, and information warfare, projecting China’s influence far beyond its borders.

However, beneath the peaceful platitudes lies a shadow. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s human rights landscape has taken a dark turn. From the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the challenges faced by Tibetans and Hong Kongers, China’s stance on basic freedoms is increasingly disconcerting. Moreover, China’s influence extends globally, touching on economic coercion, cyberattacks, and support for authoritarian regimes, challenging international human rights institutions and norms.

China’s challenge to the US and the post-1945 international system manifests in various forms, presenting a multifaceted threat. The ambition to displace, rather than replace, the US raises concerns about potential conflicts and instability. At its core is an ideological clash—China’s authoritarian capitalism versus the liberal democratic order that is the cornerstone of the international system. The corridors of power in the West are replete with recommendations: fortify alliances, champion human rights, and competently engage with the rising power.

As the world stands on the brink of a new global order, there is a sense of urgency to understand Chinese aspirations and prevent them from turning into conflict with the United States. The intertwining of power and principles calls for careful navigation of uncharted waters. The profound impact on human rights and freedoms demands a collective response—a strategic dance between nations, not merely in policy but in the very fabric of conscience.

To delve deeper into the implications of China’s global power projection, it is crucial to explore the ripple effects across various spheres. Economically, China’s rise has reshaped the global economic landscape. Its Belt and Road Initiative, spanning continents, creates a web of economic dependencies, presenting both opportunities and challenges for those nations involved. While some benefit from infrastructure development and economic partnerships, others find themselves vulnerable to China’s economic leverage. Ultimately, the terms of receiving Chinese aid often leave the recipient turning over ownership of ports, airports, railways, and other key infrastructure to the Chinese.

In the realm of technology, China is a formidable player. With advanced capabilities in artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and quantum computing, the country is positioning itself as a leader in the fourth industrial revolution. This technological prowess not only impacts the global market but also raises concerns about surveillance, privacy, and the potential

weaponization of technology for authoritarian control—something the Chinese Communist Party is already doing at home.

Moreover, China’s increasing military capabilities and assertiveness in territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, have geopolitical implications. The potential for conflicts or tensions in these areas pose a challenge to regional stability and global peace. The international community grapples with how to address and manage these challenges while avoiding the escalation of conflicts.

China’s global power projection also extends to the realm of soft power. Through cultural initiatives, media influence, and educational exchanges, China seeks to shape international narratives and perceptions. This cultural diplomacy aims to foster a positive image of China globally, further enhancing its influence and challenging the dominance of Western narratives.

In the economic and diplomatic arenas, China’s growing influence in international organizations and forums cannot be ignored. As the country becomes a key player in shaping global policies, there is a need for a recalibration of international governance structures to accommodate a multipolar world.

The implications of China’s global power projection are vast and multifaceted. From economic shifts to technological advancements, geopolitical tensions, and soft power strategies, China’s ascent reverberates across the globe. Navigating this complex landscape requires a nuanced understanding and proactive engagement from the international community to ensure a balance between cooperative partnerships and safeguard universal principles of human rights and freedom. The ongoing dialogue and strategic decisions made today will undoubtedly shape the course of international relations in the years to come.

Shane McNeil is an American intelligence professional with over 20 years of experience in the military, as a contractor, and as a government civilian.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

China’s Rise: Unraveling Power and Principle was originally published on Global Security Review.

Detractors raise three challenges to the Admiral’s concerns. First, the Chinese buildup is not extensive. Second, the Chinse cannot technically build such a big force in the projected timeframe. Third, there is nothing the Chinese threaten that justifies the level of concern. Let’s examine each concern in order.

The Chinese Buildup

According to a new Department of Defense (DoD) report on the military power of China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nuclear arsenal grew from 200 to over 500 in just the past four years and will hit 1,000 and by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. The 150 percent growth since 2020 is thus in the books and unprecedented.

As for the future, the key driving factor is the 300–360 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos that were built over the past few years. The silos are able to hold either the DF-31 or the DF-41 ICBM—capable of carrying three to ten warheads, respectively.

The additional major factor is the four new strategic nuclear-armed submarines (SSBN) projected to be fully operational by 2030, each with 20 missiles and three to six warheads per missile. The US Pacific Command says the submarines already in the Chinese fleet are currently being fitted with multiple warheads.

When combined, a reasonable estimate could project a Chinese nuclear arsenal significantly larger than the 1,500 projected for 2035. This is well above the US day-to-day operationally deployed strategic nuclear deterrent, especially given the shaky assumption that new Chinese ICBM silos will largely be filled with single warhead DF-31 missiles.

Do the Chinese have the technical capacity to build sufficiently to soon exceed the US nuclear force balance? Chinese state-run media claims that the DF-41 can carry up to ten warheads and, as James Howe explains, the PRC published a schematic of a DF-41 with ten warheads launched from a railcar.

The DF-41 has a payload of 2,500 kilograms. If one assumes this weight is split between ten warheads at 175-225 kilograms per warhead, which is feasible for a light re-entry vehicle, and reflects the Chinese trend to deploy smaller and more accurate warheads, then such an option is certainly possible.

The DoD, in the 2019 Chinese Military Power Report (CMPR), estimated that the DF-41 can carry six to ten warheads, while the 2023 CMPR now estimates the DF-41 can carry upwards of six warheads. China launched a DF-5 ICBM with ten re-entry vehicles in 2017, proving a technological capability to deploy ten warheads per ICBM.

What would the Chinese do with such a force if they built it? The United States is clearly the intended target. Critically important, as Admiral Richard told Congress, “The breathtaking growth and strategic nuclear capability enables China to change their posture and their strategy and execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy—the last brick in the wall of a military capable of coercion.”

The newly released report on the Strategic Posture of the United States concurs, noting that China and Russia repeatedly threaten the US with coercive nuclear strikes, while becoming closer allies with nuclear-armed North Korea and nuclear-aspiring Iran.

Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping designated 2027 as the year when China should have the military capability to resolve the “Taiwan” question. That could very well mean, as Admiral Richard warned, that China is seeking to coerce or blackmail the US to stand down over any conflict involving Taiwan, believing that a significant nuclear capability gives them the leverage to do so.

America’s Response

As the Strategic Posture Commission recommended, it is not that the US must match warhead for warhead the combined force of Russia and China. But as many of the Commission members emphasized, the US needs a greater nuclear deterrent capability because the program of record is not sufficient.

A quick increase in warheads carried by the Minuteman III ICBM and Trident D-5 sea-launched ballistic missile was recommended. They also suggested acquiring more Columbia-class submarines and some mobile Sentinel ICBMs. A sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile capability was highly recommended as well.

A robust missile defense of the US homeland, protecting against limited nuclear coercion, is also an excellent remedy. The new strategic environment is highly dangerous because of the significant and historically unprecedented growth in Chinese nuclear forces. To sustain deterrence, the US must add credible military capability to its nuclear forces in a series of planned, serial additions while finally deploying integrated air and missile defenses protecting the US homeland.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the case of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it seems China is sending both signals of strength and weakness to foreign audiences. What is the rationale behind these mixed signals?

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) faced some real setbacks this year, such as the August 2023 catastrophic loss of a nuclear submarine. A Type 093 Chinese 107m nuclear submarine hit a chain and anchor trap intended to snare Western vessels lurking off China’s Shandong province, with the entire crew of 55 submariners reportedly suffocated after a failure in the oxygen system. With the PRC expecting any fight with the United States to take the primary form of naval warfare, demonstrations of Chinese naval successes are important.

Then, in November, what some netizens refer to as “Chinese tofu dreg military equipment,” the PLAN’s most advanced 980 hull number Type 071 landing ship, the Longhushan, was seen with multiple fires on deck. Chinese sources claimed that the smoke was simply part of a screening exercise, but the reality is likely very different. Again, the failure gives the impression that the PLAN is not quite ready for the combined naval operations that are certain to take place in a conflict with the United States should China decide to attempt a Taiwan seizure.

To mollify American angst of China’s military buildup, the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs has several articles that explain Chinese action as a result of American aggression and strength. M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, and Magnus Langset Trøan’s China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion: How US Strategy Is Fueling Beijing’s Growing Arsenal suggests that China’s nuclear buildup is the result of its own perception of weakness. Whether this perspective is accurate is debatable, but it makes the case for Chinese weakness as an explanation for the military buildup. The implication is that the United States can change Chinese military efforts by demonstrating less strength.

Jisi Wang’s America and China Are Not Yet in a Cold War offers advice on how the two countries can avoid a Soviet-American style cold war that is precipitated by American fear of Chinese strength. In his article, Wang, a member of China’s foreign policy establishment, suggests that, in the case of Taiwan, China is capable of taking the country by force if the United States and Taiwan do not begin movement toward unification. The US would fail in any attempts to prevent China from “liberating” Taiwan. Wang’s recommendations for preventing a new cold war all require the United States to weaken its position vis-à-vis the PRC.

Given China’s investment in advanced technologies like hypersonic maneuverable reentry vehicles and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, which represent a significant evolution in its nuclear capabilities and strategy, no such approach to China should ever receive consideration. These developments also suggest a more complex and potentially assertive nuclear posture, moving beyond the traditional confines of minimal deterrence. This shift has major implications for global and regional security architectures, arms control, and the future of strategic stability.

Rather than responding with weakness, the United States should send an unmistakable message to Xi Jinping: the United States is ready and willing to counter Chinese aggression. The simple fact is authoritarian leaders of every stripe respect strength. Despite Xi’s efforts to hide his strength and bide his time, the United States must accelerate its effort to prepare Taiwan and other allies in the region to defend themselves against growing Chinese aggression.

Although the latest issue of Foreign Affairs seems to suggest, through its articles, that Chinese aggression is somehow the fault of the United States and that it is up President Biden and future presidents to take a less assertive path toward China, the fact remains that weakness is provocative. Giving up on Taiwan because China is too strong is not an option. Giving up on American nuclear modernization because China is too weak is also not an option.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, spent two decades in Taiwan and China before returning to the United States as a COVID-19 refugee. He currently lives in Washington, DC, and taught at the University of Nottingham’s School of International Studies in Ningbo, China.

Why Is China Sending Mixed Signals? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States and its allies need to engage in multi-pronged, asymmetric strategies that exploit the existing geostrategic circumstances. The chessboard of the East and South China Seas includes Japan’s Yaeyama Islands (YI) (Ishigaki, Taketomi, Iriomote, Yonaguni, Hateruma) and the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal (TS2). The geography of the YI and the TS2 is central to the strategic equation in the East and South China Seas, particularly in relation to preventing China from taking Taiwan. These locales are not merely dots on a map but multi-dimensional air, land, and maritime pieces on the chessboard or, more aptly, a Go board.

Yonaguni Island is close enough to Taiwan to serve as a forward post for both surveillance and military operations. Yonaguni serves as a forward listening post for activities around the East China Sea and the Miyako Strait, also known as the Kerama Gap. The Second Thomas Shoal, while far removed from the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan and even further from Mainland China, is emblematic of the contested multipolarity of the South China Sea and a source of Chinese aggression toward the Philippines.

The geography of these places interlocks with larger strategic aims, especially vis-a-vis Taiwan. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan it will need to see these islands and shoals incorporated into its defense strategy. If the US chooses not to defend Taiwan against China, it will need to see these areas incorporated into its defense strategy for the sake of a Japan and Philippines that now face a Communist China that has taken control of Taiwan.

The Yaeyama Islands, part of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, are located 200 kilometers from Taiwan. This proximity serves as a critical buffer zone in the event of Chinese military activity aimed at Taiwan. It provides a forward-basing opportunity for surveillance, rapid deployment, and potentially disruptive activities against Chinese assets moving toward Taiwan.

The undisputed Japanese sovereignty over the Yaeyama Islands (excluding Senkaku) offers a unique opportunity. The Japanese, and by extension their allies, have unequivocal authority to militarize the islands without violating international norms.

The same is true of the Philippine islands of Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait. These islands would prove to be especially critical in the event of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan.

Along with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade stationed on Yonaguni Island, a defense network aligning the islands appears to be taking shape. Looking to future military configurations, the US Marine Corps’ restructuring to establish marine littoral regiments points to a rapid adaptability aimed at responding to China’s growing presence. Such forces are particularly effective in island-hopping campaigns, enabling the US to project power in a more flexible and responsive manner.

The expanded regiment, previously the 12th Marine Regiment, was agreed upon by the United States and Japan following the 2023 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in January, according to the US Naval Institute, and is expected to be formed by 2025. Recently the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s commander, Lt. Gen. James Bierman Jr., visited Ishigaki, an island 160 miles east of Taiwan during the Resolute Dragon exercises.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines might consider more subtle and incremental actions. Deploying civilian fleets for research or fisheries, augmented by American and Philippine coast guard vessels, is a mechanism to assert a de facto presence without triggering a full-scale military response. By embracing the Chinese strategy of incrementalism, these nations can turn the tables without risking immediate reprisals or violating international law. Furthermore, the Philippines already established a legal precedent through its 2016 victory at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration.

A presence at TS2 sends a strong signal to China about the range and mobility of American and allied forces. This geographic stretching of the theatre can dilute Chinese focus and assets.  Recently, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels rammed Philippine Coast Guard and resupply ships carrying supplies to troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre. Considering the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Representative Mike Gallagher was emphatic that American support would include assisting the Philippines in establishing a more secure and permanent foothold in the TS2. If, for the sake of argument, Taiwan was part of China, the PRC is already encroaching on the space of two American allies—Japan and the Philippines.

Preventing further Chinese intrusion and hardening the outer islands and shoals of the Philippines and Japan can form a potential encirclement that limits the operational freedom of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in a Taiwan scenario. This Go strategy forces the PLAN into a multi-front conflict, complicating naval strategy. Exploiting these advantages requires an overlapping understanding of both the physical and symbolic dimensions of geography, intertwined with the complexities of military strategy, international law, and multi-dimensional warfare.

On November 9, in a Foreign Policy and the Quincy Institute jointly sponsored panel, Zack Cooper and Lyle J. Goldstein addressed the strategic value of the Senkaku Islands, which is just north of the Yaeyama Islands and the TS2. According to Goldstein, the US is not “going to defend shoals (TS2) or islands with goats (the Senkaku Islands).” He added, the need to “draw reasonable lines and do things that are affordable” is “a more realistic approach and that is consistent with realism and restraint.”

Cooper expressed concern about giving up TS2 or the Senkaku islands. He argued that conceding defeat on either front will cause American allies to ask, “You know, our alliance is backed by nuclear deterrence. What’s the red line on the nuclear deterrence?” By giving up on TS2 and the Senkaku Islands he said, “I worry that is what walks us into a very serious strategic crisis.” He added, “If we’re very sure that we can fight and defend Japan and the Philippines then why can’t we also protect Taiwan in the same way?”

Barely visible shoals and islands with goats will not retain their bucolic simplicity if the Chinese take control of them. In due time they will become fortified threats at the doorsteps of America’s allies. If the United States refuses to fight, it is a reasonable expectation that China will continue its aggression and claim historical ownership of Okinawa as well.

Absent a strong military response, an expansionist China may desire to limit Japan to the home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido. Chinese aggression toward the Philippines could see the country lose its islands north of Luzon. This may seem farfetched, but so, too, is believing that Chinese expansion is satiated with the Scarborough shoals and islands with nothing more than goats.

US Maneuvering in the Yaeyama Islands and the Second Thomas Shoal to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

This tough stance may seem puzzling. For one thing, Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), having a Taiwan-centered orientation, has historically been far less keen than the Kuomintang (KMT) to press on issues of ROC territorial claims outside of Taiwan proper, as these are widely seen as a holdover from the era of Republican China. For this same reason, Tsai has been perceived as being more amenable to developing deeper Taiwan-Japan ties, especially in such areas as security cooperation and trade relations—this latter would help both countries avoid keeping too many eggs in the China basket.

Likewise, from the Japanese perspective, there has been an embrace of—and high hopes for—the Tsai administration, as it promised an end to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-friendly policies.

In short: Taiwan and Japan make natural allies in a region and an era marked by an increasingly aggressive China. Why, then, Taiwan’s tough talk on the Senkakus, an issue which few Taiwanese people care about?

Earlier this month, the Executive Yuan—the executive branch of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—promulgated the island’s first-ever marine policy white paper on June 4, 2020. This move came at a time when the maritime security environment in the East and South China seas is becoming increasingly volatile as a result of China aggressively pressing its territorial claims in these bodies of water. The document has as its primary goal to provide consistent guidelines to government departments for implementing the sustainable development of ocean-related policies. According to the head of the ROC Ocean Affairs Council, the idea behind the white paper is to transform Taiwan into a “marine country,” and one that is “ecological, safe, and prosperous.”

The white paper is the result of the framework for the country’s ocean management, as approved by the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s Congress) in November 2019. The “basic act for ocean affairs,” as it is called, is another attempt to integrate all government agencies that are stakeholders in marine and maritime issues.

The efforts of the administration of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen to implement more coherent and coordinated ocean policies could not be timelier. Taiwan is an island, and it is surrounded by waters that are especially turbulent, from a geopolitical perspective. Moreover, for too long, the ROC government has paid short shrift to its littoral holdings, being reticent to conceive of itself as a maritime power. But an island nation it is, and it is about time that the DPP administration acknowledges this with its actions.

The paper U.S. Strategic Mobility in Deployment to Ensure Regional Security, written by Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a senior researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, affirmed Taiwan’s status as a nation with a stake in the events that transpire in the East and South China seas. Su pointed out that the PRC has been effective in leveraging the COVID-19 global pandemic to beef up Chinese power-projection capabilities, in the South China Sea and surrounding maritime areas, due in part to the reduced presence of the U.S. Navy. He also asserted that the instability has had a deleterious effect on key navigation channels such as the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, as well as the East China Sea.

What Su did not take into account was domestic inertia and party rivalry: That the task of coordinating and integrating the many national and local marine agencies in Taiwan, and overcoming the inter-party conflicts over maritime ideologies, may be more daunting than facing the geopolitical maritime perils that await them offshore. These two elements have long been roadblocks preventing Taiwan from being able to respond adequately to its urgent marine and maritime challenges.

In terms of coordination, the ocean-related matters in Taiwan involve at least 15 different agencies—some of whose jurisdictions overlap—ranging from technical departments to a general ministry, and from agencies that are directly involved with maritime issues to those for which ocean-related matters are only peripheral.

The main consequence of the difference in scope, focus, and structure of these government agencies—as well as the destructive yet inevitable inter-agency rivalries that tend to emerge in bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities—has been an inability to coordinate actions effectively. This makes it difficult to build up the momentum for the kind of change that is needed in order to remedy the above problems, making the proper administration of maritime affairs a difficult task.

Until now, nothing related to the marine or maritime policies in Taiwan has been integrated. Instead, there has been a patchwork of policies promulgated by a plethora of departments, each with its own marine-related area of oversight. Fishery issues are dealt with by the fishery agency, for example, and shipping issues, with the shipping agencies, and so on, until the proverbial right-hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.

Part of the reason for the different governing paradigms in Taiwan is that some sectors within the Pan-Blue camp (to wit: the KMT) still possess an outdated terrestrial or land-oriented mentality, inherited from the Chinese tradition from which this party evolved. This terrestrial mentality, however, also tends to make the KMT more assertive in terms of territory, as they see it essentially from the sovereignty perspective. It was under KMT leadership that the ROC laid the foundation for the modern Chinese maritime claims (adopted almost entirely by the PRC, interestingly). Thus, the PRC’s adherence to the U-shaped nine-dash line, originally published by the ROC in December of 1947. In this view, defense of the territorial claims in the area encompassed by this line is a natural position, and anything otherwise would be politically impracticable and ideologically contradictory.

On the other hand, the Pan-Green Camp, led by the DPP, tends to take the opposite tack. First, it prefers to focus on environmental questions, as this fits well with the DPP’s idea of being a friendly stakeholder in the disputes, given that the environmental protection discourse tends to have few opponents among the other claimants due to its nature as an issue of collective interests.

Finally, in diverting from the territorial-sovereignty discourse, the DPP intends to bring Western powers onside, by positioning its claims under the UNCLOS umbrella. Moreover, it will try to keep its distance from any mention of the U-shaped line map for two reasons: First, this presupposes a Chinese territorial centered view of the disputes, adoption of which would make the DPP undistinguishable from the KMT (and the PRC, for that matter). Second, the nine-dashed line map defense is not feasible under the UNCLOS perspective and would be perceived as extremely aggressive by the international community. These do not contribute to the way the DPP must position itself.

Therefore, the challenge of integrating ROC government departments and coordinating a coherent maritime policy is not a simple one. Whatever the effectiveness of the white paper presented by the Executive Yuan this year might bring in terms of day-to-day maritime and marine operations, a modus vivendi must be found between the Blues and the Greens. From this perspective, the Tsai administration’s tough talk on the Japanese redesignation of the Senkaku Islands may be interpreted as an olive branch to the Pan-Blue coalition—both politically, and to the many civil servants serving in the relevant ministries and departments who are known to have blue-leaning sympathies—in order to secure buy-in for this project.

If Tsai fails to find such common ground, then any of the eventual gains accrued from the current administration will be thrown away, just as both parties have done to each other every other time that a transition of power has taken place. The stakes are too high for the Taiwanese people to accept this outcome.

Confronting Japan to Defend Against China: Senkaku as a Case Study in Taiwan’s Politics was originally published on Global Security Review.

The current global pandemic that has affected us all has elicited extensive media attention.  A variety of theories have abounded on how the virus originated, i.e., that it is a biological weapon created in the lab by the Chinese, or by the U.S. military, or that it is fueled by the effects of 5G networks on our immune system. In addition, divergent views have emerged regarding the “hysteria” surrounding the pandemic, some preaching for a strict societal response, and others claiming that the surrounding panic is more detrimental for society than the danger of the virus itself. Leaders have responded differently to the crisis and have received both praise and criticism for their actions. Some leaders responded as soon as they heard warnings from the World Health Organization, which called it a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” in January, while others did not pay immediate attention to warning signs.  Some responded with the concept of building “herd immunity” throughout the society, others called for total lockdown. Some leaders are demonstrating transparency to their citizens and to the world community to tackle the challenge, while others resort to hiding information or disregarding efforts at a global response. All actions and reactions have received immense scrutiny through media platforms, as per the modern-day norm.¹

In this age of mass media, infinite narratives, and political polarization, where “objective” information often becomes blurred as subjective, could this pandemic be shining a light on what “responsible leadership” really means? Could a truth be emerging instead of a subjective opinion? In a public health crisis, conspiracy theories can kill.  Citizens look to their government for protection and are placing their safety in the hands of their leaders.  During such a critical moment, a leader must act in the best interest of the population and the world at large, or else be labeled as a leader who mishandled an epidemic and put lives at risk, something that is never taken lightly.  Even populist politicians, who have shown a general tendency to ignore scientific advice, have heeded policy recommendations from the scientific community to tackle the spread of the virus, demonstrating that denial is not a viable option. The role of the media remains critical in such an instance, as the media have a responsibility to present factual information and constructive solutions to the problem and have a duty to be critical of the mismanagement of leadership rather than encourage the spread of disinformation or politicizing the crisis. This crisis has the potential to reshape the way we view responsible leadership and see the value in constructive journalism and scientific data.

The sharing of information in our world today has evolved dramatically.  Some have coined the term “post-truth world” to illustrate the present-day difficulties of discerning truth from falsehood. We now have access to more information and evidence than ever before, yet facts seem to have lost their power somehow. Furthermore, the popularity of populists these days points to the tendency of people being attracted to what they consider more “genuine” messages as opposed to the narrative from the “establishment,” which has now been categorized as “elitist,” with little regard for the common folk.  Mainstream media, academia, science, and establishment politicians have all been placed in this category. The Oxford Dictionaries define “post-truth” as: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”  Societal trust in institutions has waned, as the general population has grown more inclined to believe that institutions such as academia or the media are simply platforms through which the establishment tries to control the narrative in society. In other words, there is a crisis of confidence. Today in the political West, instead of merely having left-wing versus right-wing politics, we increasingly see the division lying between anti-establishment and establishment political parties. Amidst this crisis of confidence, the current “information age” is a perfect breeding ground for the perpetuation of multiple competing narratives, mistrust, confusion, sensationalism, polarization and creates what seems like a “post-truth” environment.

Social media play an immense role in this “post-truth” concept. On social media, everyone has a voice and a space to share his or her belief system. People enjoy writing their thoughts and sharing comments, receiving attention, and building networks of like-minded people online. But what social media also perpetuate is polarization and sensationalism.²  To take the example of YouTube, its algorithm is constructed on the basis of encouraging the viewer to spend as much time as possible on its platform.  Therefore, when one searches for something specific to watch, videos with similar content appear as recommendations for what to watch next, reinforcing one’s point of view continuously, whether or not it is based on factuality. In addition, one’s activity on social media is recorded as data to which external companies have access.  These companies can then take advantage of one’s tendencies and beliefs to convey a particular world view to specific targets to help certain political campaigns. There have been multiple instances of troll farms creating fake accounts on social media and influencing users to be attracted to a particular viewpoint. Most of the time, this goes on without our even being aware of it.  In other words, we have lost touch with objective reality in some ways, are increasingly polarized, mistrustful, and are giving in to sensationalism, which news media channels have also taken advantage of as a way to increase their ratings. Social media offers impressionable youth and troll factories the opportunity for mischief without consequences. This type of reality is bound to breed, increasing distrust.³

Despite all the misinformation about the virus that is floating around, this pandemic has revealed an interesting twist in the form of an emerging truth.  People can say what they want to say, but the truth is that there is simply no getting around the actual numbers such as the number of cases, number of deaths, needed hospital beds, ventilators required, and witnessing the effects of one leader’s response compared with another on this set of variables. There is no room for downplaying something whose results are visible and affect the whole of society. No amount of denial or refusal to accept scientific facts is going to help in this situation.  Today’s pandemic requires that each leader take responsibility for the crisis to ensure the best outcome for his or her country, state or city, and the world at large.  In a public health crisis such as this one, we cannot ignore scientific expertise.  It is through their advice and assessments that we as a society can fully understand what is unfolding, and it is up to each leader to either heed their warnings or not. We do, however, continue to see politicized narratives and blame games from leaders who may not have reacted quickly enough, who instead attribute blame elsewhere while playing into their constituency’s worldview.  But even this practice has lost momentum and credibility in most places due to the critical nature of the crisis as it pertains to public health and the health of the economy.

China’s response to the virus has proven to be very controversial. Once the situation was made apparent domestically, draconian measures were implemented in the city of Wuhan, and the central government entrusted the scientific community with the handling of the situation, which now appears to be under control. So, on the one hand, the measures that were taken were in tandem with the expert advice of the medical community, and internal misinformation on the severity of the crisis was stopped once the central government took action against the virus. However, there was a significant problem in the handling of the outbreak when it first appeared. The problem initially was that the Wuhan province denied the severity of the virus, denied it was transmissible to humans, and did not share the information fast enough with the local population nor the central government, which allowed the virus to gain a tenacious hold. This original lack of transparency from Wuhan had severe consequences not only for China but for the international community.  Not acting quickly enough does not tame the spread of the virus. At the same time, it is still possible, and not revealing the extent of the problem to the international community doesn’t allow for enough preparation time for what is to come.  Institutions such as the WHO are only as effective as nations will enable them to be.  Its response will only be as successful as the information it receives and to which it has access. U.S. intelligence reports state that China may not have been transparent with the total number of infected cases or deaths that it officially reported, which also does not give the international community a sense of future trends in other countries.  China is now actively lending its help to the international community as a sign of solidarity and cooperation by sending supplies, rallying for global coordination, and hosting video conferences with other countries to share experiences, initiatives that the West is receiving criticism for not leading.⁴ But the international community’s outlook towards China remains distrustful due to their early mismanagement of the crisis and dubious declaration of official counts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and some right-wing media in tandem with Fox News were early on heard downplaying the disease, saying it was a “hoax.” However, once the numbers caught up to them, there was no getting away with that type of rhetoric anymore.  Credibility is lost when one toys with matters of life and death on this scale. Trump has had to listen to medical experts such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has consistently advocated for more robust measures such as imposing more prolonged and stricter lockdowns alongside increasing testing. Even though Dr. Fauci has become the target of an online conspiracy theory that he is trying to undermine the President, Trump has had to follow his advice and apply more appropriate policies.  Dr. Fauci has won the approval of 78 percent of Americans, while just 7 percent disapprove, according to the Quinnipiac national survey.[5] At this current time, Trump’s handling of the crisis is approved by about 41% of Americans.[6] Although the Trump Administration has previously shown a distaste for relying on scientific expertise, it is particularly harmful to do so during a pandemic.  If leadership tries to sow distrust in public health officials during a time when their advice is especially crucial, the results could be disastrous. Evidence shows that Mr. Trump, however, continues to mishandle information. He tweeted that the HHS Inspector General’s reporting on hospital shortages was wrong and fake and is criticizing the WHO for not having dealt with the virus aggressively enough to divert attention away from his own administration’s slow reaction, messages that encourage distrust in the information we receive from public health institutions and medical experts during a critical time. President Trump later decided to cut U.S. funding to the WHO, which is bound to have detrimental effects in nations that heavily rely on support from the organization. The U.S.’s “America First” strategy sends a clear message to the international community that it does not intend to provide global leadership during this crisis as it has done in the past. This also goes for the U.S.’ allies in Europe, with whom no efforts to coordinate the travel ban coming from the E.U. was made. The German view of Trump has been made apparent when a shipment of 200,000 masks destined for Berlin was supposedly re-routed to the U.S. The fact that Germany would even think of blaming the U.S. for this speaks volumes.⁷ Also, international action at the U.N. Security Council has been hampered by the U.S.’s objections over terminology and insistence on calling it the “Wuhan Virus.”⁸  Also, for the same reason, any hope of G7 foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on the fight against COVID-19 was killed.⁹ Trump has also ignored calls to create a global task force for COVID-19. When a leadership vacuum is produced, others rush to fill the void. In this case, it is China, as the U.S. backed away from activating any conventional international consortium to fight the virus with a united front.¹⁰

Narendra Modi, India’s right-wing populist prime minister, has ordered the most extensive lockdown in human history, pointing to the fact that despite one’s inclinations, inaction is simply not an option during this pandemic. Nevertheless, he is still acting irresponsibly in many ways. Modi dismissed the severity of the epidemic at first. When he yielded to the example of others in the international community and ordered the lockdown, he only gave the population of India four hours’ notice. This, in turn, led to mass labor migration across states largely on foot, surely an inviting breeding ground for the spread of the virus.  In addition, instead of actively mitigating the dissemination of misinformation, the government allows for the spread of utterly false information that has no scientific validity on how to cure the virus, such as by drinking cow urine or bathing in cow dung. Modi has also not stopped the politicization of the coronavirus as being a virus that originated from the Muslim communities, which are now the target of Hindu communities who think it is a ploy to destroy them. Hospitals are underfunded and underequipped, and minimal testing is being carried out. The difference is that some provinces in India are faring much better than others, and these so happen to be mostly the ones that are not governed by Modi’s BJP party. A couple of the southern provinces, such as Kerala in southwest India, are doing much better. They are the example of what the federal government should be doing, which is to follow the advice of the scientific community, reject false information, and limit grandiose expressions of misdirected success stories by leadership.

Germany has proven to be particularly responsible in dealing with the crisis. They tested extensively, made people stay home, used a system of early detection of cases, and had time to prepare for the influx of patients in hospitals. Also important to note is the way Chancellor Angela Merkel was very upfront about the seriousness of the epidemic and resisted any urge to sugarcoat anything, thus making people understand the importance of the situation and follow orders from the start. According to a German public opinion survey, 72% of respondents said they are satisfied with the government’s handling of the crisis. Interestingly to note also is that establishment parties in Germany have gained popularity during this crisis, while the popularity of anti-establishment parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has dropped.¹¹

South Korea has so far established itself as one of the more successful models for responding to the virus.  It is regarded as successful because it was transparent with other countries and with its own population from the outset. A combination of extensive testing and meticulous contact tracing allowed them to control the virus spread effectively. Health managers knew exactly what to plan for, and they used science to guide them through every step of the way. Taiwan is another excellent example.  The government acted immediately as of January with border control and the wearing of facemasks.  While they were reacting quickly, other countries around the world were still debating whether to take action or not. Some of the decisive measures implemented were a ban on travel from China, the introduction of strict punishments for anyone breaching home quarantine orders, a ramp-up domestic face mask production, island-wide testing, and punishment for those who spread disinformation about the virus. Most importantly, there was substantial public trust for the medical experts who held daily briefings on the matter.

Brazil is a good example of how the public can react when a leader does not act responsibly in the face of a public health crisis of this proportion. Jair Bolsonaro still hasn’t gotten the memo that distrusting the scientific community and generating misinformation can be dangerous. He has described the illness as a “cold” and has accused the media of manufacturing hysteria. The governors of Brazil have gone ahead and imposed lockdowns using their own powers, but Mr. Bolsonaro has encouraged Brazilians to ignore them. His irresponsibility towards the crisis has stirred a strong reaction from the public. Through his recklessness with the lives of Brazilians, he has hastened the possibility of his own departure on the political scene. Brazil’s Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta’s approval rating soared to 76% over his handling of the coronavirus crisis as he actively informed the population of the current situation and the appropriate measures to take. In comparison, the approval for President Bolsonaro’s handling of the crisis slipped to 33%, a poll by Datafolha showed.¹² Data also showed an increase in support for Brazil’s various governors, who demonstrated to be more in line with the advice of the scientific community than the President. So even part of Bolsonaro’s support base, people who elected the populist leader to reduce the rampant corruption in Brazil, has deemed him irresponsible when faced with this crisis. Bolsonaro later went on to fire the Health Minister after he advocated for a more unified voice from the government on television.

Meanwhile, the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko sneers at the lockdown measures being implemented all over the world. Lukashenko has not imposed a single restriction since the outbreak of the pandemic, claims that the situation is under control and that it suffices to drink vodka and take a sauna to cure the virus. Neighboring countries have expressed concern about his unorthodox response to the crisis. Without much of a state response, the citizens of Belarus have taken on the responsibility themselves to manage the crisis. People have volunteered to raise money for hospitals and needed supplies, private companies have allowed their staff to work at home, and football fans have called for competition to be suspended. The Metro has its carriages cleaned every day, and the Belarusian Orthodox Church has asked people to stay away from churches for now and are holding masses online. According to SATIO, a Minsk-based survey, about 48% of Belarusians stopped attending public events, and many have self-isolated.¹³ Cafes and restaurants have also decided to close or shift towards takeout and delivery. Some parents have stopped bringing their kids to school, which has forced the government to compromise and extend “spring break” by two weeks. That same survey stated that 70% of Belarusians favor a total ban on public events, and more than half would like to see education institutions close and have people work from home.¹⁴  Sixty-two percent of those surveyed feared the health system would collapse in the face of this pandemic.¹⁵ In a country without free media, the average citizen is left confused about the state of affairs and on what the government is doing. Social media has become a platform for citizens to gain awareness. A very influential post by a doctor on Vkontakte depicted the situation in the hospitals as “out of control.”¹⁶ The doctor was later called in by prosecutors.  Citizens of Belarus have taken to social media to criticize the President and his unethical response to the current pandemic under the hashtag #прашчальнаесловапрэзидзента, or “the president’s parting words.”¹⁷

Each of the examples examined has demonstrated that despite regime type or political affiliations, and despite general tendencies of some politicians to ignore science, it is evident that those who respect the advice of the medical community, who do not waste time propagating false information, who remain transparent and who engage in international efforts, have been deemed leaders who are tackling the virus more responsibly. Conversely, those who ignore experts, sow confusion among the public and demonstrate a lack of transparency and willingness to cooperate are seen as acting irresponsibly. Irresponsibility during a public health crisis ultimately leads to more infections, deaths, and general disapproval. There is no room for “post-truth” in the management of this crisis.  Denying it will cause outright danger to society. Mishandling it for political purposes is reckless, and encouraging false narratives steers the goal away from tackling the issue and responding with urgency. There is a clear binary between what is responsible here and what is not. The relative success that some countries have demonstrated in curbing infections has resulted from quick action, trusting the advice of the medical community, executing a sober strategy, and remaining transparent. The case of COVID-19 will show that responsible leadership is needed and that objectivity exists when assessing what is constituted as competent in the management of this crisis.

In this hotly discussed arrival of the “post-truth” era, people may have stopped demanding the truth because they have understood that they are excluded from any decision-making or ability to change their environment. “Infotainment” or information presented as entertainment has become commonplace. But now, during the coronavirus pandemic, faced with questions of life and death, there seems to be more of a demand for truth. The media have an essential responsibility to point out misinformation and deficiencies, ensure the correct dissemination of factual information, and refrain from politicizing a matter of urgency.  The media sources that do this will be labeled as more legitimate, while others who are trying to sow discord will lose credibility.  Trust is found in circumstances where people are seen to work together toward a greater goal. Rebuilding trust in society is going to take a while since our crisis of confidence stems from many complicated structural factors, including the economy and democratic processes. But what this crisis can teach us or at least shed light on is the importance of reliable information, leaders who make it their priority to protect us, and media that want to help us understand what is going on rather than confuse us more or leave us in the dark. If we work together as a society to combat this common enemy and take responsibility, people may feel the return of a sense that they can control their environment and contribute to a greater good – a feeling that would help stabilize our crisis of confidence.  The pandemic is shedding light on what is considered “responsible leadership,” both nationally and internationally.  This development is refreshing and essential in a world that has created so many different versions of the truth.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of the U.S. government or any U.S. government agency.

¹ A previous version of this article was published on April 17, 2020, by Loftus, Suzanne, “COVID 19: Post-Truth Age – Or Facts Making a Comeback?” The Globalist, April 17, 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/coronavirus-pandemic-covid19-media-social-media-misinformation-post-truth-populism/.

² Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality (New York: Public Affairs, 2019).

³ Simon Blackburn, “How Can We Teach Objectivity in a Post-Truth Era?” NewStateman, February 18, 2019. https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2019/02/how-can-we-teach-objectivity-post-truth-era

⁴ Evelyn Cheng, “Xi Calls for Coordinated Response to Coronavirus at G-20 Meeting,” CNBC, March 26, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/27/xi-calls-for-coordinated-global-response-to-coronavirus-at-g20-meeting.html.

⁵ Quinnipiac University Poll: https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3658

⁶ Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, “Poll: Majority of Americans Disagree With Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus Pandemic,” U.S. News & World Report, April 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2020-04-23/poll-majority-of-americans-disagree-with-trumps-handling-of-coronavirus-pandemic.

⁷ Matthew Karnitschnig and Judith Mischke, “Berlin Lets Mask Slip On Feelings for Trump’s America,” Politico, April 6, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-lets-mask-slip-on-feelings-for-trumps-america/.

⁸ https://www.france24.com/en/20200407-un-security-council-expected-to-hold-first-coronavirus-talks-thursday

⁹ Katie Simpson and Alexander Panetta, “G7 Ministers Spike Joint Statement on COVID-19 after U.S. Demands it be Called ‘Wuhan Virus,'” CBC News, March 25, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/g7-covid-19-coronavirus-wuhan-pompeo-trump-1.5510329.

¹⁰ John Haltiwanger, “The U.S. is ‘Not a Global Power’ Thanks to Trump’s Disastrous Coronavirus Response as China Fills the Void, Former U.S. Officials Warn,” Business Insider, April 15, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-chaotic-coronavirus-response-has-created-void-china-is-filling-2020-4?r=DE&IR=T.

¹¹ Sabine Kinkartz, “Coronavirus: Angela Merkel’s Approval Ratings Up Amid Health Crisis,” DW, April 3, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-angela-merkels-approval-ratings-up-amid-health-crisis/a-53001405.

¹² Anthony Boadle and Pedro Fonseca, “Brazilians Scorn Bolsonaro’s Coronavirus Efforts, Back Health Officials: Polls,” Reuters, April 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil/brazilians-scorn-bolsonaros-coronavirus-efforts-back-health-officials-polls-idUSKBN21L1W8.

¹³ Anna Perova, “Uvereny, chto stanet khuzhe. Belorusov oprosili naschet ikh otnosheniya k koronavirusu,” Tut Novosti, April 1, 2020, https://news.tut.by/society/678769.html.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Linas Jegelevicius, “Belarus and Coronavirus: Lukashenko’s Business-As-Usual Approach is ‘Mind-Blowing Negligence,'” Euronews, April 21, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/21/belarus-and-coronavirus-lukashenko-s-business-as-usual-approach-is-mind-blowing-negligence.

¹⁶ James Shotter and Henry Foy, “Belarus Faces Growing Criticism for Dismissive Coronavirus Response,” Financial Times, April 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/925c16e9-bd18-4678-936a-0539588facfa.

¹⁷ Tatiana Zinkovich, “The President without a Plan: Alexander Lukashenko still insists nobody’s going to die from COVID-19. What on earth is happening in Belarus?” Meduza, April 16, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/04/16/the-president-without-a-plan.

COVID-19 and Responsible Leadership in a “Post-Truth” Age was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

China’s military expansion is occurring at a time when Taiwan is becoming more resistant to cross-strait reunification, and the U.S. is altering its commitment to Taiwan, suggesting an increasingly dangerous decade ahead in the Taiwan Strait.

Key Insights

• Taiwan’s democratic consolidation means any future reunification with the mainland will be exceedingly difficult.
• China’s confidence in its ability to use force might mislead it into preparing for an invasion
• Misperceptions over shifts in U.S. commitment towards Taiwan could encourage an aggrieved China to use force in the future

The Taiwan Strait is reaching a critical juncture of heightened instability. Heading into the 2020s and 2030s, the struggle for independence, status quo, or reunification will be increasingly felt as each of the key actors—Taiwan, Washington, and Beijing—begin to unravel the twenty-five years of relative stability that has endured since the 1995-6 crisis. Since then, the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy has become the greatest challenge to China’s quest for reunification. Taiwan continues to oppose any possibility of reunification on Beijing’s terms even if its future leaders do not seek formal independence. Indeed, the public majority and leaders of the traditionally pro-China pan-Blue coalition and independence-minded pan-Green coalitions, including next year’s election candidates, have opposed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reintroduction of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework for reunification.

Although peaceful reunification is frustrated, mainland China is becoming more powerful and impatient under Xi’s leadership. This is not to suggest that the economic problems China faces are not acute. But the People’s Liberation Army is growing more confident in its ability to match the Taiwanese and U.S. armed forces in a contest of strength. If Xi fails to deliver the prosperity promises of his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” he could very well resort to speeding up his other more revisionist ambitions of developing a world-class military and reunifying the territories lost during the “Century of Humiliation.”

Costs of Invasion

During the 1995-6 crisis, there was no doubt about the credibility of U.S. deterrent capabilities buttressing the might of the Taiwanese armed forces, which were then considered to be more advanced and powerful than the PLA. Decades later, China’s “military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages in deterring PLA aggression,” including “the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense,” the U.S. Department of Defense noted in its 2017 report on Chinese military power. These shifts have purportedly led Xi to believe that the “tide of history”—that is, reunification with Taiwan—favors the mainland.

Assessing the cross-strait military balance generates doubts about the PLA’s capacity to subjugate Taiwan. Beijing lacks the amphibious and lift capabilities to land an invasion, and Taiwan possesses submarines and sea mines that could seriously damage any invasion fleet. Climatic conditions and the gradual build-up of Chinese forces also complicate any surprise offensive. The possibility of staging an urban, counterinsurgency warfare against a resilient Taiwanese society while simultaneously holding off U.S. forces in the Western Pacific also diminishes the success of a Chinese invasion. But with China’s continued acquisition of the relevant capabilities, these disadvantages will gradually erode in the coming decade.

Furthermore, the PLA does not need to be fully equipped to fight a war of reunification. Whether to wage war is not a decision based solely on military calculations, and having confidence in the PLA may mislead the Chinese Politburo into taking an aggressive posture. Given Beijing’s routinization of ‘island encirclement patrols’ and the creation of cross-strait military-civilian flight paths to familiarise the PLA with the terrain and conditions of airlift, an invasion may no longer require a gradual military build-up. By engineering a heightened state of military readiness, it is difficult for Taiwan to gauge when China decides to launch a surprise offensive.

It would be naive to assume that Xi does not have the political resolve to bear the responsibility of a post-invasion war-torn economy, whose share of trade to mainland China has declined to a mere 2% of total Chinese exports. Nor should it be assumed the fear of an anti-China international coalition and the repercussions to its “peaceful rise” image will restrain Beijing from using force. Since 2016, China has been engaging in a multi-faceted pressure campaign to reinforce an alternate reality of Taiwan as a “local affair” to curtail potential foreign criticisms of its cross-strait activities. This has included not just usual diplomatic isolation, but more recently a whole-of-society approach to bring the pressure to bear on the private individuals, commercial airlines and retail businesses of other countries. To a large extent, this has worked. Even the U.S., the primary security guarantor for Taiwan, quietly removed the Taiwanese flag from two of its government websites, suggesting an implicit yielding to Chinese pressure.

Potential U.S. Gradual Retreat

In the coming decade, the costs of invasion will have likely declined, while frustration with Taiwan’s democracy and impatience regarding delays to reunification will have increased. Taiwan will then have to rely not on itself but on U.S. resolve to deter a potential Chinese invasion. Although Washington has entered a period of “strategic competition” with Beijing, growing resource strain — especially with sustained budget sequestration — will force American administrations to reassess U.S. commitment overseas. However, U.S. policymakers, having witnessed President Donald Trump’s damage to U.S. international standing, are unlikely to retreat into isolation. But subsequent occupants of the White House will be forced to weigh the country’s commitments more carefully between vital and peripheral interests.

In this regard, U.S. interest in Taiwan has remained ambiguous since the post-World War II aftermath. While Taiwan sympathizers continue to uphold Taiwan as a vital U.S. interest, the stakes pale in comparison to other more pressing U.S. interests in Asia, such as support for Japan and maintaining the rule of law in the South China Sea. But the issues of prestige and reliability as the region’s primary security guarantor, the fear of China construing U.S. retreat as a sign of weakness, and the domestic sensitivities toward Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy” could conflate Washington’s priorities to stay committed in the face of aggression. Thus, while its ability and willingness to deter China from invading Taiwan is likely to decline over time, it will not retreat without putting up resistance. To make up for resource strain, Washington will demonstrate its symbolic gestures to Taiwan to caution China about the prospect of U.S. military intervention. This included the recent passing of the Taiwan Travel Act to allow two-way senior official exchanges, stationing U.S. military personnel to the new American Institute in Taiwan for the first time since 2005, potential port visits and new arms sales. But in doing so, Beijing could misread the gestures as signs of a growing commitment to Taiwan and be provoked into threatening the U.S. not to interfere in its “local affairs.”

Misreading of Signals

The Taiwan Strait has resumed its status as a dangerous flashpoint. In arranging for a politically viable way to reduce its commitment to Taiwan, Washington could find itself unwittingly confronting an aggrieved and more confident China while trying to preserve its domestic and regional reputation as best as possible. U.S. sales of 60 F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan demonstrated this challenge: the sale was praised as symbolically important but was perceived as an act of provocation by Beijing, resulting in the PLA’s intentional crossing of the ‘median line’ in the Taiwan Strait for the first time in twenty years.

While this has not escalated into further U.S.-China confrontation, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s decision to automatize the forceful expulsion of Chinese forces suggests that future transgressions of the ‘median line’ will no longer be safe from unprofessional encounters and shoot down incidents. The U.S. will then be pressured to respond with a stronger deterrent posture. But with little to no confidence-building mechanisms to manage cross-strait instability, the mutual signaling of threats between Washington and Beijing could turn into ever-more aggressive shows of force, entrapping both countries into a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis and with consequences they are not prepared to face.

The New Taiwan Strait Crisis: a Dangerous Decade Ahead was originally published on Global Security Review.

In contrast to its predecessors, the Trump administration has brought about some relevant changes to U.S. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “inter-state strategic competition” has reappeared as the principal threat to U.S. national security.

Similarly, the 2017 National Security Strategy contends that China—together with Russia—threatens to challenge “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” In short, China must be considered a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power” as it is promoting a worldview utterly “antithetical” to U.S. values and interests.

Each subsequent strategic and operational document released by the Trump administration since the National Security Strategy (2018 Nuclear Posture Review; 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0; 2019 Missile Defense Review) has chorused those conclusions. After unveiling the 2017 NSS, the White House imposed tariffs on China in response to allegedly unfair trade practices.

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The United States first imposed tariffs on $3 billion worth of goods and then enacted measures on another $50 billion. In September of 2018, the U.S. imposed a 10% tariff on approximately $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, with a possibility of a rise to 25% in January 2019. The U.S. and China negotiated a temporary truce over further protectionist escalation at the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires in December 2018, averting an increase in tariffs on Chinese exports. Nevertheless, competition between the U.S. and China is expected to endure, primarily in the economic and technological realms, forcing Washington and Beijing into an uneasy peace.

After four decades of economic growth, China today is a great power, eager to pursue its strategic interests. On a global level, however, China is bound by structures, institutions, procedures, and rules that have been promoted by the United States since 1945, and ultimately standardized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Regionally, Chinese expansionism is constrained by the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke security system that binds the United States with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region (primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand). Policymakers should keep the following four points in mind when developing China policies—these four “nots” are essential for understanding Chinese behavior, goals, and interests.

1. The center of political authority in China is NOT Xi Jinping; it’s the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to downplay the role Xi has played in fueling China’s global ambitions—rather, since 1978, it has been the Party that ultimately drives China’s foreign policy and grand strategic goals. It has always been since 1978. If Xi wants to implement a new vision or global agenda, he nevertheless needs the Party’s approval. Additionally, as Rush Doshi contends, concepts usually attributed to Xi such as “national rejuvenation,” “strategic opportunity,” and “China’s great power status,” were laid down before Xi rose to the apex of the CCP in November 2012.
2. China’s revisionist behavior is NOT revolutionary; It’s incremental and selective. As Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory states, there are two plausible paths of systemic revisionism: incremental and revolutionary. Incrementalism aims to implement “continuous adjustments within the framework of the existing system,” while revolution occurs with “intermittent abrupt changes.” Empowered by forty-years of unprecedented economic growth, Beijing eventually became more assertive and demanding of what it perceives is a more accommodating and beneficial international order, but stopped short of attempting a sweeping and radical restructuring of the global order. Thus, as Evan Feigenbaum states, China is carrying out revisionist policies through an incremental and selective approach rather than a revolutionary one.
3. China is NOT a peer competitor to the U.S. at present, but it could be in the future. Today, Chinese economic growth has run aground as Xi Jinping pursues structural reforms to shepherd the country into a more sustainable and domestic-consumption-driven path, a move which will inevitably stimy economic growth. Furthermore, a formidable strand of literature (see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Michael Beckley and Andrea and Mauro Gilli) has flourished in recent years stressing China’s deficiencies while outlining obstacles to reaching parity with the United States. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth accurately identify national military, economic and technological capabilities that are “tailored for superpower status,” but conclude that “the one-superpower [the U.S.] system is not on the cusp of structural change” and that “there has been no transformation in its fundamental operating dynamics,” despite Chinese advances.
4. China is NOT out-of-the-way; it’s in-the-way. Globalization and forty years of normalized diplomatic relations have intertwined Beijing and Washington on multiple fronts: currency reserves, trade, investments, industrial complementarity, cultural exchanges, international security matters in which both parties have interests, and more. As Michael Swaine appraised, disentangling—or decoupling—a relationship of such complexity, while addressing critical nodes, will require more than labeling China as an existential threat and discarding China’s contribution to global security and prosperity.

Beijing is a revisionist power, but it is not necessarily a subversive actor on the global stage. Indeed, as the U.K. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee recently assessed, “China is a force for order, but not liberal order.” For its part, the Trump Administration is advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that, despite promoting strong global cohesion in the face of China’s rise, displays a proclivity for unilateralism. Policymakers should consider the four “nots” as a starting point for developing a long-term strategy for countering Chinese revisionism.

The Four “Nots” to Correctly Interpreting China’s Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific region will see a fundamental shift in the geopolitical status quo throughout 2019. This shift is the result of many factors, but the most prominent is China’s rise as a political, economic, and military great power. China’s rapid economic growth has provided the foundation for an expansion of the People’s Liberation Army and has dramatically increased the country’s international political clout. 

For nearly three decades, China’s economy greatly expanded due to low wages, a large workforce, substantial demand for raw materials, and investment by multinational corporations. In the U.S., many industries suffered as production was increasingly outsourced to Chinese factories. Furthermore, Chinese companies have enjoyed easy access to the U.S. market for decades, whereas U.S. firms are forced to hand over intellectual property and make other concessions to be granted access to Chinese markets. 

Washington has embarked on a campaign to induce Beijing to implement meaningful economic reforms. By imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods, the U.S. has effectively made it more difficult for Chinese products to enter U.S. markets. In doing so, the U.S. is attempting to force China to open its markets to U.S. goods and services and to eliminate harmful policies such as forced technology-sharing and joint-investment agreements.  

The challenge for China is that submitting to Washington’s demands would profoundly weaken China’s economy, which could seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.  China is stuck between a rock and a hard place; even if Beijing were to offer to purchase more U.S. goods while gradually reducing barriers to foreign investment, it would take years for China to prove that it has been making good on its end of the bargain.

What’s Next for the U.S.-China Trade War?

It’s unlikely an immediate resolution will be found for the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute. Instead, it’s likely that both countries will continue down the path of economic decoupling. The Trump Administration is encouraging multinational firms to reorient their supply-chains outside of China and is erecting barriers to Chinese investment in the United States. This year, U.S. policymakers will have to consider imposing another round of tariffs on the remaining $267 billion worth of Chinese goods imported into the U.S. each year, on top of the duties already imposed on some $250 billion worth of Chinese products. Furthermore, there is the possibility that lawmakers in Washington could introduce sanctions on Beijing in response to China’s mass-detention of Uyghurs in the western Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Ningxia.

Due to China’s reliance on the U.S. consumer market, it will have difficulty retaliating on an equal scale. China’s wealthier coastal provinces, which host the bulk of the country’s export production capacity, are especially vulnerable to an extended trade dispute with the U.S. it will be difficult to respond due to its reliance on the U.S consumer market. That being said, Beijing has several cards left to play. The government can reduce taxes, offer subsidies, invest in infrastructure projects, and ease regulations to promote domestic consumption and economic growth in the private sector.

Beijing is also likely to use leverage the value of its currency to mitigate the damage inflicted by U.S. tariffs. As Chinese access to U.S markets is increasingly impeded, Beijing will seek new markets along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and pursue bilateral trade agreements to secure access to them.

Reorienting Global Supply-Chains

The United States will likely adopt an increasingly aggressive posture when it comes to the development and investment in strategic technological sectors. Tech firms in the U.S.—particularly those that work with dual-use (civil-military) technology—will come under increasing government supervision in 2019. Competition between China and the United States. Much like in Germany and France, the United States has been setting up barriers to Chinese investment in strategic sectors.

U.S. tech firms that work with dual-use civil-military technology will come under increasing government supervision in 2019. Such dual-use technology falls into categories such as aerospace, 5G networking, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and high-performance semiconductors. As it has done with Canada and European allies, the U.S. is likely to lobby its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to implement expert controls on similar emerging technologies. Such measures will be detrimental to the operations of Chinese firms, some of which have already been branded as national security threats by governments around the world.

As multinational corporations move to reorient their supply-chains to decrease reliance on China, there are Asian states that will be in a position to benefit from the economic decoupling of the world’s two largest economies. Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Phillippines all offer attractive alternatives to manufacturing in China. Additionally, many of these countries specialize in the production of certain goods. Vietnam, for instance, produces high-quality electronics and textiles, and Thailand and Malaysia both have formidable automobile manufacturing sectors.

According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, around one-third of American firms in China are considering moving their operations abroad due to the ongoing trade standoff. Regardless if they relocate or not, the ASEAN markets will emerge as attractive alternatives for global supply chains as foreign direct investment begins to rise throughout the region. These changes will not happen immediately. Firms will need time to find regional partners, navigate legal systems, and draft new agreements. It’s likely that the full effects of the U.S.-China trade dispute won’t be realized for three to five years, but there will be a lasting impact nevertheless.

Worsening Tensions in the South China Sea

Trade and technology aside, tensions in the South China Sea will continue to deteriorate. Beijing will likely take a more aggressive stance as it continues to militarize existing and reclaimed islands—bolstering its naval, missile, and air power capabilities in an apparent Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy. China’s expanding presence will complicate matters for powers like the U.S. and Japan who regularly conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in disputed waters.

China’s expansionary behavior and an increased presence by the United States and its allies increase the probability for accidents or a rapid escalation. Despite this, the U.S. Navy and its partners will continue to conduct FONOPS in the South and East China Seas. Furthermore, the U.S. may sell more advanced arms and technology to Taiwan and increase the number of FONOPS it conducts in the Taiwan Strait.

United States-China Rivalry Will Dominate Geopolitics in East Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

In reference to China’s foreign policy strategy, Deng Xiaoping once said: “hide your strength, bide your time.” For three decades, Chinese foreign policy was implemented accordingly. As China realigned itself as a market economy, it seemed content in its role as the  “world’s factory;” at the same time, the rest of the world was content with cheap consumer goods that were produced in China.

In recent years, however, Xi Jinping has overseen a significant shift in China’s foreign policy. China has become increasingly assertive in pursuit of its national security, foreign policy, and economic interests both in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world, from Asia to Latin America. China’s policies and behaviors, from the massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea, are clear indicators that Beijing is done hiding and biding.

Significant amounts of natural resources and secure trade routes for exports are essential to ensure China’s continued economic growth. As the land components of the BRI expand across Central and Southeast Asia, the South China Sea remains a point of geopolitical volatility. The South China Sea is host to some of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. Eighty percent of China’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, strategically positioned between the countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—all of which are American allies.

China seeks to place the South China Sea firmly within its sphere of influence. Doing so would see China move from a position of geopolitical vulnerability to one of strength, effectively maintaining a “Great Maritime Wall” that would ensure China’s unfettered access to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Consolidating and solidifying its sphere of influence will be the most significant Chinese foreign policy challenge of the twenty-first century while maintaining the status quo and retaining its strategic advantage will be that of the United States.

Estimates currently project that China will be operating a fully-fledged blue-water navy by 2030. It is likely that, around this time, China will be pushing to break through the First Island Chain in the East and South China Seas that are currently controlled by U.S. allies. Until China’s hard power capabilities are fully matured, China will continue to vie for influence using diplomacy and other soft power vehicles.

China’s Soft Power Capabilities

The canonical conception of soft power is centered mainly around ideas like constitutionalism, liberal democracy, and human rights, none of which are on offer from an unapologetically authoritarian China.  While Chinese universities are drawing growing levels of international students, the fact remains that, on the whole, China’s cultural pull is meager. Its most famous artist lives in exile, state media outlet Xinhua gets little traction outside of China, and while K-pop and J-pop are widely played outside of Korea and Japan respectively, Chinese popular music has failed to capture international attention.

China may not have much to offer as an alternative to the American Dream for populations around the world, but for the leaders and governments of developing states, China presents an attractive partner. Rather than seeking investment and financial support from the Bretton Woods institutions, which require governance and human rights reforms, many governments are turning to Beijing, which attaches far fewer strings.

While China’s lack of democratization does damage its international reputation, that damage must be viewed in the context of the relative decline of American soft power. The post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have harmed the global impression of the United States as a “bringer of democracy,” to the extent that such a phrase are now mostly invoked in irony.

In Latin America, the United States’ historical sphere of influence, many states are signing bilateral agreements with China on everything from hydropower projects to the development of telecommunication networks. China’s engagement in Central and South America has resulted in it becoming the region’s largest creditor. Furthermore, as U.S. levels of domestic shale production increase, there will be less U.S. demand for foreign energy. China’s thirst for oil, on the other hand, will continue unabated. For many Latin American nations, the choice of China as an economic partner has been a straightforward one.

The appeal of China as an alternative isn’t due to Beijing’s alignment with specific ideological criteria. Instead, China is appealing because it is an alternative. China profits from the extent to which the U.S. influence declines relative to its own, not from the gravitational pull of some cultural or ideological preponderance. This means that even those pursuing Western-style governance structures will see opportunities to engage with China. For these countries, if the United States won’t purchase foreign oil, or the World Bank won’t fund a development project, China will.

China’s Carrot and Stick

The allure of the Chinese alternative is visible in the South China Sea also. In this rather authoritarian region, liberal democratic values are held in lower regard than economic prosperity and political stability. Singapore stands as a shining example that liberalism is not a prerequisite for success in these metrics. To a working class citizen in an underdeveloped province of Indonesia or the Philippines, democracy—or “democrazy” as it is sometimes termed in the region—can seem stultified and inefficient. China, as it would have the world believe, has demonstrated that its model for global engagement achieves results.

China has attempted to satisfy concerns about the nature of its investment and economic policies. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded and led by China, is an attempt to increase engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The AIIB is a signal to countries in the region that Chinese investment isn’t solely for Latin America or Africa. Furthermore, China has been willing to engage in multilateral forums and agreements as it tries to convince its neighbors that its intentions are benign.

However, Beijing has mostly failed in this regard. Chinese military activity has increased in the South China Sea. China’s naval presence in the region has increased dramatically; the Chinese Coast Guard has even escorted fishing trawlers into Indonesian waters. Beijing is working diligently—and successfully—to reduce Taiwan’s international relations.  The Nine-Dash Line (which outlines China’s South China Sea claims) continues to be a significant source of tension; the region is flush with complex, multilateral territorial disputes, any of which could erupt into conflict with little warning. 

China, for its part, never intended to assuage its neighbors’ concerns completely. Instead, China is trying to show that, while it carries a big stick, it can be reasoned with.

Indo-Pacific states are now engaged in a continuous balancing act. Each country is weighing the benefits and costs of their relationship with the established superpower (the United States) against the incipient one (China). While China moves towards the maturation of its hard power, it is perhaps operating within the last phase of biding its time. China has attempted to sell a narrative where it is the reliable power in the Indo-Pacific, rather than a country several thousand miles across the Pacific, from which the echoes of “America first” can be heard.

Alliances are Essential for Maintaining the Status Quo in Southeast Asia

Nevertheless, regional alignment remains with the U.S.—for now. Staring down vociferous Chinese criticism, South Korea placed an American anti-ballistic missile defense system on its soil. Taiwan continues to hedge against a Chinese threat by seeking closer ties with the U.S. as regular arms sales have resumed under the Trump administration. The U.S. has turned a blind eye to Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities and encouraged the evolution of its nominal self-defense force into something more potent.

The United States’ network of alliances in Southeast Asia is intact but fragile. The U.S. must remain credible to each state individually to be credible to all states collectively. Should the U.S. signal a lack of interest—such as by withdrawing from the TPP, publicly questioning the value of a de-facto independent Taiwan, or demonstrating a hesitation to fight alongside South Korea in a conflict with North Korea—its network of alliances may be compromised.

In the twenty-first century battle for influence in the South China Sea, credibility is everything. China currently sees what it perceives as a power vacuum, and it is only too happy to slide into it. Affirming its influence and presence in the Indo-Pacific will be a key U.S. foreign policy objective over the next century. To succeed, the U.S. must act with determination yet delicacy, so that it may maintain the network of alliances that currently safeguards a strategic advantage over an emergent China.  

The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

The PLA hierarchy is being overhauled to elevate officers more receptive to Beijing’s desires to build a modern military force.

Key Insights

• President Xi’s sweeping reforms aim to develop a more centralized military force that has stronger joint operational capabilities.
• If successful, the reforms could complicate Taiwanese moves towards independence and the ability of the U.S. to operate close to China.
• New capabilities may lead to increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and on the Indian border, but China will not seek to provoke conflict.

One of the key transitions expected from the 19th Congress of the Chinese Community Party (CCP), which commences on October 18, is that of the extensive overhauling of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In the lead up to the Congress multiple generals on the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the eleven-member top military governing body—have been dropped under suspicion of corruption. President Xi Jinping’s anti-graft crackdown has been ongoing for several years. However, the escalation of investigations into PLA leadership so close to the Congress reflects Beijing’s recognition of the need to spring clean the military’s senior hierarchy and organizational structure to support its desire for a more assertive stance on the world stage.

Centralization, Centralization, Centralization

President Xi laid out the reform’s driving factors in a speech at the beginning of August: “To achieve the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must quicken the pace of building the people’s army into a world-class army… To build a strong army, we must unswervingly adhere to the party’s absolute leadership over the army”. This requires centralization of two forms: in leadership and in organizational structure.

The sacked generals have been replaced by officials whose careers have for long periods been aligned with Xi, signaling the president’s desire to surround himself with those who subscribe to his vision. This is not surprising. Xi’s military reform program is vast and unprecedented; he needs people in top positions who he can rely on to push his desired changes through the inevitable resistance in the military bureaucracy.

The creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in December 2015 is a sign of the sort of bureaucratic centralization that will continue to accompany the centralization of PLA leadership under the auspices of the reform program. The SSF subsumed the former Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff Department (3PLA), the former Fourth Department (4PLA), and elements of the PLA General Political Department. This gave it a sweeping mandate encompassing all of the PLA’s cyber espionage, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems, information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.

The salient feature of the SSF is its creation directly under CMC command, giving Xi’s inner circle close control over its operations. This represents recognition among CCP senior leadership of the limitations inherent in the military bureaucracy that has for so long stifled progress.

From a Green to Purple Military

The increasingly hybrid and non-traditional nature of war and the expanded scope of missions required to respond to modern security threats have exposed PLA shortcomings in contemporary military affairs. The PLA’s long-standing embodiment of a ‘green’ military—one overwhelmingly oriented toward the conduct of large-scale ground combat—means it lacks the ability to operate as a nimble joint force (a ‘purple’ military) capable of meeting contemporary security challenges. As a result, the PLA’s operational capabilities still lag behind the modern militaries of most major powers.

Ever since assuming the CMC leadership in 2012, Xi has unfolded successive stages of military reform to rectify this shortcoming in joint operational capability. In addition to the SSF’s launch, Xi reorganized the previous seven military commands into five as part of wider moves to make the organizational structure leaner and more agile. Additionally, a joint command-and-control system was established. This replaced the previous system whereby each service branch would report to their respective headquarters during peacetime, with an ad hoc headquarters being set up during a crisis.

A further obstacle to an advanced joint operational capability was the below-par quality of PLA officers and leaders. When Deng Xiaoping cut funding to the military in order to focus on China’s colossal economic recovery beginning in 1978, the implicit bargain was that the PLA could devise ways to profit from their services in order to stay afloat. This led to a culture of systemic and institutionalized corruption on a scale so severe that many PLA officials openly admit that China’s ability to wage war is entirely insufficient. Increasing PLA professionalism so that warfighting, rather than profit-making, is the priority has been a key concern of Xi’s reforms; the necessity being that the right personnel must be in place to implement the modernization initiatives.

Improved PLA Deterrence?

The sweeping reform process is geared toward enhancing PLA deterrence capabilities, primarily to prevent further moves by Taiwan towards independence and to dissuade U.S. reconnaissance missions close to China’s coastline as well as U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Western Pacific. If the centralization initiatives and moves toward improving the PLA’s joint operational capability are successful, then the potency and range of Chinese military power will be closer to meeting these deterrence objectives.

Beijing is highly unlikely to test any newfound military acumen by provoking combat against an adversary. However, a newfound deterrence capability will likely see China become increasingly assertive in its peripheral regions. The expansion of Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea seems the most likely arena in which this will unfold. Here, the PLA Navy and the various PRC civil-military bodies have been successful—and will likely continue to be—in incrementally furthering Chinese territorial designs without triggering military hostility from rival claimants and the U.S. This relatively free run is in contrast to Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands which are more tightly enmeshed in U.S security guarantees, making assertiveness of any degree from China more fraught. Considering that the PLA remains deployed in close proximity to Doklam—a border area dispute ostensibly resolved with India in August—it seems that this region will also continue to be a key theatre in which the PLA will look to test itself.

When considering the scale the reforms, the PLA is undergoing; the human element must be kept in the equation. While the PRC military establishment is unlikely to seek conflict if a volatile situation does arise then the newly anointed vanguard of youthful PLA officials may be keen to prove their worth. The potential then arises for miscalculation. Considering the PLA’s relative failure in the recent Doklam dispute, if the issue were to flare up again further down the track, then PLA leadership may again fail to calibrate goals with capabilities.

As PLA leaders themselves admit, there is still some way to go before the reforms will bear significant fruit; overhauling the leadership style and operational mindset is a generational process. Nonetheless, if the expected leadership reforms at the upcoming Party Congress are implemented and the broader PLA streamlining reforms continue, then the PRC will be on its way to building the military required for Beijing’s broader strategic vision.

The PRC has definitively abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘hide your strength, bide your time’ foreign relations paradigm for Xi’s ‘China dream,’ and Beijing is pushing to restore Chinese pride on the world stage. It now needs a military able to support an assertive foreign policy. The recent military stand-off with India in Doklam exposed PLA shortcomings in being the agile, capable and modern force needed to support PRC assertiveness. As such, expect to see efforts to address these vulnerabilities continue with vigor going forward. If the reforms are executed successfully, then a newfound deterrence capability will change the character of contested areas like the South China Sea.

The PLA in Transition: In Pursuit of the ‘China Dream’ was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue of reunification between mainland China and the island of Taiwan is one of the most significant obstacles to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s drive for “national rejuvenation,” a campaign to restore China’s position as a global power by 2049.

Since the end of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan has been de facto independent, and Beijing has not made forcible attempts to recapture what the Chinese Communist Party considers a wayward province. However, China has made attempts to lure Taiwan closer while preventing it from formally declaring independence.

The Taiwanese independence movement has steadily grown in influence over the past few decades, while the United States has signaled its willingness to provide a greater degree of support for the democratically-ruled island, factors which have contributed to the highest cross-straight tensions in over ten years. The Trump Administration will likely lay the groundwork for a closer relationship with Taiwan as it ratchets up pressure on China.

The Chinese government has shifted between threatening of military force to economic incentives in its campaign to draw Taiwan into Beijing’s sphere of influence. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the growing military strength of mainland China alongside its aggressive reunification rhetoric and coercive diplomacy has led the U.S. to increase arms sales to Taiwan, increase official-level communications between Taipei and Washington, and improve U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation.

Strengthened Taiwan-U.S. Ties

The growing cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan has, in turn, aggravated tensions between the U.S. and China, as the latter regards the former as challenging the “One China” principle that states that mainland China holds sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. While the Trump Administration is by no means the first to draw China’s ire in this arena, strengthened ties between the U.S. and Taiwan are accompanied by a shifting geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s rising economic, political, and military power has greatly changed the Indo-Pacific balance of power. China is more willing to use force to achieve its aims—one of which is reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. Reunification would be of both symbolic and strategic significance—Xi Jinping has declared reunification a key facet of his “national rejuvenation” by 2049 initiative, and establishing control over Taiwan would allow China to project power unimpeded into the Pacific.

Taiwan’s location, and de facto independence, currently present an impediment to Beijing’s global ambitions. Furthermore, China sees the island as a potential national security threat, as an independent Taiwan could be utilized by the U.S. as a jumping-off point for sorties against mainland China in any U.S.-China conflict.

Growing Urgency in China

Reunification is an increasingly urgent issue for Beijing—which has historically employed patience—due to Xi Jinping’s self-imposed deadline for reunification by 2049. Simultaneously, perceived growing U.S. support for an independent Taiwan, and the failure of the mainland’s previous efforts at reunification through economic incentives is raising the pressure on China.

Increased U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation would likely be met with condemnation by Beijing, however, it may be the most effective means of deterring a mainland invasion of the island. Increased cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan could take the form of the U.S. taking a visible and active presence on the island. This would ensure that China would find itself at war with the U.S. in the event of any attempt at reunification by force.

Regardless, it’s unlikely that China will attempt to reunify the mainland with Taiwan within the next decade. Taiwan maintains a strong conventional military, and the risk of a U.S. intervention remains high. However, China is steadily increasing its hard power capabilities and is projected to have a military capable of true power projection on a global scale by 2030. For the foreseeable future, reunifying China will remain a key strategic objective of Beijing.

Expect Rising Tensions Between China and Taiwan for the Foreseeable Future was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

China is a rising power. It is agreed that China has the capabilities to eventually significantly surpass the United States regarding global economic and political power. Chinese posturing in the South China Sea is an attempt to gauge and establish its sphere of influence in a region that has been long dominated by the United States.

Relations with the U.S. were tested particularly after Trump’s pre-inauguration phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, which flew in the face of 40 years of diplomatic convention.

Trump’s anti-China stance when it comes to trade is questionable. His businesses have partnered with Chinese investors and banks, and his projects have been built using Chinese steel. It’s unlikely that he would risk jeopardizing his children’s—and his own–long-term business interests.

Some argue that the U.S. and China are on the verge of inevitable conflict. This “Thucydides Trap” says that as one power rises, the other declines and the two are destined for inevitable conflict. Statistically, this isn’t a far-fetched concept; only 4 out of 16 prior great-power transitions have not resulted in war.

Is the Thucydides Trap Inevitable? Not Necessarily.

In this realist view, China is an irresistable force approaching an immovable object—the United States. The U.S.’s commitment
to the Bretton Woods institutions, alliances, and political structures which have supported its global hegemony, it is argued, is proof of the inevitability of this conflict.

The 45th President of the United States, however, may not be so steadfast in those commitments. Nixon’s overtures to China and its subsequent admission to the U.N. marked an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. Anti-Communism was rampant, but the interests of capitalism took precedence over political ideology.

In return for access to Chinese markets, the U.S. recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign authority over China, and supported the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, at Taiwan’s expense.

This rapid departure from the status quo served as a jumping-off point for bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. All the while, Nixon utilized his public abhorrence of communism to distract from his use of realpolitik in a way that sharply contrasted with American ideology.

Trump’s continued self-contradiction and erraticism could serve a similar purpose, however unintentionally. The rhetoric on Chinese economic policy, on the surface, made Trump look tough against China during the election. However, following his taking office, Trump and his advisors have been leaning on China for assistance in dealing with North Korea.

Triangular Diplomacy: a New World Order?

Many have begun to draw comparison’s between the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Nixon’s model of triangular diplomacy. To incentivize Putin, the U.S. would endorse a consolidation of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and parts of central Asia, recognizing a Russian sphere of influence, and support productive bilateral oil partnerships.

A similar strategy would be deployed with regards to China, with the impetus for them being the arrangements created between Trump and Putin. In this scenario, President Trump utilizes American commitments and the existing global power structure as commodities to transact.

Yes, this is a retreat from the current status quo, but it is not isolationism—it is a restructuring of the global order to accommodate a shift in world power—a crude re-establishment of the triangular diplomacy model employed by Nixon and Kissinger with China and Russia.

At present, the United States seems to be in its last days as the leader of a unipolar international order. Rapid technological advancement is contributing to global economic uncertainty, and international security is increasingly threatened. Global influence is becoming increasingly multipolar. Some degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt in the face of changing norms is obligatory.

Trump may recognize this. He may not. Is he a madman theorist, or is he just mad? A comparison to Nixon may not be entirely appropriate, as Nixon was a prolific student of political theory and often read up diplomatic history.

However, madman theory dictates that one’s opponent must be entirely convinced of his opponent’s irrationality. President Trump has even managed to convince long-standing American allies of that. Danish foreign minister Kristian Jensen, when asked about the future of relations with the United States, responded by saying “Donald Trump changes opinions like others change underwear.”

China, the United States, and the Thucydides Trap was originally published on Global Security Review.