Ideology matters, as I learned from surviving 18 years under the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The United States pretended otherwise for three decades, clinging to the “end of history” and similar dreams. Today, with ideologically driven conflicts simmering around the world, it is time for America to integrate deterrence, defense, and a theory of victory across the so-called gray zone of geopolitics. Doing so will require policymakers to start listening to what America’s enemies have been saying for years about their ideological designs.

In 2004, when questioned about whether a Venezuela-Cuba alliance was exporting communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States averred: “It is a thing outdated in time and it is not understanding the relationships that exist between the countries.” That was a backhanded ‘yes,’ if there ever was one. The message was meant to assuage the busy, post-9/11 national security community, diverting attention away from the problems brewing south of the U.S. border. More than two decades later, the annual warnings of USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commanders before Congress have finally been heeded by the White House.

Ideology has been slapping America in the face since the late 1990s. For this era of refocusing on state-based threats, it comes in these forms and many others: Beijing’s obsession with employing “united front” organizations to silence dissidents overseas; Moscow’s obsession with Ukraine, kicking off a murky war in 2014 that is now sustained conventionally; Tehran’s obsession with aiding and abetting proxy martyrs of the Islamic Revolution; Havana’s and Caracas’ shared obsession with waging “asymmetric war” on Western powers (which included flooding the American homeland with illicit narcotics); and Pyongyang’s obsession with subverting Seoul’s political processes and civic life. All these gray-zone efforts have an ideology at the heart. Their ideologies, variously rooted in Marxism, religion, and revanchism, drive the leaders of these states to employ irregular warfare tactics without any remorse and at any cost to civilians in the West or anywhere else. You will not find high degrees of intellectual coherence between these constructs; shared hatreds and collectivist doctrines and dogmas are cohesive enough for what now amounts to an anti-Western coalition.

Anti-Western adversaries became sneakier when strategizing and aligning with those espousing similar worldviews. They also became more convinced of their moral superiority. The U.S. national security community makes arbitrary distinctions between geopolitics and ideology. These distinctions obfuscate reality, which is already tough to comprehend, and lead to poor policymaking. Nowhere is this weakness more prominent than in the domain of irregular warfare. How did ISIS carve out its domain between Iraq and Syria, for instance, if not through the aid of its ideology?

Discussing rival-state ideology in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security seems to generate discomfort despite some strides to understand strategic cultures. It started with the spectacular triumphs of 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations’ ideological variables have been marginalized in the Federal Government. The American bureaucrat could finally put ‘Sovietology’ to rest, and, with it, anything to do with alternatives to liberal internationalism. The term ‘Great-Power Competition’ continues the delusion; ‘strategic-ideological struggle’ captures reality much better.

Disclaimer: Ideologies are messy. Their study requires incredible levels of nuance, subtlety, cultural awareness, philosophical skill, and extensive interpretive room. It is not a field of expertise attuned nor prone to engineering solutions or linear responses, making it politically dangerous to confront ideological challengers. Bringing up ideology always risks alienating a group and hurting its feelings. Hence, American political leaders and senior officials have scarcely breathed a word about state-centric ideological conflict since the demise of the USSR.

This problematic approach is a vestige of America’s long-gone “unipolar moment.” Through mirror imaging, it takes our attention away from elements that the Western world’s rivals thrive on. Several foes of the West have developed highly complex irregular warfare doctrines, intelligently focusing on the types of operations that some of these actors can excel in, and backing off from the type of war that they know they cannot win. Because illegality is the common denominator to all irregular warfare activities coming from any type of challenger, ideological zeal and fervor are absolute strategic imperatives to the leaders of these revanchist entities. Indeed, during the Global War on Terror, we recognized it as an essential enemy warfighting capability. Ideology is the glue that authoritarians, totalitarians, and other extremists apply to bind together the domestic constituencies that they rely on for control and aggression. In ideology, those leaders find the corpus of thought and the narratives required to morally justify atrocities committed in pursuit of greed, territorial expansion, or a simple clinging to power.

Acknowledgement is growing that defeating mere symptoms of its rivals’ irregular warfare campaigns cannot bring American strategic victory or even achieve deterrence in the “gray zone.” Looking back at the U.S.-led quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, more observers have called for defeating root ideologies, rather than just crushing the fighters who currently espouse a certain ideology’s flavor-of-the-moment (e.g., Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, FARC, ELN, etc.).

Defeating our enemies must include defeating their ideologies. This no longer demands global wars in the traditional (conventional) military sense. To defeat regime ideologies, whole-of-government efforts require dusting off forgotten or atrophied competencies that America used to cultivate, including the ‘dark arts’ of U.S. foreign policy. Washington needs to articulate once again what it believes in, beyond vague notions of stability, and bring like-minded allies to our side.

David Guenni is completing his doctorate with Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense & Strategic Studies. His research focuses on nation-states’ employment of narcotrafficking as an irregular warfare modality. He is a Venezuelan political asylum seeker in the United States, having spent many years in the struggle against the Chavista regime in Caracas. His opinions are his own and no one else’s.

Why Ideology Matters in Irregular Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

What Has Been the Impact on Our Nation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was a seismic event, striking a blow to both Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. While Moscow, despite its war in Ukraine and mounting Western sanctions, remains committed to its military bases, Iran’s position is far more complex. Unlike Russia, whose primary interests are geopolitical and military, Iran sees Syria as an ideological and strategic battleground central to its regional ambitions.

The de facto regime in Damascus faces an uphill battle in asserting control over a fragmented and failing state. Recent upheavals have occurred, with over a thousand, including civilians, killed in Latakia and other coastal cities. These are historical Alawite strongholds, which highlights the government’s fragile grasp on power. These disturbances, fuelled by remnants of Assad’s rule, cannot be subdued through isolated security operations or curfews alone. They expose a deeper dissatisfaction that neither Damascus nor its external backer, Turkey, can easily suppress.

Despite its opposition to a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, Iran, as a Shia’ state, retains influence over the Alawite community—the backbone of Assad’s former regime. Tehran cultivated religious and political alliances with the Alawites, ensuring that its ideological footprint in Syria endures, even as the political landscape shifts.

The situation is further inflamed by the transitional constitution, which upholds Syria’s identity as the “Syrian Arab Republic”—denying the existence of non-Arab nationalities and imposing a Muslim president with near-absolute authority and Islamic law as “a main source” of legislation. This exclusionary framework was rejected by Kurds and Druze alike, who view it as a mere continuation of Assad’s rule, now under a Sunni Islamist veneer. The brutal repression that has accompanied the regime’s efforts to enforce this new order, resulting in thousands of civilian and military deaths, only fuels further opposition.

In southern Syria, the Druze, long wary of both Sunni Islamist factions and Iranian hegemony, are positioning themselves to consolidate local autonomy. Under Israel’s umbrella, the Druze are unlikely to align with any single faction, instead leveraging their position for greater self-rule. Meanwhile, Israel maintains a watchful eye on the evolving situation, preserving its military presence in the south of Syria. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, an extremist Sunni regime in Damascus presents a far greater security threat than a Shi’a-dominated government, making Israel’s calculations in Syria more complex than ever.

For Turkey, the evolving situation presents both opportunities and challenges. While Ankara may find common cause with Sunni factions seeking to assert dominance over Syria, it will remain constrained by Iran’s interests. Iran deeply embedded itself in Syria’s military, economic, and political structures, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) playing a pivotal role in shaping the previous regime’s policies. Iran has sacrificed thousands of Quds and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces and billions of dollars in Syria. Iran made significant efforts to keep Assad in power and no one can imagine that Tehran will simply walk away and abandon its investment.

The Iranian regime followed this strategy before. After eight years of war with Iraq and massive losses, it steadily expanded its influence over Iraq’s Shi’a sector. Even after the fall of Saddam and the rise of ISIS, Iran established military proxies, ensuring that Iraq remained unstable.

Through control over Shi’a political parties, it works to suppress the Kurdistan Regional Government and keep the Sunnis weak. Those with a stake in Syria’s future should expect a similar Iranian strategy, this time through the Alawites. Iran will seek an opportune moment to replicate the strategy and will not allow Turkey, which has invested significantly less in Syria, to reap the political and economic benefits that Syria offers.

Looking forward, Syria’s future will be shaped by the competing interests of regional and global actors, each pursuing their own trajectories. The western part of the country, where the new regime struggles to consolidate power, will remain a flashpoint for unrest. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze-controlled territories are likely to maintain relative stability. The Kurdish forces, with their well-organized military and political structures, have effectively consolidated power, establishing governance mechanisms independent of Damascus.

Israel has little incentive to back any radical transformation that could empower hostile factions. What remains undeniable, however, is that the new regime in Damascus lacks the capacity to curb Iran’s entrenched influence. Tehran has invested too much in blood and resources to relinquish its foothold.

In the ever-shifting sands of Syrian politics, Iran remains a force—one that neither Turkey nor the new rulers in Damascus should ignore as its axis of resistance has the potential to reshape itself—as evidenced by the conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus and Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran’s ally, Russia, continues to maintain bases in the Alawite-controlled region, which leaves the Russians ever a concern.

Loqman Radpey, PhD, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the international legal and political dimensions of the right to self-determination for peoples and nations, including the case of Kurdistan. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law.

Iran Can Reconfigure Its Foothold in Post-Assad Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since January 20, Trump administration officials have announced an end to US participation in NATO military exercises; floated plans to relinquish NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander post (held by an American since NATO’s founding); proposed withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe; threatened the sovereignty of NATO ally Canada; raised the prospect of using force to seize Greenland (a territory of NATO ally Denmark); derided “freeloading” Europeans; said of Vladimir Putin that America “should take him at his word”; torpedoed NATO’s unanimous declaration to “never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea”; and suggested America’s NATO allies would not “come and protect us” in a time of crisis. This follows Trump’s 2024 invitation to Putin’s henchmen to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies failing to meet NATO’s defense-spending requirements; 2018 threat to withdraw from NATO; and a 2016 declaration that he would defend NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us.” Add it all up, and Trump’s view of NATO diverges dramatically from that of what was once known as the “Grand Old Party.”

For instance, as he took the reins as NATO’s first military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower—a future Republican president—called NATO “the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.” President Richard Nixon viewed NATO as “a moral force.” President Gerald Ford believed NATO “protected the free world from the threat of aggression.”

President George H. W. Bush called NATO “an insurance policy.” Indeed, for America, NATO insures against the worst scenario: another European conflict triggering another global war. For the rest of NATO, the alliance is a security guarantee backed by the United States. Without that guarantee, there is no security in Europe, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in, from Cold War Hungary to post–Cold War Ukraine.

President George W. Bush called NATO “the essential foundation of transatlantic security.” This essay did not forget President Ronald Reagan. However, many of those who claim Reagan’s mantle forget that he was an unwavering NATO advocate—during and after the Cold War. Rather than dismissing NATO as “obsolete,” Reagan called NATO “the core of America’s foreign policy and of America’s own security.” Rather than alarming NATO allies, Reagan reassured them by echoing the words of the North Atlantic Treaty: “If you are threatened, we’re threatened…. An attack on you is an attack on us.”

Rather than distorting NATO into a transactional protection racket, Reagan championed NATO as a “community of democratic states” and “a bond which has served us so well.”

Reagan never questioned NATO’s relevance, never browbeat NATO laggards, never threatened withdrawing from NATO, and never raised doubts about America’s commitment to NATO. Instead, Reagan championed NATO as “an antidote to chaos,” “a living commitment of the nations of the West to the defense of democracy and individual liberty.”

Importantly, Reagan did not think NATO’s mission was over when the Berlin Wall fell. In fact, he endorsed NATO’s continued growth. “Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” he declared after the Cold War thawed. And even after Moscow began walking the path of reform, Reagan cautioned, “We cannot afford to forget that we are dealing with a political system, a political culture and a political history going back many decades, even centuries…. We must stick with the strategy of strength.” In short, Reagan shrewdly saw NATO as a hedge against a Russia that might revert to revanchism—which is exactly what has happened.

Putin’s Russia violated nuclear treaties, conventional-weapons treaties, and its own pledge to “respect the independence…sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine”; warned NATO member Poland that its western territories were “a gift from Stalin”; dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine; countenanced and/or conducted cyberattacks against American energy infrastructure; interfered in elections throughout NATO’s membership roster; conducted sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint (including American targets); threatened use of nuclear weapons; aided and funded attacks against American forces; provided targeting data to support Houthi attacks against allied ships; and made “massive investments in its defense sector” (according to Trump’s own intelligence officials). In light of all of that—and the Kremlin’s long history of deceit—Reagan would never “take Putin at his word.”

GOP presidents, and their democrat counterparts, supported NATO because they recognized that NATO serves America’s interests. For 40 years, NATO helped deter Moscow and prevent the Cold War from turning hot. But that is just a fraction of how NATO has served America’s interests.

Thirteen current NATO allies deployed troops to assist America in defending South Korea. NATO militaries, infrastructure, and decades of interoperability served as the nucleus for the coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait, with NATO allies deploying thousands of troops to assist America.

The only time NATO’s all-for-one collective-defense clause was invoked was after September 11, 2001, when NATO allies rushed aircraft and personnel to this side of the Atlantic to guard America’s skies. NATO then bled with America in the Sisyphean campaign that followed, with 455 Brits, 158 Canadians, 86 French, 54 Germans, 48 Italians, 43 Danes, and 40 Poles dying in Afghanistan. When America withdrew from Afghanistan—20 years after the attacks on America’s capital, America’s military headquarters, America’s largest city—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not Americans. The vast majority were NATO allies. Trump is apparently unaware of this history.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 16 NATO allies sent troops when America asked for help. Hundreds of NATO troops—Brits, Italians, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Danes, Dutch, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs—died in Iraq, as did 18 soldiers from Ukraine, a country that is not a NATO ally but certainly acts like one.

In the post Iraqi freedom years, seven NATO members conducted airstrikes against the ISIS caliphate. Again, NATO was there.

Far from “freeloading,” NATO allies Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are supporting operations in the Red Sea. Likewise, British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Canadian assets are promoting freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

European nations sent more aid to Ukraine than the US. Britain and France are organizing a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine.

NATO has eight battlegroups defending its most at-risk members along the eastern flank. Only one is American-led.

Britain leads the battlegroup in Estonia, supported by Denmark, France, and Iceland. Britain is committing resources to defend NATO’s northern flank. And the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales just commenced a globe-spanning mission—the largest deployment of British naval airpower in a quarter-century.

Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, backed by Belgium, Czechia, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Germany is building permanent bases in Lithuania for 4,800 German troops. Germany is spearheading a continentwide missile shield. And Germany’s parliament recently approved a massive defense-infrastructure fund.

Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, supported by 10 other NATO allies. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania. Pouring almost 5 percent of GDP into defense, Poland fields NATO’s third-largest military. Sweden is quadrupling production of anti-tank weapons.

What NATO is doing and deterring underscores something General James Mattis observed almost a decade ago, “If we did not have NATO today, we would need to create it.”

This begs the questions: what if we did not have NATO? What if these first hundred days mark the last days of history’s greatest alliance for peace?

NATO is designed not to wage war, but to deter war. If there is any doubt about NATO’s collective-defense guarantee—and these first hundred days have created enormous doubts—Putin could be tempted to do in the Baltics what he has done in Ukraine. That would force NATO to blink or fire back. And that would lead to terrible outcomes. The former means the collapse of NATO—and with it, the entire US-led alliance system. The latter means great power war.

The best way to prevent such dire outcomes is through deterrent military strength, clarity of intent, and certainty of cause and effect. Trump’s words and actions have undermined all of these.

What the transactional Trump administration fails to recognize is that by undermining NATO, it is undermining America’s security. If a cyberattack or EMP blast or bioweapon paralyzes America; if ISIS or al Qaeda or some other terror group unleashes something worse than 9/11 or 10/7; if Moscow blinds America’s constellation of satellites; if Beijing moves against Taiwan; or if Pyongyang restarts the long-paused Korean War, America will call for help.

A post-NATO Europe may be unable or unwilling to answer.

Alan Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

FYI to the GOP on NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

These ominous developments did not happen overnight but are made worse by bad American security policy decisions just as China and Russia were simultaneously deciding to confront the United States leadership role in the world. Critical to a growing China and Russia threat is bad American nuclear policy choices.

Key to this decline were ten bad American policy decisions. These policies began in the wake of the Soviet Union’s decline and continue to the present. Let me explain.

First, America began by buying Francis Fukuyama’s flawed “end of history” thesis and believed that the “liberal international order” of the early post–Cold War period would remain in perpetuity, with authoritarian regimes collapsing as democracy and capitalism triumphed. This, as we know, proved untrue.

Second, the United States unilaterally eliminated almost its entire theater nuclear weapons arsenal, the very type of nuclear forces where there is now a serious and growing imbalance between the United States and China and Russia.

Third, after terrorism took the place of the Soviet Union as America’s top threat, the United States identified the solution to terrorism as democratization through force. The attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), US embassies in Africa (1998), and USS Cole (DDG-67) were the kindling that served, in part, to justify the later invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, despite the extraordinary take down of Saddam’s Iraqi forces in Gulf War I (1991), the deterrent value of liberating Kuwait disappeared by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were then followed by two more decades of futile efforts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fifth, the United States long assumed a cooperative arrangement with China and Russia would prevent nuclear proliferation. American leaders failed to recognize that both nations played an important role in enabling North Korea’s successful nuclear program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with a 1982 decision by Deng Xiaoping and Yuri Andropov to transfer nuclear technology to client states.

Sixth, for three decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US took a holiday from modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Now, as the US attempts to reverse course, the entire nuclear establishment requires refurbishment to make modernization possible.

Seventh, the US ignored Russian incursions into Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine during 2008–2014. Then, just prior to the 2022 invasion, the US compounded these mistakes by both declaring that the US response would depend upon how much Ukraine territory was taken or, later during the war, Ukraine could negotiate an end to the war by ceding additional territory to Russia—a country responsible for the deaths of many millions of Ukrainians during the Soviet Union’s existence. This only encourages Russian aggression.

Eighth, the US abandoned Afghanistan and left significant military equipment behind for the Taliban to use. A billion-dollar embassy and $14 billion worth of military equipment was quickly incorporated into the new Taliban-led government’s arsenal or sold to terrorist organizations around the world. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a humiliating action that undermined respect for the United States.

Ninth, the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Iranian regime allowed Tehran to continue its ballistic missile and nuclear program with increased funding from a return of assets previously seized by the United States. The Trump administration brought Iran under some semblance of control by cutting its foreign exchange reserves by over $100 billion. The killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ General Qasem Soleimani was a clear signal that then-President Donald Trump would not tolerate Iranian-backed terrorism.

The Biden administration backtracked on efforts to deter Iran. Since October 2023, Iran has conducted 170 attacks, primarily against US and assets in the region. Iran combined forces with Houthi rebels to largely shut down commercial freight and crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran also rebuilt its foreign exchange reserves, while becoming more closely allied with Russia and China. This all took place as Iran moved closer to a nuclear weapon.

Tenth, the United States long dismissed warnings about the rise of Chinese military power and the threat it posed to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s massive investment in cyber, space, conventional, and nuclear weaponry will soon make China a peer of the United States. Asian allies of the United States are increasingly worried by China’s actions.

The United States must act to alter its course before it is too late. A return to a strong military, capable of fighting two peer competitors is necessary. It may also be time for a second Manhattan Project to implement the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s  recommendations. With nuclear modernization facing regular delays, there may be no other option. Whatever the solutions are, the time to act is now.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

America’s Downward Slide was originally published on Global Security Review.

August 2, 1990: the end of the Cold War and the revival of imperialism in the Middle East. American troops have indisputably experienced the darkest bounds of these wars. Still, no one warned us about the consequences that three decades of missile launches would have on Middle Eastern civilians, their culture, and quotidian lives — except renowned philosopher, diplomat, and scholar — Charles Malik. The former UN Diplomat and General Assembly President faithfully preached for an autonomous  Near East and disapproved of any external engagement that deterred it.

To understand why foreign interference hinders the chances of peace and prosperity in the region, we must first acknowledge its significant effects on its indispensable assets. Malik humbly reminded us that all of humanity culturally and genetically originated within a 900-mile radius around Jerusalem, Beirut, or Damascus — including modern-day cities of Alexandria, Constantinople (Istanbul), Athens, and Mecca. In a 1952 Foreign Affairs piece, he referred to the complex region as the “Cradle of Civilization,” rich in ancient history, culture, and common agricultural staples which advanced human progress.^[1] Malik aimed to synthesize two perspectives that many considered antithetical; the West and Near East are deeply linked, a departure from the perspective that the two civilizations would always clash. Since Malik’s era, the modern dichotomy exacerbated from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism. In our post-9/11 minds, the West seems to perceive the other to be unsaveable.

Malik lived through arguably the most volatile decades of the 1900s, coming from a region stitched with eternal violence and genocide. His bold ideas were unique and challenged powers who sought to define borders according to their interests, including the British and French mandates for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Despite his Christian Orthodox faith, he sided against the British, another Christian Empire, and their century-long occupation that hindered Egyptian sovereignty and its potential to lead the region into a new era of peace and security. Malik particularly disapproved of France’s influence on his Lebanese homeland and the post-World War I Sykes-Picot Agreement that essentially placed its population (along with Syria) under French social and economic control. Though Lebanon declared its independence in 1926, the struggle for complete autonomy would last an additional twenty years.

As Lebanese Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, the thriving scholar embraced his political inclinations when he vocalized without hesitation his disapproval of global powers’ “formula after formula to reconcile imperial interests” and advocated for Arab independence from the West.^[2] Malik promoted Lebanon and the rest of the Near East’s autonomy through his fight for human rights and fundamental freedoms of conscience, reason, and liberal expression. One of his most celebrated contributions to this cause was the adoption of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights when he did not hesitate to vocalize the importance of the rightful hegemony of Cradle countries from external interference.

Malik did not believe in the UN as a replacement authority to fill the vacuum of power within the Post-WWII Cradle of Civilization, rather as the premier mechanism to display how humanity could fulfill its highest ideals. Instead, he looked to the West’s major thinkers and events as a blueprint, cultivating its highest ideas, such as natural rights from the Cradle’s Abrahamic faiths.

Yet much to Malik’s detriment, the British would return for Suez, France would come back for the Levant, the US would send arms to the Israelis, and even the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of various regimes. Nevertheless, Malik still hoped that the Cradle could progress economically, socially, and politically without external interference.

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According to Malik, the American-led West became a shell of what it once was in the name of countering communism. The West had a blueprint for multi-societal civilization to prosper under liberty. Still, it traded its core virtuous idea for short-term gains over lands that it had no legitimate claim to against a rival who also had no legitimate claim.

“The Near East mirrors, by deposit or reaction, the problems of the world. Whatever face the Near East shows today is fundamentally a face the West has shown it; and whatever weaknesses the Near East expresses are largely the weaknesses of the West. Thus, in a deeper sense of the problem of the Near East is the problem of the West.”  – “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

The West’s previously enlightened pursuit of reason, liberty, and progress is expelled in the apparent chase for oriental treasures in the name of power, profit, and geopolitical chess. The above quote, though written decades ago, can be applied today, perhaps even more appropriate. Yet what is most profound, as Malik would point out today, the Post-Cold War West, in search of another superpower foe, thought it could revamp a superpower region, a land which the scholar remarked as “eternal,” the Cradle of Civilization.

Malik’s fight for the right to a peaceful and prosperous life for the Near East is nowhere near its end. Humanity’s genesis from this exceptional region makes today’s Near East issues even more relevant to our daily lives. The West has enjoyed the Cradle’s food, dance, entertainment, and language for decades, romanticizing the unique aspects of its culture while ignoring its most crucial humanitarian issues, such as the genocide and banishment of minorities like the Assyrians.

As Malik would argue today, only when we realize that our connection to its thousands of years of war, migration, and progress lies deeper than the pursuit of superficialities such as power, natural resources, and profit will we realize the staunch impact that our passiveness wields on these pressing conflicts that ultimately affect us all? Charles Malik did not use the term “Cradle of Civilization” lightly, and it is up to us to vindicate its use.

^[1]  Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

^[2] Malik, Charles. “The Near East: The Search for Truth.” Foreign Affairs Journal, January 1952.

Middle East Versus the West? How a UN Diplomat’s Christian Perspective Resonates with Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

The terms of extremism and terrorism have been used interchangeably. However, there is a crucial distinction between the terms: all terrorists are extremists, but not all extremists are terrorists. Despite the latter, a fine line separates extremists from the turning point of embracing violence—thus becoming terrorists. This is because extremism is generally regarded as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs” as per the 2015 UK’s Counter-Extremism Strategy. Furthermore, extremists may resort to terrorism to coerce governments and the general public to give in to their cause.

Over the past couple of decades, extremism and terrorism were mostly associated with religious causes, especially Islamic extremism, which present a persistent threat to numerous states. Yet, the current pandemic crisis may fuel such a risk and threats from other extremism categories. This includes the right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue extremism. While clearly articulating from now why and how the case is cumbersome, government and national security leaders can relate early warning signs to counter these threats.

Some arguments are claiming that terrorist groups are currently preoccupied with protecting their members against the coronavirus. However, different incidents that took place over April 2020 points to the direct opposite. In fact, in its mid-March al-Naba newsletter, ISIS urged its followers to launch attacks in times of crisis and show no mercy.

Earlier in April, 25 soldiers in Mali were killed in a jihadist attack. On the 14th of April, in an operation where one police officer killed, Egyptian security forces exchanged fire. They eliminated seven terrorists who were part of a cell planning to conduct attacks during the Easter holiday in Egypt. Also during mid-April, the Tunisian security authorities foiled a terrorist plan to spread the coronavirus to Tunisian security forces by coughing, sneezing, and spitting.

On the 21st of April 2020, it was announced that one of Europe’s most wanted terrorists and ISIS affiliate, Abdel Majed Abdel Bary, was recently arrested by the Spanish police in Almeria where he settled in during the coronavirus lockdown. Abdel Bary reached Spain via a boat, and local newspapers indicated that he intended to return to the UK. The return intentions of Abdel Bary – who was arrested with another two persons in his apartment – remains unclear. In France, on the 27th of April, a 29-year-old Frenchman was also arrested. The man, who was not identified, has slammed his car into police cars and motorcycles, injuring three officers. It was found that the man has pledged allegiance to ISIS in a letter found in his car. A couple of days later, in a statement by the Danish authorities on the 30th of April, the police in Denmark prevented a terrorist attack with a possible “militant Islamic motive.” The arrested man was already suspected of attempting to obtain ammunition and firearms. On the 30th of April, in one of the deadliest attacks that month, ten Egyptian army personnel were killed in a terrorist attack. The incident, which included an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and eight soldiers, had an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated under their armored vehicle in Bir El-Abd in North of Sinai.

Looking at Iraq, we can see a rise in ISIL (ISIS) operations over the past few months, wherein the first three months of 2020, 566 attacks were conducted by the group in Iraq. Not only that, the group’s attacks have intensified, but the group appears to be strengthening. Given their recent attacks in Syria and Iraq, it is argued that the current pandemic has already demonstrated how durable and resilient ISIS ais In addition to that, other armed extremist groups are scaling up their targeted attacks. This can be evident by the recent assassination of Hisham al Hashimi, 47, who was fatally shot outside his house in Baghdad. Hisham was among the world’s leading security experts on ISIS and other armed groups. Iraqi officials indicated that Hisham received threats recently from Iran backed militias.

Because of the abovementioned incidents – even if they may appear minor and sporadic to some security strategists – it is worth noting that terrorist groups may take advantage of the global focus of countering the pandemic and launch attacks. Furthermore, terrorist groups may view the global pandemic crisis as an opportunity to win more recruits, supporters, sympathizers, and then strike harder than before should the right moment be presented. In this regards, Al-Qaeda suggested in its statement on the 30th of March, that non-Muslims use their time in quarantine to learn about Islam. In addition, these groups have never failed to exploit social media to advance their cause and propaganda. That said, as the pandemic continues, people are spending more time online, terrorist groups are likely to amplify their utilization of social media to further spread their dangerous rhetoric along with widely used hashtags of the terms: #Coronavirus, #COVID2019 or #COVID19 to ensure a wider audience reach for their social media posts.

Not only that, terrorist groups may use the time of the pandemic crisis to propagate their ideology or launch attacks but also use the time to reinforce their bases to remerge in a more potent form after the pandemic crisis. This can be specifically true given that most terrorist groups are taking some of the African and Middle Eastern countries like Libya, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others as their hubs and operational base. Most of these nations are developing countries, so it is possible that while these nations’ authorities and security forces are focusing their capabilities on curbing the coronavirus spread, that terrorist groups would utilize such a window period to harness their abilities. This is particularly evident from the very recent series of terrorist attacks launched by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, killing dozens of soldiers. The attacks probably took advantage of the local authorities scaling back the number of troops on the ground due to the coronavirus pandemic. A similar expansionary approach is also seen by jihadists in the Sahel region. Thus, further confirming the threat resurgence of organized terrorist groups as a result of the pandemic crisis.

Although the terrorism threat appears to be relatively regional, it requires intergovernmental and a multinational collective counterterrorism approach. With many of the terrorist groups and affiliates adopting a horizontal structure, one group in one country might be influencing the actions of other groups in many other different countries. Not to forget lone wolf terrorism, which would only take the individual perpetrator to be radicalized by merely reading and following the propaganda and extremist ideologies widely available online.

While intergovernmental counterterrorism frameworks, cooperation, and efforts already exist, the current pandemic crisis still presents an unprecedented challenge to many countries. This includes the redirection of security forces and militaries’ actions in curbing the pandemic spread, implementing lockdowns, curfews, regulating borders entry, and supporting the national overwhelmed healthcare authorities. Though the latter is important to ensure the general public safety, security bodies mustn’t lose their focus on countering terrorism, reinforcing border security, and stepping up surveillance and intelligence activities to anticipate any risks or terrorism plots. Additionally, extremist – but nonviolent – groups should be closely monitored during the pandemic and economic crisis to counter how such groups might use the pandemic to advance their propaganda and gain more sympathy from the general public. This includes right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue extremism groups such as climate activists who turn to terrorism.

Furthermore, as the economic recession builds up, different countries may implement spending cuts and reduce budgets dedicated to national security, intelligence, military, and law enforcement concerning various security programs, including counterterrorism. Accordingly, this should not be the case at all. Even if the economic recession is currently taking its toll on all sectors, government spending, and budgets dedicated to national security, intelligence, military, and law enforcement, counterterrorism efforts should not be reduced. As extremists and terrorist groups are likely to exploit the coronavirus pandemic and post-pandemic economic crisis for their benefit and incite violence, national governments should not undermine such a dormant yet imminent threat while tackling the economic consequences of the pandemic crisis. In this respect, military, national security, intelligence, and law enforcement bodies across the world should increase, and hone their counterterrorism capabilities, intelligence sharing, and international cooperation.

COVID-19 and the Increasing Risk of Terrorism was originally published on Global Security Review.

Point of Order

Payment comes in many forms, not just money, and over time violence has always been paid for by the cheapest means possible, sometimes even just by allowing life to continue or through advancing promises of ideological or moral philosophies. Jihad, for example, is a direct bounty from Allah on the heads of all infidels, the reward being not financial at all, but promises of luxurious life after death. The most common form of payment is, of course, money and has been used widely for thousands of years to incentivize the public into helping catch or kill criminals or declared criminals of various forms. From wanted posters in the wild west to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted list, American law enforcement has continuously been a significant end-user of various types of bounty systems. Technically, all modern military forces are also a party to the payment-for-violence system as well, as the primary function of all militaries is either offensive or defensive killing operations, and they all receive payment from participating. Assassins, since humanity’s early days, have often performed their art for a variety of forms of payment, including revenge, land, influence, or positions in leadership, and of course, money. Some assassins and mercenaries have proven this point to the extreme by conducting operations for opposing factions of a single conflict, sometimes even simultaneously working for both. No matter which way the issue is framed, payment for death is a long-standing human tradition, and it is here to stay until the concept of violent conflict is eliminated.

Assassins

Assassination has commonly been used as a form of political terrorism. From a historical context, assassinations have been used to instigate larger movements, such as insurrections, rebellions, revolutions, and other events over time designed to conquer a social system or ideology of an era or region on Earth. In 1933, the attack on President-elect Roosevelt by an Italian immigrant, Giuseppe Zangara, was an attack on the concept of leadership itself. Zangara professed that it didn’t matter who held the office and that his target was the symbol of the Head of State—any Head of State—as he admitted to considering other U.S. Presidents and the King of Italy as targets as well.¹ The modern term ‘character assassination’ is based on this historical and persistent type of motivation for actual assassinations, where the ultimate goal is to target a public figure in a way that moves the public ideology surrounding the target in the desired way, which has become common in today’s political environment.

More to the point of payment for death, assassinations have been one of the most effective and persistent tools of ruling bodies, always. The first known writing describing methods of assassination is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (1915), an ancient text from India dated to somewhere between 300 BC and 300 AD. The text encompasses many areas of governing, including chapters concerning war strategy, poisons, spy techniques, and strategies for assassination-style killings.² While payment is not explicitly discussed, the text is clear that the persons used in these operations are employed as a form of combatants. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (1910), believed to be written in the 5th century BC, also briefly mentions assassination as a type of mission assigned to paid spies.³ Echoing the ancient Indian Arthashastra(1915), a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) file, A Study of Assassination (1953), that was declassified in 1997, likewise details modern versions of assassination techniques, potential weapon ideas, and methods to be used for killing,⁴ and presumably was used as a training doctrine for paid employees of the Agency from its estimated publication in 1953 until the assassination ban encompassed in Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Impacts achieved from assassinations, or other forms of paid-for violence, can vary from insignificant, like the Italian who failed to assassinate President-elect Roosevelt, to toppling governments or starting a major war. World War I, for example, was initiated by just such an act. Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and leader of The Black Hand organization, Dragutin Dimitrijević, was the head of the snake that took a bite out of the Habsburg Monarchy by orchestrating the assassination of the heir presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914. The same Dragutin Dimitrijević had led an overthrow of the Serbian Monarchy just a decade prior, in 1903, to install a puppet on the throne to enhance his power and political relations with Russia.⁵ The Black Hand, a unified “Serbian nationalist organization,” also known as “Unification or Death,”⁶ was recognized as an arm of the Serbian military, acting as an early twentieth-century clandestine organization much like modern Private Military Companies (PMC), with civilian members who could offer plausible deniability to the government when necessary.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand was an advocate for peace,⁷ and at the time, most Serbians wanted to retaliate against Austria-Hungary for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The Archduke was; therefore, the primary obstacle preventing a war that Dimitrijević and many Serbians wanted to start. Ferdinand was also the heir to the throne, and the Emperor was dying, which provided Russia an opportunity to eliminate a Monarchy standing in the way of Russian expansionist ideas as well. This opportunity incentivized Russian approval of the assassination, even if it meant going to war as Serbia’s ally. War could not be achieved with the Archduke constantly advocating for peace and preventing any Austro-Hungarian aggression, so The Black Hand assassins, controlled by Dimitrijević, launched their operation. Ferdinand was attacked in his motorcade on his way to give a speech in Sarajevo, but the attack did not go as planned. The first assassin shot at Franz from a distance and missed; the second threw an explosive that ricocheted off the Archduke’s car and exploded under the vehicle following behind.⁸ This first attack failed, and the Archduke survived to give his speech, only to be targeted on the next leg of his journey through the city by the remaining assassins. As the motorcade came to a halt, Gavrilo Princip walked up to the vehicle and shot Franz in the neck, and his wife in the gut.⁹ Both died of their wounds shortly thereafter.

After the assassination of the Archduke, there was a military escalation of forces between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and all of their allies. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, one month after the assassination of the Archduke, after Serbia refused extraordinary terms offered by Austria-Hungary, which were not expected to be met anyway. Russia, allied with Serbia, mobilized its military upon this declaration of war, and Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, which caused Russia’s ally, France, to declare war on Germany. Then Germany invaded Belgium to get to Paris, instigating Britain, allied to Belgium and France, to declare war on Germany, followed a few weeks later by Japan, bound by a military treaty with Britain – Voila, World War I.¹⁰ While this is a unique assassination in the history of assassination because the goal was achieved, this is not an unprecedented success in the theme of payment for death, or of payment for death in war, as the history of mercenaries changing the tides of battle clearly shows.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries have been participating in violence for likely the same amount of time as assassins, though generally on a more public and destructive scale, without much in the ways of stealth and treachery. Before countries began fielding standing armies, mercenaries were the primary method of large-scale combat. Being a mercenary was a regular job. Groups of mercenaries would sell their services to the highest bidder, always aware that nations would continue to find reasons to use their services. When problems became scarce, and nobody wanted to pay them, they would create problems of their own, extorting their hosts in the process. Throughout most of history up to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648, which were the origin of the modern-day nation-state with recognized national borders, mercenaries were the primary forces used for war.¹¹ Mercenaries grew primarily to fill a skill void in the area of combat expertise. Before the creation of standing armies, the duties of war were rotated among individuals too often to retain the necessary experience and skill to achieve efficiency, which led to the rise of experienced warriors willing to sell their services to the highest bidder.

Eventually, mercenaries became a global industry, attracting violent, greedy people with the sole motive of money as their driving purpose. The only logical outcome of this scenario is chaos and tyranny, if for no other reason than that the existence of a large permanent mercenary population creates a strong incentive for constant war. In peace, mercenaries posed a threat to the general population, often resorting to extortion for protection to continue their livelihood when their services were not required, as happened in France in the late 15th century following the end of the Hundred Years War.¹² Despite the drawbacks associated with mercenaries, the industry itself survived long after the Peace of Westphalia, and even into the modern world, as supplemental forces to a standing national army have often been seen as desirable for several reasons, from bolstering force size to match an enemy force to bending the rules of national militaries to provide plausible deniability.

Force size has been a constant issue in war, often leading to hiring mercenaries to supplement militaries. This method is not always successful, however, as Great Britain learned during the American Revolutionary War. Unable to maintain security throughout the British Empire around the world and quell the American uprising simultaneously with available military forces, Britain hired approximately 10,000 Native Americans and 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the American Continental Army.¹³ The Revolutionary War highlights the fact that mercenaries are only as good as the money they are paid, illustrated by the fact that the American Congress instigated the distribution of “leaflets offering the Germans land and livestock” to switch sides.¹⁴ The nature of the Revolutionary war itself also highlights a more general flaw in the use of mercenaries, in that the Revolutionary war, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, had “no cause but malice against liberty.”¹⁵ This stance points out that the cause of a war, if not properly sold to the participants, can cause a severe undermining within the ranks of the combatants, in turn hurting morale, fostering dissent, and decreasing efficiency, which was experienced significantly on the side of the British. Ultimately, the British use of mercenaries failed to win the war; however, the resulting Constitutional debate was greatly informed by the use of paid actors in warfare, strengthening the Constitutional guidelines for military force regulation in America.

As America grew throughout the transition of the world from mercenary warfare to national militaries, mercenaries became less and less acceptable to the international community. Mercenaries became used primarily to provide plausible deniability to governments and avoid regulations, in much the same way assassins have been used to further objectives of leaders over time. The controversy over the use of mercenaries in warfare grew so extensively that the United Nations decided to institute a new international law, in the form of a treaty titled the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, signed in 1989.¹⁶ The treaty is interesting in that while signed by many countries, neither the United States nor Russia, the two primary superpowers at the time, has signed onto it since its creation, and the language used in the treaty leaves significant room for interpretation, specifically with regards to the treaty’s definition of a mercenary.¹⁷ These flaws have led to the continuation of non-military payment for violence, both with the continued use of bounties and bounty hunters and in the case of carefully labeled paramilitary forces that don’t fit within the legal parameters of the treaty definition for mercenaries.

Bounty Systems

In the late 19th century, after the American civil war, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a precursor to the American FBI, established what amounts to the first criminal database in history, with mug shots, wanted posters, and descriptions of criminals and their crimes, all circulating in newspapers across the country and filed with the agency until the death of the criminal.¹⁸ Bounties have also been used extensively since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty as an incentive for individual citizens to assist law enforcement and governments in capturing or killing wanted persons, from criminals to terrorists. The most widely known examples of this in America are the FBI’s most-wanted lists, which are updated regularly, and put price tags on fugitives at large in the United States and around the world. Among the lists, the FBI provides a top ten list of fugitives and a top ten list of terrorists, with price tags ranging from thousands to millions of dollars in rewards for information leading to capture.¹⁹ While the FBI’s bounty lists today are generally for capture, not killing, some infamous outlaws in American history, like Frank and Jesse James, were the targets of wanted posters that promised a reward whether the criminals were brought in dead or alive.²⁰

The American justice system outlined in the U.S. Constitution eventually eliminated the use of dead or alive wanted posters, as they are illegal under the Constitutional Bill of Rights that provides for a fair trial before sentencing. Still, the bounty system remained intact for capture. During the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, another bounty-style system was used to target the most important members of the Iraqi forces and government, in the form of a deck of cards. The Defense Intelligence Agency, after years of research, developed a target/value identification system based on the standard value system assigned to a deck of cards in poker games to assist ground forces in identifying targets of value in Iraq.²¹ Saddam Hussein occupied the highest value position, the ace of spades, with consecutively lower-valued individuals identified in succession throughout the deck, aces first, then kings down to twos. While money was not directly associated with this example, prestige was undoubtedly a motivating factor for ground forces capturing high-value targets, and the system set the stage for non-government paramilitary forces to participate directly in ongoing military operations during an active war.

Private Military Companies (PMC)

Blackwater quickly emerged as one of the first major controversies of the 21st century, as a PMC working for the United States government in active military combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, without oversight from Congress equal to that of U.S. military forces, but with missions encompassing the same areas as the American military.²² Acting independently of the military, the organization participated in defensive and offensive combat operations to help accomplish military missions of the United States. Without military oversight, and acting directly on behalf of the Executive Branch of government, PMCs like Blackwater are nearly identical to historical mercenary organizations working for pay in combat environments. The United States is not the only country with PMCs. The practice has become widespread since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty banning mercenaries and includes the Russian PMC, The Wagner Group, which is essentially the Russian version of Blackwater. The authoritarian government of Russia, however, has resulted in a much more dangerous version of a PMC than Blackwater and has included domestic operations within Russia as well as foreign operations.²³

Iranian governing practices have given rise to a very different type of PMC. Iran’s military, paramilitary, and intelligence organs are all essentially PMCs in the way that they operate due to the nature of Iran’s government structure, and they are all directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. The primary arms of these enterprises are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These organizations work together in directing and supporting the PMC-like Quds Force operatives around the world in support of collection efforts, intelligence operations, paramilitary operations, assassinations, and terrorist activities. While the Quds Force advances Iranian efforts to export revolution around the world, their local PMC-like organization, known as the Basij, works to subvert independence within Iran, assisting in tyrannical oppression of free speech and liberty within the country and violently suppressing any attempt to cause disturbances against the Supreme Leader. Iran targets enemies abroad using a decentralized system of third-party actions and efforts, combining the principles of the bounty system and PMC architecture instead of engaging directly in combat efforts. In 2006, for example, when the Islamic State terror organization was still called Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I),²⁴ the MOIS provided “financial, material, technological, and other support” to their leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directly supporting the terrorist’s war against U.S. personnel in Iraq.²⁵

The contrast between Blackwater and the Iranian Quds Force is extreme, but the core issue inherent in their existence is nearly identical. With the rise in popularity of PMCs around the world after their successful use by the United States in the War on Terror, the core issue of their existence needs attention from the world. The international community recognized that even though Blackwater was targeted for their deeds, their success in achieving mission goals was undeniable. China, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia, India, and many other countries have worked to develop similar types of organizations in their countries to take advantage of the gray area of contractor combat operations. These organizations are primarily in the employ of the Executive Branch of government or its national equivalent. They are generally not under the structure of the national military for legal purposes or oversight. They are mercenaries, being used in the modern-day to bolster force size that otherwise cannot grow and to skirt existing national and international laws with regards to combat operations and security. While the attention drawn to Blackwater caused them to change their name to Academi, the core issue of the existence of PMCs, in general, has not been significantly addressed in the international community.

Conclusion

The practice of paying people to kill has been around for a long time and is likely to stay, absent total world peace. The question that comes to mind isn’t whether or not this process exists, or even how to eliminate it, but rather, what the best way forward is for the United States and the international community, knowing that this process is an inherent part of world politics and international relationships. Attention, publicization, and regulation are likely the most effective weapons against barbarity in warfare, as has been shown throughout history. Attention drawn to assassins led to a ban on the practice of assassination. Attention drawn to mercenaries led to a ban on mercenaries. Attention drawn to the American Constitutional justice system led to the elimination of dead or alive bounties. Attention drawn to PMCs led to a restructuring of the relationship between the United States government and third-party contractors and continues to shape the potential future of PMCs. When the people of the world pay attention, publicize rights and wrongs perpetrated by governments and leaders, and work to create effective regulations to ensure that human dignity and individual liberty are the primary goals of such regulations, freedom succeeds, and tyranny fails.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

References

¹ William Crotty, “Presidential Assassinations,” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 102-103.

² Kautilya, Arthashastra, Translated by R. Shamasastry, (Bangalore: Government Press, 1915), 461-474.

³ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Lionel Giles, (London, UK: Luzac and Co., 1910), 34.

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “A Study of Assassination,” Central Intelligence Agency (1953), Accessed on July 2, 2020, https://archive.org/details/CIAAStudyOfAssassination1953/mode/2up.

⁵ Donald Yerxa, “July 1914: An Interview with Sean McMeekin,” Historically Speaking 14, no. 3 (2013): 12-16.

⁶ Elena Kosmach, “Serbs and Russians,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 43, no. 1 (2001): 109-114.

⁷ Ian Beckett, “Franz Ferdinand,” Historian no. 120 (2014): 18-22.

⁸ Geoffrey Wawro, Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, (Boulder, CO, USA: Basic Books, 2014), 104-106.

⁹ Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 106.

¹⁰ Martin Levinson, “Mapping the Causes of World War I to Avoid Armageddon Today,” Et Cetera 62, no. 2 (2005): 157-164.

¹¹ Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army: The Use of Mercenaries in the American Revolution and its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private Military Firms,” Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 317-349.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Benjamin Franklin, The Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin, (Eau Claire: E.M. Hale & Company, nd), 253.

¹⁶ United Nations, “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” United Nations (1989).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Pinkerton, “Our History,” Pinkerton (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.Pinkerton.com/our-story/history.

¹⁹ FBI, “Most Wanted,” FBI (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.FBI.gov/wanted.

²⁰ Sophie Tanno, “$5,000 for Jesse James ‘Dead or Alive’ and $100,000 for Lincoln’s Three Killers: The Fascinating Wanted Posters for America’s Biggest 19th Century Criminals,” Daily Mail (2019), Accessed on July 8, 2020, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7280265/the-fascinating-wanted-posters-americas-biggest-19th-century-criminals.html.

²¹ Doug Sample, “The Faces Behind the Faces on the ‘Most Wanted’ Deck,” American Forces Press Service (2003), Accessed on July 6, 2020, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29017.

²² Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army.”

²³ Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.

²⁴ Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 5, no. 4 (2014): 415-476.

²⁵ Library of Congress, “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,” Federal Research Division (2012), 37.

Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Finite Strategy

In game theory, there are finite and infinite games. In a finite game, the objective of the game is to win, thereby ending the game. In the infinite game, the goal is the perpetuation of the game. Since 9/11, the U.S. has implemented a finite approach to fighting terrorism. The “War on Terrorism (WoT)” archetype highlights this finite approach.

Three premises underpinned the WoT archetype: the theoretical idea that terrorism can be completely defeated, the militarization of the response to terrorism, and by extension, the overzealousness to targeted killing, especially of leaders.

As a rhetorical tactic, framing terrorism as a defeatable concept certainly helped galvanize the U.S. population and international community in the wake of the attacks. But as a theoretical approach, it is at best ill-conceived and, at worst futile. First, there is little sense to the idea of defeating terrorism completely. As scholars Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman have argued, terrorism is merely a tool.¹ As a tool, terrorism has and is used by most non-state actors²across the political violence spectrum to achieve their goals.

Therefore, conceptualizing terrorism as something that can be defeated is as illogical as declaring war on a hammer. Second, and as alluded to earlier, the WoT archetype ignores the longevity of terrorism. In other words, it frames or at least creates the perception of terrorism as a sudden and unique phenomenon that rose to prominence only after 9/11. But one can look to terrorism’s history and longevity to dismiss this claim. During the Roman Empire, the Sicarii³ used terrorism to reject Roman rule over Judea, and the etymology of the word takes us as far back to the French revolution. Moreover, David Rapport, a scholar, demonstrated how terrorism has evolved in different waves through different geopolitical contexts since the late 1800s.⁴ The point is that terrorism has been used throughout history and will almost certainly continue to be used by groups around the world for generations to come.

Because the concept has erroneously been conceived as something defeatable, the U.S. foreign policy blob assumed militarizing the response would inherently resolve the problem by overwhelming the adversary. It is not hard to see why they assumed this. The U.S military has demonstrated an ability to fight and win in multiple theatres against a variety of opponents. The U.S has been most comfortable fighting finite games such as in the Second World War, and Korea. And even, erroneously, framing infinite wars like Vietnam into finite approaches.

As such and in response to 9/11, Congress quickly enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Three Presidents since Mr. Bush have used the AUMF to start, perpetuate, and expand military-led counterterrorism (CT) operations around the world. In a closer analysis, the AUMF⁵ has been loosely interpreted to include almost any terrorist organization. And true to form, today the U.S. leads or is a partner to military-led CT operations in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan⁶, and Pakistan. The operations are as global as they are diverse in targets. The U.S. prosecutes a wide range of terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda core, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS, and affiliates in North and East Africa, Al Shabab, and others. This expansion and continuation of operations have cost the U.S. approximately 6.4 trillion dollars,⁷ according to Brown University estimates. This militarization has led in turn to overzealousness in disrupting terrorist networks through the targeted killing of leaders.

This, by extension has transformed the premise of military-led operations into statically focused campaigns. Since 2004, the U.S. military has conducted approximately 14,040 strikes in various countries, according to Bureau of Investigative Journalism data,⁸ and has formed at least two coalitions⁹ of countries to fight terrorist groups.

But as it will be demonstrated next, the finite approach has severe limitations that, at a minimum, raise the important question of why it is still the de facto strategy after almost 20 years.

A Not-So-Effective Finite Strategy

The finite framework, one built on the premise of completely defeating terrorism, has not worked. The failure of this finite strategy is not an inherent weakness of the U.S. CT capabilities. Thanks to fast innovation, competent intelligence agencies, and superior technology, the U.S. has become overtly good at finding and fixing targets. The most recent example the death of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January of this year¹⁰.

Instead, the failure is symptomatic of a finite player competing with finite methods and goals against infinite players in what is an infinite game. ISIS is the best example of this clash.¹¹ Since 2003, the U.S. and its allies have led on and off military-led CT operations against ISIS, fervently focusing on killing its top leaders. It is important to note that the U.S also led counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in 2006–2007 and from 2014–2017 — often in parallel to the CT operations — against ISIS in a response to their evolution from terrorist group to insurgency. These were narrowly successful in territorially defeating ISIS but fell short in “defeating” the group altogether. Even during COIN operations, where finite goals such as defeating ISIS territorially were achieved, the infinite strategy of the group was not sufficiently considered. This led to the continued finite approach of killing ISIS leaders. As such, in June 2006, U.S. forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,¹² the founder of AQI. Subsequent leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi met the same fate in April 2010¹³, and on 27 October 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northern Syria.¹⁴

While there should be no sympathy for dead terrorist leaders, the merit of this aspect of the finite approach is questionable when one looks at the resiliency of ISIS’s operational behavior after the death of its leaders. The decapitation approach claims to deal calamitous blows to organizations, ultimately leading to their demise by dismantling the figurehead that holds the organization together. But Audrey Kurth Cronin’s findings raise questions about this premise. Kronin found that the decapitation approach seldom works and arresting rather than killing leaders tends to be more effective in ending terrorist campaigns.¹⁵

Kronin’s findings can certainly be demonstrated when one looks at ISIS after the death of its leaders. Despite their deaths, the killings never achieved their finite goal of dismantling or ending the terrorist group. After the death of its overall founder Zarqawi and despite heavy territorial losses in, during the U.S.-led surge in 2007, ISI¹⁶ rebounded and was able to inflict extraordinary terrorist attacks throughout Iraq. From 2008–2010, the three years after the COIN operations (or Surge), over 200 people were killed per month by terrorism in Iraq.¹⁷ Before and after the death of Omar Al Baghdadi, ISI assassinated over 1345 Awakening leaders according to one estimate, ¹⁸ and launched its infamous “Breaking the Walls” campaign where it carried out 24 bombings and eight prison breaks.¹⁹ By the same extension, and since the death of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, ISIS has conducted approximately 285 attacks in Iraq, according to a review of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Even after the death of its top leader and U.S. claims that it had dealt catastrophic and “final” blows to the organization, the organization mustered the necessary capabilities to continue their terror campaigns, remain relevant, and at times outdo what it had done in previous years. This resiliency demonstrates that the finite approach of targeted killings has been futile in its efforts to “defeat” terrorism.

The ISIS example also highlights terrorist organizations’ infinite doctrine. Part of the ability, in this case of ISIS, to continue despite the endless cycle of dead leaders is the infinite framing of its goals. While external factors helped ISIS ²⁰, the “infiniteness” of ISIS goals allowed it to turn defeats to victories as part of a longer “infinite” struggle. In the aftermath of its Iraqi territorial defeat, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi stated,

“For the Mujahideen holy warriors, the scale of victory or defeat is not dependent on a city or town being stolen or subject to that who has aerial superiority, intercontinental missiles or smart bombs…… “Oh, Caliphate soldiers… trust in God’s promise and His victory… for with hardship comes relief and a way out.”²¹

If one strips away the religiosity, what is evident in Baghdadi’s rhetoric is that deaths and loss of territory do not amount to detrimental finite loses, instead they represent loses as part of a predetermined plan (in this case formulated by God according to Baghdadi) that will “ultimately” lead them to victory. The “ultimately” is worthy of closer analysis. It is this word that represents the infinite mentality ingrained in groups like ISIS. Stated differently, it does not matter how much they lose, insofar as they continue their path, “they will ultimately” be rewarded. In this regard, ISIS is not seeking to achieve finite metrics or goals, they seek an almost abstract infinite goal that might never materialize. By this logic, the U.S. inability to recognize this, and continue with a finite military-led CT approach of maiming and bombing ISIS leaders, only played to what ISIS expected and was/is “comfortable” dealing with.

Towards an Infinite Approach

However, insufficient the finite strategy has proven to be, some argue that it has and will continue to work. They point to the lack of 9/11 like attacks, something they attribute to sustained military-led CT pressure in countries that offered haven to terrorist groups.

Indeed, the U.S. has not suffered 9/11-like attacks. But the role of military-led CT operations is surely overestimated while the vast changes to airport security, intelligence capabilities, international law enforcement cooperation, and other safety mechanisms, are underestimated.

Proponents have also not sufficiently explained why the threat of attacks, or attacks that have not materialized continue to exist. In December 2019, an al-Qaeda operative shot eleven people at a U.S. military base in Florida.²² The December 2019 al-Qaeda attack is just one of many attacks since 9/11 that have been at the lower end of the extraordinary scale, failed to materialize, or were foiled before they occurred. Moreover, al-Qaeda media continues to call for attacks against the United States, including in statements from regional al-Qaeda leaders, reflecting the network’s enduring efforts to pursue or inspire attacks in the West.²³

This is to say that if the premise of the finite approach was to “defeat terrorism,” the evidence in the sheer number of intended attacks since 9/11 dismisses this. The threat is well and alive, and the finite approach has not been sufficient in quelling or even stopping it. The recent statements by the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Nathan Sales, effectively kills any debate.

When asked by the BBC, “whether this war — as originally conceived by the Bush administration — about the War on Terrorism is over?” He said, “No, the fight is very much ongoing, we’re winning the fight, but we’re continuing to fight against a determined enemy, or I should say a determined group of enemies.”²⁴

Calls to change how the U.S. conceptualizes and fights terrorism are not new. Analysts, policymakers, and the public generally recognize that a continuation of the finite approach will prolong military-led CT operations with little or no long-term solution to the threat of terrorism. What is new, however, is the shifting tectonic plates of geopolitics. And as the U.S. foreign policy blob construes a grand strategy to answer this shift, the choice presented would be at best to leave the current CT approach intact and at worst drop CT; neither are viable options for U.S. long term security interest.

Despite changing geostrategic priorities, developing and implementing an infinite CT strategy is easier said than done. Terrorism is poorly understood. This leads to criminal acts being incorrectly labeled as terrorism, effectively politicizing it. For example, in late March, the U.S. Department of Justice warned that “people who intentionally spread COVID-19 could be charged with terrorism,” arguably a stretch of interpretation.²⁵ Moreover, the political clime is such that politicians look strong in supporting military-led CT policies, and weak when they do not. When coupled with the fear terrorism generates, it is easy to see why change will be difficult.

Notwithstanding, the time to course-correct is now. An infinite strategy emphasizes a whole-of-government approach that folds finite metrics within an infinite or abstract vision. It starts with accepting terrorism can never be completely defeated; acknowledging its relatively low threat level; and it particularly means employing all aspects of national power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, economic, military, and others.

It also means using those elements of national powers towards what the research points to as most effective in ending terrorist campaigns. Research shows that terrorist groups and their terrorism campaigns most often end when they implode from within or when splinter groups challenge the main group’s narrative. They are also particularly weak during generational shifts and when non-violent alternatives are created that facilitate underlying social movement to express their political grievances.²⁶

As such, an infinite strategy calls for a sustained and prolonged multifaceted approach. It focuses on a strong role for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID) to fund and work with marginalized groups in politically unstable countries. Their work should focus on alternative non-violent social movements. Likewise, the U.S. should increase efforts to bolster intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and create international law enforcement and intelligence task forces that are not under military purview, using military-led CT operations as complementary elements. Equally important is the need to build alternative narratives to the religious interpretations used by religious terrorist groups. An alternative narrative seeks to implode groups from within, loosening the bolts of religious interpretation these groups use to justify their actions. None of these few examples are short-term or finite, easily measured, and tangible. But this is the nature of truly fighting terrorism through an infinite strategy — the actions are not easy to measure and there are no fast wins. Instead, it’s a long, slow, and prolonged approach that will challenge groups’ infinite mentality.

In all, the time is now to change how the U.S fights terrorism. An infinite strategy will ensure the U.S. reduces its dependency on military-led CT operations and starts leveraging all realms of its national power to effectively suppress the threat. If the U.S does not correct course now, then its surely proximus to insanity: continuing to do the same thing, expecting different results.

¹ Arie W. Kruglanski & Shira Fishman (2006) The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:2, 193–215, DOI: 10.1080/09546550600570119 ;

² Scholars in the Critical Studies of Terrorism field have argued that States can also and do use terrorism. I take the majority view and focus primarily on non-state actors who employ terrorism.

³ It’s been widely cited that the Sicarii were considered the first political violent group that used terrorism. See Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg in (1990) Sicarii and the Rise of Terrorism, Terrorism, 13:4–5, 329–335, DOI: 10.1080/10576109008435840; as well as Donathan Taylor, Yannick Gautron. 02 Apr 2015, Pre-Modern Terrorism from The Routledge History of Terrorism Routledge

⁴ See David Rapport’s Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (2001)

⁵ The original text of the AUMF authorized the U.S. military to “ that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” It was always mostly focused against those responsible for 9/11 i.e. AQ. It has since been broadly interpreted to mean almost any terrorist organization.

⁶ The U.S. CT operations against ISIS-K and Taliban leaders are different than the NATO-led mission that emulates elements of a counterinsurgency strategy and also of other U.S.-led missions training the ISF.

⁷ This number includes appropriated and obligated money towards 2020. Afghanistan, which as mentioned above, has three different mission sets. While the article focuses on the CT operations, the numbers account for the COIN, and broader missions.

⁸ The BIJ started to collect data since 2004, and it includes a wide range of U.S military activity, not just targeted killings. See the full methodology at thebureauinvestigates.com; the numbers are estimative and cannot be independently confirmed.

⁹ This again accounts for coalitions that were formed to defeat ISIS when it was an insurgency from 2014–2017

¹⁰ Iranian General Qasem Soleimani was the leader of Iran’s Quds forces, considered by the U.S. to be a terrorist organization. The designation might be more political than true to what terrorist groups are. Still, the Quds forces do support groups that commit acts of terrorism in line with Iran’s foreign policy objectives.

¹¹ ISIS is the most contemporary example, but the finite vs. infinite clash can also be demonstrated with AQ core and other terrorist groups.

¹² https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html

¹³ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaedas-two-top-iraq-leaders-killed-in-raid-idU.S.TRE63I3CL20100419

¹⁴ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-death-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/

¹⁵ See How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns

¹⁶ AQI became ISIS in 2007.

¹⁷ See Brian H. Fishman in The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory

¹⁸ This estimate is from retired LTC, Craig Whiteside, cited in # 17.

¹⁹ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

²⁰ U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003, the subsequent withdrawal in 2011, etc.

²¹ The audio was released in August 2018 before the https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45277322

²² https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/justice-department-al-qaeda-florida-naval-base-shooting.html

²³ https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf

²⁴ Frank Gardner — BBC- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53156096

²⁵ https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/25/politics/coronavirus-terrorism-justice-department/index.html

²⁶ See Martha Crenshaw, Audrey Kurth Kronin, and others.

After Almost Twenty Years, America’s “War on Terrorism” Resembles Insanity was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this undoubtedly is a major victory for the U.S. in the fight against global jihadism, it cannot be overlooked that this decapitation strike does certainly not mean ISIS that is finished. This organization has proved that it can outlast the loss of its leaders; its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006; his successors, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, were eliminated in 2010. Following the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State has now publicly named his successor: Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.

Consequences of al-Baghdadi’s Death

Valuable intelligence was obtained during the raid. Similarly to the raid during which Osama bin Laden lost his life, through the operation that resulted in al Baghdad’s death, the U.S. forces got to obtain, presumably exceptionally valuable, intelligence. An additional bonus is that two ISIS fighters were captured alive and then taken to Iraq for interrogation. Having been rather close to al-Baghdadi, it is likely they possess some knowledge regarding the organization’s functioning and its network of sleeper cells, whose activation in the context of staging retaliatory attacks is now one of the major concerns of the anti-IS coalition member states.

There’s a risk that ISIS sleeper cells could be activated to execute retaliatory strikes. Many security experts and analysts have warned about the wave of retaliatory strikes that ISIS will carry out to avenge al-Baghdadi’s death. Though such attacks are extremely likely to happen, it may be some time between the killing and the attacks to take place. ISIS is aware that many countries have put their intelligence and security services on high alert because of the fear of retaliatory strikes. To inflict maximum damage and casualties, it is characteristic for groups like ISIS  to wait out increased protection measures and attack once the security provisions are more relaxed. It’s almost certain that retaliatory strikes have  been planned and organized even before al-Baghdadi’s death.

The world’s most wanted terrorist was brought to justice. Killing al-Baghdadi is undoubtedly a success in the fight against ISIS, but some analysts argue that its value is rather symbolic, as it is believed that the Caliph’s control over his organization was rather limited in the recent months. While that may be true, it needs to be remembered it was him who led the organization during days of its glory and territorial conquest, and him who was responsible for the death and suffering of millions of people in the process of creating and running the Caliphate. Even though he might not have had in recent months as much power and control as he used to, he was still the most wanted terrorist in the world.

President Trump has greater justification for withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Killing al-Baghdadi provided Trump with the ammunition to defend his decision of withdrawing the U.S. troops from Syria. He can justifiably claim that the U.S. is still committed to continuing the fight against ISIS despite the withdrawal and that the American forces are not needed there on the ground to carry out effective operations against the IS. However, it must be considered that Trump’s decision has resulted in a resurgence of ISIS forces as Kurdish forces—who were guarding ISIS fighters—were forced to leave their positions to fight Turkish and Turkey-backed forces as they invaded North-eastern Syria. Reportedly, several hundred ISIS warriors escaped.

Al-Baghdadi’s death does not mean the end of ISIS

Many would want to believe that al Baghdadi’s death means the end of the struggle against ISIS and the end of the threat it has posed. This belief is, however, far from being real. Of course, losing a leader is a considerable blow to any terrorist organization, and severe damage to its image, but it needs to be acknowledged that the internal structure of the Islamic State has not been harmed much with al-Baghdadi killed.

There were people ready to take over al-Baghdadi’s role and indeed, as mentioned before, the IS has already claimed its new caliph to be Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi. Though al-Hashemi is likely to continue the work of al-Baghdadi, it is also unclear how strong his position will be and what will be the ISIS’s affiliates’ reaction to the new Caliph. Overall, however, replacing al-Baghdadi sends a message that despite the losses suffered by the terrorist group, it remains in existence and is continuing operations.

Now That Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Dead, What Next? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of the victims, thirty-five were citizens of foreign states. According to Sri Lankan authorities, multiple terrorists attacked large hotels and Christian churches with explosives. Sri Lankan security services have arrested several dozen people.

Political violence has affected Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) since the country re-established itself as a republic in 1971.  Sri Lanka was engaged in a decades-long civil war until 2009, the end-product of the country’s colonial and post-colonial oppressive social and economic policies. These policies constrained the rights of the Tamil population, a Hindu minority group. The Tamil people felt that they were politically unrepresented and were increasingly marginalized in Sri Lankan society.

In 1972, when Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka, established the state as a republic, and announced that the official religion would be Buddhism, the Tamil began peacefully protesting against the government’s policies. As time went on, however, Tamil armed resistance groups began to emerge. These groups employed terrorist tactics during what would become a bloody civil war, characterized by large-scale human rights violations and the deaths of over 100,000 people.

Today, the situation in Sri Lanka is different.

Throughout Southeast Asia, acts of violence are primarily carried out by jihadist groups and Islamic separatist movements. Christians are increasingly targeted by both long-standing terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, and groups founded more recently, such as ISIS (Daesh).  Al-Qaeda and ISIS are engaged in a competition for influence and leadership within the broader region, one that is illustrative of the evolving nature of jihadist insurgencies in the region. 

Although ISIS no longer controls territory in Syria and Iraq, the group’s increasingly asymmetric nature and the propaganda disseminated by the group are now affecting Southeast Asian states like Indonesia and the  Philippines, which governments are having difficulty countering. Furthermore, there is increasing concern over the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to their country of origin, as it could have a profound impact on local conflicts. In Sri Lanka, for instance, ISIS didn’t radicalize many people. However, the group’s propaganda intersects with that of other jihadist militant groups, increasing the overall terrorist threat in Sri Lanka, as tensions and rivalries among various jihadist factions make the security landscape inherently more complex.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka, as evidence emerged of the perpetrators’ sophisticated management and organizational capabilities, along with their use of known jihadi tactics. The government accused the National Thowheeth Jama’ath of carrying out the attacks with foreign support, which merits closer scrutiny. Not only did the Easter bombings occur on the tenth anniversary of the Tamil’s defeat by Sri Lankan government forces, but the National Thowheeth Jama’ath has historically carried out acts of vandalism rather than terrorism. If the group was, in fact, responsible for the Easter Sunday bombings, their use of explosives and suicide bombers indicates a substantial qualitative leap in terms of their capabilities. It’s essential that the ongoing investigation clarifies the National Thoweeth Jama’ath’s involvement. 

Furthermore, the attacks were the result of an intelligence failure, according to Sri Lankan authorities. Pujith Jayasundara, a senior Sri Lankan government official, reportedly received a warning from a foreign intelligence service concerning a possible terrorist attack against Christian churches in the country and issued a warning. Unfortunately, the information failed to reach policymakers in time, according to telecommunications Minister Harin Fernando.

Breaking the nexus between violent separatists and jihadist groups.

Should the National Thowheeth Jama’ath be proven to be responsible for the attacks, it will serve as further proof that violent acts by small numbers of jihadist militants can gravely threaten a country’s national security and socio-economic interests, mainly if tourism is a significant economic driver. Domestic and regional cooperation between police and intelligence services urgently needs to improve as it’s becoming easier and easier for local militants and smaller groups to connect across borders to disseminate instructions, training, and logistics information from larger terrorist organizations.

In Southeast Asia, a region deeply affected by internal conflicts, the growth of violent jihadist and separatist movements significantly impacts both political and social stability. Separatist movements are inherently a threat to national security, especially as separatism and the desire for recognition are increasingly connected with ethnonationalist and jihadist movements. Existing gaps in counter-terrorism efforts only serve to deepen the increasing interconnection and interdependence of jihadist and separatist movements.

Although local separatist movements maintain different strategies and objectives from both global and localized jihadist groups, many employ transnational jihadist rhetoric and propaganda to achieve religious-political goals. Separatist groups may use jihadist tactics for their attacks because they are hard to counter and have the desired impact on local and international media outlets. It is critical that Southeast Asian re-adapt their counter-terrorism efforts to break the nexus between political insurgency and jihadism—especially now that well-trained and experienced militants are returning home from Syria and Iraq.

Sri Lanka: Jihadism and Separatism in an Ethnically-Divided Country was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote a letter to President Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) asking that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) be designated as a “terrorist organization” in a reciprocal move, a measure already promised by some Iranian lawmakers. Shortly after that, Iran’s SNSC stated that the U.S. government was a “sponsor of terrorism” and designated CENTCOM and all affiliated forces as “terrorist groups.” Now, a new wave of tensions could spread through the region.

Too big a bite for CENTCOM to chew?

Many have argued that the U.S. is retreating from its role as a world leader and is moving in a more isolationist direction. Others point to a need to reconcentrate U.S. resources in response to the oft-mentioned return to “great power competition.”

China—and Russia, to a lesser extent—are engaged in expansionist agendas as the U.S. has been preoccupied with events in the Middle East. Many believe the time, energy, and money the U.S. has spent for nearly two decades in the region would have been better spent countering the influence of the country’s real revisionist threats.

While the U.S. remains involved in a “forever war” in Afghanistan, and with Iraq still reeling from the aftermath of sectarian conflict and ISIS, the U.S. increasingly seems bent on raising tensions with Iran in light of the recent IRGC designation as a terrorist group.

The U.S. presence and the Shiite Crescent

The Iranian proxies in Iraq, known in general as “حشد الشعبی” or Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), whose commanders such as Hadi Al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have close ties to IRGC—and Qasem Soleimani, in particular. In the aftermath of fighting ISIS in Iraq, the PMU is now better organized and equipped.

With the recent designation, these groups, with their close ties to their Shiite Iranian allies, can undoubtedly escalate the level of violence in Iraq. According to The New York Times, the recent move could even push the Iraqi parliamentarians to fuel a proposal limiting the movement and actions of the approximately 5,000 American troops in Iraq.

Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, is arguably the most loyal Iranian proxy group. With approximately 45,000 fighters, having alongside the IRGC in Syria, the Hezbollah militia has proven itself to be a capable force in implementing Tehran’s regional strategy. The PMU and Hezbollah—essentially two foreign branches of the IRGC—will pose challenges for the U.S. forces. While the United States would undoubtedly emerge tactically victorious from any conflict in the Middle East, two questions remain: at what cost, and after how long?

Designating the IRGC as a Terrorist Group: Consequences for U.S. Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions subsided with a rapprochement between the two sides, ultimately culminating in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Those days are gone—now, the remaining “adult in the room” is the walrus-mustached U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, who has publicly threatened Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei may not have many more anniversaries to celebrate.

Michael Morford, a former U.S. Army captain, and a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project has warned that it appears the so-called neoconservatives in Washington are attempting to steer the U.S. towards another war in the Middle East—this time with Iran. If this assumption is valid, the Trump administration will need to garner public support by presenting a case ostensibly justifying the use of military force. The Trump administration could follow a strategy similar to the one employed by the Bush administration before the U.S. invasion of Iraq: forcefully presenting a narrative that Iran constitutes a significant threat to U.S. national security.

In 2003, members of the Bush administration were pushing the narrative that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. In creating a pretext for military action against Iran, the Trump administration could argue that kinetic military action is warranted in response to an Iranian cyber attack. Such a scenario would set a dangerous precedent but would be a fitting pretext for a major U.S. military operation in the Middle East. Some recent incidents have made such an outcome all the more likely and should, therefore, be addressed.

Missile sabotage claims answered by drone hack footage release

After two unsuccessful satellite lunches—the first on January 15 and then on February 5—assumptions were made by U.S. media outlets that a secret satellite-launch sabotage operation started in the second Bush administration had been revived.

However, Iranian officials have rejected these claims, and Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency released footage of what it claimed were U.S. drones in Iraq that were hacked by Iranian proxies, ostensibly in response to the allegedly sabotaged satellite launches. Iranian officials declared the rocket suffered a third-stage failure, and the U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) declined to comment on the alleged drone hack.

The Citrix breach

Recently, an Iranian-linked hacking group known as Iridium was reported to have targeted one of the largest U.S. government software contractors and stole anywhere from six to ten terabytes of data. Iridium is also believed to have been behind hacks into the Australian and British Parliaments in 2017.

Particularly concerning is the recent Citrix cyber attack could be the first in a series of operations. “It’s possible that adversaries could gain insights into the company’s network configuration and the defenses of the government agencies,” said Suzanne Spaulding, a former senior official at the Department of Homeland Security, “and that would make hacking those government agencies easier.”

A history no one wants to repeat

As he was making a case for war against Iraq at the UN Security Council in 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell held up a model vial of anthrax. Shortly after that, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” began, initiating a series of events that would leave hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead, trillions of dollars wasted, the destruction of much Iraq’s infrastructure, and the eventual formation of ISIS (Daesh).  History can repeat itself; however, rather than citing the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the next Middle East conflict could originate in cyberspace.

In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the U.S. states that it will consider a nuclear strike in response to a major non-nuclear strategic attack. The NPR defines a “major non-nuclear strategic attack” as including—but not limited to—”attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”

Infrastructure, command and control capabilities, along with warning and attack assessment capabilities, could all be hampered through cyber attacks. Although it is a highly remote possibility that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber attack—given the strength of its conventional forces—a cyber attack could be used by the White House as justification for the use of force against Iran, with a U.S. diplomat referring to a flash memory drive instead of anthrax.

Even if a major Iranian cyber attack (real or imagined) isn’t enough to initiate a major conflict, there is always the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation between the two countries, and between Iran and its regional rivals. Furthermore, when one takes into account the proliferating social media disinformation and misinformation campaigns throughout the Middle East that fan the flames of war, the highly risky cyber game currently being played by the U.S. and Iran can’t be overestimated.

The Next Middle East Conflict Could Emerge Out of a Cyber Clash was originally published on Global Security Review.

Commenting on competitive interactions between a weak and a strong state, Thucydides is reported to have stated: “The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”  In assessing Iran’s strategic interactions with the United States, this statement is worth considering.

The United States and Iran have been enemies since the onslaught of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that ousted “America’s Shah” and transformed that country into the Islamic Republic it is today. Even though Iran is a weak power compared to the United States, it is not entirely without options. Some of these options appear promising, in terms of sustaining Iran’s strategic presence throughout the Middle East at a time when the United States is busy lowering its presence in that and other regions.

Weak but not without options

The Arab world post-Arab Spring has become a different region in terms of the ability of several major Arab states to manage the authoritarian systems within their borders.  Libya and Tunisia emerged as weak states—indeed, Libya is frequently depicted as a failed state—regarding political stability.

Gone is the iron rule of both Muammar Qaddafi and Zine al Abideen Bin Ali, which, if nothing else, guaranteed regime stability in Libya and Tunisia respectively.  Even though Egypt reverted to a military rule by ousting the democratically elected president of the Ikhwan, Mohammad Morsi, the political future of that country remains uncertain, with constant skirmishes between the military and ISIS.

In the Persian Gulf region, the Arab monarchies prevailed against any attempts of regime change by reformist/revolutionary groups but remained nervous about the prospects of their long-term survival.  The brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was destroyed by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  What emerged in its place is a weak country, ridden with mounting sectarian Shia-Sunni conflict, and conflict stemming from the mounting aspirations of the Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan.

As a Shia power inside a majority Shia Iraq (where about 65 percent of the population is Shia), Iran enjoys an advantage that no Arab state—all of which are majority Sunni—can match.  In fact, an argument can be made that the Wahhabi ideology of Sunni Islam, assiduously promoted by Saudi Arabia, has emerged as a significant impediment against the escalation of Sunni political influence inside Iraq and Lebanon.

The post-Saddam Iraq also became a place where Iran exercised its powerful presence and influence.  In that capacity, the pro-Iranian militias (aka Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) or Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), along with Sunni militant groups, did their very best to make America’s military presence inside Iraq a highly dangerous option.

When U.S. forces pulled out in 2011, Iran’s emergence as a major power inside Iraq became an irreversible reality.  Even after the decision of President Barack Obama to send some American troops back to Iraq to fight the Islamic State (aka ISIS), Iran’s presence and influence in Iraq remained unaffected.

In Lebanon (where Shias are generally regarded as having a substantial, if not a majority, presence), Iran has equally used Hezbollah adroitly to ensure that the Shia population remains a major player in the sustained power game among the Sunnis, Christians, and Shias.  As a paramilitary/political entity, Hezbollah also makes sure that the Sunni-dominated government in Lebanon is never allowed to have an inordinate influence over the Shia population.

Hezbollah’s role in bringing about the withdrawal of the Israeli occupiers from Lebanon in 2000 was an event that made it a major nationalistic paramilitary/political entity. Then in 2006, Hezbollah’s success in challenging the superiority of Israel’s military and surviving the intense bombing of its forces turned out to be another event enhancing its prestige in the Arab world.  Iran also accrued considerable strategic influence from both of these developments.

Iran’s decision to participate as a pro-Assad entity in the Syrian civil war is a decision whose long-term impact in the Levant will be felt for years to come.  As a pro-Syrian force, all Iran has to do is to ensure the sustenance of the Assad regime, while eradicating all anti-Assad militant forces, especially ISIS.

Advantages stemming from Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict

Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict in September 2015 brought about three developments, all of which were promising for Iran.  First, Russia’s entry elevated the Syrian conflict to the level of great power maneuvering, since the U.S. and its friendly forces were also present in Syria fighting ISIS.  Second, as an important supporter of Assad, Iran expected to have a major say in the future great power endeavors to resolve the Syrian conflict.  Third, Russia’s decision to target ISIS (along with other pro-American Islamist forces, even though Moscow never admitted targeting those forces) was to make Iran’s fight against ISIS considerably easier.

What also helped Russia is the fact that neither President Obama nor President Trump spent any effort in targeting the Assad regime. After ousting Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya from power, the United States seemed to have realized how important it was to leave the Middle Eastern autocrats in power.  The alternative to their rule was nothing but prolonged chaos, as was amply demonstrated in Iraq and Libya.  Russia not only understood that reality but was determined to exploit its strategic presence and influence in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Under the Trump administration, the United States, by deciding to spend its military resources on eradicating ISIS from Iraq (and later from Syria) has also unwittingly strengthened Iran’s presence as a power broker inside that country.

U.S.-Iran nuclear deal

Iran’s nuclear research program had the making of an ambitious plan for its eventual emergence as a nuclear weapons power.  Even though it vehemently denied having such a goal, the United States (along with Israel) was equally vehement in accusing Iran of having latent nuclear aspirations.  This issue had to be resolved in the global arena.

In an impressive show of diplomacy, the Obama administration brought about their fellow P-5+1 nations (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) to the negotiating table.  What emerged on 14 July 2014, was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Under this agreement, Iran reaffirmed that “under no circumstances will (it) ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.”  Still, the fact that Iran could keep its nuclear program appeared to its detractors as a temptation to cheat.

From Iran’s viewpoint, the signing of a nuclear (or other) agreement appeared dubious. This perception is due to the notorious American predilection for regime change as well as a related high suspicion that it cannot be trusted when it promises to be a party to nuclear negotiations, or that it will continue to honor it no matter who is sitting in the White House. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi were two targets of regime change.

In the case of Saddam, even though the administration of President George W. Bush claimed that the Iraqi dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction, no such weapons were found after the ouster of Saddam’s regime.  In the case of Qaddafi, after his renunciation of developing indigenous nuclear weapons, the United States, along with France and the U.K., took military action that eventually resulted in the dismantlement of his regime.

But Iran had no choice but to agree to the JCPOA due to decades of crippling economic sanctions levied by the U.S.

Iran’s options for charting the best course forward

On May 9, 2018, Donald Trump announced America’s withdrawal from JCPOA and promised to reimpose harsh economic sanctions on Iran.  This impetuous action placed the Western alliance system in a state of turbulence.  The U.K., Germany, and France announced their continued backing of JCPOA without the United States.  Still, much of their support depends on how strenuously the United States imposes its economic sanctions on any country that continues to do business with Iran.

Even with the weakening of American global leadership, it holds considerable economic swagger.  More to the point, the European countries appear determined about challenging the United States, but which of them is willing to pay the price, and which one of them is interested in going against the United States to support Iran’s continued observance of it is a question hard to answer.

The accession of Michael Pompeo to the job of Secretary of State and of John Bolton to the position of National Security Advisor, both staunch opponents of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal, also adds further impetus to the Trump administration’s resolve to punish Iran for its ambitious strategic posture in the Levant and for its prolific missile production program. The talk in Washington is that the cancellation of the US-Iran nuclear deal may be a prelude to Trump’s intention to bring about regime change in Iran.

Bringing about a regime change in Iran will be difficult for the Trump administration since it finds itself without allies in Europe and no support from China or Russia. However, even those realities are not likely to stop U.S. military action against Iran, if Trump is willing to pay an exorbitant price in the form of a potential tsunami of instability and turbulence in the Middle East.

Iran may be willing to discuss with the United States its commitment to the development of long-range missiles, but it is not likely to abandon it.  It might also be ready to have a general discussion over its commitment to the Assad regime and its support of Hezbollah of Lebanon.  However, no one can expect an outright abandonment of Iranian support of those two entities either.  In the final analysis, the best course for Iran, for now, is to remain steadfastly committed to observing the JCPOA.

What’s next for Iran after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The self-proclaimed Islamic State, once estimated to have occupied a third of Iraqi and Syrian territory, has been reduced to a handful of enclaves, bringing a complicated endgame into focus. In July 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory in Mosul, as his troops, with U.S. backing, recaptured Iraq’s second city.

In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recaptured the Islamic State’s self-styled capital of Raqqa in October, and the SDF and forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are both closing in on the Islamic State in its final eastern redoubt.

Introduction

The rapidly receding footprint of the Islamic State has raised the risks for new confrontations as various armed groups in Iraq and Syria, and in some cases, their foreign backers, vie for influence in the newly liberated areas. Meanwhile, experts warn that if the victors in both countries fail to make political arrangements that accommodate civilians and facilitate the return of refugees, the hard-fought military campaigns may only lay the groundwork for future cycles of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The following is a sketch of security, displacement, and reconstruction concerns in both countries.

Iraq

Security. Iraqi forces’ entry into Hawija in October marked the Islamic State’s loss of the last remaining city under its control. Three major armed groups remain in territory formerly held by the Islamic State: the Iraqi military, mostly Shia quasi-state militias, and the Kurdish peshmerga. They are cooperating with each other in some instances and competing in others.

The Islamic State’s sweep through Iraq in 2014 highlighted how the Iraqi military had been hollowed out by corruption, but recent advances showed how the force had been reconstituted; it is now regarded by many Iraqis as a professional force. Even so, the counterterrorism forces have been exhausted by the pace of the campaign for Mosul and other major cities, and both Iraqi forces and predominantly Shia militias have faced accusations of abuses, including extrajudicial executions of people suspected of collaborating with the Islamic State and collective punishment of their families.

A U.S.-led international coalition has backed Iraqi forces, primarily through air power. Most U.S. forces are advising the Iraqi military, though special forces have served on the front lines. The White House has set a cap on U.S. troops in Iraq of 5,262, but the number actually deployed at any particular time may be higher.

Also on the battlefield are Kurdish peshmerga, whose ranks may exceed 150,000, and Popular Mobilization Fronts (PMFs), predominantly Shia, numbering more than sixty thousand. Many are loyal to Iran, while others are loyal to the Iraqi clerics Moqtada al-Sadr or Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. A significant challenge for the state will be incorporating them into the conventional security apparatus. Another will be accommodating local armed Sunni Arab tribal groups. These various armed groups are jockeying to control territory abandoned by the Islamic State.

Iraqi Kurds are contesting oil-rich, ethnically mixed territories adjacent to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s three provinces, where they have had autonomy since 1991. But these territorial claims have highlighted tensions between Kurdish factions, as well as between the Kurds and others. At the center of the dispute is Kirkuk, a city occupied by Kurds since their initial advance against the Islamic State in 2014. Iraqi forces raised the national flag there once again in October 2017, apparently welcomed by the local ruling Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK has been uneasy with the drive for independence led by the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules from the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil.

The Islamic State’s last Iraqi enclave lies in western Anbar Governorate, along the Syrian border. Having lost the vast majority of its territories, analysts expect Islamic State militants who have fled the Iraqi military and militias to shift to guerrilla tactics.

Displacement. More than three million Iraqis are internally displaced. A third of them [PDF] are displaced within Nineveh Governorate, of which Mosul is the capital; some eight hundred thousand people are displaced from the city. Another fifth are in the Kurdish provinces of Erbil and Dohuk, In areas where there was little destruction, such as Mosul’s eastern half or Tal Afar, the displaced have been quick to return home, but elsewhere housing stock and infrastructure have been destroyed, and public services remain minimal, and many residents remain in makeshift camps. Tribal leaders in some cases have blocked the family members of suspected militants from returning home.

Reconstruction. Much of Mosul, particularly the western Old City, was destroyed, mostly by air strikes carried out by the U.S.-led coalition against entrenched Islamic State fighters. The United Nations estimates a third of the housing stock there has been destroyed; so too has much of the public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and water and electrical supply. Islamic State militants blew up the landmark al-Nuri Mosque and left behind mines and booby traps that have killed hundreds and could take more than a decade to clear. Also in urgent need of repair is the Mosul Dam, whose failure could jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of Iraqis.

Repairing basic infrastructure in Mosul alone could cost more than $1 billion, according to a UN official, and altogether, the Iraqi government has estimated that rebuilding the country will cost in the realm of $100 billion. Particularly given the decline in oil prices, which has left the state running a deficit, Iraq will depend on foreign assistance. But corruption is endemic [PDF], so countries and multilateral institutions may be reluctant to extend funding. The United Nations’ 2017 appeal for humanitarian funding was just shy of 50 percent met as of August.

Syria

Security. The Islamic State’s remaining presence is more substantial in Syria than Iraq, but with U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led forces declaring victory in Raqqa, territory in Deir ez-Zour Province remains its last stronghold. Islamic State fighters there are under fire from both Bashar al-Assad’s forces, backed by Russian air power, and Kurdish-led ones supported by the U.S.-led coalition.

U.S. officials are in northern Syria laying groundwork for the administration of Raqqa. The SDF backs civilian governance structures there, and U.S. forces are training a militia to police the city. It is unclear how much control the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian Kurdish political party, will have in these areas; in other Arab-majority areas the SDF liberated from the Islamic State, such as Manbij, PYD cadres are the ultimate authorities, and some suspect that Kurdish fighters will claim the territories they liberate for their de facto autonomous region known as Rojava.

Circumstances will grow even more complicated in Deir ez-Zour Province. New tensions might arise if the Sunni Arab majority there sees Kurds administering their territory as occupiers. Meanwhile, other nearby armed groups may enter the melee as their foreign backers—primarily Iran and Turkey—vie to secure influence in territories that are unlikely to return to Damascus’s centralized control. Among those groups are Iran-backed PMFs crossing over from Iraq and Sunni Arab rebel forcesthat had been backed by Jordan and the United States. Some observers believe Syrian Kurds are grabbing up territory in the oil-rich province as leverage to press for autonomy under a future settlement. The U.S. military has outposts across this region, and as the Islamic State’s footprint is diminished, clashes between these various forces will grow more likely, analysts say.

Displacement. With both the campaign against the Islamic State and the broader civil war winding down, some internally displaced Syrians are returning home. The International Organization for Migration reports that more than six hundred thousand did so in the first seven months of 2017, out of more than six million in all, though it cautions that not all returns were voluntary.

An additional five million Syrians are refugees in countries bordering Syria, and about a million have applied for asylum in the European Union. As war wanes, countries hosting refugees may face popular pressure to declare Syria safe for refugees’ return, as some have for Afghanistan. (Jordan has reportedly already deported registered refugees.) But while Syria is likely to remain divided among various spheres of influence, Assad’s continued rule from Damascus appears assured, and would-be returnees fear conscription or arrest, if not open fighting.

Reconstruction. The campaign against the Islamic State, as well as the broader civil war, has ravaged Syria. Some 7 percent of its housing stock has been destroyed, and another 20 percent damaged, the World Bank found. Likewise its educational and health-care systems have been largely destroyed, as well as much of its physical infrastructure. Rebuilding the destroyed physical capital could cost between $100 and $200 billion, according to an IMF study [PDF], but the damage to intangibles—destroyed institutions and networks that facilitate economic activity—may have exacted an even higher cost, according to a World Bank study.

The scale of the destruction is so great that reconstruction could not be done without a massive infusion of international aid and loans, but analysts warn that any such funds would likely end up in the coffers of Assad’s cronies or local power brokers loyal to him, and be used to reward loyal communities at the expense of others.

An April conference in Brussels sought to muster international support for reconstruction, but concluded that it could not successfully be done without a “genuine and inclusive transition that benefits all the Syrians.” The participants intended the prospect of international financing to incentivize the warring parties to return to what has been a fruitless UN-sponsored peace process years in the making. Assad, however, appears disinclined to compromise his authority, and he could instead turn to China, Iran, and Russia for financing.

What to Watch For in Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.