After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or an abatement of public anger, Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Rather, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some key differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

Regional Geopolitics and the Venezuelan Crisis

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a very weak government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence. An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence.

Particularly, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

How Likely is a Civil War in Venezuela? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Through analyzing Donald Trump’s role in legitimizing Russia’s propaganda, and the separate—though arguably related—issue of the Trump campaign’s own manipulation of voters via social media, it becomes apparent that, when all elements are considered together, there is a substantial argument to be made that social media was used to manipulate voters and swing an election. The precision with which voters were targeted was unprecedented.

This is the third piece in our series examining Russian information warfare, the use of social media, and the US election. Part one, Cold War 2.0: Russian Information Warfare, introduces the information warfare concept and its role in cyberspace.

Part two, Facebook, Compromised: How Russia Manipulated U.S. Voters with Social Media delves deeper into the mechanics of Russian disinformation and misinformation strategies; revealing how they manifest online and influence the electorate.

Last, Cambridge Analytica: the Darker Side of Big Data, investigates the involvement of an ethically dubious “election management” firm in the 2016 presidential elections.

Trump’s Twitter Theater

Presently, Trump’s controversial Twitter activity is under scrutiny as part of the ongoing Senate Intelligence Committee investigation and hearings.

“Today, ‘gray outlets,’ Soviet-pushing accounts, tweet at President Trump during high volumes, when they know he’s online, and they push conspiracy theories’…Watts flatly stated that the president himself has become a cog in such Russian measures… why, if Russians have long used these methods, they finally worked in this election cycle, Watts’ answer… ‘I think this answer is very simple and is one no one is really saying in this room…the commander in chief has used Russian active measures at times against his opponents.’”

Former FBI Special Agent Clint Watts, giving testimony before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee 

Regardless of whether or not the Trump campaign’s alleged coordination with Russian government-directed misinformation/disinformation campaigns was intentional, the result was nevertheless devastating. Donald Trump wields immense influence in the social media sphere: an article published in January 2017 reveals his combined following on popular social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allows him to reach an audience of over 46 Million people.

Exploiting the Platform of the Presidency

Furthermore, Trump’s elevated status as the Republican Presidential candidate, and subsequently as Commander-in-Chief, arguably provides him with the discursive power necessary to validate the authenticity of his claims in cyberspace (and the real world). The audience exposed to information shared by Trump is primed to believe in its authenticity. During his testimony, Watts substantiates the claim above with the following evidence:

“Trump’s citation of an apparently false Sputnik story at an October 2016 campaign appearance; his ongoing denial before and after the campaign of U.S. intelligence of Russian interference in the election; his claims of voter fraud and election rigging, which Watts said was pushed by RT and Sputnik; and Trump’s questioning of the citizenship of former President Barack Obama and even his primary rival Ted Cruz.”

Echoing the aforementioned themes of Russian propaganda, the examples Watts provides elucidate the relationship between the Russian Information warfare operation and the Trump campaign’s (intentional or otherwise) complicity in the spread of fake news. Trump and his associates’ repeated claims from fake news sites, implicitly sanctioning their authenticity, then feeding it back into the social media sphere, where it was then widely disseminated by real people and automated bots.

Watts explains that “the disinformation is kept alive and gradually becomes more real and plausible.” If this social media platform-mediated sabotage of the truth was not enough, the Trump campaign also employed other social media manipulation maneuvers, made possible with Big Data analytics.

This is the third piece in our series examining Russian information warfare, the use of social media, and the US election. Part one, Cold War 2.0: Russian Information Warfare, introduces the information warfare concept and its role in cyberspace.  

Part two, Facebook, Compromised: How Russia Manipulated U.S. Voters with Social Media delves deeper into the mechanics of Russian disinformation and misinformation strategies; revealing how they manifest online and influence the electorate.

Last, Cambridge Analytica: the Darker Side of Big Data, investigates the involvement of an ethically dubious “election management” firm in the 2016 presidential elections.

The Trump Campaign’s Exploitation of Social Media was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

The Current Situation: Repression, Resource Insecurity, and the Risk of Escalation

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, and the stage was effectively set for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests really different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e. for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Crisis in Venezuela: Economic Collapse, Violent Unrest, and Human Survival was originally published on Global Security Review.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that certain political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, Venezuela’s government would agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and agree to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy requires an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors so as to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a major effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.” There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it’s granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, it typically provides reduced sentences for human rights abusers, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity. Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. an interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela would be the first time that has happened, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Solving the Economic & Security Crisis in Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a candidate, Donald Trump structured his narrative around the idea that the U.S. had overextended itself—that allies were taking advantage of American military and economic support.  Trump contextualized the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO)—a bulwark of the post-World War II international order—as outdated while falsely stating the idea that some of America’s oldest allies owed the United States a financial debt for the American presence in Europe.

Trump pledged to usher in a new age of American isolationism. Throughout the campaign, he distanced himself from Secretary Clinton’s tough stance on Russia; he refused to pledge his steadfast support to NATO—characterizing the alliance as “obsolete”—arguing that the United States was overextended abroad and needed to concentrate on domestic affairs.

Simultaneously, Trump pledged to increase defense spending to “rebuild” the American military. After his inauguration, now-President Trump proposed a $54 billion dollar boost in defense spending in his first budget, with Congress authorizing an additional $15 billion to finance ongoing operations in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the globe until a full budget is approved.

Trump’s foreign policy: tweet loudly and carry a nuke.

Pundits and technocrats across the media spectrum proclaimed the president-elect as a sheep in wolf’s clothing, with some arguing that Clinton represented a greater threat to world peace. Incidentally, this argument was also put forth by Russian state media outlets (RT, Sputnik), by Wikileaks, and outlets like Breitbart, Zero Hedge, and InfoWars.

Before the election, one economist in The Hill stated that Trump would be “less aggressively militaristic.” Theodore Roosevelt’s mantra, “Speak softly and carry a big stick” could be easily adapted for Trump: “Tweet loudly and carry a nuke.” The Trump administration isn’t offering a retreat from American intervention; he’s offering a 21st-century version of imperialism while openly endorsing authoritarian regimes.

More crucially, President Trump seems to be a bigger proponent of American military force projection and realpolitik than any president since Richard Nixon. Since taking office, Trump has shown that he is not, in fact, “less aggressively militaristic.”

Impulsivity & International Security: The Consequences of Failing to Think Strategically

After reports had emerged that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad again used chemical weapons against civilians, the U.S. responded by launching a barrage of Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Syrian Air Force base from which the chemical weapon strikes originated. This missile attack was seemingly conducted as a one-off operation in the absence of a broader strategy to de-escalate the Syrian civil war.

The one-off strike had little effect on the Syrian air force’s ability to operate. Moreover, it reveals a high degree of impulsivity and a failure to think strategically, increasing the risk of an unexpected global crisis. Such a crisis could be brought about by a miscalculation in judgment, or by impulsively ordering military action without considering a situation in its’ entirety. In a region like the Korean peninsula, for instance, the consequences of such a blunder would be dire.

What is U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration? was originally published on Global Security Review.

China is a rising power. It is agreed that China has the capabilities to eventually significantly surpass the United States regarding global economic and political power. Chinese posturing in the South China Sea is an attempt to gauge and establish its sphere of influence in a region that has been long dominated by the United States.

Relations with the U.S. were tested particularly after Trump’s pre-inauguration phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, which flew in the face of 40 years of diplomatic convention.

Trump’s anti-China stance when it comes to trade is questionable. His businesses have partnered with Chinese investors and banks, and his projects have been built using Chinese steel. It’s unlikely that he would risk jeopardizing his children’s—and his own–long-term business interests.

Some argue that the U.S. and China are on the verge of inevitable conflict. This “Thucydides Trap” says that as one power rises, the other declines and the two are destined for inevitable conflict. Statistically, this isn’t a far-fetched concept; only 4 out of 16 prior great-power transitions have not resulted in war.

Is the Thucydides Trap Inevitable? Not Necessarily.

In this realist view, China is an irresistable force approaching an immovable object—the United States. The U.S.’s commitment
to the Bretton Woods institutions, alliances, and political structures which have supported its global hegemony, it is argued, is proof of the inevitability of this conflict.

The 45th President of the United States, however, may not be so steadfast in those commitments. Nixon’s overtures to China and its subsequent admission to the U.N. marked an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. Anti-Communism was rampant, but the interests of capitalism took precedence over political ideology.

In return for access to Chinese markets, the U.S. recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign authority over China, and supported the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, at Taiwan’s expense.

This rapid departure from the status quo served as a jumping-off point for bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. All the while, Nixon utilized his public abhorrence of communism to distract from his use of realpolitik in a way that sharply contrasted with American ideology.

Trump’s continued self-contradiction and erraticism could serve a similar purpose, however unintentionally. The rhetoric on Chinese economic policy, on the surface, made Trump look tough against China during the election. However, following his taking office, Trump and his advisors have been leaning on China for assistance in dealing with North Korea.

Triangular Diplomacy: a New World Order?

Many have begun to draw comparison’s between the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Nixon’s model of triangular diplomacy. To incentivize Putin, the U.S. would endorse a consolidation of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and parts of central Asia, recognizing a Russian sphere of influence, and support productive bilateral oil partnerships.

A similar strategy would be deployed with regards to China, with the impetus for them being the arrangements created between Trump and Putin. In this scenario, President Trump utilizes American commitments and the existing global power structure as commodities to transact.

Yes, this is a retreat from the current status quo, but it is not isolationism—it is a restructuring of the global order to accommodate a shift in world power—a crude re-establishment of the triangular diplomacy model employed by Nixon and Kissinger with China and Russia.

At present, the United States seems to be in its last days as the leader of a unipolar international order. Rapid technological advancement is contributing to global economic uncertainty, and international security is increasingly threatened. Global influence is becoming increasingly multipolar. Some degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt in the face of changing norms is obligatory.

Trump may recognize this. He may not. Is he a madman theorist, or is he just mad? A comparison to Nixon may not be entirely appropriate, as Nixon was a prolific student of political theory and often read up diplomatic history.

However, madman theory dictates that one’s opponent must be entirely convinced of his opponent’s irrationality. President Trump has even managed to convince long-standing American allies of that. Danish foreign minister Kristian Jensen, when asked about the future of relations with the United States, responded by saying “Donald Trump changes opinions like others change underwear.”

China, the United States, and the Thucydides Trap was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on President Trump’s stated policy of unpredictability and instability, it’s difficult to say what his end-goals may be—or if he even has them. The administration seems to favor a realpolitik approach to global affairs—with an increasingly transactional form of diplomacy.

Trump himself is certainly no ideologue, nor is he a micromanager. The president prides himself on being a delegator—details aren’t his forte. Based on the fact that he frequently contradicts himself, changing his stance on a given policy from one week to the next, the President appears to be a communications channel for which the various spheres of influence within West Wing compete for access.

Strategic Irrationality

The defining feature of Trump’s self-professed success in negotiating is unpredictability. To put it in his words: “I don’t want to broadcast my intentions…You want to have a little bit of guess work for the enemy.”

Many have compared his behavior to Richard Nixon’s, particularly during talks with the North Vietnamese, and in his manipulation of tensions between China and the U.S.S.R. to the benefit of American commercial and national security interests.

The concept of ruthless perseverance in the pursuit of political objectives has been discussed and debated for over a half a millennia. In Discourses on Livy, Niccolò Machiavelli dedicated an entire chapter to the benefits of irrationality in politics, labeling it, “How at times it is a very wise thing to stimulate madness.” Centuries later, Richard Nixon put this theory into practice.

Richard’s Nixon’s Madman Theory

Nixon based his foreign and military policy on what he called “madman theory.” To show the North Vietnamese that there was no end to his hostility, he ordered the indiscriminate carpet-bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

“I want [the North Vietnamese] to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip word to them that ‘Nixon is obsessed about communism…and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’”

These tactics, along with unpredictable changes to U.S. foreign policy initiated by Nixon led to a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union, then led by Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev, like Nixon, was a proponent of brinkmanship—employing posturing and political doctrine to support a policy of mutually assured destruction when it came to relations between the two superpowers.

Both men believed that peace rested on an elaborate system of triggers that would guarantee nuclear holocaust in the event of any first strike. It was a combination of the absolute nature of this destruction with the instability of the peace that prevented it, it was argued, which guaranteed that no power would dare carry out a first-strike attack.

Nevertheless, some continue to argue that these negotiation tactics led to the development of a joint space exploration program, increased commercial ties, and, most importantly, nuclear détente.

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Doctrine

Trump, however, is not the prolific reader of foreign policy and political science that Nixon was. There are, however, some senior advisors, like National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who are heavily informed on matters of military history and theory and have significant experience at the strategic level. Mattis’ Defense Department, more importantly, has been given near-complete autonomy with regards military authority.

In any case, an attempt at forming a Moscow-Washington axis could have unintended consequences. Many of the president-elect’s cabinet and advisor appointees are virulently anti-Iran, which doesn’t exactly align with Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Islamic Republic.

Given Trump’s prior statements on the matter, his seeming attraction to nuclear weapons also underscores the notion of his employing some form of madman theory, be it intentionally or otherwise.

One could even perceive Trump’s rhetoric as condoning—even encouraging—the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Syria. When asked by MSNBC‘s Chris Matthews whether he would support the use of nuclear weapons against ISIS, he answered:

“I would never take any of my cards off the table.”

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Administration Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense led by Secretary James Mattis has been given a significant degree of autonomy to operate within. Following a series of missile and nuclear bomb tests in North Korea, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the “era of strategic patience is over,” referencing the U.S. North Korea policy under prior administrations.

In April and May of 2017, the U.S. Navy began increasing its forward-deployed military presence in the region, in a show of force to the North. Concurrently, in attempts to call the United States’ “bluff” regarding a pre-emptive strike, North Korea has taken steps to escalate tensions with aggressive anti-American rhetoric and threats of nuclear war and continued weapons tests in defiance of the UN Security Council.

By May, the U.S. Navy had deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups (formerly referred to as battle groups) to the Korean Peninsula—the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the U.S.S. Carl Vinson carrier strike group.

By June, the Navy confirmed that a third carrier battle group, led by the U.S.S. Nimitz, was en route to the region. Upon its arrival, the United States’ will have three of its aircraft carrier-led battle groups operating in the vicinity of North Korea, almost 30% of the U.S. carrier fleet.

How would war involving the U.S. and North Korea play out?

According to senior Defense Department officials, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be one of the most violent and devastating combat operations in over a generation. Despite that, allied forces led by the U.S. would be victorious. The high levels of projected casualties stem from the proximity of the South Korean capital of Seoul to the North Korean border.

Seoul is one of the most densely populated metropolitan areas in the world. It lies just over 30 miles from the North Korean border and is well in the range of the hundreds of artillery and missile batteries that the North has stationed just north of the demilitarized zone.

South Korea has approximately 625,000 active-duty troops and another 3.1 million troops on reserve. While North Korea has roughly twice those numbers, their equipment is highly outdated, albeit augmented by an asymmetric nuclear capability.

What are the risks and consequences of a pre-emptive strike on the North?

Minor equipment or troop movements on the South Korean border can spark aggression from the North. Therefore, American, South Korean, and Japanese forces preparing to launch a pre-emptive strike would need to do so clandestinely, to catch North Korean forces off-guard.

In this scenario, major military, nuclear research, bunkers, and weapons depots would be targeted, with marines and special forces being deployed from carriers and amphibious assault ships off the North Korean coast. Such an operation would need to be executed swiftly, and with overwhelming force.

Otherwise, risk larger numbers of civilian casualties that would result from an attack—conventional or nuclear—on the Seoul metropolitan area should the North maintain the capability to launch such offense after a pre-emptive strike.

The China Option: Regime Change or Diplomacy

Trump’s attraction to authoritarian heads-of-state could very well lead to a negotiated settlement, or at the very least, some form of detente. China publicly favors a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Alternatively, Chinese political and military leaders may decide that it’s in China’s strategic interest to support or execute a regime change in North Korea.

Economically, the West has much more to offer China than North Korea does. However, China remains wary of uncontrolled destabilization in North Korea as it would likely lead to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with high numbers of refugees flooding into China.

Escalation on the Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.

Jared Kushner reportedly discussed the possibility of setting up back-channel communications with Russian Intelligence Officials to facilitate secret and secure communications between the top levels of government in Washington and Moscow.

In December, Kushner reportedly asked Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, about the possibility of the Trump administration utilizing Russian diplomatic communication lines or facilities in order to circumvent the United States national security and intelligence bureaucracies.

Kushner’s lack of prior experience in national security and foreign policy was hopelessly apparent. In national security and diplomatic circles, it’s common knowledge that the FBI makes a practice of intercepting the communications of Russian officials within the U.S., while the National Security Agency (NSA) continuously monitors the communications and SIGINT of Russian government officials overseas.

American officials told the Washington Post that Ambassador Kislyak subsequently informed Russian officials in Moscow of the request Kushner made. Reportedly, Kislyak was surprised at the suggestion—the proposed backchannel would have carried obvious security risks for the soon-to-be-installed Trump administration, and for Russian national interests.

“Kislyak…was taken aback by the suggestion of allowing an American to use Russian communications gear at its embassy—a proposal that would have carried security risks for Moscow as well as the Trump team.”

What was going through Kushner’s mind when he presented this proposal? Objectively, one can determine that Kushner’s naiveté got the best of him; he was either unaware of the security risks associated with such an arrangement, or he assumed that his contacts in Moscow trusted him to the same degree that he trusted them. Regardless, it’s increasingly obvious that—for all his reported brilliance as a political tactician—Kushner remains ignorant—almost pathetically so—to the nuances and details of foreign policy and national security strategy.

Vnesheconombank Chairman Sergey Gorkov Met With Kushner—at Kislyak’s Request

“The idea of using Russian facilities to skirt Russian surveillance would either be a serious attempt to hide something or the actions of a young amateur,” said former FBI special agent Clint Watts to The Atlantic. Former CIA acting-Director John McLaughlan provided that “I can’t keep out of my mind the thought that, if an American intelligence officer had done anything like this, we’d consider it espionage.”

This meeting is one of several that took place between senior Trump campaign officials or Trump surrogates and Russian diplomatic or intelligence officials that are of investigative interest to the FBI’s ongoing counterintelligence and criminal investigations into Trump’s campaign and subsequent administration.

Kushner is also reportedly involved in a number of other, high-profile, and clandestine meetings with Russian and other foreign officials.  Just days after making the backchannel inquiry to Kislyak, Kushner met with Sergey Gorkov—at Kislyak’s request. Gorkov is a former Russian intelligence officer and chairman of Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB). He maintains close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Putin effectively runs VEB as his private slush fund. If Putin wants to throw money at something like a bailout, or [the Winter Olympics in] Sochi, or Ukrainian industrial manufacturing, he uses VEB,” according to Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Aslund added, “VEB does not do any ordinary banking business. Therefore it is so remarkable that Jared Kushner met with the head of VEB.”

Vnesheconombank’s board is made up largely of Kremlin ministers; its chairman is Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and  Bank chairman Gorkov was trained at an FSB academy and has strong ties to both the KGB and its successor organization, the FSB. VEB frequently collaborates with Russian security services, providing agents with cover identities and institutional affiliations. VEB acts as the funding vehicle for Russian operations in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria, and the Caucasus—effectively providing an entirely off-the-books budget for the Putin regime.

Initially founded as a traditional development bank along the lines of the World Bank, Vnesheconombank’s initial purpose was to deliver long-term funding for projects private sector banks would likely avoid, according to a Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit analyst.

However, as time passed VEB was systematically converted into a “special purpose agency to finance politically important projects.” For instance, VEB has been heavily involved in efforts to forge inextricable economic links between Ukraine’s industrial and energy sectors and Russia—which would then give the Russian government enormous influence over the domestic politics of Ukraine.

Photo credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via Visual Hunt / CC BY

Jared Kushner Wanted Secret Back-Channel with Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.