The Transitional Justice Process So Far

Since 2006, the transitional justice process has seen some developments, including the CPA in 2006 and the Interim Constitution of 2007, both of which committed to providing justice to victims of human rights abuses by the institutions of the Nepalese state and the Maoists. In 2015, the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) were instituted and received approximately 66,000 complaints of torture, rape, and murder by all parties to the conflict.

The Commissions, while in-principle representing steps towards ensuring accountability of crimes, were perceived as moves to build leniency into the transitional justice process. This was primarily because they had been empowered by the Transitional Justice Act of 2014 to grant amnesty. But this leniency was checked by the Nepalese Supreme Court when it ruled that the Nepalese Supreme Court could only establish criminality. A positive development, but four years later this remains to be integrated—and therefore actionable—by amending the 2014 Act. 

As the transitional justice process has ebbed and flowed, a fleeting appetite for transitional justice remains, given as some may argue that Nepal has “moved on” from the conflict, but much to the detriment of those who have and continue to suffer. 

Problematic Political Will

One of the primary challenges to the transitional justice process has been the attempts to co-opt it politically. Since April 2019, the two Commissions have been inactive as new members remain to be appointed. In the current format, a recommendation committee makes the recommendations which are subsequently approved by the political parties in Nepal. 

While the process to identify new members has been underway, the three main political parties—the Nepali Congress (NC) and the two factions of the Nepali Communist Party (NCP)—have been trying to influence the membership in favor of those individuals who these parties believe will do their bidding. The inadequate political willingness stems from a deep concern that pursuing a proper transitional justice process will implicate present-day leaders and members of these political parties.

Moreover, the NC and NCP were on opposite ends of the conflict given as the NC formed the government while members of the NCP were the rebels. As a result, they have not been able to agree on members. The Nepalese Army, also a party to the decade-long conflict, has consistently maintained that members of the Nepalese armed forces must be tried separately in a military court and not in civilian courts or other transitional mechanisms.  

The culmination of repeated iterations of such problematic political will is that the transitional justice process has come to be centered around those in positions of power, thereby sidelining the victims.

The Lack of a Victim-Centric Approach 

The Conflict Victims’ Common Platform (CVCP), a collective of regional victim groups enabled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), has demanded the process of appointments to the Commissions be undertaken only after the Transitional Justice Act is amended as per the 2015 Nepalese Supreme Court ruling. By ensuring this amendment, the Act will ensure that those in power will have a lesser say in determining the nature of justice and the nature of reparations.

The CVCP has also reiterated that membership in the two Commissions is determined through a public and consultative process. In the current format, a recommendation committee is selecting the members to the Commission without any meaningful consultation with the conflict victims and other stakeholders. Thus, the ongoing nature of the process resembles one that is working to protect the perpetrators, rather than ensure the delivery of justice to the victims. Echoing this sentiment, human rights organizations and the United Nations have also been calling for a more victim-centric and consultative transitional justice process to address the general apathy towards addressing the impact of the war on victims. 

Where to, Hereon?

A natural result of this problematic political will and the lack of integration of victims is a transitional justice structure that has been consciously deprived of a definitive end. A tendency to move on and look towards the future has also emerged. Some speculate how this is plausible, especially when legacies from the past continue to create the future landscape. In the aftermath of the brutal rape of a 13-year-old girl in 2018, one editorial spoke of how the disastrous fact-finding process that followed may not have been so if the post-war legacy would have been one of building accountability and ensuring justice. 

At this juncture, it is imperative to make two changes to help correct course. The first is that the members to the committees must be appointed through a more public and consultative process per the directive of the CVCP. The victims must have a say in determining this selection. The second is that the committee must also take into account the merit of the members it selects in the human rights domain. The transitional justice literature often makes references to the role that wise and respected individuals could play in enabling trust into the transitional justice process. At this juncture, the transitional justice process in Nepal needs this trust to be rebuilt into it. 

No End in Sight to the Struggle for Transitional Justice in Nepal was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a strong likelihood, however, that it will guarantee the opposite—an enduring condition of violence and unrest that can spill over into South Asia and beyond.

The Indian Government has repealed Article 370—the article in the Indian Constitution that guaranteed Jammu & Kashmir’s status as an autonomous territory, rather than a union state of India—greatly angering Kashmiris, who have been protesting since the announcement on August 5th, stunning observers worldwide. The move also violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 38.

Kashmiris knew something was wrong as the announcement was foreshadowed by widespread Indian state activity in Indian-administered Kashmir. Curfews along with a media and communications blackout were imposed, former Kashmiri Chief Ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti were put under house arrest, and additional troops were deployed, bringing the total up to 46,000. 

The Indian Government gave no warning ahead of the lockdown, announcing the article’s repeal the next day.  Mass protests have rocked the streets of Kashmir since the announcement, the region’s biggest demonstrations thus far. In the town of Soura alone, at least 10,000 demonstrators protested the repeal of Article 370. Despite the relaxing of travel restrictions, protests are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Indian security forces resorted to using pellet guns to disperse protesters. The use of pellets has been the subject of a great deal of international scrutiny and condemnation, as it violates international law and has left thousands of Kashmiris permanently blinded. Between July 10th and 12th of 2016, SMHS Hospital in Srinagar received 570 patients for eye treatments and surgeries after they had been fired upon with birdshot pellets. Pellet blindings, along with other human rights violations by Indian security forces,  lead some Kashmiris to join and participate in a homegrown insurgency.

There is a case to be made that repealing Article 370 was a response to American offers to mediate the Kashmir Issue. India has long tried to keep the issue bilateral, rather than internationalize it. When Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the U.S. at the end of July, President Donald Trump said in an Oval Office press conference that India had asked him to mediate the Kashmir Issue—something Indian authorities robustly denied, in keeping with their line of keeping the issue bilateral and off the international agenda. All of this has been on the tail of worsening Indian-U.S. relations, following a dispute regarding increased Indian tariffs on American goods, and India’s exclusion from the Afghan Peace Process in favor of Pakistan.  

What does repealing Article 370 mean?

Article 370 guaranteed that the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh would be governed autonomously rather than from New Delhi. A sub-article, Article 35A, ensured that non-Kashmiri Indians would not be able to buy land or vote within Indian Kashmir, meaning that Kashmiris would remain in control of their territory as well as their governance.

Repealing Article 370 means that sub-Article 35A will be reversed as well, meaning Hindus and other non-Kashmiris can purchase property, settle, and participate in politics within Kashmir. Native Kashmiri Muslims are fearful this may be the first step in a campaign of ethnic cleansing by majoritarian Hindus. Indeed, such concerns were voiced by former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti in response to the decision, saying that the reason behind repealing Article 370 was to change the demographics of Indian-controlled Kashmir and render India’s only Muslim-majority state ethnically homogenous.

By purchasing land in Kashmir and settling, they would eventually be able to force the native Muslim population out or replace it by marrying Kashmiri women. Such fears are reinforced by the vitriolic nationalist rhetoric espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government in Delhi, as well as by a swath of the Indian media. As a result of New Delhi’s decision to repeal Article 370, Kashmir faces a higher risk of sub-state violence and the potential for a mass-emigration of Kashmiris.

Increased Militancy and Violence

The Kashmiri population will lash out more violently against the Indian state than before, having already been on the receiving end of state violence and repressive policies. The potential for violence is likely the underpinning factor in the logic behind the pre-announcement media blackout and troop deployments. 

Repealing Article 370 could end up inciting increased violence in Kashmir due to the end of the autonomy that has been highly-valued by Kashmiris for the past seven decades. A violent response to the repeal could beget even more violence and heavy-handed action from Indian authorities, threatening regional peace. Pulwama was the deadliest attack against Indian forces in Kashmir, and the response threatened global security and turned more Kashmiris against the Indian state.

Established movements like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) could re-emerge, alongside a range of newer actors fighting the Indian state. In either case, a violent uprising would lead to an enduring and far more ferocious condition of insurgent violence, with more frequent and intense attacks adding to the nearly 50,000 casualties resulting from the 30-year-long dispute. The prolonged enactment of humiliating and repressive policies by the Indian government against Kashmiris has, for decades, arguably fostered a condition of hatred and a loss of allegiance to India, leaving an endless pool of potential recruits for an insurgent movement. Repealing Article 370 could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. 

While the Indian government’s decision has profound ramifications for Kashmiris, who will be targeted by security forces in retaliation, a renewed Kashmiri insurgency would impact regional security as well, depending on how New Delhi responds.

In the aftermath of the February 2019 Pulwama bomb attack, India immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack (with minimal evidence), before launching airstrikes against Pakistani territory (this author previously published a two-part article covering the Pulwama Incident for Global Security Review). While neither side escalated to full-scale war, there was a genuine potential for nuclear conflict.

Simply blaming Pakistan is not an effective strategy for India, nor is baiting Pakistan into military adventurism. Given the sensitive nature of the Article 370 issue, a heavy-handed response to militancy in Kashmir would detrimentally impact regional security.

A mass-movement of Kashmiri refugees

As mentioned earlier, the settlement of non-Kashmiris will have a profound impact on the area’s demographic make-up. Rampant Islamophobia emanating from New Delhi raises fears that native Kashmiris will be forced out of their territory, either into India or over the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. 

Kashmiris are already one of the most marginalized communities in India, being the targets of pogroms and Islamophobic violence by Hindu extremists and repressive policies enforced by security forces in Kashmir itself. Following the Pulwama attack, Kashmiri students across India were targeted in acts of violence and harassed at school. Increasingly alienated by India, Kashmiris who can leave, will. 

Kashmiris have previously crossed the LoC into Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since the 1990s, 38,000 refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir fled the fighting and escaped across the LoC, with some leaving their families on the other side. Like many in Indian-administered Kashmir, the refugees were subject to repressive policies enforced by Indian security forces.

Due to their shared religion and history of mass migration, Kashmiri refugees will head for Pakistan, despite its economy being unable to cope with an influx of refugees. A Kashmiri exodus would be the last nail in the coffin, compounding other problems like overpopulation and mismanaged funds. Additionally, should Pakistan be blacklisted at the Financial Action Task Force meeting in October, it will be precluded from receiving the loans it so desperately needs to keep itself going. 

Pakistan is still reeling from the influx of refugees from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion, along with internecine civil unrest in cities like Karachi during the 1990s. According to UNHCR, there are 1.4 million registered Afghans living in Pakistan. The mass movement of refugees has had a detrimental impact on Pakistan’s resources, and security through Afghan involvement in crime and terrorism. 

India’s BJP government will achieve the opposite of what was intended if it believed that Indian security would be enhanced by bringing Kashmir into the Indian Union. To Kashmiris, it seems that the government has written them off entirely, which more radical elements see as a green light to conduct acts of violence against India. 

Pakistan has successfully been able to lobby the UN Security Council to discuss the current Kashmir Crisis in a meeting on the 16th of August. Whatever the outcome, Kashmiris have the most to lose as a result of the BJP’s political adventurism.

Ending Kashmir’s autonomy will mean wide-ranging implications for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.  

In the early days of U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, there were three schools of thought over the future of the Afghan armed forces. In the first, there were those who believed that Afghanistan does not need a full-fledged army and police but a small defense force to quell local revolts and maintain border security. This was based on the rationale that international security forces would remain for the long run in the country and also due to objections from former Pakistani dictator, General Pervez Musharraf,  who opposed the establishment of a large army for Afghanistan for geopolitical reasons. The second school of thought advocated for an Afghan army and security forces in the scale and size of the pre-civil war era (i.e. 250,000 strong with an airforce). Third, was a group of Afghan monarchists and former mujahidin who believed in the mobilization and transformation of the existing mujahidin and militias into an army and police. Of course, none of those options prevailed. Instead, Afghans together with their NATO allies raised, trained and deployed a completely new army based on their threat perception and needs assessment for the country.

In 2014, during the transition of the security responsibilities from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan forces led by Gen. Patreaus and the then chairman of the transition commission and now President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, there was a golden opportunity to reconfigure and redesign a financially sustainable Afghan security forces but this chance was lost. Although steps were taken, other priorities took over, and the task remained unfinished. While the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) under the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with the United States, alongside the NATO Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) ensures long-term funding, training, and mentoring to Afghan forces, the election of President Trump and increasing war fatigue in the United States has put the long-term future of bilateral security cooperation on uncertain and shaky ground.

Almost for a hundred years, Afghanistan owned a military despite many periods of instability and political anarchy, which it funded through a mixture of traditional and non-traditional sources. The traditional sources of funding included a quota based national conscription mechanism through tribal elders and maliks to fill in the ranks of the army and police; imposition of local taxation and food rations to feed the army and security forces, and finally reliance on local transport for logistics and sustenance. The non-traditional aid came largely from the British Raj and the Russians (later the Soviets).

The Raj, the Russians, Germany,  Turkey, and others provided military equipment and training. Amir Sher Ali Khan established the first Afghan army with some auxiliary tribal militias with the financial and technical support of the British Raj and Russian czar. This army was trained, equipped and funded over the years with a mixture of British tributaries, equipment from British Raj and local taxation and quota conscription system on local tribal elders across the country.  conscription became a controversial matter much later on during the communist regime when many Afghan youths were pushed into the frontlines to fight against the mujahidin, many of whom never returned home, which led to massive migration of Afghan youth to neighboring countries for safety and work. But the culture, practice, and acceptability of conscription as a system existed during the reign of various Afghan rulers. Afghan kings, historically, used a national quota conscription system to fill the ranks of the army and security forces.

Today, Afghanistan has a paid volunteer army and security forces, which is almost entirely funded by the United States and NATO allies. Any experienced military expert will tell you that raising, maintaining, and sustaining a voluntary force is extremely expensive and complicated for poor and aid-dependent economies. Turkey, Israel, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and a dozen other states, in the Afghan neighborhood and beyond, who are in a much better economic and financial state run a national conscription system to sustain its armed forces.

Afghanistan can use the revenue from its vast mineral wealth, sale of its abundant water resources to neighbors, transit fees as a land and air bridge to South and Central Asia and export of high-value agriculture crops to fund its security forces. The Afghan leadership and its international partners can rethink, reconfigure, and redesign affordable and financially sustainable Afghan forces through reinstating a carefully designed national conscription system, build up of local defense industries to drive cost down and saving on essential defense budget items to pave the way for medium to long-term financial sustainability of the Afghan security forces.

The time has come for the Afghan military leaders and its international partners to make some hard choices and decisions for the long-term financial sustainability and viability of the Afghan security forces. They will have to rethink, reconfigure, and build a fiscally sustainable, operationally efficient and capable military increasingly funded from the domestic revenues of Afghanistan.  This can be done through a combined four-track financial sustainability strategy: a. Force management and national conscription; b. Fiscal austerity and budgetary savings; c. Building local defense industries; and d. Establishing localized defense and militias.

The first significant decision to make is whether the Afghan military and political leadership would like to have a NATO or non-NATO regular army and security forces. Some military experts argue that a NATO standard Afghan army and security forces can only be viable if Afghanistan remains a long-term ally of NATO and the west with a functioning self-sustaining economy while others advocate for a hybrid standard (i.e. a mixture of NATO and non-NATO standard force based on the agility, mobility and needs assessment of the various units with the Afghan armed forces.

The second major decision is to implement a national, local quota-based conscription mechanism combined with better force management, salary, and remuneration rationalization and anti-corruption drive which could significantly drive down the personnel costs within the Afghan armed forces. 

The idea of enacting drafting or conscription is a politically charged subject in Afghanistan, especially if you have a politically fragile government in Kabul, which lacks broad-based political support. This is primarily due to bad memories of the population from the communist era conscription drive, which led to the deaths of thousands and migration of much more Afghan youth from the country. The Afghan mujahidin and even Taliban to this day impose local conscription in their areas of control.

If the local elder does not generate the required quota of able-bodied men to fight, he will have to offer money, cattle, or agricultural products as a replacement. This exact practice has been in place since the rule of the Afghan Iron Amir, Amir Abdulrahman Khan, in the late eighteenth century who for the first time used this method as a systematic way to fill in the ranks of the Afghan military. The current Afghan government will have to enact a carefully designed quota-based local, national draft or conscriptions system. This will assist in significantly driving down the costs of the Afghan armed forces; foster patriotism and shift much needed budgetary resources to other priorities within the security sector.

Furthermore, the Afghan government can save significant amount of money from the existing budgetary expenditures through taking a couple of bold austerity measures: a. domestic purchase as compared to import of food items for Afghan forces. b. saving on fuel,  oil and energy costs. c. better maintenance and inventory management of weapons, ammunitions and armored vehicles among others. Such austerity measures could assist in saving millions of dollars within the budget of Afghan security forces. Additionally, the time has come for Afghanistan to produce and manufacture its own basic defense items such as bullets, weaponry and other basic defense items.

While the initial capital investment cost of such an undertaking will be high but over time this will significantly drive down defense expenditure and increase self-reliance. Moreover, Afghanistan could redesign its defense forces to a more mobile and highly equipped small professional army meant to fight terrorism and local insurgency designed for irregular warfare augmented with an auxiliary local militia. This means we could significantly reduce the number of the existing Afghan army and police while augment the gap with local tribal forces to fight local insurgencies and terrorism. This will also assist in the long-term financial sustainability and operational effectiveness of the Afghan security forces.

Such a fundamental reorganization of the Afghan security forces followed by austerity measures will leave Afghanistan with three options for the shape and size of any future army and security forces: a. A modern professional army which will be costly and unsustainable unless Afghanistan finds alternative sources of revenue to fund it. b. A small professional army at the core augmented with auxiliary local militias across the country to fight insurgencies and do counter-terrorism. c. A hybrid force—a combination of a professional army, localized defense forces and militias at different levels.

Regardless of the choice of standard, size, and format of the Afghan security forces; the Afghan government and its international partners – principally the United States and NATO member states will need to fund this force for years to come until Afghanistan builds an indigenous self-sustaining economy from two sources: The first being traditional sources such as a national tax scheme, a saving and austerity regime, and national conscription. The second is non-traditional sources—a long-term trust fund but with significantly less contribution in terms of dollar amount as compared to the current rates to help sustain the force along with scholarships and training programs for its officers corp.

In the words of former Afghan Defense Minister, General Tariq Shah Bahrami, Afghans will eat grass but will fund Afghan forces and defend their country even if NATO and U.S. forces leave the country. While this may be true, Afghans will have to fundamentally rethink and redesign Afghanistan’s military into financially viable, economically sustainable, and professionally agile armed forces.

Economizing Defense: A Roadmap for Building Sustainable Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

Five decades of insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines has presented a socio-political dilemma for both the government and the general public. From the perspective of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, New People’s Army (NPA), the platform espoused by the Duterte administration’s tagline of “change is coming” has been not realized until now. The NPA’s actions of late reveal a presumption of justification of its violent struggle, as protracted infighting within its ranks draws increased attention from the authorities and society at-large.

The government’s over-arching strategy is to prevent communist rebels from committing atrocities and acts of violence going forward. Increased engagement on the part of the government highlights the policy guidance of President Rodrigo Duterte, amidst conflicting internal and external factors as well as joint cooperative operations (i.e., AFP-DND’s DSSP Kapayapaan 2017 and an audit request to the European Union over the alleged funding of communist NGOs).

Even after the fiftieth anniversary of Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on December 26, 2018, there are two compelling and competing dilemmas in Philippine political climate that may or may not come to a head until the end of this year. The first is a continued push for charter change (CHA-CHA), vis-a-vis legal reformation, and a restructuring of the political system (i.e., Federalism). The second is finding a resolution over the insurgent and terrorist activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA) through the resumption of peace talks.

The current negotiations, to date, are the longest–running peace talks since the CPP-NPA began its armed struggle. After years of guerrilla warfare, disinformation, and a strategy which is heavily influenced by communism and radical left-leaning ideology, the NPA’s seemingly newfound use of terror tactics attempts to sway the minds of many to favor the group’s cause, as well as to drive recruitment to boost its numbers.

Between January 16 and February 1, 2017—six months after Duterte was inaugurated as president—the NPA was involved in fifteen incidents, nine of which occurred on January 30. Around the same time, talks between the NDFP and GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines) proceeded in Rome from January 19-25, which involved discussion of the implementation of the NDFP’s socioeconomic reform program. Though the talks were considered productive by all parties, it resulted in few concessions by either side. In particular, the GRP maintained its refusal to release 392 NDFP prisoners from custody until the issue of amnesty was fleshed out.

On January 30, 2017, the NPA broke a ceasefire with simultaneous assaults in Mati, Surigao Del Norte, Valencia City, Bukidnon, Pag-asa, Lebe, Sarangani, Union, Compostella Valley, San Isidro, Mahayahay, Hinambangan, Kitcharao, and Agusan Del Norte. Subsequently, on February 1, the NPA unilaterally called off its ceasefire, citing the failure of the GRP to release their political prisoners and generally abide by the terms of the ceasefire. In response, on February 3, Duterte withdrew the GRP from its ceasefire in response. In May 2017, President Duterte suspended peace talks with the NDFP, accusing communist rebels of attacking government forces while engaging in negotiations. Months later, on November 23, 2017, President Duterte signed Proclamation No. 360 that formally terminated the talks. Eleven days later, he issued Proclamation No. 374, declaring the CPP and the NPA to be terrorist organizations.

To counter the Duterte administration’s moves, CPP had a Second International Conference on the Indigenous Peoples in Metro Manila (July 2018). This conference intended to portray the Filipino government as having committed human rights violations. The UN High Commission and European Union acted as third-party assessors for the conference.

Despite its substantial experience with running counter-insurgency campaigns over fifty years, the Philippines remains plagued with insurgent groups. After launching numerous assaults based on purportedly effective methodologies and sound concepts, why is the government unable to defeat the CPP-NPA? Such questions that continue to linger in the minds of not only those in government but of the general public, as well.

The CPP-NPA Theater of Power

An analysis of the works of Jose Maria Sison (JOMA)—such as the Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party! (1968), Our Urgent Tasks (between 1969 and 1975), and Specific Characteristics of our People’s War (1971)—reveals that the main difference between the new communist party founded by JOMA in 1968 to that of its precursor, the old communist party of the Lavas’ and Taruc is the former’s emphasis on the importance of a sound mass base. The works above also provide for the phasing and general direction of the revolution which calls for the adoption of stages in the development of revolution through a protracted war of encircling the cities from the countryside and by concentrating first on building a strong base and a peasant army.

Based on the said works of JOMA, the old party pushed for the immediate overthrow of the “reactionary” government by directly confronting the military. Without a stable base to launch its offensive, the former party became vulnerable to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) counter-offensive. Learning from this mistake, the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) of JOMA and its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA) established Guerrilla Fronts (GFs) all throughout the Philippine archipelago to spread out the AFP and dissipate it away from the seat of national government in Metro Manila purposely to provide initiative and flexibility to the Party and the Army.

The CPP-NPA document Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward! (1991) reveals that an ideological split in the early 1990s among the CPP-NPA’s top leaders over the general direction that the revolution shall follow resulted in a divide between the “Rejectionist” (anti-Sison) bloc and the “Reaffirmist” (pro-Sison) bloc. The “Reaffirmists” accused the “Rejectionists” of leftist adventurism and rightist opportunism that undermined the revolution. The leftist adventurists departed from the protracted war concept and pushed the revolution into the urban centers, while the rightist opportunists espoused legal and parliamentary participation as the primary means of struggle relegating the armed struggle to the backdrop.

The document, together with other CPP-NPA published documents, also called for the implementation of the “back to basics” program to correct deviations and repudiate in particular the strategic counter-offensive (SCO) concept of the “leftist adventurists.” The SCO concept had resulted in large NPA formations decimated by the AFP. Also mentioned in the document is the assertion made by JOMA that the strength of the NPA is still in no match to the AFP. He directed to break down the NPA military formations back into platoons and squads and intensify mass works to recover the lost mass base left unchecked and regained by the AFP. JOMA pointed out that the continued decline of the party’s base would isolate both the party and army, as happened to the old CPP.

An analysis of the CPP-NPA documents previously mentioned as well as to other CPP-NPA Anniversary Statements published over the past two decades would disclose that the “back to basics” program of the 1990s was designed to alter the NPA development from vertical to horizontal in order to enable the NPA platoons and squads to cover a wider area and build as many GFs as possible, necessary for the survival of the Party and the Army.

In terms of ongoing counter-insurgency methodologies, the AFP has come up with Internal Security Operations (ISO) concepts and methods to address the internal security threats. One of these is the triad concept of Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Intelligence, and Combat Operations. There has been much debate over the years as to which triad component shall prevail over the rest.

The Philippine government grappled for the right solution to the country’s communist insurgency problem, while the AFP—with a mandate to conduct ISOs—initiated several campaigns to address this primary threat to the country’s internal peace and security, with little success. The ascent to the presidency by the then Senator Benigno Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III in the 2010 national election through an overwhelming victory gave hope for a speedy resolution of armed conflicts in the country.

The Aquino administration promoted the peace process as the centerpiece of its internal security program anchored on the overarching concept of “Unified Action,” a holistic approach which emphasizes that “the AFP will focus on the military dimension, while it will be supporting and/or assisting other government agencies in the economic and political dimensions” of insurgency (AFP Strategic Intent, p. 12). As regards to ISOs, “a grand plan in dealing with internal threats, including the non-traditional actors, had been laid out through the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) (Ibid., p.10).” While it is indisputablee that the AFP’s success in all of the aforesaid mission areas is crucial, it cannot also be an overstatement that its success in ISO is as critical as ever, for in order to focus on other mission areas especially in Territorial Defense, the current internal threats must be addressed first and foremost.

Defeating the Philippine’s Communist Rebellion was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Pulwama bombings in Kashmir on February 14^th, 2019 sent shockwaves throughout South Asia. An unstable and tense region, to begin with, the bombing brought about greater instability and tension between the region’s two leading powers: India and Pakistan. The terrorist attack nearly brought about a catastrophically destructive event.

What happened?

On February 14th, a car laden with explosives was driven into a Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) convoy near the town of Pulwama in Kashmir. The bomber, later identified as 20-year-old Aadil Dar, had recently joined the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), who claimed responsibility for the attack, and the deaths of 40 Indian policemen—the deadliest terrorist attack in Kashmir to date. Kashmir is no stranger to terrorism, nor Pakistan and India struggling over it, as control of the mountainous province has been a key bone of contention between the two nuclear-armed states since their independence in 1947.

Within hours of the attack, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi leveled blame for the attack on Pakistan and declared them responsible for the bombing. Pakistan denied any involvement, even though JeM is based in the Pakistani city of Bahawalpur. The international community has since weighed in, condemning Pakistan and its involvement in supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. In the week following the raid, Indian security forces conducted raids on JeM cells and operatives in Kashmir, resulting in the death of the attack’s alleged mastermind, known as Kamran.

Despite finding and killing those behind the attacks, the accusations set in motion a chain of events that raised tensions between the two states to their highest in recent times, even resulting in military action. On February 26^th, Indian Air Force (IAF) planes violated Pakistani airspace to conduct air raids, bombing what it claimed to be a JeM camp in the Pakistani-Kashmir town of Balakot. 

This was the first time an Indian aircraft violated Pakistan’s airspace since 1971, and the first instance in which nuclear-armed nations have bombed each other. From that day, conflict and tensions between the two escalated, to the point where Pakistan shot down and captured an IAF pilot, Wing Commander Abhinanadan Varthaman, who was subsequently released on March 1^st. Since that week, there has been mutual shelling from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).

This is incredibly problematic for maintaining South Asian Security at large, mostly because there is little conclusive evidence that Pakistan was directly involved in the Pulwama Bombing, but more so because of the presence of nuclear weapons and a history of interstate warfare in the region. The risk this poses cannot be understated, as if both states were to use their nuclear weapons, it would bring about the end of modern civilization through famine and the spread of radioactive fallout. 

Instability and its Effects

There is an element of truth to the accusations laid unto Pakistan supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. Since the 1980s, the Pakistani security apparatus has funded mujahideen and Jihadist insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Initially, this was to counteract the Soviet Union when they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Once they withdrew in 1989, these mujahideen had no conflict left to fight, until they declared jihad on India, and went to fight them in Kashmir.

Groups responsible for attacks in India, such as JeM, have been banned within Pakistan and their membership and leaders arrested, more intensely since Khan announced a recent string of crackdowns in response to almost being put on the Financial Action Task Force “grey list”, a list of countries that have engaged in money laundering and terrorist financing, which India has accused Pakistan of doing. To be put on the list would lead to increased costs for money transfers and running businesses, severely damaging Pakistan’s already weak economy.

However, India has also contributed to the condition of insecurity experienced since February 14^th, through blaming Pakistan for the attacks without providing evidence or intelligence, and more recently the use of air raids. Arguably, this posture is due to General Elections in April, with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government aiming to use harsh action on Pakistan and Kashmir to secure votes.

In the week following the bombing, media focus on blaming Pakistan ended up mainly ignoring that the attack was a textbook case of homegrown terrorism. Dar was a Kashmiri who was radicalized by other groups before he joined JeM, and according to officials in the Indian Military, the explosives were locally sourced. The vehicle used to attack the Indian convoy was Indian and had changed hands several times within Indian territory. This shows that a Kashmiri insurgency is now self-sufficient, and no longer needs Pakistani support to conduct operations. 

It also shows that India needs to enact a more nuanced counterinsurgency strategy to deal with the issue, rather than dragnet crackdowns and mass arrests. Mistreatment and human rights violations have led to Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s mutating into the more homegrown insurgent campaign today. To blame Pakistan and subsequently conduct strikes on targets on their soil is an extremely dangerous and counterintuitive tactic, considering the minuscule margins for error associated with nuclear weaponry.

The attack has had the most significant impact on Kashmiri Muslims throughout India, however. Kashmiri students have been forced to leave their universities, and others have been victims of Islamophobic abuse or forced into hiding following wide-scale government-led crackdowns across the country.

Kashmiri militants have used violence in response to repressive measures taken out by Indian security forces and police against Kashmiri protesters, such as the use of pellet rifles to disperse protests, which happens to be a violation of human rights and international law. This latest incident has not made life any easier for them, who have been protesting for independence since 1948, though these became far more violent in 2016. It also creates an environment ideal to radicalize disenfranchised Kashmiris, giving Kashmiri militant and Jihadist groups more fighters. It is a vicious cycle, one that can be closed through India entertaining the Kashmiri desire for self-determination and giving them a forum to air their grievances.

Lessons to be Learned

Pakistan and India stood at the precipice and stared down the barrel of a nuclear war. Thankfully, neither side escalated further, and both appear to have stood down for the most part, except for drone flights and air patrols of the LoC and the international border. There are lessons that both sides need to learn though, especially considering the Kashmir crisis.

Read Part Two of the Pulwama Incident: Pakistan and India Have Much to Learn

The Pulwama Incident Part One: The Razor’s Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.