There is a comforting fiction at the heart of much contemporary strategic thinking: conventional military capabilities can substitute for nuclear deterrence without requiring the same political will. It is a neat idea—reassuring, technologically optimistic, and politically convenient. It is also dangerously wrong.

Deterrence does not reside in platforms, precision, or posture. It resides in belief—specifically, the adversary’s belief that you are both capable of inflicting costs and willing to do so. Strip away that second element, and deterrence collapses into theater.

This is the central problem confronting Australia and its allies as they navigate a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific security environment. As nuclear risks grow, particularly with China’s expanding arsenal, there has been a noticeable intellectual pivot toward elevating conventional capabilities as a more “usable,” credible, and politically palatable form of deterrence. Long-range strike, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, and advanced ISR are all presented as tools that can impose meaningful costs without crossing the nuclear threshold.

However, this argument only holds if those tools are used. Too often, the debate stops at capability acquisition. Billions are spent, platforms are announced, doctrines are drafted. Yet, there is a conspicuous silence when it comes to the harder question: under what circumstances would Australia employ these capabilities in anger? What thresholds trigger their use? What risks are we prepared to accept in doing so?

Without clear answers, the signal sent to adversaries is not strength, but hesitation. Consider the logic from the perspective of a competitor. If Australia invests heavily in long-range strike but avoids articulating when it would employ it, an adversary may conclude that those capabilities are politically constrained. If grey-zone coercion, such as the deployment of sea mines, harassment of maritime assets, or interference with undersea infrastructure, does not elicit a forceful response, then the lesson learned is not deterrence, but permissiveness.

In this sense, ambiguity is not always stabilizing. It can just as easily invite probing. The uncomfortable reality is that conventional deterrence demands a level of resolve that many policymakers are reluctant to acknowledge. Unlike nuclear weapons, whose very horror lends them a paradoxical clarity, conventional forces sit in a murkier space. They are more usable, but precisely for that reason, credibility hinges on demonstrated willingness.

A missile that will is restricted from use is not a deterrent. A submarine that will not be deployed into contested waters does not shape adversary behavior. A cyber capability that remains permanently in reserve does not impose costs. Deterrence, in the conventional domain, is performative. It must be signaled, exercised, and at times demonstrated.

This does not mean recklessness or a rush to escalation. It means recognizing that deterrence is not cost-free. If the objective is to prevent adversary action, then one must be prepared to act before the situation becomes intolerable. Waiting until costs are imposed on you, economically, militarily, or politically undermines the very logic of deterrence. This is where much of the current discourse falls short. There is a tendency to treat conventional capabilities as inherently stabilizing, as though their mere existence alters adversary calculations. But capabilities without credible intent are inert. Worse, they can create a false sense of security, masking the erosion of deterrence beneath a veneer of preparedness.

The challenge is particularly acute for middle powers like Australia, which rely heavily on alliances and extended deterrence. As questions grow around the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees, especially in a more contested and multipolar environment, there is an understandable desire to bolster national self-reliance through conventional means. This is a sensible objective. But it cannot be achieved through hardware alone.

If conventional forces are to serve as a substitute or even a supplement to nuclear deterrence, then they must be embedded within a clear framework of political resolve. This requires more than capability development. It requires declaratory policy, strategic signaling, and a willingness to accept escalation risks.

For example, if the laying of sea mines in Australian waters is deemed unacceptable, then that must be stated clearly and backed by a credible commitment to respond with force if necessary. Anything less invites incremental encroachment. Over time, such encroachment normalizes behaviors that would once have been considered intolerable.

History offers ample evidence of this dynamic. Deterrence erodes not in dramatic moments, but through a series of small, unchallenged actions that cumulatively shift the baseline of what is acceptable. By the time a clear red line is crossed, it is often too late as the adversary has already recalibrated expectations.

The solution is not to abandon conventional deterrence, but to take it seriously. This means confronting uncomfortable questions. Are we prepared to use long-range strike capabilities against an adversary’s military assets in the initial stages of a crisis? Would we target grey-zone actors operating below the threshold of armed conflict? How do we signal our intentions without triggering the very escalation we seek to avoid? There are no easy answers, but avoiding the questions altogether is not a strategy, it is an abdication.

Ultimately, deterrence is about shaping perceptions. It is about convincing an adversary that the costs of action will outweigh the benefits. This cannot be achieved through ambiguity alone, nor through capability acquisition in isolation. It requires a coherent integration of means, messaging, and above all else, will.

If policymakers are unwilling to countenance the use of conventional force, then they should be honest about the implications. In such a scenario, conventional capabilities do not replace nuclear deterrence; they merely decorate its absence.

The risk is not just strategic failure, but strategic surprise. An adversary that perceives a gap between capability and intent will exploit it; once that perception is formed, it is exceedingly difficult to reverse.

Deterrence, in the end, is a test of credibility and resolve. It is not measured by what you possess, but by what an adversary believes you will do. In strategic competition, credibility is not claimed; it is proven and without resolve, deterrence is nothing at all.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Deterrence Without Resolve Is No Deterrence at All was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1987, acclaimed feminist researcher Carol Cohn released a scathing gendered critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Cohn argued that the ‘technostrategic,’ masculinized language used to discuss deterrence strategy was not accidental. It obscured moral responsibility, normalized violence, and made nuclear war more plausible. As one of the most influential pieces within its subfield, Cohn’s conclusions are still cited more than three decades later in the growing cadre of women arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons is anti-feminist.

Cohn is part of a distinct group of political theorists referred to as international relations (IR) feminists. Rather than offering a causal explanation of war, IR feminists focus on exposing the gender hierarchies embedded in international politics. They specifically argue that the dominant classical IR theories, such as realism and liberalism, privilege masculinity and normalize violence through abstract language. War, in their view, is linked to masculinized norms of autonomy, aggression, and control. Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate instrument of war, are then the ultimate instruments of male violence.

So, what does it mean to be a woman working within the nuclear weapons complex today? Do all women who find themselves in such a position suddenly become anti-feminist? Given that the argument that nuclear deterrence is responsible for the sharp decline in major power conflict is quite persuasive, the answer is most certainly not.

At its core, feminism argues that women are affected differently than men for many things, yet still fundamentally deserve equal rights to life, liberty, and property. War, in particular, is a strong example of this. Unquestionably, sexual violence is a tactic used in genocides and ethnic cleansings; a type of violence that is predominantly perpetrated against women. Therefore, the prevention of war is also a feminist issue. Nuclear weapons are simply the key to deterring the very global wars that would result in mass atrocities like the Rape of Nanjing. These specific war crimes were enabled by a powerful, unchecked conventional army in an era without nuclear weapons.

Cohn’s critique of nuclear discourse is compelling on its surface, but it does not offer an alternative theory of deterrence. Nuclear war has not occurred since 1945, not because states abandoned violent thinking after World War Two, but because deterrence altered strategic calculations. Feminist IR theory does not explain this outcome.

The deeper issue is that feminist IR theory prioritizes deconstruction over explanation. Its intellectual roots in critical theory lead it to distrust policy-oriented thinking, viewing it as complicit in domination. As a result, IR feminist scholars often resist offering recommendations to leaders or engaging with strategic trade-offs. However, international relations theory exists to explain and manage conflict, not merely to critique it.

This gap becomes clear when IR feminists are asked the same question classical theories confront directly. Why do wars begin between states at particular moments? IR feminists often answer by pointing to patriarchy, masculinized institutions, or hierarchical gender norms. These may be part of the broader social environment, but they do not explain timing, escalation, or variation. Patriarchy exists in both peaceful and belligerent states.

States pursue deterrence because they cannot directly control their enemies’ actions and want to avoid war without capitulation. Deterrence is successful when a state’s credibility and capability are maintained. As Herman Kahn once bluntly put it, deterrence works because “the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”

Cohn critiques the language used to discuss this logic: “Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relation of one set of weapons to another. As such, it is utterly bankrupt of possibilities for thinking about peace or meaningful security.” Cohn gets the argument of deterrence wrong, however. Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relationship between one state’s risk threshold and another’s. So far, thankfully, no nation has determined that the military benefit of using nuclear weapons in a conflict is worth the risk that nuclear weapons will subsequently be used against it. This has fundamentally maintained global peace; the fear of nuclear escalation has prevented small wars from intensifying into world wars.

Another element of Cohn’s argument, and those of IR feminists at large, is that there is no such thing as objective, impartial knowledge. Contending with this premise is intentionally made difficult by IR feminists as they further argue requests for evidence are themselves masculine-coded; these are arguments of bad faith. Their arguments against nuclear weapons have the same fallacies. Deterrence is measurably less aggressive than the alternatives of armed conflict.

Whether morally troubling others or not, deterrence operates within a realist framework in which adversaries’ perceptions determine outcomes. Feminist IR theory offers no alternative explanation for how nuclear war is avoided in a world where states cannot control their enemies’ choices. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that while a world without nuclear weapons might appear desirable, “you cannot base a sure defense on dreams.”

Unfortunately, IR feminists have co-opted the broader interaction of feminism with international relations theory. It has since made it difficult for other aspects of feminist thought to combine with IR theories to produce more nuanced explanations of war that do not rely on critical theory. As explanations of war ultimately seek to offer paths of war prevention, feminist IR theory as it stands remains an incomplete theory.

To want war to be avoided is a core feminist issue. Acknowledging that nuclear weapons are the key to this is not anti-feminist. Deconstructing the language of deterrence strategy does not explain why nuclear war has been avoided for nearly eight decades, nor does it offer a credible alternative for preventing it. Preventing global war protects the very populations feminists seek to defend. Women can therefore work in the nuclear enterprise without being morally bankrupt, and feminists can support nuclear deterrence because the prevention of catastrophic war is itself a profoundly feminist objective.

Alexis Schlotterback is the screening editor for Global Security Review and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Her experience includes a Masters Degree from Missouri State’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and participation in the National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellowship. The views of the authors are her own.

Yes, You Can Be a Feminist and Still Support Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Todays Top GSR Headlines

• BBC — Trump’s nuclear arms control push with Russia hinges on China (Feb. 5, 2026). U.S. efforts to replace New START face a major obstacle: Beijing resists trilateral limits, making any successor agreement slower, harder, and strategically more complex.
• Newsweek — War Won’t Solve Iran’s Nuclear Threat. This Could | Opinion (Apr. 25, 2026). The article argues the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be strengthened through stricter inspections and verification rather than military action against Iran’s contested nuclear program.
• AP News — Iran’s nuclear program takes focus as atomic treaty review starts (Apr. 27, 2026). A new NPT review session opened with Iran’s program at center stage, highlighting renewed friction over safeguards, disarmament commitments, and peaceful nuclear rights.
• GB News — New Start treaty: World enters grim new nuclear era after historic US-Russia pact expires (Feb. 4, 2026). With New START expired, the U.S. and Russia now operate without treaty limits, feeding concern over transparency losses, strategic instability, and renewed arms competition.
• USNI News — “STRATCOM CO: Chinese, Russian Build Up of Nuclear Weapons Will ‘Test’ U.S. Strategic Deterrence” (date not exposed in surfaced result). USNI’s archive highlights warnings that parallel Chinese and Russian nuclear expansion could strain U.S. deterrence credibility, modernization plans, and force-posture assumptions.
• War on the Rocks — Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force (Mar. 30, 2025). The essay explores whether an Anglo-French nuclear framework could strengthen European deterrence as allies reconsider burden-sharing, sovereignty, and the future of transatlantic defense.
• Global Times — Chinese FM releases national report of China’s implementation of NPT (Apr. 19, 2026). China publicized its national NPT implementation report ahead of review diplomacy, presenting Beijing as supportive of non-proliferation and multilateral nuclear governance.
• Substack — Messages from Moscow (Apr. 8, 2026). This Substack post examines Russian strategic signaling and its implications for deterrence, escalation management, and Western interpretation of nuclear and geopolitical messaging.
• BBC — Fears of new arms race as US-Russia nuclear weapons treaty expires (Feb. 4, 2026). BBC frames New START’s expiration as a watershed moment ending decades of bilateral nuclear restraint, transparency, and inspections, while raising fears of a destabilizing arms race.
• AP News — The last US-Russian nuclear pact is about to expire, ending a half-century of arms control (Feb. 4, 2026). AP describes New START’s lapse as the end of the final U.S.-Russian nuclear constraint, removing caps on deployed warheads, missiles, bombers, and verification mechanisms.

Todays Top Stories was originally published on Global Security Review.

Introduction

Russia’s recent deployment of a conventionally armed, diesel-powered submarine to Indonesia should not be dismissed as routine naval activity. It is a calculated strategic signal. One that highlights a growing challenge for Australia and calls into question the resilience of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. While such deployments fall below the nuclear threshold, they reveal an emerging approach to strategic competition. The use of advanced conventional capabilities can undermine the systems that enable nuclear deterrence.

At the center of this challenge is the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt, are integral to this architecture. They support early warning, signals intelligence, and communications with nuclear forces. As such, they are not only strategic assets but also potential targets. Modern diesel-electric submarines—quiet, survivable, and increasingly capable—can operate in Australia’s northern approaches and threaten these critical nodes with precision strike options or intelligence-gathering missions that enable future disruption.

The Gray Zone Effect

This development reflects a broader shift in adversary strategy. Rather than relying on overt nuclear coercion, states such as Russia are exploring how to achieve strategic effects through conventional means. By targeting NC3 infrastructure using submarines, cyber operations, or long-range precision strike, adversaries can degrade the credibility of nuclear deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. This approach exploits the grey zone between peace and war, complicates escalation dynamics, and introduces ambiguity into alliance responses. It is not escalation dominance in the traditional sense, but escalation manipulation, and shaping the environment so that nuclear deterrence becomes less certain, less credible, and therefore less effective.

Recent Chinese naval activity reinforces this concern. The PLA Navy’s circumnavigation of Australia should not be viewed as routine presence or symbolic signaling alone. Rather, it demonstrates an emerging capacity to operate persistently along Australia’s littoral approaches and key maritime choke points—areas proximate to critical infrastructure that underpins U.S. and allied NC3. Such operations enable the mapping of undersea terrain, surveillance of communication pathways, and potential identification of vulnerabilities in systems such as subsea cables and relay nodes. In a crisis, these capabilities could be leveraged to conduct limited, deniable disruption of NC3 functions that degrade communication, delay decision-making, and complicate alliance coordination without crossing the threshold of armed attacks. In this sense, China’s activity mirrors and reinforces the broader trend: the use of conventional means to hold at risk the foundations of nuclear deterrence.

For Australia, the implications are significant. The traditional model of U.S. extended deterrence, anchored in the threat of nuclear retaliation, assumes that nuclear forces remain survivable, communicable, and politically usable. However, if NC3 systems are degraded or disrupted, that assumption weakens. Deterrence begins to erode not because nuclear weapons are absent, but because their employment becomes uncertain or delayed. In such a scenario, adversaries may calculate that they can act with greater freedom at the conventional level, confident that escalation can be managed or avoided. 

Policy Recommendations

This evolving threat environment demands a recalibration of Australia’s defense and deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. It must be reinforced by a comprehensive strategy that integrates conventional resilience, grey-zone competition, and a more explicit recognition of the role nuclear forces play in underpinning deterrence across all domains.

First, Australia should prioritize the hardening and resilience of NC3-related infrastructure on its territory. This includes enhancing physical protection, investing in redundancy and dispersal, and strengthening cyber defenses. Facilities such as Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt must be able to operate under contested conditions, ensuring continuity of communication and decision-making even in the face of sustained disruption. This may also require the development of alternative communication pathways, including space-based and mobile systems. Resilience is not merely a defensive measure; it is a core component of deterrence, signaling to adversaries that attempts at degradation will not succeed.

Second, Australia must significantly expand its undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ability to detect, track, and, if necessary, neutralize hostile submarines in Australia’s maritime approaches is critical to protecting strategic infrastructure. Investments should focus on integrated undersea sensor networks, maritime patrol aircraft, autonomous systems, and closer operational integration with allies. A persistent and credible ASW posture will complicate adversary planning, increase operational risk, and reduce the feasibility of covert operations targeting NC3 nodes.

Third, Canberra should deepen strategic dialogue with Washington on the role of Australia within U.S. nuclear deterrence architecture. This dialogue must move beyond general assurances and address specific contingencies, including how attacks on NC3 infrastructure in Australia would be interpreted. Greater clarity around escalation thresholds, attribution challenges, and response options will reduce the risk of miscalculation and strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. This should include regularized nuclear consultation mechanisms and scenario-based planning.

Fourth, Australia should take the lead in advocating for the development of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. Such a framework that brings together the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia, would formalize shared deterrence responsibilities and strengthen collective resolve. While politically sensitive, this arrangement could include elements of nuclear consultation, planning, and burden-sharing, similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. By distributing deterrence functions and signaling unity, such an alliance would complicate adversary calculations and reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence across the region.

Fifth, Australia must engage India more directly on the implications of Russian strategic behavior. As a key regional power with longstanding ties to Moscow, India occupies a unique diplomatic position. Canberra should clearly communicate its concerns regarding Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including the risks posed to critical infrastructure and regional stability. In parallel, India should be encouraged to consider the broader consequences of a hypothetical Russian attack on Australia, not only for bilateral relations, but for its strategic partnerships with both the United States and Australia. This dialogue would not seek to force alignment, but to underscore the interconnected nature of regional security and the potential costs of strategic ambiguity.

Sixth, Australia should explore options to visibly anchor U.S. nuclear deterrence in the region. This necessitates a proactive approach to alliance integration. Mechanisms such as enhanced consultation, increased transparency around nuclear policy, and potential participation in nuclear planning arrangements could reinforce deterrence by demonstrating resolve and cohesion. Initiatives under AUKUS provide a foundation for this deeper integration and should be expanded to include broader deterrence considerations.

Seventh, Australian defense policy must explicitly recognize the interdependence of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Investments in long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare are essential, but they must be understood as part of a broader deterrence framework. These capabilities contribute to resilience and denial, but they are ultimately underpinned by the threat of escalation. Ensuring that this relationship is clearly articulated in strategy and doctrine will strengthen deterrence coherence and improve signaling to adversaries.

Finally, Australia must broaden its strategic focus to account for multiple nuclear-capable adversaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. While China remains the primary focus of defense planning, Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia underscores the need for a comprehensive approach. Strategic competition is no longer confined to a single actor or domain. It is multi-faceted, simultaneous, and increasingly coordinated. Australia’s deterrence posture must reflect this complexity.

Conclusion

The central lesson is clear. Deterrence in the 21st century cannot be treated as a layered system in which nuclear weapons sit passively at the top. Instead, nuclear deterrence must actively underpin and reinforce every level of conflict, including the conventional and grey-zone domains. Adversaries are increasingly seeking to exploit gaps between these layers, using conventional means to achieve strategic effects without triggering nuclear retaliation.

To respond to this challenge, Australia must take seriously the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on which it relies. This means investing in the resilience of critical systems, strengthening conventional capabilities, and engaging more deeply with allies and partners on the role of nuclear alliances and forces in regional security.

In an era defined by ambiguity and threshold management, the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on integration, clarity, and resolve. By advancing new nuclear alliance structures, deepening strategic dialogue, which includes India, and reinforcing both conventional and nuclear pillars of deterrence, Australia can ensure that sophisticated conventional threats do not undermine the stability of the broader strategic order.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Silent Signals: Russian and Chinese Conventional Threats to NC3 and U.S. Extended Deterrence in Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Technological advances and rising military expenditures in recent years have accelerated the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Though this technology is still in its infancy, it has already transformed modern warfare. LAWS, when fully evolved, will provide means for precise and independent selection and engagement of targets without exposing soldiers to battlefield dangers. A 2025 Congressional Research Service report titled Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on LAWS classifies it as “a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify, target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy it without manual human control.” The US Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (2023), defined LAWS as systems that, once activated, “can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This concept, known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy,” involves target selection and engagement based on inputs from artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, and sensor-based identification. 

According to Data M Intelligence, the global autonomous weapons market reached USD 14.2 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow to USD 33.47 billion by 2032, with a compound annual growth rate of 11.39 percent during 2025-2032. Simultaneously, global civil society initiatives are advocating a ban on fully autonomous systems. In October 2012, Amnesty International launched the Stop Killer Robots campaign, an alliance of over 180 organizations across 65 countries, calling for an international law on autonomy in weapon systems to ensure machines are not allowed to make decisions that affect life and death. 

Concerns have arisen over unsupervised use and the potential for system errors that can cause unintended civilian casualties, escalate conflicts, and threaten global peace and security. The increasing integration of autonomous weapon systems in combat has already been highlighted by their reported use in Ukraine conflict and in Gaza. A February 2025 report by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research titled Deadly Algorithms: Destructive Role of Artificial Intelligence in Gaza War revealed that Israel employed AI-based systems, Lavender and Habsora, to identify and attack human targets. The report states that Lavender can approve targets within 20 seconds, often without substantive human review. Since October 2023, the system has compiled a list of 37,000 potential individuals labelled as Hamas members without verifying their military profile.  

Since 2014, the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has debated the regulation of LAWS. In May 2024, Arms Campaign Director Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch warned that “the world is approaching a tipping point for acting on concerns over autonomous weapons systems,” underscoring the urgency of an international legal instrument. On 2 December 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/79/62 on LAWS by 166 votes in favor, 3 against, and 15 abstentions. The resolution marked a decisive step in acknowledging global concerns over autonomous weapon systems, affirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) and called for further consultations in 2025. The first UNGA meeting on autonomous weapons, held on 12-13 May 2025 and attended by 96 countries, including representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society, reinforced momentum to prohibit and regulate LAWS. On that occasion, UN Secretary-General António Guterres advocated for a legally binding instrument to ban LAWS by 2026, describing them as “politically unacceptable and morally repugnant.”  

Despite global concerns, progress on a legally binding treaty on LAWS remains elusive due to divergent strategic interests of major powers. The US continues to resist codification of a new binding framework, emphasizing the adequacy of national weapons review mechanisms to preserve strategic and technological flexibility. While the US maintains that it does not currently possess LAWS, senior military leaders have acknowledged that Washington may be compelled to develop them if adversaries do so. Russia has opposed any binding treaty, while China supports negotiations on the CCW and the development of norms “when conditions are ripe.” The European Union, in contrast, advocates for a legally binding international instrument, emphasizing Meaningful Human Control (MHC) and compliance with IHL. The EU’s approach seeks to differentiate between systems that incorporate human oversight and those that operate without it. 

The integration of artificial intelligence into weapon systems also presents an increasing challenge to nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. For instance, during the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Peru in November 2024, the then US President Joe Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping jointly pledged not to integrate AI in nuclear command-and-control systems, recognizing the catastrophic risks of automation in nuclear decision-making. However, as AI rapidly improves surveillance, missile guidance and targeting systems, it is unclear whether this restraint will hold.  

The integration of AI in nuclear forces may introduce instability into deterrence dynamics by reducing decision-making time and increasing challenges caused by algorithmic bias in early warning systems, posing the threat of false nuclear alarms. Cold War history reminds us of human judgment, central to nuclear stability, and averted catastrophes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the B-59 submarine incident on 27 October 1962 brought the two superpowers close to nuclear exchange when a Soviet submarine commander considered launching a nuclear-tipped torpedo under the mistaken belief that hostilities had commenced. The refusal by Vasily Arkhipov to authorize the attack prevented a potential nuclear war. Similarly, Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defense Forces, chose to disregard a false early-warning alert indicating an incoming US nuclear strike in 1983, preventing a global nuclear disaster. Such decision-making underscores the indispensable role of human rationality in nuclear command-and-control systems.  

As LAWS presents multifaceted threats to international peace and security, states need to consider negotiating a legally binding instrument that ensures MHC over autonomy in weapon systems. Enhancing transparency, accountability, and rigorous weapons reviews are essential to prevent destabilization and ensure that technological progress does not outpace the human element in the use of force. Confidence-building measures, such as transparency in military AI, the establishment of international verification mechanisms and a moratorium on the development and deployment of LAWS, could help mitigate future dangers. 

Jawad Ali Shah is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS), Pakistan. He holds a BS in International Relations from the University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. His research areas are emerging military technologies, and South Asian nuclear deterrence and strategic stability dynamics. The views are the author’s own. 

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A New Battlefield Reality was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific increasingly occurs in the grey zone, the space between routine statecraft and open armed conflict. China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran employ a range of coercive tactics designed to alter the strategic environment without triggering a conventional military response. These activities include cyber operations, maritime harassment, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and limited military provocations. Because these actions remain deliberately below the threshold of war, they often exploit the reluctance of states to respond with force. As grey zone competition intensifies, the question confronting policymakers is not only how to deter such activities, but also how to ensure that responses to them are credible. In this context, a nuclear alliance could serve as the ultimate strategic backstop for military responses to persistent grey zone coercion.

Grey zone strategies rely heavily on ambiguity and escalation management. The states that employ these tactics understand that their adversaries—particularly democratic states—are cautious about escalating disputes into major military confrontations. By operating just below the threshold of armed conflict, grey zone actors seek to gradually erode the strategic position of their opponents while avoiding a decisive response. Maritime coercion in disputed waters, persistent airspace incursions, cyber intrusions, and limited military demonstrations all serve this purpose. Over time, these actions can reshape the operational environment, undermine alliances, and weaken the credibility of deterrence.

The difficulty lies in crafting responses that are both proportionate and credible. Conventional military responses to grey zone activities risk escalating a crisis if they are perceived as excessive, yet insufficient responses can embolden further coercion. This dilemma has led analysts to argue that deterrence in the grey zone requires a layered approach that combines political, economic, and military tools. However, even robust conventional responses may prove insufficient if adversaries believe that escalation dominance ultimately rests in their favor. It is in this context that nuclear deterrence retains enduring strategic relevance.

A nuclear alliance would not be designed to deter grey zone activities directly. Nuclear weapons are instruments of last resort intended to deter existential threats and large-scale conventional aggression. Nevertheless, the presence of a credible nuclear backstop fundamentally shapes the broader strategic environment in which grey zone competition occurs. By reinforcing the credibility of allied military responses, nuclear deterrence can prevent grey zone crises from escalating into major wars while simultaneously discouraging adversaries from testing the limits of conventional deterrence.

In practical terms, a nuclear alliance would strengthen escalation management in the Indo-Pacific. If regional states believed that their security rested on a collective nuclear deterrent, they would be better positioned to respond firmly to grey zone provocations. Maritime patrols, cyber countermeasures, and limited military deployments could be undertaken with greater confidence that adversaries would hesitate to escalate beyond the conventional level. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a strategic umbrella under which lower-level military responses can occur without triggering uncontrolled escalation.

The experience of the Cold War offers a useful historical precedent. During that period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relied on nuclear deterrence to prevent large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union while simultaneously engaging in conventional competition across multiple domains. Although grey zone tactics—including espionage, proxy conflicts, and political interference—were common, the presence of a credible nuclear deterrent helped ensure that such competition did not escalate into direct war between nuclear powers. A similar logic could apply in the Indo-Pacific today.

In the contemporary regional context, a nuclear alliance could involve close coordination among the United States and key Indo-Pacific partners. Such an arrangement would not necessarily require the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, it could mirror existing extended deterrence frameworks in which nuclear-armed states provide security guarantees to non-nuclear allies while maintaining operational control over nuclear forces. Through mechanisms such as joint planning, strategic consultation, and integrated command structures, allied states could strengthen the credibility of collective deterrence without undermining existing non-proliferation commitments.

Importantly, a nuclear backstop would also reinforce political resolve among allied states. Grey zone strategies often aim to exploit divisions within alliances by testing whether partners will respond collectively to incremental coercion. If adversaries perceive hesitation or disunity, they may conclude that the risks of escalation are manageable. A formal nuclear alliance could signal a high level of strategic commitment among participating states, thereby increasing the perceived costs of continued grey zone pressure.

Critics may argue that linking nuclear deterrence to grey zone competition risks lowering the nuclear threshold or introducing unnecessary escalation dynamics. These concerns highlight the importance of clearly defining the role of nuclear weapons within a broader deterrence framework. The objective would not be to threaten nuclear retaliation for minor provocations, but rather to ensure that adversaries understand that attempts to escalate beyond the grey zone could encounter a unified and credible deterrent response. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a stabilizing force that sets clear limits on how far coercion can be pushed.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the central arena of strategic competition, the persistence of grey zone tactics will continue to test existing security arrangements. States that rely solely on conventional responses may find themselves locked in a cycle of incremental coercion that gradually shifts the balance of power. By contrast, a nuclear alliance would provide a strategic foundation that reinforces the credibility of allied military responses across the escalation spectrum.

Ultimately, understanding grey zone actors and the tactics they employ is essential for effective deterrence. Yet deterrence also requires credible escalation management and the assurance that adversaries cannot exploit the space between peace and war indefinitely. In the Indo-Pacific, a carefully structured nuclear alliance could provide the strategic backstop necessary to ensure that responses to grey zone coercion remain both credible and effective while preventing escalation into catastrophic conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 3: A Nuclear Alliance as the Ultimate Backstop to Grey Zone Coercion was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Indo-Pacific is entering a far more dangerous strategic era. Military modernization, grey-zone coercion, and rapid nuclear expansion are reshaping the regional balance of power. Most notably, China is undertaking a historic expansion of its nuclear arsenal, investing in silo fields, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and dual-capable systems. Simultaneously, Russia’s willingness to use nuclear threats in Europe demonstrates that nuclear coercion is once again central to great-power competition.

In Washington, proposals such as Ely Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact reflect recognition that the current security architecture is insufficient. A more formalized collective defense structure in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.

However, this is not sufficient. A conventional Pacific Defense Pact does not fully address the most dangerous level of escalation to large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack. What the region now requires is a narrowly defined Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

A Narrow, Explicit Purpose

This would not be a sweeping defense pact covering every maritime incident, border clash, cyber intrusion, or grey-zone coercive act. It would have a clear and carefully delimited purpose. That is to deter large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack against member states.

Its clarity would be its strength. That clarity performs a second vital function. It minimizes the risk of entrapment by ensuring member states are not dragged into escalation over actions below the threshold of war. By explicitly excluding grey-zone coercion and limited crises from its nuclear remit, the alliance would reassure leaders that only truly existential threats trigger its highest-level commitments.

Participation becomes politically sustainable and strategically credible because it avoids automatic escalation over incremental provocations. The alliance would draw a line at catastrophic strategic aggression.

The Historical Record: Why Nuclear Deterrence Matters

The case for a nuclear alliance is not theoretical. It is grounded in historical experience. During the Cold War, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented direct large-scale war and nuclear attack in Europe. Despite ideological confrontation and proxy conflicts, neither side attempted a conventional war or nuclear attack on the other’s core territories. Nuclear weapons imposed restraint. They deterred not just nuclear use, but overwhelming conventional assault.

Similarly, within NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear guarantees has prevented full-scale Russian conventional attack on Alliance territory. Moscow has tested boundaries through

hybrid tactics and coercive signaling, but it has not launched a large-scale attack on NATO soil. Nuclear deterrence at the alliance level raised the costs to an unacceptable threshold.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict further illustrates how nuclear capability constrains escalation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear superiority allowed it to signal credible threats, while China’s emerging nuclear capability and mobilization signaled resolve. Mutual fear of escalation compelled negotiation, including intervention through U.S. triangular diplomacy. Nuclear weapons shaped behaviors without being used.

The India–Pakistan experience is equally instructive. Prior to overt nuclearization, the two states fought multiple full-scale wars. Since their nuclear tests in 1998, crises have erupted, but they have remained limited. Missile strikes, cross-border skirmishes, and periods of great tension have not escalated into all-out conventional war or nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence imposed a ceiling on the conflicts.

Contrast this with the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s and now confronts a nuclear-armed Russia without possessing its own nuclear deterrent. The result has been a prolonged and costly conventional war of attrition. The absence of mutual nuclear deterrence has made sustained large-scale conventional war possible. By comparison, Russia has not launched a direct assault on NATO territory precisely because nuclear deterrence underwrites NATO’s collective defense.

The pattern is clear. Where credible nuclear deterrence exists between adversaries, large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack is sharply constrained or avoided. Where it does not, prolonged and devastating large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack becomes more likely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategic Gap

The Indo-Pacific currently relies on a patchwork of bilateral extended deterrence arrangements centered primarily on Washington. These remain essential, but they are increasingly strained or at risk of being fractured by China.

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal complicates escalation management. A larger and more survivable force reduces the credibility of assumptions that escalation will remain controlled or asymmetrical. Meanwhile, the region contains multiple flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the India–China border where conventional conflict could rapidly climb the escalation ladder.

Frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad strengthen capabilities and coordination, while the proposed Pacific Defense Pact aims to guarantee that the U.S. and its allies can act in concert during crises or conflicts. But they are not structured as nuclear deterrence mechanisms. They do not institutionalize shared nuclear declaratory policy, crisis consultation at the strategic level, or joint planning for high-end escalation management. A nuclear alliance would fill that gap.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact

A Pacific Defense Pact, as envisioned in conventional terms, strengthens interoperability and signals unity. But without an explicit nuclear dimension, it leaves ambiguity at the highest rung of escalation. That ambiguity can invite miscalculation.

A nuclear alliance would not broaden commitments; it would sharpen them. It would: (1) establish shared declaratory policy on deterrence of large-scale war and nuclear attack, (2) institutionalize strategic consultation mechanisms during crises, (3) coordinate planning to ensure credible escalation management, and (4) reinforce extended deterrence while discouraging independent nuclear proliferation.

Importantly, such an alliance need not require additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Like NATO, it could rely on extended deterrence commitments and nuclear-sharing with structured burden-sharing and planning arrangements. Nuclear forces may remain nationally controlled, but alliance cohesion amplifies deterrent credibility. 

Clarity as Stability

The objective is not confrontation. It is clarity. By defining a narrow and explicit threshold—large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack—the alliance reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. It signals to potential aggressors that existential aggression will trigger unified strategic consequences.

Simultaneously, it reassures members that lower-level competition will not automatically escalate to nuclear commitments. This dual clarity strengthens deterrence at the top end and stabilizes politics at the lower end.

A Necessary Evolution

The Indo-Pacific is now the central arena of 21st-century strategic competition. Nuclear modernization is accelerating. Multi-nuclear dynamics are emerging. Escalation timelines are compressing.

History shows that nuclear weapons, and when embedded within credible alliance structures, deter catastrophic war. They prevent large-scale conventional war and nuclear attacks not because they are desirable tools of war, but because they impose unacceptable costs on those who contemplate it.

A Pacific Defense Pact is a step forward, but in the current strategic environment, it is not enough. To deter large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack in the Indo-Pacific, the region must move beyond a Pacific Defense Pact. It must build a nuclear alliance.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact: Why the Indo-Pacific Requires a Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

This pattern has direct relevance for the Indo-Pacific region. Deterrence depends not only on forward-deployed forces and advanced capabilities, but also on the sustained ability of allied military institutions to function under pressure. Long-duration crises test personnel systems, logistics governance, and civil–military coordination in ways short conflicts do not. Joint operations across multiple states rely on interoperability, shared intelligence, and coordinated command structures that may degrade under stress. Failure of these institutional mechanisms can be as decisive as battlefield defeat. The Indo-Pacific presents additional challenges, including vast maritime distances, diverse political systems among allies, and critical chokepoints such as the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, which amplify the consequences of institutional stress.

Logistics is often the first system to degrade in prolonged conflict. Early wartime adaptation can mask structural weaknesses, but logistics networks become brittle over time. Sustained disruption, infrastructure damage, and competing civilian demands reduce flexibility. Recent high intensity conflicts demonstrate that logistics effectiveness often declines due to cumulative friction across transportation, maintenance, and energy supply chains. These vulnerabilities are particularly pronounced in maritime and air domains, where long supply lines and port dependencies create operational risks. For Indo-Pacific states, heavy reliance on maritime transport and civilian infrastructure further intensifies these challenges. Deterrence credibility therefore depends not only on stockpiles, but on whether logistics governance can function after months of sustained pressure.

Energy infrastructure resilience is intricately linked to logistics sustainability. Sustained strikes on energy systems rarely halt operations immediately, but they gradually erode institutional capacity. Power instability affects command systems, maintenance cycles, training pipelines, and civilian support networks. Over time, these disruptions degrade operational tempo and decision-making quality. Many Indo-Pacific states rely on centralized power generation, imported fuel, and dual-use infrastructure, increasing their vulnerability to prolonged disruption. Such stress would not only affect military units, but also civilian resilience, intensifying friction between defense requirements and societal tolerance. Extended deterrence relies heavily on political cohesion, making energy resilience a strategic factor. States with diversified energy networks, redundant supply routes, and hardened civilian-military interfaces are better positioned to sustain military effectiveness.

Personnel systems represent another critical late-phase vulnerability. High-intensity conflict places sustained demands on trained personnel that are difficult to replace. Initial mobilization often creates an illusion of depth, but over time training quality declines, leadership fatigue accumulates, and institutional knowledge erodes. These effects are gradual and frequently overlooked until they become operationally decisive. Demographic constraints further complicate personnel sustainability across Indo-Pacific allies, many of which face aging populations and limited mobilization pools. Prolonged conflict would force trade-offs between force quality and quantity. Effective deterrence planning requires realistic long-duration personnel strategies, including force rotation, cross-training, and preplanned personnel pipelines that preserve institutional knowledge under operational stress.

Civil–military coordination also deteriorates during prolonged crises. Early conflict phases typically produce strong political consensus and public support. Over time, however, economic strain, infrastructure damage, and social fatigue create competing priorities. Decision-making processes slow, risk tolerances shift, and coordination mechanisms weaken. These dynamics have direct deterrence implications because adversaries observe not only military deployments, but also institutional coherence. Prolonged stress that reveals political fragmentation or administrative paralysis can undermine deterrence credibility. In the Indo-Pacific, where extended deterrence relies on alliance unity and sustained commitment, maintaining institutional cohesion is strategically essential. Regular joint exercises, wargaming, and civil–military education can strengthen resilience before conflict emerges.

Technological developments and emerging threats intensify these challenges. Hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems, cyber operations, and space-based surveillance increase operational tempo and reliance on interconnected networks. Disruption in one domain can cascade across others, magnifying institutional stress. Attacks targeting space-based command-and-control or satellite navigation systems would degrade precision strike capabilities, logistics coordination, maritime awareness, and joint operational planning. Although technological superiority remains important, it cannot compensate for institutional degradation during prolonged conflict. Resilience in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity frameworks, and redundancy planning therefore represents a decisive late-phase determinant of military effectiveness.

Space and cyber capabilities are especially significant for extended deterrence. American space-based sensors, missile warning networks, and communications satellites provide critical detection and coordination advantages. However, these systems rely on both technical redundancy and organizational resilience. Sustained disruption would test alliance coordination and operational cohesion as much as physical hardware. Prolonged conflict would reveal whether allied institutions can maintain effectiveness under persistent technological and informational pressure. Cyber operations are particularly concerning because they can gradually degrade institutional functionality without provoking overt confrontation, underscoring the importance of integrated defensive architectures and rapid recovery mechanisms.

Nuclear deterrence is similarly shaped by institutional endurance. Adversaries observing strain in logistics, personnel systems, or civil–military coordination may question the credibility of extended deterrence commitments. Modernization programs that enhance survivable nuclear forces and resilient command-and-control systems remain essential, but their effectiveness depends on institutional capacity to operate under sustained stress. Endurance therefore emerges as a strategic variable equal in importance to platforms and weapons systems. Deterrence credibility is continuously tested by the ability of institutions to project capability during protracted crises.

For deterrence planners, the central lesson is clear: prolonged conflict transforms military effectiveness from a function of platforms into a function of institutions. States that plan for short, decisive engagements risk strategic failure if conflicts extend beyond expectations. The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies must rebalance deterrence planning by emphasizing late-phase resilience. Priorities should include logistics governance under disruption, energy system adaptability, personnel sustainability, durable civil–military coordination, and protection against emerging technological threats. These factors determine whether deterrence remains credible over time rather than only at crisis onset.

Prolonged conflict is not an anomaly but a plausible future condition. Strategies that overlook institutional endurance risk failure not at the outset of war, but after sustained operational pressure erodes recovery capacity and strategic credibility. Integrating late-phase considerations into readiness assessments, modernization programs, and alliance coordination is therefore essential. Ultimately, the credibility of extended deterrence rests less on platforms alone and more on the ability of military and political institutions to withstand the cumulative stress of prolonged conflict.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Late-Phase Failure and the Erosion of Military Effectiveness in Prolonged Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to spy and surveillance satellites—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s concept of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.

Basrur identifies two levels of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.

India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as navigation satellites (NavlC) and communication satellites (GSAT). India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous development of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.

The Mission Shakti ASAT Test is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both the US and Russia as per its strategic needs. This multi-alignment strategy aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.

Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as Chandrayaan, Mangalyaan, and the upcoming Gaganyaan mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India’s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.

Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the Artemis Accords, the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time data that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.

Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly offensive space uses, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.

At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.

In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary strategic rift between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most the world’s approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately 5,500 and the US holding approximately 5,177, declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated 600 operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.

These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.

Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.

Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel’s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.

Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a “crucial year” for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.

Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.

In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own.

The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of interest these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.

While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist Dr. William Van Cleave, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “Team B.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.

Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.

The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who advocated for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.

Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. Designed by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists arguing the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.

Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be vastly reduced using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.

The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome was originally published on Global Security Review.

Featuring insights from Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the discussion examines the myths perpetuated by Hollywood, the historical context of deterrence policy, and why accurate understanding matters for national security.

Participants gain a deeper appreciation of: * The evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy since the Cold War * Misconceptions in movies like Oppenheimer and Dynamite * The critical role deterrence plays in preventing large-scale conflict This event is part of NIDS’ ongoing mission to advance peace and stability through education, research, and dialogue on strategic deterrence.

Hollywood vs. Reality: Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite and Oppenheimer-Huessy Seminar was originally published on Global Security Review.

Physicists and engineers now realize that just as most car crashes stem from driver error rather than mechanical failure, the same logic applies to nuclear weapons, their platforms, and their potential use. Whether Americans like it or not, humans are in the system and humans are, almost certainly, the weakest link.

Humans are the weakest component in the quantification of margins and uncertainty (QMU) sense. Engineers often test individual components and larger systems of nuclear weapons to a 1-in-1,000 certainty that they will function correctly. There has long been a view that nuclear weapons should always detonate when employed and never when they are not. To achieve this “always/never” goal, systems are engineered to perfection while largely ignoring sources of human error.

Humans design and manufacture the components, assemble the weapons, complete the wiring, and install systems onto delivery platforms (i.e., subs, silos, and bombers). Humans verify satellite signals of potential attacks from US Strategic Command, communicate those findings to the President, and, depending on the response, draft and transmit emergency action messages (EAMs). This is a gross simplification because fragile humans play a much larger role, but it illustrates the embeddedness of the human element in the system.

One example of human fragility that took place in September 2023 at the Pantex Plant is instructive. It appears a worker mistakenly cross-connected color-coded electrical wires inside a nuclear weapon.

Across the world this very task might be performed by a civilian or by an Air Force 2W2X1 Nuclear Weapons Specialist. At first glance, it seems simple; connect the red wire to the red wire and the green wire to the green wire. But around 8 percent of men are born with red-green color vision deficiency (color blindness) that makes it difficult for them to differentiate between red and green (and many other color combinations. The US Air Force correctly requires normal color vision for this role.

Not all color tests are created equal. Some vision tests catch 99 percent of people with colorblindness and others catch 90 or even 50 percent of colorblind individuals. An analogy may be useful in illustrating this point.

If, for example, a worker was testing a component and needed to detect 14MeV neutrons, a detector that simply says “between 2 and 20 MeV neutrons were detected” would be unacceptable. A tester with adequate sensitivity is required to test critical components. Detectors that verify the specific reading may even be required. Sensitive tests for humans who work on nuclear weapons is also required.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently updated its standards, rejecting the century-old Ishihara color vision test and the D-15 test due to known shortcomings. The Ishihara test is fairly good at detecting red-green defects but will miss 100 percent of blue (Tritan) defects. Humans have red, green, and blue light sensitive cones in their eyes, and the Ishihara only tests two cones and ignores blue vision entirely. The D-15 test can pass up to half of individuals with color blindness, depending on how its administered (a test commonly used by police departments).

Figure 1. Simulated Color Vision Defects and Wire Color

Even if Pantex adopted one of the FAA’s “best in class” tests, such as the CAD, Rabin, or Waggoner Computerized Color Vision Test (WCCVT), there is still another issue—test frequency. Color vision should be tested periodically, not just once.

While 8 percent of men and 0.5 percent of women) are born with color blindness, it is expected that 15 percent of all people will develop an acquired color vision deficiency during their lifetime, most often affecting blue vision. Most people assume color vision is a static ability, but it is more like hearing loss, which is impacted by age and environmental factors.

Changes in color vision ability can occur rapidly due to medications, diseases, or environmental conditions. For critical roles, annual color vision testing should be a minimum standard.

Finally, different color vision tests examine different axes within the visible spectrum of light, meaning that a person could pass the Rabin but fail the WCCVT based on individual differences and the specific axis tested by each test. This is truer for mild vision defects but mild defects can still cause sub-par performance on real world tasks (i.e., reacting to red traffic lights).

Across the United States, teams are working to quantify this human element in complex, high-consequence systems. These include the Air Force’s 711th Human Performance Wing and the social scientists at Sandia National Laboratories.

The next time you hear about a cognitive psychologist, industrial-organizational psychologist, or human factors researcher at a national lab, do not assume they’re experimenting with LSD and goats to perfect psychic warfare. They’re far more likely to be studying how humans interact with technology—quantifying behavior, limitations, cognition, and the human’s reliability within critical systems.

Organizations should, whenever possible, bring these human-focused professionals into projects. They will identify issues most engineers never consider across a variety of scales, “from neurons to nations.” Factors like color vision, tool slips, (as in the Louis Slotin “demon core” incident), dropped sockets (as in the Titan II missile explosion in Damascus, Arkansas), mismatched job abilities, fatigue, attention lapses, and even intentional sabotage can all impact the nation’s deterrence posture. When processes are optimized to include the human, overall risk is minimized.

In the end, deterrence is not just about weapons. It is about the humans behind the weapons, the fallible, unpredictable, indispensable human element that remains both our greatest strength and our greatest risk.

Rob Kittenger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Meet the Human in Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The NIDS View Podcast: Regional Security Under Pressure: Japan, Taiwan, and the Future of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

For advocates of renewed nuclear weapons testing, stop packing for the journey to the Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS). No mushroom cloud or subterranean detonation is soon to take place. Anti-nuclear protestors should also stay home.

The truth is less exciting. No real changes will happen “immediately” that “light up the sky and shake the ground.” This is not to say that the announcement had no effect. In fact, the statement was indeed monumental and incredibly significant.

Contrary to public perception, the US has never ceased testing its nuclear weapon systems. What has changed since the 1992 self-imposed moratorium on high-yield explosive testing is the nature of those tests.

Before 1992, the US conducted 1,054 nuclear weapon test explosions. The country detonated 839 of those warheads underground, mostly at the then-named Nevada Test Site, where the last halted test, Icecap, still stands as a memorial to the explosive testing days.

Several scientists involved in Icecap acknowledge that, owing to the extensive preparations undertaken, such as instrumentation, computational simulation, analysis, and test rigging, the most significant insights were gained from the limited number of unsuccessful tests. In other words, there is still great confidence in the performance and reliability of the American nuclear arsenal. It is this kind of “testing” to which President Trump’s declaration is likely referring.

Since 1992, testing has been through proxy systems that simulate a nuclear explosion’s unique energy output and then uses the results to validate physics models on advanced computer systems, known as physics-based modeling. This approach provides a way to validate the physics and predict the performance of a nuclear explosion under conditions that were never known in an underground test.

Scientists continuously conduct these tests, improving and refining them as added details are learned. They often report that scientists know much more now than possible from explosive testing.

Despite the president’s directive that testing “will begin immediately,” experts agree that resuming full-scale nuclear explosive testing is a complex and time-consuming endeavor. According to the Arms Control Association, it would take at least 36 months to prepare the Nevada Test Site for contained underground detonations.

This includes environmental assessments, infrastructure upgrades, and political approvals. This does not mean that explosive testing is impossible, but it represents a clear change in policy and a national effort to move nuclear weapons to the forefront of national strategy through an active nuclear explosive testing program.

The phrase “on an equal basis” is particularly provocative. It implies that nations like Russia and China may already be conducting nuclear explosive tests or at least advancing their capabilities in ways that challenge the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Either of these should sound alarms and rightly must elicit a response.

The president has chosen precisely the response as outlined in the National Institute for Deterrence Studies’ (NIDS) Dynamic Parity report, where a response matches the activities of adversaries, giving them the option to continue expanding their nuclear capabilities, knowing how America will respond, or cease and return to the table to negotiate for a more stable relationship.

The announcement of an “immediate” resumption of (explosive) testing is monumental because of its effect on deterrence. In his international policy book, The Necessity of Choice, Henry Kissinger writes that deterrence is the (mathematical) product of will and capability. Few would question that the US has a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems that can cause incredible damage and harm. However, there is growing criticism and concern that the US lacks resolve to deploy its nuclear weapons even if an existential crisis arises.

Without clear signals of resolve, adversaries may doubt American willingness to act, weakening deterrence. This declaration supports that resolve without making a direct threat to any adversary. It simply puts them on notice.

Whether President Trump’s message leads to actual detonations or remains symbolic, it marks a turning point in American nuclear policy. It also aligns with the Dynamic Parity framework advocated by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, which calls for symmetrical deterrence and strategic clarity.

President Trump is demonstrating resolve, assuring allies, and highlighting American commitment to nuclear deterrence. The path forward should prioritize modernization, transparency, and diplomacy—not a return to the destructive rituals of past decades.

James C. Petrosky, PhD, is the President and Co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor Emeritus of the Air Force Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are the authors own. 

“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast! was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.

These capabilities are considered key to a state’s escalation dominance strategy. However, India’s escalation dominance in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.

In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.

Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named Cold Start, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.

On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its operational capability and survivability, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.

The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.

India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a bunker-buster. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.

These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.

It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.

Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its military capabilities and technological strides.

On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, Trump’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high tariffs was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.

India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.

India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of Russia’s closest economic partners. At the outset of the war, Germany was criticized for its hesitant offer to Ukraine of 5,000 military helmets, at a time when other European states, especially the Baltic nations, were offering weapons and heavy military equipment to defend against the Russian invasion.

This hesitancy had two facets. First, the belief that military aid would escalate the war to unmanageable levels. Second, the fear that Russia could easily achieve its military objectives. In such a case, it was unwise for Germany to risk its economic interests, particularly its heavy reliance on Russian natural gas.

However, Germany, later, began supplying weapons and other military aid to Ukraine under domestic and international pressures. Later, Germany even supplied heavy military equipment to Ukraine. As of August 2025, Germany is one of the largest suppliers of military aid, amounting to $47 billion worth. This includes air-defense systems, advanced drones, and heavy artillery. German action illustrates how incremental support erodes Russia’s nuclear red lines.

Incremental Steps Eroding the Threshold 

In the Russian conceptualization of deterrence, strategic deterrence (strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye), both nuclear and conventional deterrence merge into one holistically integrated framework. The threat of or actual use of nuclear weapons would deter a conventional attack on Russia, help achieve military objectives, prevent third parties from entering a war, and help de-escalate a war. In the 1990s, when Russia fielded a conventionally inferior armed force, it relied primarily on nuclear deterrence for its security.

However, a nuclear-deterrence-focused security strategy does not consider the erosion of thresholds owing to incremental changes during war (i.e., incremental changes test interwar and intrawar deterrence). After Pakistan became a nuclear power, Pakistan employed sub-threshold tactics (terrorism) against India, assuming that the fear of mutual nuclear vulnerability would prevent India from using kinetic means in retaliation. However, this approach failed when India employed conventional force against Pakistan in 2016, 2019, and, more prominently, in Operation Sindoor (2025). Similarly, Ukraine challenged Russia with its aggressive attacks in response to Russian invasion.

Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine (2024) brought the threshold of nuclear employment to an even lower level than earlier doctrine. This includes “actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure” and “the massive launch […] of air and space attacks means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles).”

Ukraine’s Operation Spyder Web crossed these “nuclear thresholds” set in the 2024 doctrine. Russia’s numerous threats of tactical nuclear weapons use are not taken seriously by Europe any longer. This creates a stability-instability paradox where “conventional balances also reduce the credibility of nuclear threats precisely because there is a conventional alternative to resorting to nuclear weapons.”

One of the implications of the stability-instability paradox in international relations is that while nuclear weapons create stability at the strategic level by deterring large-scale war between nuclear-armed states, they increase the likelihood of smaller, limited, or conventional conflicts. This is reinforced in the Ukraine conflict, where Russia simply cannot use nuclear weapons to deter third-party military help to Ukraine and Ukraine’s counteroffensives.

Nuclear deterrence has limitations and does not deter incremental or conventional actions of lower yields. The costs associated with utilizing nuclear weapons for deterring incremental erosion of thresholds is unimaginable. It is difficult for parties in a war to agree upon thresholds. Thus, resorting to conventional attacks rather than escalating to nuclear use becomes more likely, even after crossing stated red lines. 

States Should Build on That 

For that matter, those states looking to augment their defence preparedness should invest in conventional deterrence capabilities that can guarantee security. This goes beyond just building missile and air-defense systems of a high calibre. Conventional deterrence is not merely about weapons to deter an adversary.

Military thinking needs to go beyond just inventing new weapons and focus on military strategy. States need to go beyond a one-size-fits-all understanding of deterrence, where all states subscribe to the same benchmarks, variables, and conceptualization of deterrence, and have a shared sense of it. Situating deterrence within the fold of strategic culture, how a state’s strategic culture shapes deterrence, is more helpful. For instance, in contrast to the denial versus punishment typology, Russia uses the forceful versus non-forceful scheme for deterrence.

States may need to invest in the re-invention of military doctrines, strategy, and thinking to suit current challenges. It is worth studying how adversaries see the concept of deterrence. It confers two advantages. First, it helps one remain prepared for any incremental utilization of force under the fear of mutual destruction. Second, it allows the defender to assess the opponent’s risk-taking appetite and nuclear threshold in a war. This would confer advantages associated with effectively using conventional means.

At the same time, both parties need to be aware of over-extension, where a misguided action can cause a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Since agreeing on the same trigger point is subjective and difficult, states must study the pace, timing, and intensity of the use of non-nuclear forces to effectively achieve objectives without jumping to the nuclear step on an escalatory ladder.

In the end, preventing nuclear war is critical. Thus, understanding thresholds is important. If war is unlikely to end, ensuring it does not escalate to nuclear use should be a top priority.

Anshu Kumar is a Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian & Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Showcases the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the war in Ukraine firmly established the utility of drones in warfare, the relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence is still a largely unsettled topic. Suggesting that they are relevant is unlikely to draw much disagreement, but the exact form that relevance takes is where there may be disagreement. This leads to the following discussion.

Nuclear deterrence is a psychological effect where the perceived costs of taking an action that is undesirable to an adversary outweigh the perceived benefits. During the Cold War, the threat of catastrophic retaliation prevented the Soviet Union and the United States from initiating a nuclear attack against the other.

Historically, this doctrine relied on the survivability of nuclear arsenals in the event of a first strike by the adversary. Secure second-strike and a robust early-warning system were key elements of deterrence credibility. The introduction of drones into this framework in the years ahead creates new dimensions to the deterrence dynamic. Drones may enhance surveillance, improve command and control, and/or potentially deliver nuclear weapons.

Drones offer several advantages that make them attractive in the context of nuclear deterrence. They can provide continuous monitoring of adversary activities, bolstering early warning systems and reducing the risk of surprise attacks. Such a capability could increase strategic stability.

Advanced drones equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) could execute highly accurate first strikes, which could neutralize enemy nuclear assets preemptively. This would likely prove destabilizing.

Fielding drones capable of ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces by serving as mobile and/or concealed platforms could ensure a state maintains a credible second-strike capability. Again, this would likely prove stabilizing.

Drones could also serve as command-and-control platforms in a degraded environment when, for example, space assets are lost early in a conflict. Such a capability could serve as a deterrent to attack.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into drones has significantly expanded their operational capability. AI-enabled drones can autonomously navigate complex environments, identify targets, and execute missions with minimal human intervention. This autonomy is particularly valuable in nuclear scenarios, where rapid decision-making and precision are critical.

Moreover, drones are being developed to carry nuclear payloads, although this remains a controversial and largely theoretical capability. The miniaturization of warheads and improvements in drone propulsion systems make this possibility increasingly plausible. If realized, nuclear-armed drones could offer stealthier and more flexible delivery options compared to traditional ballistic missiles.

Recent conflicts demonstrate the strategic value of drones. In Ukraine, for instance, drones are used extensively for reconnaissance and precision strikes, prompting global powers to accelerate their investment in drone technologies. While these applications are conventional, they underscore the potential for drones to play a role in strategic deterrence.

In the United States, China, and Russia, military doctrines are certain to evolve and incorporate drones into nuclear command-and-control systems. These developments reflect a broader trend toward automation and digitization in defense strategies, raising questions about the future of human oversight in nuclear decisionmaking.

Despite their strategic benefits, drones introduce several risks that could undermine nuclear stability. Autonomous drones conducting reconnaissance near sensitive sites could be misinterpreted as precursors to a nuclear strike, triggering unintended escalation. Increased autonomy in drone operations may reduce human oversight, heightening the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The accessibility and affordability of drone technology could lead to its proliferation among non-nuclear states or rogue actors, complicating global arms control efforts. None of the challenges are guaranteed, but they are possibilities.

To mitigate the risks associated with drones in nuclear deterrence, the following policy measures are recommended. First, nuclear-armed states should develop treaties and agreements that define acceptable uses of drones in strategic scenarios, including restrictions on nuclear payloads. Second, there is a need for information-sharing among nuclear weapons states, designed to reduce misinterpretation of actions and build trust. Third, ensuring that critical decisions involving nuclear weapons remain under human control, even in automated systems, is an important component of any international agreement. Fourth, developing tools to monitor drone deployments and verify compliance with international agreements is also needed.

The potential for drones to enhance surveillance, improve targeting, and support second-strike capabilities makes them valuable assets in maintaining strategic stability. On the other hand, their autonomy, the potential to misinterpret their use, and the proliferation risks of some drones pose a significant challenge. As drone technology continues to evolve, it is imperative that policymakers and military experts work collaboratively to understand its benefits while safeguarding against its dangers. The future of nuclear deterrence stability may be influenced in significant ways by how well or poorly we adapt to drone technologies.

Steve Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research at NIDS. Views express in this article are the author’s own. 

The Role of Drones in Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

American allies are unanimous in rejecting extended deterrence that does not include the potential use of nuclear weapons. NFU would give a nuclear-armed adversary, such as Russia, a sanctuary from which to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Removing American nuclear forces as a credible deterrent cedes all bargaining power to Moscow, China, and any other would-be nuclear or conventional adversary.

Associated with this campaign is an effort to remove the president’s authority to employ nuclear weapons without at least two additional officials supporting such a decision. They also claim the president would have very little time to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should the US face a nuclear first strike. Of course, ending the president’s “sole authority” would only exacerbate the challenge.

There is a false argument often repeated that American nuclear weapons are on “hair trigger alert” and the president might make a reckless decision to launch, given the assumed minimal time available to determine whether a nuclear response is warranted. It is of course clear how such a decision-making process is significantly impeded if the president must receive concurrence from other officials to make a decision. Such a move reduces the credibility of American deterrence in the minds of adversaries.

Three other factors are also being brought to bear in this campaign to adopt a NFU strategy. First, there is an assertion that the president could be reckless and impetuous and might unnecessarily order the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is an assertion that a president’s order may be illegal and thus having a “second confirmation authority/opinion” is a good thing. Third, there is an assertion that American deterrence strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons against cities and urban areas—with the objective of killing millions of civilians.

All three assertions are false. The first assertion is belied by the fact that every president understands the dangers of nuclear war. President Donald Trump made several statements to this effect, so the notion he, or any president, would be “reckless and impetuous” does not bear scrutiny. His administration’s major investments in deterrence illustrate the seriousness with which the country seeks to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

The second assertion on the “illegality” of ordering nuclear use ignores the constitutional role of the president as commander in chief. States wage war regardless of whether the United Nations says it is illegal. Nuclear weapons are merely tools of war. They are not special. They simply pack more explosive energy in a smaller package than a conventional weapon.

The third assertion ignores the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which explicitly states that attacks against unarmed civilians and non-combatants violate just war principles and are prohibited. American nuclear deterrence strategy explicitly rules out the purposeful targeting of civilian populations and cities, a posture many nuclear abolitionists oppose as they advocate city busting.

Given US deterrence strategy strictly forbids the targeting of cities and civilian populations, there is no basis for believing that carrying out the president’s order to employ weapons will be or be seen as illegal by either civilian or military officials. Thus, there is no need for multiple individuals involved in releasing weapons, all while the president is working through an already compressed and stressful timeline.

A recent “study” by the University of Massachusetts and the Human Security Lab cooked the books by asking both military and civilian officials whether they would oppose an “illegal” presidential order requiring the US to launch nuclear weapons against civilians. Many respondents, having been coached to believe such orders were realistically probable, said they would oppose such orders or at least seek to question the orders. These results were then hijacked to create a false narrative that even military officials now doubt President Trump’s leadership and would not obey the commander in chief if ordered to employ nuclear weapons. Given the survey was conducted during the Israel and US military strikes against Iran, the results were designed to call into question the reasonableness of conventional strikes on Iran.

The campaign to call into question American deterrence policy is based on a willful misrepresentation of states policy and strategic reality. Annie Jacobsen dramatized this misinformation in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario, in which she described US nuclear deterrence strategy as crazy. She proposed jettisoning the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, whether used first or second, and taking such capability completely off the table. When asked what replacement she recommended, Jacobsen claimed such a question was beyond her expertise.

Leaving the nuclear deterrent off the table is part of a concerted disarmament campaign pushed by nuclear abolitionists. These groups were able to ensure the United Nations passed a treaty that bans nuclear weapons, which is as valuable as a treaty which bans war. While 73 nations signed the treaty, none are nuclear weapons states.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is seeking to stop nuclear modernization in the United States, which is strange considering Russia and China are in the midst of major modernization programs. There is nothing less effective than taking a knife to a gunfight, which is exactly what advocates of nuclear disarmament would impose on the free world. For nearly 80 years the US has made sure the nation fields the systems needed to ensure deterrence works. Now is not the time to abandon a successful strategy for the sake of feel-good activism.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Campaign to End Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Adam, Curtis, and Jim tackle a bold and unsettling question:
After America’s successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, is the U.S. truly prepared to defend its nuclear arsenal?

This conversation dives deep into the heart of nuclear strategy and deterrence:

• The critical role of airborne alert systems and the lessons of the Looking Glass mission.
• The tension between traditional deterrence systems and emerging technologies.
• Why visibility, command, and control remain the pillars of credible nuclear deterrence.
• How modernization of nuclear forces shapes the future of U.S. security.

In an age of rapid technological change, understanding deterrence isn’t just for policymakers—it’s vital for anyone who values global stability.

Listen now to uncover why the strength of deterrence rests not just on weapons, but on resilient systems and clear strategy.

#NuclearDeterrence #NationalSecurity #Modernization #CommandAndControl #StrategicStability #DefenseInnovation

Watch now.

Is America Prepared for a Strike Against its Nuclear Command and Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hosted on YouTube, Rumble or RSS.com

YouTube	Rumble	RSS.com

Get Involved with more NIDS Services: https://thinkdeterrence.com/

Deterrence Education at NIDS https://thinkdeterrence.com/deterrence-education/

Like and follow us – LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/thinkdeterrence

X.com: https://x.com/thinkdeterrence

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyGa4dcPqONWzjmbuZMOBHQ

Rumble: https://rumble.com/user/NIDSthinkdeterrence

Global Security Review: https://globalsecurityreview.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/globalsecurityreview/

X.com: https://x.com/security_wonk

Our Free Events: https://thinkdeterrence.com/events/

Podcast – Future-Proofing National Security: We Can’t Just Wish for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Christine and Natalie engage with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, a nuclear historian, to discuss her book ‘Inheriting the Bomb’ and the complexities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. They explore the historical context of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, the narratives surrounding its disarmament, and the implications of security assurances from major powers. Mariana shares her personal reflections on the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenges faced by nuclear facilities under occupation, and the lessons learned for international security and cooperation.

Podcast: The Complexities of Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk make drones increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. Their capabilities already include reconnaissance and surveillance, long-range strike missions, electronic warfare, and precision killing.

With their precision-targeting ability, drones can be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could be used to ensure the survivability of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones could also support a more viable second-strike capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a larger attack, even when they are only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.

The possibility that expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons into nuclear first use could occur from Russian views of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory, with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, provides one example of concerns in this category.  Lewis A. Dunn suggests that President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. He writes:

Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. US–Russia cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior US officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.

Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and difficult to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched. In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe their nuclear retaliation capabilities could be neutralized by fast-moving drone strikes.

As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, the delegation of decision-making to machines is highly controversial. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.

Given that drones can operate autonomously, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.

Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial compared to deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states will have to quickly manage the deterrence and/or conduct conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the information or knowledge domain. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls, connects, and prioritizes among the component parts of the various domains in order to provide for the correct response to threats or attacks.

AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policymakers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. But the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, together with the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy nuclear first strike to choose preemption instead of retaliation.

Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or strike missions. Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect American interests in cislunar space.

Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appear threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter or defend against any threat to the viability of American satellites for warning and assessment; command, control, and communications; geolocation; and other missions.

Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burden, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, and additional reconnaissance and strike weapons along with smarter drones and larger swarms.

The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationship to nuclear deterrence has implications for nuclear arms control. It is important for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine for many reasons. One reason is so that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed the New START agreement, due to expire in 2026.

The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine is dismissed by some as bluffing for effect, a form of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts appear to move toward a more permissive standard as the war continues. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, but dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.

The character of war changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking.  But the nature of war is perennially the environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policymakers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Deterrence and Drones: An Unpredictable Mix? was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR – Week of February 24, 2025

Deterrence at a Crossroads: A Call for Strength and Resolve

America is pivotal in nuclear modernization, strategic deterrence, and global security. As threats from Russia and China escalate, U.S. defense policy must adapt—or risk catastrophic consequences.

Key Strategic Insights

Nuclear Deterrence Imperative – The Minuteman III test launch underscores the critical need for modernization. General Tom Bussiere warns: “We must recapitalize our nuclear forces while maintaining the old—an unprecedented challenge.”

The Russian Threat – Moscow’s aggression is reinforced by information warfare and nuclear coercion. Sergei Shoigu states: “We must undermine the political, economic, and social system of the West.” The impending New START Treaty expiration (2026) raises concerns of a Russian nuclear breakout.

China’s Strategic Decline – $168 billion in foreign direct investment fled China in 2024. Its aggressive military expansion—the largest since WWII—coupled with its alliance with Russia, isolates Beijing internationally.

Global Realignment & Defense Priorities –
Britain increases defense spending (2.5% GDP by 2027).
South Korea considers nuclear options in response to North Korea.
The U.S. must act decisively to maintain strategic dominance.

The Cost of Hesitation

From Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to past Western miscalculations on Russia, history warns against underestimating adversaries. De-escalation as a default strategy has failed.

The Air Force Association calls for a $45 billion annual increase in USAF and Space Force funding. As Stephen Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee, bluntly states:

“If we do not plug our capability gaps, we will lose to China.”

Call to Action: Strength Through Deterrence

Fully modernize the U.S. nuclear triad
Accelerate next-generation air and missile defense
Fund a credible and flexible deterrent

Deterrence is not optional—it is the foundation of peace. America must lead with strength, invest in security, and ensure our adversaries understand that aggression will never be left unanswered.

The future is watching. We must be ready.

ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies

Key Takeaways

• Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.
• U.S. Defense Leadership Changes: Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.
• Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments: Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.
• Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities: Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran’s growing missile capability.
• Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission: NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance’s credibility.
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates: Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.

International Developments

Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion

• Russia’s military spending will increase to 13.5 trillion rubles, estimated at 7-8% of GDP, its highest post-Soviet military budget.
• Significant investments in modernized nuclear and conventional forces to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.
• Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.

Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements

• Intelligence sources indicate Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China, raising alarms among Western security analysts.
• Iran continues uranium enrichment, prompting warnings from the UN about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.

China & Russia’s Nuclear Expansion

• Reports predict that by 2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
• Concerns grow over China’s accelerated nuclear development and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.

Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon

Escalation Risks in Space Warfare

• A RAND Corporation study warns that Russia may escalate conflicts in space early due to its heightened fears of a U.S. first strike.
• The study underscores Moscow’s increasing risk tolerance and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.

Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

• NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.
• U.S. extended deterrence remains under scrutiny, with debates over whether the Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization

• The U.S. Air Force confirms that the Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.
• Discussions continue over potential mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft to ensure nuclear survivability.

‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System

• President Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.
• Critics call it overly ambitious, but proponents argue that it is essential to counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Key Events

Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)

• Speakers: Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) & Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).
• Topic: Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)

• A 4-star USAF officer will serve as the featured speaker.
• Expected discussions on extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy.

Conclusion

The ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025, highlights key developments in U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues. With Russia’s increasing military budget, Iran’s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion, the U.S. faces a growing multipolar nuclear environment. Discussions on extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events will provide further insights into these critical security matters.

ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Not Today Satan” is a song (questionable by my earlier generation) by KB and Andy Mineo, drawing on the roots of one’s faith and the daily battle of one’s temptations (my words, not theirs). But breaking down the lyrics can teach us a ton about the world of deterrence.

Deterrence, in general, draws back to the earliest battles recorded in history. Being able to create an opposing force without ever lifting a sword is often how I think of deterrence. Having a force that is willing, alongside a proven capability, is a powerful pair, and one that makes up today’s most reliable deterrent—the American nuclear triad. But the triad’s effectiveness goes beyond what I know it can do. Others must know and understand its value as well. This is where KB steps in with some relevant lyrics:

Yeah, I live my life on the regular
But his attacks are perpetual
Forbidden fruit seem so edible
You try to resist like ellipticals.

An understanding of our world is an interest of mine. As I walk through KB’s lyrics, I cannot help but see the parallel he paints for his listener. We are all regular people under consistent attack. Though carefully crafted, this “attack” does not appear as an attack. The subtle convincing, or slight shifts in one’s core belief about a topic is altered with ease, slowly manipulating a person’s core understanding, while creating a heavy load of resistance against what and how one might think, slowly shifting what we believe.

As a nation, better yet, a human race, we must understand the truth behind nuclear deterrence. What lives on our social feeds and livestream networks will not highlight these truths. Much of what is pushed today is developed using your search data, often repurposed with a subtle undertone and agenda, luring you in to want more; making the information you absorb feel like, in the words of KB, “forbidden fruit” appearing “so edible.” Unfortunately, this information can be misleading, luring the reader to believe a message that is untrue.

The genesis of deterrence is found in some of the greatest writings of military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. How nations prepare and think about war began on the rumination of the words muttered by these men and their predecessors. Beyond the expert understanding required by men and women who wear the uniform, the people that deterrence serves must also understand how it works and why it exists.

Today’s nuclear deterrence is not mere jargon. In fact, it is the opposite. Just as KB and other lyricists carefully craft the words in a song, senior leaders, strategists, and policy developers carefully craft deterrence strategy and deliver capability that, like a good song, speaks to the emotions of the intended audience.

For American deterrence, it is not merely the ability to tug at the heart strings of the listener that is its power, unlike a song. Instead, it is the new B-21 raider, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that make it effective.

These three legs of the nuclear triad work together to make deterrence effective, just as the combination of KB’s lyrics, instrumentation, and beat work together to make a song great.  With impeccable timing, these assets deliver the desired effects. Just as a musician must deliver a performance for an audience to experience the desired emotions, sailors and airmen must perform as expected to make these systems effective in conveying their message to the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians.

Keeping with the music analogy, effective deterrence requires the American military to offer a daily performance similar to Queen’s performance at Live Aid in 1985—often considered the greatest performance of all time. As a country, the United States seeks to protect an international order where democracy and personal freedoms thrive and allow artists like KB to create the kind of music that moves listeners.

In doing so, the United States must understand how to deter those who seek to challenge that order. If Americans do not want to see “Satan today,” as KB’s lyrics say, we better understand what it means to keep the adversary away. It is not moving lyrics or a great performance that will accomplish this goal, but a ready nuclear arsenal and the willingness to employ its weapons that keeps the peace.

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ben Burdette was a missileer in the United States Air Force. He is the founder of Networth and an executive coach. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.  

Not Today: A Nuclear Deterrence Analogy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Canyon begins her article by employing the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where diplomacy rather than military force carried the day. Her explanation is simple disinformation and misunderstands how nuclear deterrence works.

Early in the crisis, President John F. Kennedy moved nuclear-armed bombers to Air Force bases in Florida, lining them up wing tip to wing tip, as a visible display of the nuclear hell both Cuba and the Soviet Union would face if Nikita Khruschev did not remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. That signal was seen by the Soviets.

President Kennedy also called the then-recent deployment of Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) his “ace in the hole.” He credited his ICBMs with forcing the Soviets to back down. Minuteman I was very much American escalation dominance that the Soviets could not match.

He also implemented a blockade around Cuba. When the Soviet submarine B-59 attempted to run the blockade, the USS Beale depth charged the submarine. Rather than launching its nuclear torpedoes against the Beale, B-59 retreated.

Contrary to Canyon’s assertion that diplomacy carried the day, it was military strength and nuclear superiority that carried the day. General Secretary Khruschev knew that the United States had a superior nuclear arsenal and backed down.

Arms Racing

Canyon is also concerned that the United States will invite an arms race should it develop the full spectrum of capabilities that are required to effectively deter China, North Korea, and Russia. The reality is the race has already begun. The only participant that is yet to leave the starting block is the United States.

Russian strategic nuclear modernization is nearly complete, with Russia also maintaining at least a 10 to 1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons. China is adding at least 100 new nuclear weapons per year and will soon outmatch the United States.

North Korea is now capable of striking the homeland with intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Kim Jung Un, North Korea will build an arsenal of 500 nuclear weapons.

It is only the United States that is yet to field a new nuclear delivery system. The newest American nuclear delivery vehicle, the B2 bomber, is three decades old.

Contrary to the aspirations of nuclear disarmament advocates in the United States, not a single nuclear-armed adversary is willing to follow the United States down the path of disarmament. The post–Cold War era, three decades now, is a glaring example of the failures of the disarmament delusion.

Canyon is completely wrong when she asserts that China and Russia are modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals because of American nuclear modernization. They began their own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts long before the United States began its effort to replace aging weapons with new variants.

It was not American nuclear weapons that drove Chinese and Russian modernization to begin with. It is American superiority in conventional precision-guided weapons, which neither adversary can match, that led them to follow a strategy like President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look Policy.

For some reason, Canyon claims that the ability to maintain nuclear escalation dominance is advocating “unchecked militarization.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Nuclear forces are a deterrent to conventional military aggression. Historically, great powers wage war four to six times per century, killing millions in the process. Nuclear weapons put an end to great power war and led to a more than 90 percent decline in conflict-related casualties. Lest Canyon forget, the last great power war, World War II, led to the death of 70 million people and saw the United States spend almost half of its gross domestic product fighting the war.

Canyon, like many in the disarmament community, mistakenly believes that weakness leads to peace. They incorrectly impose their own aversion to conflict onto Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jung Un. In reality, these authoritarians, who are actively seeking to topple the American-led international order, only see American passivity as weakness and an opportunity to coerce the United States.

Peace through strength is no mere slogan. It is the most accurate and effective way to deter America’s adversaries and ensure they never believe that they can achieve their objectives through conflict.

Defense Spending

Canyon also argues that defense spending is too high and the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad is wasteful. Instead, she proposes increasing spending on social programs. Any examination of federal, state, and local budgets illustrates that Canyon is again incorrect.

In 2024, the federal budget was $6.75 trillion. Of this, $841.4 billion, 14 percent, went to defense spending. Of defense spending, about $50 billion was dedicated to current operation and modernization. This was about 6 percent of defense spending and less than 0.1 percent of federal spending.

Federal, state, and local governments spent more than $10 trillion in 2024. The federal government alone spent 69 percent of its budget on social programs. That is approximately $4.6 trillion—more than all federal revenue collected ($4.4 trillion) in 2024. Excluding federal pass-through funds, state and local governments spent an additional $4 trillion in 2024. State and local governments spent 65 percent of their budgets on social programs—another $2.6 trillion. Federal, state, and local governments spent $1.8 trillion just on anti-poverty programs—more than twice the defense budget.

According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that runs these two programs, Medicare and Medicaid lose more than $100 billion every year to waste, fraud, and abuse. That is twice the cost of the entire nuclear enterprise. Surprisingly, Canyon is not bothered by this and other waste, fraud, and abuse in federal, state, and local programs. They are affordable. In her mind, it is nuclear spending that is breaking the bank.

The simple fact is that social justice warriors have never seen a dollar they do not want to spend. After all, more than 100 percent of federal revenues are already spent on their preferred programs. State and local governments spend two-thirds of their budgets on social programs. Americans also spend more than $450 billion a year in charitable donations. Despite the spending on social programs, the demand only grows.

Defense spending, however, is at a 70-year low. At 3.4 percent of gross domestic product, these rates of defense spending have not been seen since prior to World War II.

Thus, when Canyon argues that too much is spent on defense and nuclear modernization, she is flat wrong. It is just the opposite.

Americans now live in a nation where social programs crowd out defense spending at a time when avoiding war is only possible by fielding a military and a nuclear force that is powerful enough to not only deter Russian aggression, but Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian as well. That can never be done by good intentions. Weakness is provocative. Peace comes through strength and an unwillingness by aggressive adversaries to challenge the United States.

Canyon is wrong in her reading of history, wrong in her understanding of strategy, and wrong about government spending. The time is now to have a guns-versus-butter debate because it may soon be too late.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Escalation Dominance Does Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Too few Americans contemplate the role of digital currency volatility in acting as a barrier or an enabler to nuclear deterrence. The reality is that there are opportunities and risks that volatile cryptocurrency plays in the strategic calculus of nuclear states.

Cryptocurrency and Geopolitical Shifts

Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and borderless, challenging traditional financial systems and reshaping how states interact economically. Their volatility stems from market immaturity, speculative trading, regulatory uncertainties, and evolution of these ever-changing technologies. Essentially created to prevent intermediaries, like banks and financial institutions, cryptocurrencies lay the foundation for trustless transactions for illicit activities.

This volatile mix of person-to-person transactions and zero oversight introduces both unpredictability and opportunity, raising questions about their implications for nuclear deterrence, which now must deal with a domain that includes ungoverned access to financial streams that can be used by state and non-state actors to engage in elicit behavior that undermines deterrence stability.

Nuclear deterrence relies on a delicate balance of power, with states maintaining assured second-strike capabilities to dissuade adversaries from initiating conflict. This balance hinges on credibility and capability. Cryptocurrencies, with their volatile swings in value, could serve to undermine stability within a country or enable elicit actors to engage in a range of nonnuclear actions that undermine strategic stability.

The Risks of Cryptocurrency Volatility as a Barrier

Cryptocurrency volatility can act as a barrier to nuclear deterrence by creating financial instability and undermining a state’s ability to project economic power. Traditional nuclear powers depend on stable economies to maintain robust defense capabilities, fund deterrence strategies, and support diplomatic efforts. Sharp and unpredictable fluctuations in digital assets can undermine financial stability, weakening a state’s capacity to fund critical defense initiatives.

For the United States, crypto is not a major issue currently. But, for North Korea, who funds its nuclear program through elicit activities, crypto is important. Proliferators also use crypto to conduct activity. Instability in crypto makes illicit activity even more high stakes and unpredictable.

Instability creates advantages for state and non-state actors to exploit cryptocurrency markets for nefarious purposes, such as evading sanctions, financing proliferation, and bypassing traditional financial controls. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies complicates efforts to monitor, track, and regulate illicit activities, potentially undermining efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or restrict financing for state and non-state actors pursuing destabilizing weapons programs.

Cryptocurrency instability also presents a challenge to strategic stability through cyber threats. If critical financial systems or exchanges are disrupted, or if adversaries manipulate markets to harm a nation’s economy, it could create economic shocks severe enough to destabilize deterrence relationships, increase miscalculation risks, or fuel insecurity-driven arms build-ups.

The Darknet and Conflict Escalation

Darknet cryptocurrency markets empower bad actors by offering anonymity and decentralized financial tools, enabling a wide range of conflict-escalating activities. These markets facilitate the purchase of illegal arms, military-grade technology, and hacking tools, often used to destabilize regions and target critical infrastructure (command-and-control systems) through cyberattacks.

Terror organizations leverage cryptocurrencies for anonymous funding, allowing them to finance operations, recruit globally, and expand their influence. Sanctioned entities exploit these markets to bypass international restrictions and acquire resources that fuel aggressive actions.

The ability to transact anonymously with cryptocurrencies also shields organized crime, including narcotics and human trafficking, whose revenues often fund conflict zones and insurgent groups. Covert exchanges on the darknet can increase espionage, destabilize international relations, and provoke hostilities to serve a radically motivated agenda.

In parallel, extremist groups utilize these platforms to spread propaganda, incite violence, and radicalize populations, further destabilizing fragile regions. The combination of anonymity, decentralized systems, and hidden economies presents a formidable challenge for global security efforts aimed at conflict prevention and stability.

Cryptocurrency as an Enabler of Nuclear Deterrence

On the other hand, cryptocurrency volatility also opens new avenues for strengthening nuclear deterrence through financial resilience and innovation. The decentralized nature of digital assets can enable states to diversify their financial resources and reduce dependency on traditional systems that might be vulnerable to adversarial influence or geopolitical tensions. In times of economic crisis or sanctions, cryptocurrencies can provide states with alternative means to maintain fiscal stability, thus supporting their deterrent capabilities. Countering bad activities with good can be as challenging as the reliance on traditional financial stability for positive security assurance.

Furthermore, blockchain technology, which underpins cryptocurrencies, offers potential for transparency, accountability, and verification mechanisms in arms control agreements. By leveraging blockchain, states can create tamper-proof records for tracking nuclear materials, enhancing verification regimes, and building trust between adversaries. The volatility of digital assets may fuel innovation and drive investment into these applications, ultimately strengthening nuclear stability and deterrence structures.

Balancing the Risks and Opportunities

While the volatility of cryptocurrencies poses undeniable risks, it is essential to approach them with a nuanced perspective to find the right balance between risk and reward. Policymakers must strike a balance between leveraging the opportunities that digital assets present and mitigating their risks to global security. Collaborative efforts to regulate and stabilize cryptocurrency markets can reduce the likelihood of financial instability while harnessing the potential of decentralized systems.

In addition, enhanced cybersecurity measures must accompany any state or multilateral effort to integrate cryptocurrency into the financial systems that underpin deterrence capabilities. Protecting digital infrastructure against malicious actors will ensure that the advantages of decentralized assets are not overshadowed by their exploitation for destabilizing purposes.

A New Strategic Frontier

The volatility of cryptocurrency markets is both a challenge and a frontier for instability of nuclear deterrence. While it poses risks through financial instability, illicit use, and cyber threats, it also offers opportunities for financial resilience, innovation, and transparency. In today’s evolving digital environment, nations must adapt to this dual-edged sword, developing strategies that incorporate the volatility of digital assets into a comprehensive approach to deterrence.

Ultimately, whether cryptocurrencies become a barrier or enabler of nuclear deterrence depends on how nations, regions, and regulators in the broader international community respond to this evolving challenge. By advocating cooperation, innovation, and regulation, cryptocurrencies can strengthen global security architectures and contribute to a stable nuclear order—turning volatility into a force for strategic stability and peace.

Greg Sharpe is the Marketing and Communications Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own.

The Volatility of Cryptocurrency: Barrier or Enabler of Nuclear Escalation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.

A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.

Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization

Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.

Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s

Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.

By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.

The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.

Developing Supporting Infrastructure

To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for

forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.

Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.

Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises

Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.

Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.

Conclusion

Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.

These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.

William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.

Bolstering Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, adversaries, ranging from Imperial Japan to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, badly miscalculated American resolve. This was, in part, because the US did not effectively communicate national will and the country’s ability to generate combat power.

While nuclear deterrence held during the Cold War, a worrisome erosion of America’s nuclear deterrence appears underway. A combination of unilateral cuts to the American arsenal, sluggish nuclear modernization, and “nuclear psychosis” (fear of one’s own nuclear arsenal) likely led Russian President Vladimir Putin to develop an escalate to win nuclear doctrine. The same factors may also contribute to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia issuing mounting conventional and nuclear threats against the West.

Americans need to remember that escalation dominance is an essential ingredient in effectively maintaining deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies. Escalation dominance means having the option to retaliate up or down the escalation ladder—at America’s choosing. This means developing and fielding capabilities that at least achieve parity, if not superiority, at each rung of the escalation ladder.

Without the US investing in the needed capabilities for full-spectrum conflict, all-domain escalation dominance, adversaries can study America’s capabilities and identify gaps. They can then develop and execute successful strategies that exploit those gaps. They can also incorrectly believe gaps exist, because of a failure of American messaging. Either way, American deterrence might fail.

The US once understood the art and science of escalation dominance—including how to weigh and manage uncertainties and unavoidable risks. At the most dangerous point in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US out-thought, outmaneuvered, and overmatched the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed down. President Ronald Reagan successfully escalated an arms race while also waging economic warfare. The Soviet Union collapsed.

America now faces multiple adversaries it must engage across the spectrum of conflict. Both horizontal and vertical escalation are certain. With the potential for conflicts to start in the cyber or space domain, the United States must have the ability to limit damaging incursions and malicious interference, while out-escalating an adversary.

History shows that America’s enemies, whomever they might be, tend to be relentless, brutal, casualty acceptant, and even genocidal. Current events, in conflict zones around the world, prove that this has not changed. Appeasement is as ill-advised today as it was with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Restraint is also as ill-advised now as it was then.

Sound theories of American victory need to be developed. Sound American strategy requires the proper matching of objectives to means. Without these in place, deterrence might not hold.

The stakes could not be higher. Conventional war is still almost always a prolonged and very bloody business, in which civilians are caught in the middle and have no safe refuge. If America’s strategic deterrence ever fails, the homeland might suffer devastating attack. Destruction in Ukraine is a small example of what such destruction could look like.

Nuclear war would likely prove unimaginably worse. Nuclear deterrence demands the ability to respond with proportional retaliatory strikes. It also requires the ability to match enemy escalation. The US cannot allow itself to be self-deterred by either a lack of will or a lack of capability. Self-deterrence is to give license to adversaries.

Yet some in the US continue to advocate for policies that eschew escalation at any cost.  This is a theory of defeat, not victory. Attempts to avoid risks only increase the cost of risk.

Such advocates need to be reminded that bullies will always test those they despise. Saving face and taking safe off-ramps are not a priority. For the US to be unable or unwilling to respond with sufficient force when necessary will only invite further and far worse aggression.

In the Cold War now underway, there is a danger of rapid escalation. To cede the military initiative to adversaries, to abandon America’s time-honored strategic culture of retaining full-spectrum escalation dominance, is to invite a nuclear strike against the nation and/or its allies. Adversary malign-influence campaigning is underway and now pervades American information.  Succumbing to these efforts to convince American society that isolation and pacifism are the nation’s best option is a mistake.

Appeasement never satisfies autocratic aggression. The United States must instead invest in the capabilities required to re-master the art and science of strong-stomached escalation dominance. This will support deterrence of America’s adversaries, assurance of America’s allies, and defense of the homeland. Now is the time to act.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports

The Only Nuclear Deterrence Strategy America Needs.
Dynamic Parity by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther
https://thinkdeterrence.com/dynamic-parity/

The latest ICBM EAR Report by Peter Huessy
https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/

Articles

Nuclear Devices in Space by Joe Buff
https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-devices-in-space/

Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority by Joshua Thibert
https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/

Podcasts

Real Space Strategy: Starlink, Key Tool in the Battle for Freedom?
https://globalsecurityreview.com/real-space-strategy-starlink-key-tool-in-the-battle-for-freedom/

Podcast Episode: Keeping AI Honest in Nuclear Command and Control
https://globalsecurityreview.com/podcast-episode-keeping-ai-honest-in-nuclear-command-and-control/

For more compelling reports and analysis visit us at https://thinketerrence.com and https://globalsecurityreview.com

Weekend Gouge – November 8, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Issues Include:

Korea and Russia News

1. North Korean ICBM and Military Collaboration with Russia
   • North Korea recently launched its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to date, signaling its intent to counter U.S.-South Korean alliances. Following this, the U.S. and South Korea held joint air drills as a show of force.
   • Reports indicate North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading to Ukraine, marking a potentially destabilizing support for Russia’s war efforts. North Korea may seek advanced nuclear technology from Russia as part of their cooperation.
2. Strategic Reactions and Military Developments
   • The U.S. and South Korea have pledged deeper military and technology cooperation, emphasizing nuclear defense scenarios. Meanwhile, North Korea’s alignment with Russia is raising concerns about heightened regional instability and the potential extension of the Ukraine conflict.

ICBM Report to Congress on LGM-35A Sentinel

1. Program Overview
   • The LGM-35A Sentinel, set to replace the aging Minuteman III, forms the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Sentinel will enhance the U.S.’s deterrent capabilities with an expected procurement of 634 missiles, modernized silos, and facilities across strategic areas
2. Funding and Development
   • The FY2025 budget includes $3.7 billion from the Department of Defense and $1.1 billion for the W87-1 warhead from the National Nuclear Security Administration. Modernization will involve upgrades to 450 silos and over 600 facilities, establishing the Sentinel as a long-term, modular system to address future threats
3. Strategic Justifications
   • As a critical element of U.S. defense, the Sentinel program is designed to meet evolving threats, preserve industrial capabilities, and ensure cost-effective lifecycle management. The Air Force targets initial deployment in 2029.

Get the full report!

ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Specifically, if the United States does not reduce government spending and reduce the national debt, the nation’s ability to modernize the nuclear arsenal and keep pace with rapid technological advancements is not possible. It is time for a “guns versus butter” debate that ultimately reigns in domestic spending.

The relationship between economic power and military strength is well-documented. As Paul Poast notes, “Money is power.” Paul Kennedy’s research empirically shows, from the Roman Empire to the Cold War, that economic decline often precedes the erosion of military dominance. In today’s context, the United States faces a growing national debt, projected to surpass $50 trillion by 2033, according to the Congressional Budget Office. While this staggering figure is often discussed in terms of domestic economic consequences, such as inflation and interest rates, its implications for national security are equally alarming. The costs of servicing this debt, combined with rising entitlement spending, will leave fewer resources available for defense.

Deterrence and the Need for Modernization

Deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, is the bedrock of American security strategy since the end of World War II. The ability to deter adversaries—whether through nuclear capabilities or advanced conventional forces—depends on maintaining a credible threat of retaliation. This requires not only a robust military infrastructure but also a commitment to modernization.

The American nuclear arsenal, a cornerstone of deterrence, is aging. The nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers—was largely developed during the Cold War. Many of these systems are nearing the end of their operational lives, and without significant investment, they will soon become less effective. The Sentinel ICBM program and the Columbia-class submarine are critical components of this modernization effort, but they come with hefty price tags. The Department of Defense estimates that modernizing the nuclear triad will cost over $1.5 trillion over the next 30 years.

This modernization is not optional. As adversaries like China and Russia expand their nuclear capabilities, failure to update our arsenal would undermine the credibility of American deterrence. In addition, North Korea’s continued nuclear development and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons only increase the need for a reliable deterrent. However, modernization is only possible with sustained investment. If the US continues its current fiscal trajectory, defense spending will only decline, as it already has, by the growing demands of interest payments on the national debt and mandatory spending on programs like Social Security and Medicare.

Technological Advancements: The New Frontier of Deterrence

Beyond nuclear modernization, the future of deterrence will be defined by emerging technologies. As Michael Horowitz notes in his 2020 article, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous drone warfare, cyber warfare, and hypersonic weapons are reshaping the nature of conflict. These technologies have the potential to transform military operations by providing advanced capabilities for precision strikes, autonomous systems, and cyber operations that can incapacitate an adversary’s critical infrastructure without the need for traditional warfare.

However, the integration of these technologies into the American defense apparatus requires substantial investment in research, development, and deployment. China is already making significant strides in AI and quantum technologies, while Russia continues to prioritize hypersonic weapons development. The US cannot afford to fall behind in this technology race, as the consequences for deterrence are dire. A nation that lacks cutting-edge capabilities risks becoming vulnerable to both traditional and non-traditional forms of warfare.

Yet, technological innovation is expensive. Maintaining a competitive edge in AI, cyber capabilities, and other advanced technologies requires not only a well-funded military but also a robust industrial and academic infrastructure. If government spending continues to spiral out of control, the funds necessary to develop and integrate these technologies will be diverted to service the national debt or shore up social welfare programs. This creates a vicious cycle in which the American military falls further behind while adversaries close the gap—or even surpass the United States—in critical areas.

The Economic Roots of Military Power

The decline in military readiness that results from unchecked government spending and rising debt is not hypothetical. Historical examples illustrate the dangers of economic mismanagement leading to military weakness. The Soviet Union, for instance, collapsed, in part, because it overextended itself militarily while failing to manage its economic challenges. While the US is far from Soviet-style economic collapse, the lesson is clear; no nation can maintain military dominance without a strong economic foundation.

Paul Poast, a leading scholar on the political economy of security, highlights the importance of economic capacity in sustaining military power. Military expenditures are only sustainable if the state has the economic resources to support them. Poast argues that focusing solely on military budgets without addressing the underlying economic conditions that make those budgets possible is a recipe for disaster.

In the American case, the growing national debt is directly threatening the economic foundation necessary for sustained military investment. Interest payments on the debt already consume $900 billion each year, and that figure is expected to rise significantly in the coming decade. As interest rates increase, so will the cost of servicing the debt, leaving fewer funds available for national defense. Without a course correction, this fiscal irresponsibility will leave the US incapable of maintaining its military superiority, much less modernizing its forces for the future.

The Path Forward: Fiscal Responsibility as a National Security Imperative

To avoid this grim future, the US must prioritize fiscal responsibility as part of its broader national security strategy. There are no historical examples of any nation borrowing its way to prosperity. This begins with reining in government spending and reducing the national debt. While this may require difficult political choices—such as reforming entitlement programs or scaling back certain discretionary spending—the alternative is far worse. A nation that cannot afford to invest in its defense is a nation that cannot defend itself.

Moreover, reducing the national debt would free up resources for the investments necessary to modernize the nuclear arsenal and integrate emerging technologies into the military. By putting the nation’s fiscal house in order, it is possible to ensure that the US remains a global leader in both traditional and technological forms of deterrence. Failure to do so risks not only economic consequences but also the erosion of America’s ability to defend its interests and allies in an increasingly volatile world.

The political economy of security is not just about guns and bombs—it is about dollars and cents. If the nation fails to address the growing national debt, the US will prove unable to modernize its nuclear arsenal or keep pace with the technological change that is defining the future of warfare. Fiscal responsibility is not just a domestic issue; it is a national security imperative. Only by controlling spending and reducing debt can deterrence remain credible.

By taking the necessary steps now, the nation can secure a future where America’s deterrent capabilities remain strong and its security unassailable. Failing risks a future where deterrence fails, and with it, the ability to protect the nation and its allies. The stakes could not be higher.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Political Economy of Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. Plutonium Pit Production: Back In Business was originally published on Global Security Review.

These early civil defense measures were eventually neglected and then forgotten after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the Soviet Union ended in 1991. Such measures were mirrored in the USSR under General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, but by no means neglected afterward.

Civil defense is, by nature, a community-wide activity. The more people participate and help, the better the results for the entire citizenry. This includes improved morale and will to resist, fewer combat casualties, and prolonged lifespans in case of conventional or nuclear war.

The organization of processes, the laying down and buildout of infrastructure, the first-responder rehearsals, and pervasive homefront readiness drills all require group dedication in the face of natural popular skepticism, even active resistance by a vocal few.

Although there is ample room for volunteerism, and for more formalized national service (especially for those well above military draft age), governments at different levels do need to take overall charge. This ensures efficient coordination, direction of available funding into the most pressing needs, and arranging for efficient communication and reasonable compliance.

With Vladimir Putin’s many nuclear threats, it is once again time to ensure the nation has effective civil defenses against nuclear employment. It may not be the 1950s and 1960s, but civil defense matters.

This is perhaps a prime case where today’s financial-industrial and high-tech oligarchs (billionaires) can work with and/or under contract to the federal government, or even on their own initiative, to assure that, for example, America is hardened against electromagnetic pulse attack, cyber assaults, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction attacks. These may not be traditional civil defense measures, but they are civil defense for the modern era.

This collaboration is already happening in the space domain where President Putin’s “Sputnuke” threatens to totally disrupt space operations, and where President Xi Jinping’s growing space-dominance capabilities threaten to disrupt current civil society.

Effective civil defense measures are as central to effective nuclear deterrence and ally assurance as is nuclear modernization. Effective civil defense also includes ensuring the societal supporting infrastructure, such as housing, hospitals, and food stocks, are secure and survivable under even the most highly stressed circumstances.

In fact, an essential component of a truly superb American deterrence strategy must be a comprehensive program of being able to absorb an attack and nevertheless survive. Only in this way can the United States make it clear to adversaries, as President Richard Nixon said, “Not today, Comrades. Not ever.”

Church and synagogue groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders, and fraternal organizations, such as the Shriners or the Boy Scouts can also play a significant role in providing the ultimate in community civil defense. Examples of such efforts abound from the current conflict in Ukraine and Israel.

Exactly how much civil defense is the right amount? Nuclear strategists Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn were never able to agree. Such agreement is even less likely today.

The right answer to civil defense is likely a programmatic solution that is affordable and optimizes the strengths of local communities. The right amount of civil defense should be a discussion between the federal, state, and local governments. The challenge for any civil defense effort is that more than two-thirds of all federal spending and about half of all state spending are dedicated to mandatory social programs. This leaves very little room for civil defense programs, which must compete with all other government functions for an ever-dwindling percentage of federal and state budgets.

For most Americans, the threat of nuclear strikes on the homeland is an abstract threat. Thus, they would rather have immediate government services than look to an event that may never happen. This leaves the prospects for improving civil defenses low. Much as in the Cold War, it may be up to Americans to look to their survival in the event of the unthinkable.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Modernizing Civil Defense Is Wise was originally published on Global Security Review.

I was taken aback by his comment. It also convinced me of the role Air & Space Power Journal played, albeit small, in deterring the Chinese from choosing conflict with the United States. In the decade since that encounter, Air & Space Power Journal—Mandarin, which published Mandarin language (often translated from English) articles written specifically for a Chinese audience, ceased publication. Arabic and French editions are also no longer published. Air University Press, which publishes books by military and civilian authors and the Air Force’s professional journals, also lost several of its staff positions.

If Air Education and Training Command’s proposed 2025 budget remains unchanged, Air University Press’s operating budget will shrink to a point that operations will become virtually untenable. The circumstances are similar for National Defense University Press, which publishes Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), and a number of books and research monographs on topics related to joint operations. Naval War College Press, Army War College Press, Marine Corps University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press also saw their budgets decline over the past decade. It is only Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth that still seems to maintain significant support—despite being smaller than at past points in time.

The decision to further reduce military press budgets in fiscal year 2025 to the point that even operating is a challenge, is short sighted in the extreme. For example, the 2025 NDU Press budget, proposed as an unfunded requirement (UFR), is 54 percent less than the 2012 budget. NDU eliminated funding for NDU Press, including Prism and JFQ, as of FY21. Temporary funds were identified, but those will likely expire in 2025. Without the UFR, NDU Press, now down to a staff of 5, will cease production of JFQ for the first time in 32 years.

Military presses play a vital role in the life of the services and the joint community. They are unique tools that allow each service to discuss and debate tactical, operational, and strategic issues internally and share and debate the perspectives of service members with the academic community, other services, allies, and partners, and, as our experiences illustrates, America’s adversaries.

For less than 0.000025 percent of the defense budget (roughly $20-25 million), the services can fully fund all seven presses. Such a sum does not even constitute noticeable waste in the federal government. Service presses play an important role that goes well beyond the few points offered above. Let us explain.

The Service Press

Just over 40 years ago, noted civil-military scholar Sam Sarkesian observed, “All militaries must be socialized into reinforcing their commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism.” The US military, as a group of individuals with specialized knowledge, “are granted autonomy contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve,” and in which members become experts on this knowledge and “share a commitment to common values and ethical principles.”

Debate and discussion about these issues often take place in the pages of service journals. For example, in the Spring 2024 issue of the US Air Force’s, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower, three Air Force officers discuss the challenge of “moral injury” as a result of waging war. Service presses also frequently publish articles or books on professional ethics, leadership, and related topics. They serve as a vital outlet for members of the military and civil service to identify and discuss the very challenges that undermine the character of a free nation’s military.

The importance of thinking about larger ideas and crafting thoughtful arguments is nothing new. In an October 1946 speech to the US Air Force’s Air University, Army Air Forces Major General F. L. Anderson noted, “It is not enough for airmen to be technicians. They must be versed in human affairs; they must understand the political, social, and economic aspects of international relations. They must be educated to the standard required by the history-changing role of Air Power.” Service presses serve as leading indicators of the intellectual health of the military as they affirm, explore, and expand the “specialized knowledge” of the profession as well as the all-volunteer force’s shared “commitment” to broader societal values and principles.

By providing a platform for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians to discuss and debate the profession of arms in a rigorous manner—a platform that includes inputs from the public at large including taxpayers, Allies, partners, diplomats, and civilian researchers—largely unavailable anywhere else, servicemembers are compelled to think deeply about war and its consequences. Consider the persistent debate over the role of retired senior military officers in US foreign policy in the pages of Parameters first in 2006 and revived again in 2020, or the Gian Gentile-John Nagl debate over Afghanistan in pages of JFQ. These professional academic fora provide an opportunity for military professionals and civilian contributors to challenge the existing orthodoxy and offer new and better approaches for achieving American interests through military means. Publications of publicly funded professional military presses are often a place for self-examination and criticism of the system. As discussed below, they are the one place where authors are free to challenge the institution they serve.

These long-standing institutions are places where the military’s best and brightest can engage with and participate in the intellectual development of the military profession and its members. In fact, key service doctrinal innovations were developed and honed in military publications—consider Air Force Colonel John A. Warden’s Five Rings, Army General Don Starry’s AirLand Battle, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Finally, professional military presses serve as a critical repository and history of the military’s intellectual development, providing Americans a window into the proclivities, trends, and concerns of a subordinate military, which, while representing a fraction of the population that the Constitution makes subordinate to civilian authority. Sadly, in an era focused on technological solutions to all military challenges, service presses and their role in encouraging innovative thought within the military is seen as expendable.

Scholarly For a Reason

Except for National Defense University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press, which work for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Special Operations Command, respectively, military presses are subordinate to each services’ education and training command and aligned under their professional military education institutions. These schools are civilian-accredited masters- and, in some cases, doctoral-degree granting institutions. These presses adhere strictly to civilian academic publishing standards but vary in one important way. They provide an unmatched level of support to the many military officers who seek to publish an article, book, or monograph related to their profession. Military press editors spend far more time helping their writers craft quality articles than traditional academic presses. After all, military presses serve the profession of arms, along with university academics who write for a living.

The founding of military presses and their publications date back seven decades or more. Importantly, they offer military members a place to publish that maintains a strong tradition of discourse and academic freedom. In the inaugural issue of Air University Quarterly Review in March 1947, the editorial board noted the now-familiar disclaimer that accompanies all publications of military presses, that the content therein represents authors’ opinions and may not “coincide with” that of the military service or department.

The 1947 opening statement said, “The Editor and Editorial Board wish to encourage new thinking. Consequently, if the appearance here of articles which may not agree with accepted policy, or even with majority opinion, will stimulate discussion and provoke controversy, an important part of this journal’s mission will have been accomplished: to induce airmen to have original thoughts on these matters and to give these thoughts expression.” In the immediate post-World War II era, leaders of the Army Air Forces knew how important it was to encourage airmen to think, write, and develop ideas that challenge the status quo.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, established Joint Forces Quarterly in 1993, soon after the Gulf War, admonishing readers not to “read the pages that follow if you are looking for the establishment point of view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively interplay among some of the finest minds committed to the professional of arms.”

Military presses are not part of a service’s public affairs office, nor should they be. Understandably, contributions to military presses must be cleared to ensure no classified information is released and that a service’s doctrine is not misrepresented. However, well-reasoned dissent and criticism are not only acceptable but highly desired. In fact, in many cases, that is the purview of a military press—loyal opposition. Starving military presses of funding or killing them outright shuts down the very discussion they were designed to facilitate.

Contributions to military presses are necessarily wide-ranging and include everything from the fine details of drone technology to satellite operations, international political economy, deterrence, and discussions of social issues affecting the military. Again, the military not only must execute America’s political will with lethal force but must continually replenish its all-volunteer ranks through enticing individuals and families to serve.

Society-Wide Intellectual Engagement

Military presses engage in a dialogue that is both internal to each service, where iron sharpens iron, and external, where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians attempt to shape perspectives nationally and abroad. The relatively few academic journals that cover “security studies” broadly speaking, rarely publish the type of scholarly yet professionally focused articles and books that are the purview of service presses. This means that without them, the debate ceases to occur.

Western militaries are bureaucratic and technocratic in nature and rigorously examine failures. Coming from open societies, they often freely discuss their challenges to find the best solutions. Cutting off that discussion by killing the venues where those discussions take place will inevitably lead to suboptimal outcomes. The civilian and military contributors to service press publications, together with readers, create a larger intellectual common where dialogue that is critical to stewarding the effective execution of politics by other means takes place.

The common created by this dialogue has significant worldwide reach and impact. For example, Air University Press’s four journals have an annual audience of well over one million readers globally. National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly had close to one million readers worldwide in 2023. The other military presses have similar annual readerships. Ally and partner militaries read American military publications and often adopt similar thinking and approaches. Adversary militaries read American military publications and are impressed by the level of creativity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness of the United States’ military establishment.

Historical Record

Finally, military presses are an unrivaled record of military thought and the change in thinking that follows the nation’s many conflicts. Military Review is a case in point. It was first published in 1922 as a response to American involvement in World War I. In the century since the journal began, Military Review has played a vital role in the various reform movements that changed the Army after major conflicts like Vietnam, for example.

The flagship journal of the Air Force, currently represented by the journals Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower and Air & Space Operations Review, turned 77 in March 2024 and predate the establishment of the US Air Force. Airpower’s evolution and debates surrounding topics like the Air Force role in countering a rising China and nuclear modernization are found in their pages.

Naval War College Review was founded in 1948 and serves as the central venue for the discussion of seapower. The journal’s archives are the central repository for discussion and debate concerning seapower’s role during the Cold War, for example.

Parameters: A Journal of Strategic Landpower published its first issue in 1971 and was largely a response to the US Army’s performance in Vietnam. Many of the post-Vietnam reforms undertaken by the Army were first discussed in its pages.

Further, these publications are peppered with the articles of field grade officers who later became general and flag officers—a sign of the importance the military places on the intellectual development of its future leaders. Just to name a few, then-Major David H. Petraeus, then-Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., then-Captain James Stavridis, and then-Lieutenant Colonel B. Chance Saltzman all wrote in their respective professional journals. Leading civilian scholars of the military also contribute to service professional journals. Barbara Tuchman, Richard Betts, John Mearshimer, Robert Pape, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Tammi Biddle, Williamson Murray, Matthew Kroenig, and Hal Brands all contributed to the various professional publications of the military presses.

Whether Civilian or Military Outlet

Some ask why civilian-operated military-focused outlets cannot do the job of a military press. Indeed, fine civilian and association journals, such as Air & Space Forces Magazine, Texas National Security Review, Global Security Review, Marine Corps Gazette, Proceedings, Armed Forces & Society, RUSI Journal, and War on the Rocks are actively engaged in the various and important debates that arise from the military profession. However, service presses do not report to a board of directors, individual donors, or other private entities. They are publicly funded, open access, and are often staffed and led by active-duty, retired, or former servicemember with deep service-specific knowledge. This approach to publishing allows service presses to publish on topics that are important to their service, but not necessarily commercially viable.

The End of Service Presses?

For senior service leaders looking to pinch every last penny to fund new weapons or additional operations, this makes a support entity like a press an attractive target. This is a short-sighted effort to save very little money. In the case of the Air Force, eliminating Air University Press will save about $1 million in operations costs and $2 million in staff salaries and benefits. This, in an Air Force Budget of about $217 billion.

The services and the Department of Defense should reconsider the regular cuts to military press budgets. Rather than severely underfunding or effectively defunding their presses, the services and the Department of Defense should fund them to a level that allows each to perform the functions discussed above.

Service leaders must be fully cognizant of the role their presses play and the audience they serve. While most fall under the organization of each service’s military university or war college, service presses draw contributors and readers from across the service and beyond. Over 99 percent of the more than 1 million readers that learn from the Air Force’s professional journals are not students at Air University, for example.

It is also time to put to rest the incorrect belief that military presses exist solely to serve students at the various command and staff and war colleges. They do not. Instead, they belong to their respective services and provide information and research for audiences—military and civilian—at home and abroad. As such, it is perhaps time for service secretaries and chiefs of staff to take a role in ensuring that their presses continue to serve as the place where the service expresses its intellectual history, innovation, and thought.

Regardless of whether the United States wins or loses its wars, military presses and the professional books, monographs, and journals they publish will serve as the place where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and members of the broader society think, discuss, and debate the profession of arms. The demise of service presses is not in the interest of any service, but it seems it will take a senior leader or Congress to step in and stop this from happening.

Dr. Laura Thurston-Goodroe is the editor of Æther and Air & Space Operations Review. Dr. Adam Lowther is the Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.

Why Military Presses Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, held on March 27, 2019, highlights its growing space capabilities and intent to weaponize space. India’s test, known as “Mission Shakti,” demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit, positioning India as one of only four countries with such capabilities. While Indian officials maintain that the test was aimed at strengthening national security and not directed toward any particular country, such a capability would pose a significant threat to Pakistan’s space assets, which would undermine Pakistan’s situational awareness, communication, and command-and-control capabilities during a conflict.

The implications of India’s recent MIRV test to its intent in the space domain have received little scrutiny, with one Indian analyst suggesting that the country’s MIRV efforts complement its space ambitions. However, analysts did not address the potential implications on regional stability. India’s development and testing of advanced missile technologies suggest that New Delhi could use these capabilities for counter-space missions, including the targeting of satellites, and their expansion of counter-space weapons may disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia.

Bringing MIRVs to Space

While the primary use of MIRV ballistic missiles is not in counter-space missions, there are scenarios and technologies related to MIRVs that could potentially be adapted for anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Instead of carrying nuclear warheads, the MIRV could be equipped with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) or other payloads designed to disable or destroy satellites through collision or other means. A missile equipped with MIRV technology could launch multiple payloads into space, each with its own propulsion and guidance systems, allowing them to maneuver into specific orbits close to target satellites. Moreover, the independent targeting capability of MIRVs means each payload could be directed to a different satellite, potentially allowing for simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in different orbits.

In addition, co-orbital systems can loiter in space and potentially engage targets when needed, providing a persistent threat compared to direct-ascent ASAT systems. MIRVs could be adapted for co-orbital ASAT missions by modifying their payloads and utilizing their independent targeting capabilities. Russia and China have demonstrated co-orbital ASAT systems, while the United States maintains advanced space technologies that could potentially be used in similar roles. The adaptation of MIRVs for such purposes would be complex and carry significant strategic and legal implications.

Implications for Regional Stability

Outer space is considered a global common, a concept established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which ensures that space is free for exploration and use by all countries, cannot be claimed by any nation, must be used for peaceful purposes, and should be preserved for future generations. It is crucial that this principle should be consistently applied to preserve space for the benefit of all states for communication, navigation, weather monitoring, and scientific research. However, the growing overlap between military and space technologies is blurring the lines between these fields and raises apprehensions about the militarization and potential weaponization of the domain.

The advancements made by India in military technology and satellite capabilities, which integrate military and space capabilities, have raised significant concerns about the weaponization of space in Pakistani policy circles. Pakistan also tested a MIRV capability on its Ababeel missile. However, it never demonstrated its intent to develop counter-space weapons through policy or capability development. Pakistan’s space policy and activities are focused on peaceful uses of outer space, such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and scientific research. Islamabad has participated in international initiatives aimed at promoting the responsible and peaceful use of outer space, including discussions on space security and arms control within forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Considering India’s development and modernization of its military beyond traditional security needs, such as its ASAT capability and advanced missile ranges, there is a possibility that New Delhi may use MIRVs for counter-space missions in the future. In a scenario of escalating tensions with Pakistan, India could conduct counter-space missions by either placing co-orbital ASAT systems during a brewing crisis or launch KKVs during a conflict by using MIRV capability. This would enable India to destroy Pakistani satellites, severely impairing Pakistan’s situational awareness, disrupting secure military communications, and degrading command-and-control functions.

As New Delhi strengthens its counter-space capabilities, its potential development of counter-space capabilities can upset the balance maintained by Pakistan’s effective deterrence posture in South Asia. The complex interplay between nuclear and conventional forces maintains this balance. However, there is a growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in space capabilities.

New Delhi’s substantial advancements and investments in space technology and infrastructure outmatch Pakistan’s space capabilities, creating a significant power disparity where India has a much greater capacity to deploy and utilize space-based assets for various purposes, including military and intelligence gathering. India’s disproportionate expansion of space capabilities not only poses a threat to Pakistan but also China. Their reliance on satellites for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions is growing to address genuine security needs. Pakistan recognizes the strategic importance of information superiority in modern warfare.

With evolving security challenges, including border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, Islamabad is enhancing its C4ISR capabilities through significant technological upgrades such as satellite programs and advanced communication systems, along with the integration of centralized command centers and secure communication networks. The expansion includes increased use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, development of electronic warfare capabilities, and robust cybersecurity measures.

Human resources are being developed through specialized training and international collaboration, particularly with China and Turkey, to facilitate technology transfer and interoperability. These efforts aim to improve situational awareness, decisionmaking, and operational effectiveness, strengthening Pakistan’s overall national security.

During a crisis, Pakistan may face the risk of its satellite assets being targeted which could have significant impact on its military and strategic capabilities. Pakistan could face severe constraints in its C4ISR capability. Moreover, the integration of satellite communication into Pakistan’s drone operations and C4ISR framework highlights the dependence on these assets for maintaining robust communication. Hence, the loss of satellite communication could disrupt command-and-control functions, impairing coordination and timely decisionmaking across the armed forces.

In view of these reasons, it is possible to conclude that India’s MIRV test represents a dangerous shift in the domain of space weaponization. The integration of MIRV technology with India’s missile systems not only enhances its nuclear deterrence but also signals its potential use for counter-space capability. Therefore, while India’s achievements in missile technology and space capabilities are notable, they carry significant risks for regional stability.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the authors own.

India’s MIRV Development – A Latent Counter-space Capability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

This declaration ensures that all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states’ military authorities can establish and use airspace from these five countries for NATO training and exercises. Realistic training in the air domain is critical to NATO’s collective deterrence, security posture, and European defense build-up.

For NATO to ensure air dominance in a Nordic area often harassed by the Russian air force, but also threatened by its submarines, NATO requires close coordination and cooperation between civil and military authorities. This requires operating in and around large swaths of Nordic countries’ national airspace.

Nordic countries are leading in the implementation of decisions endorsed at the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum as part of multi-domain operations, industrial base reconstruction, and securing defense technology supply chains. NATO members launched a strategic initiative to enhance capabilities relevant to the space and cyber domains.

NATO created the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) program. The APSS marks the largest multinational investment in space-based capabilities in NATO’s history. APSS will boost the Alliance’s ability to monitor activities on the ground and at sea with unprecedented accuracy and timeliness.

Next, the signing of the letter of intent for the allied software for cloud and edge (ACE) services by 22 NATO member-states is expected to provide key building blocks to the Alliance-wide digital backbone. NATO’s no-nonsense goal is to streamline and integrate all member’s hardware and software infrastructures—getting up to speed with cloud and edge computing. The pressing challenge to solve is intelligence and battlefield data fragmentation. It will be ACE’s job to improve operational efficiency by ensuring unified communications and enabling seamless data sharing across multi-domain operations.

This NATO effort, with a significant contribution by Nordic countries, also indirectly supports the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Arctic strategy, which emphasizes space and satellite capabilities. The DoD’s 2024 Arctic strategy focuses on enhancing space and satellites capabilities for improved communications, intelligence gathering, and monitoring in response to evolving geopolitical challenges in the Arctic, an area now contested by both China and Russia. Both were recently spotted flying joint missions within the Alaskan air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The strategy calls for both military and commercial solutions to improve tactical and strategic communications, while emphasizing the need for agreements with NATO allies and partners to enhance satellite coverage in the region.

A case in point for Nordic leadership in NATO’s space domain is its two new members Finland and Sweden. Seizing the opportunity to fill in the gaps of NATO’s space strategy, Sweden is keen to establish itself as a key player in the international space domain by virtue of its geographic position. Sweden just adopted the country’s first-ever defense and security space strategy. With the aim of making the nation a space hub for allies, Northern Sweden is now home to the Esrange Space Center, the first European mainland orbital spaceport. Overall, the Swedish space strategy is to create a portfolio of space-related capabilities and services in line with the country’s “total defense and crisis preparedness” concept.

According to Colonel Ella Carlsson, Sweden’s space chief, the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration acquired, in 2023, Smart-L long-range radars from Thales. This will allow the Swedish to detect threats at a range of up to 2,000 kilometers—Russian incursions. Colonel Carlson said, “We can use space as part of the solution to find, detect and hit targets or threats with partners.”

She also said that in Sweden’s quest for new sensors, the country is cooperating with the Netherlands, which also has the Smart-L radar, to assess further use cases. The Swedish Air Force additionally signed a Space Situational Awareness sharing agreement with US Space Command in 2022. In early 2024, Sweden participated in the US-led Global Sentinel space exercise, demonstrating its desire to support NATO space efforts.

As for Finland, it is home to the company ICEYE, based in Espoo. ICEYE owns the world’s largest synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) satellite constellation, monitoring any location on Earth. The company’s capabilities support defense operations.

In August 2022, ICEYE signed a contract with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation that would give the Armed Forces of Ukraine access to one of its satellites. According to the Ukrainian intelligence agency, the now dubbed “People’s Satellite” helped Ukraine hit over 1,000 targets. This crowd-funded satellite indeed enabled Ukraine to have a much better independent view of the battlefield, as well as targets in Russia.

These examples of actions taken by NATO’s newest members illustrate the value they are already providing and where they see their contributions securing the Alliance’s defense. NATO’s new Nordic member-states demonstrate leadership beyond government and the established industrial base. As the Finnish example of ICEYE demonstrates, entrepreneurs and investors are supporting the defense build-up, particularly in the space and cyber domains.

The United States and other NATO member-states should continue to cheer on the efforts of Finland and Sweden. Given their strategic position next to Russia, both nations can provide the Alliance a tremendous advantage against Russian aggression.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nordic Countries Supercharge NATO’s Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, the international security environment is anything but stable, certain, and peaceful. And the future is trending in the wrong direction for the United States and its allies. American strategic force posture must be rebalanced. The US needs a policy of strategic sufficiency 2.0 with new regional nuclear triads as its centerpiece.

Those who favor a rules-based construct of international relations now face the specter of broad and catastrophic threats from a new axis of authoritarianism. This axis is a political union comprised of authoritarian China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, each guilty of intense human rights abuses of their own people. They seek to create a new world order of control, coercion, and, when needed, armed conflict where they reap the benefits. This new political union could include aggression against the US and its allies simultaneously.

Their military prowess is greatly increasing, through a nuclear arms race that the United States is passively observing. Most importantly, this includes theater nuclear forces of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific and Europe. Today, the US simply has no theater range nuclear forces forward-deployed to the Pacific. According to the Congressional Research Service, all American nonstrategic nuclear weapons are either forward-deployed with aircraft in Europe or stored in the United States. Further, with Russia possessing as many as 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US and NATO are outpaced in theater nuclear forces in Europe by perhaps a 10-to-1 margin.

Unlike the Cold War, these threats are undergirded by China’s economic power, ironically fueled for decades by liberal societies enamored with China’s cheap product and labor. It is meaningless to characterize the American relationship with these regimes as competition. The United States and its allies are in conflict with them, not yet armed conflict, but conflict, nonetheless.

The US has four broad policy choices for its strategic force posture. First, it can stay within guidance of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and slowly modernize the strategic nuclear triad while reducing reliance on nuclear weapons hoping adversaries follow. However, every nuclear-armed adversary is deepening reliance on nuclear weapons and expanding nuclear forces, with no signs of stopping.

Second, the US can seek an isolationist foreign policy and aid its allies in developing and deploying their own nuclear capabilities. This option requires that the US all but abandon its policy of extended deterrence and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), placing regional security in peril and fostering geopolitical atrophy.

Third, it can promote new security architectures in Europe and the Pacific, where a leading regional ally would assume responsibility for providing the needed “nuclear umbrella” over fellow regional allies. This option is likely unworkable.

The fourth option is for the US to embrace its historical leadership role, strengthen its strategic force posture, and, working with Allies, reconstitute regional conventional defenses. The last option is the only prudent one to prevent conflict through deterrence against multiple adversaries for the foreseeable future. The logic of such a strategy should start with President Richard Nixon’s approach.

In the late 1960s, Nixon formulated a realist policy of “strategic sufficiency.” It was designed to adjust the American strategic force posture to the threats, uncertainties, and instability of that time. Such threats included rapid growth in Soviet nuclear forces and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. Nixon concluded strategic balance was essential for overall security, though it meant expanding the American nuclear forces immediately. Quantity was a quality all its own. If numbers mattered to the Soviets, then the United States needed to include them in sufficiency assessments.

In his first annual foreign policy report to Congress, Nixon argued strategic sufficiency required a military calculation of forces for warfighting, but explicitly argued sufficiency’s core idea was political. Forces could only be sufficient if they accounted for vital and long-term American security interests and aspirations, including the protection of global commercial markets.

Combined, the military and political features of Nixon’s sufficiency enabled the US strategic force posture to accomplish a wide set of policy goals. These included deterring the Soviets, assuring allies, countering coercion, providing a president political bargaining power to successfully wage an escalatory battle, fight and finish war on multiple fronts, and safeguard long-term interests.

To rebalance the force, the Nixon administration moved to upload nuclear missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to be able to attack more targets and overcome enemy defenses without reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy. Nixon also hardened intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, increased the mobility of forces, and increased air and missile defenses. Nixon coupled American security to allied security but demanded more of allies especially for conventional forces to deter regional aggression. Such was the logic and choices of Nixon’s policy.

However, Nixon’s sufficiency policy was formed in the 1960s, in an era when large or surprise Soviet nuclear attack was feared. It focused on American strategic nuclear forces that provide central deterrence of attacks on the homeland. Today, the most likely pathway to nuclear escalation and attacks on the homeland is through regional conflict, where adversaries have a significant and growing theater nuclear advantage, particularly in sub-intercontinental-range missiles. Allies are faced with direct and immediate threats of aggression and nuclear attacks. The United States nuclear triad of strategic systems is neither designed nor credible for waging regional nuclear war and escalation. It invites nuclear retaliation on the homeland.

Therefore, a strategic sufficiency 2.0 for the future must include nuclear forces necessary to satisfy Nixon’s military-political goals, but with a focus on the theater. Beefing up the American strategic nuclear triad is important, but so is expanding regional conventional forces and homeland defenses. However, the greatest deterrence priority for this new axis of authoritarianism is building American theater nuclear triads.

Adversaries calculate the totality of war and the risks of escalation all the way through war termination prior to making the initial decision to wage war. And so, the strategic force posture must have the forces in place to succeed at every step of conventional and nuclear war in order to deter war. Regional nuclear triads plug the greatest force sufficiency gap in this spectrum.

Regional nuclear triads would create a deterrent wall between regional conventional conflict and escalation to strategic nuclear conflict against the homeland. Today, such walls are virtually nonexistent. Regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific would be sufficient to provide the president a wide range of theater options to counter simultaneous axis escalation threats, without having to move forces from one region to the other. Such diverse options enable a president to successfully wage the regional escalation battle without using the strategic triad. To use the strategic triad would pointlessly drive central deterrence risks to the homeland.

Regional nuclear triads not only build the critical deterrent wall, but they are also sufficient to accomplish, at the regional level, the full range of Nixon’s military and political features noted above (deterrence, assurance, counter-coercion, escalatory bargaining, and war winning). Theater nuclear forces of such strength also hedge against the uncertainties involved in adversary nuclear force projection and intentions in the outyears. This reduces regional and homeland risks, and builds the high confidence needed of a strategic sufficiency policy.

Regional nuclear triads would have varying ranges and yields for proportionality and credibility and would afford the same force attributes of survivability, responsiveness, and flexibility provided by the strategic triad. This combination of attributes creates the military, political, and psychological effects that maximize adversary doubts and fears of the consequences of undesired actions. Placing regional nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific achieves this strong regional deterrent effect unlike any other policy option.

This should be achieved in both theaters. For example, the United States can deploy a combination of ground-based nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and nuclear-armed F-35 aircraft, nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (the SLCM-N), and air-launched nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles. Regional nuclear triad means-of-delivery and nuclear weapons must also be of sufficient numerical strength to balance Russian theater nuclear forces in Europe and Chinese/North Korean theater nuclear forces in the Pacific.

As mentioned earlier, American strategic force posture must account for military and political force requirements across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, in addition to regional nuclear triads, strategic sufficiency 2.0 also requires an American strategic force posture to make three other adjustments to deal with threats.

First, the US must upload its ICBM force with additional nuclear weapons. In keeping with Nixon’s uploading policy, the US should use uploaded missiles to keep pace, weapon for weapon, with Chinese strategic nuclear weapon deployments. This achieves the military and political purposes stated earlier, but also demonstrates political resolve toward arms control at some point.

Second, the posture must safeguard key elements of the homeland from enemy coercion. Missile defenses reassure the American people, but also enable a president to take the risks necessary to effectively escalate and win a conflict where nuclear use is threatened or takes place. A limited defense against coercive attacks against major American population centers and adversary first-strike weapons against American leadership adds that needed reassurance to the deterrence equation.

Third, in partnership with allies, the US must restore regional conventional forces to deter axis aggression. This should include a substantial number of American air-, sea-, and land-based conventional hypersonic missiles capable of defeating, at range, enemy defenses and their anti-access area-denial capabilities. It will also require greater allied burden and risk sharing through increased defense spending, expanding regional combat power and expanding access for American theater nuclear forces.

Challenges to a strategic sufficiency 2.0 policy come in several forms. Detractors may make the following arguments.

First, some may argue that expansion of American nuclear forces will spark an arms race. Unfortunately, an arms race already exists. The United States is not a participant.

Second, some may argue nuclear expansion is unaffordable. Nuclear forces, including ongoing strategic triad modernization, account for 6 percent of the defense budget and less than 1 percent of federal spending. Regional nuclear triads, uploading, conventional hypersonics, and improved missile defenses are minimal in cost. Deterrence is, however, far less expensive than warfighting.

Third, some may suggest a single nuclear weapon system, such as the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), is all that is needed for regional deterrence. But this approach leaves out critical military and political features of sufficiency such as attributes, warfighting capabilities, and escalation options that regional nuclear triads offer.

Finally, some could argue that the United States can accomplish its military and political objectives if the nation can strike key targets with the strategic nuclear triad. This force sufficiency assumption is a common trap. Nixon argued that while narrow military planning is necessary in helping to discern strategic sufficiency, he warned against “debatable calculations and assumptions regarding possible scenarios.” Rather, sufficiency dealt more with force capacity in its “broader political sense.” Anything less than full force balance is unacceptable.

The policy of the United States should be to embrace leadership and engagement in the world to resolutely safeguard its national security and that of its allies and partners. To do so, American policy should be to reconstitute strategic force posture, including expanding the strategic nuclear triad through MIRVing ICBMs; establishing theater nuclear triads in Europe and the Pacific; expanding missile defenses; and expanding theater conventional forces.

War prevention is the object of deterrence, a strategy that has worked for over 75 years. Deterrence, strategic stability, and nonproliferation were always the strongest when the US and its allies were strong. Power is the language respected by authoritarians, and the US should not be afraid to wield it. Strategic sufficiency 2.0, with an emphasis on regional nuclear triads, can rebalance the American strategic force posture and create the conditions of strategic stability and deterrence effectiveness against the multipolar axis threat.

Jonathan Trexel, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and on the faculty of Missouri State University. The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Strategic Sufficiency 2.0: Deploying Regional Nuclear Triads was originally published on Global Security Review.

If your interest fits one of these areas:

• Experienced professional with expertise in arms control, nuclear deterrence, and international security priorities.

• Specialized in analyzing arms deals, assessing nuclear strategies, and understanding global alliances.

• Dedicated to promoting diplomacy, reducing the threat of nuclear war, and advocating for responsible statecraft.

Then this report gives you nuanced perspectives on nuclear proliferation in East Asia, focusing on Japan and South Korea, and China’s influence in the Middle East, as well as a deep understanding of international relations, security issues, and geopolitical developments.

Finding that you are committed to discussing critical issues shaping the world today,  here are the 7 critical take aways you’ll find most interesting:

1. Shift towards nuclear weapons, with concerns about reversing the momentum towards a world without nuclear arms.

2. Escalating tensions in various regions, leading to the emergence of opposing cold war-style camps. ​

3. Growing calls in Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the US. ​

4. North Korea’s rapid expansion of nuclear capabilities changing the nuclear balance on the Korean peninsula. ​

5. Increasing support for nuclear armament in South Korea. ​

6. Strengthened military alliances between the US, Japan, and South Korea. ​

7. China’s influence in the Middle East aimed at reducing American influence in the region. ​Welcome this key and influential information into your must read for the week and you will remain on top of what matters most in national security.

Read, share, print, discuss, give us your thoughts!

ICBM EAR Week of August 8, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

It might be tempting to dismiss these statements as yet another instance of grandstanding by an aggressor portraying itself as an innocent victim. However, it might be worth putting Putin’s comments into context for some decoding of the next steps required not only for the Ukraine conflict but for the entire European deterrence picture.

The deployment of American intermediate-range missile systems on German territory is scheduled for 2026. When declaring Russia unbound by any unilateral moratorium on deploying medium- and short-range strike capabilities, Putin blamed the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) for Russia’s necessary actions.

Russia plans to produce weapons similar to those prohibited by the INF Treaty, increasing the nuclear component of Russia’s military budget. Overall, Putin presented the US deployment of missiles in Europe as a strategic threat to Russia and a potential justification for Russia’s own nuclear response. Russian invasion of Ukraine and nuclear threats against NATO had nothing to do with it.

During his speech at the Naval Day Parade, Putin raised concerns about Western tolerance for nuclear weapon use and the deployment of missiles in Germany. There was also an aspect of pleasing the crowd at home and impressing on them the irrefutable logic of his leadership. Reminding Putin’s audience of Russia’s military power and strategic importance, particularly regarding the Baltic Sea, was paramount.

Putin often refers to what he characterizes as the period of great tension between the tragically defunct Soviet Union and the West—the Cold War. The Russian narrative once again views the West as an enemy. It is helpful to listen to Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. He advocated for an offensive stance towards the West and revigorated the Russian complex of obsidionalism (under siege mentality), which views the West as a long-term adversary.

When in 2008 Putin invaded Georgia, French president Nicolas Sarkozy barely managed to understand what the invasion meant. The naivete of the West convinced Putin that Crimea was up for grabs. Indeed, not one shot was fired by the West when Putin grabbed Crimea in 2014.

Putin is also well aware of the fact that the current NATO defense math simply does not add up. For example, France used to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense—at the end of the Cold War. France stopped just short of completely gutting its military after 1991 and kept its nuclear weapons in working order. Three decades later, France struggles to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, though it has now substantially increased defense spending as of late. Most of Europe, except for the voluntarist Baltic and Nordic countries, is in this situation or even worse.

On the one hand, Russia may be trying to extend the Ukraine conflict as a way to justify increased defense spending. On the other hand, extending the Ukraine conflict also postpones Russia’s rearming for a much larger and deeper fight against NATO.

When Putin publicly threatens the use of nuclear weapons, it plays to domestic audience reassurance. Russian naval struggles in the Black Sea are real. The enlargement of NATO to Sweden and Finland only makes matters worse as the Baltic Sea now sees Putin with NATO able to cut off access to the Atlantic and Kaliningrad. After all, the expansion of NATO leaves Russia with NATO forces much closer on land and able to completely cut off Russia by sea in the West. It should come as no surprise then that Putin threatens the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has decided a structural investment in nuclear forces is his best option.

In his protracted conflict with Ukraine, the Ukrainians are provided enough military support to avoid defeat, but not enough to unambiguously prevail over Russia. Finnish President Sauli Väinämö Niinistö made an ouverture to Russia to suggest peace negotiations. Considering economic and military recruitment challenges and struggles on the ground and in the Black Sea, Russia may eventually seek negotiations. However, Putin and Russian leaders may be reluctant to negotiate as it could be perceived as a sign of weakness.

Western diplomacy should look deeper at the strategic and deterrence picture. It is rather challenging to create a consensus within Russia’s political circles regarding Putin’s foreign policies, particularly towards the West. Even the rapprochement and convergence of interests that led to the China-Iran-North Korea-Russia nexus, the “Axis of Upheaval” according to British prime minister Keir Starmer, is not something straightforward. Russia’s concern for China’s ambitions should never be underestimated.

Ukraine, however, is the immediate concern and deterring further NATO intervention is most important. Thus, Putin will continue to threaten in an effort to coerce NATO restraint and the further deterioration of Russia’s position in Europe.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Putin’s Nuclear Swagger was originally published on Global Security Review.

Doubtless the significance of Hiroshima speaks for itself. The bomb had previously been tested successfully in the New Mexico desert, but it had yet to be used under operational conditions. Scientists and military experts offered various predictions about whether the bomb would detonate as expected and what it might cause. The bombing of Hiroshima turned theory into practice. The United States created a new weapon of unprecedented and terrifying power.

On the other hand, even after the destruction of Hiroshima, the Japanese political and military leadership was not prepared to surrender. Anticipating an eventual American invasion of the Japanese home islands, the imperial government prepared their civilian population for protracted urban warfare and other means of diehard resistance to foreign occupation. Outside the home islands, large contingents of the imperial Japanese armed forces remained capable of fighting, absent a regime surrender.

Japanese leaders may have also doubted whether the United States was capable of repeating the destruction inflicted on Hiroshima. The US might have only one of these unprecedented weapons in its arsenal and, having used it, would need to defeat Japan’s military by an inevitable invasion, costly to Americans as well as to Japanese.

The bombing of Nagasaki changed this optimistic calculus to a more pessimistic one.  Now it seemed possible that the US may have many of these weapons ready for immediate use.  As we now know, the United States did not. But, if the war lasted well beyond August of 1945, the US could have manufactured and used additional atomic weapons against Japan. Facing this possibility, Emperor Hirohito made an unprecedented radio address calling on his population and armed forces to surrender.

The emperor’s address caused most, but not all, Japanese to accept the “unthinkable” surrender. A number of military officers committed ritual suicide, and a small coterie of fanatics tried to overthrow the government and continue the war, notwithstanding the wishes of the emperor.

But after the bombing of Nagasaki, most accepted that there was no alternative to surrender. The US wisely agreed to spare the life of the emperor and to avoid treating him as a war criminal, despite calls for his incarceration and execution on the part of many Americans. It was judged correctly that Hirohito would be a necessary legitimizing symbol useful in establishing a postwar democratic regime under the governance of Douglas MacArthur.

The bombing of Nagasaki is significant in other ways as well. It shows that deterrence is based not only on the experience of pain and destruction already inflicted, but also on the expectation of more pain to come, if the demands of an adversary are not met. The future unknown can be more terrifying than the known past, however terrible the past was.

By example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was able to rally parliament and the British public in 1940 to resist Hitler at all costs, regardless of the pessimism of some in the political establishment, many of whom preferred to make a deal with Hitler. It was not only the immediate peril of British forces deployed in France that mattered, but also the unknown fate of Britain under German rule that caused leaders and most of the British public to stand fast despite seemingly impossible odds.

The bombing of Nagasaki is significant in another way. Contrary to the predictions of many experts, it represented the last use of the atomic bomb fired in anger. Nuclear deterrence proved to be more durable and less brittle than expected, even during the worst moments of the Cold War. The Cuban missile crisis was a close call, but Khrushchev’s reckless gamble in America’s backyard was discovered by US intelligence and exposed in time for crisis management to succeed.

Can we assume that deterrence will hold firm in a new world order of rising competition and conflict among three nuclear-armed great powers; one rogue nuclear weapons state; a potential rogue nuclear weapons state; and possible additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Asia, or elsewhere? This question has special significance for Japan and takes us back to its singular experiences of atomic bombing. Their history has understandably created, in the minds of the Japanese people, an allergic reaction to the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal.  But, as Japan faces a more assertive China, an erratic North Korea, and an aggressive Russia, reality may overcome such resistance.

Thus far, Japan has depended upon the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter adversaries against nuclear coercion or first use. As the military configuration of Asia changes, leaders in Japan may begin to entertain the notion of a nuclear deterrent: modest in size, but sufficient to create the expectation of unprecedented, and unacceptable, damage to any prospective attacker. Should that day arrive, Japan will come full circle from the attack on Nagasaki.

Steve Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Significance of Nagasaki was originally published on Global Security Review.

The use of atomic weapons on Japan by the United States was the culmination of the Manhattan Project’s extraordinary technological achievements. The decision to use these weapons came after US Army and Navy estimates of a protracted invasion of the Japanese home islands (Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaidō) offered casualty ranges from the tens to hundreds of thousands. If the Japanese fought as hard on their own home territory as they fought for Okinawa, for example, there was real concern that the loss of American life would eclipse that seen in Europe.

Additionally, the estimated losses on the Japanese side were five to ten times that of the United States. Japanese tenacity and refusal to surrender in the face of certain defeat was both hated and admired by American troops.

At the time of Germany’s defeat on May 7, 1945, the United States was five weeks into one of the bloodiest fights of the entire war, the battle for Okinawa, which cost more than 50,000 American casualties before the island was taken in late June. Only after the war did it come to light that more than 110,000 Japanese soldiers and 150,000 Okinawan civilians died in the battle. About half of Okinawa’s pre-war population was killed during the battle, sometimes at the hands of Japanese soldiers.

For the military commanders of the war in the Pacific, Okinawa demonstrated a stark example of the Japanese resolve and willingness to fight and die. It should come as no surprise that President Harry Truman, a World War I veteran, understood the difficult decision required to take provocative actions to save American lives. While this was not a war the Americans started; it was a war we had to win—without conditions.

Scholars and non-scholars alike may continue to debate the moral, ethical, and legal justifications of the use of the atomic bomb, but there is little doubt that the men assigned to military units waiting for the invasion to begin were happy to know that the atomic bomb made the loss of their own lives unnecessary. Their families were certainly happy as well. In the articles that often appear on the anniversary of Hiroshima, there is often a lack of understanding of the American lives (and Japanese) that were saved by the use of the atomic bomb.

The Manhattan Project began because the United States feared Nazi Germany would successfully develop the bomb first. With Germany falling to the allies in May 1945, just months before the bomb was ready, it was a logical transition for the target of the A-bomb to shift from Europe to Japan. The weapon, originally designed to counter a German threat, became the best option to quickly end the war in the Pacific.

Often, the articles commemorating the use of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima repeat inaccuracies and leave out important facts. For example, it is common to suggest that the detonation of Little Boy directly caused all of the devastation experienced in Hiroshima. However, approximately 80 percent of the death and devastation in Hiroshima was caused by the fire that began with the detonation and spread far beyond the area directly affected by the bomb. This same level of damage would have been realized with one of Curtis LeMay’s conventional fire-bombing raids because Japanese buildings were in close proximity to one another and made of highly flammable wood and paper. The blast effects of the bomb, while dramatic, were not the leading cause of destruction and loss of life—as is normal with a nuclear detonation.

In retrospect, the American firebombing of Tokyo was far more destructive of life and property than either atomic bomb. Little Boy was detonated at such a high altitude, about 1,400 feet above ground zero, that its damage was limited.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a sound military decision that took the best military advice, applied casualty estimates for a future fight to the equation, and reached a sound decision. The atomic bomb did exactly what President Truman and General Marshall desired—end the war as quickly as possible with the least loss of American (and Japanese) life.

The loss of an estimated 150,000 Japanese lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was tragic, but more than justified by the American lives saved. This number, however, in comparison to the estimates of over a million Japanese and American lives that were projected to be lost in an invasion drives a different conclusion and deeper reflection than numbers alone.

The benefit of hindsight to those who challenge the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima often forget that there were real American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines (as well as Japanese military and civilians) who would have died by the hundreds of thousands had the war continued. War is a terrible thing, and, paradoxically, the dramatic use of the atomic bomb, while taken as a single event appears horrific, in contrast to the larger landscape of lives saved demonstrates a justified use that saved lives in the end. Because of this, American warfighters returned home to start lives, get married, raise children, and pursue lives that may very well have ended with a bullet or bomb in Japan.

USAF Col (Ret) Paul Hendrickson, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Reflections on Hiroshima: August 6, 1945 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent surge in OSINT intake is driven by the exponential growth of digital information, the proliferation of social media, and the increasing availability of online data. These factors have expanded the volume and variety of accessible information, enabling intelligence agencies to glean valuable insights from a vast array of sources, ranging from news articles and social media posts to academic publications and government reports. However, this influx of data necessitates advanced tools and techniques to manage, analyze, and extract actionable intelligence efficiently.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) applications are being implemented across the American intelligence community to enhance capabilities, resulting in a significant increase in OSINT intake. Managing this surge requires leveraging advanced technology, enhancing analytical capabilities, and ensuring efficient collaboration. AI and ML algorithms automate data collection, filtering, and initial analysis. The development of natural language processing (NLP) tools to process large volumes of text data in multiple languages will mature over time with appropriate investment. Additional investment in scalable big data platforms that can handle OSINT data will be critical, utilizing cloud-based solutions for storage and processing to ensure scalability and flexibility.

Human capital enhancement is crucial for any strategic intelligence strategy. There must be an increased focus on recruiting and developing specialized training for intelligence analysts in OSINT techniques, tools, and methodologies. Continuous education programs will keep analysts updated on the latest technologies and trends. Expanding hiring efforts to identify experts in data science, cybersecurity, linguistics, and regional studies will increase the talent pool capable of enhancing the analytical capabilities of the intelligence community. By fostering an environment that promotes continuous learning and expertise in emerging technologies, the intelligence community can stay ahead of adversaries and ensure that their analysts have the necessary skills to leverage advanced tools effectively.

Interagency collaboration within the American intelligence community and with trusted allies is vital. Creating joint OSINT task forces involving multiple agencies fosters collaboration and information sharing, leveraging unique capabilities and expertise. Developing standardized protocols and best practices for OSINT collection and analysis enhances situational awareness and reduces duplication of efforts.

By establishing clear lines of communication and cooperation, intelligence agencies can ensure a more unified approach to addressing emerging threats and challenges. This collaboration also extends to international partners, creating a robust intelligence-sharing network that provides a broader perspective and pools resources to counteract the strategic moves of adversaries.

From a strategic perspective, developing secure and user-friendly platforms for sharing OSINT findings across different agencies is essential. Implementing interoperable systems for seamless data exchange, supported by comprehensive policies and guidelines aligned with legal mandates, builds trust between agencies and the public. Ensuring the security and integrity of data and communication channels is paramount, as it protects classified information from cyber intrusions and ensures the resilience of supply chains and critical infrastructure against cyber threats. Enhanced cybersecurity measures are essential for maintaining the trust and operational effectiveness of intelligence operations.

Reversing concerns about the expanding influence of the technology industry is necessary for the defense industry and intelligence community to embrace a collaborative environment that encourages growth, innovation, and trust. The technology industry already has expertise in these domains, which can be leveraged for public-private partnerships to access cutting-edge innovations. By fostering partnerships, the intelligence community can benefit from rapid advancements in technology and stay ahead of emerging threats. Collaboration with the technology industry also provides access to a pool of highly skilled professionals who can contribute to enhancing the capabilities of intelligence agencies.

The intelligence community must embrace public-private partnerships to foster a collaborative environment that encourages innovation. Establishing feedback mechanisms, conducting regular reviews, and setting up innovation labs within intelligence agencies ensures they stay ahead of emerging threats. Feedback mechanisms can include regular debriefings, user surveys, and performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of OSINT strategies. Review processes might involve periodic audits, peer reviews, and after-action reports to identify gaps and areas for improvement. Innovation labs can foster a culture of experimentation and rapid prototyping of new technologies and methodologies. By creating a space for testing and developing new ideas, innovation labs can drive significant advancements in intelligence operations and ensure that agencies are equipped to handle evolving threats.

Continuous improvement and adaptation will be key to maintaining a competitive edge in a dynamic and ever-changing global threat landscape. Establishing feedback mechanisms to continually assess the effectiveness of OSINT strategies and make necessary adjustments is essential. Conducting regular reviews and audits to identify gaps and areas for improvement will ensure that the intelligence community remains agile and responsive to emerging threats and challenges. Enhancing all-source analytical techniques for integrating OSINT with other intelligence sources (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) will provide a comprehensive view of the intelligence landscape, bridging the knowledge and awareness gaps that often plague the intelligence community.

To further support these advancements, the intelligence community must also embrace public-private partnerships to leverage the technology industry’s expertise and foster a collaborative environment that encourages innovation. Establishing feedback mechanisms, conducting regular reviews, and setting up innovation labs within intelligence agencies will ensure they stay ahead of emerging threats and challenges. By fostering a culture of experimentation and rapid prototyping, innovation labs can drive significant advancements in intelligence operations and ensure that agencies are equipped to handle evolving threats.

Managing the surge in OSINT requires a holistic approach that combines technological innovation, enhanced human capital, effective interagency collaboration, and robust policy frameworks. By adopting these strategies, the intelligence community can maintain its edge in an increasingly complex and dynamic world.

Joshua Thibert is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. Views expressed are his own. 

AI Overload: Navigating the US Intelligence Community’s Data Deluge was originally published on Global Security Review.

The book is fast-paced and covers Nitze’s career in and around government in just 268 pages. James Graham Wilson, an historian at the US State Department, draws on voluminous archived notes of White House meetings and State Department documents to build his description of Nitze’s influence. This allowed the author to clearly and confidently identify what and how Nitze’s ideas were injected into treaties and American policy. Wilson also does not shy away from criticizing Nitze’s policy or personal shortcomings where warranted. This makes for a complete yet consumable treatment of Paul Nitze’s work.

Whether working in the Department of State or Defense, where Nitze served, aspiring national security professionals should be reading this book. Following Paul Nitze’s career path might be impossible today, but tracing it offers many useful insights.

Nitze made a personal fortune investing during the volatile years of the market crash and depression. He married into political connections and with his comfort secured, could have lived a life of leisure, but chose a life “in the arena” instead. Nitze first applied his exceptional analytical skills to a pressing national security issue—assessing the value of strategic bombing in World War II. It was here, with the US Strategic Bombing Survey, that the Nitze way came to prominence. As Wilson tells it, this “way” is to find the facts, use them to craft executable plans for securing American “predominance,” and then fight aggressively but patiently to get that plan implemented.

The Bombing Survey demonstrated that strategic bombing did not achieve the goals its advocates claimed, earning Nitze no friends in the Pentagon. His analytical accuracy, candor in presentation, and independence of thought earned him the respect of President Truman, Eisenhower, and most presidents that followed.

Paul Nitze has a particular policy related to nuclear weapons. His influence did not depend on his holding a position in government but transcended political partisanship. He saw himself as a “man of action” who fused his mathematical mind with the social sciences and balanced theory with his practical experiences to provide realistic policy. Wilson’s Nitze changed his views rarely and did not shy away from bullying when the tactic appeared useful.

Nitze’s laser focus on America first policies put the country on the path for peace through strength well before those were popular slogans. His loyalty to national interest over personal gain was showcased in a scathing op-ed he helped write that attempted to scuttle the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, once he came to see it as counter-productive to defense.

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68) was Paul Nitze’s first, and perhaps most important policy document. Wilson dedicates a chapter to this product, but it permeates the entire book. Wilson shows how this document was so much more than simply a plan to deal with Soviet nuclear weapons. It was close in impact to Kennan’s Long Telegram. While sensitive to the value of public debate on defense policy, Wilson demonstrates that Paul Nitze was self-conscious about publishing. However, Wilson credits Nitze with an impressive writing feat in NSC-68, functionally creating the first national security strategy. This document certainly echoes across the decades from its initial presentation to Truman in 1950 well past the Cold War.

Later in his career, Nitze led President Ronald Reagan’s negotiation team for the anti-ballistic missile and intermediate nuclear forces treaties. Nitze consistently pushed for a strong US nuclear posture to enable effective negotiations. This is reflected in deterrence theory today in books like Matt Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters.

Advocacy for high defense budgets did not restrict Nitze from calling for complete nuclear disarmament later in life. He believed that the 1991 Gulf War showed that this could be achieved because of the strategic effects of precision-guided weapons and what the Biden administration calls integrated deterrence.

Some of today’s up and coming defense policy and strategy practitioners may have a hard time relating to Paul Nitze’s privileged upbringing or his self-made independent wealth. Wilson’s assertion that it is unlikely that anyone today could move back and forth across the political aisle like Nitze did is probably true. But there are many useful nuggets of Nitze wisdom and experience in this book that are useful for new and well-practiced policymakers. Wilson’s Nitze is a persistent yet practical advisor at the nexus of defense and diplomacy whose work covered most of the last century but whose impact will likely reach into the next. Paul Nitze’s professional life is worth your time and this book is a great introduction to his work.

James McCue is a retired USAF aviator and nuclear security professional. He is an expert on nuclear strategy and national defense policy. He is a fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Associate Editor for Global Security Review. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is some debate, however, as to their continued utility in modern times. They are costly to build, at least $13 billion, require a large complement of personnel, require an escort, and are vulnerable to attack from ballistic missiles and now hypersonic weapons. Disabling an American aircraft carrier would be a priority for enemy nations, as it would be a symbolic victory with great propaganda value for them. An aircraft carrier is simply a very attractive target that, depending upon the analyst, is more or less of an easy target. A missile strike that causes even a listing of a few degrees or propulsion damage can prevent them from being used by air assets.

While on paper supercarriers can carry up to 130 aircraft, they typically have about 70 aircraft of varying types at any given time. Some are under maintenance, some allocated to fleet protection, with the rest able to conduct offensive operations. Using rough math and averaging air wings, at any given time a carrier may have an estimated 15 aircraft in the air for offensive operations. Thus, in a large-scale conflict, it would be best for multiple carriers to work in concert, and for the navy to “surge” personnel and aircraft to deployed carriers.

The most dangerous threat to this strategy is the potential for an adversary, like China, to employ nuclear weapons against a carrier strike group. China, for example, could claim American naval assets are violating its sovereign waters, constituting an invasion, and employ nuclear weapons against the carrier strike group, hundreds of miles from land.

Such a scenario is certainly not a high probability but is a reasonable concern with an uncertain outcome. The ability of fleet defenses to prevent such a strike is uncertain. However, this risk does not negate the utility of carriers, in general. In fact, there may be some utility in building at least two supercarriers with even longer flight decks than the Gerald R. Ford class.

There are two areas where carriers have a possible future: carrying large swarms of long-legged drones and serving as mid-point logistical platforms. Such supercarriers could also host anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile interceptors, changing the boundaries and layers of continental missile defense, as needed.

Ostensibly, a drone-focused carrier can serve as a waystation for land-based drones and even host drone operators. With advancements in remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUV), it would make sense to redesign a new class of assault ships that can launch them. These can also be built cheaper and crewed by fewer personnel, with the goal of having more. In fact, they can be designed to be mostly unmanned and operate within the protection of a carrier strike group.

For supercarriers, their use behind the main lines of combat, between strike groups and mainland bases, has the potential to make them mobile bases for the purposes described above. Should a peer conflict begin in the Indo-Pacific, their use would be between Japan or Australia, and Hawaii, or as an alternative to American bases in the Pacific should China, for example, strike these bases.

The future use of aircraft carriers may be by American allies, whom, if trained, could deploy their own aircraft from American ships. South Korea and Japan, for example, have airfields in the region but, if struck by North Korea or China, may need an alternative hub to refuel and rearm. If land-based aircraft and airfields are at risk, it makes sense to have alternatives.

Contemplating and integrating the capabilities described is certainly well outside the US Navy’s current operational concept. American naval strategy is well established and slow to change, but, if former Indo-PACOM commander Admiral (Ret.) John Aquilino’s “hellscape” concept of a future asymmetric battlefield in the Indo-Pacific were to ever become a reality, rethinking the use of aircraft carriers may become a necessity.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Rethinking Aircraft Carriers was originally published on Global Security Review.

China adopted a policy of no first use upon testing its first nuclear weapon in 1964. From a theoretical perspective, proponents of no first use believe such declarations limit the likelihood of nuclear war. By promising only to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack, intimidation with nuclear weapons is minimal and thus escalation is controllable. This, however, seems to be the opposite direction China is heading.

When the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong, declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, he faced an increasingly difficult environment for his new nation. Amid ongoing tensions, following the Chinese Civil War, Mao faced the Kuomintang (Chinese nationalists) in Taiwan. The KMT still promised a victory over the communists and was aided by the West. In the years that followed, Mao and the CCP leadership watched, what they deemed, bullying from the nuclear weapons states—the US and Soviet Union. Finally, due to a strained relationship with the Soviet Union, China founded the China National Nuclear Corporation in 1956 to build its nuclear weapons program. After fielding a small nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, China largely downplayed the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese foreign policy and never sought an arsenal to rival the US or Soviet Union.

Today, however, that is rapidly changing. Within the varied set of tools that China has used for coercing its neighbors under gray zone tactics, there is one tool it has not yet tried: threatening the use of nuclear weapons—with the exception of threatening Japan. Premier Xi Jinping called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” transforming institutions and norms in ways that will reflect Beijing’s values and priorities. China’s approach to achieving its strategic goals in the region may transition toward the inclusion of nuclear weapons into its framework of political threats, intimidation, and even the use of force to achieve its international goals.

Today, the PRC is fielding new, more mobile, and more accurate nuclear weapons, while simultaneously enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The PRC completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which cumulatively contain at least 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, with intelligence suggesting those silos are now filled. China’s new strategic plan also includes road-mobile ICBMs that carry at least three multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The US first agreed to eliminate MIRV’d missiles from ICBMs with the signing of the START II treaty despite the agreement’s failure to enter into force. Nations like China and India do not believe themselves to be beholden to the same restrictions, regardless of moral condemnation from the arms control community.

In addition to the growing numbers of China’s coast guard fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is also enhancing and producing more advanced surface ships as these become key components of the PRC’s goal of unmitigated regional expansion. The PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of at least 370 ships and submarines, in addition to over 140 major surface combatants. The new Jin-class ballistic missile submarine will carry third-generation JL-3 ballistic missiles designed with a range of greater than 10,000 kilometers, more than capable of striking the American homeland.

To counter this pacing threat, the US needs to think strategically and long term to compete with China’s decades-long expansionist plans. During the Cold War, NATO was formed to prevent a likely invasion of Europe on its eastern front by the Soviet Union. NATO’s structure of strong defensive and ideological commitments, aided by the assistance of the American nuclear umbrella with a high level of credibility, prevented that catastrophe from happening. A similar approach should be developed in Asia. The case of Taiwan is increasingly vital because a failure to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression may signal the end of American global leadership.

China’s nuclear arsenal, born in 1964 as a small, purely defensive achievement, is now reaching for parity with the United States. The growing power of its nuclear capabilities indicates that PRC leadership intends to update its nuclear policy, moving from a no first use to an active and credible deterrent.

The US should consider at least two strategies to cope with this inevitability: build a stronger political commitment with allies in the Indo-Pacific and continue to counter the Belt and Road Initiative. Regardless of the time it takes for China to declare a new nuclear strategy, preparations within the American government must now begin as if this change has already occurred.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral student at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

China’s Growing Power and the Inevitable End of “No First Use” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eight recent assessments of future prospects for strategic stability in light of growing nuclear dangers have been brought forward for consideration including (1) a Brookings Institute essay by Caitlyn Talmadge on the Biden and Trump approaches to nuclear deterrence; (2) Representative and Intelligence Chair Mike Turner’s nuclear and space related remarks at CSIS; (3) Joe Cirincione’s description of the Biden and Trump nuclear agenda’s as dangerously bad and worse, respectively; (4) Professor Wittmer’s complaint that everything Trump might do or has done on nuclear deterrence has accelerated the “arms race”; (5) Brad Robert’s top-notch look into the future about what the LLNL program director describes as “unwelcome” truths  that must be faced; (6) Mark Schneider’s welcome assessment of what French President Macron is trying to do with extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the related pitfalls; (7) Mathew Kroenig and Mark Massa review the value of ICBMs and particularly what is required for future ICBM related nuclear deterrence–and in their usual scholarly manner; and (8) commentary by Mike Albertson of LLNL and (9) Con Coughlin of Gatestone about what the US  and its allies are facing over the next few decades in the nuclear arena and why meeting the deterrent challenge is both very interesting but also absolutely challenging. Coughlin’s top concern is the US non-confrontational policy with respect to Iran and the relative loss of credible US deterrent capability.

The Critics

Talmadge, Wittmer, and Cirincione portray former President Trump as some kind of nuclear Mad Hatter or Dr. Strangelove who will bring about nuclear Armageddon, although all three largely get  recent nuclear deterrent history wrong. However, their narrative is common with Hollywood and reflected in both the new Oppenheimer film, as well as in Annie Jacobson book that describes current US nuclear deterrent strategy as “Mad” and immoral. Cirincione even describes the Biden nuclear modernization program as highly dangerous even though its entirety fits within the confines of the New START agreement of 2010.

As for Whitmer’s claim the “arms race” accelerated after 2017, the facts are that as of 2010, Russia had already planned the deployment of some 29 new types of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, which have remained on schedule and are now over 90% complete.

As for whether the US should have shown restraint, an amendment to kill the ICBM leg of the Triad was offered by Representative Garamendi in June 2021 in the HASC and House floor, with the Democrats in the majority, and lost 49-9 in Committee and 308-119 on the House floor. And as Dr. David Trachtenberg has shown in a previous essay, the idea that US restraint in US deployments of nuclear weapons will generate similar restraint among our adversaries is debunked by history. As former defense secretary Harold Brown once quipped, “We build, they build. We stop, they build.”

Steady as You Go & Enhancements Needed?  .

Another perspective comes from the essays of Dr. Roberts, Dr. Kroenig and Mr. Massa. They both are excellent contributions to the growing proposals of how to meet the challenge of what Admiral Charles Richard described as a projected two peer nuclear armed enemies of the United States by 2035. Both analyze the program of record which is based on the force structure planned in 2010 and which fits within the New START agreement which has been observed for the past three administrations, including that of President Donald Trump for 2017-21.

Kroenig and Massa explore former HASC Chairman Smith’s proposal to eliminate all ICBMs. Their unique contribution is to point out if ICBMs are so needed they might be launched promptly during an attack, it makes no sense to eliminate their capability, especially as it would eliminate a key required deterrent capability while also leaving the US with roughly 12 targets on land and at sea which if eliminated would put the US out of the nuclear business. As former NDU President General Mike Dunn once explained, “Why would we make it easier for our enemies to disarm us?”

Dr. Brad Roberts explains the positive days of 2010 are now gone, and the unwelcome truths are that we are entering a very dangerous nuclear era but which we must squarely face. He is concerned a future US administration might fail to continue the US extended deterrent over NATO and our Pacific allies, with the possible consequence that our allies seek their own nuclear deterrent, which could have serious consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And his top concern is the relative lack of urgency with which US national leaders take to the nuclear table, as the consequence of inaction or delay could be deadly.

NIPP’s Mark Schneider looks at what President Macron is proposing for extended deterrence in Europe as wholly inadequate for NATO’s security but should be fully examined. It is important to note when discussing the US relationship with NATO that under the previous administration, the DoD resources devoted to defending our NATO allies increased significantly, as did the number of NATO members that met the 2% spending target for defense, completely consistent with previous President Trump’s recent declaration that he is “100%” with NATO.

House Intelligence Chair Mike Turner explores with Dr. Kari Bingen of CSIS the big threats facing the US (which the critics reviewed here hardly mention). The Russian deployment of ASAT nuclear forces is a serious threat says Turner to US space assets, while the Posture Commission support for widespread missile defense capabilities is a big breakthrough and hopefully will lead to rapid new US deployments says the Ohio representative.

The highlight of the new NIPP study by Schneider is the chart on what Russia is currently building or has in development—some 26 new nuclear types of weapons while the US has five. The Russian force moderation is near 93% complete according to the Kremlin while the US modernization effort has yet to place its first SNDV or strategic nuclear delivery vehicle into the force.

Program of Record Plus

The three critics of current modernization are primarily concerned with four augmentations to the program of record, as well as the rhetoric and diplomatic actions of the former President, even in the case of Cirincione thinking even the Obama era current program of record is highly dangerous.

As the Strategic Posture Commission report emphasized, the current program of record is necessary even critical but it is not adequate to the deterrent task before us. One thing being proposed by Brad Roberts, for example, is the development of a Navy cruise missile that would be nuclear armed, a Tomahawk technology removed from the theater nuclear force inventory by President Herbert Walker Bush but then dismantled by the Obama administration.

The stealthy, prompt and survivable at sea theater system would meet all the criteria needed for a sound theater deterrent and would meet the current gap between US vs Russian and Chinese theater systems in the European and Pacific theaters. The number that might be deployed would probably be in the intermediate dozens of such weapons, but certainly not anywhere near the 1900 Russian theater systems identified by the US intelligence community, to say nothing of what the Chinese may have deployed. But as Franklin Miller writes July 10^th, “a U.S. nuclear sea-launched cruise missile would enhance deterrence and reassure allies in peacetime and crisis, and, in wartime, provide a President with additional options to prevent enemy nuclear escalation. The W 76-2 is an excellent weapon, but any President deserves more than one option; the combination of the ballistic W 76-2 and the airbreathing SLCM-N would provide a President with significant flexibility to manage a crisis.’

Another augmentation has been completed and that has been adding low-yield nuclear weapons to the D-5 missiles, again for a total number of such weapons in the low dozens at most, an added capability endorsed by the current administration. Both the low-yield D-5 and a SLCM-N would help rectify the current theater imbalance and be able to deter the use of such weapons at the low end of the nuclear spectrum, which itself enhances deterrence, avoiding what then Senator John Kennedy declared in 1959 was the bad choice between all out Armageddon, (massive retaliation), or surrender (standing down.) .

Additional elements of enhancing the US deterrent posture especially after New START expires would be adding warheads to the US ICBM and SLBM force of 692 missiles as envisioned by the 12 Columbia class submarines (the minimum needed) and 192 D-5 missiles and the 400 Sentinel missiles, although there are proposals on the table for also deploying the 50 reserve ICBMs allowed as a hedge under New START. As well as to upload our B52s and other bombers.

Implementing the Hedge?

When taken together, the US has a hedge capability of around 1000 additional warheads the US could add to its strategic nuclear posture and could do so over a period of 3-4 years depending on how fast the US could deploy additional ICBM warheads on either the legacy MMIII ICBMs or the new Sentinel system. Whatever is the case, the roughly 2800+ warheads the US could have in its strategic nuclear force by 2035 would be dwarfed by the projected Russia and China nuclear forces, which Professor Chris Yeaw, at the 20^{th of} June Triad Symposium at LSUS,  has projected will reach some 10,000 warheads.

In short, what proponents of nuclear enhancements vs nuclear restraint are arguing over is the deployment of some 1000 US warheads or an augmentation of the US strategic force of some fifty percent of the current US strategic, long-range force. Even if one adds in a force of 300 theater systems including the current gravity bombs in Europe and the projected new SLCM-N theater forces, the total buildup for the United States would at best reach 3000 warheads by the middle of the next decade. Or more likely the following decade some 20 years hence if the fully modernized force of 12 Columbia class submarines and SLEP D-5 missiles, 20 B21 bombers and associated cruise missiles and 400-50 Sentinel missiles, is fielded.

Given the breathtaking expansion of Russian and Chinese forces already underway, such a US response is nothing but practical and proportionate and well within a reasonable calculation of what is required, as Franklin Miller has noted, to right the current deterrent imbalance, without necessarily matching warhead for warhead the projected deployed Russian and Chinese forces.

The critics of enhancement, however, spend almost no time doing an informed review of how they would correct the current imbalance except to claim the US is unnecessarily leading a new arms race (demonstrably wrong), or as Cirincione put it, seeking to wage nuclear war (again demonstrably absurd).

The next US Administration and the JCPOA, North Korea, INF and Arms Control.

What the critics concentrate on is the rhetoric and diplomatic action of the previous administration. These actions include withdrawal from the JCPOA, the joint nuclear agreement with Iran, the withdrawal from the INF treaty, and the US relationship with North Korea and its nuclear and missile forces.

North Korea and the Button

The former President did remind the leader of North Korea that the US did have a more formidable nuclear deterrent than the DPRK and that our deterrent after decade of testing actually worked. Both comments were perfectly consistent with the time-honored point of the US deterrent strategy: (1) our deterrent is very large and (2) we have the will to use it should North Korea attack the United States. Interestingly, the NPRK did not test a nuclear weapon or test an ICBM range missile during 2017-20.

Iran & The JCPOA

The United States never ratified the Iranian JCPOA as the votes were not there in the US Senate. The deal could not be ratified because it was a bad deal. Instead, the previous Obama administration used a clever rube goldbergian strategy to secure an occasional review of the agreement by the US Senate. The agreement allowed the Iranians to build up an enhanced capability to produce weapons grade nuclear fuel, with the requirement that the low-level produced fuel be exported—primarily to Russia. However, since all the provisions in the deal expire soon, where are the diplomatic efforts over the past 2 ½ years to extended the agreement or make it permanent if its provisions are so demonstrably good? The fact that Iran may have been adhering to the provisions of the deal does not magically change the terms of the deal from terrible to good!

And where is the diplomatic effort for the US  to sign back up to the JCPOA and this time get the Senate to agree? In fact, much of the opposite has occurred including the US dropping sanctions against Iran, which then provided to Tehran tens of billions in hard currency. On top of which, despite the US restraint, Iran has attacked the US some 170 times between October 2023 and January 2024.

Including killing and wounding US servicemen and women, to saying nothing of planning, arming and financing the horrible Hamas slaughter of Israel’s last October and the launching of hundreds of missiles and rockets against Israel this spring. No such attacks occurred during the previous administration as Iranian hard currency reserves fell to around $10 billon, which is near 1/10^th their current level, and contributed significantly to the Iranian lack of resources to conduct its serial terrorist activities.

Even more dangerous is that Iran in cooperation with China, Russia, and the terrorist group Houthis, has engineered a  new form of piracy where ocean borne freight traffic, including oil tankers are denied access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal unless they agree to abide by new Chinese rules, a kind of ocean toll road regime, as outlined recently by the group Committee on the Present Danger-China.

And as a former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress about the Somalia based “pirates,” they could only locate ships at sea with the use of GPS—which as only the US and Russia could provide such technology it was obvious with what country  the pirates were doing business.

INF & Arms Control Prospects?

The previous administration did try and bring China and Russia do the arms control table but were harshly criticized for thinking China would agree to any such warhead ceilings while trailing the US inventory—although the Soviets did just that in SALT I with respect to the balance in strategic forces in 1972. And despite being outgunned 2000/1 by the Soviets SS-20 deployments, President Ronald Reagan successfully secured the removal of all Soviet SS-20 missiles from both Europe and Asia, while strengthening NATO and our Pacific alliances.

As for the INF treaty, it is widely known the Russians were serially cheating on the agreement. Having only one party to a treaty that is complying with is hardly the way international agreements work, although perhaps the critics have some suggestions which were absent from their essays.

The Record of Arms Control Deals

The tendency for the critics of former President Trump is to claim those with whom they disagree are somehow “against arms control,” in favor of arms races and want to fight nuclear war. These claims were made against President Reagan, who in fact once quipped his domestic critics were harsher in their opposition to his nuclear modernization plans than was the USSR!

In hosting some multiple hundreds of arms control seminars from 1983 through 2024, the actual facts are startling: Republican Presidents cut US strategic long-range nuclear forces from over 10,000 to roughly 2200, and reduced theater nuclear forces by additional multiples of ten thousand warheads, while also securing –for a multiple of reasons– massive reductions in Soviet and then Russian nuclear weapons amounting to also multiple tens of thousands.

Where and When Did Modernization Start?

Unfortunately, as retired General John Hyten explained during the last ten years of his military leadership as Deputy Commander of the USAF Space Command, then  as Commander of US Strategic Command, and then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Putin had a plan to fully modernize his forces starting in 2004 and not continue on the path of further nuclear reductions but to actually augment the Russian force to multiples of the New START allowable force.

According to Rick Fisher and Bradley Thayer and Mark Schnieder, the Chinese too had plans to build up to over 1500 strategic nuclear warheads, fully adopted in the 2008-9 timeframe, both demonstrably before the Trump administration, which completely obliterates Professor Wittmer’s complaint that the Chinese and Russian nuclear buildups are all Trump’s fault.

The Great Unravelling

Indeed, the arms control progress assumed to be holding from START I to New START has come unraveled. Although it’s tempting to “always blame America” for the rogue behavior of Xi and Putin, their nuclear transgressions are all their own as the Posture Commission explained—to them nuclear weapons are instruments of coercion and blackmail, to serve not to deter the interests of military aggression.

But on the current administration’s watch as Ms. Talmadge admits, things no longer hold: “Iran is now closer to a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s arsenal can more directly threaten the United States. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding as it becomes increasingly confrontational toward Taiwan…and Russia is now engaged in a major conventional war on NATO’s border.’ The origin of the relative loss of US deterrent capability may be a complicated subject, but that the US has lost some deterrent strength is unquestioned. The key will be, as the Strategic Posture Commission boldly explained, to restore US deterrent strength on a bipartisan, lasting basis so we can successfully meet the challenges of the new nuclear era.

GET THE FULL REPORT

The Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence in the Next American Administration was originally published on Global Security Review.

Its author, James Wilson, is a supervisory historian at the State Department. Wilson oversees the compilation and editing of declassified documents for publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States. His focus is Cold War national security policy and interactions with the Soviets. He previously wrote a book about the end of the Cold War with a focus on Mikhail Gorbachev. Wilson also writes for War on the Rocks.

His latest effort focuses on Paul Nitze, his life, and his role in American national security policy throughout the Cold War.

Paul Nitze is not a household name when it comes to 20th-century US history or even Cold War history. There are only a handful of books about him; four books were published from 1969 to 2006 mentioning him, usually in passing. Keep in mind, he authored NSC-68, which is arguably the most important national security document in the nation’s history. His relative obscurity is not surprising, though, as his opinion of political scientists was mostly negative.

One can see from James Wilson’s resume that he understands the influential events of history and works with official material on these matters every day, which means Paul Nitze is important beyond just authoring NSC-68. Nitze was not just an advisor, but someone known by all post–World War II presidents, and too important to be promoted to a cabinet-level position.

Paul Nitze was and is important for reasons other than just a historic memo and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a man who helped write the Selective Service Act, helped procure resources for the Cold War fight against communism, wrote the final reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and authored the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). His conclusions on the turning and end points for the Axis Powers during the war informed his beliefs throughout the Cold War.

Some of today’s challenges would be familiar to Nitze. He warned of expanding NATO and was highly critical of the State Department’s lack of imagination and ability to adapt. He understood what was required to win a war and a nation’s vulnerabilities during war. If he were alive today, he would most likely find the US to be as provocatively weak as it was on December 7, 1941.

As a man who believed in peace through strength, he would be discussing the nation’s weak economy and supply-chain challenges and advocate for technological innovation across the Department of Defense. He would also oppose consolidating military and private-sector logistics.

One of his worst fears was that an attack on American military forces would push the president into choosing between a retaliatory nuclear strike or surrender. This is still a concern today.

Wilson offers readers a great read and tells untold stories that those interested in World War II and the Cold War will enjoy. The later chapters set up the major policy decisions and events that bring readers to the present day.

This work reminds us that we have been here before, and that achieving strategic superiority is not easy. It took advocates like Paul Nitze, with grit and determination over decades, to make it happen. The threats to the nation continue to evolve. Thus, a new generation of advocates for technological and strategic superiority are needed. American leaders need to look past credentialism and embrace the competent, from wherever they may come. Hopefully the story of Paul Nitze will be an inspiration to them.

One of the highlights of the book is the tale of the overnight negotiations that took place in Reykjavik, Iceland, on the weekend of October 11–12, 1986, when President Ronald Reagan sought to bring General Secretary Gorbachev around to his previously outlined positions regarding START. After an all-night haggling session, and some shuttle diplomacy with their respective bosses, came the morning after. Paul Nitze and Soviet delegation head, Sergei Akhromeyev, agreed that, under the terms of START, they would count gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles on heavy bombers as one warhead.

Nitze was never constrained by academic tenure or any other hindrances. He thrived as an investment manager in private equity, fund management, and foreign direct investment when not in government. That gave Nitze the financial autonomy that shielded him from employers’ and pressure groups’ retaliation. It provided him with the freedom and ability to perform his political activism at the highest level.

Nitze was a man of action who shaped the clockwork of history’s small and big wheels. That does not mean he despised thinkers who kept their fingers on the pulse of things. But what Nitze really loathed was ineffective theorists with no impact on real decision-making.

James Wilson’s biography of Paul Nitze, who experienced the Cold War’s “tension between opposites,” reminds us of the words of Sir William Francis Butler who wrote, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find it’s fighting done by fools and it’s thinking done by cowards.”

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a practicing attorney.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

America’s Cold Warrior: A Review was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest ICBM EAR Report provides updates from USAF Global Strike command ’s on the ICBM Bomber Nuclear Programs, senior officials quotes, Hill developments and international strategic developments. A must read for all National Security professionals.

Summary: The US Congress and Administration are now grappling with how to improve US deterrence in the face of military conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, and the growing possibility of an additional military conflict in the Western Pacific. The common thread is the coordination of such military aggression by North Korea, Iran, Russia and China. The current defense budget is constrained by a 1% cap on any increase for FY2025, significantly below what most recognize as what is required for the US to spend, even with a coordinated effort by the US and its allies to all increase defense investments. Some House members have called for a change in defense but to do so after the November election. The Senate SASC did approve a $25 billion increase in defense spending to $768 billion (not including NNSA) which was originally proposed by Senator Wicker, the ranking member of the Committee.

Key Events of the Week

Lt Gen Michael Lutton (Deputy Commander of USAF Global Strike Command) and Maj Gen Stacy Jo Huser (Commander of 20^th USAF) spoke on Friday June 28^th at 10am and 2pm, respectively, on the ICBM and bomber nuclear programs as part of the ongoing nuclear seminar series by NIDS/Huessy. Links are available from alex.litlefieeld@thinkdeterrence.com A full report on their remarks will be available in next weeks report.

Triad Conference June 20^th at LSUS

https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3819202/strategic-systems-programs-promotes-workforce-modernization-at-nuclear-triad-sy/

Quotes of the Week:

Ms. Kelly Lee, SSP’s Director of Plan and Programs: “Strategic deterrence is a team sport, and all three legs are needed to win.” (At the LSUS, NIDS and BFR Triad Symposium, June 20^th.

Mr. Cole (R-OK)“They’ve [the Senate Democrats] got to learn to prioritize a little bit. It’s a lot more dangerous world than one would like right now, so I think defense ought to be the priority.”

Mr. Diaz-Balart (R-FL) “A 1% increase with inflation is basically a 5% reduction. Obviously, logic would tell you that’s not good enough.”

Republican Study Committee Chair Kevin Hern (R-OK): “The cap should stay where it’s at overall and something else has to give–we would agree to increase defense spending in exchange for cuts to nondefense funding.”

Hill Developments

The Congress is currently in the midst of a Congressional tug of war to pass a new defense bill but which also responds to the need for a greater nuclear and conventional deterrent capability as outlined by the Posture Commission of the United States.

The House HASC has kept within the 1% budget growth required by the previous budget deal agreed to by the Administration. The HASC nearly fully funded most of the nuclear deterrent.

The SASC added a number of new nuclear provisions (outlined in my remarks below to the LSUS/NIDS/BFR Triad Symposium in Shreveport, Louisiana on June 20^th, 2024.) while increasing overall defense spending by $25 billion as proposed by Senator Wicker of Mississippi the ranking member of the Committee.

However, the HAC defense subcommittee cut $324 million from the Sentinel program and according to CQ added ICBM language to the Committee report, while also sticking to the 1% budget growth as required by the law:

HAC Report June 2024 Minuteman Modernization / Ground Based Strategic Deterrent

The United States currently deploys more than 400 Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, and under the current nuclear modernization program the Air Force plans to replace the Minuteman with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system (named the “Sentinel”). The measure appropriates $3.4 billion for continued research and development of the GBSD, $324 million less than requested.

Section II. Major Weapons Systems Fact Sheet No. 118-29

In January 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that Sentinel is two years behind schedule and that overall costs have increased from $96 billion to more than $130 billion. The schedule delays triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which occurs when a major acquisition program experiences delays beyond a threshold used to manage the costs of major programs.

In its report, writes CQ, the HAC said it was surprised to learn about the program acquisition unit cost breach of at least 37% and is concerned that the issues driving the critical overruns were not identified sooner. The measure therefore directs GAO to assess the impact of program turnover within 180 days of passage of this act.

Some in the House GOP reject Senate bid to renegotiate budget deal for defense spending boost, seek boost after November’s election.

By Lindsey McPherson – The Washington Times – Wednesday, June 26, 2024

Senate defense hawks want to renegotiate a budget cap deal signed into law last year to spend an extra $25 billion on national security, but most House Republicans do not want to revisit the contentious spending level debate.

The House has managed to address pressing defense needs from deterring conflict with China to ensuring troops get a pay raise while sticking to budget caps, Republicans argue.

“They love to spend, those senators,” Rep. Nick LaLota, New York Republican, told The Washington Times. “Opening up the deal is opening up a can of worms and is probably not what we should do.”

Mr. LaLota, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee that oversees defense policy, said the 1% increase in defense spending the House has proposed, in alignment with the budget cap, “meets the moment.”

Republicans on the House Appropriations Committee, which oversees spending, had differing views about the Senate’s proposed defense increase. Some prefer to stick to the budget cap and others are sympathetic to spending more on defense to keep up with inflation and rising foreign conflicts.

But GOP appropriators seem to agree that renegotiating the spending limits would run contrary to their goal of cutting nondefense spending. Senate Democrats are demanding any boost to defense be paired with an equal percentage increase to domestic funding.

“It does make it problematic,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, Florida Republican, told The Times. “So, we’ll see what they try to come up with.”

Mr. Diaz-Balart is, however, supportive of increasing defense spending beyond the 1% allowed under the statutory limit.

“A 1% increase with inflation is basically a 5% reduction,” he said. “Obviously, logic would tell you that’s not good enough.”

More conservative members of the Appropriations Committee said they want to stick with the spending limits enacted last year as part of the debt limit law, the Fiscal Responsibility Act.

“It’s the law of the land. There’s no need to negotiate it,” said Rep. Andy Harris, Maryland Republican.

House Appropriations Chair Tom Cole, Oklahoma Republican, said the House will continue passing spending bills that adhere to the budget caps, including the defense appropriations bill that is on the floor this week.

As for his willingness to renegotiate spending levels with the Senate, Mr. Cole said, “Not between now and the election.”

“I’m all for additional money for defense, and we’ll sit down and bargain afterward,” he told The Times.

Mr. Cole also had a warning for Senate Democrats pushing for equal increases to nondefense spending: “They’ve got to learn to prioritize a little bit. It’s a lot more dangerous world than one would like right now, so I think defense ought to be the priority.”

While Mr. Cole would be involved in any negotiation over spending levels, he said any decision on whether to revisit the spending caps is up to House Speaker Mike Johnson, Louisiana Republican.

Mr. Johnson’s office did not respond to a request for comment. However, the speaker tends to consult his members on such decisions, and the prevailing view in his conference is to stick to the spending limit.

“The cap should stay where it’s at overall and something else has to give,” Republican Study Committee Chair Kevin Hern of Oklahoma said, noting GOP members would agree to increase defense spending in exchange for cuts to nondefense funding.

Senate Democrats would not go for that. They are already complaining House Republicans have not fully adhered to last year’s deal. In addition to the spending caps enacted into law, the deal included unenforceable side agreements involving budget maneuvers appropriators could use to spend more on defense and nondefense programs without technically breaching the law’s limits.

Since the side deal was brokered under former Speaker Kevin McCarthy, House Republicans, now under new leadership, have disregarded it.

House Republicans’ appropriations bills “ignore the deal that they negotiated in favor of devastating cuts to nondefense,” Senate Appropriations Chair Patty Murray said in a floor speech last week.

The Washington Democrat called on the Senate to “chart a different path” and “provide additional resources beyond the caps to address major shortfalls and new challenges.”

Administration Statement of Administration Policy threatens to veto House defense spending bill

InsideDefense.com, June 24 (1550) | Tony Bertuca

President Biden would veto the GOP-led House’s version of the fiscal year 2025 defense appropriations bill if it were to pass in its current form, according to a new statement of administration policy from the White House Office of Management and Budget. The administration opposes all the House GOP’s appropriations bills on the grounds that they make steep cuts in non-defense spending and eliminate various initiatives related to climate change mitigation, abortion services and diversity, according to OMB.

ICBM Critics push the Pentagon for ‘unbiased’ review of costly Sentinel nuclear missile program

The Hill Online, June 24 (1001) | Brad Dress

A group of Democrats led by the congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group sent a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Monday calling for a “comprehensive, thorough, and unbiased assessment” of the controversial Sentinel nuclear missile program, which has soared in costs over the years. In the letter, provided first to The Hill, the lawmakers expressed concerns that the Pentagon’s review of the Sentinel program, which is mandatory after a significant cost overrun in January, was “being prepared with an end-state in mind.”

In the letter, the lawmakers expressed concerns that the Pentagon’s review of the Sentinel program, which is mandatory after a significant cost overrun in January, was “being prepared with an end-state in mind.”

“Given the imperative of advancing nuclear policies that promote stability and prevent escalation, we demand a thorough review of all alternatives,” they wrote. “At this critical juncture, we must not allow momentum and preconceived notions to cloud our judgment in reviewing whether this program provides for our national security or is wasting U.S. taxpayer dollars.

“The American people have a right to know how their money is being spent and to what end, particularly for our nation’s nuclear policy,” the lawmakers added.

The congressional working group, which is holding a July hearing on Sentinel, is co-chaired by Democratic Sens. Ed Markey (Mass.) and Jeff Merkley (Ore.) and Reps. John Garamendi (Calif.) and Don Beyer (Va.).

The letter was also signed by several other Democrats, including Sens. Elizabeth Warren (Mass.), Chris Van Hollen (Md.), and Ron Wyden (Ore.) and Reps. Sara Jacobs (Calif.), Mark Pocan (Wis.), Barbara Lee (Calif.), Jim McGovern (Mass.) and Jerry Nadler (N.Y.). -20-

The Monday letter signals that concerns are growing about the embattled Sentinel nuclear missile program, with more Democrats pressing for an honest review of the initiative and of the alternatives.

Sentinel aims to replace the more than 50-year-old Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) scattered across the rural western U.S. in underground silos. The 400 ICBMs are one part of the nuclear triad, along with bomber planes and submarines.

But the program, which awarded its first contract in 2020 to defense giant Northrop Grumman, the contractor likely to keep developing the program, overran its costs by 37 percent in January, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach that requires a Pentagon review.

Sentinel is expected to now cost around $130 billion, far more than the original roughly $60 billion about a decade ago. Much of the increase is tied to a vast real estate project as the Air Force looks to modernize related infrastructure for the new missiles.

In the letter, the lawmakers said the Air Force “has relied on a budget projection that underestimated costs, made poor assumptions, and relied on incomplete data to gain Congressional approval for the program’s authorization.”

“It’s unacceptable that such flawed assumptions were the basis for a project of this magnitude and that these types of errors persist to this day,” they wrote.

Supporters of Sentinel argue that it is critical for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad and modernize each leg as competition increases with China and Russia. Skeptics have questioned whether ICBMs provide a necessary deterrence, considering they lack the abilities of fast bomber planes or clandestine submarines.

Modernization, however, remains a key national security strategy under the Biden administration, and Air Force officials have said that Sentinel must be funded.

The Democratic lawmakers on Monday said Sentinel, after the Nunn-McCurdy breach, can only be continued if there are no alternatives, the program’s cost is reasonable and can be constrained further, and if the program is essential to national security and a higher priority than other programs that may be cut.

In the letter, however, they pointed to past comments by the Air Force and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante, vowing that Sentinel will be funded as “concerning signs that past preferences prejudiced the outcome of this new review.”

“There must be an honest evaluation of the necessity of proceeding with this program now and at what cost we are willing to continue,” lawmakers said. “Inevitably, this means making hard decisions about how and where to spend taxpayer dollars. Billions of dollars and at least a decade have been spent justifying the $130 billion Sentinel program. This requires reevaluation.”

International & Strategic Developments

U.S. to Hezbollah: Don’t count on us to stop an Israeli attack

Politico Online, June 24 (1926) | Nahal Toosi, Erin Banco and Lara Seligman

U.S. officials trying to prevent a bigger Middle East war are issuing an unusual warning to Hezbollah: Don’t assume that Washington can stop Israel from attacking you. The blunt message comes as many U.S. officials appear resigned to the possibility that Israel will make a major move against Hezbollah inside Lebanon in the coming weeks. Two U.S. officials told POLITICO that the militia needs to also understand that Washington will help Israel defend itself if Hezbollah retaliates. They stressed that the militant group should not count on America to act as a brake on Israeli decision-making.

Pentagon Confident It Can Still Defend Against Houthi Attacks Without a Carrier in the Region

Military.com, June 24 (1708) | Konstantin Toropin

The Pentagon said Monday it remains confident that it will be able to respond to ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea after a Navy aircraft carrier strike group departed the region and it was unclear when another carrier group might arrive. “We still have capability in the region,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters. The Navy will “continue to work very closely with our international allies and partners toward that end when it comes to safeguarding the flow of commerce and safety of mariners in the Red Sea.”

Air Force fires official overseeing Sentinel missile program

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4741560-air-force-fires-sentinel-missile-program-overseeing-official-charles-clegg/

BY: BRAD DRESS for THE HILL // 06/26/24 3:22 PM ET

The Air Force has fired the top official overseeing the costly Sentinel nuclear missile program, which is currently under a Pentagon review for ballooning costs.

The commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Maj. Gen. John Newberry, fired Col. Charles Clegg, The Hill confirmed Wednesday. Clegg had assumed the position in August 2022, serving less than two years in the job that oversees the Sentinel program that began around a decade ago. An Air Force spokesperson said Clegg was removed from his job because of a loss of confidence and that it was not related to the Nunn-McCurdy breach in January, when Sentinel overshot its budget costs by 37 percent.

That triggered the Defense Department to review whether the program is still necessary and vital to national security. “He was removed because he did not follow organizational procedures. This removal action is not directly related to the Nunn-McCurdy review,” the Air Force spokesperson said in an email. The spokesperson also said the removal does not impact the operation of the 400 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that Sentinel is supposed to replace.

Minuteman “remains our nation’s safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, just as it has been without interruption for the past six decades,” the spokesperson added. The Sentinel program aims to create brand-new missiles to replace the aging, more than 50-year-old Minuteman ICBMs. But the project’s cost has grown from around $60 billion in 2015 to around $130 billion now and has attracted more intense congressional scrutiny after the Nunn-McCurdy breach.

Several Democrats sent a letter to the Pentagon this week calling for a fair and honest review of whether Sentinel is vital to national security at the updated cost of the program. A congressional nuclear arms working group is also holding a July 24 hearing on the program. The sentinel is supposed to finish around 2030 but is now expected to be delayed. The main contractor on the project, Northrop Grumman, earlier this year announced it would not be conducting a critical flight test until 2026.

The project’s costs are inflating in part because it also involves renovating or constructing new real estate, including infrastructure that will house the new missiles. The Minuteman ICBMs are spread out across several states in the rural Western part of the country. The Air Force has fired the head of its program to build the next intercontinental ballistic missile, whose projected costs have ballooned to $131 billion.

Sentinel Systems Director Col. Charles Clegg was removed because he “did not follow organizational procedures” and the service lost confidence in his ability to lead the program, Air Force spokesperson Ann Stefanek confirmed in a statement. The removal, first reported by Bloomberg, comes after the troubled program breached Nunn-McCurdy limits, which triggered the Pentagon to review the program and recertify it to stop it from being canceled.

However, Stefanek said Clegg’s removal “is not directly related to the Nunn-McCurdy review.” The results of the Nunn-McCurdy process are due to Congress on July 9, but some lawmakers are already concerned that the Pentagon’s process of evaluating the program hasn’t been fair. The Air Force started the Nunn-McCurdy review with “biased and preconceived notions,” a group of Democratic lawmakers wrote in a June 24 letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Those lawmakers want  a “thorough review of all alternatives” before the Pentagon moves ahead with Sentinel

Important Essays To Review

Make All B52s Nuclear Capable

The SASC proposed making the entire B52 force nuclear capable. Here is what it might cost: https://www.twz.com/air/making-the-entire-b-52-fleet-nuclear-capable-what-it-would-take

HSCI Chairman Mike Turner speaks About Nuclear Weapons and US Foreign Policy

https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-weapons-and-foreign-policy-conversation-hpsci-chairman-mike-turner

Should  the United States cut Nuclear weapons spending as part of a fiscal discipline strategy?

https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/we-cant-afford-cut-americas-nuclear-modernization-program

Three Essays on ICBMs and nuclear deterrence by Peter Huessy

Is US Nuclear Deterrence In Jeopardy? Lost? – Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization

Nuclear Weapons Essay: Rust to Obsolescence or Modernize to Credibility? – Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization

Closing Remarks by Peter Huessy at the LSUS, BFR and NIDS Triad Symposium, June 20^th, 2024, on the Campus of Louisiana State University in Shreveport, Louisiana in support of the USAF Global Strike Command

A leading progressive newspaper recently noted that the world has a “lot of arms but not much control.” And surprisingly, the editorial went on to explain—correctly—while the US has exercised restraint in its nuclear modernization—staying within the New START limits—not so Russia and China, with the result that a two-nation arms race is underway in which the United States is not participating.

As retired Admiral Charles Richard noted in 2022 China is adding to its nuclear arsenal at a breathtaking speed. Russia may have  already engaged in a significant upload of its New START accountable warheads, as it has such a capability in the multiple thousands of warheads. And especially dangerous given there have been no New START inspections for many years, on top of thousands of Russian deployed theater nuclear forces under no arms limits.

North Korea and Iran, one an expanding nuclear armed rogue state and the other on the nuclear doorstep, are allied with Russia and China, adding to nuclear dangers. Acting with its proxy terror groups such as the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran shut down western allied freight traffic in the Red Sea and Suez, attacked US forces some 170 time in the region since October 2023, and launched thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel and other US allies. On top of which, Putin continues to make serial nuclear threats to Ukraine, while China says if Japan comes to the defense of Taiwan, it will suffer the same fate as the country did in WWII.

It is right to characterize the 2010 US nuclear program of record as consistent with the New START treaty. But absent a new agreement by China and Russia to restrict arms, the US is indeed projected in the 2025-35 timeframe to face two nuclear armed peer adversaries for the first time, each probably with unrestrained nuclear arsenals. In such an environment, the US nuclear deterrent strategy needs to be augmented as it was adopted in a more benign environment.

What then should the United States do?

There are two general approaches currently being discussed.

As the Posture Commission noted, the program of record is necessary, even critical, but not sufficient. The Senate Armed Service Committee is listening it appears, and in the NDAA or national defense legislation, calls for at least four new initiatives: (1) make all 76 B52s nuclear capable; (2) deploy the Sentinel ICBM in all 450 silos; (3) establish a SLCM-N program office; and (4) create a high-level DoD official to oversee all nuclear programs. One could also reasonably add three additional Columbia submarines [post 2042] as well as add warheads to the SLBM and ICBM legs of the Triad.

Now some critics note that the US should just improve our conventional capability. But as senior US military officials have told Congress, if adversary nuclear weapons are introduced into a conventional conflict, “nothing holds,” thus requiring for the USA to have both a conventional and nuclear deterrent second to none.

This is where Putin and Xi are making the world dangerous—as they are threatening the use of nuclear force as an adjunct to their conventional capability, using nuclear weapons not to deter conflict but to make it serve their purposes—getting the US and its allies to stand down in a conflict, what the Posture Commission described as nukes for bullying and coercion. It is this “gap” in US capability at the theater level particularly that needs to be remedied.

Especially as Professor Chris Yeaw told this conference, Russia and China combined may have within the decade some 10,000 deployed nuclear weapons both strategic and theater.

Now what are some alternative strategies than adding to the capability of the US nuclear deterrent?

Annie Jacobson new book calls US deterrent strategy as crazy—“mad” is her description. She says the US needs more negotiations and diplomacy—but not more weapons. But she does not say what we are negotiating for and where diplomacy will take us.

Some members of Congress call for unilateral measures—to make the US nuclear arsenal smaller—such as killing ICBMs. This would reduce the US strategic nuclear force by 70% fewer SNDVs or Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles and 25% fewer warheads, while also eliminating any hedge to build beyond the current New Start warhead level.

This idea of killing our ICBM needs some examination. Some six arguments are common.

First, critics of ICBMs propose we just remove the silo targets, and then Russians wouldn’t be tempted to attack them. If ICBM silos are first, logically would New York city be next? Would moving the people of New York throughout rural America stop Russia from attacking us with nuclear weapons? Are the targets at fault?

Second, ICBM’s are apparently on a hair trigger although no President has ever called for their launch in the past 3.2 million minutes since the MMIII went on alert in Montana in October 1962. That is some excellent “launch control” but certainly not characteristic of any supposed hair trigger weapon.

ird, for some reason ICBM critics think the Russians are suicidal and will launch nearly all their New START accountable ICBM warheads—over 900—to take out 400 Minuteman ICBM silos and associated warheads and 45 launch control centers spread over 32,000 square miles over 5 states.

But Russia would be ignoring 350-400 sub warheads that could be deployed from Kings Bay and Bangor based submarines and 60 bombers from 3 bomber bases with anywhere between 600-1000 cruise missiles and gravity bombs available for retaliation. To say nothing, of the estimated 800 warheads at sea also available for retaliation.

Fourth, another implicit charge is if the Russians launch their submarine missiles at the ICBM silos, they secure a shorter flight time making it even more difficult for a President to launch our ICBMs back at Russia. But Moscow has around 500 submarine-based warheads in their entire fleet, not all of which are necessarily on alert. The force simply cannot hold at risk the entire US ICBM force.

Fifth, given the Russian missiles would have to either be launched at different times or would reach US soil at different times—either scenario would allow the US to launch after being attacked which would place Russia in nuclear jeopardy.

Sixth, critics often say the nuclear modernization effort is simply too expensive. But if you examine the defense budget, all strategic nuclear modernization efforts within DOD—subs, sub missiles, ICBMs, bombers, cruise missiles and NC3—come to $18.6 billion annually, which is 2% of the defense budget, and one third of all DOD-NNSA nuclear expenditures, including all nuclear sustainment and all nuclear modernization.

Another way to measure the cost is that over the 50 years of the ICBM force being deployed, it comes to an annual investment of $2.6 billion annually, compared to $128 billion annually for food stamps and the $76 billion annual Federal cost of caring for illegal aliens.

As General Mattis has said, “the US can afford survival.”

To restore deterrence and prevent the world from spinning out of control, continuing the program of record and the newly recommended additional capabilities is the only choice we have unless again as Admiral Charles Richard explained, we wish to disarm and get out of the nuclear deterrent business. We can rust to obsolescence or modernize to deter. Those are our only two choices.

Now will the US succeed in this unprecedented modernization effort? I think the presence of so many attendees  here —in record numbers—and your growing support for this Symposium will help America make the right choice. [Applause]

Thank you.

Political News of the Week

In the six battleground states, 44% say Mr. Trump will do a better job handling threats to democracy in the U.S., compared to 33% who said Mr. Biden would do a better job, according to a poll by The Washington Post and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

The same poll found that 16% of swing state voters think neither candidate is equipped to handle threats to democracy, and 7% said both candidates are equally prepared to deal with threats.

Mr. Trump leads among so-called “deciders,”

voters who fit into one or more categories such as voting in only one of the past two presidential elections, between 18 and 25, registered to vote since 2022, not sure if they will vote for Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden this year, or switched this support between 2016 and 2020.

Nearly 40% of “deciders” say they trust Mr. Trump more to handle threats to democracy while 29% say they have more trust in Mr. Biden. More than 20% of deciders say they don’t trust either to handle threats to democracy while 10% say they are both equally prepared to deal with threats.

The poll surveyed 3,513 registered voters in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in April and May. Of those surveyed, 2,255 were classified as “deciders.”

Toons of the Week

As concern grows over the growing conflict in the Middle East, Michael Ramirez, the Pulitzer Prize winning editorial cartoonist, incapsulates in these toons the ongoing Iranian directed turmoil and the feckless response by the United Nations.

A recent news story about Iran’s latent nuclear program goes right to the heart of the Iranian capability: Iran’s strategy of warning that it will build a bomb has become more prominent, public, and explicit in the wake of October 7 and the ensuing war in Gaza.

Throughout the conflict, Iran has mounted a steady drumbeat of attacks on Israel, U.S. forces, and international shipping via its surrogate groups across the region. Iran’s nuclear program has played a role in Iran’s management of the crisis, too, as Tehran has relied on a combination of technical signaling and rhetoric to bolster the credibility of its threshold deterrent and manage escalation risks.

That Iran’s leaders have not kept the nuclear program out of the spotlight is a sign that they view their threshold capability as more of an asset than a liability. For example, last December Iran reverted the configuration of its advanced centrifuges to a setup that in early 2023 had produced small amounts of 84 percent enriched material—a hair’s breadth away from the 90 percent needed for nuclear weapons.

Tehran knew inspectors would see and report the December change, which strongly suggests its leaders wanted to communicate that the possibility of producing weapons-grade uranium was back on the table. Iranian officials have also ramped up their commentary about the country’s ability to build nuclear weapons and the conditions under which they might do so. In January, the head of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohammed Eslami, repeated the long-standing Iranian position that weapons of mass destruction have “never been part of [its] security and defense doctrine” but added that Iran’s nuclear latency—its inherent capacity to build nuclear weapons—provided a deterrent.

“It is not about the lack of capability,” he declared in a televised interview. “I think we have achieved such deterrence . . . . We should not underrate our current achievements, thinking that we are not there yet.” The Iranian government then circulated Eslami’s statement on social media. The next month, his predecessor and one of the key negotiators of the 2015 nuclear deal, Ali Akbar Salehi, elaborated on Eslami’s point.

When asked whether Iran can build a nuclear bomb, Salehi replied that Iran has crossed “all the scientific and technical nuclear thresholds.” Using the example of manufacturing a car, he continued: “What does it take to make a car? You need a chassis, an engine, a wheel, a gearbox . . . . If you are asking me if we [have] built the gearbox and the engine, my answer is yes.”

The Archives

Lots of arms, too little control

Washington Post, June 18 (0115), Pg. A16 | Editorial

Russia and China are pushing the world toward a new nuclear arms race. And it could be even more dangerous, and more difficult to brake, than the Cold War competition that ended three decades ago. That was the unsettling message Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation at the National Security Council, delivered in a largely overlooked but important speech June 7 to the Arms Control Association.

In the near term, Mr. Vaddi declared, “the prospects for strategic arms control are dim.” Russia has rejected talks, and the last remaining U.S.-Russia treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, New START, which caps each side’s warheads on missiles, submarines and heavy bombers, expires in 2026 – possibly, Mr. Vaddi said, “without replacement.” China, for its part, has never had any nuclear arms agreements with the United States and has shown no interest in nuclear arms control. On the contrary, Mr. Vaddi noted that China, which has historically maintained a small stockpile of nukes, is “expanding and diversifying” its nuclear arsenals “at a breakneck pace,” as are Russia and North Korea. In refusing to discuss limits, these three geopolitically aligned adversaries “are forcing the United States and our close allies and partners to prepare for a world where nuclear competition occurs without numerical constraints,” he said.

To understand why this new arms race is dangerous, look back at the last one: The United States and the Soviet Union together amassed more than 60,000 nuclear warheads in a standoff that threatened mutual, possibly global, annihilation. The danger of an accidental launch grows when great powers keep their nuclear weapons on launch-ready alert, as the United States and Russia still do today. Fortunately, arms control treaties and the end of the Cold War reduced both the tensions between the two countries and their respective arsenals. Thus, it was especially significant that Mr. Vaddi said that the shrinkage of those stockpiles over the past 25 years might now be reversed. “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from the current deployed numbers is required,” he said.

China has more than 500 nuclear warheads and is aiming to accumulate more than 1,000 by 2030, compared with the 1,550 warheads the United States and Russia each currently deploy. A three-way arms race poses complex strategic questions – more complex than those presented by the two-way U.S.-Soviet conflict. Should the United States seek to match the combined strength of Russia and China, or just one of them? How would Moscow and Beijing respond? Mr. Vaddi said the United States would pursue “better” and not necessarily “more” nuclear weaponry. This country does “not need to increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them,” he said.

That’s good, but no one knows whether that notion would hold up in a future arms race, nor whether Russia and China could or would make similar calculations.

Mr. Vaddi also warned of a “new and dangerous era” because of the efforts of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran to proliferate advanced weapons technologies, including missiles, drones, and chemical and biological weapons. “Unlike our adversaries,” he said, “we will not develop radiation-spewing, nuclear-powered cruise missiles – or nuclear weapons designed to be placed in orbit – which would be a clear violation of the Outer Space Treaty.” He was referring to Russia, which is reportedly developing both.

Ideally, more aggressive U.S. diplomacy might bring China to the table for tripartite arms talks with Russia and the United States. The prospects for that are dim, however, as the United States found when it made a proposal to China on managing strategic risks last year – and Beijing brushed it off. The Cold War arms race began to end when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found the political will to reduce the arsenals. Gorbachev was desperate to ease the burden of the arms race on his tottering communist system, and Reagan had long harbored an ambition to abolish nuclear weapons altogether. President’s Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, however, show no such flexibility or pragmatism. If anything, their pursuit of a new arms race reflects a desire for heightened geopolitical struggle.

Mr. Vaddi’s warning is deeply worrisome. It would be far more preferable to reach verifiable, binding treaties to limit nuclear weapons. But diplomacy takes two to tango, or, in this case, three.

ICBM EAR Week of June 25, 2024, Prepared by Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow at NIDS and President of Geostrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland

ICBM EAR Report for June, 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In March 2023 Azerbaijan finally opened its embassy in Israel, despite establishing bilateral relations in 1992. Baku opted to open its embassy in Tel Aviv after restoring its territorial integrity. The next month, in April 2023, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, making it the closest Israeli embassy to Iran, just 17 km from the Iranian border. Iran followed all these diplomatic moves with annoyance and concern.

Normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations was also widely discussed as an extension of the Abraham Accords. Momentum similarly grew in 2022 for Israel and Turkey to normalize their strained relations. At the next meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed to continue developing bilateral relations and to pay official visits to each other.

Azerbaijan’s initiative to set a new trilateral format for cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey was advancing rapidly in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty for Tehran. The October 7, 2023, attack on Israel gave Iran the chance to derail possible Saudi-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties and stop the Azerbaijani initiative for trilateral cooperation in its tracks.

Tehran seized the opportunity of the war in Gaza to pursue its grand, multidimensional strategy. It is using economic means, via a set of coercive actions, to achieve foreign policy objectives, something widely overlooked. Iran’s multidimensional strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian strategy prioritizes using economic means to isolate Israel by derailing its relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s subtle, calculated, approach also intends to inflict an economic blow on Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which makes substantial revenue from the export of oil via Turkey to Israel.

Considering the global nature of the modern economy, economic power plays a significant role in shaping geopolitical outcomes and foreign policy. In this case, Iran’s usage of political, diplomatic, and media instruments, as well as its regional proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, merits analysis. The use of economic means to shape geopolitical outcomes and achieve foreign policy goals is the cornerstone of Iran’s multidimensional strategy. Iran does not possess the necessary economic means, by itself. However, the Islamic Republic does possess significant geopolitical assets in the form of proxy groups and diplomatic and media resources, which it is using to hinder or shut down global navigation and prevent the flow of strategic commodities to Israel.

The late Iranian foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, called on Muslim-majority countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel and expel its envoys in October 2023. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Muslim countries to cease trade, particularly food and oil with Israel, the following month. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, followed Ayatollah Khamenei’s call and appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel.

The call for an economic boycott of Israel by Muslim-majority states gives an insight into Iran’s multidimensional strategy. The late Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, also reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s call for a boycott of Israel at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2023. President Raisi argued that Islamic countries must cut diplomatic relations as well as refuse to buy Israeli goods, echoing Khamenei’s call. Weeks after his call for an economic boycott, Ayatollah Khamenei had urged Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel to halt diplomatic ties for a limited period. In January 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his call for a total blockade of Israel by Muslim countries.

The official rhetoric of Iran’s leaders clearly shows Tehran’s multidimensional strategy of using the war in Gaza to isolate Israel economically, impose an oil embargo, destroy economic and diplomatic ties between Israel and Muslim-majority countries, and position Iran as a major geopolitical force in the region. To implement this strategy Iran has employed coercive media propaganda against many countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Iranian media has intensified criticism of Turkey for its trade and economic ties with Israel and Azerbaijan for oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which meet 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil.

Iranian media has also targeted Turkish president Erdoğan for not cutting trade relations with Israel, which was actively used within Turkey by Islamist circles including the leader of the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), Fatih Erbakan, in recent local elections. The New Welfare Party, which sympathizes with Iran, managed to get 6.1 percent of the nationwide vote—contributing to Erdoğan’s first election loss in decades. When Erdoğan’s ruling party suffered the election setback, he launched economic measures against Israel, halting trade. Iranian media propaganda and the active shaping of the narrative in the run-up to elections in Turkey yielded a significant result by creating strain in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. The multidimensional Iranian strategy of achieving goals in multiple theatres has so far succeeded in two places: Turkey and Yemen. Using the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping, Iran positioned itself as a key player that can shut down trade not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Bab al Mandab Strait.

Iran’s strategy of using economic means to achieve its goals also entails containing and weakening Azerbaijan by inflicting significant revenue losses. Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed were awarded a license to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have long been a primary concern for the Iranian establishment. The military-technical partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan helped Baku boost its national security and defense, as well as to retake control of its territory from occupying Armenian forces. Changes in the realities of South Caucasus politics since 2020 are a security concern for Tehran. Constant Iranian media attacks against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline are part of the multidimensional Iranian strategy.

Better understanding Iran’s strategy is important if the United States desires to counter those efforts. Iran’s use of hybrid warfare, proxies, media propaganda, and blackmail—to force neighboring countries to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Israel—is having some success but is not in the interest of the region. Iran’s primary goal is to derail the normalisation process under the Arab-Israeli Abraham Accords; to strain Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic ties; to damage Azerbaijan’s independence by targeting its primary source of revenue; to prevent the emergence of the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey trilateral cooperation; and to prevent further diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. It is only through understanding Iranian efforts that the United States, Israel, and the larger region can prevent Iran’s success.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Multidimensional Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

By incorporating stealth, the KC-Z can operate discreetly in contested airspace, safeguarding both itself and the aircraft it refuels such as the F-22, F-35, B-2, and B-21. Additionally, the enhanced capabilities of the KC-Z significantly extend operational reach, allowing aircraft to operate farther from their bases and demonstrate a rapid response to global threats, thus serving as a powerful deterrent.

Technical specifications and design details for the KC-Z are still under development. However, Lockheed Martin’s proposed design emphasizes stealth as a core feature, incorporating low-observable materials, shaping, and potentially radar-absorbing coatings. The KC-Z is expected to be larger than existing tankers to accommodate a substantial fuel capacity and potentially integrate advanced mission systems, such as enhanced communication and electronic warfare capabilities. The design will likely include features to reduce its infrared and acoustic signatures, further enhancing its stealth capabilities. Details about the refueling mechanism, boom or drogue system, are yet to be finalized, but it is expected to be compatible with various aircraft types, including fighters, bombers, and, potentially, unmanned aerial vehicles.

The KC-Z’s presumed ability to loiter for extended periods enhances the US military’s persistent presence in critical regions, reinforcing extended deterrence commitments to allies and partners. Although the US Congress has halted plans to phase out the current fleet of KC-135s until the USAF can submit a formal acquisition strategy for the KC-Z, the acknowledgement of the KC-Z’s importance as a definitive force multiplier that amplifies air combat capabilities through the enablement of longer flight durations, expanded mission support, and overall greater flexibility, further deterring adversaries, highlights the pivotal role the KC-Z will have by integrating with other advanced platforms by enabling coordinated operations across multiple domains.

While the exact timeline and cost of the KC-Z project remain fluid, current projections estimate the first operational aircraft to be fielded by 2040. The USAF is currently in the initial phases of the acquisition process, with a request for information issued in early 2023. This will be followed by an analysis of alternatives to determine the specific requirements and design of the NGAS, which includes the KC-Z. The development of a stealth aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities is expected to be a complex and costly endeavor, with estimates reaching into the tens of billions of dollars. However, proponents argue that the long-term strategic advantages and enhanced operational capabilities justify the significant investment.

Despite the potential advantages, the development and deployment of the KC-Z faces significant challenges. The high cost associated with developing and maintaining stealth aircraft raises concerns about the project’s overall cost-effectiveness, especially considering the budgetary constraints in the defense budget. Additionally, questions remain about the long-term viability of maintaining the KC-Z’s stealth profile, given the wear and tear of regular operations and potential advancements in radar technology by adversaries. Some argue that investing in alternative refueling solutions, such as unmanned tankers or ground-based refueling systems, might be more practical and cost-efficient. Furthermore, integrating a new, complex platform like the KC-Z into existing air operations could pose logistical and operational challenges, requiring substantial adjustments to training, tactics, and maintenance procedures.

Though the Next-Generation Air-Refueling System (NGAS) includes the KC-Y or “bridge tanker” that will close capability gaps between the future KC-46 and KC-Z, recognizing the importance of stealth design in aerial refueling airframes to the deterrence mission will strengthen the United States deterrence strategy by expanding operational capabilities in contested environments, projecting power globally, maintaining a persistent presence, multiplying force effectiveness, and fostering integrated operations. The KC-Z represents a critical evolution in air refueling, aligning it with the demands of modern warfare.

The development of the KC-Z places the U.S. at the forefront of aerial refueling technology, potentially sparking a new arms race as other nations seek to maintain parity or develop their own stealth tanker capabilities. This could have significant implications for international relations and global security. While the KC-Z is primarily intended for defensive and deterrence purposes, its potential offensive applications could raise concerns among rival nations, further fueling geopolitical tensions. Conversely, the KC-Z could also act as a deterrent by showcasing American technological prowess and bolstering alliances with countries that benefit from extended airpower projection capabilities. The international community will undoubtedly be watching the development and deployment of the KC-Z closely, assessing its potential impact on the global balance of power and the future of aerial warfare.

The introduction of the KC-Z could significantly reshape the USAF’s strategic posture. By enabling stealth aircraft to operate deeper into contested airspace, the KC-Z would expand the reach and effectiveness of airpower, potentially altering the dynamics of air combat and deterrence. This could lead to new operational concepts and tactics, as commanders leverage the KC-Z’s unique capabilities to project power and maintain air superiority in challenging environments.

The ability to conduct extended missions with fewer refueling stops could also streamline logistics and reduce the vulnerability of support aircraft. Furthermore, the KC-Z could play a crucial role in enabling distributed operations, where aircraft disperse across a wider area to minimize the risk of detection and enhance survivability. This shift towards a more agile and resilient force structure could have far-reaching implications for the future of air warfare.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own. 

Lockheed Skunk Works KC-Z: Extending the Range of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Evaluating these effects is part of actuarial science, applied macroeconomics, and geostrategic analyses. There is nothing simple about the implications for the United States’ nuclear posture.

It is true that demographic effects may give the United States an advantage over adversaries on the economic and conventional military fronts through such things as maintaining a stable population, particularly in working- and military-age males. When demographic trends are unfavorable, the importance of nuclear weapons for the United States or an adversary grows as a smaller population of military-age males forces a nation to rely more heavily on a nuclear arsenal.

Conflicting Demographic Trends

Russia and China are suffering significant declines in their total fertility rate (TFR), that is, the average number of live births over the lifetime of each woman in their population. Ignoring the effects of immigration, so is the United States.

For a country to avoid a population gradually shrinking, it must maintain a TFR of at least 2.1. The fertility rate of the US is currently 1.6, China 1.1, and Russia 1.4. China and Russia are lower than America’s by enough to create a more serious problem for Russia, and especially for China, than for the United States. It can take decades for a state’s TFR to effectively reverse a downward trend.

The United States’ 1.6 TFR would, by itself, make the US average age increase, while also shrinking the total population. But, America has one problem which is also an opportunity, while China and Russia have only the problem—immigration. Millions of young people are trying to get into the US, legally or illegally. Very few people of any age are trying to get into Russia and China, while many people in those authoritarian regimes are leaving.

Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Effects

As a country’s population ages, the size of its working-age population declines, and so will government tax revenues. The number of young people available for military service also declines. This has negative consequences. An aging population, when not offset by youthful immigration, leads to increases in the medical and pension costs for the elderly. These costs can grow into an increasingly divisive burden on a state’s economy and citizens—reducing resources available for military expenditures.

An aging population, if not offset by immigration, also leads to a decrease in available military manpower. This can weaken conventional armed forces.

Nuclear Risks

The negative impacts of an aging population can have an unfortunate two-fold effect. They can nudge an expansionist regime to rely more on its nuclear arsenal for coercion and deterrence. In the extreme, nuclear employment “escalate to win” may occur when a smaller and less capable conventional force cannot win outright.

One reason population decline can lead to greater reliance on nuclear weapons is the economic necessity that a small conventional military creates. Nuclear weapons are a cost-effective deterrent and useful for coercion. It should come as no surprise that Russia is substituting nuclear capability for its conventional weakness.

Conclusion

The declining populations of Russia and China are a reality that is unlikely to change. Such decline has widespread impact on the economy and military. It can lead their leaders to feel pressed to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons and take aggressive action before the decline takes its full effect. The timing of the current war in Ukraine may, in part, be a result of such considerations. It appears the reliance on nuclear weapons is underway. For Russia and China, nuclear weapons are the offset to American power.

While the demographic trends mentioned can give the United States a relative advantage in the economic and conventional military spheres, it is critical the nation does not become complacent. Properly understanding these trends can emphasize how vital it is the US modernizes and right sizes its nuclear arsenal for effective deterrence.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). He is an experienced actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed are his own.

Adversary Demographic Trends Are Eroding American Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Flawed Modeling Assumptions

Game theory finds ideal tactics for conflicts between two opponents. It works great for something simple like checkers. But to get far it needs assumptions that, together, weaken the approach for something as tricky as convincing an adversary to never coerce or attack with nuclear arms.

In its basic form, game theory assumes both players have the same goals and want to avoid the same downsides. It also assumes all relevant information for the game is known fully and equally by both players, who are unbiased, unhurried, and perform all calculations perfectly. It assumes the game has a clear beginning and end, and moves are made in an orderly one-goes-then-the-other-goes manner.

Plainly, none of these apply well to states or blocs in a nuclear crisis or an escalating conventional shooting war. More subtly, game theory does not take account of tacit cooperation between opponents—such as to avoid nuclear Armageddon.

Modern game theorists are starting to study games with many players, in which different players have different goals and different information. But this research needs to mature more and be validated rigorously before it can be trusted enough to guide national defense.

Macroeconomics is a tool for understanding and managing the workings of a national economy. In its traditional form, macroeconomics assumes that everybody decides to buy or sell things based only on their price, and that all decisions are made with one hundred percent efficiency using complete information.

The difficulty of controlling a real-world economy is shown by the problems of fluctuating American inflation rates, recessions, and unemployment. While the conceptual framework of macroeconomics was adapted to analyze nuclear deterrence decades ago, there are practical limits to policy guidance obtained this way.

Modern research turned to what is called behavioral economics. This approach pays attention to the emotional reasons people do things. It also considers that different people seek different real and emotional rewards. Even sophisticated actors are driven by an irrational perception of risk. This emerging discipline seems promising, but still needs testing.

Systems analysis studies a problem, such as how to win a war, by breaking the warfighting into moving parts, then analyzes how those parts interact. The goal is to create statistics-driven procedures, such as body counts, that will achieve the desired outcome—victory.

Systems analysis has flaws for national defense policymaking. To get anywhere, it needs to make very difficult choices about exactly how to measure effectiveness, how to handle incomplete or absent data, how to take account of fundamentals and intangibles such as political will, and how to remove analyst bias. The near impossibility of doing all this successfully was demonstrated by the failure of systems analysis in the Vietnam Conflict.

Modern Threat Assessment

During the Cold War, other practical drawbacks of these technical tools were masked by the fact that the only major players of the nuclear deterrence game were the US and USSR. Neither became so aggressive or desperate as to resort to a nuclear attack. But there were close calls, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, peacefully resolved by back-channel bargaining between strong-willed leaders. Details of the next nuclear crisis, if one occurs, will be totally different and difficult to model realistically in advance.

Today, there are several significant nuclear adversaries confronting the US and its allies. The chances seem high that equations cannot capture the many psychological subtleties and unknown-unknown interactions, especially when several authoritarian regimes can form an opaque axis of expansion.

A good way to test the utility of behavioral economics and modernized game theory is to see if it can yield insights on dealing better with enemies who use nuclear threats against the United States, such as to limit American support for a beleaguered ally. The cases of Ukraine and Taiwan come to mind.

Conclusion

It is not just an academic exercise to confront and prevent the possibility that Russia, China, and North Korea may take their nuclear brinksmanship beyond mere verbal threats and saber-rattling exercises. Arms control advocates and defense policymakers need to recognize that nuclear attack is not simply a verbal bargaining chip thrown around by foreign potentates who are unserious, bluffing, or who have purely defensive goals. There is no pause button. There are no do-overs.

Nuclear deterrence cannot be reduced to a blackboard puzzle. Doing it properly needs undivided attention to the subtle nuances and fine distinctions that can make all the difference in an outcome. It calls for all-out political commitment despite many daunting complexities. Above all, effective deterrence requires deep understanding of how to make adversaries feel the raw fear generated when what they value most is at risk.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Nuclear Deterrence Is Not a Theoretical Game was originally published on Global Security Review.

Data source: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data

Deficit spending is a long-standing tradition in the US, with a budget surplus occurring in only four of the past 50 years. Debates about the size and importance of the federal debt raged for decades. With interest rates at historically low levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, debt financing came at a relatively small price soothing many concerns about deficit spending. Over the 2010s, net interest to finance the debt averaged only 6.8 percent of government spending and just 1.4 percent of GDP. Low interest rates led some to argue that “[t]he economics of deficits have changed,” and that reducing the debt and deficit spending should be a low priority compared to continued government investments in security, infrastructure, and well-being.

Two fundamental factors emerged to accelerate debt accumulation during the COVID-19 pandemic and aftermath. First, federal deficit spending limited the negative economic consequences of federal, state, and local responses to COVID-19. Second, the Federal Reserve sought to control inflation, a result of the Federal Reserve’s practice of “quantitative easing,” by increasing interest rates following the end of the pandemic—increasing government borrowing costs. The overall result was that net interest on government debt more than doubled between 2019 and 2024 in actual dollars. More funds spent to finance the debt leaves a smaller fraction of outlays available for discretionary spending, including national defense.

Data source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data

As the above chart illustrates, the percentage of GDP allocated to debt repayment surpassed defense spending in 2024. Future CBO projections appear in dashed lines. Major wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the height of the Cold War increased defense spending in the short term, but the overall trend was downward. Future defense spending is increasingly constrained by spending growth in both debt and nondiscretionary programs. With debt repayment exceeding defense spending, the American people should see this as a warning that must be redressed. Given great-power competition with China and several active hotspots around the world, decreasing American defense funding as a fraction of GDP is a significant concern. However, defense spending remains at a relative high point when examined in constant-year dollars.

Data source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data.

The size of defense budgets, accounting for inflation, provides a more optimistic view. The solid line presents historic defense spending in constant 2024 dollars and the dashed line, again, represents CBO projections. From 1950–2000, US defense spending increased significantly during major conflicts and at the height of the Cold War. Over those fifty years, peaks in defense spending remained below $750 billion in fiscal year 2024 dollars. Post–September 11, 2001, operations resulted in much higher levels of spending, approaching $940 billion at its peak. Even with reductions over the 2010s, spending over the next decade projects to be 15 percent higher annually than at the peak of the Cold War.

Even with high levels of spending, the current US force structure is in desperate need of modernization due to a laser-sharp focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in prior decades. Since the year 2000, operations and maintenance (O&M) spending has taken an increasing share of the national security budget. This means the United States is using its assets in combat and on deployment. Over the past 24 years, O&M averaged 39 percent of the national security budget. In the 35 years prior to 2000, this number was only 30 percent.

The growing fraction of O&M costs left a smaller fraction of the budget available for system acquisition. What funds remained were heavily focused on winning the Global War on Terrorism, meaning that investments in technologically advanced systems to counter threats posed by China and Russia often took a back seat. A second effect of the lack of procurement is that today’s military is simply smaller. For example, the US Air Force will soon have a fleet of less than 5,000 aircraft for the first time in its history and the US Navy will sail only half the ships it did 40 years ago. The outcome of these decisions, according to leading researchers, is that the “US defense strategy and posture have become insolvent.”

What does this situation mean for the security of the US and its allies? While American involvement in a major conflict would certainly result in increased defense spending, there is precious little room for the peacetime defense budget to grow without large tax increases or significantly reduced spending on entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare. The most likely outcome is that new investments will need to come at the expense of other platforms or spending inside the defense budget.

Closing the gap between strategic goals and the means needed to achieve those goals during this dangerous time of strategic competition requires a thorough examination of solutions beyond increasing defense spending. The defense strategy needs rightsizing and a focus on the most stressing threats to the nation’s security. New concepts for imposing costs on competitors need to be developed. Methods to deter conventional and nuclear conflict should also be prioritized with special attention paid toward developing methods to prevent a conventional conflict from escalating across the nuclear threshold.

Carl Rhodes, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the founder of Canberra-based Robust Policy.

The US Must Handle Its Fiscal Challenges was originally published on Global Security Review.

Against a backdrop of conflict and global security concerns, 2023 may prove to have also been a pivotal year for automated nuclear weapons systems.

A year that began with chatbots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the subjects of major news stories – some with particularly concerning headlines – ended with members of the United States Congress introducing legislation to ban AI systems from nuclear weapons and US President Biden signing an Executive Order on the subject. The issue was even raised in discussions between the United States and China at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which met in San Francisco in November.

One can imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a nuclear weapon targets a naval base, but an approach pattern recognition determines that the target submarines have already put to sea, and so the missile opts for a redirected underwater strike instead of an atmospheric detonation. This is but one of many possible scenarios to consider involving AI.

AI systems offer an opportunity to strengthen nuclear deterrence by providing a more accurate and capable defensive nuclear response. The purpose of making nuclear weapons more accurate and capable is not to promote their usage. Such capabilities, instead, provide a more credible deterrence to nuclear war and are consistent with classic nuclear doctrine. AI is simply a strategic tool, like nuclear weapons themselves.

Read More

Should artificial intelligence be banned from nuclear weapons systems? was originally published on Global Security Review.

AI and the Future of Deterrence: Promises and Pitfalls was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. Foreword and Executive Summary:
   • The ASC program has utilized high-performance computing for nearly three decades to support U.S. nuclear deterrence following the 1992 ban on underground nuclear testing.
   • The integration of AI technologies aims to accelerate problem-solving for national security challenges.
   • The strategy emphasizes combining AI with existing modeling and simulation capabilities to enhance the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program.
2. AI4ND Strategy Objectives:
   • Apply AI methods to nuclear security missions, focusing on design, production, and analysis.
   • Develop ML tools to function with limited data and stringent accuracy requirements.
   • Create scalable and secure data infrastructures to support ML applications.
   • Foster a data-driven workforce by investing in training and developing expertise in AI and ML.
3. Motivations for AI in Nuclear Deterrence:
   • AI can reduce time for material discovery, model development, manufacturing, and maintenance.
   • AI/ML technologies promise to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons lifecycle, including discovery, design optimization, manufacturing, certification, and maintenance.
4. Enabling Capabilities and Investment Areas:
   • Physics-Informed Machine Learning (PIML): Embedding physical constraints in ML models to ensure accuracy and speed in simulations.
   • Limited and Sparse Data Sets: Developing methods to work with limited experimental data and augmenting it with simulations.
   • Verification, Validation, Uncertainty Qualification, and AI Trustworthiness: Ensuring AI models are reliable and explainable, integrating existing verification practices.
   • Data Infrastructure: Investing in performant data storage, federated data environments, and flexible data access interfaces.
   • Machine Learning Architectures and Systems: Developing high-performance ML systems integrated with existing HPC platforms.
5. Workforce, Collaborations, and Partnerships:
   • Establishing partnerships with industry, academia, and other U.S. government agencies to leverage external advancements in AI/ML.
   • Developing international collaborations with similar programs in France, the UK, and Japan.
   • Building a capable workforce through training programs and collaboration with universities.
6. Conclusion:
   • The successful execution of this AI4ND strategy will enhance the ASC program’s ability to meet national security needs, increase efficiency, and attract specialized talent.
   • Collaboration with academia, industry, and other government agencies is crucial to achieving these goals.

The document emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in ensuring a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent through strategic investments in technology, data infrastructure, and workforce development. Get the report.

Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in 2007 and 2023 offer no evidence of success. Experts now say Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at Natanz and Furdow should be neutralized with GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their adits (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop North Korea from getting the bomb. Words and tighter sanctions will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a disruptive, warmongering, rogue state. Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical sect that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to Paradise. Iran’s leaders promise to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their extremist ideology. Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective nuclear counterterrorism.

Both Russia and China have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

North Korea shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei surely realizes, “Israel is a one-bomb country” because of its small size. This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated sleight of hand to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran’s latest threats to attack Israel’s nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran’s nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran’s covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine approach to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely 4 percent of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck…or a camel…or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel’s cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “mowing the grass,” or reticent watchful waiting, are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman recently said, “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently said, “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need more lectures about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

Joe Buff is a senior fellow for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

Encouraging competition and redirecting investments away from major defense contractors such as Raytheon, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, towards emerging companies (Space X, Looking Glass, Kodiak) with innovative approaches and cost-effective capabilities, can enhance national security. This shift has the potential to lower defense procurement costs, provide technological advantages, and reduce the monopolistic control and price gouging these major contractors have over government defense contracts.

Shipyards

Naval shipyards are the backbone of maritime defense, yet their capacity and efficiency were challenged in recent years. Currently, the top military shipbuilding corporations are General Dynamics, Huntington Ingles, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The nation cannot continue to rely on these companies to produce cost-effective, on-time results for the Navy. The simple truth is almost every contract awarded to these companies ends up over budget and delayed years.

By fostering competition among up-and-coming companies we can revitalize our shipbuilding industry, introducing new technologies and innovative approaches that improve cost-effectiveness and speed of construction. Paramount to the issue, the US needs to invest in developing additional shipyards to combat the growing Chinese capabilities as a new maritime superpower. This will not only strengthen the US naval fleet, but also allow the Navy to counter the rising threat and reverse the nation’s downward trajectory, creating jobs and stimulating economic growth.

ICBM Manufacturing

Enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities is essential for maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. Currently, Boeing is responsible for producing key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles and US Minuteman III ICBMs, while General Dynamics manufactures key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles. Lockheed Martin plays a role in upgrading Trident II (D5) missiles for the US and UK, as well as Minuteman III, and also manages a UK nuclear weapons laboratory along with several US nuclear weapons facilities.

Northrop Grumman is involved in similar activities, including Trident II (D5) missile upgrades for the US and UK, Minuteman III, and management of some US nuclear weapons facilities. Additionally, in 2020, Northrop Grumman was awarded a sole-source $13.3 billion contract for engineering and manufacturing Sentinel missiles to replace the current arsenal of 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. They have also acquired Orbital ATK, which has similar involvements.

Unfortunately, every nuclear modernization project went over budget and was delayed despite tens of billions of dollars pledged towards the modernization goal. Ultimately, increasing competition in this sector can spur innovation, resulting in more dependable and advanced missile systems at a more cost-effective price. Encouraging companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic to invest in defense manufacturing of rocket technology, possibly through government contracts, could drive progress. Furthermore, diversifying the manufacturing base can mitigate the risk of supply-chain disruptions, ensuring a consistent supply of these critical weapons. 

Nuclear Weapons Facilities

Nuclear weapons design and manufacturing facilities are another area where competition can yield significant benefits. Currently, the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is the only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. The nation needs more than a single facility for this task. This is a national security concern. Any issue with this facility, and assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons is hampered. By encouraging competition, the nation can modernize the nuclear arsenal, ensuring it remains safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, competition in the assembly and disassembly process can lead to cost savings, which enables the nation to allocate resources to other pressing defense needs.

Aircraft Manufacturing 

The need for a robust aircraft manufacturing capability is paramount. Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command said, in recent congressional testimony, that China has the world’s largest navy and is soon to be the world’s largest air force. With potential adversaries investing heavily in advanced aircraft, America must maintain a competitive edge. With the looming prospect of having to fight and fund a three-front war (Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Iran, and China-Taiwan), the US needs to maintain its ability to obtain and provide air superiority in whatever conflicts it enters.

By fostering competition, we can spur innovation in aircraft design and production, ensuring air superiority in future conflicts. Investing in cost-effective drone swarms and continued advancements of our 5th- and 6th-generation fighters is essential. Furthermore, the US must increase the number of strategic stealth bombers in its arsenal from 20 to 200 to 300. Development and purchase of 100 B-21 Raiders is a good start, but there needs to be more competition or manufacturing supply-chain issues will continue to plague this modernization process. 

Fallout Shelter Investments 

Investing in a more robust fallout shelter system is crucial for ensuring the safety and protection of the American population in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. While government efforts have historically been the primary driver of fallout shelter development, there is also a role for private entities to play in this important endeavor.

During the Cold War, the United States undertook a massive effort to build fallout shelters in anticipation of a potential nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The government constructed thousands of public fallout shelters in buildings such as schools, government offices, and subway stations. Private individuals and organizations also built their own shelters to protect against nuclear fallout.

The government entities involved with fallout shelters are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). FEMA is responsible for coordinating federal government efforts in disaster response and recovery, including the development and maintenance of fallout shelters. The DoD is involved in the construction and maintenance of fallout shelters, particularly those designed to protect military personnel and assets such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex.

The primary private entities involved in developing and manufacturing fallout shelters are Atlas Survival Shelters, Rising S Company, and Hardened Structures. Atlas Survival Shelters specializes in the design and construction of underground shelters for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. Rising S offers a range of underground bunkers and shelters for protection against various threats, including nuclear fallout. Similarly, Hardened Structures provides custom-designed shelters and bunkers for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.

While the number of public fallout shelters declined since the end of the Cold War, there are still thousands of designated shelters across the country, although most are unknown, rundown, and primarily used for storage. They should be refurbished and updated to properly address the sheer number of citizens that would be required to shield from not only the initial blast, but any possible fallout.

Ultimately, it is essential that efforts to develop and maintain fallout shelters continue, as the threat of nuclear conflict remains a major concern in today’s world. By fostering competition in this sector, the nation can drive innovation and ensure that every American has access to adequate protection in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. 

Conclusion

The United States must prioritize investments in fostering competition and innovation across key areas of the defense industry to strengthen national security. By redirecting investments from major defense contractors towards emerging companies with cost-effective military capabilities, the nation can enhance its military edge, reduce costs, and mitigate the near-monopolistic control of government defense contracts.

Revitalizing naval shipyards, enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities, modernizing nuclear weapons facilities, advancing aircraft manufacturing, and investing in a robust fallout shelter system are critical steps in safeguarding our nation against emerging threats.

By encouraging competition and diversifying the manufacturing base, the nation can drive innovation, ensure a continuous supply of critical weapons, and maintain a technological edge over adversaries. It is imperative that the nation act now to secure the future of our national security.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the authors own.

Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry was originally published on Global Security Review.

From counterterrorism efforts to geopolitical forecasting, the applications of AI in strategic intelligence operations span a diverse array of domains, shaping national security strategies and global geopolitics alike. However, alongside these transformative capabilities come complex ethical, legal, and policy considerations that necessitate careful navigation.

            Foremost, AI has the ability to continuously monitor news sources, social media feeds, and other open-source intelligence channels in real time, alerting analysts to relevant developments as they happen. Sifting through massive datasets from diverse sources that include both open-source and classified reporting will allow analysts to quickly dismiss the “noise” and more easily discover relevant information that might otherwise be missed by human-driven analysis. Tedious and repetitive tasks, like report generation or data cleaning, can be automated, increasing efficiency and allowing analysts to focus their time and efforts on critical strategic analysis.

Furthermore, algorithms will unearth subtle trends, correlations, and anomalies that traditional analytical methods often overlook. This enhanced capability will empower proactive decision-making based on insights that would have otherwise remained hidden. Algorithms can help identify and mitigate potential biases in human analysis, promoting more objective decision-making processes. AI tools can act as a “smart assistant,” highlighting relevant information, providing summaries, and offering different perspectives to enhance human analysis. This frees up analysts from mundane information-gathering tasks and allows them to focus on higher-order strategic thinking.

Expanding further, the advanced collection and analytical features of AI will greatly assist with gauging potential instability in regions of interest, analyzing competitor activities, patent filings, and market trends, which can be streamlined with AI to quickly identify threats and opportunities. AI can analyze network traffic to detect anomalies indicative of potential cyberattacks, allowing for a faster response to cybersecurity threat detection.

The capabilities of generating and analyzing various potential scenarios based on historical data and current trends, in a fraction of the time needed for humans, provides analysts with a more comprehensive analysis for decision-makers to assess the likelihood of different outcomes and a higher confidence in predicting and understanding the consequences of their decisions. The AI-powered predictive analytical forecasting potential of geopolitical events, economic shifts, or emerging technologies that might create future strategic risks or opportunities for governments is attractive to all states as they leverage advantages to expand influence and power.

Incorporating AI capabilities into the strategic intelligence realm is not without its challenges or concerns. It will be imperative to ensure meaningful human control over any AI systems associated with strategic intelligence. Other national security assets should be considered a high priority at this critical onset of AI applications focused on the establishment of safeguards against autonomous decisions.

Considering AI relies on the accuracy and completeness of data, ensuring effective measures are in place to maintain data integrity and avoid garbage-in, garbage-out scenarios is critical. It is vital that AI models are interpretable so that analysts can understand the reasoning behind recommendations. This builds trust and facilitates better decision-making. Addressing biases in AI models and ensuring algorithms are used in a transparent and responsible manner that aligns with organizational values is also important.

Advancing AI may process vast amounts of data in times of crisis, and do it far faster than humans, though there is understandable concern about the appropriate level of AI involvement in high-stakes decisions where time is of the essence. For example, should AI have any control over nuclear launch decisions, and if so, how much? Errors in AI analysis or reliance on faulty data could lead to miscalculations and unintended escalation.

As intelligence agencies increasingly rely on advanced technologies like AI, there is a need for robust regulation and oversight to prevent abuse of power, misuse of data, and violations of civil liberties. Policies should establish clear guidelines for the collection, storage, and use of intelligence data, as well as mechanisms for accountability and transparency.

The proliferation of intelligence data and the use of advanced analytics pose challenges related to data security and protection. Policies must address issues such as data encryption, secure storage, access controls, and measures to safeguard against cyber threats and breaches.

Given the global nature of many intelligence threats, there is a need for international cooperation and the development of norms and standards governing the use of AI technologies. Policies should promote collaboration among intelligence agencies from different countries while respecting sovereignty and legal frameworks.

AI algorithms used in intelligence operations may exhibit bias or produce unfair outcomes, particularly if trained on biased data or programmed with flawed assumptions. Policies should address these concerns through measures such as algorithmic transparency, fairness assessments, and diversity in data sources and large language model (LLM) development.

The development and deployment of AI technologies can confer strategic advantages to nations or organizations. Policies may need to balance the pursuit of such advantages with efforts to prevent destabilizing arms races or conflicts arising from the use of intelligence capabilities.

The use of AI capabilities, particularly in areas such as cyber warfare or information operations, can raise the risk of deterrence failures or unintended escalation. Policies should seek to establish clear deterrence strategies, rules of engagement, and mechanisms for de-escalation to mitigate these risks. As AI technologies become more sophisticated, intelligence operations will increasingly involve human-machine collaboration. Policies should address issues such as human oversight, accountability for algorithmic decisions, and the ethical implications of human-AI interaction in intelligence activities.

The future of AI and strategic intelligence operations is poised to be characterized by continued innovation, integration, and adaptation to evolving geopolitical, technological, and societal landscapes. Further breakthroughs in AI technologies, including deep learning, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning, will enable intelligence agencies to extract deeper insights from vast and diverse datasets. This will enhance capabilities for predictive analysis, anomaly detection, and decision support across a wide range of intelligence operations.

The integration of AI into autonomous systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), will certainly revolutionize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. These systems will be capable of operating in contested or denied environments with reduced risk to human operators and logistical support assets.

The proliferation of cyber threats and the increasing reliance on information warfare tactics will drive the expansion of cyberintelligence capabilities. Intelligence agencies will focus on detecting, attributing, and mitigating cyberattacks, as well as leveraging information operations to shape narratives and influence adversaries.

The rise of social media platforms and digital communication channels will continue to reshape intelligence gathering and analysis. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and social media analysis techniques will play an increasingly prominent role in monitoring global events, assessing public sentiment, and identifying emerging threats. Intelligence agencies will increasingly collaborate with other government agencies, international partners, and private-sector entities to leverage complementary expertise and resources. Fusion centers will facilitate the integration of intelligence from multiple sources to produce more comprehensive and timely assessments.

Intelligence agencies will need to enhance their resilience and adaptability to rapidly evolving threats, including emerging technologies, geopolitical shifts, and unconventional adversaries. This will require agile organizational structures, flexible operational frameworks, and continuous investment in training and capabilities development.

Overall, the future of AI and strategic intelligence operations will be characterized by a dynamic interplay between technological innovation, geopolitical dynamics, and societal trends. By embracing these trends and addressing associated challenges, intelligence agencies can enhance their effectiveness in safeguarding national security and advancing strategic objectives in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

As the United States intelligence community navigates the complexities of an increasingly interconnected and unpredictable world, the future of strategic intelligence operations will be defined by our ability to harness the power of AI technologies while mitigating their risks and ensuring their responsible and ethical use. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and upholding democratic values, intelligence agencies can effectively confront the challenges of the 21st century and advance the interests of peace, security, and prosperity for all.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own.  

Unveiling the Future: The Convergence of AI and Strategic Intelligence Operations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since 2021, Russia upgraded or modernized approximately 85 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal. China undertook what then-Commander of United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, called “a strategic breakout,” with “explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces.” North Korea went from a fledgling 1980’s nuclear program to possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Iran’s nuclear program goes deeper underground, figuratively and literally, to avoid US threats and complicate US risk assessment.

Little occurred in the US nuclear arsenal during the same two decades. The nuclear enterprise is attempting to modernize each leg, with debatable levels of success. In June 2023, the Biden administration publicly confirmed and accepted American numerical nuclear inferiority for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The administration posits deterrence comes from quality over quantity. But how is a triad that is 30–50 years old qualitatively better than a new Russian arsenal?

The non-strategic nuclear arsenal rose in prominence as the Ukraine war began and Russia began making threats to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. Production of the B61-13 and life extension of the W80-4 emphasize regional nuclear deterrence and may preempt strategic conflict at a lower level but may arrive too late. Retiring the B83 purportedly transfers the hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) responsibility to the B61-13, streamlining the Department of Energy’s sustainment and modernization expenses. The Department of Defense is still weighing a 2022 study, evaluating future HDBT targets to demonstrate viability of the non-strategic capability.

Since 2021, the nuclear enterprise began receiving long-overdue attention, but it will take years to yield results. The enterprise competes for American talent, amongst lucrative technological fields, that it needs for successful reconstruction and for addressing the needs of the triad. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $500 million more than requested for plutonium pit production reconstitution at Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) goal is to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year, between the two facilities, by 2030. Assuming 80 pits per year went into refurbishing 85 percent of deployed nuclear warheads, matching Russia’s accomplishment, that pace would require nearly 16.5 years and almost 20 years for a 100 percent refurbishment. In FY 2024, the NNSA is requesting 8.6 percent more money than enacted in FY 2023 for the Product Modernization Program to support strategic nuclear weapons modification and life extension.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, refocused on strategic-level concerns, reprioritizing strategic power over Russia and China higher than post-9/11 terrorism. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for nuclear modernization, as previous NPRs did, but was followed by the financial resources outlined in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act required for execution.

There is a nexus between terrorism, nuclear weapons, and immigration. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and Hamas’ terror campaign against Israel. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon and provides it to any of these groups, the US may be left searching for nuclear fingerprints in the aftermath of a detonation. The Federation for American Immigration Reform reported Customs and Border Patrol data showing 3.2 million aliens illegally crossed into the US between October 2022 and October 2023. Among those apprehended, 172 aliens were suspected terrorists. One hundred sixty-nine attempted an illegal entry at the southern border. The notion of an attack on the homeland by terrorists using a smuggled weapon of mass destruction is a credible threat.

Law Enforcement sources assert terrorists can employ nuclear weapons without sophisticated delivery systems on US soil. Former FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker described the US as extremely vulnerable to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Swecker suggested that the mismanaged southern border is the key source of that vulnerability, concurring with a warning presented in December 2023 by the Department of Homeland Security. Preventing such dangerous exposure belongs at the forefront as policymakers seek to correct three years of negligent border protection. American strategic deterrence once overshadowed immigration, reducing temptation from adversaries abroad.

Nuclear-armed nations and proliferators alike must remember any nuclear attack against the United States from a terrorist organization will result in retaliation against the nation providing the weapon, as codified in the Bush Doctrine found in the 2002 National Security Strategy. While internal politics unnecessarily expose the US, those responsible can project strength by reiterating the consequences of exploiting that vulnerability and reemphasizing nuclear deterrence.

Terrorism and nuclear war are real. The US cannot afford to alternately overlook one in favor of the other. When adversaries see vulnerabilities, it invites aggression. Controlling who and what comes across US borders is essential to keeping Americans safe. Maintaining a modern, reliable, and lethal nuclear deterrent can foundationally dissuade terrorist attacks on US soil.

Dan Wasserman was both a missile operations and maintenance officer in the United States Air Force. He remains active in the field. The views expressed are his own.

Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea continues to increase its weapons production while advancing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nascent submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) legs of an emerging nuclear dyad. At the same time, China increased its numbers and types of nuclear weapons and dual-capable delivery systems. It has built multiple fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce and separate plutonium. Moreover, China’s fielding of a dual-capable fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and hypersonic glide vehicle raises questions about its commitment to its long-standing policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

As Matthew Kroenig notes, the more nuclear weapons a state has, the more assertive and coercive it tends to become to achieve its goals. This fits China’s pattern of behavior and is consistent with North Korea’s modus operandi. These developments threaten vital American security interests by undermining extended deterrence—placing the United States and mutual defense treaty allies at increased risk.

To counter this situation, while preserving strategic options for use during periods of acute crisis, “nuclear castling” would involve the restationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea. In chess, castling involves the simultaneous moving of the king and rook in a protective maneuver that preserves capabilities and opens new possibilities across the board.

Repositioning American nuclear weapons to South Korea would help close an emergent theater deterrence gap and modernize extended deterrence for all Indo-Pacific allies. The following proposal addresses how these weapons would serve an even greater imperative than in the past, even if only to provide the president of the United States options for use in extremis.

The United States should restation B61-3, 4, and/or 12 nuclear gravity bomb variants in South Korea for delivery of low-yield weapons by dual-capable F-35A, F-15E, or F16C/D. New START Treaty limitations only apply to heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, as opposed to these lower yield warheads and fighter aircraft. Additionally, the South Korean Air Force should train to perform conventional support for nuclear operations (CSNO), similar to how the air forces of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe operate. The United States should also use this opportunity to invite the Japanese Air Force to participate in CSNO training and operations.

Skeptics will likely say the April 2023 Washington Declaration between the United States and South Korea should have a chance to strengthen deterrence and assurance. Part of the agreement commits America to reintroducing periodic ballistic missile submarine patrols in the vicinity of South Korea. In addition to South Korea reaffirming its pledge not to seek its own nuclear weapons and commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Washington Declaration clears the way for America and South Korea to establish a nuclear consultative group modeled on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

In fact, within six months of the Washington Declaration, the USS Kentucky made the first visit of an American ballistic missile submarine to South Korea since the 1980s. The visible gesture of deterrence accompanied the inaugural meeting of the American and South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group meeting on the same day in July 2023.

In parallel, an April 2024 display of combined air operations with the South Korean and Japanese Air Forces further contributes to theater deterrence. But, while the Washington Declaration is an important step in the right direction, more is needed to deter North Korea or China and to assure our regional allies.

Others will also argue that reintroducing small numbers of nuclear weapons to South Korea will not make an appreciable difference in North Korea or China’s perception of risk or the credibility of America’s nuclear deterrent. However, repositioning weapons within the theater to deter two nuclear arms–racing aggressors and assure allies creates options for the United States that do not require employment of strategic weapons. For allies that rely on extended deterrence, reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea would renew confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella.

While some observers may also view any reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea in this manner as a contravention of the NPT, the United States would rely on custodial control to align with the NPT. Though fundamentally different than long-standing NATO arrangements that pre-date the NPT, restationing nuclear weapons in South Korea is a comparable approach that involves a treaty ally of the United States. Most importantly, there is a historic precedent between both countries.

At a relatively low cost and risk, restationing nuclear gravity bombs in South Korea has a high return on investment if agreed to by the South Korean government. Additionally, considering production delays for the American Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the current Ohio-class submarines and the similarly lengthy timeline for fielding a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, this recommendation is a timely option for strengthening overall American nuclear deterrence.

The Indo-Pacific chess board has strategically shifted since the United States last stationed weapons there. The longer America maintains a regional nuclear status quo in the face of egregious North Korean and Chinese nuclear arms racing, the less credible and more overstretched America’s nuclear deterrent may appear. Nuclear castling offers an approach to close the emergent deterrence gap and to provide a forceful example of interoperability for treaty allies, complementing bold integrated deterrence moves and magnifying a new sense of integrated assurance.

COL Michael R. DeMarco serves in the United States Army Reserve. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

Nuclear Castling in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years have passed since the United States announced a unilateral ban on the testing of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The ban was announced on April 12, 2022, and hailed as a first step towards establishing a norms of responsible behavior to further the ideal of sustainability in outer space.

Several states, including many that do not possess nor intend to deploy such a capability, made similar proclamations. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India, however, refused to make the pledge. The US also sponsored a resolution, which was a lead-in to the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, led by the United Kingdom and supported by the US. With the blinding effect of celebration subsiding, a more reasoned look at the drawbacks and weaknesses of the ban is in order.

Unilateral Arms Control Concession

Lost in the euphoria of the ban is the reality that the ban is a unilateral arms control concession. The US ignored an important tenet of diplomacy and negotiation and frittered away destructive ASAT testing without exacting similar concessions from Russia and China. American idealists believed that by signing the ban, the US would show leadership as a responsible actor and encourage both Russia and China to abandon their threatening counterspace build up. However, the American precedent of unilaterally banning direct-ASAT testing on its own without seeking concessions from either Russia or China signals to both that the US may be convinced to make more concessions without either adversary surrendering any of their own capabilities.

Sacrificing Freedom of Action

The unilateral American concession is not about giving up something vital to national security, but rather forfeiting freedom of action with no tangible benefit—other than creating positive political optics and an illusory norm of behavior. Many of the states pledged to the ban and the resolution lacks the requisite technology, capabilities, or the political desire to develop or acquire such technology. In other words, these states pledged to give up a freedom of action and a capability they neither possess nor plan to acquire. Conversely, Russia, China, and India, who all possess the capability, are not willing to give up their freedom of action to the advantage of the United States.

Demonstration Versus Test

The premise of the destructive test ban is the kinetic actions involving destructive ASATs are tests to determine whether a capability works. What the ban ignores is that these events are demonstrations and not tests.

The distinction between “test” and “demonstration” is not a matter of semantics but rather it is the difference between a state ascertaining whether it has a capability as opposed to showing others that it has a capability and a capacity. Ground-launched ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense technology, and the know-how for that capability has existed for decades.

Any state that possesses a missile defense capability is presumed to have a rudimentary ASAT capability that can transition to a break-out capability. Thus, a test ban is nonsensical as the need to test a capability is unneeded and any event involving an ASAT is considered a demonstration, including India’s 2019 satellite intercept and Russia’s 2021 intercept. Thus, the US has unilaterally sacrificed freedom of action for “destructive testing” when the capability is already proven and no longer necessary.

Implications for Missile Defense

An outright ASAT ban implicates the testing and development of mid-course missile defense systems. Direct-ascent ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense and destructive mid-course missile defense testing against dummy warheads could open the opportunity for Russia and China to complain that the United States is going back on its commitment and testing ASAT technology. This would fall in line with their narrative of “space weapons” given the impetus for this talking point is to stunt the development of American missile defense technology and capabilities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics focusing on sustainability would also foster this narrative and create public pressure for the US, both in and out of international organizations, to suspend missile defense testing.

Ceding Space Control

Space control is the unspoken chip on the table, especially since the US does not have an operational destructive counterspace capability and restricts its ability to develop offensive capabilities necessary to achieve deterrence through superiority with Russia and China. According to Dana Johnson, “Space control in geopolitical terms is the capability of a nation to maintain freedom of action in outer space and to deny the same to an adversary should national interests dictate.” The unilateral concession by the US bargains away kinetic space control for the ideal of sustainability and the anticipation it will create leverage and put international pressure on Russia and China to restrict their counterspace capabilities and thus ensure sustainability.

Conclusion

At its core, the unilateral ASAT test ban is a sacrifice of freedom of action made for political convenience and to check off a bucket list item for NGOs, academics, and civil servants. The US unilaterally forfeited something of major significance for something trivial and of questionable significance without taking into consideration it would not be reciprocated. The American attempt to use the ban to create momentum for its effort to create pseudo-norms and the drafting of a legally binding treaty to the same end is misplaced and is a detriment to American standing in outer space law, policy, national security, and deterrence.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert and practitioner in outer space law, policy, security, and lawfare/hybrid warfare strategy. He is the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis. Views expressed are the author’s opinion and not legal advice.

Two Years After the ASAT Test Ban: A Realistic Assessment was originally published on Global Security Review.

In both cases, the situation is dire for Ukraine and one that will require considerable external assistance. Such assistance is crucial to maintain the credibility of the West, yet the fear is that once the war ends, so, too, will Western interest—leaving Ukraine with an aging population and a destroyed economy that may not recover for decades. If that happens, the demographic decline of the state will only accelerate as it will provide few opportunities for its younger population who will leave. The West needs, therefore, to come up with a long-term plan to reverse both these interrelated trends.

Demographic Decline

Ukraine’s population is declining and has for some time. The country went from a population of 51.7 million, at the time of independence in 1991, to 43.5 million in 2020. A weak economy with few jobs led to an exodus of young people to other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe. Declining birth rates also contributed to a shrinking of the population with it reaching a fertility rate of 1.23 children per couple by 2019. Ukraine is one of the European countries that was already in serious demographic decline and the war has only exacerbated this trend. By 2023 the population shrank to 34.8 million.

The war led to 4–6 million citizens living in an area occupied by Russia, another 4 million are refugees in the European Union (EU), and another 1 million are spread over the rest of the world. Worse, about 20 percent of Ukraine’s children are now refugees in the EU and there is a big question mark over how many of these children and their parents will return to the war-torn and impoverished nation. Thus, a Ukrainian population that was meant to reach 35 million by 2050 is now expected to further shrink by that year to 30.9 million. As the Census Bureau’s data shows the bulk of this population will be in the age group 55–75, hardly a cohort that can drive economic activity in the country, foster innovation, or attract outside investment.

The Cost of Economic Reconstruction

The economic damage to Ukraine, especially the destruction of its infrastructure, continues to grow, leading the World Bank, in 2023, to estimate that the country would require $411 billion for rebuilding from the war’s devastation. This estimate now tops $486 billion, although the final figure is unclear—given recent attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. By the time the war is over the cost of reconstruction is likely to exceed $500 billion, a staggering amount for any group of countries to provide in assistance. To put this in perspective, the EU is committing $54 billion over a four-year period to Ukraine—a sum of $13.5 billion a year. Funding at that level is too little to significantly change the fortunes of Ukraine, especially since after the war is over the EU and US may have other priorities. This means upping aid to the level where it has a meaningful effect on Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and that leads to the other problem.

The EU and US would have to sink roughly $20 billion a year for 25 years into the country. Asking for such a long-term commitment is difficult. Western nations would likely balk at the sums involved and the length of the financial commitment to Kyiv. Further, western public opinion, while overwhelmingly supportive of Ukraine, is likely to lose interest in the minutiae of post-war reconstruction. Supplying arms, after all, is far more compelling and appealing than seeking to rebuild power grids and schools.

One solution is to take the $300 billion of confiscated Russian assets and either transfer them to Ukraine or loan them to Kyiv. The problem with this approach is that it reduces confidence in western financial institutions as secure and safe repositories of foreign assets.  Taking such an action might see foreign investors pull their holdings in the West. Funding Ukrainian reconstruction may, therefore, be costly for the West. But both for demographic reasons and for showing the strength of Western commitment, it is necessary to consider a sizeable and long-term economic package for Ukraine.

Demographically, a Ukraine that shows the prospect of being rapidly rebuilt is far more likely to attract back the millions of refugees who have crossed into other countries. It will also stem the outflow of future populations from the country as jobs and opportunities become freely available. Beginning with the Ukrainian arms industry, particularly its missile and aircraft industries, may be a good starting place. At one point, Ukraine-based Antonov was one of two producers of heavy-lift aircraft for the Soviet Union. Antonov manufactured the world’s largest transport aircraft—the An-225 Mriya. The sole operational Mriya was destroyed in the early days of the attack on Kyiv, but the manufacturing rights and technical data were sold to China in 2016. Rebuilding what Ukraine has a proven talent and capacity for would be the first right step in the path to reconstruction.

A long-term commitment would also show the rest of the world that the West is willing to bear the burden of a decades-long aid process. In doing so, it would signal that the Western alliance does not cut and run when its short-term objectives are achieved. After Afghanistan, for example, trust in the West as a reliable long-term ally reached a low given the manner of the pull-out from Kabul. A sustained commitment to Kyiv would show that the sacrifices made by the Ukrainian people were not in vain.

While the war may continue for a while, it is necessary to develop a solid long-term plan for the economic reconstruction of Ukraine and to line up donors who will fund it over a long period of time. Otherwise, Ukraine’s demographic disaster will only escalate, and the West will be seen as an alliance that does not honor its commitments.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the NIDS. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Ukraine’s Long-Term Catastrophes: Demographic Decline and Economic Devastation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Capabilities Assessment

The possible introduction of SLCM-N to the attack submarine fleet creates an imperative that requires assessing the weapon’s efficiency in enhancing the United States’ ability to both deter an adversary and defeat it, if necessary. From a tactical standpoint, the deployment of SLCM-N offers enhanced flexibility and responsiveness, enabling targeted precision strikes against key adversary assets.

Additionally, the versatility of SLCM-N enables credible deterrence across a spectrum of threats, bolstering the United States’ strategic resilience in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. By utilizing and retrofitting existing or in-process systems, it is possible to make SLCM-N a variable-yield, stealthy, and surgically precise tactical-/battlefield-employable nuclear system. Furthermore, the necessity for a more regionally targeted nuclear weapon capability is necessary, now more than ever, to deter aggression in both EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters and potentially provide greater assurance to partners and allies.

Cost Implications

A key focal point in deliberations surrounding the re-establishment of non-strategic nuclear capabilities is an evaluation of the associated costs—financially and politically. While the deployment of SLCM-N entails large financial investments, its strategic value in offsetting deterrence capabilities warrants consideration. It is important to ensure the cost efficiency of SLCM-N deployment without compromising critical Navy readiness and modernization initiatives. Despite the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review calling for the cancellation of the SLCM-N program, Congress expressed its consternation with that decision by funding the program anyway.

This is key to understanding some of the nuances of shared power within the federal government. Additionally, the geopolitical cost implications must be addressed as well. Adding new capabilities to the American arsenal could drive significant costs for arms control globally. Both near-peer and pacing competitors could see this as an expression of aggression and escalation. This could increase tensions surrounding global arms control and nonproliferation. However, continuing to ignore pacing challenges could potentially threaten arms control and the credibility of ally assurance.

Communication Strategy

Effective communication lies at the heart of strategic decision-making, particularly concerning sensitive topics such as nuclear deterrence. Transparent communication that emphasizes the importance of clarity between military leadership, policymakers, and the public regarding the rationale and implications of reestablishing non-strategic nuclear capabilities is critical. Effective communication also includes proactive engagement with international partners and allies, which is important in fostering cohesion and avoiding misperceptions in a world of continuously evolving threats. Proper messaging to adversaries is equally vital to ensuring the efficacy of adding a new capability to the toolbox. The delicate nature of communication must not be overlooked. American leaders must place this facet of military strategy at the forefront of their minds when addressing not only nuclear but also any decision that is likely to have second- and third-order effects whether intentional or unintentional. Due to the historic nature of American involvement in conflict around the world, the ability to communicate effectively on the world stage is imperative to ensuring the success of this task.

Conclusion

The re-establishment of a non-strategic nuclear capability within the US Navy, bringing SLCM-N to the fleet, represents a nuanced proposition that warrants meticulous scrutiny from a tactical perspective. Keeping an eye on the capability provided, system and modification cost, and a broader communication strategy is essential for informed decision-making when navigating such a complex topic. Nuclear weapon experts Robert Soofer and Walter Slocomb write, “The House and Senate appropriations committees have not provided adequate funding for the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). This is a mistake. The United States needs this capability to deter Russia, China, and North Korea, and to assure its allies.”

SLCM-N enhances deterrence by providing the United States with a flexible and credible deterrent against nuclear-armed adversaries. Fielding an additional nuclear response option also improves allied assurance. A breadth of nuclear capabilities, including sea-launched cruise missiles, gives the American nuclear arsenal the depth required for adversaries that are growing their own capabilities. This aids in ensuring deterrence holds, while reaffirming American commitment to ally security.

TSgt William Atkins is an instructor at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirtland AFB. The views expressed are his own.

Re-Establishing Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities in the United States Navy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathic dictators are nothing new. They date back more than two millennia. In their time, the social mechanisms and technology of the day were employed. Ancient Rome’s Emperor Augustus is but one example. The word realpolitik, invented in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, describes the application of diplomacy and force in the pursuit of selfish state interests. Count Otto von Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor,” was another master of ruthless realpolitik.

Fake news is modern slang for purposeful disinformation spread as real news. Fake news makes claims that the maker knows to be false, but intentionally packages and distributes to seem genuine, to serve their political and military purposes. English-language fake news, used as wartime propaganda, was already commonplace by the time of the English Civil War (1642–1651). It also vexed the American founding fathers during the American Revolution (1775–1781).

Sociopathic dictators have a serious psychological disorder characterized by constant deceitful manipulation and a complete lack of regard for other people. When a very ambitious and successful sociopath rises to be head of state, taking control of national armies and arsenals and even nuclear weapons, the results can be devastating.

Infamous examples of twentieth-century dictators who practiced realpolitik, propagated fake news, and were sociopaths include Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Mao Zedong. Between them, their amoral aggression and complete disregard for lives caused the deaths of tens of millions.

Understanding these three historical and contemporary phenomena is essential for America to effectively address national security concerns. Acting together, realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathy shape adversary strategic behavior and work to the United States’ serious detriment. During the nuclear age and the social media era, the risks due to this “trinary weapon” skyrocketed.

Coping with these clear and present dangers calls for a nuanced and multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to deterrence and defense. This approach needs to go well beyond traditional military strategy that focuses on applying force while maintaining secrecy. Three lines of effort are important to help mitigate the above-mentioned trinary aspects of coercive statecraft.

First, multilateral engagement is important for combating the ill effects of enemy realpolitik. Just as in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, collective international efforts by like-minded democracies are vital to resisting expansionist tyranny. Further strengthening multilateral frameworks and alliances, to address common security challenges and deter adversarial behavior, is a useful approach. Important examples include expanding NATO and rationalizing its burden sharing. Expanding AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US, to include Japan and other Asia-Pacific allies, such as South Korea and Canada, is another option.

Second, strategic communication and information resilience is important. These hybrid-warfare, offensive and defensive weapons need further development by the United States. Clear and consistent messaging is indispensable to effectively convey America’s values and goals and to counteract bad-actor manipulation. This can help immunize allies against falling for adversary disinformation and protect victims of repression from enemy brainwashing.

To this end, enhancing resilience against fake news requires expansion within the United States. This can be done using media literacy programs, non-partisan fact-checking mechanisms, and widespread public awareness campaigns. Any information warfare efforts the US employs to target adversary populations needs to meet high legal and ethical standards. It must also be tempered by stark realism about the utility of disinformation. In short, unconstrained free speech requires an informed public.

Third, psychological profiling techniques, now standard practice in law enforcement, need further development to identify and mitigate the influence of sociopathic dictators in shaping strategic events. Such hyper-threatening individuals could, perhaps, be identified mid-career, before rising to lead nations. Overt and covert efforts to remediate or interdict the rise of such dangerously pathological persons is a tricky matter, but one the Pentagon, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency should not neglect. This line of effort can adapt and extend approaches refined since September 11, 2001, to better understand and short circuit mental processes behind progressive radicalization leading to violent terrorism.

These lines of effort need more urgent furthering on a truly whole-of-nation basis. Government officials and private-sector executives can turn their efforts to developing the required capabilities. Social media companies are already expert at manipulating Americans. Perhaps it is time their efforts are employed for the nation rather than against it.

By addressing these new-old challenges head-on and implementing effective countering strategies, America can enhance its defense against the realpolitik and disinformation employed by sociopathic dictators. By doing so, the United States and its allies safely navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics and growing three body problem.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Realpolitik and Fake News Complicate Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout World War II, Tinian became a key battleground between American and Japanese forces. In 1944, the United States launched Operation Forager, a campaign to capture the Mariana Islands, including Tinian, from Japanese control. The Battle of Tinian, which lasted from July 24 to August 1, 1944, resulted in a decisive American victory, with the island ultimately falling under American control.

Following its capture, Tinian was transformed into a major strategic military base for the United States. The United States Army Corps of Engineers quickly began construction of airfields and other infrastructure to support American operations throughout the Pacific theater with Tinian’s airfields, particularly North Field and West Field, becoming vital launching points for American bombing raids against Japanese targets during the final stages of World War II. It was from Tinian that the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers Enola Gay and Bockscar took off to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, hastening the end of World War II in the Pacific theater.

Beyond the successful termination of World War II, Tinian remained under American control as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which was administered by the United States. The island’s military installations were maintained and utilized for various purposes, including training exercises, logistics support, and surveillance activities during the Cold War.

In the modern era, Tinian continues to host military activities, although on a smaller scale. The island’s airfields are still used for military and civilian flights, and the United States maintains a presence in the region to support its security interests in the Pacific.

Overall, the history of American military affiliation with Tinian reflects the island’s strategic significance as a key outpost in the Pacific theater during World War II and its continued importance in maintaining American military presence and influence in the region.

Tinian’s location in the Pacific makes it strategically important for maintaining a presence in the region. It provides a strategic foothold for the United States in the western Pacific, enabling rapid response to regional security challenges and ensuring stability.

With the growing focus on the Indo-Pacific region, Tinian offers a base from which the US can conduct military exercises, patrols, and operations in theater. This enhances America’s ability to deter potential adversaries and protect its interests in the region.

Tinian’s infrastructure, particularly its ports and airfields, also support military operations and logistics in the Pacific. It serves as a hub for resupplying and refueling military assets and facilitating the movement of troops and equipment across the region.

Tinian’s strategic value extends beyond its physical attributes. It also plays a role in strengthening alliances and partnerships with regional allies, such as Japan and South Korea, by demonstrating American commitment to regional security and stability. Though Tinian played a vital role in supporting American interests for decades, re-establishing a strategic airfield on Tinian Island presents several challenges for the United States.

First, Tinian’s existing infrastructure needs significant upgrades and expansion to accommodate American bombers. This includes runways, taxiways, hangars, fuel storage facilities, and other support infrastructure. Constructing and maintaining these facilities is costly and time-consuming.

Given the emphasis on eco-friendly sustainability, Tinian’s diverse ecosystems, including coral reefs, coastal forests, and wetlands are a possible challenge to military expansion. Establishing a large airfield could have adverse effects on these environments, potentially leading to habitat destruction, pollution, and other environmental impacts. Mitigating these concerns, while developing the airfield, is essential to minimizing negative cultural and socio-political consequences that have the potential to impact foreign relations.

Locally, some residents of Tinian and nearby islands may oppose the establishment of a strategic airfield due to concerns about noise, increased military presence, and potential disruptions to their way of life. Addressing these concerns and gaining local support for the project is crucial for its near- and long-term viability. The process of acquiring land and securing necessary permits for the airfield may involve navigating complex political and legal landscapes, both locally and internationally. Cooperation with the local government of the Northern Mariana Islands and adherence to relevant laws and regulations are essential for a smooth and lawful development process.

Furthermore, establishing a strategic airfield on Tinian Island requires ensuring its security against potential threats, including military aggression, terrorism, and espionage. Implementing robust security measures, such as perimeter fencing, surveillance systems, and military patrols, is necessary to safeguard the airfield and its operations. Establishing a comprehensive force protection plan designed to deter and mitigate external and internal threats is challenging for a geographically isolated operational installation.

Logistically, maintaining a strategic airfield on Tinian requires adequate support, including transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Ensuring reliable access to these resources, particularly in remote island locations, is challenging and may require coordination with military and civilian logistics providers with the capabilities to provide operational and contingency logistical support.

Addressing these challenges requires careful planning, coordination, and cooperation between various stakeholders, including the United States military, local government, environmental agencies, and the civilian population. Despite the obstacles, the strategic value of establishing an airfield on Tinian outweighs the challenges, given its importance for projecting American military power and political influence in the Pacific region.

Tinian stands as a critical asset in the United States’ deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, offering strategic advantages that enhance American military presence and projection capabilities. Its historical significance, particularly as a pivotal base during World War II, underscores its enduring importance in shaping regional security dynamics.

While Tinian holds immense strategic value, its development as a key military outpost presents a myriad of challenges. From the need for significant infrastructure upgrades to addressing environmental concerns and local opposition, establishing and maintaining a strategic airfield on Tinian requires careful planning, coordination, and cooperation among various stakeholders.

Despite these challenges, the strategic imperatives driving the United States’ presence on Tinian Island are clear. As geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region continue to evolve, Tinian’s role as a forward-operating base for American forces remains indispensable for deterring potential adversaries, safeguarding regional stability, and protecting vital national interests.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, Joshua’s background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management within the private sector. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Fortifying America’s Pacific Presence: Revitalizing Tinian Island’s Airfield was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton, labels this issue the three body problem. As nuclear strategy experts suggest, American deterrence capabilities and overall numbers both matter.

Patrick McKenna and Dylan Land’s “Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates,” details four essential variables for right-sizing the arsenal: risk management, deterrence and assurance goals, force use guidelines, and operational constraints. This article will unpack the matter of risk management.

Risk management issues permeate virtually every decision about nuclear posture and arsenal right-sizing. The perspectives of tolerable nuclear risks held by America, this country’s adversaries, and this country’s allies all matter to effective global nuclear peacekeeping.

Deterrence theorists rightly argue that the US should start by understanding exactly what each adversary values most and their goals. This information is useful in determining what to hold at risk—the high value assets to target. The total number of those targets is an essential input to arsenal right-sizing.

Political and fiscal compromises have a major impact on arsenal size as well. For the United States, the finite capacity of the defense industrial base is a major current constraint. The less money available to sustain America’s triad, the greater the risk that the force structure is not adequate to deter adversaries and assure allies. The weaker the political will to resist coercion, and to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attacks, large or small, the less successful is deterrence and assurance.

Similarly, the less the production capacity of the defense industrial base, the less the US is able to implement on a timely basis whatever types and numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads are the chosen arsenal size and force structure.

Since nuclear deterrence has never failed, analysis is necessarily prospective and does not rely on large quantities of data or past experience. Instead, there is a reliance on inferences from military and political history, combined with playing out, on paper, the aftermath of a nuclear war.

The United States is now dealing with the unpleasant reality that any significant expansion in the nuclear arsenal is accomplished much less rapidly than adversaries can grow and strengthen their own arsenals. Actuarial science suggests that guarding against catastrophic failures calls for worst-case planning. Given the catastrophic results of nuclear warfare, right-sizing the nuclear triad must deter all adversaries simultaneously. This includes accounting for the instance in which China, North Korea, and Russia collaborate to coerce or attack the United States. Should they ever take the gamble to launch a nuclear attack, American deterrence has utterly failed.

An upper bound on American deployed warheads is the sum of what is needed to deter each adversary in isolation. This is because should US Strategic Command deploy enough nuclear weapons to simultaneously hold Chinese, North Korean, and Russian targets at risk, deterrence is likely to hold. Keep in mind, there is no historical example to suggest that all weapons will strike designated targets.

Thus, the fewer weapons there are to strike targets, the greater the risk of deterrence failure. This leaves the old pejorative, “We will make the rubble bounce,” important when considering that probability of target destruction is certainly much lower than many believe.

As with other inputs to triad right-sizing, wherein less of an important resource increases the risk of deterrence failure, the more the total number of deployed nuclear warheads falls short of the upper bound mentioned above, and the greater the risk becomes that one or another scenario of adversary coercion or attack will occur and possibly succeed.

But assuming the US fields a large enough and modernized arsenal, there is a disincentive for any single attacker to strike the United States and for a second adversary to wait, assess the damage, and perhaps complete what the initial attacker did not. There is also a disincentive for all adversaries to collaborate in a unified attack. Absent a large American arsenal, such considerations become more viable.

Risk is relative. There is seldom one right answer when many limited resources are being competed for, while the nation must also address other priorities besides the all-important national defense. But to go very far below the upper bound of the total number of high-value targets risks deterrence failure. Any resource savings are short-term and illusory. The costs of deterrence failure vastly eclipse any imagined benefits to a too-small arsenal.

Only further research and development, strategic planning, intelligence analysis, and open debate can lead to a sound consensus on exactly how big the nuclear arsenal needs to be during the risk-laden years that lie ahead. There is no time to waste.

Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with four decades of experience. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Right-sizing was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) tested its first nuclear device on October 9, 2006. This action exacerbated an already significant threat perception by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Because of the United States’ treaty agreement concerning the defense of South Korea and Japan, both nations, while uneasy, were confident in American security guarantees. In the subsequent two decades, the North Korean threat has grown considerably as has the China threat.

On December 18, 2023, the Associated Press reported that “North Korea on Monday conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test in five months, likely launching a developmental, more agile weapon, as it vows strong responses against US and South Korean moves to boost their nuclear deterrence plans.” The DPRK tested the Hwasong-18 ICBM. Theodore Postol argues that the Hwasong-18 is “identical” to the Russian Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 2). Jacob Gleason describes the Topol-M as having a range of 10,500–12,000 kilometers. The ranges of the Topol-M and DPRK’s Hwasong-18 are similar. According to Ridzwan Rahmat, the “Hwasong-18 is deployed onboard a nine-axled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).”

Rahmat suggests that the Hwasong-18 is possibly equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which enhances its strategic military posture by enabling a singular missile launch to engage multiple targets concurrently. Drawing on the framework posited by Postol, which draws a parallel between the SS-27 and the Hwasong-18, it is plausible, to infer that the Hwasong-18 missile may have the capacity to carry up to four nuclear warheads.

In the context of North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, it is imperative to formulate a strategic response that effectively deters Kim Jong Un from engaging in provocations that might threaten the United States, South Korea, or Japan. Within this intricate security landscape, the United States is responsible for reinforcing and validating the trust of regional allies, specifically the ROK and Japan.

Regarding the American commitment to South Korea, the Department of Defense provides insights that emphasize the necessity of a robust and unwavering alliance framework to ensure regional stability and counter the threats posed by the DPRK’s military advancements. This necessitates a nuanced approach that balances deterrence with diplomatic engagement, thereby maintaining regional peace and security while upholding the integrity of international alliances.

As the Department of Defense recently reminded Americans, “In 1953 the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) signed the Mutual Defense Treaty pledging to promote peace, defend against external threats, and strengthen collective defense in the Pacific region. Seventy years later, the U.S.-ROK Alliance now stands as one of the world’s premier alliances.” This is a clear statement of commitment to the alliance with South Korea. To comply with the “defend against external threats” directive, the United States needs to change its nuclear policy toward North Korea.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, Article III states, “The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.” These agreements codify an American commitment to the ROK and Japan.

If either South Korea or Japan lost faith in American commitment to their security, both countries have the technical capacity to pursue their own nuclear arsenals to deter the DPRK. To prevent such an eventuality, the United States, under the auspices of the Washington Declaration, is actively expanding its assurance efforts. The success of American efforts is evinced in the South Korea announcement: “The United States and South Korea plan to draw up joint guidelines on nuclear defense strategy by the middle of next year and establish an integrated system to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Yonhap news agency said on Saturday.”

For American assurance efforts to work long term, the United States must explore multiple options to mitigate the potential security threats posed by North Korea. First, the US must continue support for joint exercises, like Ulchi Freedom Shield, but also consider including greater employment of nuclear weapons. The message conveyed through exercises is simple—the US and ROK alliance is prepared, through practice, for conflict.

Second, the United States should rotationally deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This will signal North Korea that the United States is deeply committed to South Korean security. However, this strategy requires cautious execution to avoid provoking China, which could lead to unintended consequences.

Third, the United States could also undertake a continuous deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. They were in South Korea for decades and widely accepted by South Koreans. Nuclear weapons would be more welcome today given North Korean nuclear pursuits.

China is certain to respond negatively to any of these options, as would North Korea. However, the consequence of doing nothing may produce a situation that allows the DPRK to push the escalation rhetoric and provocations to the point of conflict.

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and China’s nuclear breakout are increasingly concerning for South Korea and Japan as both nations see these efforts as a clear threat to their own security. American commitment to the ROK and Japan remains on shaky ground, despite the positive steps taken since the Washington Declaration. Countering those threats with a very clear commitment of American nuclear weapons may prove just the right demonstration of commitment to friend and foe alike.

James M. Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The North Korean Missile Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

European nations’ responses to the Russia challenge remain fragmented. They also show little concern about threats from China and North Korea. This led to a lack of strategic alignment between the US and Europe on the problem of facing the combined threat of China, North Korea, and Russia.

France and Germany prevented the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from qualifying China as a threat. France also torpedoed a NATO attempt to open a representative office in Japan. Neither does Europe plan to get involved in a Taiwan conflict. Max Hoell, during his talk, said, “European strategic autonomy thus appears to translate into a quasi-equidistance between Washington and Beijing.” This perspective appears correct.

The European political discourse is replete with concerns that a second Donald Trump presidency will usher in a post-NATO world. Such concerns miss the point. Regardless of who is in the White House in Washington, DC, the views of American presidents evolve as resources become finite. Europe needs to step up to the plate and not only pay their fair share for Europe’s defense, but also understand the need for a division of labor to defend a world threatened by revisionist powers. British and French deterrence face a credibility challenge. If faced with a conflict against China or Russia, Europe’s nuclear arsenals may not deter absent American support.

Realpolitik is to advocate a stronger transatlantic cooperation in extended deterrence. To rely solely on national European deterrence introduces reliability issues, such as the security of one country depending on the presidential power of another. Certain political parties, if victorious in French or German elections, would opt to appease China and Russia—possibly ending NATO and a European nuclear deterrent. Ideally, Europe should increase its contributions to deterrence efforts, including strategic alignment with NATO, increasing defense spending, and expanding European nuclear capabilities within the framework of transatlantic cooperation.

There is a need, though, for political leadership to engage domestic audiences in understanding the importance of nuclear deterrence to garner support for necessary security policies. Educating the public on nuclear realities and strategic imperatives is vital. European nations should continue evaluating their security strategies in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics and disruptive technological advancements. Only modernization can ensure adaptability and effectiveness in deterrence efforts.

Practically speaking, what are the options for a European nuclear deterrent involving France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) that operate in concert with the United States? A joint European nuclear force, unified under joint command and control involving France, Germany, and the UK, could provide a deterrent against threats to European security, but at a level well below that of Russia. Another option, an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella under a bilateral arrangement between the UK and France to cover other European nations, could provide security guarantees and potentially share nuclear assets.

Independently maintaining and enhancing European nuclear capabilities and further developing their own nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy may be a necessary step. But that would further fragment the approach to European security. Alternatively, Europe could create a European federation where a unified nuclear force is established. Spearheaded by France, Germany, and the UK, it could support a “European Federation Nuclear Force.” This option, which is no less than the Holy Grail of European unity and strategic autonomy, would require significant political integration and coordination among European states. Nationalist tendencies would prove problematic. This not only sounds far-fetched, based on decades of previous attempts, but the contemporary climate of election interference and electoral tactics make it not only a remote prospect, but also a repellant to a majority of voters.

A fiscally sustainable endgame could be an expanded NATO nuclear-sharing agreement, with additional European countries sharing the burden of nuclear responsibilities within the alliance, together with France and the UK. The feasibility and desirability of these options would depend on various factors, including intra-European political will and transatlantic cooperation, while getting the China and Russia strategic picture right. A combination of realist threat perception and American-led deterrence realpolitik can generate the kind of tremendous pressure under which Europe will prove itself to be adaptive and step up to demonstrate its ability to lead and deter.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bad actors, for example, would likely cheat on such a ban. Russia, for example, has a long track record of cheating on international agreements. As with all law, it is only the honest who follow the rules. The dishonest are incentivized to cheat in order to employ nuclear coercion, or even nuclear attack, in a time of crisis.

Scenario analysis of possible results from denuclearization suggest there is significant risk to such a move. Removing the constraints on conventional war, which mutual nuclear deterrence has provided since 1945, could serve as the catalyst for expanded conventional conflict. Disarmament would not eliminate nuclear arms design knowledge. Instead, the world would rely on a shaky monitoring regime to ensure no misuse of such knowledge.

Without the impediment of a nuclear-armed adversary, great-power war would return with gusto. Some simple actuarial calculations are revealing. First, about 80 million soldiers and civilians were killed in World War II. An equivalent war today, accounting for population growth, gives an approximate death toll of 325 million. This estimate could be too low, given modern military capabilities.

There is a myth that modern war produces less collateral damage and fewer civilian casualties due to precision-guided munitions, prevailing humanitarian restraint, and improved medicine. Actual conditions in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine illustrate that this is a myth. Modern conventional warfare tends to equal the destructive capacity of that in the twentieth century.

Similarly, the idea that ethnic cleansing (genocide) is a thing of the past is also false. The Balkans, Ukraine, and Xinjiang are all examples.

Other likely side effects of conventional great-power war deserve consideration. War creates refugees, expanding troop requirements, violence, stress, deprivation, and overtaxed medical systems.

If Americans thought the loss of life during the COVID-19 pandemic was terrible, and the global death toll was about seven million, how many more will the next world war kill? Lest we forget, the American medical system was overtaxed by a flu virus that left only a small percentage of the population needing medical care. If the next world war brings the fight to the United States and the American people, the medical crisis will prove far greater.

Furthermore, during the next world war, the current focus on manufacturing consumer goods will shift to a focus on producing war materials as nations exhaust their financial resources to wage war. Environmental regulations, child labor laws, and the other luxuries of peace will certainly be cast aside as victory becomes the primary concern.

Nuclear disarmament also has another consequence that should enter the equation. The nation(s) losing the war or those fearful of being pulled into war may very well turn to the covert development of nuclear weapons to either win or prevent attack. In short, the genie will likely escape the bottle once again, but without the benefit of providing pre-war deterrence. The scientific knowledge and engineering know-how to build nuclear weapons will never go away. Neither will ample supplies of special nuclear material.

A race among combatants to be the first to build new nuclear weapons would likely result. With trust at zero, an incentive to go nuclear is certain. As a conventional World War III wore on, anger, panic, grief, and revenge would likely feed the collapse of restraint. A rebirth of the most powerful nuclear weapons possible is likely. International law would prove meaningless as the fear of defeat loomed. Events far more terrible than Hiroshima and Nagasaki may follow.

Advocates of nuclear abolition argue that without global denuclearization, the accidental launch of a nuclear weapon or use by miscalculation is very likely, even if deterrence never fails. The disarmament community wants it both ways, while ignoring basic human nature.

Focusing on solid risk-mitigation decisions is a better option than the risky course of nuclear abolition. Assertions that general nuclear war is inevitable and will kill millions before bringing about nuclear winter is bad science and worse strategy. It attributes high probabilities where none exist.

Effective nuclear deterrence can sustain peace as it has for seven decades. Efforts to abolish nuclear weapons are based on emotion rather than a well-founded understanding of human nature. It is time we fully consider the consequences of a world without nuclear weapons. They are certainly not attractive. We know what that world looks like because we have seen it before.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

The Consequences of Nuclear Disarmament was originally published on Global Security Review.