Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.

To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.

Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.

Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.

The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”

The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.

Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”

NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.

Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.

NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.

Europe must face a Kulturkampf in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.

Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.

Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the effort de guerre are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.

In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul
• The Ukrainian government could likely escalate the conflict within the next year.
• Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots
• Russian foreign policy has fed domestic nationalism and pride has become a source of power for the Kremlin.

Russia attempts to make inroads to the east as tensions persist with the West.

As relations with the West remain tense for the foreseeable future, Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul, playing them off each other, and off Beijing, to its benefit.

Despite talks between Russia and Japan in November 2017, the two countries are still at odds over a contested set of islands, and China remains Moscow’s most important partner in the region.

Russia’s proposal to send U.N. Peacekeeping forces to Donbas will gain traction, despite discussions between Russia and Ukraine, together with its Western supporters, over the installation’s parameters.

Expect Continued Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine

The plan likely will not come to fruition by the end of the year. However, there is a small chance it may reduce the violence in eastern Ukraine in the short-term.

In the medium- to long-term,  recent developments in Ukraine may mean an escalation of hostilities in the country’s east, as the Ukrainian military takes command over operations in the region.

A recently passed bill by the Ukrainian parliament outright labels Russia as a foreign aggressor. The law gives the President increased over Ukraine’s armed forces and eliminated the requirement for parliamentary support before ordering military action. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict in eastern Ukraine joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence, like the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict within the next year.

Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots

Two other post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan), and the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, will remain prone to internal instability and vulnerable to political, cyber, military, or other hybrid interference from Russia.

The long-term standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially flare up again. The joint border shared by Moldova and Ukraine will potentially result in an increased Russian security presence in the region, either by conduction more frequent military exercises or shipping more weapons to separatist groups.

While it is unlikely that either of these territories will result in a regional conflict, it remains to be seen whether Russia will seek to exploit ongoing political and social divisions in the West to advance its interests in either region.

Both lie within what the Kremlin considers its traditional “sphere of influence,” and maintaining this sphere is an essential component of its national security strategy

Russia: the aspiring—but declining–great power?

Russia aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber-rattling, and foreign engagements overseas. Russian foreign policy is centered on regaining and retaining the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, at home, it faces increasing constraints from a poorly-diversified economy and crippling U.S. and E.U. sanctions, levied in the aftermath of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin (and above all, Putin) prizes internal stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and political expression.

Moscow’s ability, through its foreign policy, to regain what it views as its traditional role on the world stage—even through aggressive expansionism and disruption abroad—has fed domestic nationalism and pride which has further legitimized the Kremlin and has become a source of regime power.

Russian nationalism features strongly in the Kremlin’s national narrative, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism.

Putin is personally popular, but recent protests driven by economic and administrative mismanagement reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power by government officials and those close to them.

However, Putin’s recent re-election has been used by the Kremlin as a referendum to buttress his continued rule. Domestically, authoritarianism and decreased rule-of-law are likely to be expected.

Foreign policy will be dictated by heightening tensions with the west due to the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and foreign interference operations will dictate Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Russian Foreign Policy: Expansionism Feeds Domestic Nationalism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 Brexit vote and rising the popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin, in no small degree—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe seems to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continues to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions. For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

The E.U. Will Attempt to Implement Reforms in 2018

Europe is in dire need of reform, both politically and economically. The bloc faces significant internal divisions. Demographics, economic stagnation, and ideological arguments threaten the European Union’s ability to act as a global power.

Over the next two years, the E.U. will need to decide whether or not it is in search of an ever-closer union, mainly as it manages Brexit negotiations. The bloc’s leadership badly needs to prove the legitimacy and value of the Union, and consolidating power as the UK leaves may be the way forward.

While Brexit initially seemed to undermine the E.U.’s standing overseas, it may have had the opposite effect. Member states on the continent have primarily reaffirmed their commitment to the bloc, particularly following the election of pro-EU President Emmanuel Macron of France.

In fact, the loss of the UK may facilitate more easy implementation of EU-wide fiscal and monetary policies, as the UK has famously retained its currency—the pound—and with it, monetary sovereignty.

Security concerns may play a decisive role in further E.U. integration. Concerns about U.S. credibility following the election of Donald Trump could lead to higher military integration by E.U. members. Germany, which has maintained a more pacifist stance since the end of the Cold War, is integrating parts of its’ armed forces with the militaries of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania.

Increased numbers of NATO and European troops have been deployed along Europe’s frontiers with Russia and Belarus.  Additionally, there has been more and more talk of greater security integration and E.U.-wide policy towards defense and security.

What’s the future of the European Union?

Economically, Europe is still at risk. Eurozone banks continue to distribute capital unevenly due to irregular E.U. banking regulations. Migration within the E.U. will persist, as will migration to Europe from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Separatist movements will continue, encouraged by the Brexit movement.

Demographically, Europe’s population is changing. Aging population will consume government revenues as health care will be an even more significant concern. Youth unemployment in countries like Spain and Italy will continue to be a security risk, as this is a group at risk for violent radicalization. Growth will be dependent on Europe’s abilities to reform E.U. institutions, provide employment, and manage public anxiety about issues like immigration, terrorism, and national identity.

Of immediate concern is the aftermath of the recent Catalonian independence crisis in Spain. The handling of the issue by the central government in Madrid, the imprisonment of Catalonian political leaders, and the steadfast refusal of Catalonia’s leaders to find a compromise could destabilize the internal politics of the bloc, and encourage other separatist regions in E.U.-states like Belgium to pursue secession referendums of their own. The dispute could be prolonged in the aftermath of snap elections called in the wake of Madrid seizing administrative power over Catalonia.

The European Union Faces Challenges to Its Legitimacy in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This comes alongside news that the Polish military will create a 50,000-strong volunteer militia as fears grow of a resurgent Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Poland shares a border with Russia. Since Moscow has annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported the insurgency in the east of the nation, Russia’s neighbors have warily observed its military expansion.

Polish President Andrzej Duda signed off a statement which will increase defense spending and increase the strength of the military by 50,000 troops from the current 100,000 troops. The bill will also include provisions for a volunteer militia force, numbering around 50,000, according to reports from state broadcaster Polskie Radio.

Increased Defense Spending is Policy Everyone Can Agree On

The bill—a rare piece of cross-partisan legislation—envisions defense spending increasing to up to 2.5 percent of Poland’s gross domestic product by 2030. Most NATO members have yet to meet their pledges to increase defense spending to, at least, 2 percent of their respective GDPs.

Of the 28 NATO members, only the U.S., the U.K., Greece, Poland, and Estonia currently meet the 2 percent threshold that all members have pledged to meet. “The Polish army will, within ten years, gain the capability of stopping every opponent,” said the Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz.

Poland is one of just five NATO allies that share a border with Russia, along with all 3 Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. NATO’s ongoing reinforcements in Eastern Europe has leaned towards alleviating the anxieties of Poland and the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), where multinational NATO battalions are based.

Deterrence or Expansion?

Russia has consistently argued that NATO expansion in the former Soviet sphere of influence is part of a strategic encirclement of Russian territory, rather than providing protection for European states that would be otherwise vulnerable to Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has vowed that his nation would never strike a NATO ally and risk a conflict.

Nevertheless, confidence in Russian foreign policy among Western governments is at a post-Cold War low. The Kremlin has made a string of spurious claims about the character of its campaign in Syria, in which it’s denied all reports of infringing and bombing civilians. Russia’s official policy is to refuse any military backing for insurgents in east Ukraine. However, the insurgents themselves have claimed to have thousands of Russian troops in their ranks.

Poland Will Increase the Size of Its Military by Over 50% was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s annual strategic “Zapad” (запад; Russian for west) military training exercises—held in Russia’s Western Military District and regions of Belarus—began on September 14. Troops from neighboring ally Belarus joined alongside Russian forces in the week-long demonstration of military force.

Historically, Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has maintained a habit of conducting offensive operations under the guise of training exercises. The drills will reveal the Russian military’s tactical capabilities and provide indicators on the threats it is focused on.

How Moscow could use the exercises to its advantage

Moscow could use the exercises to boost its presence in states along the front line with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and to increase its military assets in Belarus.

The two nations have partnered in the drills ever since 2009. Within their 1st year as a collaborative endeavor, the drills had been the biggest joint exercises Russia had conducted in the post-Soviet era. Official statements announced that 12,500 military personnel Participated In the 2009 exercises, which included 100 combat, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery airplane and 20 warships.

These drills took place in the crucial Area surrounding the Baltic area and mimicked not only the invasion of Poland but a strategic nuclear strike on Warsaw, increasing concern among NATO member countries.

Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

Russia and Belarus held the next Zapad exercises in September 2013. Expanded to include all branches of Russia’s army As well as rapid response Units of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the drills likely were considerably bigger than the previous exercises, even though the exact numbers are up for debate.

The exercises simulated an assault by Baltic terrorists on Belarus which resulted in a mixed air, naval forces, and urban warfare response. And as had become custom by that time, they ended with a mock atomic attack, this time against Sweden. More important, Russia employed a number of the same approaches it tried in the 2013 Zapad exercises, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, when it got involved with battles In Ukraine and Syria during the following two years.

Moscow isn’t happy with Minsk.

Belarus and Russia entered into a formal “Union State” in 1999 to promote trade and other policies, but the goal of a single currency was never realized. Some experts suggest Putin could use the financial component of the “Union State” arrangement as his legal justification in annexing Belarus.

Putin has been growing uneasy with the West warming to President Lukashenko of Belarus since 1994. The U.S. has sought to get closer to Belarus by lifting some sanctions it imposed to encourage political forums. Last year, The European Union also lifted its five-year sanctions on Belarus, a country with about 10 million people.

Moscow also isn’t happy that Belarus continues to depend on Russian subsidies because the collapse in oil prices has made Moscow cut back on spending. Moreover, Lukashenko’s ties with Moscow worsened when he positioned himself as a neutral mediator for the Ukraine peace talks.

At the same time, there’s a chance Belarusian’s officers might side with Russia in a military conflict. Some of the officers were trained in Russian military schools and are paid less than their peers in Russia. Belarusian troops realize that if Belarus gets annexed by Russia, they’ll be better paid—with the bonus of serving in the armed forces of a nuclear-armed power.

Russia, meanwhile, beefed up its own forces along the borderlands and boosted its security support to regional allies and breakaway territories. Now that Washington has expanded its sanctions against Moscow — and the Kremlin has promised an “asymmetrical” response — Russia is looking to use this year’s military drills to send a message to the West.

Heightened Tensions between Russia and the West

The United States and NATO built up their forces along the European borderlands after Russia annexed Crimea and began backing Ukrainian separatist forces in 2014. The West deployed continuous battalion rotations of 1,000 troops to the Baltic states and Poland and increased its presence in the Black Sea.

Held along the Europe’s borders with Belarus and Russia, Zapad-2017 has emerged as an item of skepticism for governments and media outlets in Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Heletey commented that the 2017 Zapad exercises could be a prelude to an assault on any “country of Europe that shares a border with Russia.” This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements.

This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements. Those skeptical about Russia’s intentions will point out that Russian partners can be underreporting numbers since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s so called Vienna Accord require OSCE nations to permit in observers for particular activities between 13,000 troops or more.

Analysis: Biggest risk comes from non-transparency and Russia’s displeasure with Belarus

The 2017 Zapad exercises are drawing attention because Russia can avoid the need for official outside observer nations by claiming it will have less than 13,000 soldiers in the drills. However, several smaller exercises will be conducted simultaneously, allowing Moscow to avoid the conditions put forth in the Vienna Accord.

Western intelligence and military agencies believe that over 100,000 troops could be deployed. According to statements from the U.S. Department of Defense, Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test response  through other measures, escalations in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia), or attempts to use nonlinear/hybrid warfare tactics, or asymmetric tactics,  in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Could Russia Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against Belarus? was originally published on Global Security Review.

While eastern European leaders are certainly justified in their concern, it is the job of military leaders all over the world to ensure that their forces are prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios. Zapad and other large-scale war games are intended to test the readiness of military forces to deal with such situations.

History, and Russia’s military doctrine, tells us that for the Kremlin to legitimately consider the use of force against a sovereign state—under the guise of aiding Russian-speaking separatists, military drills, or otherwise, the Russian military and political leadership must perceive a legitimate threat to Russia’s national interest—largely the interests of its ruling oligarchic elite.

Additionally, the Kremlin must be sure of its ability to prevail in any forceful confrontation or to, a minimum, ensure a stalemate. Neither condition seems present.

Since last year’s strategic Caucasus-2016 exercise, no Russian allies or client states are under greater threat than they were last year. A few, like Bashar al Assad of Syria, have seen threats to their rule decrease in the past year.

How Likely is it that Russia Will Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against the Baltics?

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Western countries were caught unaware as Russia employed hybrid tactics to hide its deployment of forces to Crimea.

NATO has beefed up its presence in its Baltic and Eastern-European Union member countries, further reducing the already slim chances that Russia will want to attempt an incursion in Baltic or E.U. states.

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Preparing for a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

The Russian military has been holding large scale strategic exercises each year of the twenty-first century, as the Russian economics has rebounded from the lows of the early 1990s. Preparing for such a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

It is also worth noting a correlation between Russia’s economic state and its military spending and training. This would imply that the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to train as far because they can afford to.

Until 2015, Russia’s military expenditures and the number of war games it conducted, both large- and small-scale, had been increasing at a faster rate than the rate of economic growth.

Russian Troop Deployments in Military Training Exercises

Russian GDP figures, Military Exercise Data, and Troop Numbers

Given the degree of attention focused on Russia’s military deployments, it’s highly unlikely that that Zapad-2017 will escalate into a full-scale or partial military conflict with NATO.

Even though Russia’s Gross domestic product grew to 2014, its costs grew by 300 percent at the exact same period and the number of war games increased by 157 percent from 2008 to 2014.

It should be noted that this precludes any so-called “black money” that would not appear on a publicly available balance sheet.

Security Analysis: Although Possible; War with NATO is Unlikely.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test responses through other measures, moderate or temporary escalation in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).

Additionally, due to regional geopolitical developments in the Russia-Belarus relationship, Russia may attempt to use “nonlinear” warfare tactics (asymmetric tactics) in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Zapad-2017: Analyzing Troop Numbers & Economic Factors was originally published on Global Security Review.

A question facing foreign policy experts the world over is whether or not the Russian Federation is preparing for war. The query involves a consideration of how the movement of Russian troops, currently and historically, may lend insights into the intentions of Moscow when it comes to the question of military action in or against other nations.

Is the Crimean Annexation a Harbinger for Further Russian Aggression?

The Russian Federation and its predecessors have long been involved in military action involving Crimea. The first major military operation occurred in the last century of the Russian Empire and was aptly named the Crimean War, lasting from 1853 to 1856. The rationale Czar Nicolas I utilized in trying to militarily seize Crimean territory in the middle of the 19th century was quite like the argument advanced by Russian Federation President Putin in the 21st century. Both leaders contended individuals of Russian descent living in the Crimean Peninsula needed to be protected.

Since the Crimean War, the peninsula has been in and out of Russian control, including being fully engulfed into the now-defunct Soviet Union. The Crimean people gained independence from the Soviet with the liberation of Ukraine from the USSR with the Declaration of State Sovereignty on July 16, 1990, by the newly constituted Ukrainian Parliament.

Full Crimean integration with Ukrainian State following the declaration of independence from the USSR lasted about 15 years. On February 23, 2014, Russian President Putin initiated steps to annex the Crimean Peninsula, using the Russian military. In contemplating whether the events in the Crimean Peninsula serve as a harbinger of what may occur in the not too distant future, a look at Russian military troop movements after February 23, 2014, is illustrative.

The first step President Putin took to annex the Crimean Peninsula was the movement of Russian maritime forces from the naval base at Sevastopol to what international observers considered provocative positions in the Black Sea, which surrounds much of the peninsula. The second step of President Putin in the annexation process was to infiltrate not only the Crimean Peninsula but other Ukrainian territories as well with unmarked Russian ground and special forces, in addition to a number of intelligence officers from GRU (Russian military intelligence) and the FSB/FIS (the domestic and foreign intelligence services that succeeded the Soviet KGB).

Within a matter of a couple of weeks of the Russian Army advancing notoriously into the Crimean Peninsula, a hastily called referendum was called among the Crimean population. On March 16, 2014, an announcement was made that a fully 97 percent of voters in the Crimean Peninsula voted to join the Russian Federation. A so-called treaty of accession was executed bringing the Crimean Peninsula into the Russian Federation over the objectives of the Ukrainian government and the United Nations, NATO, and a multitude of individual nations.

The Baltics in the Aftermath of the Crimean Annexation Into the Russian Federation

In the immediate aftermath of the Crimean annexation into the Russian Federation, the trio of leaders of the Baltic nations sounded alarmed. The leaders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, all stated without equivocation that they anticipated the Russian Federation making military moves into their territories in the future. The leaders of Baltic republics were united in announcing they, in fact, believed Russian military aggression in Ukrainian and Crimean territory was, in fact, a harbinger of war to come throughout the Baltics.

The Russian Federation and Former Warsaw Pact Nations

Following Russian military action on the Crimean Peninsula, some leaders of former Warsaw Pact nations expressed alarm that they believed that their countries were to be targeted by the Russian Federation, and its leader, President Putin. The government of Poland was particularly strident in voicing its concerns about the potential for Russian military action against its frontiers.

Many analysts attribute the alarms that sounded in some former Warsaw Pact national capitals to the removal by the United of defensive armament systems out of nations like Poland and the Czech Republic by order of the Obama Administration. The fact that many Warsaw Pact countries had actual experience with Soviet tanks rolling across their borders during the Cold War added to the heightened sense of apprehension across much of Eastern Europe.

As will be discussed more fully later in this analysis, the so-called Russian Reset of the Obama Administration, coupled with the theory of “lead from behind,” left Eastern European leaders feeling more vulnerable to Russian military excursions, or even widespread war, than at any time since leaving the Soviet orbit.

In fact, Russian military exercises did not focus with any great specificity on any former Warsaw Pact nation. On the other hand, the rhetoric of President Putin about reintegrating former Soviet Republics back into the Russian sphere started to extend further to encompass the idea of restoring Warsaw Pact nations into a Moscow lead alliance.

The tensions involving Eastern European, or former Warsaw Pact, nations eased a bit when the Obama Administration took steps to replace defensive weapons systems back in some of these countries during the latter years of President Obama’s second term. In addition, the seemingly more hardline approach to military excursions by different nations of U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have calmed nerves in Eastern European capitals, at least for the time being.

The Russian Federation and Syria

The actions of the Russian Federation in regard to the civil war in Syria and terrorist infiltration in that Middle Eastern country does provide clues on whether Moscow is preparing for war. Overall, Moscow has ignored admonitions regarding its involvement in Syria, including the manner in which it is using its own military and intelligence forces to support the Syrian regime.

Some analysts have concluded that the Russian presence in Syria is designed in part to bring that nation into its sphere of influence or even control. However, many of these same analysts also contend that Syria is serving as something of a proving ground in which Moscow is testing the extent to which it can act militarily in another nation without a counter-push from other nations, specifically the United States.

On some level, this is a reexamination of the Soviet foray into Afghanistan in the 1980s. Initially, the Soviets acted with little response from the United States, or any other nation, in Afghanistan. In the end, surreptitious U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, through groups like the Mujahedeen and nations like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

The Russian Federation and Iran

A similar proving ground for the Russian Federation is also in place in Iran, some analysts would argue. The Russian Federation was highly influential in forcing the conclusion of the multi-state nuclear agreement.

In point of fact, the content of that agreement, to which the United States via the Obama Administration, became a signatory party. The Russian Federation is now positioned to use that same agreement, and Iran more generally, as means of testing U.S. resolve in light of the new presidential administration.

The Russian Federation and the United States

In the current geopolitical climate, the posture of the United States vis-à-vis the Russian Federation remains the primary blockade to further Russian military aggression. The Russian Federation has been engaged in measures designed to test the resolve of the United States regarding desired military adventurism, or regional war, on the part of Moscow.

The reality is that many foreign policy experts expressed surprise that Moscow did not push further into Ukrainian territory, and perhaps even move into the Baltic States, while Barack Obama was in office. The Russian Federation overall faced little meaningful opposition from the United States when it claimed the Crimean Peninsula, acted in Syria militarily and engaged in extensive machinations in regard to the Iranian nuclear deal.

With the accession of the Trump Administration in the United States, the Russian Federation is forced to test the boundaries again of what it can and cannot do with impunity when it comes to military action and blowback from the United States. Presently, it is the perceived unpredictability of the Trump Administration that may be giving the Russian Federation pause when it comes to military adventures in limited theaters.

As an aside, Moscow appears to be testing these boundaries through the use of both its Navy and Air Force. Moscow has engaged in somewhat provocative encounters with U.S. military forces with Air Force flybys and naval exercises.

Russian Snap Military Exercises: The Dangers of Whole Government Drills

The actions of the Russian Federation concerning the Crimean Peninsula are not seen as the only signs that Moscow may be laying the foundation for a broader war. Contributing to this concept that Moscow may be preparing for war is also found in the ever-increasing number and size of Russian snap military exercises. Snap military exercises are those that are called without any sort of real warning.

What is most troubling about Russian snap military exercises since the Crimean annexation is not just the increase in their frequency nor the ever-enlarged number of troops of all types being involved in these exercises. The major red flag regarding Russian military intentions is the fact that these snap exercises have become whole government exercises. In other words, these snap “military” exercises have become something far more intensive and all-encompassing. They have become designed to place the entirety of the Russian military and government on a war footing for the purposes of these drills.

Historically, this level of military focuses, war focused, exercises that involve a nation’s government more fully tend to be indicative of a regime intent on mounting an offensive attack in the not too distant. Historically, whole government military exercises were seen with increasing regularity on the eves of the First and Second World Wars.

As an aside, few foreign affairs analysts believe that even if the Russian Federation is moving towards even more of a war footing that the regime headed by President Putin intends anything like a globalized conflict. Rather, most analysts conclude that the Russian Federation under President Putin has its sights on the Baltic states, Ukraine, and perhaps some other former Soviet Republics.

Why Moscow Would Launch a Military Strike

President Putin has made it clear that he supports the proposition that the Russian Federation expand and incorporate former Soviet Republics into a sphere of control under the heels of Moscow. The Russian Federation President has made this clear both in his rhetoric and in his military forays, particularly in the Ukrainian theater and on the Crimean Peninsula.

In the final analysis, Moscow may strike militarily if two conditions are met. First, the target of military action must be in the sights of the Russian Federation President himself. Second, there must be some assurance in Moscow that other nations, and particularly the NATO alliance and the United States, lack the resolve to take on the Russian Federation militarily in limited theater military conflicts.

How Moscow May Strike

Moscow is not likely to wage a widespread battle of any sort. Rather, if the country moves forward with military action, it will be sharply focused on specific theaters. These theaters are likely to be Ukrainian territory, the Baltic States, and perhaps in the Middle East.

What to Reasonably Expect in Regard to Russian Military Action in the More Immediate Future

Russia garners significant military advantages through the warm water ports of the Crimean Peninsula and the Ukrainian Republic. Similarly, the Russian Federation collects definite strategic advantages if it were to take direct control over the Baltic States.

Should Moscow elect to seize political control of the sovereign baltic states, the result would be significant international instability. For example, the movement of the Russian Federation into the Baltic States would—theoretically—trigger a response from the NATO Alliance as required by article five (5) of the North Atlantic Treaty; an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. The same treaty obligation does not exist in regard to Ukrainian territories because that nation is not part of NATO.

When it comes to the likelihood of the Russian Federation going to war, the likelihood of further military action by Moscow in Ukrainian territory is likely. In fact, some well-regarded foreign policy analysts actually express some level of surprise that President Putin has not made further, more blatant military moves within Ukrainian territory.

The Baltic States present a bit of a different story when it comes to evaluating whether, when, and where the Russian Federation may elect to go to war or engage in more overt military action. The potential for NATO response has already been noted. In addition to that, the newly-elected U.S. President presents the Russian President and military leaders with something of an unknown.

Despite social media being ablaze with allegations of collusion between Trump advisors and Russia, actual facts supporting much of anything in that regard is largely circumstantial, at least thus far. In any case, it is clear that the Russian government really cannot know what to expect from President Trump when it comes to any campaign to incorporate the Baltic States into a larger Russian Federation.

The early days of the Administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon are illustrative concerning the Russian Federation, military action, and the Baltic States. Not long after President Nixon took office, his then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with him in the Oval Office. Kissinger advised President Nixon that many world leaders, including the leadership of the Soviet Union, thought President Nixon was unpredictable, if not crazy.

President Nixon is said to have smiled at his National Security Advisor, and responded “good.” President Nixon believed that foes of the United States who were uncertain about how the new President would respond to military aggression because he was considered unpredictable, actually played in favor of the United States and overall world peace.

The same sense of uncertainty is in the air when it comes to President Trump and many world leaders, including President Putin. There simply is no clarity on how President Trump might respond to even some type of limited offensive movement of Russian troops. This may serve as a sort of military aggression breakwater, at least for the time being.

Moscow’s Pursuit of Limited Theater War

In the final analysis, Moscow likely is preparing for limited theater war. This includes planning for further military action in the Ukrainian theater. Such action in the Ukrainian theater might include a direct more by Moscow on the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, which is the greater Ukrainian theater. It might also include a similar Russian military movement into Donbas, which is also part of Ukrainian theater. The Russian Federation could engulf these areas in much the same way it took the Crimean Peninsula, slowly eating away at Ukrainian sovereignty.

Moscow’s thirst for limited theater war also includes planning to move on Latvia, Lithuanian, and Estonia. Finally, but less certainly, is the potential for more active military action by the Russian Federation in the Middle East. NATO, the United States, and European powers are not legally obligated to intervene as elements of the military, criminal, and security services of the Russian Federation violate the sovereignty of Ukraine. However, any attempted Russian military offensive on one or all of the three Baltic states would likely lead to the invoking of Article 5. As such, an appropriate and overwhelming response by NATO, the EU, and the United States is essential. It is necessary to demonstrate the integrity and resolve of the NATO alliance, the European Union, and the United States.

Is Russia Preparing for War with NATO and the West? was originally published on Global Security Review.