Ideology matters, as I learned from surviving 18 years under the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The United States pretended otherwise for three decades, clinging to the “end of history” and similar dreams. Today, with ideologically driven conflicts simmering around the world, it is time for America to integrate deterrence, defense, and a theory of victory across the so-called gray zone of geopolitics. Doing so will require policymakers to start listening to what America’s enemies have been saying for years about their ideological designs.

In 2004, when questioned about whether a Venezuela-Cuba alliance was exporting communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States averred: “It is a thing outdated in time and it is not understanding the relationships that exist between the countries.” That was a backhanded ‘yes,’ if there ever was one. The message was meant to assuage the busy, post-9/11 national security community, diverting attention away from the problems brewing south of the U.S. border. More than two decades later, the annual warnings of USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commanders before Congress have finally been heeded by the White House.

Ideology has been slapping America in the face since the late 1990s. For this era of refocusing on state-based threats, it comes in these forms and many others: Beijing’s obsession with employing “united front” organizations to silence dissidents overseas; Moscow’s obsession with Ukraine, kicking off a murky war in 2014 that is now sustained conventionally; Tehran’s obsession with aiding and abetting proxy martyrs of the Islamic Revolution; Havana’s and Caracas’ shared obsession with waging “asymmetric war” on Western powers (which included flooding the American homeland with illicit narcotics); and Pyongyang’s obsession with subverting Seoul’s political processes and civic life. All these gray-zone efforts have an ideology at the heart. Their ideologies, variously rooted in Marxism, religion, and revanchism, drive the leaders of these states to employ irregular warfare tactics without any remorse and at any cost to civilians in the West or anywhere else. You will not find high degrees of intellectual coherence between these constructs; shared hatreds and collectivist doctrines and dogmas are cohesive enough for what now amounts to an anti-Western coalition.

Anti-Western adversaries became sneakier when strategizing and aligning with those espousing similar worldviews. They also became more convinced of their moral superiority. The U.S. national security community makes arbitrary distinctions between geopolitics and ideology. These distinctions obfuscate reality, which is already tough to comprehend, and lead to poor policymaking. Nowhere is this weakness more prominent than in the domain of irregular warfare. How did ISIS carve out its domain between Iraq and Syria, for instance, if not through the aid of its ideology?

Discussing rival-state ideology in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security seems to generate discomfort despite some strides to understand strategic cultures. It started with the spectacular triumphs of 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations’ ideological variables have been marginalized in the Federal Government. The American bureaucrat could finally put ‘Sovietology’ to rest, and, with it, anything to do with alternatives to liberal internationalism. The term ‘Great-Power Competition’ continues the delusion; ‘strategic-ideological struggle’ captures reality much better.

Disclaimer: Ideologies are messy. Their study requires incredible levels of nuance, subtlety, cultural awareness, philosophical skill, and extensive interpretive room. It is not a field of expertise attuned nor prone to engineering solutions or linear responses, making it politically dangerous to confront ideological challengers. Bringing up ideology always risks alienating a group and hurting its feelings. Hence, American political leaders and senior officials have scarcely breathed a word about state-centric ideological conflict since the demise of the USSR.

This problematic approach is a vestige of America’s long-gone “unipolar moment.” Through mirror imaging, it takes our attention away from elements that the Western world’s rivals thrive on. Several foes of the West have developed highly complex irregular warfare doctrines, intelligently focusing on the types of operations that some of these actors can excel in, and backing off from the type of war that they know they cannot win. Because illegality is the common denominator to all irregular warfare activities coming from any type of challenger, ideological zeal and fervor are absolute strategic imperatives to the leaders of these revanchist entities. Indeed, during the Global War on Terror, we recognized it as an essential enemy warfighting capability. Ideology is the glue that authoritarians, totalitarians, and other extremists apply to bind together the domestic constituencies that they rely on for control and aggression. In ideology, those leaders find the corpus of thought and the narratives required to morally justify atrocities committed in pursuit of greed, territorial expansion, or a simple clinging to power.

Acknowledgement is growing that defeating mere symptoms of its rivals’ irregular warfare campaigns cannot bring American strategic victory or even achieve deterrence in the “gray zone.” Looking back at the U.S.-led quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, more observers have called for defeating root ideologies, rather than just crushing the fighters who currently espouse a certain ideology’s flavor-of-the-moment (e.g., Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, FARC, ELN, etc.).

Defeating our enemies must include defeating their ideologies. This no longer demands global wars in the traditional (conventional) military sense. To defeat regime ideologies, whole-of-government efforts require dusting off forgotten or atrophied competencies that America used to cultivate, including the ‘dark arts’ of U.S. foreign policy. Washington needs to articulate once again what it believes in, beyond vague notions of stability, and bring like-minded allies to our side.

David Guenni is completing his doctorate with Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense & Strategic Studies. His research focuses on nation-states’ employment of narcotrafficking as an irregular warfare modality. He is a Venezuelan political asylum seeker in the United States, having spent many years in the struggle against the Chavista regime in Caracas. His opinions are his own and no one else’s.

Why Ideology Matters in Irregular Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

What Has Been the Impact on Our Nation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

These efforts at nuclear compellence, using the threat of escalation to coerce NATO to limit its support for Ukraine, introduce dangerous loopholes that can be exploited by non-state jihadi actors such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, who possess no stake in global stability and are religiously motivated to see the downfall of a global order they view as sinful. These loopholes can be exploited via a false flag attack by imitating what appears to be (but is not) a NATO-backed conventional weapons attack on Moscow with the deliberate intent of triggering a nuclear war.

Jihadi terrorists, unlike state actors, do not seek to maintain a status quo. They are apocalyptically motivated, seeking to bring about the conditions for their version of an Islamic caliphate.

ISIS, al-Qaeda, and aligned groups are motivated by a destructive, apocalyptic worldview. In a 2007 video, Osama bin Laden had promised to use massive weapons to upend the global status quo, destroy the capitalist hegemony, and help create an Islamic caliphate, while Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd said, “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction, even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the Earth.”

ISIS aims to weaken and ultimately destroy state actors, including Russia, which they view as an enemy for its role in propping up the Assad regime in Syria. Furthermore, ISIS has a history of calling for attacks on Russia, specifically in retaliation for Russia’s military involvement in Syria and its broader fight against Islamist movements in the North Caucasus. If their leaders or the leaders of al-Qaeda can exploit a loophole to trigger a large-scale conflict between Russia and NATO, they might see this as a means to cripple both powers, creating a vacuum wherein they can establish their Caliphate.

One of the most disturbing scenarios arises from the possibility of ISIS orchestrating a false flag conventional weapons attack that manages to trigger a nuclear response and thus leads to all-out nuclear war. In today’s interconnected global landscape, terrorist groups can exploit modern technologies, cyber capabilities, and regional instability to mislead major powers. A well-executed false flag attack could deceive both NATO and Russia into believing they are under attack from the other, prompting a rapid escalation into a nuclear conflagration.

Imagine a scenario where ISIS or an affiliated group, through bribery or threats, gains control of a missile system from a third-party state or rogue military element and manages to smuggle this system into a NATO nation with porous border security, such as Romania. From this site, they launch a salvo of conventional missiles at Moscow, which the Russian government might interpret as either a NATO-supported attack or at least an action by rogue members of the NATO chain of command. Russia would be unlikely to consider the possibility that the launch was in fact performed by an uninvolved third party such as ISIS.

Within Putin’s revised nuclear doctrine, a sufficiently embarrassing non-nuclear strike on Russian territory could provoke a nuclear retaliation. This scenario becomes even more plausible if Russia believes the attack was coordinated by a NATO member or supported with NATO-provided weaponry. Thus, a false flag operation can exploit the lowered red lines Putin has established, triggering a nuclear launch by Russia, which would in turn be met with massive nuclear relation by NATO and America—leading to wider nuclear conflict.

ISIS’s leaders are not known for long-term survival planning, especially in the event of a global catastrophe like nuclear war. Their ideology prioritizes martyrdom and the apocalyptic fulfillment of their religious vision over practical concerns about survival in a post-nuclear world. If a NATO-Russia nuclear conflict were to lead to a nuclear winter—an environmental catastrophe that would devastate agriculture and global ecosystems—ISIS may believe that their movement, or at least their ideological successors, would survive through divine intervention or sheer resilience.

ISIS’s apocalyptic vision and willingness to exploit global chaos makes them a serious threat to global security, especially in the context of Russia’s current nuclear posture. Russian and NATO forces must work to enhance intelligence-sharing and establish clearer lines of communication to avoid falling victim to such a false flag operation. Furthermore, global powers must consider the broader implications of lowering nuclear thresholds in an age where non-state actors can exploit such vulnerabilities. Robust systems for verifying the origins of attacks, improved missile defense technologies, and clear diplomatic channels are essential to prevent any false flag attempt from succeeding.

For Russian military strategists, in particular, understanding the apocalyptic motivations of groups like ISIS is crucial. Putin’s strategy of nuclear compellence might seem effective in deterring NATO’s involvement in Ukraine, but it also opens dangerous new avenues for manipulation by non-state actors. By setting conditions where even a conventional attack could provoke a nuclear response, Russia risks falling into a trap set by terrorist groups that wish to bring about the universal Caliphate and wipe the global slate clean. This cannot happen.

Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu is a researcher of security vulnerabilities in artificial intelligence systems and was the first discoverer of a critical vulnerability called “prompt injection,” which enables hijacking the actions and instructions of numerous AI systems. Jonathan discovered prompt injection as part of his work as co-founder of an AI safety & security firm called Preamble. Oksana Bairachna is an associate professor of management at the Odesa National University of Technology (ONTU) and a contributor to Preamble’s research on global strategic stability.

Why and How ISIS Leaders Might Exploit Putin’s Nuclear Compellence to Destroy Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The brainwashing of youths, monopoly over illicit drug production, sheltering and supporting global terrorist groups, weaponization of poverty, and recruitment of refugees has brought Afghanistan to the verge of an imminent explosion, with consequences that may prove more consequential than those of September 11, 2001. Understanding what the Taliban is doing deserves further explanation.

Brainwashing the Youth

The Taliban’s focus on educating Afghan youth in religious schools (madrasa), which serve as training centers for militants and suicide bombers, poses an immediate and long-term threat to the region and the West. Through relentless brainwashing, these madrasas create a generation of children and teenagers steeped in radicalism. Young recruits are taught that martyrdom and suicide attacks are not only honorable but also necessary.

What makes this particularly worrisome is the sheer scale. Tens of thousands of young minds are being primed for violence, and this army of youths will be deployed somewhere. The consequences for neighboring countries and the West, which are already struggling with radicalization, could be catastrophic. As Roza Otenbayeva, head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), said to the UN Security Council, “The Taliban do not allow any monitoring of these schools and we don’t know what they teach there.”

According to the Taliban Ministry of Education, at least 17,300 madrasas are officially active across Afghanistan. Meanwhile, according to an order issued by the Taliban on June 20, 2022, three to 10 jihadi schools, with a capacity of 500–1,000 students each, are being built in every district of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has 408 districts, and the construction of three to 10 new jihadi schools per district could quickly turn the country into the center of global terrorism.

Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is once again a haven for international terrorist groups. The Taliban’s victory emboldened and empowered extremist groups, providing them with the space to reorganize, train, and plan. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now operate freely inside Afghanistan. Taliban ties with these terrorist groups are not superficial. They are rooted in common ideology, long-term political interests, and, most importantly, many Taliban leaders have long-standing family ties with the leaders of these groups.

According to a report in Hasht-e-Subh, the Taliban are building well-equipped bases with residential houses for the Al-Qaeda network and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni province. Likewise, UN reports, especially the July 2024 report, are proof of this claim. The United Nations says Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is a “safe haven” for groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This network of relationships ensures that the Taliban will continue to cooperate with these groups in their collective efforts to destabilize the region, expand influence, and export terror globally, creating a security disaster with devastating global consequences.

Drug Monopoly

Although the Taliban officially banned the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, it has monopolized the industry. By limiting the supply, the Taliban is driving up the price of drugs, making the trade more profitable for themselves and their affiliates. As noted in the July 2024 UN Security Council report, it is still too early to assess the full impact of the poppy cultivation ban. However, senior Taliban officials oppose the ban. Poppy farmers lose while the Taliban profits. The report states, “Due to poppy stockpiles, the drug trade in Afghanistan remains significant.”

The world’s lack of attention to this development risks creating an underground drug economy, further empowering the Taliban and their allied terrorist groups—undermining security and stability in Afghanistan and the region. As the Taliban’s drug empire expands, terrorist groups will increasingly benefit.

Weaponization of Poverty

One of the most dangerous strategies used by the Taliban is the deliberate impoverishment of the Afghan people. By doing this, they pursue two goals.

First, they plunge a large portion of the population into extreme poverty and eliminate opportunities for education, employment, and basic survival. This makes it easier to recruit people into their ranks and allied terrorist groups.

Second, the Taliban’s control over local resources and their monopoly on illicit trade provides ample financial incentives for those willing to fight for them. In this way, poverty becomes a weapon and fuels rebellion and radicalism.

Recruitment of Deported Asylum Seekers

The Taliban encourages the deportation of Afghan refugees by secretly cooperating with some countries, particularly those in the region. This is a policy that is of strategic importance to the regime.

Many deported Afghans, returning to the land where they find no means of survival, are easily recruited by the Taliban and allied terrorist groups. Deportation is vital for the Taliban, as it ensures a steady stream of disillusioned and frustrated individuals who become pawns in their larger scheme.

Many countries fail to grasp the significance of this issue and view it superficially. Deporting immigrants, especially from Western countries, fuels anti-Western sentiments among the population, making them susceptible to serving terrorist groups.

Time Is Running Out

If the world continues to ignore the dire situation in Afghanistan, the consequences will soon prove irreparable. The brainwashing of the nation’s youth, Taliban drug running, safe havens for terrorists, the weaponization of poverty, and the recruitment of refugees will soon impact Afghanistan’s neighbors and the West. Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and India, will suffer the most, but the impact will not be limited to the region. Countries far beyond, especially in the West, will be in the crosshairs of these repercussions.

The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The Biden administration, particularly Jake Sullivan, believes that drones and aerial surveillance can control the situation. This reflects a strategic mistake reminiscent of America’s approach during the Cold War. Ultimately, that mistaken view contributed to the rise of international terrorism and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Abandoning the Afghan people once again will prove catastrophic, especially the West.

As an Afghan, I urge the West to pay attention and ensure that the Afghanistan that led to 9/11 does not become the same Afghanistan of the near future. It may be a landlocked country in Central Asia, but Afghanistan has already proved that it can cause great harm when left to its own devises.

The author is an Afghan who, for reasons of safety, is unnamed.

The Coming Disaster in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

The terms of extremism and terrorism have been used interchangeably. However, there is a crucial distinction between the terms: all terrorists are extremists, but not all extremists are terrorists. Despite the latter, a fine line separates extremists from the turning point of embracing violence—thus becoming terrorists. This is because extremism is generally regarded as “the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs” as per the 2015 UK’s Counter-Extremism Strategy. Furthermore, extremists may resort to terrorism to coerce governments and the general public to give in to their cause.

Over the past couple of decades, extremism and terrorism were mostly associated with religious causes, especially Islamic extremism, which present a persistent threat to numerous states. Yet, the current pandemic crisis may fuel such a risk and threats from other extremism categories. This includes the right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue extremism. While clearly articulating from now why and how the case is cumbersome, government and national security leaders can relate early warning signs to counter these threats.

Some arguments are claiming that terrorist groups are currently preoccupied with protecting their members against the coronavirus. However, different incidents that took place over April 2020 points to the direct opposite. In fact, in its mid-March al-Naba newsletter, ISIS urged its followers to launch attacks in times of crisis and show no mercy.

Earlier in April, 25 soldiers in Mali were killed in a jihadist attack. On the 14th of April, in an operation where one police officer killed, Egyptian security forces exchanged fire. They eliminated seven terrorists who were part of a cell planning to conduct attacks during the Easter holiday in Egypt. Also during mid-April, the Tunisian security authorities foiled a terrorist plan to spread the coronavirus to Tunisian security forces by coughing, sneezing, and spitting.

On the 21st of April 2020, it was announced that one of Europe’s most wanted terrorists and ISIS affiliate, Abdel Majed Abdel Bary, was recently arrested by the Spanish police in Almeria where he settled in during the coronavirus lockdown. Abdel Bary reached Spain via a boat, and local newspapers indicated that he intended to return to the UK. The return intentions of Abdel Bary – who was arrested with another two persons in his apartment – remains unclear. In France, on the 27th of April, a 29-year-old Frenchman was also arrested. The man, who was not identified, has slammed his car into police cars and motorcycles, injuring three officers. It was found that the man has pledged allegiance to ISIS in a letter found in his car. A couple of days later, in a statement by the Danish authorities on the 30th of April, the police in Denmark prevented a terrorist attack with a possible “militant Islamic motive.” The arrested man was already suspected of attempting to obtain ammunition and firearms. On the 30th of April, in one of the deadliest attacks that month, ten Egyptian army personnel were killed in a terrorist attack. The incident, which included an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and eight soldiers, had an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated under their armored vehicle in Bir El-Abd in North of Sinai.

Looking at Iraq, we can see a rise in ISIL (ISIS) operations over the past few months, wherein the first three months of 2020, 566 attacks were conducted by the group in Iraq. Not only that, the group’s attacks have intensified, but the group appears to be strengthening. Given their recent attacks in Syria and Iraq, it is argued that the current pandemic has already demonstrated how durable and resilient ISIS ais In addition to that, other armed extremist groups are scaling up their targeted attacks. This can be evident by the recent assassination of Hisham al Hashimi, 47, who was fatally shot outside his house in Baghdad. Hisham was among the world’s leading security experts on ISIS and other armed groups. Iraqi officials indicated that Hisham received threats recently from Iran backed militias.

Because of the abovementioned incidents – even if they may appear minor and sporadic to some security strategists – it is worth noting that terrorist groups may take advantage of the global focus of countering the pandemic and launch attacks. Furthermore, terrorist groups may view the global pandemic crisis as an opportunity to win more recruits, supporters, sympathizers, and then strike harder than before should the right moment be presented. In this regards, Al-Qaeda suggested in its statement on the 30th of March, that non-Muslims use their time in quarantine to learn about Islam. In addition, these groups have never failed to exploit social media to advance their cause and propaganda. That said, as the pandemic continues, people are spending more time online, terrorist groups are likely to amplify their utilization of social media to further spread their dangerous rhetoric along with widely used hashtags of the terms: #Coronavirus, #COVID2019 or #COVID19 to ensure a wider audience reach for their social media posts.

Not only that, terrorist groups may use the time of the pandemic crisis to propagate their ideology or launch attacks but also use the time to reinforce their bases to remerge in a more potent form after the pandemic crisis. This can be specifically true given that most terrorist groups are taking some of the African and Middle Eastern countries like Libya, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others as their hubs and operational base. Most of these nations are developing countries, so it is possible that while these nations’ authorities and security forces are focusing their capabilities on curbing the coronavirus spread, that terrorist groups would utilize such a window period to harness their abilities. This is particularly evident from the very recent series of terrorist attacks launched by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, killing dozens of soldiers. The attacks probably took advantage of the local authorities scaling back the number of troops on the ground due to the coronavirus pandemic. A similar expansionary approach is also seen by jihadists in the Sahel region. Thus, further confirming the threat resurgence of organized terrorist groups as a result of the pandemic crisis.

Although the terrorism threat appears to be relatively regional, it requires intergovernmental and a multinational collective counterterrorism approach. With many of the terrorist groups and affiliates adopting a horizontal structure, one group in one country might be influencing the actions of other groups in many other different countries. Not to forget lone wolf terrorism, which would only take the individual perpetrator to be radicalized by merely reading and following the propaganda and extremist ideologies widely available online.

While intergovernmental counterterrorism frameworks, cooperation, and efforts already exist, the current pandemic crisis still presents an unprecedented challenge to many countries. This includes the redirection of security forces and militaries’ actions in curbing the pandemic spread, implementing lockdowns, curfews, regulating borders entry, and supporting the national overwhelmed healthcare authorities. Though the latter is important to ensure the general public safety, security bodies mustn’t lose their focus on countering terrorism, reinforcing border security, and stepping up surveillance and intelligence activities to anticipate any risks or terrorism plots. Additionally, extremist – but nonviolent – groups should be closely monitored during the pandemic and economic crisis to counter how such groups might use the pandemic to advance their propaganda and gain more sympathy from the general public. This includes right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue extremism groups such as climate activists who turn to terrorism.

Furthermore, as the economic recession builds up, different countries may implement spending cuts and reduce budgets dedicated to national security, intelligence, military, and law enforcement concerning various security programs, including counterterrorism. Accordingly, this should not be the case at all. Even if the economic recession is currently taking its toll on all sectors, government spending, and budgets dedicated to national security, intelligence, military, and law enforcement, counterterrorism efforts should not be reduced. As extremists and terrorist groups are likely to exploit the coronavirus pandemic and post-pandemic economic crisis for their benefit and incite violence, national governments should not undermine such a dormant yet imminent threat while tackling the economic consequences of the pandemic crisis. In this respect, military, national security, intelligence, and law enforcement bodies across the world should increase, and hone their counterterrorism capabilities, intelligence sharing, and international cooperation.

COVID-19 and the Increasing Risk of Terrorism was originally published on Global Security Review.

In order to gain attention and to distinguish itself from the Taliban, IS-K is employing new tactics like targeted killing, as well as complex attacks designed to instill as much fear as they can. Targeted killings has increased in major cities, especially in Kabul. IS-K has been capable of launching heart-wrenching, high-profile complex assults, killing hundreds of people.

Last May, IS-K militants stormed a maternity hospital in Kabul, killing newborn babies, mothers, nurses, and a police officer. On the same day, they targeted a funeral gathering in Nangarhar through a suicide attack, killing dozens of people. Similarly, they conducted a complex attack on a Sikh temple in March, killing 25 worshippers, in a ruthless targeting of the Hazara minority. The group also claimed responsibility for an attack on the U.S. military Bagram airbase in Parwan province.

With the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, IS-K stands ready to inherit the role of violent spoiler. It poses a serious danger as it attracts fighters from across the region. IS-K, with its global agenda has been able to recruit fighters from more than a dozen countries. Militants from the Middle East under pressure in the Syria war have joined IS-K in Afghanistan. Foreign fighters from India, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have joined their ranks in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the suicide attacks on Sikh minorities was attributed to one of their Indian fighters, who hailed from Kerala. Battle hardened, educated, and professional fighters in the thousands are skillful in attracting foot soldiers and brainwashing the poverty-stricken illiterate population of the country.

In addition to ideological propaganda, IS-K has been using coercion, force, intimidation, and empty promises of finances to recruit local fighters. One major challenge for IS-K has been the xenophobic nature of Afghans and hate among local residents regarding their brutal tactics they used from the outset of their operations in the country. Moreover, extortion, taxation, and mineral resources exploitation, which are major sources of revenue for IS-K has also caused concerns among local Afghans.

With their fighters coming from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, IS-K has the capacity to destabilize Central Asia, once it gets a firm foothold in Afghanistan. This remains one of the major concerns of Russia and Iran who view IS-K as a group driven by Salafi ideology, working to destabilize Central Asia. Most of IS-K fighters come from the middle class and are operative in far flung areas. They have been successful in getting safe havens in the capital, Kabul.

IS-K has been active in nine provinces from Nangarhar and Kunar in the east, Jawzjan, Faryab, and Badakhshan in the north and Ghor in the center west. IS-K is viewed sympathetically by some ethnicities in the north. Key Tajik and Uzbek commanders like Mawlawi Satar and Mawlawi Abdullah Majid have already joined IS-K. Who are actively involved in the recruitment of ethnic Tajik and Uzbek fighters in their ranks. When their regional leader Aslam Farooqi was captured in Kandahar along with 12 Pakistani nationals—including 4 women, a Bangladeshi man, and 2 Russian speaking women—it is believed Farooqi was engaged in an effort to contact groups in the South in order to bring  them to their ranks.

Some security experts believe that IS-K lacks the capability to launch complex attacks on its own. Taliban’s hardline wing, the Haqqani network, is suspected of providing technical assistance to IS-K in conducting complex attacks. IS-K and Haqqani network share a mutual interest—to undermine the Kabul government control and credibility by conducting attacks in major cities. Thus, on one hand, the Taliban takes the blame out of itself while, on the other hand, they portray the weakness of the government, meanwhile, IS-K relevance is served better. Afghan Government calls IS-K as the new face of the Haqqani network.

IS-K is an emerging threat, which represents itself as a replacement of the Taliban. It seeks to establish a Caliphate beginning in South and Central Asia, which will expand as Muslims across the globe join. This will be horrendous not only for U.S. national security interests but can destabilize the whole region. With their recent brutal attacks, IS-K has proved the fact that we are faced with a renewed threat, a new reign of terror, limited but far more complex and violent.

With the U.S.-Taliban Deal in place, IS-K seeks to build a reign of terror in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Point of Order

Payment comes in many forms, not just money, and over time violence has always been paid for by the cheapest means possible, sometimes even just by allowing life to continue or through advancing promises of ideological or moral philosophies. Jihad, for example, is a direct bounty from Allah on the heads of all infidels, the reward being not financial at all, but promises of luxurious life after death. The most common form of payment is, of course, money and has been used widely for thousands of years to incentivize the public into helping catch or kill criminals or declared criminals of various forms. From wanted posters in the wild west to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most wanted list, American law enforcement has continuously been a significant end-user of various types of bounty systems. Technically, all modern military forces are also a party to the payment-for-violence system as well, as the primary function of all militaries is either offensive or defensive killing operations, and they all receive payment from participating. Assassins, since humanity’s early days, have often performed their art for a variety of forms of payment, including revenge, land, influence, or positions in leadership, and of course, money. Some assassins and mercenaries have proven this point to the extreme by conducting operations for opposing factions of a single conflict, sometimes even simultaneously working for both. No matter which way the issue is framed, payment for death is a long-standing human tradition, and it is here to stay until the concept of violent conflict is eliminated.

Assassins

Assassination has commonly been used as a form of political terrorism. From a historical context, assassinations have been used to instigate larger movements, such as insurrections, rebellions, revolutions, and other events over time designed to conquer a social system or ideology of an era or region on Earth. In 1933, the attack on President-elect Roosevelt by an Italian immigrant, Giuseppe Zangara, was an attack on the concept of leadership itself. Zangara professed that it didn’t matter who held the office and that his target was the symbol of the Head of State—any Head of State—as he admitted to considering other U.S. Presidents and the King of Italy as targets as well.¹ The modern term ‘character assassination’ is based on this historical and persistent type of motivation for actual assassinations, where the ultimate goal is to target a public figure in a way that moves the public ideology surrounding the target in the desired way, which has become common in today’s political environment.

More to the point of payment for death, assassinations have been one of the most effective and persistent tools of ruling bodies, always. The first known writing describing methods of assassination is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (1915), an ancient text from India dated to somewhere between 300 BC and 300 AD. The text encompasses many areas of governing, including chapters concerning war strategy, poisons, spy techniques, and strategies for assassination-style killings.² While payment is not explicitly discussed, the text is clear that the persons used in these operations are employed as a form of combatants. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (1910), believed to be written in the 5th century BC, also briefly mentions assassination as a type of mission assigned to paid spies.³ Echoing the ancient Indian Arthashastra(1915), a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) file, A Study of Assassination (1953), that was declassified in 1997, likewise details modern versions of assassination techniques, potential weapon ideas, and methods to be used for killing,⁴ and presumably was used as a training doctrine for paid employees of the Agency from its estimated publication in 1953 until the assassination ban encompassed in Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Impacts achieved from assassinations, or other forms of paid-for violence, can vary from insignificant, like the Italian who failed to assassinate President-elect Roosevelt, to toppling governments or starting a major war. World War I, for example, was initiated by just such an act. Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and leader of The Black Hand organization, Dragutin Dimitrijević, was the head of the snake that took a bite out of the Habsburg Monarchy by orchestrating the assassination of the heir presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914. The same Dragutin Dimitrijević had led an overthrow of the Serbian Monarchy just a decade prior, in 1903, to install a puppet on the throne to enhance his power and political relations with Russia.⁵ The Black Hand, a unified “Serbian nationalist organization,” also known as “Unification or Death,”⁶ was recognized as an arm of the Serbian military, acting as an early twentieth-century clandestine organization much like modern Private Military Companies (PMC), with civilian members who could offer plausible deniability to the government when necessary.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand was an advocate for peace,⁷ and at the time, most Serbians wanted to retaliate against Austria-Hungary for annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The Archduke was; therefore, the primary obstacle preventing a war that Dimitrijević and many Serbians wanted to start. Ferdinand was also the heir to the throne, and the Emperor was dying, which provided Russia an opportunity to eliminate a Monarchy standing in the way of Russian expansionist ideas as well. This opportunity incentivized Russian approval of the assassination, even if it meant going to war as Serbia’s ally. War could not be achieved with the Archduke constantly advocating for peace and preventing any Austro-Hungarian aggression, so The Black Hand assassins, controlled by Dimitrijević, launched their operation. Ferdinand was attacked in his motorcade on his way to give a speech in Sarajevo, but the attack did not go as planned. The first assassin shot at Franz from a distance and missed; the second threw an explosive that ricocheted off the Archduke’s car and exploded under the vehicle following behind.⁸ This first attack failed, and the Archduke survived to give his speech, only to be targeted on the next leg of his journey through the city by the remaining assassins. As the motorcade came to a halt, Gavrilo Princip walked up to the vehicle and shot Franz in the neck, and his wife in the gut.⁹ Both died of their wounds shortly thereafter.

After the assassination of the Archduke, there was a military escalation of forces between Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and all of their allies. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, one month after the assassination of the Archduke, after Serbia refused extraordinary terms offered by Austria-Hungary, which were not expected to be met anyway. Russia, allied with Serbia, mobilized its military upon this declaration of war, and Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, which caused Russia’s ally, France, to declare war on Germany. Then Germany invaded Belgium to get to Paris, instigating Britain, allied to Belgium and France, to declare war on Germany, followed a few weeks later by Japan, bound by a military treaty with Britain – Voila, World War I.¹⁰ While this is a unique assassination in the history of assassination because the goal was achieved, this is not an unprecedented success in the theme of payment for death, or of payment for death in war, as the history of mercenaries changing the tides of battle clearly shows.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries have been participating in violence for likely the same amount of time as assassins, though generally on a more public and destructive scale, without much in the ways of stealth and treachery. Before countries began fielding standing armies, mercenaries were the primary method of large-scale combat. Being a mercenary was a regular job. Groups of mercenaries would sell their services to the highest bidder, always aware that nations would continue to find reasons to use their services. When problems became scarce, and nobody wanted to pay them, they would create problems of their own, extorting their hosts in the process. Throughout most of history up to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648, which were the origin of the modern-day nation-state with recognized national borders, mercenaries were the primary forces used for war.¹¹ Mercenaries grew primarily to fill a skill void in the area of combat expertise. Before the creation of standing armies, the duties of war were rotated among individuals too often to retain the necessary experience and skill to achieve efficiency, which led to the rise of experienced warriors willing to sell their services to the highest bidder.

Eventually, mercenaries became a global industry, attracting violent, greedy people with the sole motive of money as their driving purpose. The only logical outcome of this scenario is chaos and tyranny, if for no other reason than that the existence of a large permanent mercenary population creates a strong incentive for constant war. In peace, mercenaries posed a threat to the general population, often resorting to extortion for protection to continue their livelihood when their services were not required, as happened in France in the late 15th century following the end of the Hundred Years War.¹² Despite the drawbacks associated with mercenaries, the industry itself survived long after the Peace of Westphalia, and even into the modern world, as supplemental forces to a standing national army have often been seen as desirable for several reasons, from bolstering force size to match an enemy force to bending the rules of national militaries to provide plausible deniability.

Force size has been a constant issue in war, often leading to hiring mercenaries to supplement militaries. This method is not always successful, however, as Great Britain learned during the American Revolutionary War. Unable to maintain security throughout the British Empire around the world and quell the American uprising simultaneously with available military forces, Britain hired approximately 10,000 Native Americans and 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the American Continental Army.¹³ The Revolutionary War highlights the fact that mercenaries are only as good as the money they are paid, illustrated by the fact that the American Congress instigated the distribution of “leaflets offering the Germans land and livestock” to switch sides.¹⁴ The nature of the Revolutionary war itself also highlights a more general flaw in the use of mercenaries, in that the Revolutionary war, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, had “no cause but malice against liberty.”¹⁵ This stance points out that the cause of a war, if not properly sold to the participants, can cause a severe undermining within the ranks of the combatants, in turn hurting morale, fostering dissent, and decreasing efficiency, which was experienced significantly on the side of the British. Ultimately, the British use of mercenaries failed to win the war; however, the resulting Constitutional debate was greatly informed by the use of paid actors in warfare, strengthening the Constitutional guidelines for military force regulation in America.

As America grew throughout the transition of the world from mercenary warfare to national militaries, mercenaries became less and less acceptable to the international community. Mercenaries became used primarily to provide plausible deniability to governments and avoid regulations, in much the same way assassins have been used to further objectives of leaders over time. The controversy over the use of mercenaries in warfare grew so extensively that the United Nations decided to institute a new international law, in the form of a treaty titled the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, signed in 1989.¹⁶ The treaty is interesting in that while signed by many countries, neither the United States nor Russia, the two primary superpowers at the time, has signed onto it since its creation, and the language used in the treaty leaves significant room for interpretation, specifically with regards to the treaty’s definition of a mercenary.¹⁷ These flaws have led to the continuation of non-military payment for violence, both with the continued use of bounties and bounty hunters and in the case of carefully labeled paramilitary forces that don’t fit within the legal parameters of the treaty definition for mercenaries.

Bounty Systems

In the late 19th century, after the American civil war, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a precursor to the American FBI, established what amounts to the first criminal database in history, with mug shots, wanted posters, and descriptions of criminals and their crimes, all circulating in newspapers across the country and filed with the agency until the death of the criminal.¹⁸ Bounties have also been used extensively since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty as an incentive for individual citizens to assist law enforcement and governments in capturing or killing wanted persons, from criminals to terrorists. The most widely known examples of this in America are the FBI’s most-wanted lists, which are updated regularly, and put price tags on fugitives at large in the United States and around the world. Among the lists, the FBI provides a top ten list of fugitives and a top ten list of terrorists, with price tags ranging from thousands to millions of dollars in rewards for information leading to capture.¹⁹ While the FBI’s bounty lists today are generally for capture, not killing, some infamous outlaws in American history, like Frank and Jesse James, were the targets of wanted posters that promised a reward whether the criminals were brought in dead or alive.²⁰

The American justice system outlined in the U.S. Constitution eventually eliminated the use of dead or alive wanted posters, as they are illegal under the Constitutional Bill of Rights that provides for a fair trial before sentencing. Still, the bounty system remained intact for capture. During the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, another bounty-style system was used to target the most important members of the Iraqi forces and government, in the form of a deck of cards. The Defense Intelligence Agency, after years of research, developed a target/value identification system based on the standard value system assigned to a deck of cards in poker games to assist ground forces in identifying targets of value in Iraq.²¹ Saddam Hussein occupied the highest value position, the ace of spades, with consecutively lower-valued individuals identified in succession throughout the deck, aces first, then kings down to twos. While money was not directly associated with this example, prestige was undoubtedly a motivating factor for ground forces capturing high-value targets, and the system set the stage for non-government paramilitary forces to participate directly in ongoing military operations during an active war.

Private Military Companies (PMC)

Blackwater quickly emerged as one of the first major controversies of the 21st century, as a PMC working for the United States government in active military combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, without oversight from Congress equal to that of U.S. military forces, but with missions encompassing the same areas as the American military.²² Acting independently of the military, the organization participated in defensive and offensive combat operations to help accomplish military missions of the United States. Without military oversight, and acting directly on behalf of the Executive Branch of government, PMCs like Blackwater are nearly identical to historical mercenary organizations working for pay in combat environments. The United States is not the only country with PMCs. The practice has become widespread since the signing of the 1989 UN treaty banning mercenaries and includes the Russian PMC, The Wagner Group, which is essentially the Russian version of Blackwater. The authoritarian government of Russia, however, has resulted in a much more dangerous version of a PMC than Blackwater and has included domestic operations within Russia as well as foreign operations.²³

Iranian governing practices have given rise to a very different type of PMC. Iran’s military, paramilitary, and intelligence organs are all essentially PMCs in the way that they operate due to the nature of Iran’s government structure, and they are all directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. The primary arms of these enterprises are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These organizations work together in directing and supporting the PMC-like Quds Force operatives around the world in support of collection efforts, intelligence operations, paramilitary operations, assassinations, and terrorist activities. While the Quds Force advances Iranian efforts to export revolution around the world, their local PMC-like organization, known as the Basij, works to subvert independence within Iran, assisting in tyrannical oppression of free speech and liberty within the country and violently suppressing any attempt to cause disturbances against the Supreme Leader. Iran targets enemies abroad using a decentralized system of third-party actions and efforts, combining the principles of the bounty system and PMC architecture instead of engaging directly in combat efforts. In 2006, for example, when the Islamic State terror organization was still called Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I),²⁴ the MOIS provided “financial, material, technological, and other support” to their leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directly supporting the terrorist’s war against U.S. personnel in Iraq.²⁵

The contrast between Blackwater and the Iranian Quds Force is extreme, but the core issue inherent in their existence is nearly identical. With the rise in popularity of PMCs around the world after their successful use by the United States in the War on Terror, the core issue of their existence needs attention from the world. The international community recognized that even though Blackwater was targeted for their deeds, their success in achieving mission goals was undeniable. China, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia, India, and many other countries have worked to develop similar types of organizations in their countries to take advantage of the gray area of contractor combat operations. These organizations are primarily in the employ of the Executive Branch of government or its national equivalent. They are generally not under the structure of the national military for legal purposes or oversight. They are mercenaries, being used in the modern-day to bolster force size that otherwise cannot grow and to skirt existing national and international laws with regards to combat operations and security. While the attention drawn to Blackwater caused them to change their name to Academi, the core issue of the existence of PMCs, in general, has not been significantly addressed in the international community.

Conclusion

The practice of paying people to kill has been around for a long time and is likely to stay, absent total world peace. The question that comes to mind isn’t whether or not this process exists, or even how to eliminate it, but rather, what the best way forward is for the United States and the international community, knowing that this process is an inherent part of world politics and international relationships. Attention, publicization, and regulation are likely the most effective weapons against barbarity in warfare, as has been shown throughout history. Attention drawn to assassins led to a ban on the practice of assassination. Attention drawn to mercenaries led to a ban on mercenaries. Attention drawn to the American Constitutional justice system led to the elimination of dead or alive bounties. Attention drawn to PMCs led to a restructuring of the relationship between the United States government and third-party contractors and continues to shape the potential future of PMCs. When the people of the world pay attention, publicize rights and wrongs perpetrated by governments and leaders, and work to create effective regulations to ensure that human dignity and individual liberty are the primary goals of such regulations, freedom succeeds, and tyranny fails.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

References

¹ William Crotty, “Presidential Assassinations,” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 102-103.

² Kautilya, Arthashastra, Translated by R. Shamasastry, (Bangalore: Government Press, 1915), 461-474.

³ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Lionel Giles, (London, UK: Luzac and Co., 1910), 34.

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, “A Study of Assassination,” Central Intelligence Agency (1953), Accessed on July 2, 2020, https://archive.org/details/CIAAStudyOfAssassination1953/mode/2up.

⁵ Donald Yerxa, “July 1914: An Interview with Sean McMeekin,” Historically Speaking 14, no. 3 (2013): 12-16.

⁶ Elena Kosmach, “Serbs and Russians,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 43, no. 1 (2001): 109-114.

⁷ Ian Beckett, “Franz Ferdinand,” Historian no. 120 (2014): 18-22.

⁸ Geoffrey Wawro, Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, (Boulder, CO, USA: Basic Books, 2014), 104-106.

⁹ Wawro, Mad Catastrophe, 106.

¹⁰ Martin Levinson, “Mapping the Causes of World War I to Avoid Armageddon Today,” Et Cetera 62, no. 2 (2005): 157-164.

¹¹ Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army: The Use of Mercenaries in the American Revolution and its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private Military Firms,” Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 317-349.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Benjamin Franklin, The Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin, (Eau Claire: E.M. Hale & Company, nd), 253.

¹⁶ United Nations, “International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,” United Nations (1989).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Pinkerton, “Our History,” Pinkerton (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.Pinkerton.com/our-story/history.

¹⁹ FBI, “Most Wanted,” FBI (2020), Accessed on July 6, 2020, www.FBI.gov/wanted.

²⁰ Sophie Tanno, “$5,000 for Jesse James ‘Dead or Alive’ and $100,000 for Lincoln’s Three Killers: The Fascinating Wanted Posters for America’s Biggest 19th Century Criminals,” Daily Mail (2019), Accessed on July 8, 2020, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7280265/the-fascinating-wanted-posters-americas-biggest-19th-century-criminals.html.

²¹ Doug Sample, “The Faces Behind the Faces on the ‘Most Wanted’ Deck,” American Forces Press Service (2003), Accessed on July 6, 2020, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29017.

²² Underwood, “Jealousies of a Standing Army.”

²³ Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.

²⁴ Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 5, no. 4 (2014): 415-476.

²⁵ Library of Congress, “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,” Federal Research Division (2012), 37.

Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Finite Strategy

In game theory, there are finite and infinite games. In a finite game, the objective of the game is to win, thereby ending the game. In the infinite game, the goal is the perpetuation of the game. Since 9/11, the U.S. has implemented a finite approach to fighting terrorism. The “War on Terrorism (WoT)” archetype highlights this finite approach.

Three premises underpinned the WoT archetype: the theoretical idea that terrorism can be completely defeated, the militarization of the response to terrorism, and by extension, the overzealousness to targeted killing, especially of leaders.

As a rhetorical tactic, framing terrorism as a defeatable concept certainly helped galvanize the U.S. population and international community in the wake of the attacks. But as a theoretical approach, it is at best ill-conceived and, at worst futile. First, there is little sense to the idea of defeating terrorism completely. As scholars Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman have argued, terrorism is merely a tool.¹ As a tool, terrorism has and is used by most non-state actors²across the political violence spectrum to achieve their goals.

Therefore, conceptualizing terrorism as something that can be defeated is as illogical as declaring war on a hammer. Second, and as alluded to earlier, the WoT archetype ignores the longevity of terrorism. In other words, it frames or at least creates the perception of terrorism as a sudden and unique phenomenon that rose to prominence only after 9/11. But one can look to terrorism’s history and longevity to dismiss this claim. During the Roman Empire, the Sicarii³ used terrorism to reject Roman rule over Judea, and the etymology of the word takes us as far back to the French revolution. Moreover, David Rapport, a scholar, demonstrated how terrorism has evolved in different waves through different geopolitical contexts since the late 1800s.⁴ The point is that terrorism has been used throughout history and will almost certainly continue to be used by groups around the world for generations to come.

Because the concept has erroneously been conceived as something defeatable, the U.S. foreign policy blob assumed militarizing the response would inherently resolve the problem by overwhelming the adversary. It is not hard to see why they assumed this. The U.S military has demonstrated an ability to fight and win in multiple theatres against a variety of opponents. The U.S has been most comfortable fighting finite games such as in the Second World War, and Korea. And even, erroneously, framing infinite wars like Vietnam into finite approaches.

As such and in response to 9/11, Congress quickly enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). Three Presidents since Mr. Bush have used the AUMF to start, perpetuate, and expand military-led counterterrorism (CT) operations around the world. In a closer analysis, the AUMF⁵ has been loosely interpreted to include almost any terrorist organization. And true to form, today the U.S. leads or is a partner to military-led CT operations in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan⁶, and Pakistan. The operations are as global as they are diverse in targets. The U.S. prosecutes a wide range of terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda core, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS, and affiliates in North and East Africa, Al Shabab, and others. This expansion and continuation of operations have cost the U.S. approximately 6.4 trillion dollars,⁷ according to Brown University estimates. This militarization has led in turn to overzealousness in disrupting terrorist networks through the targeted killing of leaders.

This, by extension has transformed the premise of military-led operations into statically focused campaigns. Since 2004, the U.S. military has conducted approximately 14,040 strikes in various countries, according to Bureau of Investigative Journalism data,⁸ and has formed at least two coalitions⁹ of countries to fight terrorist groups.

But as it will be demonstrated next, the finite approach has severe limitations that, at a minimum, raise the important question of why it is still the de facto strategy after almost 20 years.

A Not-So-Effective Finite Strategy

The finite framework, one built on the premise of completely defeating terrorism, has not worked. The failure of this finite strategy is not an inherent weakness of the U.S. CT capabilities. Thanks to fast innovation, competent intelligence agencies, and superior technology, the U.S. has become overtly good at finding and fixing targets. The most recent example the death of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January of this year¹⁰.

Instead, the failure is symptomatic of a finite player competing with finite methods and goals against infinite players in what is an infinite game. ISIS is the best example of this clash.¹¹ Since 2003, the U.S. and its allies have led on and off military-led CT operations against ISIS, fervently focusing on killing its top leaders. It is important to note that the U.S also led counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in 2006–2007 and from 2014–2017 — often in parallel to the CT operations — against ISIS in a response to their evolution from terrorist group to insurgency. These were narrowly successful in territorially defeating ISIS but fell short in “defeating” the group altogether. Even during COIN operations, where finite goals such as defeating ISIS territorially were achieved, the infinite strategy of the group was not sufficiently considered. This led to the continued finite approach of killing ISIS leaders. As such, in June 2006, U.S. forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,¹² the founder of AQI. Subsequent leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi met the same fate in April 2010¹³, and on 27 October 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northern Syria.¹⁴

While there should be no sympathy for dead terrorist leaders, the merit of this aspect of the finite approach is questionable when one looks at the resiliency of ISIS’s operational behavior after the death of its leaders. The decapitation approach claims to deal calamitous blows to organizations, ultimately leading to their demise by dismantling the figurehead that holds the organization together. But Audrey Kurth Cronin’s findings raise questions about this premise. Kronin found that the decapitation approach seldom works and arresting rather than killing leaders tends to be more effective in ending terrorist campaigns.¹⁵

Kronin’s findings can certainly be demonstrated when one looks at ISIS after the death of its leaders. Despite their deaths, the killings never achieved their finite goal of dismantling or ending the terrorist group. After the death of its overall founder Zarqawi and despite heavy territorial losses in, during the U.S.-led surge in 2007, ISI¹⁶ rebounded and was able to inflict extraordinary terrorist attacks throughout Iraq. From 2008–2010, the three years after the COIN operations (or Surge), over 200 people were killed per month by terrorism in Iraq.¹⁷ Before and after the death of Omar Al Baghdadi, ISI assassinated over 1345 Awakening leaders according to one estimate, ¹⁸ and launched its infamous “Breaking the Walls” campaign where it carried out 24 bombings and eight prison breaks.¹⁹ By the same extension, and since the death of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, ISIS has conducted approximately 285 attacks in Iraq, according to a review of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Even after the death of its top leader and U.S. claims that it had dealt catastrophic and “final” blows to the organization, the organization mustered the necessary capabilities to continue their terror campaigns, remain relevant, and at times outdo what it had done in previous years. This resiliency demonstrates that the finite approach of targeted killings has been futile in its efforts to “defeat” terrorism.

The ISIS example also highlights terrorist organizations’ infinite doctrine. Part of the ability, in this case of ISIS, to continue despite the endless cycle of dead leaders is the infinite framing of its goals. While external factors helped ISIS ²⁰, the “infiniteness” of ISIS goals allowed it to turn defeats to victories as part of a longer “infinite” struggle. In the aftermath of its Iraqi territorial defeat, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi stated,

“For the Mujahideen holy warriors, the scale of victory or defeat is not dependent on a city or town being stolen or subject to that who has aerial superiority, intercontinental missiles or smart bombs…… “Oh, Caliphate soldiers… trust in God’s promise and His victory… for with hardship comes relief and a way out.”²¹

If one strips away the religiosity, what is evident in Baghdadi’s rhetoric is that deaths and loss of territory do not amount to detrimental finite loses, instead they represent loses as part of a predetermined plan (in this case formulated by God according to Baghdadi) that will “ultimately” lead them to victory. The “ultimately” is worthy of closer analysis. It is this word that represents the infinite mentality ingrained in groups like ISIS. Stated differently, it does not matter how much they lose, insofar as they continue their path, “they will ultimately” be rewarded. In this regard, ISIS is not seeking to achieve finite metrics or goals, they seek an almost abstract infinite goal that might never materialize. By this logic, the U.S. inability to recognize this, and continue with a finite military-led CT approach of maiming and bombing ISIS leaders, only played to what ISIS expected and was/is “comfortable” dealing with.

Towards an Infinite Approach

However, insufficient the finite strategy has proven to be, some argue that it has and will continue to work. They point to the lack of 9/11 like attacks, something they attribute to sustained military-led CT pressure in countries that offered haven to terrorist groups.

Indeed, the U.S. has not suffered 9/11-like attacks. But the role of military-led CT operations is surely overestimated while the vast changes to airport security, intelligence capabilities, international law enforcement cooperation, and other safety mechanisms, are underestimated.

Proponents have also not sufficiently explained why the threat of attacks, or attacks that have not materialized continue to exist. In December 2019, an al-Qaeda operative shot eleven people at a U.S. military base in Florida.²² The December 2019 al-Qaeda attack is just one of many attacks since 9/11 that have been at the lower end of the extraordinary scale, failed to materialize, or were foiled before they occurred. Moreover, al-Qaeda media continues to call for attacks against the United States, including in statements from regional al-Qaeda leaders, reflecting the network’s enduring efforts to pursue or inspire attacks in the West.²³

This is to say that if the premise of the finite approach was to “defeat terrorism,” the evidence in the sheer number of intended attacks since 9/11 dismisses this. The threat is well and alive, and the finite approach has not been sufficient in quelling or even stopping it. The recent statements by the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Ambassador Nathan Sales, effectively kills any debate.

When asked by the BBC, “whether this war — as originally conceived by the Bush administration — about the War on Terrorism is over?” He said, “No, the fight is very much ongoing, we’re winning the fight, but we’re continuing to fight against a determined enemy, or I should say a determined group of enemies.”²⁴

Calls to change how the U.S. conceptualizes and fights terrorism are not new. Analysts, policymakers, and the public generally recognize that a continuation of the finite approach will prolong military-led CT operations with little or no long-term solution to the threat of terrorism. What is new, however, is the shifting tectonic plates of geopolitics. And as the U.S. foreign policy blob construes a grand strategy to answer this shift, the choice presented would be at best to leave the current CT approach intact and at worst drop CT; neither are viable options for U.S. long term security interest.

Despite changing geostrategic priorities, developing and implementing an infinite CT strategy is easier said than done. Terrorism is poorly understood. This leads to criminal acts being incorrectly labeled as terrorism, effectively politicizing it. For example, in late March, the U.S. Department of Justice warned that “people who intentionally spread COVID-19 could be charged with terrorism,” arguably a stretch of interpretation.²⁵ Moreover, the political clime is such that politicians look strong in supporting military-led CT policies, and weak when they do not. When coupled with the fear terrorism generates, it is easy to see why change will be difficult.

Notwithstanding, the time to course-correct is now. An infinite strategy emphasizes a whole-of-government approach that folds finite metrics within an infinite or abstract vision. It starts with accepting terrorism can never be completely defeated; acknowledging its relatively low threat level; and it particularly means employing all aspects of national power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, economic, military, and others.

It also means using those elements of national powers towards what the research points to as most effective in ending terrorist campaigns. Research shows that terrorist groups and their terrorism campaigns most often end when they implode from within or when splinter groups challenge the main group’s narrative. They are also particularly weak during generational shifts and when non-violent alternatives are created that facilitate underlying social movement to express their political grievances.²⁶

As such, an infinite strategy calls for a sustained and prolonged multifaceted approach. It focuses on a strong role for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID) to fund and work with marginalized groups in politically unstable countries. Their work should focus on alternative non-violent social movements. Likewise, the U.S. should increase efforts to bolster intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and create international law enforcement and intelligence task forces that are not under military purview, using military-led CT operations as complementary elements. Equally important is the need to build alternative narratives to the religious interpretations used by religious terrorist groups. An alternative narrative seeks to implode groups from within, loosening the bolts of religious interpretation these groups use to justify their actions. None of these few examples are short-term or finite, easily measured, and tangible. But this is the nature of truly fighting terrorism through an infinite strategy — the actions are not easy to measure and there are no fast wins. Instead, it’s a long, slow, and prolonged approach that will challenge groups’ infinite mentality.

In all, the time is now to change how the U.S fights terrorism. An infinite strategy will ensure the U.S. reduces its dependency on military-led CT operations and starts leveraging all realms of its national power to effectively suppress the threat. If the U.S does not correct course now, then its surely proximus to insanity: continuing to do the same thing, expecting different results.

¹ Arie W. Kruglanski & Shira Fishman (2006) The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:2, 193–215, DOI: 10.1080/09546550600570119 ;

² Scholars in the Critical Studies of Terrorism field have argued that States can also and do use terrorism. I take the majority view and focus primarily on non-state actors who employ terrorism.

³ It’s been widely cited that the Sicarii were considered the first political violent group that used terrorism. See Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg in (1990) Sicarii and the Rise of Terrorism, Terrorism, 13:4–5, 329–335, DOI: 10.1080/10576109008435840; as well as Donathan Taylor, Yannick Gautron. 02 Apr 2015, Pre-Modern Terrorism from The Routledge History of Terrorism Routledge

⁴ See David Rapport’s Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (2001)

⁵ The original text of the AUMF authorized the U.S. military to “ that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” It was always mostly focused against those responsible for 9/11 i.e. AQ. It has since been broadly interpreted to mean almost any terrorist organization.

⁶ The U.S. CT operations against ISIS-K and Taliban leaders are different than the NATO-led mission that emulates elements of a counterinsurgency strategy and also of other U.S.-led missions training the ISF.

⁷ This number includes appropriated and obligated money towards 2020. Afghanistan, which as mentioned above, has three different mission sets. While the article focuses on the CT operations, the numbers account for the COIN, and broader missions.

⁸ The BIJ started to collect data since 2004, and it includes a wide range of U.S military activity, not just targeted killings. See the full methodology at thebureauinvestigates.com; the numbers are estimative and cannot be independently confirmed.

⁹ This again accounts for coalitions that were formed to defeat ISIS when it was an insurgency from 2014–2017

¹⁰ Iranian General Qasem Soleimani was the leader of Iran’s Quds forces, considered by the U.S. to be a terrorist organization. The designation might be more political than true to what terrorist groups are. Still, the Quds forces do support groups that commit acts of terrorism in line with Iran’s foreign policy objectives.

¹¹ ISIS is the most contemporary example, but the finite vs. infinite clash can also be demonstrated with AQ core and other terrorist groups.

¹² https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html

¹³ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaedas-two-top-iraq-leaders-killed-in-raid-idU.S.TRE63I3CL20100419

¹⁴ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-death-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/

¹⁵ See How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns

¹⁶ AQI became ISIS in 2007.

¹⁷ See Brian H. Fishman in The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory

¹⁸ This estimate is from retired LTC, Craig Whiteside, cited in # 17.

¹⁹ https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state

²⁰ U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003, the subsequent withdrawal in 2011, etc.

²¹ The audio was released in August 2018 before the https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45277322

²² https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/justice-department-al-qaeda-florida-naval-base-shooting.html

²³ https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf

²⁴ Frank Gardner — BBC- https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53156096

²⁵ https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/25/politics/coronavirus-terrorism-justice-department/index.html

²⁶ See Martha Crenshaw, Audrey Kurth Kronin, and others.

After Almost Twenty Years, America’s “War on Terrorism” Resembles Insanity was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this undoubtedly is a major victory for the U.S. in the fight against global jihadism, it cannot be overlooked that this decapitation strike does certainly not mean ISIS that is finished. This organization has proved that it can outlast the loss of its leaders; its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006; his successors, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, were eliminated in 2010. Following the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State has now publicly named his successor: Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.

Consequences of al-Baghdadi’s Death

Valuable intelligence was obtained during the raid. Similarly to the raid during which Osama bin Laden lost his life, through the operation that resulted in al Baghdad’s death, the U.S. forces got to obtain, presumably exceptionally valuable, intelligence. An additional bonus is that two ISIS fighters were captured alive and then taken to Iraq for interrogation. Having been rather close to al-Baghdadi, it is likely they possess some knowledge regarding the organization’s functioning and its network of sleeper cells, whose activation in the context of staging retaliatory attacks is now one of the major concerns of the anti-IS coalition member states.

There’s a risk that ISIS sleeper cells could be activated to execute retaliatory strikes. Many security experts and analysts have warned about the wave of retaliatory strikes that ISIS will carry out to avenge al-Baghdadi’s death. Though such attacks are extremely likely to happen, it may be some time between the killing and the attacks to take place. ISIS is aware that many countries have put their intelligence and security services on high alert because of the fear of retaliatory strikes. To inflict maximum damage and casualties, it is characteristic for groups like ISIS  to wait out increased protection measures and attack once the security provisions are more relaxed. It’s almost certain that retaliatory strikes have  been planned and organized even before al-Baghdadi’s death.

The world’s most wanted terrorist was brought to justice. Killing al-Baghdadi is undoubtedly a success in the fight against ISIS, but some analysts argue that its value is rather symbolic, as it is believed that the Caliph’s control over his organization was rather limited in the recent months. While that may be true, it needs to be remembered it was him who led the organization during days of its glory and territorial conquest, and him who was responsible for the death and suffering of millions of people in the process of creating and running the Caliphate. Even though he might not have had in recent months as much power and control as he used to, he was still the most wanted terrorist in the world.

President Trump has greater justification for withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Killing al-Baghdadi provided Trump with the ammunition to defend his decision of withdrawing the U.S. troops from Syria. He can justifiably claim that the U.S. is still committed to continuing the fight against ISIS despite the withdrawal and that the American forces are not needed there on the ground to carry out effective operations against the IS. However, it must be considered that Trump’s decision has resulted in a resurgence of ISIS forces as Kurdish forces—who were guarding ISIS fighters—were forced to leave their positions to fight Turkish and Turkey-backed forces as they invaded North-eastern Syria. Reportedly, several hundred ISIS warriors escaped.

Al-Baghdadi’s death does not mean the end of ISIS

Many would want to believe that al Baghdadi’s death means the end of the struggle against ISIS and the end of the threat it has posed. This belief is, however, far from being real. Of course, losing a leader is a considerable blow to any terrorist organization, and severe damage to its image, but it needs to be acknowledged that the internal structure of the Islamic State has not been harmed much with al-Baghdadi killed.

There were people ready to take over al-Baghdadi’s role and indeed, as mentioned before, the IS has already claimed its new caliph to be Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi. Though al-Hashemi is likely to continue the work of al-Baghdadi, it is also unclear how strong his position will be and what will be the ISIS’s affiliates’ reaction to the new Caliph. Overall, however, replacing al-Baghdadi sends a message that despite the losses suffered by the terrorist group, it remains in existence and is continuing operations.

Now That Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Dead, What Next? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of the victims, thirty-five were citizens of foreign states. According to Sri Lankan authorities, multiple terrorists attacked large hotels and Christian churches with explosives. Sri Lankan security services have arrested several dozen people.

Political violence has affected Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) since the country re-established itself as a republic in 1971.  Sri Lanka was engaged in a decades-long civil war until 2009, the end-product of the country’s colonial and post-colonial oppressive social and economic policies. These policies constrained the rights of the Tamil population, a Hindu minority group. The Tamil people felt that they were politically unrepresented and were increasingly marginalized in Sri Lankan society.

In 1972, when Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka, established the state as a republic, and announced that the official religion would be Buddhism, the Tamil began peacefully protesting against the government’s policies. As time went on, however, Tamil armed resistance groups began to emerge. These groups employed terrorist tactics during what would become a bloody civil war, characterized by large-scale human rights violations and the deaths of over 100,000 people.

Today, the situation in Sri Lanka is different.

Throughout Southeast Asia, acts of violence are primarily carried out by jihadist groups and Islamic separatist movements. Christians are increasingly targeted by both long-standing terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, and groups founded more recently, such as ISIS (Daesh).  Al-Qaeda and ISIS are engaged in a competition for influence and leadership within the broader region, one that is illustrative of the evolving nature of jihadist insurgencies in the region. 

Although ISIS no longer controls territory in Syria and Iraq, the group’s increasingly asymmetric nature and the propaganda disseminated by the group are now affecting Southeast Asian states like Indonesia and the  Philippines, which governments are having difficulty countering. Furthermore, there is increasing concern over the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to their country of origin, as it could have a profound impact on local conflicts. In Sri Lanka, for instance, ISIS didn’t radicalize many people. However, the group’s propaganda intersects with that of other jihadist militant groups, increasing the overall terrorist threat in Sri Lanka, as tensions and rivalries among various jihadist factions make the security landscape inherently more complex.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka, as evidence emerged of the perpetrators’ sophisticated management and organizational capabilities, along with their use of known jihadi tactics. The government accused the National Thowheeth Jama’ath of carrying out the attacks with foreign support, which merits closer scrutiny. Not only did the Easter bombings occur on the tenth anniversary of the Tamil’s defeat by Sri Lankan government forces, but the National Thowheeth Jama’ath has historically carried out acts of vandalism rather than terrorism. If the group was, in fact, responsible for the Easter Sunday bombings, their use of explosives and suicide bombers indicates a substantial qualitative leap in terms of their capabilities. It’s essential that the ongoing investigation clarifies the National Thoweeth Jama’ath’s involvement. 

Furthermore, the attacks were the result of an intelligence failure, according to Sri Lankan authorities. Pujith Jayasundara, a senior Sri Lankan government official, reportedly received a warning from a foreign intelligence service concerning a possible terrorist attack against Christian churches in the country and issued a warning. Unfortunately, the information failed to reach policymakers in time, according to telecommunications Minister Harin Fernando.

Breaking the nexus between violent separatists and jihadist groups.

Should the National Thowheeth Jama’ath be proven to be responsible for the attacks, it will serve as further proof that violent acts by small numbers of jihadist militants can gravely threaten a country’s national security and socio-economic interests, mainly if tourism is a significant economic driver. Domestic and regional cooperation between police and intelligence services urgently needs to improve as it’s becoming easier and easier for local militants and smaller groups to connect across borders to disseminate instructions, training, and logistics information from larger terrorist organizations.

In Southeast Asia, a region deeply affected by internal conflicts, the growth of violent jihadist and separatist movements significantly impacts both political and social stability. Separatist movements are inherently a threat to national security, especially as separatism and the desire for recognition are increasingly connected with ethnonationalist and jihadist movements. Existing gaps in counter-terrorism efforts only serve to deepen the increasing interconnection and interdependence of jihadist and separatist movements.

Although local separatist movements maintain different strategies and objectives from both global and localized jihadist groups, many employ transnational jihadist rhetoric and propaganda to achieve religious-political goals. Separatist groups may use jihadist tactics for their attacks because they are hard to counter and have the desired impact on local and international media outlets. It is critical that Southeast Asian re-adapt their counter-terrorism efforts to break the nexus between political insurgency and jihadism—especially now that well-trained and experienced militants are returning home from Syria and Iraq.

Sri Lanka: Jihadism and Separatism in an Ethnically-Divided Country was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wrote a letter to President Hassan Rouhani and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) asking that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) be designated as a “terrorist organization” in a reciprocal move, a measure already promised by some Iranian lawmakers. Shortly after that, Iran’s SNSC stated that the U.S. government was a “sponsor of terrorism” and designated CENTCOM and all affiliated forces as “terrorist groups.” Now, a new wave of tensions could spread through the region.

Too big a bite for CENTCOM to chew?

Many have argued that the U.S. is retreating from its role as a world leader and is moving in a more isolationist direction. Others point to a need to reconcentrate U.S. resources in response to the oft-mentioned return to “great power competition.”

China—and Russia, to a lesser extent—are engaged in expansionist agendas as the U.S. has been preoccupied with events in the Middle East. Many believe the time, energy, and money the U.S. has spent for nearly two decades in the region would have been better spent countering the influence of the country’s real revisionist threats.

While the U.S. remains involved in a “forever war” in Afghanistan, and with Iraq still reeling from the aftermath of sectarian conflict and ISIS, the U.S. increasingly seems bent on raising tensions with Iran in light of the recent IRGC designation as a terrorist group.

The U.S. presence and the Shiite Crescent

The Iranian proxies in Iraq, known in general as “حشد الشعبی” or Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), whose commanders such as Hadi Al-Amiri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have close ties to IRGC—and Qasem Soleimani, in particular. In the aftermath of fighting ISIS in Iraq, the PMU is now better organized and equipped.

With the recent designation, these groups, with their close ties to their Shiite Iranian allies, can undoubtedly escalate the level of violence in Iraq. According to The New York Times, the recent move could even push the Iraqi parliamentarians to fuel a proposal limiting the movement and actions of the approximately 5,000 American troops in Iraq.

Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, is arguably the most loyal Iranian proxy group. With approximately 45,000 fighters, having alongside the IRGC in Syria, the Hezbollah militia has proven itself to be a capable force in implementing Tehran’s regional strategy. The PMU and Hezbollah—essentially two foreign branches of the IRGC—will pose challenges for the U.S. forces. While the United States would undoubtedly emerge tactically victorious from any conflict in the Middle East, two questions remain: at what cost, and after how long?

Designating the IRGC as a Terrorist Group: Consequences for U.S. Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extremist propaganda has spread beyond Libya to reach Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. While this isn’t a new phenomenon, North African states continue to suffer from substantial terrorist attacks. Recently, the Tripoli-based Libyan National Oil Company and the High National Electoral Commission were attacked by militants seemingly linked to ISIS (Daesh). Extremist movements are increasing their propaganda output and continue to pose a severe threat to internal and regional security.

Tunisia is engulfed in a deep economic crisis. As such, international financial institutions are demanding significant economic structural reforms, which have triggered protests and prompted an increase in propaganda originating from networks in Libya to exploit socio-economic issues to attract disaffected young people to their ranks.

On October 28^th, 2018 a woman with no previously-known militant background (according to Tunisian authorities) blew herself up. The attack occurred just as the country’s vital tourism industry started to recover more than three years after two deadly terror attacks. More recently, on March 7^th, 2019, a post office in Tunis intercepted 19 letters containing potentially deadly toxins addressed to notable journalists, politicians, and trade unionists. Local authorities revealed that the substances were produced in a Tunisian laboratory. This is a critical security issue that needs to be addressed—both domestically and regionally, and possibly in cooperation with the European Union. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are strategic partners for Europe—ensuring their stability is essential to avoid further crises in the region.

On March 10^th, 2019, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’s (AQIM) al-Andalus media foundation released an audio clip of a speech given by AQIM official Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi. The address championed the Algerian protests against current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and encouraged protesters to demand Sharia-based governance. Despite Algeria having recently initiated a massive counter-terrorism operation to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the country’s borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, extremist propaganda still represents a serious issue.

Algier’s counter-terrorism efforts are increasingly complicated by illegal migration and human trafficking along Algeria’s southern border. Terrorism and criminality are increasingly interconnected, and the need to break the nexus between the two has increased following the social unrest that led to the ouster of the 82-year old Bouteflika. Stability in Algeria is critical—for the security of Algerians, and the broader region. The country’s next leader will face a challenging economic situation, persistent threats from terrorist networks in Mali and Libya, and increasing extremist propaganda targeted to influence the country’s younger generations.

According to the British government’s Foreign Travel Advice, “terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Morocco. You should be vigilant at all times.”  Two Scandinavian tourists were brutally killed in Morocco in December of 2018. While local authorities reported the attackers were not affiliated with ISIS, the attack—coupled with ISIS’ territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq—has lead to growing scrutiny over the group’s increasingly asymmetric dimension.

One component of the Moroccan counter-terrorism strategy is moussalaha—a reconciliation program. Launched in 2018, it is a de-radicalization program to combat violent extremism. According to the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, human rights and anti-radicalization experts provide psychological support and rehabilitation of charged and jailed people for terror crimes. On March 10^th of 2019, Moroccan authorities announced a repatriation program to allow militants of Moroccan origin to return in safety. The returnees were subject to judicial investigations for their alleged involvement in terror-related activities. The Head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation estimated 1.668 Moroccans joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

In Egypt, several cells affiliated with Wilaya Sinai (Islamic State in the Sinai) remain operational and continue to threaten security and stability in the Sinai. Egypt continues to suffer from ongoing attacks against Christians and other religious minorities. The elimination of the territorial holdings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq could force militants to flow into Egypt.

Furthermore, despite the group’s territorial defeat, ISIS-affiliated propaganda and the group’s shift to an asymmetric entity from a territorially-based entity will continue to threaten North African security. ISIS, in addition to smaller, localized groups, are capable of radicalizing young people in a complex regional context, one deeply affected by economic crises. Extremist propaganda represents an illusory—but convincing—opportunity for young people to turn from losers to winners. Breaking the nexus between terrorism and criminality (especially smuggling) is essential to promote regional stability and security.

The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

In July 2015, a new Prevent statutory duty was introduced, which compelled specified authorities to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

Introduction

This duty was introduced by Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and it seeks to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism by leveraging on the notion of “non-violent extremism.” The section represents a significant change to the Prevent strand of the overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, because it placed specific legal responsibility on a number of public bodies to tackle radicalization and extremism.

Over the years, Prevent attracted broad criticism for lacking empirical evidence in support of its main corollaries and for being based on the study, “Extremism Risk Guidance” (ERG22+), which however was never validated by the normal process of independent peer review and scientific scrutiny. As a result, in September 2016, over 140 experts and academics criticised Prevent in an open letter to the Government, in which they wrote:

“We are concerned with the implementation of “radicalization ” policies within the UK Prevent strategy, internationally referred to as countering violence extremism. Tools that purport to have a psychology evidence base are being developed and placed under statutory duty while their “science” has not been subjected to proper scientific scrutiny or public critique.”

Prevent originates from the assumption that radicalization is a linear process towards terrorism, which some people are vulnerable to. It also assumes that it is possible to identify someone on a trajectory towards acts of terror, and that, consequently, this trajectory can be interrupted through a process of de-radicalization.

While a large volume of research has been conducted on this topic, statistics keep showing that Prevent is not fit for purpose; instead, it rests on a largely discriminatory interpretation of “radicalization” and “extremism.” Even the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) admitted that 80% of referrals to Channel are redundant, pointing out that there was, in fact, no risk of radicalization.

Further statistics from the Home Office, covering April 2015 to March 2016, show that in 2015/16, a total of 7,631 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, with most referrals (2,539 – accounting for 33%) coming from the education sector. Of the 7,631 individuals referred in 2015/16, 2,766 (36%) left the process requiring no further action, 3,793 (50%) were signposted to alternative services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to be discussed at a Channel panel. In 2015/16, 381 people received Channel support following a Channel panel. Of these, 365 (96%) have subsequently left the process.

Prevent casts a wide net seemingly disregarding the profound consequences that the process has on individuals who are mistakenly identified as subjects at risk. This trend was strongly amplified by the introduction of the statutory Prevent duty.

Towards a police state

The introduction of the statutory Prevent duty compelled the government to find models to train public sector workers to identify and prevent radicalization and extremism. However, the mandatory training is based on the assumptions underpinning the Government’s counter-extremism strategies and, as such, it is marred by the same flawed methodology at the base of the Prevent study. This research identifies four major problems with the legislation.

The first issue is that the Prevent strategy moves from a position of suspicion, that is, everyone is a potential suspect, and everyone can be deterred from committing acts of violent extremism. While the effort to prevent such acts is commendable, the making of the statutory Prevent duty co-opts public sector workers (teachers, nurses, counsellors etc.) into an intelligence tactical role that turns public bodies into sites of securitisation and would require a level of training far superior to that currently provided by the Prevent training course.

In short, not only does the Prevent duty create a climate of suspicion and mistrust between public workers and society, but also puts an enormous responsibility on people who do not necessarily have the background, skills, training, and overall in-depth understanding of radicalization, terrorism, insurgency and related issues. Individuals who have never been involved in the field of counter-extremism are suddenly expected, and in fact compelled, to refer people who they think might be on the path to violent extremism.

The second issue concerns the fact that the Prevent training is shaped upon the faulty assumptions underpinning the Government’s counter-extremism strategies, as well as its understanding of radicalization and extremism. According to the 2011 revised Prevent strategy, the Government has defined extremism as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” This definition, however, poses a number of issues:

1. British values remains a nebulous concept when used to identify individuals at risk of radicalization. Indeed, democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs are arguably universal and human values and do not necessarily reflect the ‘level of Britishness’ of an individual. When such values as transposed into a purely British context, one could then wonder if, for example, criticism of the UK government or of the monarchy could be seen as a sign of un-Britishness and consequently of extremism.
2. The rhetoric of Britishness and British values provides a fertile environment for the festering of far-right ideas and the myth of ‘non-integration’ by Muslim communities. The nearly two decades of constant negative depictions of Islam has resulted in a widespread demonization of British Muslims for their diversities and complexities, which are perceived and portrayed as characterizing various degrees of ‘un-Britishness.’ Such perception can have a profound impact on the way Prevent referrals are made.
3. British values are often defined in opposition to others. For example, David Cameron’s 2011 speech in which he declared “we are a Christian country. And we should not be afraid to say so”, suggests that non-Christians inherently do not belong in Britain. This contributes to creating a climate in which diversity – or more specifically non-Christianity – might be perceived as an indicator of un-Britishness and therefore extremism.
4. Finally, public sector workers such as teachers are required to promote British values as a crucial step to undertake in an effort to prevent radical ideologies. This can result in increasing censorship of dissenting voices, even when these are fully legitimate. It can also result in a profound sense of alienation for all individuals who legitimately disagree with canonical rules or with what is subjectively (and the confusion over British values inherently requires a certain degree of subjective interpretation) perceived as being ‘British values’.

In short, tackling extremism on the basis of an ambiguous definition of ‘British values’ is as dangerous as it is counterproductive. Such a paradigm inevitably frames race relations in light of the Government’s security agenda, while having a profound impact on freedom of expression, diversity, legitimate dissent, and overall multiculturalism.

The third problem is that the Prevent training is based on the presumption that there are clear, identifiable signs that an individual is drifting towards violent extremism.  This conveyor-belt theory, however, is based upon a number of studies conducted on individuals who had in fact committed acts of terror. For instance, the authors of “Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K” identified six signs of radicalization 1] by analyzing the behavior of “terrorists known to have participated in an attack or an attempted attack.” However, there was no control-study of those who were not terrorists to compare/contrast these signs with, which means that all the identifiers led to terrorism not because there is a linear pattern but because of the selected case studies.

Likewise, the government-funded ERG22+ research conducted by Dean and Lloyd suffers from the same limitations caused by the omission of control-studies. Even the MI5 confirmed in its report “Behavioural Science Unit Operation Briefing Note: Understanding radicalization and violent extremism in the UK,” that the several hundred terrorists it analyzed “had taken strikingly different journeys to violent extremist activity.”

There are two consequent problems with this. First, a public worker is not necessarily equipped to understand the nuances of religiosity, theology, political activism, and to differentiate between them and a potentially real ongoing radicalization process. Indeed, as pointed out by Paul Thomas, Professor of Youth and Policy at the University of Huddersfield, questions should be asked as to whether a one-hour-long course can equip a public worker (for example, a teacher) to discern between extremism and conservativism, particularly when this distinction applies to individuals belonging to communities already considered ‘at risk’, such as the Muslim one. A second issue concerns the fact that Prevent identifies a number of extremely loose and generic behaviors that might indicate radicalization. These include:

1. Isolating themselves from family and friend
2. Talking as if from a scripted speech, unwillingness or inability to discuss their views
3. A sudden disrespectful attitude towards others
4. increased levels of anger
5. Increased secretiveness, especially around internet use.

These identifiers are however extremely ambiguous, especially for a teacher dealing with teenagers in the midst of adolescence. As such, it can be contended that a teacher, or any other public worker for that matter, might be inclined to look for other factors to fulfill his/her Prevent duty, such as the level of an individual’s religiosity.

Finally, it is unclear what the duty seeks to tackle, and more specifically, at what point of the presumed radicalization process is Prevent attempting to intervene. If the public worker is expected to intervene to forestall a violent act of extremism, then s/he is effectively pre-empting a terrorist attack – an enormous responsibility to put on the shoulders of a non-expert with merely a one-hour-long training. If the public worker is expected to intervene to forestall acts of non-violent extremism – thus “ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology” –then s/he is challenging and stopping ideas from being expressed. This has potentially disastrous consequences for freedom of speech, particularly within the Education Sector, where debate is key for the advancement and development of pupils and students.

Neoliberalism and Muslim Identity

The statutory Prevent duty has created a profound fracture among Muslim communities and between the Muslim and non-Muslim community because it adds a bottom-up level to the traditional top-down securitization process. This, in turn, adds to the jurisprudential transition towards – and effectively establishment of – a legal system based on pre-crime, in which individuals are not prosecuted for committing a crime, but for fear that they might.

As such, while Britain’s pre-crime-based legal system has created a nation of potential suspects, the introduction of the statutory Prevent duty has also created a nation of potential police officers, effectively crystallizing societal divisions based on suspicion. In turn, difficulties in defining radicalization, terrorism, extremism and ‘British values,’ creates a climate of profound legal, social, and political uncertainty, in which other, and certainly more subjective, factors come into play.

An individual’s level of religiosity appears to be a predominant factor in the determination of subjects considered at risk of radicalization. An increasing number of studies is pointing at an inherent, and seemingly irreconcilable, distinction between British and Muslim identities, with the former being built primarily in opposition to the latter – a trend further evidenced by the Brexit vote.

According to M. S. Elshimi, a Research Analyst at the Royal United Services Institute specialising in Countering Violent Extremism, the fracture is not caused by an alleged inability of Muslims to subscribe to the set of British values encompassed in the government’s Prevent definition (democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs) – which are in fact largely shared by British Muslims. Instead, it is provoked by the construction of a British identity according to the model of neoliberal nation-states, and which appears incompatible with some of the more prominent traits of Islam.

Materialism, secularism, modernity, and individualism – just some of the most defining characteristics of a neoliberal state –are inherently at odds with Islam, but their rejection, or a lesser degree of acceptance of them, cannot and should not be seen as a sign of radicalization. The age of globalism, however, has led to a question of reconciliation of multitude identities beyond normative universal values. As such, normality is ascribed to consumerism, secularism, individualism and a general de-politicisation, which constitute an acceptable level of conduct in a neoliberal state. Too much religiosity, consequently, is abnormal and challenged as a sign of radicalization.

In short, it is the Muslim identity that is being problematized and challenged in the current counter-extremism legislation, not terrorism. The difficulty in defining British values makes it impossible to define what a threat to British values is, and in turn, this leads to a more subjective and arguably over-conjectural categorization of individuals at risk.

Conclusion

The introduction of the statutory Prevent duty has severely altered the fabric of British society by extending the scope of the current pre-crime system to dangerous new levels. As noted above, while a preventative legal system turns everyone into potential suspects, the bottom-up securitization introduced by the statutory Prevent duty turns non-experts into overly zealous officers.

The problems outlined above revolve around the major issue of not knowing what terrorism and radicalization mean, and consequently of being unable to address it satisfactorily. Furthermore, the government’s attempt to frame extremism in opposition to British values has created ulterior confusion due to the difficulty of defining what ‘British values’ actually means. The issue of British identity – or lack thereof – coupled with nearly two decades of anti-Islam rhetoric, has led to an inevitable clash between neoliberal and Islamic values, with the former being formulated in opposition to the latter.

Religiosity, and even more so religious conservativism, seemingly remains a problem in British society. On the one hand, the secularism and modernity embedded in neoliberal states make religion a suspicious presence in the country; while on the other, the rejection of diversity (perfectly illustrated by the Brexit vote) has led to a societal embracement of cultural isolationism.

Muslims are disproportionally impacted by the framework within which Prevent operates. Statistics presented by the Government’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) show that a Muslim is almost 80 times more likely to be referred by Prevent for Channel de-radicalization since 2012. Of the 7,361 individuals referred to Prevent in 2015/16, 4,997 were referred for “Islamist extremism”, but only 5% went on to receiving Channel support. This shows that, while Muslims are the prime suspects, there is still very little understanding of what ‘Islamist extremism’ actually means, and what the identifiers of radicalization are.

The widespread belief among Muslims that the Government’s strategies are aimed at enforcing a political, religious and moral revisionism, contributes to the polarization of communities and in reducing the chances of bridging the gap between them. With the statutory Prevent duty co-opting public workers into the process of securitization, this fracture is amplified on every level of society. This also contributes to perpetuating the Huntingtonian paradigm that there is an “us” and a “them” and that the two are very distinct and irreconcilable. The ambiguities resulting from this model cause widespread misunderstandings, which often result in nothing short of a witch-hunt against Muslims. Marginalisation, stigmatization, and resentment thus become embedded in the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The Prevent duty casts a long shadow of fear and suspicion while demanding idealistic results from public workers with no experience in the field of radicalization and counter-extremism. As argued by Professor Richard English, an authority in the field of terrorism, what really matters is not that we deal with violent extremism but how we do so. Encroaching civil liberties in the name of security legitimizes terrorism because it leads to a dramatic overturn of our societal values and its defining features, while simultaneously eradicating the very ethics we are attempting to protect.

[1] The signs identified in the study are: 1) The Adopting a Legalistic Interpretation of Islam; 2) Trusting Only Select Religious Authorities; 3) Perceived Schism Between Islam and the West; 4) Low Tolerance for Perceived Theological Deviance; 5) Attempts to Impose Religious Beliefs on Others; 6) Political Radicalization.

U.K. Statutory Prevent Duty: The Creation and Consequences of a Police-State was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the self-proclaimed Islamic State has dominated the headlines and preoccupied national security officials for the past four years, al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding. Its announcement last summer of another affiliate—this one dedicated to the liberation of Kashmir—coupled with the resurrection of its presence in Afghanistan and the solidification of its influence in Syria, Yemen, and Somalia, underscores the resiliency and continued vitality of the United States’ preeminent terrorist enemy.

Although al-Qaeda’s rebuilding and reorganization predates the 2011 Arab Spring, the upheaval that followed helped the movement revive itself. At the time, an unbridled optimism among local and regional rights activists and Western governments held that a combination of popular protest, civil disobedience, and social media had rendered terrorism an irrelevant anachronism.

The longing for democracy and economic reform, it was argued, had decisively trumped repression and violence. However, where the optimists saw irreversible positive change, al-Qaeda discerned new and inviting opportunities.

The successive killings in 2011 and 2012 of Osama bin Laden; Anwar al-Awlaki, the movement’s chief propagandist; and Abu Yahya al-Libi, its second-in-command, lent new weight to the optimists’ predictions that al-Qaeda was a spent force. In retrospect, however, it appears that al-Qaeda was among the regional forces that benefited most from the Arab Spring’s tumult. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri has emerged as a powerful leader, with a strategic vision that he has systematically implemented.

Forces loyal to al-Qaeda and its affiliates now number in the tens of thousands, with a capacity to disrupt local and regional stability, as well as launch attacks against their declared enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, and Russia. Indeed, from northwestern Africa to southeastern Asia, al-Qaeda has knit together a global movement of more than two dozen franchises. In Syria alone, al-Qaeda now has upwards of twenty thousand men under arms, and it has perhaps another four thousand in Yemen and about seven thousand in Somalia.

The Arab Spring’s Big Winner

The thousands of hardened al-Qaeda fighters freed from Egyptian prisons in 2012–2013 by President Mohammed Morsi galvanized the movement at a critical moment, when instability reigned and a handful of men well-versed in terrorism and subversion could plunge a country or a region into chaos.

Whether in Libya, Turkey, Syria, or Yemen, their arrival was providential in terms of advancing al-Qaeda’s interests or increasing its influence. The military coup that subsequently toppled Morsi validated Zawahiri’s repeated warnings not to believe Western promises about either the fruits of democracy or the sanctity of free and fair elections.

It was Syria where al-Qaeda’s intervention proved most consequential. One of Zawahiri’s first official acts after succeeding bin Laden as emir was to order a Syrian veteran of the Iraqi insurgency named Abu Mohammad al-Julani to return home and establish the al-Qaeda franchise that would eventually become Jabhat al-Nusra.

Al-Qaeda’s blatantly sectarian messaging over social media further sharpened the historical frictions between Sunnis and Shias and gave the movement the entrée into internal Syrian politics that it needed to solidify its presence in that country. Al-Qaeda’s chosen instrument was Jabhat al-Nusra, the product of a joint initiative with al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch, which had rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). But as Nusra grew in both strength and impact, a dispute erupted between ISI and al-Qaeda over control of the group.

In a bold power grab, ISI’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced the forcible amalgamation of al-Nusra with ISI in a new organization to be called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Julani refused to accede to the unilateral merger and appealed to Zawahiri. The quarrel intensified, and after Zawahiri’s attempts to mediate it collapsed, he expelled ISIS from the al-Qaeda network.

Although ISIS—which has since rebranded itself the Islamic State—has commanded the world’s attention since then, al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding and fortifying its various branches. Al-Qaeda has systematically implemented an ambitious strategy designed to protect its remaining senior leadership and discreetly consolidate its influence wherever the movement has a significant presence.

Accordingly, its leaders have been dispersed to Syria, Iran, Turkey, Libya, and Yemen, with only a hard-core remnant of top commanders still in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Advances in commercial digital communication tools, alongside successive public revelations of U.S. and allied intelligence services’ eavesdropping capabilities, have enabled al-Qaeda’s leaders and commanders to maintain contact via secure end-to-end encryption technology.

The Importance of Syria

The number of top al-Qaeda leaders sent to Syria over the past half-dozen years underscores the high priority that the movement attaches to that country. Among them was Muhsin al-Fadhli, a bin Laden intimate who, until his death in a 2015 U.S. air strike, commanded the movement’s elite forward-based operational arm in that country, known as the Khorasan Group. He also functioned as Zawahiri’s local emissary, charged with attempting to heal the rift between al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Haydar Kirkan, a Turkish national and long-standing senior operative, was sent by bin Laden himself to Turkey in 2010 to lay the groundwork for the movement’s expansion into the Levant, before the Arab Spring created precisely that opportunity. Kirkan was also responsible for facilitating the movement of other senior al-Qaeda personnel from Pakistan to Syria to escape the escalating drone strike campaign ordered by President Barack Obama. He was killed in 2016 in a U.S. bombing raid.

The previous fall marked the arrival of Saif al-Adl, who is arguably the movement’s most battle-hardened commander. Adl is a former Egyptian Army commando whose terrorist pedigree, dating to the late 1970s, includes assassination plots against Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 terrorist campaigns in Saudi Arabia and South Asia. He also served as mentor to bin Laden’s presumptive heir, his son Hamza, after both Adl and the boy sought sanctuary in Iran following the commencement of U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan in late 2001. The younger bin Laden’s own reported appearance in Syria this past summer provides fresh evidence of the movement’s fixation with a country that has become the most popular venue to wage holy war since the seminal Afghan jihad of the 1980s.

Indeed, al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria is far more pernicious than that of ISIS. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the latest name adopted by al-Qaeda’s local affiliate, is now the largest rebel group in the country, having extended its control last year over all of Idlib Province, along the Syrian-Turkish border. This is the culmination of a process al-Qaeda began more than three years ago to annihilate the Free Syrian Army and any other group that challenges al-Qaeda’s regional aspirations.

Filling the ISIS Vacuum

ISIS can no longer compete with al-Qaeda in terms of influence, reach, manpower, or cohesion. In only two domains is ISIS currently stronger than its rival: the power of its brand and its presumed ability to mount spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe. But the latter is a product of Zawahiri’s strategic decision to prohibit external operations in the West so that al-Qaeda’s rebuilding can continue without interference.

The handful of exceptions to this policy—such as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and the 2017 St. Petersburg Metro bombing in Russia—provide compelling evidence that al-Qaeda’s external operations capabilities can easily be reanimated. Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s capacity to commit acts of international terrorism—especially the targeting of commercial aviation—was recently the subject of a revealing New York Times story.

Al-Qaeda’s success in resurrecting its global network is the result of three strategic moves made by Zawahiri. The first was to strengthen the decentralized franchise approach that has facilitated the movement’s survival. Over the years, the leaders and deputies of al-Qaeda’s far-flung franchises have been integrated into the movement’s deliberative and consultative processes. Today, al-Qaeda is truly “glocal,” having effectively incorporated local grievances and concerns into a global narrative that forms the foundation of an all-encompassing grand strategy.

The second major move was the order issued by Zawahiri in 2013 to avoid mass casualty operations, especially those that might kill Muslim civilians. Al-Qaeda has thus been able to present itself through social media, paradoxically, as “moderate extremists,” ostensibly more palatable than ISIS.

This development reflects Zawahiri’s third strategic decision, letting ISIS absorb all the blows from the coalition arrayed against it while al-Qaeda unobtrusively rebuilds its military strength. Anyone inclined to be taken in by this ruse would do well to heed the admonition of Theo Padnos (née Peter Theo Curtis), the American journalist who spent two years in Syria as a Nusra hostage.

Padnos related in 2014 how the group’s senior commanders “were inviting Westerners to the jihad in Syria not so much because they needed more foot soldiers—they didn’t—but because they want to teach the Westerners to take the struggle into every neighborhood and subway station back home.”

A parallel thus exists between the U.S. director of national intelligence’s depiction of the al-Qaeda threat today [PDF] as mainly limited to its affiliates and the so-called Phoney War in western Europe between September 1939 and May 1940, when there was a strange lull in serious fighting following the German invasion of Poland and the British and French declarations of war against Germany. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain visited British forces arrayed along the Franco-Belgian border that Christmas.

“I don’t think the Germans have any intention of attacking us, do you?” he asked Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery, the commander of an infantry division defending the front. The Germans would attack when it suited them, Montgomery brusquely replied. It is a point worth keeping in mind as al-Qaeda busily rebuilds and marshals its forces to continue the war against the United States it declared twenty-two years ago.

The Resurrection of Al-Qaeda was originally published on Global Security Review.

10. Robert Mugabe’s Ouster. Can someone be both a hero and a villain? The career of Robert Mugabe suggests the answer is yes. Like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Mugabe endured years in prison to lead the movement that ended white minority rule in his country, then known as Rhodesia, but known today as Zimbabwe. That victory for human decency is to his credit. But unlike Mandela, Mugabe never grasped that democracy means letting go of power. He ran Zimbabwe for thirty-seven years and planned to rule for longer, even if that meant running the economy into the ground and becoming increasingly ruthless. His presidency ended only when tanks rolled into Harare in November to force him from power. The trigger was his decision to shove aside his vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in favor his wife, Grace. The seventy-five-year-old Mnangagwa had been Mugabe’s associate for more than half a century. Rather than go quietly, the man known as “the Crocodile” because of his ruthlessness struck back. Mugabe quickly lost the support of his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and after some hesitation, finally resigned. Zimbabweans rejoiced at the news of his ouster, and Mnangagwa promised to hold new elections next year. Based on his early decisions, however, the new boss looks a lot like the old boss.

9. Britain Triggers Article 50. The June 2016 “Brexit” vote was merely advisory. Actually initiating divorce proceedings from the European Union (EU) required Britain to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The move “from which there can be no turning back” finally came on March 29. Britain now has until March 29, 2019, to negotiate the terms of its departure. Prime Minister Theresa May tried to shore up Britain’s weak negotiating leverage this spring by calling a snap election. The decision backfired; her Conservative Party lost its parliamentary majority, and she ended up leading a hung parliament. In early December, Britain and the EU reached an agreement on several critical preliminary issues, including how much Britain has to pay to settle its debts to the EU (somewhere between €40 billion and €60 billion). Assuming that deal holds, the two sides can now focus on the rules that will govern their future economic relationship. Those negotiations will likely be difficult; EU members have yet to agree among themselves on what terms to offer, and the British Parliament has asserted its right to vote on the final agreement. Unless a deal is signed, sealed, and delivered by March 29, 2019, or a unanimous EU agrees to an extension, Britain faces a “hard Brexit.” That would maximize how much disruption its divorce from the EU causes. The clock is ticking.

8. The Rohingya Crisis. The Rohingya may be the most persecuted minority group in the world. They have lived in Myanmar for centuries. Most of them are Muslims, though some are Hindus, in a country in which nearly nine out of ten people are Buddhists. The Rohingya have long been discriminated against, often violently so, and the Myanmar government refuses to acknowledge them as citizens. The latest and ugliest surge of violence began in August when Rohingya began fleeing into neighboring Bangladesh telling stories of mass killings, systematic rape, and torture. At last count, more than 400,000 have fled Myanmar, and thousands more have been displaced internally. The Myanmar military denies committing atrocities, insisting that it is combating attacks on police posts and army bases by Rohingya insurgents. But it’s clear, as the U.S. government has charged, that the Myanmar government is engaged in ethnic cleansing. Aung San Suu Kyi, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and Myanmar’s most prominent official, has done little publicly to end the violence. That’s probably because the military still runs the country despite the political opening of the past few years.

7. The Fall of Mosul. ISIS shocked the world in June 2014 when its forces captured Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. Within a month, ISIS had declared a new caliphate. Although President Obama once dismissed ISIS as “the JV,” it proved to be a stubborn foe. Finally, in October 2016, Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers, backed by Britain, France, and the United States, as well as by Iran, launched an offensive to liberate Mosul. In June 2017, after a three-year-long occupation, the city was finally liberated. The cost was high. Perhaps as many as 40,000 civilians died in the fighting and another million displaced. The city itself was devastated and will take years to rebuild. Unfortunately, the liberation of Mosul did not resolve the divisions that bedevil Iraq. In September, Iraqi Kurds voted for independence, which triggered clashes between the Iraqi army and Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi government, with the help of Iran, seized control of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk from the Kurds. By the same token, the loss of Mosul didn’t mean the demise of ISIS. The group has a cyclical history, waxing and waning in strength over time. As its territorial control diminishes, it’s likely to revert back to its insurgent roots. All in all, Iraq’s future remains troubled.

6. Mohammad bin Salman Remakes Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) is a young man in a hurry. Back in June, his father, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, made the thirty-two-year-old his heir, after deposing the previous crown prince, the king’s nephew and MBS’s cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef. MBS immediately got to work. His vehicle for remaking the country is Vision 2030, a two-year-old initiative that seeks to modernize Saudi Arabia’s economy and society. The idea is to prepare the country for a post-oil future and to loosen its conservative social structures. The former goal has Saudi Arabia proposing to take its state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco, public, while the latter has it allowing women to drive. MBS moved quickly to consolidate power. In November, he had eleven of his cousins arrested on corruption charges. (Their jail cell was a Ritz-Carlton.) President Trump applauded the move. But MBS isn’t only looking inward. He is moving aggressively to counter Iranian influence in the region. He championed Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen in 2015, which created a humanitarian disaster for Yemenis and a quagmire for the Saudis. He also pushed for this summer’s Saudi-led embargo of neighboring Qatar. Some experts think that MBS is Saudi Arabia’s best chance for a moderate and prosperous future. Others worry that he is reckless. A lot turns on which side is right.

5. Global Growth Picks Up. Ten years after the Great Recession started, global economic growth is accelerating and stock markets around the world are hitting record highs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in October that “The outlook is strengthening, with a notable pickup in investment, trade, and industrial production, together with rising confidence.” The IMF added the caveat that “recovery is not yet complete.” However, even cautious optimism has been in short supply for nearly a decade. The IMF predicts that global economic growth will average 3.6 percent in 2017. That’s a half percentage point higher than in 2016. The Eurozone has been a particular bright spot—growth there is at a ten-year high and unemployment is at a nine-year low. The U.S. economy grew 3.3 percent in the third quarter of 2017, a three-year high, and unemployment is the lowest it’s been since 2000. China looks to be beating its target of 6.5 percent growth in 2017, though it continues to face risks. Even Russia, which has struggled for several years because of low oil prices and sanctions over Ukraine, is seeing modest growth. The big question is whether good economic news will give a political lift to globalization by tamping down rising protectionist and nationalist impulses around the world.

4. The Globe Continues to Warm. The news is not good. The earth is getting warmer, whether people believe it or not. In September, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announced that 2017 was shaping up as the second warmest year on record. What is the warmest year? 2016. The other eight warmest years on record have all occurred since 1998. Do the devastating hurricanes that struck the Caribbean this summer, causing upward of $290 billion in damage and displacing hundreds of thousands, prove that human activity is changing the climate? No. After all, catastrophic storms aren’t new, and storms may create more havoc today because societies are denser and more dependent on modern amenities. Still, the dramatic melting of the Arctic and Antarctic and of glaciers around the world is something that climate scientists have been predicting for decades. And it’s basic physics that warmer oceans temperatures mean bigger storms. But the mounting evidence that the climate is changing hasn’t moved governments to make substantial reductions in the emission of heat-trapping gases, even if only as an insurance policy against the fact that climate scientists might be right. President Trump announced in June that the United States would leave the Paris Climate Agreement, and words have been more common than deeds in other foreign capitals. The trend is not our friend.

3. North Korea Defies the World. Successive U.S. presidents have insisted that they would prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. They backed that up by offering carrots, imposing sanctions, and threatening military action. North Korea hasn’t listened. In early September, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. Three months later it tested a ballistic missile that looks capable of hitting any U.S. city. President Trump says he will stop North Korea in its tracks, vowing that North Korea “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” tweeting that “military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded,” and calling North Korean leader Kim Jung-un “Little Rocket Man.” Trump has also pushed China to solve the problem. While Beijing is taking a tougher line on North Korea, it can’t—or won’t—compel Pyongyang to back down. Only military force looks likely to do that. But the cost of military action would likely be steep—possibly even “catastrophic.” On the other hand, allowing North Korea to remain a nuclear power poses big risks as well. Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo have tough choices ahead in 2018.

2. Xi Jinping’s “Extraordinary Elevation.” Not even Adele with her five Grammy awards had as good a year as Xi Jinping. Although China blatantly exploits international trade rules, Xi won applause for his January speech at Davos championing globalization and likening protectionism to “locking oneself in a dark room.” In April, President Donald Trump feted him at a two-day summit meeting at Mar-a-Lago and quite noticeably avoided his typical China-bashing rhetoric. In June, Xi won more global accolades for doubling down on his commitment to the Paris climate agreement. But his biggest success came in October at the nineteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress. It was a coronation. Xi was named to his second five-year term as party general secretary. He was also named a “core leader,” a title denied to his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao. The congress also wrote “Xi Jinping Thought” into the party’s constitution, an honor previously bestowed only on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Best of all for Xi, the congress ended without naming anyone as his successor. When Trump called Xi “king of China” during his November “state visit-plus,” he wasn’t far off the mark. Xi is China’s most powerful leadersince Mao, and he’s likely to be around for a while. If you’re wondering how he might approach foreign policy in the years ahead, consider this: in his 205-minute speech to the party congress he used the terms “great power” and “strong power” twenty-six times. So don’t expect him to sit on the sidelines while others try to set the agenda or the rules.

1. Donald Trump Champions America First. Donald Trump campaigned on a pledge to do things differently and to do different things in foreign policy. He has been good to his word since getting to the White House. He has canceled U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrawn the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement, refused to certify that Iran is in compliancewith its nuclear obligations, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, ramped up the use of drones, and relegated democracy and human rights to the sidelines of U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, Trump hasn’t enacted all of his campaign promises. He beefed up rather than withdrew U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and he hasn’t declared China a currency manipulator or kicked NAFTA to the curb. But his tough campaign trade talk may soon be U.S. policy. Trump is poised to take punitive actions against Chinese trade practices, his demands for a revamped NAFTA look to be unacceptable to Canada and Mexico, and he’s waging a low-level war against the World Trade Organization. Trump’s dismissal of traditional foreign policy practices even has some fellow Republicans questioning whether America First means embracing a “doctrine of retreat.” Many of America’s closest allies are worried. They fear the era of U.S. global leadership is ending. If so, the consequences are epic.

Other stories of note in 2017. In January, António Guterres became the ninth secretary general of the United Nations. In February, Israel announced plans for its first new settlement in the West Bank in more than twenty years. The United States began deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) system in South Korea in March. Violent protests wracked Venezuela in April, a critical point in the country’s constitutional crisis. In May, Emmanuel Macron defeated Marine Le Pen to become France’s youngest president. In June, Montenegro became the twenty-ninth member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The G20 met in Hamburg in July and failed to agree on climate action. In August, Britain’s Prince Philip announced he was retiring from making official appearances. Russia and Belarus carried out the Zapad 2017 military exercises in September. Catalonia’s October independence referendum triggered a political crisis in Spain. In November, thousands attended a far-right nationalist rally in Warsaw. The Australian parliament voted in December to legalize same-sex marriage, making Australia the twenty-fifth country to do so.

So that’s my top ten world events of 2017 plus some other events of note. You may have a different list, or you might put these events in a different order. If so, please let me know on Facebook or Twitter.

Corey Cooper and Benjamin Shaver contributed to the preparation of this post.

10 Most Significant Global Events of 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The territory in eastern Syria that will be freed of Islamic State control now constitutes the focus of the struggle between the United States and Iran in Syria, as both are striving to seize the area.
• Early June marked the onset of the final phase of the US-led coalition’s offensive to conquer the city of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, with a combined Kurdish-Arab (though predominantly Kurdish) ground force – the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – and air support provided by the international coalition, including the United States, other Western countries, and Arab states.
• At the same time, Iran and its proxies have also started intensifying efforts aimed at shaping Syria the day after the fall of the Islamic State.
• Forces of the pro-Assad coalition are currently trying to expand their control in the Deir ez-Zor region and improve their access to Raqqa and the surrounding area, and also seize critical positions along the Syrian-Iraqi border

Geopolitically, Syria Sits in the Middle of Two Axes of Influence

The race to shape the Syrian arena, which is currently focused on the campaign to conquer Raqqa and defeat the Islamic State, encompasses two main strategic efforts. One, led by Iran, aims at laying the foundation for a Shiite axis land bridge from Iran in the east, via Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon in the west. Its primary mode of operation is the seizure, by Iranian proxies, of significant passage points between Iraq and Syria – with Iraqi Shiite militias (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the People’s Mobilization Forces) on the Iraqi side of the border and forces of the pro-Assad coalition, including the remnants of the Syrian army under the authority of Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias on the Syrian side of the border.

According to Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “a relationship has been forged between the popular forces, the forces of the Iraqi government and military, and the allied forces in Syria. In practice, this is a strategic victory for Iran’s allies and for the ring of resistance to Zionism that begins in Tehran and reaches Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.”

In a rival strategic effort, the US-led coalition has been operating to create a wedge running north-south to sever the Iranian land bridge and cut off Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and west of the Persian Gulf. This effort is aimed at creating a buffer zone-security strip controlled by US allies, extending from Turkey in the north, via eastern Syria, southward to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Over the past weeks, some attacks have been carried out by US air forces against forces of the pro-Assad coalition along with the southeastern segment of the Syrian-Iraqi border, in the region of the Syrian city of al-Tanf, located near the tripartite border between Jordan-Syria-Iraq.

The United States has declared this area to be a “de-confliction” zone under its influence and will therefore not allow the deployment of forces belonging to Assad or Iranian proxies in the region. On June 18, a Syrian fighter plane was shot down in the Raqqa region of eastern Syria as part of the air cover that the United States is providing to the Syrian Democratic Forces fighting to liberate Raqqa.

Iranian parties have explained that the deployment of forces loyal to Iran along the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border is meant to thwart the US plan to divide Syria. According to the Iranians, the United States seeks to link the northeastern part of Syria that is under Kurdish control to the southeastern section of the country, up to the Jordanian border and has therefore increased its activities and attacks in the Tanf region.

The voices from Iran indicate that their forces aim: (a) to defend Iran’s dominance in Iraq, the survival of the Assad regime, and Iranian strategic depth by means of a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut; (b) to destroy the Islamic State along the Syrian-Iraqi border; (c) to neutralize the US plan to dismantle Syria; and (d) to prevent US-supported forces from establishing control over eastern Syria.

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Iran chose to respond to the Islamic State attack in Tehran by launching six surface-to-surface missiles from Iranian territory at an Islamic State target in the Deir ez-Zor region of eastern Syria. In doing so, it demonstrated its potential in the field of ballistic missiles and leveraged its message that it is at war with the Islamic State and is unafraid of operating in a sector in which the United States is working to establish its influence.

Russia’s position in this context is not entirely clear. On the one hand, both the Assad regime and sources in Moscow report that Russia is a partner in the Assad regime’s efforts in eastern Syria, aided by Iran and Hezbollah, to derail the American plan. On May 8, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan, which has close relations with the regime, reported that “massive reinforcements of Syrian and Russian military forces have arrived in the Syrian desert, in addition to the forces of friends, in preparation for an operation to take control of Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border.”

At the same time, there have been reports of coordination efforts in Jordan between US and Russian representatives. There have also been reports that Russia is working to prevent friction between forces of the Syrian regime and its allies and US forces, and strives to reach understandings with the United States and Jordan regarding a de-confliction zone, a de-escalation zone, and mutual attacks in southern Syria.

In response to the intercepting of the Syrian plane in the Deir ez-Zor region, Russia announced that “all aircraft, manned and unmanned, of the international coalition operating west of the Euphrates River, will be identified as targets by Russian air defense systems,” appearing to create a Russian-controlled no-fly zone west of the Euphrates. As part of the struggle for control of southeastern Syria, the United States has deployed two HIMARS multiple launch rocket batteries to the American special forces base near al-Tanf.

In response, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that every entry of a foreign weapon system into Syria requires authorization by the central government in Damascus and that the deployment indicates that the United States is not focused on fighting the Islamic State as its claims to be. The United States was then charged with failing to prevent Islamic State fighters from fleeing Raqqa toward Deir ez-Zor.

The pro-Assad coalition led by Russia and Iran appears to be following the American activity in southern and eastern Syria with great concern. In addition to the establishment of an exclusive security zone north of the Jordanian-Syrian border and attacks on forces supporting the Assad regime, this activity has included use of a training infrastructure for troops of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of US special forces reinforced by artillery support, and an air umbrella provided by the Western coalition.

From an Iranian perspective, and perhaps also from a Russian point of view, this marks a new phase in the US campaign to shape Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State, which is aimed at neutralizing the Iranian presence and influence in Syria.

The Potential for Escalation between the US and Iran in Syria and Iraq

The Trump administration includes elements that are extremely hostile to Iran and are pushing to expand the war in Syria as an opportunity to clash with Iran on a “comfortable” playing field. These elements have apparently suggested the idea of establishing an American-dominated north-to-south running strip through eastern Syria with the aim of blocking and containing Iran’s regional aspirations.

At the same time, Secretary of State James Mattis and US military leaders oppose the opening of a broad front against Iran and its proxies in Syria and regard it as endangering the capacity for a focused effort to advance the primary goal: the dismantling and defeat of the Islamic State. Therefore, at least at this stage, the US military leadership is seeking to avoid friction with the Iranians and Russians.

In the meantime, Iran is resolutely striving to progress toward its goals – i.e., more than other actors in the Middle East. It is checking the limits of US intervention, without any capacity to estimate the intensity of the United States commitment in the race to achieve control over eastern Syria. As a result, there is currently a potential for US-Iranian escalation in Syria that could spread to Iraq – either intentionally or as a result of miscalculated assessments.

Conclusion: The current race for control of territory in Syria appears as if it’s between Iran and the United States

The current race for control of territory in Syria now seems to be a competition between Iran and the United States, which have established two respective axes –with a vertical American (north-south) effort on the one hand, and a horizontal Iranian (east-west) effort on the other. In practice, this is another stage in the shaping of Syria in preparation for the day after the Islamic State. Thus far, the Syrian arena could be viewed as a game board with multiple squares, with the move of pieces in each square having an impact on the state of affairs in the others.

First, Russia set up its pieces on the board’s central-western sector, between Aleppo and Damascus, including the coastal region. Turkey followed suit, arranging its forces in the board’s northern sector along the Syrian-Turkish border, including an effort to safeguard its interests in the Kurdish region. The United States focused its warfare against the Islamic State primarily in northeastern Syria and is now trying to reorganize its pieces in the southeastern square of the Syria game board.

As a result, the country’s southwestern region, from Daraa to the Golan Heights, remains open for activity and influenced by Israel and Jordan, which must begin taking action before it is too late. Contacts are apparently underway to formulate a joint Israeli-Jordanian-American strategy aimed at preventing Iranian influence and the presence of its proxies, especially Hezbollah and Shiite militias, in the southern square of the Syrian game board. Israel and Jordan must also prepare themselves for the possibility that Islamic State fighters fleeing northeastern Syria could move southward and link up with the Islamic State branch at the border in the Golan Heights.

Moreover, Israel must not forget Russia’s influence in Syria and the need to reach understandings with Moscow, at least on a clandestine level, regarding every move in this direction. Syria may have understood as much, which would explain the increased intensity of the pro-Assad coalition’s attacks in the Daraa region over the past few weeks, primarily from the air. Still, Russia understands that Israel possesses the capacity to cause significant damage in Syria, and therefore prefers to maintain understandings with Israel and take Israel’s concerns seriously.

The Race for Syria after the Islamic State was originally published on Global Security Review.