Turkey provides advanced military equipment to Pakistan and financial support when necessary. The success of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones in Ukraine are but one example of Turkey’s push to build a technologically sophisticated military force.

Greece, however, is focused on domestic programs and is developing a military capable of effectively deterring Turkey, should the desire to seize further Greek territory arise. Greeks are complacent and too willing to view membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a guarantee against Turkish aggression.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a diplomatic visit to Cyprus on June 15, 2025. This was a fortuitous visit because India has long dealt with the kind of challenges Turkey poses to Greece. The country has also undertaken an effort to modernize its forces, which offers lessons for Greece.

The United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total military spending, with their total expenditure amounting to $1.6 trillion. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) most recent data highlights that India is consistently investing more in defense, as security issues increasingly dominate national priorities.

India is among the top five military spenders in the world, according to new SIPRI data. India’s defense spending increased by 1.6 percent in 2024, reaching $86.1 billion, making it the fifth largest military power in the world.

India’s first domestically produced hydrogen-powered drones are ready for use. Sharad Shah, Managing Director of Paras Defense Space Technologies, says his company is able to support India’s immediate security needs following the recent attacks. And just as India was preparing to launch deadly strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan, Paras announced a strategic joint venture with Haven Drowns in Israel, a US-based global company recognized for its autonomous, hydrogen-powered, and mission-specific drones.

The joint venture with Haven Drones will create a new capability in India for the design, manufacture, and supply of next generation drone systems tailored to India’s defense and internal security. These drones serve long-term plans to address global crises.

Paras is a defense engineering company specializing in advanced cutting-edge optical systems, optoelectronic systems, and defense solutions—not originally a drone manufacturer. The drones that emerged from this Indian-Israeli collaboration were tested on the highly volatile border of Israel. What makes them a game changer for India is their resilience and autonomy. These are hydrogen-powered unmanned aircraft that can stay in the air five times longer than current systems and are virtually silent, making them ideal for round-the-clock surveillance. One model can hover 500 meters above the ground, maintaining continuous surveillance of vast areas.

The recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in the Pahalgam region of Kashmir underlines a harsh reality; persistent surveillance and rapid response are no longer optional—they are urgent. Paras is focused on providing real-time intelligence and countermeasures through surveillance technologies that can be deployed without delay and is working with India’s Ministry of Defense to ensure border security.

Both India and Greece must give maximum effort to protect their borders with state-of-the-art drones that can both prevent entry of illegal aliens and detect enemy movements. Greece can benefit greatly from drones in the Evros, which borders Turkey by land and sea. India has similar challenges in the Kashmir region, which borders Pakistan, and in Arunachal Pradesh, which China illegally claims by calling it South Tibet. These common challenges make India a natural partner.

India’s defense sector has experienced strong growth in recent years, driven by the government’s strong emphasis on innovation and increased defense spending. Rising border tensions and global geopolitical challenges spurred both domestic and international orders of Indian defense hardware, demonstrating increased confidence in the capabilities of Indian defense manufacturers.

The domestic defense industry grew to Rs 1.27 lakh crore (over $18 billion) in 2024, registering a remarkable growth of 174 percent since 2015. This impressive growth is supported by government efforts along with foreign military sales that include more than 17,000 items, which encourages domestic production for the international market.

It is time for Greece to start developing its own heavy industry sector and to stop relying on tourism as its source of revenue. In the 1980s, Greece even stopped making automobiles and started depending on loans from European organizations. Given Greece’s central location as the buffer between Europe and the Middle East, it is time to start investing in its own domestic arms manufacturing industry which is exactly what the “Made in India” movement is all about.

Of course, Greece does not have a domestic arms industry, but it understands the complexity of the simultaneous crises that impact the country. It is because of worsening conditions that the Greek Air Force is strengthening air defenses on Crete.

There is, however, positive news. Minister for National Defense Nikos Dendias proposed the creation of a defense dome, Achilles’ Shield, for the country. This effort is already underway as part of the Agenda 2030 effort. This follows the approval of the New Force Structure and the 12-year Armament Program by parliament and the Kysea. These efforts are a good start.

If Greece follows India’s example and invests in an indigenous arms industry that serves both Greece’s needs and an international market, the endeavor can prove successful. Restoring domestic industrial production is also an important undertaking for a country that has largely seen its domestic manufacturing industry perish. Greece has too long rested on its laurels while Turkey modernized its military and grew its domestic defense industry. Taking the positive elements of India’s efforts and avoiding their mistakes can serve as a path forward for Greece.

Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer who works as a journalist writing about human rights violations in South Asia. She works for Greece’s biggest newspaper, Skai.gr, and Huffpost.Gr, as well as international distinguished news sites such as Modern Diplomacy and Global Research. 

The Future of War Is Coming from India to Greece was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.

While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.

The Demographic Transition

One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.

Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As Table 1 shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.

 Table 1

Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. (These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.)

These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.

The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.

The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.

Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.

The Two Percent Myth

The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

            The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.

Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.

Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.

The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?

A European Nuclear Deterrent

 One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.

One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.

One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).

While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.

Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.

For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.

Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Is Trump Right About Europe? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of the AUKUS agreement, EU member states must come to terms with the loss of primacy and the shift of the U.S.’s geostrategic center of gravity to the East to counter Chinese expansionism. The old Eurocentric western security architecture is essentially in shambles, hindering NATO’s integrity as well. The emerging “Quad” alliance between the U.S., U.K., Australia, India, and Japan diminishes NATO’s importance in the Indo-Pacific. The French and other traditional allies and partners—members of EU and NATO—collectively appeared more enraged than China, highlighting the clumsy formation of AUKUS that was accelerated by the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle. AUKUS marks a turning point in global geopolitics that will have a domino effect on several parts of the world—one being the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the diplomatic blow of AUKUS and Angela Merkel’s retirement from frontline politics, France’s first reaction was to strengthen its ties with Greece and increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing a rearmament deal that modernizes the Hellenic Navy and commits to an important Defense Assistance Agreement. The latter includes a clause of mutual defense assistance—similar to the mutual defense clause (Article 42.7 TEU) of the Treaty of the European Union—in case one of the two states is attacked on its territory.

Analysts note a relation between AUKUS and U.S. support for France to pursue a more proactive role in the Eastern Mediterranean through the game-changing Franco-Greek deal that bolsters the Greek armed forces with three Belharra frigates (+1 option). Athens previously ordered 18 Rafale fighter jets and has plans to acquire six more in the future.

France already showed its intention to support Greece against Turkey during a prolonged 82-day crisis that brought Greece and Turkey (two historic rivals and NATO members) to the brink of conflict. Back in 2020, the Turks deployed their seismic research vessel Oruç Reis accompanied by a flotilla of warships to conduct surveys on the Greek continental shelf (as described in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS III) that Turkey claims with the unsubstantiated Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) naval doctrine. The Mavi Vatan opposes UNCLOS III provisions and is based on the arbitrary assumption that all islands are deprived of the right to exert jurisdiction on the continental shelf. However, the Law of the Sea is binding on all states to the extent that it represents customary international law, and although Turkey is not a signatory to it, it has to comply with it.

French President Emmanuel Macron openly criticizing Turkey’s activity on the Greek and Cypriot continental shelf/exclusive economic zone (EEZ) said, “I don’t consider that in recent years Turkey’s strategy is the strategy of a NATO ally… when you have a country which attacks the exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of two members of the European Union.” In contrast, on another occasion, he clarified that “France has been very clear. When there were unilateral acts in the eastern Mediterranean, we condemned them with words, and we acted by sending frigates.” After signing the Franco-Greek deal in Élysée Palace, he also noted that “it will help protect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of both states.”

France’s intervention came as no surprise since it has competing interests with Turkey over Syria, Lebanon, and Africa. As Professor of Geopolitics Kostas Grivas explained, France has a large presence and significant geopolitical interests in Africa. Its strategic depth is in Africa, incorporating more than the Francophone states.

The Mediterranean is bridging France with the African continent; thus is imperative to maintain control of it, especially after the recently discovered energy resources attracting a great deal of interest. This brings France closer to Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus in a containment effort against Turkey’s expansionism left unanswered by the EU’s inability to guard its outermost borders.

The Turks, as expected, expressed their frustration with the newly formed Franco-Greek strategic alliance by putting pressure on Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish frigates obstructed the Maltese-flagged research vessel Nautical Geo hired to conduct research related to the EastMed gas pipeline. The ship attempted to work on the Greek continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (delimitated with Egypt) and Cypriot EEZ (delimitated with Egypt). Turkey, however, is claiming the same continental self with the Mavi Vatan doctrine.

With an increased military presence, the Turks aimed and succeeded in forcing the Americans on yet another equidistance statement. A State Department spokesman said the U.S. “encourages all states to resolve maritime delimitation issues through peaceful dialogue and in accordance with international law,” an announcement that overlooks the fact that the Turkish frigate obstructed Nautical Geo’s work on Greek and Cypriot delineated EEZs.

The Connection Between AUKUS, the Franco-Greek Pact, and the EastMed Pipeline was originally published on Global Security Review.

Recent statements by US Ambassador to Greece, Geoffrey Pyatt, support the notion that Greek islands have rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. If Greece were to act upon these claims, Greece’s held small island of Kastellorzio cuts Turkey’s EEZ claims in half. But what if Turkey enforces its claimed maritime boundaries? How would Greece, neighboring states, and the US respond?

The Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) face an increasingly complex operational environment. Athens sits in an increasingly hostile region replete with irredentist neighbors, such as Turkey, and growing interest from the great powers, particularly from China and Russia. Despite common NATO membership, relations between Turkey and Greece have ebbed and flowed throughout the past 40 years, recently, intensifying over Cyprus, Aegean Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean. The transatlantic security partnership is buckling, under the weight of political nativism and the competing national interests of its member states.

In this new geopolitical environment, the HAF are outmatched in terms of size, military capabilities, and technology, I posit a scenario wherein Turkey decides to act on its territorial claims on the Greek islands in the Mediterranean Sea. In such a scenario, Ankara displays both the willingness and capability to carry out while a thorough examination of some of the HAF’s operational shortcomings, finally, what Athens can do to close the widening security gap with its hostile neighbors.

Turkey-Greece relations are arguably at their worst since 1974. In May, Greek and international media reported movement of Turkish special armed forces upon Greek sovereign territory along the Evros river, spanning the area of about 10 football fields. This followed heightened levels of Turkish aerial incursions into Greek airspace, which in recent years have become a near-daily occurrence. According to the Greek Ministry of Defense, Turkey has violated Greek airspace “thousands of times.”

Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey is demonstrating an increased willingness to use military power in pursuing its policy objectives,  Some key examples of this are Ankara’s invasion of northern Syria and deployment of Turkish military frigates to secure illegal oil drilling EEZ. President Erdoğan’s actions and rhetoric have provoked an immense backlash from many actors such as Egypt, Israel, and Greece who have been forced to ramp up elocutions as Turkey flexes its Mediterranean reach.

All these events have led to today’s crucial stakes, where the HAF finds itself in an entirely new defensive situation juxtaposed to a Turkish military that increasingly uses military power to further strategic goals in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s new agreement with the Tripoli Government (GNA) now places aggressive claims upon Greek islands, claiming maritime boundaries across the Eastern Mediterranean. These new boundaries have been condemned by the international community, despite the Tripoli Government’s recognition by the United Nations. President Erdoğan has also pushed Turkish armed forces to set up a base in Misrata, Libya, a front in the Libyan Civil War.

Greece has attempted to curtail Turkey’s rise in the Eastern Mediterranean through Operation IRINI and aggressive appeals to the EU and the United States, but these have been mainly unsuccessful. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ direct bilateral talks with President Erdoğan also have shown no progress. In July of 2020, Prime Minister Mitsotakis openly stated that Turkey’s new claims with the Tripoli Government are a “totally illegal memorandum of understanding” in international law.

Among the Turkish claims in the Eastern Mediterranean is the contentious and tiny island Kastellorizo and its smaller satellites, Ro and Stroggeli. These were granted to the Mussolini’s Italy through a series of agreements with Turkey and secured by Greece through the 1947 Treaty of Paris, a treaty that Turkey did not participate in, and thus, has never recognized Greece’s claims upon the island. The island is lightly defended by a small army base and an airstrip, and it has a population of fewer than 500 people. Still, its isolated location, far away from the major Greek islands, makes it a critical strategic location for Turkey to support its desired ambitions in the Mediterranean.

Over the past decade, Turkey has been increasing its amphibious war capabilities, continually improving its technologies to provide for sea-to-land invasions. One such example is the TCG-Anadolu, which can serve as a landing vehicle launched from nearby Aksaz Naval Base for Turkish Special Forces and marines, who have recently gained combat experience according to unclassified reports. Under the Mavi Vatan or “Blue Homeland” grand strategy, Turkey’s increased investments in the naval capabilities are a deliberate effort to expand its reach into the Aegean.

Greece is enforcing an EEZ in the region of Kastrellorizo that is four times its square meter area. Still, Turkey has ardently argued against this, pointing to the Turkish precedent against international accords, which state that islands cannot create EEZ’s. Weeks after the Turkey-GNA agreement, Turkish Foreign Ministry affirmed this view:

“The [Greek] islands cannot influence the coastal projection of Turkey, the country with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the islands on the opposite side of the middle line between two mainland areas cannot create maritime jurisdiction beyond their territorial waters.”

Notional Scenario, Phase 0: Turkey Prepares for the Operation

The year is 2023.  Due to a resurgent wave of opposition, President Erdoğan’s reelection chances are grim. His efforts to members within his own party and the crackdowns on journalists have not halted his domestic adversaries. Meanwhile, the economic situation has grown worse. At the same time, the Lyra declines in potency, and Turkey’s GDP stagnates. Predictions from world economists that damage from SARS-COV-2 could make the domestic economy collapse prove to be true.

Using the power of domestic media to his advantage, President Erdoğan disseminates anti-Greek propaganda and ramps up rhetoric about the unfair Treaty of Lausanne (the binding agreement that currently forms Greco-Turkish relations). He stokes nationalist morale against the upstart Greeks who have used their status as an EU member to pressure Turkey with its aggressive EEZ claims.

Inside Ankara, discussions occur that Turkey is not only capable of capturing a small, lightly-defended    Greek island like Kastellorizo, but the West’s lack of real response to powers’ seizure of territory (i.e., Russia and Crimea, China and Hong Kong) has set a new standard of apathy towards aggression. Surely, attacking the Greek capital of Athens would create an Article V, united NATO forceful response and possible additional responses from non-NATO nations such as Serbia, an Orthodox country, and nearby Egypt and Israel. Therefore, President Erdoğan must hammer the narrative on the international stage that Kastellorizo and its near satellites are (1) unjustly in Greek hands, (2) rightfully Turkish due to an agreement with the GNA, and (3) an encroachment of the West’s right to claim lands within non-Western nation-states.

Notional Scenario, Phase 1: “Checkmate”

Ankara’s tactical checkmate will rely on speed to get Athens to surrender its holdings on Kastellorizo in order to protect its small civilian population. The Turkish Air Force uses their classic antagonistic air tactics to create a diversion in the northern Aegean with fighter jets out of Balikesir Air Base. From naval ports near Marmaris, Turkey administers a naval blockade cutting off the potential for Greek authorities to intervene without shooting first.

The Turkish Armed Forces could use their superior firepower and special forces to attack the island of Kastellorizo within hours. Still, it is more likely Turkey will opt not to use force and instead encircle it in a hostage maneuver.

Athens is aware that the Turkish infantry is highly experienced due to recent campaigns in Syria and Libya. The Greeks could not risk a devastating loss if they fight for Kastellorizo, while an attack elsewhere on Turkey could jeopardize other Greek islands such as Rhodes, Lesvos, Chos, and Chios. Greece’s underfunded military could not last in such a considerable conflict that encompasses the entire Aegean. Therefore, Turkey’s “checkmate” tactic is accomplished without a single weapon being fired.

Notional Scenario, Phase 2: Diplomatic Unrest

Athens attempts to invoke NATO Article V, but member states are divided as the conflict is between two “allies.” Specifically, Germany, an unofficial foreman in EU-Turkey dialogues on the Syrian Refugee Crisis, would likely call for Turkish appeasement as President Erdoğan continues to press the threat of unleashing new immigration rhetorically.

Meanwhile, in Washington, D.C., the U.S. would be forced into an awkward position of taking another stance in the Aegean Dispute. Although U.S. Ambassador Pyatt’s recent statements supported the notion of Greek EEZ’s on islands (thereby rejecting the Turkish view), American rhetoric in the 1996 Imia/Kardak dispute would likely follow the same precedent of status quo ante. The U.S. is non-party to UNCLOS, the standard that created EEZ’s; therefore, the U.S. would have no choice but to side against Greece’s claim on Kastellorizo.

Outside of the NATO alliance, new allies to Athens, Egypt, and Israel would not be in a position to respond due to the sheer speed of the Turkish Armed Forces. Aggressive hostility and possible drills would occur, yet neither states would make any drastic attempts to assist with force.

Notional Scenario, Phase 3: A Renegotiation of Lausanne

While maintaining a blockade on Kastellorizo and her satellites, President Erdoğan calls Athens to the table. The 1923 borders are at stake. States friendly to Turkey, such as Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Qatar, now recognize Kastellorizo as Turkish sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Turkish media proclaims President Erdoğan to be a hero for reclaiming so-called lost territory. His approval ratings skyrocket, ensuring a more extended claim on authority for years to come.

As an ongoing standoff in the Aegean continues, the western press loses interest. EU and NATO members such as France and Poland may spark pro-Greek rhetoric while outsiders such as Serbia call for attention, yet Greece will remain alone in negotiations. Depending on the situation, Turkey would call for (1) the end of Greece’s use of EEZs on offshore islands, such as Kastellorizo, Chios, Chos, and Lesvos, and (2) the recognition of its occupied portion of Cyprus as the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

How Can Greece Improve Readiness?

The HAF lacks two critical qualities that can be remedied: a quick reaction force (QRF) that can respond to a Turkish attack on its islands and sufficient deterrent capabilities to forestall a Turkish invasion. Although the HAF has special operations troops, including the noteworthy Raider Forces, they are too small to defend a 400 mile (643 km) coastline of islands in the Aegean.

Policymakers in Athens and HAF command should look to Israel as examples of a nation with a pristine QRF that can respond to any threat immediately. Although the two are not exactly similar in size, the Greek government could ask the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for development and assisted training of a QRF in exchange for Israeli use of its airspace for its training purposes. The QRF would be amphibious, highly mobile, and able to deploy within hours from designated locations on strategic Greek islands, such as but not limited to Kastellorizo, Rhodes, Crete, Lesvos, Chios, Limnos, or Samos. This new group of HAF volunteers or conscripts who have opted for the assignment can be deployed by sea or rotary-wing aircraft.

To challenge a naval blockade and amphibious assault on Kastellorizo, Greece could purchase the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile system, which is capable of deployment from the island and its satellites. Variants of the Gabriel have already been exported to nations with similar defense budgets (by fiscal dollars, not per GDP) such as Argentina, Chile, and South Africa.

Greece also needs more assistance on the possible threat of Turkish warships entering its waters. Perhaps the oldest and cheapest way to do so is through sea mines. The MANTA, an Italian shallow water sea mine, has a proven record of success against multi-billion dollar ships and is cost-effective for the underfunded Greeks.

Athens can also strengthen its relationship with the U.S. diplomatically, financially, and militarily. After the entrance of China into the European community, Prime Minister Mitsotakis can pivot to Silicon Valley and U.S.-based military companies by proclaiming his country to be the most technologically ambitious nation in Southern Europe. He would use the Huawei-U.S. technology competition to bargain a financial deal on technology and communications improvements designed to watch over the Aegean. Military industry contractors looking for procurement deals with the Pentagon could be encouraged to make agreements in efforts to test new technology, including 5G, for the benefit of the HAF.

Finally, Greece has a valuable port in Souda Bay, Crete, in which the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center [NMIOTC] trains allied operators (as seen above) for modern combat. Greece should leverage the base for a long-term deal with Washington to affirm the U.S.’s geostrategic interests in the region. As Russia now operates freely from warm Syrian waters, Libya continues its civil war, and anti-Western terrorist groups maneuver in Africa and the near east, the port is irreplaceable for the U.S. Prime Minister Mitsotakis, although contradictory to his persona, could ramp up rhetoric against the U.S. much in the same way that President Trump did with NATO, asking for extra spending. Mitsotakis could follow suit and use Trump’s tactic for Greece’s benefit.

Conclusion

Turkey can quickly seize Kastellorizo and her satellites without repercussions. Claims to the islands, unchallenged military defense, an unstable domestic economy, a robust military, and apathy from Western powers on the global stage are all significant factors that can push President Erdoğan into this operation.

Taking Kastellorizo could also be a final play by Turkish grand strategists to get Greece to renegotiate the defining principles of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which resulted in a Greek EEZ in the Aegean and Turkey ceding Cyprus (an agreement that Turkey has already broken). If Greece remains unprepared, it will lose territory, Turkey will gain a stronger foothold in quasi-internationally recognized Greek waters, NATO will remain submissive to an ally gone rogue, and Erdoğan will emerge as the dominant player in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Kastellorizo is the Key to Turkish & Greek Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean was originally published on Global Security Review.

“We have already drilled two wells in waters to the east and west of the island of Cyprus, and the [ship] Yavuz will be drilling our third well. Such activities will continue with determination,” Turkish Energy Minister Fatih Donmez recently said at the Turkey Energy Summit.

Current drilling by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government has provoked a wide array of actors in the Eastern Mediterranean including Israel and Egypt, both U.S. allies. Illegal Turkish drilling vessels in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are even accompanied by military vessels. The activity has many in Nicosia and abroad worried as international oil companies have major stakes in the region since the discoveries of hydrocarbons off of the Cypriot coast several years ago.

Why is the Eastern Mediterranean so vital to the world economy? The U.S. Geological Survey believes 122 trillion cubic feet of gas is in the area, however, the exact potential for gargantuan wealth to be found is yet to be confirmed. The area contains a vast amount of potential energy for Europe, which is heavily reliant on imported gas. This is especially true for the EU’s dependence on imported gas from Russia, the world’s second-largest exporter with a roughly 18.6% share of global production. European energy needs are extremely crucial for the global economy, and, of course, the President of the United States, as he is using the message of U.S. economic growth and record-level fossil fuel production as a foundation for his 2020 campaign.

Meanwhile, since the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, states that once held no close ties with one another are now actively working together to maintain regional security. For the past decade, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel engaged in trilateral talks on energy cooperation for electricity and oil (catching the attention of communities at home, an inspiration for the creation of a “Hellenic-Israeli Alliance” in the U.S. Congress). Gas pipelines are currently under development and will reach into Europe via the Greek mainland.

The “Energy Triad” made progress with neighboring Egypt as well. In fact, Israel has begun exporting gas to Egypt as obstacles impeding cooperation are removed while Cyprus announced a strengthening of ties with Egypt through economy and tourism. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi also seeks to strengthen and modernize Egypt’s navy in response to the threat posed by Turkey in the region to protect the country’s growing Mediterranean and Red Sea oil and natural gas interests.

“Countries that were once not talking are now coming together”, said Georgios Lakkotrypis, Cypriot Minister of Energy and Commerce in a recent interview. Talks between the four have brought Italy, Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority to the table.

The restructuring of alliances to hedge against Turkey is similar to the unofficial anti-China coalition forming in the South China Sea, as powers are converging against Beijing—so are Mediterranean powers against Ankara. Yet Moscow has emerged as another major player in the Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not only been instrumental in the aid of Syrian President Bashir Al Assad’s government but also recently sold the S-400 missile system to America’s NATO ally, Turkey. Congress then barred Turkey from acquiring the American F-35 fighter as punishment—further straining Turkey’s relations with the West and undermining its reliability as an ardent partner in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, since the Greek-led 1974 coup d’état in Cyprus and subsequent Turkish invasion, the island has been divided, with Turkish forces illegally occupying the north while the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls the south. With no military except for a small defense force, outfitted with small patrol boats and anti-tank weapons from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Cypriot government is essentially defenseless. But Russian influence in the region is further complicated by Cyprus’ decision to actively hold Russian money, leading to skepticism regarding the inclusion of Cyprus into the American sphere. However, a recent U.S. Congressional delegation announced that the Cypriot government is working to terminate the laundering boogeyman head-on.

What are the options for President Trump with an increasingly aggressive Turkey and a resurgent Russia in the region—as an entente of economic and military cooperation forms in the Eastern Mediterranean?

John Gay, Executive Director of the John Quincy Adams Society, a nonpartisan Washington, D.C. based organization whose stated aim is to steer foreign policy conversation in direction of “More strategy. Less war”, takes the issue of Turkish self-interest back to the President’s administration:

“Trump has rightly pointed out that many U.S. allies do not do much to defend themselves, instead preferring to rely on the United States to defend them. The best way out of this is for those allies to become more capable of defending themselves. This has a twofold benefit for the United States: first, they do more (or all) of the fighting; second, they have a stronger interest in their own survival and well-being than we do, so they can make more credible commitments and threats against those that endanger them than we can make on their behalf. That’s especially true with a state like Cyprus since we don’t have a formal alliance commitment to them. If we believe a strong, independent Cyprus offers benefits to U.S. security, letting them buy our weapons is a way to get that on the cheap.”

The first option for the President is to make arms and modern radar systems available for Cypriot purchase to improve the country’s defensive capabilities, including but not limited to: short- and medium-range artillery, guided anti-tank missiles, and surface-to-air missile technology. At present, Cyprus remains barred from purchasing weapons from the U.S. A bipartisan bill to lift the Cyprus arms prohibition, co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Marco Rubio (R-FL), failed to make it out of the Senate.

However, within the new National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section 1270I, the prohibition can be lifted so long as one major obstacle is overcome: Russia (See: Section 1270I, e, 1, a and b). For Cyprus to receive arms from the U.S., it must first cooperate with Washington to counter Russian money laundering in Cypriot banks and terminate any refueling of Russian naval vessels that frequent the island on Eastern Mediterranean patrols.

The President may waive these requirements for one year if he chooses (See: Section 1270I e, 2). Arming Cyprus could be an effective way to apply pressure to a NATO ally pursuing objectives contrary to the interests of the United States.

Another option for President Trump is to reduce, block, or obfuscate Turkey’s role in NATO. Erdoğan values its membership in NATO, but Turkey’s membership is only one means to arm and defend itself (as the case was made when they purchased weapons from Russia). President Emmanuel Macron of France has already vehemently condemned Ankara’s actions in the Cypriot EEZ and recently dispatched French naval forces to deter further Turkish actions in the area.

While European Council President Donald Tusk recently affirmed that “the European Union stands united behind the Republic of Cyprus and expects Turkey to respect sovereign rights of the member states,” the situation is further complicated by Erdoğan’s cooperation in certain areas, such as participating in the Defeat ISIS Coalition. “Turkey opened its military bases to the United States and Coalition partners in July 2015. Since that time, Incirlik Air Base has been critical in the effort to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” the U.S. State Department said earlier this year.

However, taking action against Ankara may backfire, Turkey could pivot even further towards Moscow and Tehran. The three have already met to discuss the future of Syria without the consultation of the United States. Estranging Turkey from NATO cooperation could ultimately backfire as the U.S. could lose an ally for its future Eurasian interests.

The final, most immediate, and detrimental action against Turkey is economic sanctions—a move that may further exacerbate the state of Western-Turkish relations. Turkey is very dependent on foreign investor influence, especially Germany. Trade between the EU and Turkey is valued at approximately $220 billion. U.S. trade with Turkey is worth some $24 billion. While European and American political parties may be easy to jump to economic retaliatory means, they must also remember Erdoğan’s trump card.

The Turkish president has publicly stated that if Western powers take action against him, he will retaliate by sending over 3.6 million Syrian refugees to Europe. The Turkish economy has already felt a considerable impact with the recent devaluation of the Lira and, theoretically could save a significant amount of money by sending refugees to Europe if hit by further economic hardship (although Europe, and possibly the U.S., would almost certainly retaliate to impose further economic costs on Turkey).

President Trump must make a decision along with the support of lawmakers and the Pentagon that will uphold international law and standards on illegal economic activities by entities of one state in the EEZ of another sovereign state. Turkey’s illegal oil drilling shows no signs of abating in a region vital to the global economy and crucial to U.S. geopolitical interests.

Turkish Oil Drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ Threatens to Destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean was originally published on Global Security Review.

What began as a small collection of infrastructure projects in neighboring countries in 2013, has now expanded to neighboring regions and continents, impacting 65% of the world’s population, and 40% of global GDP. Primarily funded by private investors, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China’s Exim Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s flagship of foreign policy and investment. Encompassing massive economic corridors, transportation routes, and critical infrastructure across 68 countries, BRI is nothing short of the most ambitious development project in history.

The incentive for the initiative stems from a shared desire to improve transcontinental connectivity in commerce and people-to-people ties by offering massive investment, inexpensive credit lines, and excess Chinese capacity in steel and cement — all vital to critical infrastructure projects. In turn, Beijing aims to realize the return on BRI investments through the expansion of its geopolitical and economic spheres of influence.

Initially driving investment in transportation routes between Eastern and Western China, an economic corridor through Pakistan, and deep sea port development in Sri Lanka, BRI projects quickly spread from Central and Southeast Asia to Eastern and Southern Europe. Already the EU’s second-largest trading partner, China offers Europe abundant opportunities to improve transportation in the Eurasian corridor by decreasing transportation costs, transit times, and carbon emissions.

As international trade routes operate now, importing Chinese products can be rather cumbersome. The most cost-efficient route can take up to 40 days on a container ship. To reach European markets from coastal China, a freight ship must sail through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, up the Red Sea, and through the Mediterranean Sea to round Iberia and Normandy, and finally pass through the English Channel to dock at the deep-water ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg.

With new high speed rail across Central Asia, trains could freight materials by land directly from China to the European Union. According to research from the Center for Economic Policy Research, new transportation routes created by BRI infrastructure projects will decrease shipping times and costs by 3.5% and 4% between BRI countries and by 2.8% and 3.2% with the rest of the world.

Although there are numerous ways in which Chinese investment — within and apart from BRI — can benefit Europe, the European Union remains wary of increasing Chinese influence within its member states, and with good reason. In 2017, China’s state-owned enterprise (SOE) COSCO Shipping, one of the world’s largest ocean carriers, bought up a 51% share in the Port of Piraeus — Greece’s largest port. Athens subsequently blocked a joint EU statement on Chinese human rights abuses at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Far from being an isolated incident, Chinese lobbying of the kind seen in the Port of Piraeus has become China’s M.O. in exercising economic sharp power in Europe. While the Belt and Road Initiative is an opportunity to foment economic development and stability across Eurasia, it is also the disguised economic engine of Chinese geopolitical statecraft.

Beijing seeks to insert itself into the European dialogue and policymaking process to undermine European unity to gain preferential access to European markets and limit the ability of the European Union to exercise collective foreign and economic policy that hampers China’s geopolitical ambitions. Where Russia seeks to challenge and disrupt Europe through disinformation and military posturing, China seeks to assert its will into European policymaking to manipulate the geopolitical climate to its advantage.

Countering Sharp Power

In recognition of the threat to collective policymaking, on 20 November, after less than 18 months of negotiations, the European Parliament, Council, and Commission committed to the creation of an investment screening mechanism. The unprecedented speed and unity on this issue marks the gravity with which the European Union perceives the threat of Chinese economic influence in the European theater. Although the mechanism applies broadly to all FDI in the European Union, the motivation to protect the EU’s domestic interests through its creation is evident.

The EU also appears acutely aware of the need the accompany investment screening with its own economic development initiatives. Greater EU investment in Southern and Eastern Europe would strengthen political ties with Northern and Western Europe. It would also provide an economic alternative to Chinese investment in European countries with higher unemployment, emigration, and hostility towards the political elite in Brussels.

The EU recognizes that without a significant economic alternative, Europe’s poorer countries are willing to file in line with China’s geopolitical ambitions so long as they reap the benefits from Chinese investment. China has already invested €600 million in the Port of Piraeus in an attempt to modernize the port, which is poised to bring in thousands of logistics jobs and an increased demand for further infrastructure investments from Greece, inland to Western Europe.

China’s success in pressuring Greece to block a joint statement against Chinese human rights abuses at the UN is undoubtedly alarming to European national security policymakers.  Nevertheless, it’s important to recognize that Greek politicians are beholden to their constituents, who might be willing to overlook criticizing Chinese human rights for the economic benefits that accompany Chinese investment.

Even with enhanced investment screening, the EU’s foreign interests remain vulnerable. On 21 September, following a 2017 “Joint Staff Working Document” on a “Euro-Asian Connectivity Mapping Exercise,” the European External Action Service adopted an “EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia,” hereafter referred to as the Euro-Asian Connectivity Initiative (ECI). Implicitly designed to respond to the geopolitical ambitions of the BRI, the ECI aims to further develop the EU’s own soft power through increased economic and diplomatic presence within its Eastern neighborhood and beyond.

Adapted to “pursue a ‘coherent approach’ to connectivity” which “encompass[es] all modes of transport links (land, sea and air) as well as digital and energy links in the Euro-Asian area,” the ECI will likely become an integral part of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the East, providing an economic and diplomatic framework for future relations. The question remains, will Europe’s ECI come into direct competition with China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

Although Europe and China have differing visions for Eurasia, many of their fundamental goals are shared. Both Europe and China recognize the potential for economic growth at home and abroad by bringing the two ends of Eurasia closer together. Fostering greater connectivity and trade through Central Asia would not only drive down the costs and time required of maritime shipping, but also provide economic stimulus for developing economies in the region and greater access to rich natural resources. As Central Asians’ mobility and wealth increase, greater connectivity  will encourage stronger people-to-people ties through shared education, research, innovation, culture, and tourism. China and Europe also share a mutual interest and commitment to the political stability and security of periphery countries at the nexus of Europe and Asia which can be strengthened through economic growth.

However, Europe’s vision for Eurasian connectivity is to encourage economic development, good governance, and open society through adherence to “principles of sustainability, transparency, market principles, open procurement rules, a level playing field, as well as equal treatment and equal access.” Likewise, Europe will likely require benchmarks for the respect of human rights and democratic governance to its investment proposals through the ECI. In addition to these laudable goals, the EU will, nonetheless, seek to develop its own soft power and influence throughout Central Asia, in part for its own merit and in part to counter the influence of China over the heartland of Eurasia.

In contrast, China is solely dedicated to reaping economic benefits and accruing political leverage over key routes of connectivity, reflected by its lack of insistence on governmental transparency, respect for human rights, or equal access to investment opportunities. Most BRI contracts are ultimately chosen by Beijing. However, Chinese investments often come with a ‘no strings attached’ policy which may appeal to countries reluctant to meet Western provisions for economic and political liberalization.

Baiting the Balkans

Even within non-EU European nations, the temptation of Chinese investment funding is strong. There are fewer bureaucratic delays and stipulations attached to massive infrastructure investment projects when dealing with an autocratic regime. China has the financial resources, enterprise, and political wherewithal to invest billions in new development projects overnight.

In the eyes of EU candidate countries, Chinese investment is a godsend. Among the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria for European Union membership, countries must have a well-developed and stable economy to integrate well into the single market without posing themselves a burden on the European economy. For EU hopefuls like Serbia, Chinese infrastructure investment reads like a golden ticket to economic prosperity and eventual EU membership.

With around €5.3 billion ($6 billion) in Chinese investments in Serbia alone, the Balkans has become China’s backdoor entry to securing greater influence in the European Union.

Yet Beijing’s investment overtures in the Balkans and Eastern Europe are the call of a siren for many would-be EU member states. As attractive as these investments may seem, Serbia doesn’t have to look far to get a sense of the risks that come with Chinese investment. Just 500 km from Belgrade, Montenegro embarked on an ambitious project in 2017 to connect their port of Bar to mainland Serbia, largely funded by China’s Exim Bank.

In theory, completing this project could be hugely beneficial to Montenegro. Yet two feasibility studies in 2006 and 2012 disproved the project’s economically viability due to the lack of traffic in the area. With an already burgeoning debt to GDP ratio, the Chinese loan “has sent Montenegro’s debt soaring and forced the government to raise taxes, partially freeze public sector wages and end a benefit for mothers to get its finances in order.”

China’s “if you fund it, they will come” approach to economic development may not actually yield the short and long term results it promises. What’s even more disappointing for the Balkans is the use of Chinese labor and capital to advance these projects — in Montenegro, 70% of the workers on the port of Bar project are Chinese. China is, in essence, driving Montenegro into debt to finance a project with highly questionable economic returns while using primarily Chinese labor in Serbia’s backyard. Belgrade should take note.

For now, the EU’s dualistic response to China’s increasing sharp power is encouraging. A stronger investment screening mechanism will ensure that European countries agree to infrastructure projects or loans on financially stable terms and will prevent China from buying up industries that could threaten national security. At the same time, EU funding initiatives will provide an economic alternative to Chinese investment and will bolster political ties with European, Central, and South Asian countries.

The Road Ahead

American hegemony over the post-Cold War liberal world order grew out of an alliance of Western countries adhering to free market economics, democratic soft power, and control over the global commons. While China has no ambition to replace the United States and become a global hegemon, but rather aims to displace the West’s influence by leveraging Chinese capital, technocratic policymaking, and foreign debt.

By amplifying its political and economic soft power through BRI investments, China simultaneously creates and controls the means by which its economic power is exercised through BRI countries. The renowned scholar of Asian geopolitics Parag Khanna tells us that the driving force of the 21st century will be the ever-closer economic and people-to-people ties between nations around the world. He is right to claim so. Connectivity — and the means to control it — is the new currency of geopolitics.

The European Union is gradually coming around to this way of thinking, but its implementation in foreign policy remains slow. The ECI marks a first step towards pursuing a greater presence in Eurasian connectivity projects and policymaking. As Europe moves closer to a state of strategic autonomy, it must develop a more comprehensive, efficient, and effective foreign policy regime to keep pace with China’s expanding influence. Great strides have been taken already by establishing a screening mechanism for FDI, establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and elaborating upon the European Union’s Neighborhood Policies. Nevertheless, Brussels needs to develop a more cohesive strategy to address Chinese sharp power influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

The European Union has yet to reconcile its own principles with its nascent role as a regional hegemonic power. Maintaining and promoting liberal international values of democracy, free market equality, and human rights are difficult to pair with the realpolitik of geopolitics in the era of connectivity. It remains to be seen if the EU has the political wherewithal to compete with China on 21st century terms. For now, the future of Eurasia hangs in the balance.

This article was originally published on The International Scholar.

Geopolitics in the Era of Connectivity: Beijing and Brussels Compete for Central Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a lesson to be learned from recent events in Macedonia—and it must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identity and foreign policy in the Balkans. Any foreign policy decision that is seen as a threat to the continuity of the national identity is perceived as a security threat, and therefore, it is rejected as ontologically unacceptable. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans (still recovering from the traumatic experience of ethnic conflicts) require a different approach than what is advocated by the European Union.

President George Ivanov of the Republic of Macedonia, during his second inaugural speech in 2014, stated that he “will not accept ideas or proposals that would threaten the Macedonian identity, distinctiveness of the Macedonian nation, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian model of coexistence.” Ivanov added that “the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian citizens are a benefit for the Union only if we enter as equal in the mosaic of diversity of the European Union, with our own identity and dignity.” 

In his speech, Ivanov makes a clear distinction between Macedonia’s pursuit of its foreign policy interests and the need to ensure the continuity of the country’s national identity and explicitly states his reluctance to endorse any policy that would pose a threat to Macedonian’s self-image in the international arena. Taking this into consideration, one could legitimately expect that the recent political developments in Macedonia can shed new light into the complex relationship between a state’s national identity and its foreign policy. 

The Referendum in Macedonia

The referendum held at the end of September 2018 in Macedonia—in contrast to Ivanov’s 2014 speech—conflates of the concept of national identity with foreign policy into a single question: “Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” 

The “Prespa” agreement between Macedonia and Greece includes specific clauses about changes to Macedonia’s official name, in addition to modifications to an already-established historical narrative of its national identity. The text of the Agreement arguably indicates a degree of political control over the planned reconstruction of the historical elements of the Macedonian national identity: “The Parties shall establish […] a Joint Inter-Disciplinary Committee of Experts on historic, archeological and educational matters, to consider the objective, scientific interpretation of historical events based on authentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources and archeological findings. The Committee’s work shall be supervised by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Parties […].” As such, established historical narratives that contribute to the Macedonian national identity would be revised based on a politically supervised “objective, scientific interpretation of historical events.”

Also, the wording of the referendum question implicitly points out the conditional relationship between the national identity and foreign policy objectives. In other words, the Macedonian voters were reminded that the full implementation of the “Prespa” agreement (and the subsequent amendments to historical elements of the national identity) is a crucial precondition for the realization of the country’s foreign policy goal—joining the E.U. and NATO. 

However, a majority of Macedonians decided to boycott the referendum, illustrating a reluctance to answer a question in which they were asked to affirm the mutually exclusive nature of the relationship between Macedonia’s national identity and its foreign policy priorities. Voter turnout was low at 37 percent, thus failing to secure the 50 percent threshold required to make the vote legitimate. The concept of ontological security must be taken into account to understand why the Macedonian government was unsuccessful in legitimizing the referendum.

The Referendum in the Context of Ontological Security

The concept of ontological security, when applied to international relations, is defined as the unconscious and conscious possession of a fundamental national identity that justifies a country’s existence. It is argued that states pursue ontological security to ensure the continuity of the state’s identity. States must provide for their ontological security in addition to pursuing physical security objectives, such as ensuring the territorial integrity of the state. 

Ontological security of the state is especially important when the national ‘self’ interacts with the significant ‘other’ in the international arena. The harmony between the already established narratives and discourses that comprise the state’s identity of the state and foreign policy objectives is something governments take into consideration when conducting international relations.

In some cases, however, foreign policy is not conducted by the established narratives of the national identity. Thus, these foreign policy decisions are arguably ontologically unacceptable. To overcome this obstacle, policymakers selectively use specific narratives and discourses to emphasize certain parts of the national identity that could justify the new foreign policy. This strategic manipulation of narratives is done to bridge the cognitive gap between national identity and a foreign policy that is perceived as controversial or disruptive.

The referendum in Macedonia and the events preceding present an ideal case study for analyzing the importance of ontological security in foreign policymaking. Consistent reminders from both E.U. and NATO officials that an agreement on the name issue between Macedonia and Greece is a crucial precondition for Macedonia’s integration both entities made both of these foreign policy objectives ontologically unacceptable for many voters in Macedonia.

After years of difficult negotiations between Greece and Macedonia, an agreement was reached. Voters were faced with a referendum where they were asked whether they would accept the “Prespa” name-change agreement for the sake of Macedonia’s integration into the E.U. and NATO. Undoubtedly aware of the substantial cognitive dissonance between the already established ontological narratives and the requirements set by foreign policy objectives, the government initiated a strategic and selective reshaping of narratives to improve the controversial perception of these conflated policies—thus reducing the perceived threat to Macedonia’s ontological security.

The Macedonian Government’s Failed Strategy

A major theme of the government’s pre-referendum strategy was portraying the referendum as an opportunity to affirm the ‘European’ nature of Macedonia. The media and political elites in Macedonia told voters that they had the historic chance to vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia. The Prime Minister of Macedonia Zoran Zaev said that “September 30 is a day to write history, for European Macedonia.” For months before the vote, the European dimension of the Macedonian national identity was emphasized through political rhetoric. In contrast, the country’s new name—the Republic of North Macedonia—decided in the agreement between Macedonia and Greece, was hardly mentioned. 

This selective application of specific narratives and withdrawal of others to formulate a revised national identity represents a discursive manipulation aimed at bridging the cognitive gap between the national identity and the foreign policy goal. In other words, the Macedonian national identity was repeatedly ‘europeanized’ in political statements to portray the pro-European foreign policy as ontologically acceptable and compatible with the national identity—thus posing no threat to the continuity of the identity of the state. 

However, low voter turnout for the referendum indicates the government’s pre-referendum campaign was not sufficient. Voters were not convinced of two crucial things: that if they vote ‘yes’ they vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia, and that the continuity of the national identity – the ontological security of the state – will be maintained if the referendum was successful. Put in other words, the government’s strategy of selective usage and strategic manipulation with different narratives did not succeed in its aim to bridge the gap between national identity and foreign policy priorities. 

The events in Macedonia must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identities and foreign policymaking, especially in the Balkans. A volatile security context such as that of Balkan states leaves relatively less space for political differentiation between the physical and ontological security of the state. The region’s historical and geopolitical context gives the historical element of the national identity a central place in the politics of the Balkan countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the continuity of the national identity has been considered as a crucial component of the security and sovereignty of the states in the Balkans. 

Unfortunately, a crucial, yet oft-neglected, issue is that the E.U. conditional framework for states in the Balkans doesn’t entirely account for the importance of national identity in the region. On the contrary, E.U. conditionality criteria include clauses requiring that aspiring members enter into negotiations over their national identities. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans, which continue to recover from the trauma of multiple ethnic conflicts—mandate a different approach on the part of European institutions. The 2018 referendum in Macedonia should serve as a reminder that the geopolitical interests are not always the first choice in the Balkans, especially if they come at the cost of losing the ontological security of the state. 

Ontological Security in the Balkans: Lessons from Macedonia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past few weeks, turmoil has engulfed the two countries of Greece and Macedonia – all over a simple name change. The debate over Macedonia’s name is a point of contention between both countries and has been for many years.

However, on June 20, 2018, Macedonia’s parliament ratified an agreement with Greece to change its formal name from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Although the opposition party boycotted the vote and there is much public opposition against it, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev believes this compromise on the name is a step in the right direction for his country. If ratified, the deal will end 27 years of dispute between both countries.

The question of Macedonia’s name has to do with a Greek province.

Greece argues that the usage of the name Macedonia is at odds with a northern Greek province with the same name.

Specifically, Greece is concerned that by allowing their northern province as Macedonia as a whole to have the same name, they are opening themselves to potential future issues of territorial claims.

This dispute arose in 1991 when Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Even Macedonia’s admittance to the United Nations was done under a provisional name.

Greece has boycotted Macedonia’s attempts to join the European Union and NATO for years.

Due to the dispute, Greece has continually vetoed Macedonia’s acceptance into both the European Union and NATO. However, with this agreement in sight, European Union foreign ministers have agreed to open accession talks for both Albania and Macedonia in June 2019.

Before negotiations can take place, both countries will have to show significant progress regarding their human rights and democratic reforms. Regardless, the door is now open for both countries to enter the E.U.

At the July 11-12 NATO summit, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also indicated that he hopes members will agree to start accession talks with Macedonia. Greece has been the primary objector to Macedonia joining NATO.

This change in attitude by Greece might mean a shift in these organizations. Macedonia may be a small country, but a new Eastern member to NATO and the E.U. is always of concern to Russia. Consider that the last time an Eastern non-E.U. state showed interest in joining, part of that state’s territory was annexed by Russia. Naturally, Macedonia is not nearly as strategically important to Russia as Ukraine was. Regardless, any expansionist policy by NATO or the E.U. is watched with suspicion by Russia.

There’s still a long way to go for Macedonia.

Although it is notable that both country’s foreign ministers signed off on this historic deal, there are many hurdles to come. On June 26, 2018, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov refused to sign the agreement, calling it a “criminal act.” However, his refusal to sign it may have no impact.

If the parliament convenes again and approves the change with a two-thirds majority – then he cannot block the name change. Moreover, widespread support for the name change in both countries is at an all-time low.

After provisional approval in the Macedonian parliament, the deal will then be voted on by the Greek parliament. Even that is up in the air, although, Greek Foreign Minister, Nikos Kotzias, claims there is no reason for concern. However, the political volatility of both countries may mean that the necessary majorities in both countries may not exist by the time of the deal.

As far as security ramifications go, the change of Macedonia’s name might not seem noteworthy. The slow process of diplomacy means that the realist urges of each country may soon halt any speedy changes. Ignoring this change, nevertheless, would be a mistake. Any shift in the unpredictable Balkan region is one to be watched with care.

With such small countries, any political turmoil is relevant. Particularly with Erdogan’s recent reelection, the upcoming NATO summit and the subsequent summit between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin – small shifts remain relevant. Will the name change be used as fodder? Or will it operate as a new expansionist shift in NATO and E.U. rhetoric? And how will Russia respond? Only time will tell.

Macedonia Changes Its Name—Or Does It? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This comes alongside news that the Polish military will create a 50,000-strong volunteer militia as fears grow of a resurgent Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Poland shares a border with Russia. Since Moscow has annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported the insurgency in the east of the nation, Russia’s neighbors have warily observed its military expansion.

Polish President Andrzej Duda signed off a statement which will increase defense spending and increase the strength of the military by 50,000 troops from the current 100,000 troops. The bill will also include provisions for a volunteer militia force, numbering around 50,000, according to reports from state broadcaster Polskie Radio.

Increased Defense Spending is Policy Everyone Can Agree On

The bill—a rare piece of cross-partisan legislation—envisions defense spending increasing to up to 2.5 percent of Poland’s gross domestic product by 2030. Most NATO members have yet to meet their pledges to increase defense spending to, at least, 2 percent of their respective GDPs.

Of the 28 NATO members, only the U.S., the U.K., Greece, Poland, and Estonia currently meet the 2 percent threshold that all members have pledged to meet. “The Polish army will, within ten years, gain the capability of stopping every opponent,” said the Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz.

Poland is one of just five NATO allies that share a border with Russia, along with all 3 Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. NATO’s ongoing reinforcements in Eastern Europe has leaned towards alleviating the anxieties of Poland and the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), where multinational NATO battalions are based.

Deterrence or Expansion?

Russia has consistently argued that NATO expansion in the former Soviet sphere of influence is part of a strategic encirclement of Russian territory, rather than providing protection for European states that would be otherwise vulnerable to Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has vowed that his nation would never strike a NATO ally and risk a conflict.

Nevertheless, confidence in Russian foreign policy among Western governments is at a post-Cold War low. The Kremlin has made a string of spurious claims about the character of its campaign in Syria, in which it’s denied all reports of infringing and bombing civilians. Russia’s official policy is to refuse any military backing for insurgents in east Ukraine. However, the insurgents themselves have claimed to have thousands of Russian troops in their ranks.

Poland Will Increase the Size of Its Military by Over 50% was originally published on Global Security Review.