Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?

The Military Linkage

First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.

Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed the purchase of 12 more Sukhois to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.

Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.

The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.

The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to have a hypersonic capability. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.

Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.

Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of cryo-engine from Russia to further their ambitions in space.

On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.

The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.

Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.

In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.

Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as discussed, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.

Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only did it reduce import costs, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.

In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.

Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.

In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Start the debate! Let us know your thoughts in the comments section.

It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to separate this terrorist organization from the innocent Palestinian population that is dying as sacrificial lambs to Hamas’ ideological goals. Hamas is arguably using the self-made shield of dead and starving Palestinian civilians to gain appeal with Western observers. Civilian casualties, whether child or adult, male or female, devout or secular, are collateral damage in the terrorist organization’s quest to remain hidden and effective in their fight for narrative supremacy.

Yet upon further examination of Hamas’ covenant, “The Day of Judgment will not come about until [Muslims] fight Jews and kill them.” History has demonstrated that the groups and individuals who choose violent and radical means to achieve ideological goals often disregard the unintended consequences of their ambitions.

It seems that Hamas rejects any long-term peace talks. According to the Hamas covenant, “So-called peaceful solutions and international conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement…Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the infidels as arbitrators in the lands of Islam.” To take it a step further, Hamas believes, “There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.”

Hamas does not care about the thousands of dead Palestinians, or the families displaced and starving. One must ask, is Hamas an organization supporting Palestinian liberation or a cancer on long-term peace and security in the Palestinian-Israeli question?

From a strategic perspective, Iran is the actor behind the scenes supporting Hamas, which many experts suggest is a subordinate organization in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. A further examination suggests Hamas’ ideological blindness brought the current hell on Gazans. In November 2023, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly told Hamas leader, Ismail Haniya, “You gave us no warning of your October 7 attack on Israel and we will not enter the war on your behalf.”

Analysts can choose to believe this or not. But Tehran struggles to keep up with heavy inflation, faces angry and restless youth and minority groups, a possible invasion by Azerbaijan into Armenia, which would cut trade and electricity imports. This is all while Iran undertakes a multifaceted campaign to remove the US from the middle east.

Hezbollah has largely remained out of the Gaza conflict, limiting engagement with Israel to small skirmishes on the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah’s ideological and militaristic zealots do not appear willing to sacrifice their manpower and treasure for a group that is not comprised of co-religionists. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria was not going to join Hamas either because of its never-ending civil war and depleted resources. The Houthis are a different story, but as one al- Jazeera columnist wrote, the group’s real goal is permanent deterrence against the Saudis.

Hamas failed to understand that Israel would “rally around the flag” in an effort to exterminate the organization once and for all. Although Hamas sought to invoke a severe reaction from Israel to generate Gazan casualties, which then generates international support and aid, the Hamas leadership did not expect Israel to pursue a fight to the death.

Globally, Hamas is experiencing significant support in the information war, which can prove equally important to battles on the ground. While fighting rages in Gaza, the terror group’s strategic ambitions remain unchanged. The confounding reality is that the war is producing distorted Western perceptions of Hamas which are winning sympathy for Hamas (a designated terror group since 1997). Uninformed views of Hamas in the West confuse some younger generations, leaving them thinking the extremist group is fighting for freedoms similar to those found in the West.

Sadly, social media algorithms seem to ignore the hostage situation. Hamas took roughly 240 Israeli hostages during the attacks that killed over 1,200 people. The hostages were taken to underground “tunnels of the resistance”. Recent efforts to negotiate the trade of Hamas prisoners for Israeli hostages has failed. Though many Gazans celebrated in the streets after the October 7 attacks, Gazans recently criticized the harm caused by Israel’s response and are calling for an end to Hamas’ reign of terror. Tragically, the Israeli response and the refusal of Egypt or any other neighboring nations to accept Palestinian refugees has created a humanitarian crisis that is often viewed from very skewed sources that create echo chambers of disinformation.

This content amplification may arguably be convincing actors to commit more acts of terror. National law enforcement agencies report seven arrests made in connection with planned terror attacks related to efforts to support Hamas. Three of them were planning an attack on behalf of Hamas in Denmark and four in Germany and the Netherlands were members of the organization. They were detained due to suspicion of planning attacks against Jewish institutions in Europe.

European countries are notorious for knife attacks related to terror groups. Americans are susceptible to the same danger due to the Biden administration’s open-border policy. A US Customs and Border Protection internal intelligence notice warned that “individuals inspired by, or reacting to, the current Israel-Hamas conflict may attempt to travel to or from the Middle East via circuitous transit across the Southwest border.” Hamas’ ideology is indeed a cancer that will spread to the West if left uncontested. Amplified media content indirectly can support Hamas, as the justification and expansion of terrorism is copycatted.

Hamas is far from an Enlightenment-minded organization advocating for personal freedom and the preservation of human life. Americans can help end this war, but only with the defeat of Hamas.

Lora Karch Dulgarian is an independent analyst focusing on national security, social, political, and economic issues in the Middle East and Europe. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Israel-Hamas Conflict Has Spread the Fog of War Across the Western World was originally published on Global Security Review.

The escalating tensions with Iran present a serious problem that cannot be ignored. The continued attacks on American troops by Iranian proxies underscores the urgent need for the Biden administration to define and communicate clear red lines to prevent further acts of aggression and protect the lives of American military personnel in the region.

 The Need for Red Lines

 Firstly, the absence of a defined red lines allows Iran to push the boundaries of acceptable behavior without facing substantial consequences. Currently the Biden administration is “weighing responses” to the attack. However, red lines were required once the administration entered office. Iran needed a clear picture of aggression’s consequences, especially aggression causing American casualties. This continued lack of clarity from the administration not only undermines the safety of American soldiers but also weakens the credibility of the United States on the international stage. Without a clear stance, there is a risk of further attacks and a wider regional conflict.

Secondly, defined red lines serve as a deterrent, signaling to Iran that the United States will not tolerate attacks on its military personnel. Establishing such boundaries is essential to maintaining stability in the region and preventing an escalation that can have far-reaching consequences. This sends a powerful message that acts of violence will not go unanswered, fostering a more secure and predictable relationship.

Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding American responses can embolden other hostile actors in the region and elsewhere to test the waters. Clear red lines are not only about dealing with Iran but also about deterring other potential aggressors and ensuring that the United States is perceived as steadfast and resolute in defending its interests. The Biden administration must follow through on any violations of red lines to solidify credibility.

 The American Response

 To address this critical issue, the Biden administration must take decisive action. First, it is imperative to communicate clear and non-negotiable red lines to Iran, making it unequivocally clear that attacks on American soldiers will trigger severe consequences. Simultaneously, diplomatic engagement with Iran is needed to convey the seriousness of the American position, emphasizing the importance of de-escalation and constructive dialogue—but always backed by the threat of overwhelming violence.

However, to fortify its position and respond effectively to the heightened tensions with Iran, the United States must go beyond diplomatic initiatives and reinforce its military capabilities in the region. The US should bolster its military presence, which serves as both a deterrent and a tangible demonstration of the nation’s commitment to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety of its troops and allies. A visible and formidable American military presence sends a powerful signal, not only to Iran but to the entire region. The United States is prepared to defend its interests and respond decisively to any acts of aggression.

Additionally, the US must respond forcibly to the recent attack. As William Wechsler recently argued, it should be done in ways to avoid a wider regional war from occurring. Matthew Kroenig, however, suggests the United States can incapacitate the Iranian navy. It could conduct strikes on Iranian naval bases or even emulate former President Donald Trump’s approach by targeting Iranian leadership, as demonstrated in the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. Additionally, the Biden administration should consider the option of striking and dismantling Iran’s ability to proliferate nuclear weapons, especially considering American officials believe Iran can build a bomb in roughly twelve days.

Lastly, strengthening alliances with regional partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, etc.) is another pivotal aspect of a comprehensive strategy that the Biden administration should pursue. Solidifying a unified front with its allies and friends in the Middle East fosters a collaborative approach to regional security. Collective efforts enable the sharing of intelligence, joint military exercises, and coordinated responses to potential threats. Such partnerships not only enhance the effectiveness of American actions but also contribute to regional stability by creating a cohesive and united response to aggression from Iran and its proxies.

Ultimately, well-defined red lines, coupled with a robust response to aggression, is essential for safeguarding American lives and maintaining stability in the Middle East. President Biden must seize the opportunity to demonstrate strength, resilience, and a commitment to protecting American interests in the face of escalating threats. If he fails to do so, deterrence will continue to falter, and attacks on American troops will continue to escalate. The stakes are high and clear red lines coupled with strict enforcement is the first step toward ensuring the US protects its interests within the region and enhances the credibility to deter further aggression.

 Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Drawing a Clear Red Line: Biden’s Imperative Response to Iranian Aggression was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring brought about renewed optimism in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, it ended in catastrophic failure. Over 180,000 individuals were killed, and over six million were displaced—a solemn reminder to demonstrators and activists today. While the defiance of demonstrators is laudable, lives were lost as the death toll increased to seemingly little avail as negotiations between the military government and opposition in Sudan seemed destined for failure, until talks brokered by the African Union yielded a breakthrough agreement.

The United States dispatched an envoy to facilitate ongoing talks in Sudan, and the African Union suspended the country’s membership. While the situation in Sudan appears to have stabilized to a degree, the unrest in Sudan and Algeria has spread to other North African states, in a reverberating echo of the 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt. As economic discontent spreads throughout the Middle East, political unrest is growing. 

In Morocco, a BBC survey has revealed that more than half of respondents in the country seek immediate political change. Whether mass protests will erupt in Morocco is unknown; however, grievances are palpable, signaling a possible rerun of the unrest experienced in the Arab Spring protests. Eight years after the failure of the mass protests of 2011 to affect meaningful reform, lessons must be learned to avoid similar outcomes—or worse.

With the removal of the Mubarak dictatorship, came the election of Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Just as Morsi’s election symbolized the dawn of a new era for many, his demise by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup and recent unexpected death was emblematic of democracy’s often brutal fate in the Middle East and North Africa—a statement which does not imply support for the Muslim Brotherhood or deflect from the short-lived hopes for a chaotic presidency, but rather highlights its reverse effect: the emboldening of military dictatorships. Except for Tunisia, many states in the region have seen the implementation of greater autocratic control or have spiraled into anarchy since the Arab Spring. 

The convoluted role of the United States in the Arab Spring, whereby President Obama sanctioned regime change in Libya while supporting the military-backed coup in Egypt, arises from the contention between abiding by America’s foreign policy and national security interests and aligning with local democratic movements. 

One conspicuous feature of the United States’ approach to recent unrest is resounding silence. This could reflect the Trump’s antipathy to foreign intervention or precautionary measures after the inefficacy of U.S. involvement in 2011. Nonetheless, the protests in Sudan and Algeria are organic movements of ordinary citizens, many of whom are young people—the nemesis of autocratic dictatorships. The large-scale involvement of youths was illustrated in the successful attempt to block 82-year-old Algerian President Bouteflika from running for a fifth term. 

Almost seventy percent of Algeria’s population is under the age of 30, resembling the demographic profile of the Arab Spring protests, aided by social media and propelled by economic hardships seeking to topple military-backed regimes. These similarities present similar obstacles with a decentralized opposition being unsustainable in the long-term. Meanwhile, the presence of social media as a weapon for democracy remains a concern for Arab governments, evidenced by the internet blackout in Sudan, which only served to further fuel public grievances. 

A case study of Egypt reveals that deposing the front-facing leadership is merely a smokescreen to the power structure that remains—mainly bureaucrats, members of the security and military establishments, and oligarchs loyal to the old regime. While delaying elections in Algeria favors protestors in buying time to prevent Army Chief Gaid Salah’s preferred candidate taking office—a remnant of Bouteflika’s regime—the action highlights how a lack of organization amongst the opposition impedes progress. The militaries in both Sudan and Algeria are the repositories of power. Salah’s description of protestors who opposed the army as being “enemies of Algeria,” reinforces the brevity of hope instilled by the protests, before being silenced by the military. 

Revolutions enthuse the masses with optimism, however, the experiences of the 2011 protests reveal an illusory and temporal effect in the face of a powerful military and security establishment. The Sudanese and Algerian cases highlight growing dissent in the Middle East and North Africa. Without an organized opposition with overwhelming international support, political unrest in the MENA region is likely to bear an uncanny resemblance to the events of the first Arab Spring, potentially resulting in anarchy, civil war, or the imposition of stronger autocratic rule.

The Return of the Arab Spring was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extremist propaganda has spread beyond Libya to reach Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. While this isn’t a new phenomenon, North African states continue to suffer from substantial terrorist attacks. Recently, the Tripoli-based Libyan National Oil Company and the High National Electoral Commission were attacked by militants seemingly linked to ISIS (Daesh). Extremist movements are increasing their propaganda output and continue to pose a severe threat to internal and regional security.

Tunisia is engulfed in a deep economic crisis. As such, international financial institutions are demanding significant economic structural reforms, which have triggered protests and prompted an increase in propaganda originating from networks in Libya to exploit socio-economic issues to attract disaffected young people to their ranks.

On October 28^th, 2018 a woman with no previously-known militant background (according to Tunisian authorities) blew herself up. The attack occurred just as the country’s vital tourism industry started to recover more than three years after two deadly terror attacks. More recently, on March 7^th, 2019, a post office in Tunis intercepted 19 letters containing potentially deadly toxins addressed to notable journalists, politicians, and trade unionists. Local authorities revealed that the substances were produced in a Tunisian laboratory. This is a critical security issue that needs to be addressed—both domestically and regionally, and possibly in cooperation with the European Union. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are strategic partners for Europe—ensuring their stability is essential to avoid further crises in the region.

On March 10^th, 2019, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’s (AQIM) al-Andalus media foundation released an audio clip of a speech given by AQIM official Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi. The address championed the Algerian protests against current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and encouraged protesters to demand Sharia-based governance. Despite Algeria having recently initiated a massive counter-terrorism operation to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the country’s borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, extremist propaganda still represents a serious issue.

Algier’s counter-terrorism efforts are increasingly complicated by illegal migration and human trafficking along Algeria’s southern border. Terrorism and criminality are increasingly interconnected, and the need to break the nexus between the two has increased following the social unrest that led to the ouster of the 82-year old Bouteflika. Stability in Algeria is critical—for the security of Algerians, and the broader region. The country’s next leader will face a challenging economic situation, persistent threats from terrorist networks in Mali and Libya, and increasing extremist propaganda targeted to influence the country’s younger generations.

According to the British government’s Foreign Travel Advice, “terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Morocco. You should be vigilant at all times.”  Two Scandinavian tourists were brutally killed in Morocco in December of 2018. While local authorities reported the attackers were not affiliated with ISIS, the attack—coupled with ISIS’ territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq—has lead to growing scrutiny over the group’s increasingly asymmetric dimension.

One component of the Moroccan counter-terrorism strategy is moussalaha—a reconciliation program. Launched in 2018, it is a de-radicalization program to combat violent extremism. According to the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, human rights and anti-radicalization experts provide psychological support and rehabilitation of charged and jailed people for terror crimes. On March 10^th of 2019, Moroccan authorities announced a repatriation program to allow militants of Moroccan origin to return in safety. The returnees were subject to judicial investigations for their alleged involvement in terror-related activities. The Head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation estimated 1.668 Moroccans joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

In Egypt, several cells affiliated with Wilaya Sinai (Islamic State in the Sinai) remain operational and continue to threaten security and stability in the Sinai. Egypt continues to suffer from ongoing attacks against Christians and other religious minorities. The elimination of the territorial holdings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq could force militants to flow into Egypt.

Furthermore, despite the group’s territorial defeat, ISIS-affiliated propaganda and the group’s shift to an asymmetric entity from a territorially-based entity will continue to threaten North African security. ISIS, in addition to smaller, localized groups, are capable of radicalizing young people in a complex regional context, one deeply affected by economic crises. Extremist propaganda represents an illusory—but convincing—opportunity for young people to turn from losers to winners. Breaking the nexus between terrorism and criminality (especially smuggling) is essential to promote regional stability and security.

The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Erdoğan confronted former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and accused him to his face of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza. He accused the German government of “Nazi actions” when it wouldn’t allow him to campaign for his presidential referendum. He accused the United States of turning a Kurdish militia in Syria into a “terrorist army.”

Thus far, however, Erdoğan’s response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi been measured and calculated.

What does Erdoğan want?

Erdoğan has three clear objectives: to draw Saudi Arabia away from what he sees as an anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition; to create a rift between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) and his father King Salman; and to sew divisions between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

When one has control over the release of information, one can control the narrative—and Turkey has all the information.  Saudi Arabia cannot contrive a comprehensive and believable story that might absolve the Saudi leadership, because it knows that the next day Turkey could leak new information that expose its lies. As a result, the cloud of guilt over Saudi Arabia looms larger and larger.

Erdoğan sees Muhammad bin Zayed in the United Arab Emirates, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and MBS as the embodiment of the anti-Turkey, anti-Qatar, and anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition—his key opponents.

Saudi tensions with Turkey and Qatar have considerably deteriorated following MBS’ rise, as the result of Turkish and Qatari support for the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood. Much of the deterioration in relations can be attributed to him personally—the Crown Prince, at one point, even referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” that includes Iran and Qatar. For Saudi Arabia, the issue of Islamism is a double-edged sword.

As Jamal Khashoggi wrote before his murder, “Saudi Arabia is the mother and father of political Islam and he [MBS] cannot run away from this.” The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have the potential to be a strong coalition, as long as they remain united. However, without Saudi Arabia they will be unable to shape the region—and their coalition may even collapse.

Erdoğan also aims to create rifts within the Saudi royal family—his primary goal being to divide King Salman and his son the Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has created many enemies among the elites in Saudi society and within the royal family as a result of his reforms and actions as the country’s de-facto ruler. King Salman was pivotal in his son MBS superseding as crown prince the much more accomplished and senior Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef—the preferred candidate of both the United States and Turkey.

In his speech that set out to reveal the “naked truth” of the Jamal Khashoggi killing, Erdoğan spoke of King Salman in a highly respectful tone and called him the “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” In the same speech, he didn’t even mention the name Mohammad bin Salman.

Finally, Erdoğan wants to create space between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Trump administration has invested heavily in its relationship with Saudi Arabia as relations with Turkey have increasingly soured.  Erdoğan wants the U.S. to adopt a Middle East strategy that is more reliant on Turkey and less focused on Saudi Arabia.

When Donald Trump was elected president, MBS called him “the right leader at the right time.” He was one of few world leaders to praise the new American president in such a way. MBS understood that the critical foreign relationship for his survival as Crown Prince is the relationship with the United States— Erdoğan understands this too.

Erdoğan does have an overarching goal: to paint a target on the head of MBS. He wants the U.S., the Royal Family, and even King Salman to view MBS as a liability.

Will Erdoğan get what he wants?

Already, King Salman’s brother and MBS rival, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, has returned from self-imposed exile in London. Senator Lindsey Graham has called for MBS to go. MBS has praised the strength of the Qatari economy, signaling a potential thaw in relations.

While it is by no means certain, it is no longer impossible to imagine a future of Saudi Arabia without Mohammad bin Salman. The days of highly publicized meetings with Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and glowing endorsements from Thomas Friedman are long gone.

If MBS doesn’t go, Saudi Arabia will suffer economically and politically, at least in the short term. MBS is may survive, but his wounds won’t heal any time soon, because the Khashoggi murder is unlikely to go away.  Erdoğan has all the information he needs to keep this story alive.

What does Erdoğan want from the Jamal Khashoggi Murder? was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.
• Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.
• The United States is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).
• The European Union’s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.
• The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).

The global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.

This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

 Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.

A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe’s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7’s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.

China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050

While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn’t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.

However, China is projected to be the world’s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.

By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.

Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.

Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.

Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies. 

Today’s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.

Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions are increasing between the Shia-minority and the Kingdom’s Sunni ruling class in the aftermath of the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr. Regional jihadists are attempting to foment sectarian conflict in the kingdom by exploiting the unrest post-execution. In hopes of diluting attention focused on al Nimr, Saudi Arabia decided he’d be executed alongside 46 others, the majority of which were Sunnis accused of having links with Al Qaeda.

Per sentencing protocols, Saudi authorities would not have to give prior notice of the execution.  Security forces were able to suppress low-level actions by activists, but a worrying concern has been the rising number of jihadist suicide strikes taking place not just in the Sunni portions of the country, but in Shiite populated areas.

Shiite extremists are bombing Shiite mosques

Suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques are designed to goad Shiites into retaliating, creating an even more significant security issue for elites, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed a leadership role in Saudi counterterrorism and defense efforts.

Jihadist exploitation of the al Nimr execution would involve strikes on religious targets and security forces, given the difficulties in targeting and disrupting petroleum infrastructure with such attacks. The killing of al Nimr will complicate negotiations for a political settlement in Syria.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to sit down in December when the region’s foreign ministers meet to negotiate on Syria. The two sides disagree over the groups that should be party to a post-Al Assad political solution, assuming all parties can even create the necessary battlefield conditions to engage in a political transition in Syria.

The proxy conflict in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ongoing in Lebanon, where a political agreement on the presidency is contingent on improved Iran-Saudi dialogue.

Saudi Arabia is Fostering a Sunni Coalition

Saudi Arabia isn’t the only Sunni power experiencing tensions with Tehran. As Turkey grows more assertive in the area, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria will be crucial arenas for competition between the old opponents.

Saudi Arabia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Tehran is a test for the Sunni regional coalition that Riyadh has painstakingly tried to gather in the past few years.

Thus far, the states that have followed Riyadh’s lead to Iran protests are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Bahrain, at the heart of the Saudi camp, has already reminded his ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian charge d’affaires in October.

Saudi Arabia has been attempting to foster a tighter relationship with Cairo to underpin its Arab coalition and will be signing grants and loans worth $3 billion for Egypt on Jan. 5 to make apparent the priority Saudi Arabia is giving the relationship.

Egypt will gladly accept the monetary support, but Cairo can be expected to maintain a more balanced approach with regards to contentious cultural disputes in the region. The execution of Al Nimr is a piece of a much more significant regional game.

The United Arab Emirates, which was in close military coordination with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Libya and Syria, downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran by recalling its ambassador and ordered a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats stationed at the Emirates. Sudan that has seen its alliance with Riyadh reinforced while distancing itself from Iran—expelling the Iranian ambassador—has received increased Saudi monetary assistance.

Kuwait, conscious of its Shiite minority, condemned Iran after the attack on the Saudis Embassy but stopped short of severing diplomatic relations. Egypt chose to be more cautious, condemning Iran and avoiding any mention of Mohamed Fathi Abdel Ati, an Egyptian national who had been one of the Sunnis executed in the same group as al Nimr.

Analysis: Saudi Arabia will look abroad for support after lackluster support from Sunni neighbors

Saudi Arabia will focus on securing its oil facilities while dealing with sporadic bouts of unrest and jihadist attacks. While managing these domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia will look overseas for allies at the time of need.

The response will be mixed from its Sunni neighbors, based on how much they rely on security and assistance. The United States and others in the West will meanwhile do their best to maintain their distance from the proxy conflicts which are part and parcel of the changing regional balance of power between Iran and its adversaries.

Increased Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East as the Saudi-Iran Proxy War Heats Up was originally published on Global Security Review.