For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements and prioritized military readiness in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel’s aggression nor Iran’s ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States’ changing focus in the Middle East, it will end up losing more than its economic potency and military confidence. It will lose the ability to arrange the chessboard.

The inability of the Arab world to synchronize with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Is staying mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?

To mitigate conflict spillovers, the Arab nations have prioritized active defense investments and air denial practices. Systematic defense procurements have streamlined their multi-domain operations to prevent entanglements, but out-spying Iran’s asymmetric warfighting or Israel’s intelligence warfare remains a political test. Israel’s intelligence directives of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlight the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA’s defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not synchronizing against a common enemy caused several problems: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world’s warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous productions of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic connections existing as a starting point, the underlying factors of alliance fragmentation have increased.

Consistent strategic differences are fracturing the prospects of political reconciliation and strategic retrospection. Facing multiple power projectors, shared security architecture has reshaped how the geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA’s high-fliers see this geography without one dominant actor. This vacuum has yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf’s current strategy to combine deterrence with diplomacy has been met with historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its fair share of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness to arrange the Middle East offers a

complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a cohesive block from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theater.

Israel’s versatile intelligence alters political entanglements for the Gulf. It introduced a hybrid wave of targeted psychological operations (PSYOPS). The open presence of Israel’s intelligence in the Middle East has resulted in its neighbors’ doctrinal fatigue. This ‘eye in the sky’ layering impacts the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA’s doctrinal postures. It pushes the Persian Gulf to enhance battlespace in three settings: Iran’s predictive intelligence, the Gulf’s threat assessment, and integrated weapons systems. Still, the absence of collective military intelligence and interoperability is glaring.

To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a threefold approach, by formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to succeed in collectively preserving power, let alone projecting it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) strategic behavior was observed. It preferred personalized military innovations and investments, while securing inter-regional strategic alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Tukey to the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the disconnected objectives. However, the Gulf’s common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios for a future strategy.

First, to become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making Five Eyes a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, to continue investing in personalized, ad-hoc security investments before active defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy provided the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the previous geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was the rump administration’s idea to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt’s withdrawal soured the idea MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.

Currently the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA. It has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding common ground remains an Achilles ‘ heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from inter-regional coalition lessons is one go-to strategy.

Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He has published his work in the Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, and the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). The views of the author are his own.

A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.

A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety

The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.

The memory of Iraq’s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.

Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard

Iran: A Threat Undiminished

Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.

Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The proliferation of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.

Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North

While Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school education systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to Jarabulus.

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey’s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.

Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic resets, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.

Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation

Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with Druze militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.

While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.

Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection

Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.

1. Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking

Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The Captagon crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.

Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the resurgence of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.

2. Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence

Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions relief, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s debt to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.

Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.

An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence

Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an opportunity for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.

This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.

Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty

Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.

Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.

Syria as a Forward Defense Zone

Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.

In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the looming humanitarian threats should be the first order of business for U.S. policy there, another kind of ever-present crisis threatens to make the situation markedly worse in the longer term. If the Biden administration is serious about preventing Afghanistan from becoming an even bigger security threat, they must construct a strategy that better addresses the effects of climate change—not only there but across other flashpoints like Syria and Yemen where intractable conflicts have been exacerbated by environmental stress.

80% of conflicts in Afghanistan are linked to natural resources, and with 60% of Afghans deriving their income from agriculture, the unpredictable and infertile conditions will continue to multiply internal strife and result in greater security threats. Northern regions of Afghanistan, like Kabul, now see snow and glaciers melt earlier and more quickly, flooding fields and irrigation systems, and yielding snowmelt-related droughts in the winter. Northern, central, and southern areas of Afghanistan also experience the impacts of floods, caused by the heavy spring rainfall. Areas where agriculture and pastoralism determine livelihoods have seen precipitation events increase by 10 to 25% since 1990. Both extremes yield poor harvests and spike wheat prices.

For years, the Taliban has taken advantage of this agricultural stress.  The increasingly poor farming conditions and economic pressure had pushed farmers into difficult situations. Thousands relocated to urban areas and left families behind, who became more vulnerable to Taliban influence. The Taliban also recruited farmers as fighters and paid them $5-$10 a day, more than they could earn from farming.

Other intractable conflicts in the Middle East have also been fueled, or even caused, by climate change.

The dual crises in Syria and Yemen show how water insecurity instigates and exacerbates regional instability and humanitarian crises. Between 2006 and 2010, Syria suffered its worst drought in over 900 years. 800,000 Syrians lost their source of income, 1.5 million moved into cities to find work, and the price of bread nearly doubled. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad subsequently reduced fuel and water subsidies, which aggravated ethnic tensions, increased the prices of water and food, and ultimately created the conditions for a devastating civil war.

The conflict had national security implications for the United States, creating the conditions in which ISIS thrived and ultimately resulted in American military intervention in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. More than a decade has passed since the devastating drought and onset of the Syrian Civil War and, today, 60% of the population faces food insecurity, over 600,000 people have been killed, and more than 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country.

As the war dragged on in Syria, the crisis in Yemen simultaneously gained international attention. Before the conflict erupted in 2014, much of the country’s violence was rooted in disputes over resources, especially water. Seven years after its onset, approximately 20.5 million Yemeni people urgently need water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance. As one of the world’s most water-stressed countries, scarce resources have severely compounded the political, economic, and social conflict in Yemen. In conjunction with intensified climate conditions, state and non-state actors continued weaponization of water in Yemen will further inflame the ongoing crisis.

There is no perfect solution to any of these intractable conflicts, but it is clear that climate change has only exacerbated them—and it will continue to do so. The future U.S. strategy to address these conflicts needs to consider the role that climate change has and continues to play. Mitigation of environmental stressors should be considered a security imperative.  At the same time, America’s climate change policies themselves must also recognize and address its impact on these conflicts.

The United States should learn from these humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria and seek to prevent similar security and humanitarian crises in Afghanistan. First, the United States must facilitate a global response to the growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan that addresses across the country. However, over the longer term, US programs must invest in climate mitigation practices across Afghanistan and the Middle East to prepare for the intensified and frequent consequences of climate change – namely conflict and humanitarian disaster. In addition to providing urgent humanitarian aid to protect citizens’ most basic needs, USAID should work with local stakeholders, including farmers, to build more resilient infrastructures that can support citizens in the face of climate change.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates President Biden’s mission to redefine U.S. security policy and pursue new strategic opportunities. However, increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters will fuel intractable conflicts, and the U.S. cannot simply turn away from the instability nor disengage from the region.

The United States needs an approach in the Middle East and Afghanistan that elevates and addresses the implications of climate change through a security lens. This is necessary to both mitigate future conflict and prevent humanitarian crises.

When it Comes to Security in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Climate Change is a Looming Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

Approximately twenty-two million civilians require immediate aid, 1.2 million cases of cholera have been reported, and 8.4 million are experiencing severe food insecurity.  The conflict in Yemen, which has become a battleground for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis in existence today.

United States policy regarding the Arabian Peninsula has failed to address this tragedy. The U.S. has remained silent as its allies have contributed to increasing levels of human suffering. As peace talks start in Stockholm, the United States must call on Saudi Arabia to join the conversation for a peaceful resolution with the immediate goal being ensuring the security of Yemeni civilians.

For three years, the Saudis have been at war with the Houthis—a Shia rebel group that seized power in Yemen that has received support from Iran.  Saudi Arabia views the relationship between the Houthis and Iran as a threat, seeing the Houthis as Iranian proxies. Their response to the possibility of Iran expanding its influence on the Arabian Peninsula has been severe. The Kingdom has carried out air strikes and blockaded Yemen’s borders and ports, preventing essential food and supplies from reaching Yemen’s civilian population.

The United States has supported Saudi Arabia by providing the Kingdom with intelligence, weapons, and logistical support. Now, however, the U.S. needs to take an active role in paving a path to peace and security.

First, the United States must accept accountability. In August, the Saudi-led coalition used bombs purchased from the U.S. to carry out an air strike in Yemen.  The bombs hit a school bus and killed forty children.  The international community placed the blame on both Saudi Arabia and the United States.  The U.S. needs to acknowledge its role in the ongoing humanitarian crisis—failure to do so will damage the moral authority of the United States.

Second, the United States must assist Yemen in the road to recovery.  Washington must induce Riyadh to lift the blockades and halt air strikes. USAID could provide immediate life-saving assistance such as nutrition, clean drinking water, safe shelter, and treatment to those suffering from cholera. Doing so would prevent further spread of disease by administering vaccines to citizens in high-risk regions. Humanitarian intervention by a U.S.-led coalition may also alleviate some of the reputational damage that resulted from the Saudi air strikes.

Third—and most important—the United States needs to encourage and facilitate constructive dialogue between the opposing parties.  In November, the Houthis offered to agree to talks if the Saudis would agree to a cease-fire.  This was a sudden and surprising development.  On December 3rd, U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, traveled to the capital city of Sana’a to work with the Houthis to set the stage to move negotiations forward.  The United States must exert substantial pressure on Saudi Arabia de-escalate and take concrete steps toward a ceasefire.

The Khashoggi murder will no doubt complicate relations with Saudi Arabia, but the United States also has pressing interests in Yemen: a lasting peace settlement and a resumption of humanitarian aid to Yemen’s suffering civilian population. Failure to do so will only lead to greater regional insecurity for years to come.

Time for the U.S. to Act on Yemen as Negotiations Begin in Sweden was originally published on Global Security Review.

Both powers are vying for regional hegemony as Iran seeks a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, while Saudi Arabia works to remain at the top of the region’s hierarchy and protect its national security.

The people of Yemen continue to languish in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as the conflict persists. The situation has been aggravated by violent attacks against cities alongside growing food insecurity perpetuated by closed ports and embattled infrastructure. The proxy war has fomented widespread instability in Yemen, creating a breeding ground for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

While most Al-Qaeda offshoots have died out or reduced their presence, the AQAP branch has remained intact by taking advantage of Yemen’s instability while continuing to make threats against Saudi Arabia and the West.

Today, a large proportion of U.S. security experts believe that AQAP is the largest terrorist threat to the United States—more so than the Islamic State, the strength of which is consistently sensationalized by the media. Experts believe AQAP is capable of building bombs without metal, making them easy to transfer across international borders and nearly impossible to detect.

As the Saudi Arabian-led coalition—backed U.S. weapons, equipment, and intelligence—fights Iranian-backed Houthi forces in the northern Yemen, it is also combating AQAP militants in the country’s south.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia escalated operations against AQAP, using drone strikes in Yemen to target the group’s leaders. Unfortunately, these counter-terrorism efforts have actually made the situation worse.

Saudi Arabia pursues its national security interests on the Peninsula.

The deterioration of Yemen’s internal security has allowed AQAP to gain a strong foothold in a relatively lawless and unstable state.

The terrorist group’s close vicinity to Saudi Arabia has made the monarchy uneasy due to its hatred of the Saudi monarchy for its relationship with the United States.

Saudi Arabia’s shared border with Yemen allows AQAP members to easily enter Saudi Arabia, allowing the group to destabilize the Kingdom.

With Iranian-backed forces in northern Yemen and AQAP militants in Yemen’s south, the situation is increasingly precarious for Saudi Arabia.

To prevent the two aggressors from advancing, Saudi Arabia seems likely to continue carrying out airstrikes and ground assaults as the two groups gain ground and threaten not only Saudi Arabia’s regional interests and its national security.

The U.S. moves to stop the spread of AQAP.

U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over the past few years have not only supported the country’s fight against Houthi rebels in Yemen. They have also been intended to eliminate the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and limit its potential expansion.

Prior to the Houthi rebellion, the U.S. and Yemeni President Hadi maintained built a strong alliance, with U.S. officials touting Hadi as a leader in counterterrorism.

Once Hadi’s regime collapsed, however, U.S. policymakers had to depend more heavily on the alliance with the Saudi monarchy to target AQAP.

In 2017, the White House stated that its recent arms deal with Saudi Arabia was struck not only to protect Saudi Arabia’s national security, but to assist in counter-terrorism operations in the Peninsula.

Reportedly, the sale would reduce the need for the U.S. military to participate in combat operations. However, U.S. special forces were deployed to assist Saudi troops in Yemen later that year.

As of 2018, anti-AQAP efforts have targeted over 3,000 Al-Qaeda members, forcing them into Yemen’s interior. However, the group continues to benefit from the lack of stable leadership in Sana’a, continuing its attempts to fill the power vacuum despite U.S. and Saudi efforts to eliminate it.

AQAP is easily exploiting the situation in Yemen.

Despite U.S. and Saudi efforts, experts have argued that the campaign against AQAP in Yemen may have actually helped the group prosper by destabilizing the region and providing new gaps for the terrorist group to exploit.

Al Qaeda has been able to further capitalize on the fact that many Yemeni civilians are turning against both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as they watch the actions of the two countries deepen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

Despite this, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have continued their strikes upon AQAP, though their imprecision has resulted in numerous civilian deaths.

Over the course of just two days in January 2017, the U.S. military performed a ground operation in Al Bayda Province that resulted in the death of 24 civilians.

Just a few months later, 30 U.S. airstrikes against AQAP killed a few dozen more. The U.S. declared these actions a success—but to Yemeni civilians, these events were further proof that the U.S. is not a benevolent actor, but would continue to steer the fate of the Middle East to ensure its own national security interests.

Naturally, the number of civilian casualties has brewed distaste for the U.S. in the Yemeni psyche, a feeling that is rapidly replacing their once pro-U.S. attitudes.

As stated by Dafna H. Rand, a representative of the U.S. State Department, the continuity of the war and U.S. involvement in Yemen will potentially foster anger against the U.S. that could encourage radicalization and increase AQAP membership.

AQAP’s anti-Saudi Arabia and anti-Western stance has resonated with some Yemeni civilians who feel that the Saudi-U.S. partnership has devastated their country and deteriorated their quality of life. Eventually, larger numbers of Yemeni civilians may see AQAP as the only secure and stable option for their country.

U.S. soft power is the key to countering AQAP.

Ultimately, the strength of AQAP may grow as more civilians begin to support its cause against the Saudi monarchy and the West.

While both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have entered the fray with AQAP on grounds of preserving their own respective national securities, their biggest accomplishment thus far has been to foment hatred within Yemen, all while plunging more cities into crisis.

If Yemeni civilians continues to perceive the U.S. as a threat, AQAP’s anti-U.S. sentiments will gain steam. Instead, the U.S. needs to reduce involvement in airstrikes and ground assaults and take on a more humanitarian role—ensuring food security, providing medical aid and access to education, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.

Facilitating reconstruction in Yemen would benefit all parties. Yemeni civilians will benefit from increased humanitarian aid, the U.S.’s assistance would hopefully engender more positive feelings in Yemeni civilians and slow the acceptance and spread of AQAP.

Is the U.S.-Saudi Partnership in Yemen Strengthening Al-Qaeda? was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the self-proclaimed Islamic State has dominated the headlines and preoccupied national security officials for the past four years, al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding. Its announcement last summer of another affiliate—this one dedicated to the liberation of Kashmir—coupled with the resurrection of its presence in Afghanistan and the solidification of its influence in Syria, Yemen, and Somalia, underscores the resiliency and continued vitality of the United States’ preeminent terrorist enemy.

Although al-Qaeda’s rebuilding and reorganization predates the 2011 Arab Spring, the upheaval that followed helped the movement revive itself. At the time, an unbridled optimism among local and regional rights activists and Western governments held that a combination of popular protest, civil disobedience, and social media had rendered terrorism an irrelevant anachronism.

The longing for democracy and economic reform, it was argued, had decisively trumped repression and violence. However, where the optimists saw irreversible positive change, al-Qaeda discerned new and inviting opportunities.

The successive killings in 2011 and 2012 of Osama bin Laden; Anwar al-Awlaki, the movement’s chief propagandist; and Abu Yahya al-Libi, its second-in-command, lent new weight to the optimists’ predictions that al-Qaeda was a spent force. In retrospect, however, it appears that al-Qaeda was among the regional forces that benefited most from the Arab Spring’s tumult. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri has emerged as a powerful leader, with a strategic vision that he has systematically implemented.

Forces loyal to al-Qaeda and its affiliates now number in the tens of thousands, with a capacity to disrupt local and regional stability, as well as launch attacks against their declared enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, and Russia. Indeed, from northwestern Africa to southeastern Asia, al-Qaeda has knit together a global movement of more than two dozen franchises. In Syria alone, al-Qaeda now has upwards of twenty thousand men under arms, and it has perhaps another four thousand in Yemen and about seven thousand in Somalia.

The Arab Spring’s Big Winner

The thousands of hardened al-Qaeda fighters freed from Egyptian prisons in 2012–2013 by President Mohammed Morsi galvanized the movement at a critical moment, when instability reigned and a handful of men well-versed in terrorism and subversion could plunge a country or a region into chaos.

Whether in Libya, Turkey, Syria, or Yemen, their arrival was providential in terms of advancing al-Qaeda’s interests or increasing its influence. The military coup that subsequently toppled Morsi validated Zawahiri’s repeated warnings not to believe Western promises about either the fruits of democracy or the sanctity of free and fair elections.

It was Syria where al-Qaeda’s intervention proved most consequential. One of Zawahiri’s first official acts after succeeding bin Laden as emir was to order a Syrian veteran of the Iraqi insurgency named Abu Mohammad al-Julani to return home and establish the al-Qaeda franchise that would eventually become Jabhat al-Nusra.

Al-Qaeda’s blatantly sectarian messaging over social media further sharpened the historical frictions between Sunnis and Shias and gave the movement the entrée into internal Syrian politics that it needed to solidify its presence in that country. Al-Qaeda’s chosen instrument was Jabhat al-Nusra, the product of a joint initiative with al-Qaeda’s Iraqi branch, which had rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). But as Nusra grew in both strength and impact, a dispute erupted between ISI and al-Qaeda over control of the group.

In a bold power grab, ISI’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced the forcible amalgamation of al-Nusra with ISI in a new organization to be called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Julani refused to accede to the unilateral merger and appealed to Zawahiri. The quarrel intensified, and after Zawahiri’s attempts to mediate it collapsed, he expelled ISIS from the al-Qaeda network.

Although ISIS—which has since rebranded itself the Islamic State—has commanded the world’s attention since then, al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding and fortifying its various branches. Al-Qaeda has systematically implemented an ambitious strategy designed to protect its remaining senior leadership and discreetly consolidate its influence wherever the movement has a significant presence.

Accordingly, its leaders have been dispersed to Syria, Iran, Turkey, Libya, and Yemen, with only a hard-core remnant of top commanders still in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Advances in commercial digital communication tools, alongside successive public revelations of U.S. and allied intelligence services’ eavesdropping capabilities, have enabled al-Qaeda’s leaders and commanders to maintain contact via secure end-to-end encryption technology.

The Importance of Syria

The number of top al-Qaeda leaders sent to Syria over the past half-dozen years underscores the high priority that the movement attaches to that country. Among them was Muhsin al-Fadhli, a bin Laden intimate who, until his death in a 2015 U.S. air strike, commanded the movement’s elite forward-based operational arm in that country, known as the Khorasan Group. He also functioned as Zawahiri’s local emissary, charged with attempting to heal the rift between al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Haydar Kirkan, a Turkish national and long-standing senior operative, was sent by bin Laden himself to Turkey in 2010 to lay the groundwork for the movement’s expansion into the Levant, before the Arab Spring created precisely that opportunity. Kirkan was also responsible for facilitating the movement of other senior al-Qaeda personnel from Pakistan to Syria to escape the escalating drone strike campaign ordered by President Barack Obama. He was killed in 2016 in a U.S. bombing raid.

The previous fall marked the arrival of Saif al-Adl, who is arguably the movement’s most battle-hardened commander. Adl is a former Egyptian Army commando whose terrorist pedigree, dating to the late 1970s, includes assassination plots against Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 terrorist campaigns in Saudi Arabia and South Asia. He also served as mentor to bin Laden’s presumptive heir, his son Hamza, after both Adl and the boy sought sanctuary in Iran following the commencement of U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan in late 2001. The younger bin Laden’s own reported appearance in Syria this past summer provides fresh evidence of the movement’s fixation with a country that has become the most popular venue to wage holy war since the seminal Afghan jihad of the 1980s.

Indeed, al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria is far more pernicious than that of ISIS. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the latest name adopted by al-Qaeda’s local affiliate, is now the largest rebel group in the country, having extended its control last year over all of Idlib Province, along the Syrian-Turkish border. This is the culmination of a process al-Qaeda began more than three years ago to annihilate the Free Syrian Army and any other group that challenges al-Qaeda’s regional aspirations.

Filling the ISIS Vacuum

ISIS can no longer compete with al-Qaeda in terms of influence, reach, manpower, or cohesion. In only two domains is ISIS currently stronger than its rival: the power of its brand and its presumed ability to mount spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe. But the latter is a product of Zawahiri’s strategic decision to prohibit external operations in the West so that al-Qaeda’s rebuilding can continue without interference.

The handful of exceptions to this policy—such as the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and the 2017 St. Petersburg Metro bombing in Russia—provide compelling evidence that al-Qaeda’s external operations capabilities can easily be reanimated. Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s capacity to commit acts of international terrorism—especially the targeting of commercial aviation—was recently the subject of a revealing New York Times story.

Al-Qaeda’s success in resurrecting its global network is the result of three strategic moves made by Zawahiri. The first was to strengthen the decentralized franchise approach that has facilitated the movement’s survival. Over the years, the leaders and deputies of al-Qaeda’s far-flung franchises have been integrated into the movement’s deliberative and consultative processes. Today, al-Qaeda is truly “glocal,” having effectively incorporated local grievances and concerns into a global narrative that forms the foundation of an all-encompassing grand strategy.

The second major move was the order issued by Zawahiri in 2013 to avoid mass casualty operations, especially those that might kill Muslim civilians. Al-Qaeda has thus been able to present itself through social media, paradoxically, as “moderate extremists,” ostensibly more palatable than ISIS.

This development reflects Zawahiri’s third strategic decision, letting ISIS absorb all the blows from the coalition arrayed against it while al-Qaeda unobtrusively rebuilds its military strength. Anyone inclined to be taken in by this ruse would do well to heed the admonition of Theo Padnos (née Peter Theo Curtis), the American journalist who spent two years in Syria as a Nusra hostage.

Padnos related in 2014 how the group’s senior commanders “were inviting Westerners to the jihad in Syria not so much because they needed more foot soldiers—they didn’t—but because they want to teach the Westerners to take the struggle into every neighborhood and subway station back home.”

A parallel thus exists between the U.S. director of national intelligence’s depiction of the al-Qaeda threat today [PDF] as mainly limited to its affiliates and the so-called Phoney War in western Europe between September 1939 and May 1940, when there was a strange lull in serious fighting following the German invasion of Poland and the British and French declarations of war against Germany. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain visited British forces arrayed along the Franco-Belgian border that Christmas.

“I don’t think the Germans have any intention of attacking us, do you?” he asked Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery, the commander of an infantry division defending the front. The Germans would attack when it suited them, Montgomery brusquely replied. It is a point worth keeping in mind as al-Qaeda busily rebuilds and marshals its forces to continue the war against the United States it declared twenty-two years ago.

The Resurrection of Al-Qaeda was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last couple of weeks, the Gulf region has been on a rollercoaster ride. Risk analysts are struggling to deal with the dramatically changing geopolitical and financial environment while a direct military confrontation between the Saudi-led alliance and Iran’s proxies is around the corner.

The signals coming from the Saudi capital Riyadh are still the same; Saudi Vision 2030 and the Aramco IPO are on track. The media remains skeptical about the unforeseen crackdown on corruption, a week after the so-called “Davos in the Desert” financial get-together in Riyadh (October 24-26), where 3,500 CEOs and financial wizards convened.

The fallout of the direct attack on Saudi Arabia’s financial moguls and construction giants, such as Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal and the Binladin Group, would put fear in the heads of investors in New York, London, Beijing, and Moscow.

Most agreed that bin Salman overplayed his hand, causing instability in the country and the region.The reality for insiders, however, looks different.

The anti-corruption crackdown by MBS is part of his overall strategy to implement Vision 2030. First of all, the Davos in the Desert meeting showed the financial world’s immense interest in investment opportunities in the kingdom. Considering that 99 percent of the attendees had never visited Saudi Arabia before, while only the speakers already represented a $22 trillion value of assets under management, MBS could tick off another box on his long list to make Vision 2030 a success.

At the same time, the Trump Administration and the UK government tried to woo MBS to list the Aramco IPO on their stock exchanges. Some would have become more lenient towards a flexible approach when looking at the amount of interest, but MBS upped the ante and pushed for new hard-needed changes. The anti-corruption crackdown was carefully considered and timely and served not only to remove corruption in the kingdom but can also be seen as a way to remove remaining opposition to MBS’s future reign.With military precision, MBS removed most of the obstacles still blocking a possible MSCI Emerging Markets Index listing in 2018.

By taking out high-profile businessmen that were already convicted several times for corruption and removing princes that held commanding positions within the armed forces, MBS moved the kingdom towards a more modern economy while consolidating his own power. The inclusion of the kingdom in the MSCI index will bring a multitude of FDI, much larger than the Aramco IPO. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, for example, gives European pension and investment funds the possibility to invest in the kingdom and trade on its stock exchange. The Saudis have reportedly already attracted $9 billion in recent weeks. Some analysts are much more optimistic when looking at the long range of IPOs planned on the Tadawul (Saudi stock exchange).

MBS’s domestic popularity has increased in recent months. The Crown Prince has great support among the youth and has shown to be listening to the majority of his people while being unafraid to make dramatic changes to outdated social structures within the kingdom. Still, MBS understands internal Saudi politics and will try not to completely upset the establishment.

At the same time, regional instability and unrest complicate MBS’s agenda.

The confrontation between Arab nations and Iran has reached a tipping point. And looking at the statements made by UAE’s minister of foreign affairs on November 12 during the Emirates Policy Center’s Abu Dhabi Strategic Debates (ADSD2017) on Sky Arabia shocked the audience. The direct attack and accusations vented towards Iran and Qatar, both accused of promoting instability, financing terrorism, and extremism, were of an unprecedented tone. Gargash also accused both of committing “acts of war”, especially via arming Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah. These accusations are openly supported and repeated by a long list of Arab politicians and leaders.

The war drums are being banged—and this time not as an empty threat, but as a precursor to real military action. Most analysts are looking to Riyadh, as they expect MBS to lead this operation against Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Iranian IRGC; most likely the lead will be taken by the UAE.

Expect military action in the coming weeks, with—or without Washington’s support.

The political show around Lebanese PM Hariri is only part of this. Analysts tend to forget that Hariri’s real power is in Saudi Arabia, where he is the owner of construction giant OGER, currently under investigation as it is in financial trouble. MBS has taken the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone and remove OGER out of the picture in Saudi Arabia while destabilizing Lebanon. This was organized in close cooperation with other Arab leaders. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, a close friend of MBS, will head the anti-IRGC venture, as Abu Dhabi has been doing for years under the radar in Yemen, Syria and especially Libya.

Military action can be expected, with or without the support of Washington. As several Arab ministers and advisors have stated in recent days, it’s time for Arabs to take the future into their own hands. Washington can support, but not lead. If no American assistance is given, others will undoubtedly fill the gap. Moscow has been extremely quiet the last weeks, not indicating any support for Tehran nor trying to mitigate between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi axis and Iran-Hezbollah. These plans seem to have already been discussed in the respective capitals, as ministers of the said countries have convened in several places.

If action is taken against Iran and its proxies, OPEC and oil prices will be impacted immediately. Oil price increases of $5-10 per barrel a day could be a distinct possibility. An escalation in Lebanon, due to the inclusion of Israel in the action, or maritime traffic attacks in the Gulf, would only push prices up further. After years of low geopolitical risk premiums, risk has returned to the market. This time, however, they are new players, unknown to the majority of risk analysts. MBS and Iran will put volatility back on the market where it belongs.

Saudi Corruption Crackdown Could Permanently Boost Oil Prices was originally published on Global Security Review.