The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

Clearing the harbor of the collapsed bridge and debris requires the removal of containers from the Dali so that it can be towed away, as well as the removal of wreckage, section by section. Meanwhile there are 11 large ships stuck in the port until the main channel opens. With the primary channel only 50 feet deep, the wreckage blocks all large vessels from entering the Port of Baltimore. On April 28 the first container ship since the wreck passed through a temporary channel.

A deeper channel was opened May 10, and the permanent channel is expected to reopen by June. The Navy is relying on contractors to bring cranes in to remove the salvage.

Since the incident, many naval and shipping experts have chimed in on social media about the state of our Navy and Army Corps of Engineers. There is a concern about the military’s lack of capacity to conduct salvage operations without contractors.

As good ports are determined by geography, there are only so many options for the US Navy. Naval bases are in enclosed bays, such as Puget Sound, San Diego, and San Francisco. Nearly all of them are located behind a bridge that crosses the mouth of their respective bays.

There are five major naval bases behind narrow passageways, and three that are easily obstructed by an unassuming containership. One can find all of these using google maps in minutes. It does not take long to find where the home ports are for American warships or what their deployment cycles look like. The US even has fleet trackers that are posted on social media. Using this information alone, one can estimate how many ships are in port at any given time, and their state of readiness. There is no need for satellite surveillance.

According to the International Chamber of Shipping, there are 1.8 million seafarers worldwide. Most come from China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Russia. Two of those nations are adversaries. The largest ocean carrier, Mediterranean Shipping Company, has more than 700 ships and a long history with Balkan drug cartels. The largest cocaine seizure in US history took place on one of their vessels, as did many other massive drug busts.

This begs the question: is it really impossible for a small number of Chinese-flagged container ships to obstruct the entrance to critical ports, trapping most of the US Navy in port and isolating approximately one-fourth of the Navy from reinforcement and resupply? Such an event would be the modern analogy to the Battle of Gravelines or Red Cliffs, with the Pacific becoming a vacuum for an up-and-coming naval power—China.

America’s allies throughout the Pacific would suffer. It is impossible to maintain logistical supply lines in the Pacific without the Navy. A modern container ship can carry up to 400,000 tons of cargo. The Air Force’s 52 C5 Galaxy cargo aircraft and 275 C17s carry a combined cargo of 25,975 tons. It is far more efficient and practical to resupply by sea.

The US Navy may have the best radar, the best anti-ship missiles, and the best crews, but the fleet only has so much food, fuel, and firepower. Unfortunately, US Navy logistics capabilities were completely gutted, including prepositioned stocks. On top of that, as seen with the USS Boxer’s recent breakdown, the Navy has limited dry-dock capabilities for repairs.

In light of the Dali disaster and the US Navy’s present capabilities, it is time to reassess the security of American ports from asymmetric or even conventional attack. They are simply more susceptible to attack than at any time.

After the War of 1812, the Fortification Board was created to plan for coastal defenses. From then until World War II the Army Corps of Engineers occupied their time with coastal defense. This is no longer their focus—or any other federal agency’s focus. This leaves the nation vulnerable to an unexpected attack.

The United States’ position in the world is a result of American economic strength, a strong military, and a commitment to the freedom of navigation. Adversaries do not share these values and seek to change the status quo. Times have changed, and so have the means and methods of adversaries to harm the United States.

First, it was foreign port security after the USS Cole bombing. Then it was airline security after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Now, the nation must adapt its capabilities and defenses to secure ports and entryways—before an attack has a catastrophic effect. This will require investment in time and treasure, as well as a shift in strategic thinking. The payoff is preventing a larger Pearl Harbor. The time to act is now when costs are at their lowest.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Fixing the Nation’s Harbor Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?

The Military Linkage

First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.

Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed the purchase of 12 more Sukhois to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.

Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.

The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.

The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to have a hypersonic capability. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.

Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.

Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of cryo-engine from Russia to further their ambitions in space.

On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.

The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.

Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.

In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.

Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as discussed, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.

Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only did it reduce import costs, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.

In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.

Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.

In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.

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It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, international order is breaking down. Essays by Walter Russell Mead, Victor Davis Hanson, and Nadya Schadow, for example, detail this breakdown, and all reference China and Russia as top culprits. The October 2023 report from the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States likewise weighs in with an acute warning that China, Russia, North Korea (DPRK), (and soon Iran) are now in the business of using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool with which to secure their objectives—raising the danger of nuclear conflict to the highest level since the 1945 dawn of the nuclear age.

American nuclear deterrent strategy is part of the international order and prevented direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the Cold War, American extended deterrence over NATO and allies in the Pacific prevented, respectively, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and a repeat of the DPRK invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

During the Cold War’s nearly five-decade-long struggle, the US faced one nuclear-armed peer adversary. In  2022 as the head of US Strategic Command warned, the US will soon face not one but two nuclear-armed peer competitors and do so for the first time in its history.

The unique dangers of this environment are reflected by the manner with which Russia and China see deterrence. Their goals are not designed to prevent war, but to embolden both nations to successfully engage in aggression—such as against Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan. Their nuclear capability acts as an umbrella under which they succeed in preventing the United States from defending the rules-based order. If the US stands down, military aggression succeeds and is not deterred.

Today’s emerging strategic environment contains a change that is not fully appreciated. American conventional military superiority, for example, is believed to help guarantee American and allied security. The US kicked Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, and decimated ISIS a decade later—all through conventional military superiority. American strategy, then and now, relies on superior technology and precision weapons, all backed by the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

However, when President Yeltsin decreed in April 1999 that the Russian military would develop highly accurate and very low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, he set Russia on a path that now enables President Vladimir Putin to dominate warfare in Europe. China is in the process of adopting a strategy that threatens to introduce limited nuclear strikes into the conventional battlefield mix—“escalate to win”—leading the former commander of US Strategic Command to conclude that American conventional battlefield superiority “cannot hold.”

Without a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to restrain adversaries from using nuclear weapons, American plans to prevail on the conventional battlefield will no longer hold. And equally invalid is the Global Zero assumption that the US can prevail on the battlefield if the United States relies on conventional forces in a conflict that goes nuclear.

What then can the US make of the push by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to rewrite the rules of international behavior? That is, what should Americans make of what Russia describes as the unfair unipolar agenda and Iran describes as the great “global arrogance”? Americans should certainly worry that the nation is unprepared for the years ahead.

China’s growing nuclear arsenal emboldens President Xi Jinping to run roughshod over the South China Sea and its Philippine neighbors—flying military aircraft and steaming naval vessels recklessly in international waters. China may also be assisting Venezuela’s effort to grab oil-rich areas of Guyana. This is all taking place at a time when China is seeking bases on the Persian Gulf and near Gibraltar.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and regular threats to use nuclear weapons need little description. This is at a time when Russia maintains at least a 10 to 1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States.

Nearly nuclear-armed Iran, partially under the protection of Moscow and Beijing, wages war through Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis. The Iranians and their allies are killing thousands, grabbing commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, assassinating regime opponents, and ransoming hostages. The American response is, at best, muted.

North Korea recklessly and with impunity fires hundreds of missiles over Japanese and ROK territory and manages a vast international criminal complex of drug running, human trafficking, and weapons transfers, all while imprisoning millions of its own people in the world’s worse gulag. This is all made possible by China. It is through Chinese banks that North Korea avoids sanctions and finances its ongoing mayhem, including its nuclear program.

In short, the United States faces a daunting challenge that it must manage if the American-led international order has any hope of surviving the growing challenges the mayhem brothers present. The time to act is now.

The Mayhem Brothers: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States and its allies need to engage in multi-pronged, asymmetric strategies that exploit the existing geostrategic circumstances. The chessboard of the East and South China Seas includes Japan’s Yaeyama Islands (YI) (Ishigaki, Taketomi, Iriomote, Yonaguni, Hateruma) and the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoal (TS2). The geography of the YI and the TS2 is central to the strategic equation in the East and South China Seas, particularly in relation to preventing China from taking Taiwan. These locales are not merely dots on a map but multi-dimensional air, land, and maritime pieces on the chessboard or, more aptly, a Go board.

Yonaguni Island is close enough to Taiwan to serve as a forward post for both surveillance and military operations. Yonaguni serves as a forward listening post for activities around the East China Sea and the Miyako Strait, also known as the Kerama Gap. The Second Thomas Shoal, while far removed from the Luzon Strait south of Taiwan and even further from Mainland China, is emblematic of the contested multipolarity of the South China Sea and a source of Chinese aggression toward the Philippines.

The geography of these places interlocks with larger strategic aims, especially vis-a-vis Taiwan. If the US chooses to defend Taiwan it will need to see these islands and shoals incorporated into its defense strategy. If the US chooses not to defend Taiwan against China, it will need to see these areas incorporated into its defense strategy for the sake of a Japan and Philippines that now face a Communist China that has taken control of Taiwan.

The Yaeyama Islands, part of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, are located 200 kilometers from Taiwan. This proximity serves as a critical buffer zone in the event of Chinese military activity aimed at Taiwan. It provides a forward-basing opportunity for surveillance, rapid deployment, and potentially disruptive activities against Chinese assets moving toward Taiwan.

The undisputed Japanese sovereignty over the Yaeyama Islands (excluding Senkaku) offers a unique opportunity. The Japanese, and by extension their allies, have unequivocal authority to militarize the islands without violating international norms.

The same is true of the Philippine islands of Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait. These islands would prove to be especially critical in the event of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan.

Along with the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade stationed on Yonaguni Island, a defense network aligning the islands appears to be taking shape. Looking to future military configurations, the US Marine Corps’ restructuring to establish marine littoral regiments points to a rapid adaptability aimed at responding to China’s growing presence. Such forces are particularly effective in island-hopping campaigns, enabling the US to project power in a more flexible and responsive manner.

The expanded regiment, previously the 12th Marine Regiment, was agreed upon by the United States and Japan following the 2023 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in January, according to the US Naval Institute, and is expected to be formed by 2025. Recently the III Marine Expeditionary Force’s commander, Lt. Gen. James Bierman Jr., visited Ishigaki, an island 160 miles east of Taiwan during the Resolute Dragon exercises.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines might consider more subtle and incremental actions. Deploying civilian fleets for research or fisheries, augmented by American and Philippine coast guard vessels, is a mechanism to assert a de facto presence without triggering a full-scale military response. By embracing the Chinese strategy of incrementalism, these nations can turn the tables without risking immediate reprisals or violating international law. Furthermore, the Philippines already established a legal precedent through its 2016 victory at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration.

A presence at TS2 sends a strong signal to China about the range and mobility of American and allied forces. This geographic stretching of the theatre can dilute Chinese focus and assets.  Recently, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels rammed Philippine Coast Guard and resupply ships carrying supplies to troops stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre. Considering the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Representative Mike Gallagher was emphatic that American support would include assisting the Philippines in establishing a more secure and permanent foothold in the TS2. If, for the sake of argument, Taiwan was part of China, the PRC is already encroaching on the space of two American allies—Japan and the Philippines.

Preventing further Chinese intrusion and hardening the outer islands and shoals of the Philippines and Japan can form a potential encirclement that limits the operational freedom of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in a Taiwan scenario. This Go strategy forces the PLAN into a multi-front conflict, complicating naval strategy. Exploiting these advantages requires an overlapping understanding of both the physical and symbolic dimensions of geography, intertwined with the complexities of military strategy, international law, and multi-dimensional warfare.

On November 9, in a Foreign Policy and the Quincy Institute jointly sponsored panel, Zack Cooper and Lyle J. Goldstein addressed the strategic value of the Senkaku Islands, which is just north of the Yaeyama Islands and the TS2. According to Goldstein, the US is not “going to defend shoals (TS2) or islands with goats (the Senkaku Islands).” He added, the need to “draw reasonable lines and do things that are affordable” is “a more realistic approach and that is consistent with realism and restraint.”

Cooper expressed concern about giving up TS2 or the Senkaku islands. He argued that conceding defeat on either front will cause American allies to ask, “You know, our alliance is backed by nuclear deterrence. What’s the red line on the nuclear deterrence?” By giving up on TS2 and the Senkaku Islands he said, “I worry that is what walks us into a very serious strategic crisis.” He added, “If we’re very sure that we can fight and defend Japan and the Philippines then why can’t we also protect Taiwan in the same way?”

Barely visible shoals and islands with goats will not retain their bucolic simplicity if the Chinese take control of them. In due time they will become fortified threats at the doorsteps of America’s allies. If the United States refuses to fight, it is a reasonable expectation that China will continue its aggression and claim historical ownership of Okinawa as well.

Absent a strong military response, an expansionist China may desire to limit Japan to the home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido. Chinese aggression toward the Philippines could see the country lose its islands north of Luzon. This may seem farfetched, but so, too, is believing that Chinese expansion is satiated with the Scarborough shoals and islands with nothing more than goats.

US Maneuvering in the Yaeyama Islands and the Second Thomas Shoal to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

When news of the incident broke, Filipinos took to social media to express their outrage. According to a report published by Business Insider, “The Philippines has accused China of ramming a Philippine fishing vessel, sinking it, and then abandoning the crew to drown in open waters […] The crew of the sunken Philippine vessel was ultimately rescued by a Vietnamese ship operating nearby.”

The Turkish news outlet TRT World reported that Filipinos were angered after a Chinese vessel seemingly rammed a fishing boat in the South China Sea and left its crew to fend for themselves. The New York Times noted that the 22 Filipino fishermen were at sea before being rescued by a Vietnamese boat. The fishermen returned to the Philippines on board the Philippine Navy patrol ship BRP Ramon Alcaraz.

The incident occurred around midnight on June 9th, 2019 in Reed Bank (Recto Bank), 500 kilometers off from the coast of the Philippines. Reed Bank is considered to be a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishermen and is frequented by fishermen from other countries like Vietnam, China, and Taiwan.

The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) boat detection (VDB) located near the province of Occidental Mindoro revealed that at approximately 1:08 am local time (approximately an hour after the ramming incident), the Yuemaobinyu 422212 detected and allegedly berthed. Meanwhile, the borne-out F/B GEMVIR was transported towards the Caminawit, San Jose port. It also says that five months ago, around January 25th, the Chinese vessel was seen in the area.

A few hours after the news went viral, the Department of National Defense of the Philippines released the following statement:

“A collision between a Chinese and Filipino vessel was reported by Filipino fishermen near the Recto Bank in the West Philippine Sea on the evening of June 9, 2019. The collision sank the Filipino vessel. This is not the expected action from a responsible and friendly people.”

On June 13th, the Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro “Teddy” Locsin stated that the Philippines issued a diplomatic protest over the ship-ramming incident in the West Philippine Sea. The country’s top diplomat also described the collision on social media as “contemptible and condemnable.” Locsin’s statement was echoed up by an assessment from the Philippine military’s western command (WESCOM), and Alexander Pama, a  former chief of the Philippine Navy, said that there was no doubt that the Chinese vessel had intentionally hit the Philippine boat. Subsequently, the mayor of the town of San Jose in Occidental Mindoro expressed his belief the Chinese vessel had intentionally collided with the Filipino boat.

China released a press release admitting that a Chinese vessel from the province of hit a Filipino vessel in the vicinity of Reed Bank on June 9th. Interestingly, it claimed that the Chinese fishing boat Yuemaobinyu 42212 was “berthed” in the area when seven or eight Filipino fishing boats “besieged” it. Beijing stated that China regards its relationship with the Philippines relationship and the safety of life at sea with high importance and that it would continue to properly handle this issue with the Philippines seriously and responsibly. 

China maintained its claim that there was no such thing as a “hit-and-run.” Furthermore, on June 13th, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang called the incident “an ordinary maritime traffic accident” and said that China was still investigating the matter. “If the relevant reports are true, regardless of the country from which the perpetrator came from, their behavior should be condemned,” the Chinese official said. Intriguingly, statements were removed from the Chinese Embassy’s social media pages the Friday after the incident but were reposted on the Chinese Embassy’s official Twitter page one day later.

Philippine Navy chief Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad confirmed that the Chinese vessel which came into contact with a Filipino fishing boat and caused it to sink was no accident, but a deliberate maneuver to ram the smaller craft. Also, Gemvir 1 crewmembers had made it clear that it was a Chinese vessel that rammed their boat and not a Vietnamese vessel, as some officials had insinuated.

According to Junel Insigne, captain of the Filipino vessel, “Umikot muna sila, binalikan kami, sinindi yung maraming ilaw, nung nakita kaming lubog na, pinatay yung ilaw ulit bago umatras, bago tumakbo palayo (They circled us, went back, switched on their lights. When they saw us sinking, they switched off their lights and hurriedly left),” adding he could tell they were Chinese because of the type of ship lights. “Kung wala dun yung Vietnam, baka mamatay na kaming lahat (If the Vietnamese weren’t there, we would have died).”

Moreover, the Navy Chief said at the Maritime Symposium held at The Manila Hotel on June 14th that “The Filipino vessel was anchored. So when based on the International Rules of the Road, it had the privilege because it could not evade […] the ship was rammed. This is not a normal incident. The boat was anchored.” In similar instances, the Armed Forces of the Philippines may assist the relevant government agency in conducting a formal inquiry on the incident, given that it caused the fishermen and the boat owners over 2 million Philippine pesos worth of damages. It included about three tons of fish with an estimated worth of P1 million; P500,000 in capital, and P700,000 for the fishing boat.

Financial assistance was provided one week after the incident occurred. Agriculture Secretary Emmanuel Piñol, through the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), released P25,000 for each of the 22 fishermen under the Survival Response (SURE) Loan Program to help them recover losses incurred. Aside from financial assistance, the government, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource (BFAR), committed to grant the fishermen 30-footer fiberglass boats fully outfitted with engine and nets, in addition to 11 boats—each of which would be shared by two fishermen—in order for them to have a source of additional income while the F/B GEM-VIR 1 is being repaired. 

The government also tapped the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) for additional funding. The funding will not be limited to assisting the 22 fishermen, but will also be used to buy ice-making machines and cold storage for fishing grounds nationwide. Meanwhile, Vice President Leni Robredo gave P50,000 in financial assistance (under the Angat Buhay Program) to fisherman as she visited them in Mindoro.

Strategic Analysis

The 1951 San Francisco Treaty failed to assign possession of the Spratly Islands when Japan lost its title to them following its defeat in the Second World War. Article 2 states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” 

The Spratly Islands constitutes the chain of 200 islets, coral reefs, and seamounts. Its northern extension, the Paracel Islands, spreads across 250,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea, a vast continental shelf that constitutes a potentially rich source of oil and natural gas. It went further into an international conflict when several claimants began extracting resources from the seabed contiguous to their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the mid-70s. China, Taiwan, and four ASEAN states − Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam − all laid claim and occupied part of the islands in the South China Sea. The contested ownership over the Spratly Islands continues to be a key point of contention.

Meanwhile, a significant aspect of the territorial dispute in the South China Sea concerns China’s construction in the area. China has engaged in large-scale land reclamation activities in seven reefs (Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef) in the disputed Spratly Islands. In other words, China’s act from the past two weeks shows uncertainty from the previous records of reclamation and actual tension over its bid to resolve the issue. While the issue is no longer a dispute, it begs the question of sincerity and managing the maritime area, given that it has been decided since July 12^th, 2016 in the Hague Ruling on Arbitration Case.

As for the recent event, it very clearly shows the strategy of China’s psychological operations (PsyOps). For the first time, The United States Department of Defense dragged this paramilitary force (People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia/PAFMM under Paramilitary Forces) out of the shadows in 2017 in its annual report on Chinese military power. The Pentagon said the maritime militia is used to “enforce maritime claims and advance China’s interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.” In the 2018 report, the department said that the maritime militia (Chinese Yuen Tai Yu) plays a significant role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting. They live up to Sun Tzu’s statement in the Art of War: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio says it’s highly likely that a Chinese maritime militia vessel rammed the Filipino fishing vessel F/B Gimber 1 in the West Philippine Sea on June 9^th. Carpio stated, “this may signal the start of a new “gray zone” offensive by China to drive away Filipino fishing vessels in the West Philippine Sea, in the same way, that China is driving away Vietnamese fishing vessels in the Paracels.” Whether this claim by the lead magistrate bids for the verity of the maritime militia of China, it also yields the expectation that Vietnam also has militias. If other Asian countries can do so, this is also another avenue for the Philippines to develop among its citizens, like its Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) or Civilian Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, it would be much easier to probe the incident in the said area of operation if there was a vessel monitoring system put in place just like the lighthouses located nearby Benham Rise. The Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement (IUUF) Act of 2015 required countries to closely monitor foreign vessels through inspections and enforcement. This could be through satellite or non-satellite-based ship monitoring systems with installed transponders in every fishing boat. If this is enabled, this will transmit speed, location, proximity, and a faster tracking measure by passers or the vessels in real-time.

In support the IUUF, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) would have the authority to make more vessel inspections, deny port entry to vessels that illegally fish, and share the inspection data with other countries. The hope is that this will strategically communicate to the rest of the world that the Philippines is serious about cracking down on IUU fishing too, where maritime crimes are also being taken advantage of by poachers and intruders. To avoid such confrontation in the maritime domain, as said in international rules, stationary vessels should be avoided. Thus, the crew-members of oceangoing vessels, as well as commanding officers of warships, should be knowledgeable of the International Rules of the (maritime) Road. And lastly, the Philippine Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety Services Command shall exhaustively investigate the case.

In time, the prosecution must pursue the actual perpetrators who not only violated the rule of law but also committed economic sabotage on the Filipino fishermen whose livelihoods are dependent on fishing. According to Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and an expert on the geopolitics of the South China Sea, “if the Chinese vessel had deliberately rammed a stationary Filipino boat, it would be a clear breach of international norms.” Gregory Poling, Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, said that a large number of Chinese fishing vessels had been discovered in the Subi and Mischief Reefs of the Spratly Islands in 2018. He also noted at one point that all claimants must “find the path forward to manage these disputes before something breaks.”

If China is indeed found to be the responsible party after a “joint investigation,” despite efforts by those opposed to probing the incident, then China shall be held liable. China will continue to analyze the situation as it waits for feedback from the Philippines. China may also expand more in the West Philippine Sea as part of its regional strategy while engaging in a balancing act with the Philippines to maximize benefits from surpluses caused by trade tensions with the U.S. and at the same time trading with the Philippines and strengthening ties using silk roads. 

Mr. Lucio Pitlo III of Ateneo De Manila University and a Research Fellow to Asia Pacific Pathways for Progress Foundation Inc. says that the South China Sea dilemma still allows competition and cooperation among China and ASEAN. He said that “the Philippines plays its best despite being small. Small states’ curse is usually impacted by big states (whether they make love or make war). There is always an impact, but we can implore them not to engage in war.”

In sum, renewed tension creates challenges in many ways: trust and confidence among parties involved, forging alliances for stronger maritime cooperation (i.e. ASEAN-U.S., ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN+3, and Philippines-PRC), strategic policy and direction for ASEAN to push for a Code of Conduct sooner or later, semantics and narratives of various media mileage exploiting the masses and social media through news and propagandas on the side (i.e. President Duterte’s usage of  “little maritime accident”), legal and diplomatic luminaries with different stands, political vis-a-vis decision making from the top-level, crisis communication systematized strategy, the balancing act among states in trade while the issue at hand is being exploited by interest groups abroad, how reliable the rules-based approach and multilateralism that the two countries have not been in-sync in previous negotiations, and the domestic politics affecting how political proponents react and implement.

The Way Forward

While this incident may have impaired the diplomatic relations of the two states, the Philippines needs to maintain open lines of communication given the robust economic ties and high-dense investment that both states have already engaged in since 2016. Simultaneously, the Philippines has to be increasingly cautious with its actions since any miscalculation may result in more coercive tactics by China in the South China Sea. 

Technically speaking, the situation is far from open conflict, since bilateral economic cooperation has been improved under the current administration. It will  and should always be China seeking closer partnership with the Philippines—not the other way around. The Philippines will always present China with a dilemma and an opportunity. on China’s dilemma and opportunity. Though others view the diplomatic protest of the Department of Foreign Affairs as hypocritical, even if China ignores the protests (as it often does), the Philippines still stands to benefit. We do not want to repeat the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and the 2015 encounter of Filipino fishermen in the same area. During that time, the Philippines also lodged diplomatic protests with China over two alleged fishing-related incidents at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

We also have to be consistent in not tolerating such lies or fabrication for that matter (reversing the issue against Filipino fishermen), like the way China used as a pushback in 2013 Arbitration Case when they said that the tribunal (Permanent Court of Arbitration/PCA) debunked China’s claim of ownership to over 85.7% of enclosed water claimed by China using “nine-dash line,” which has no factual or legal basis.

In the long run, the Philippines has to push for and completely support the strict implementation of the Code of Conduct which has been overdue since 2017, when it was first discussed at the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines with other member-states. Despite President Rodrigo Duterte expressing concern and disappointment over the delay in the negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea last 34th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit Retreat on June 23rd, it still has to be supported by member states as an integral policy to push forward. Domestically, the Philippines needs to initiate fishing boat modernization programs, since the majority of the fishing boats being used in the Philippines are made from wood. Of course, Manilla needs an updated crisis communication system to be established with effective strategic communication from government agencies like DND, AFP, NSC, NICA, and the Office of the President. They have to formalize dialogue before issuing a press release to the public to avoid changing words from time to time.

In short, the June 9th incident is a wake-up call not only for the political and security sectors. Most of all, however, it is vital for the security of the commercial fishing industry, environmental protection, and especially human capital (in this case, Filipino fishermen). This is not just about those 22 Filipino fishermen; the entire population of the Philippines is dependent on maritime and food security as well.

Indeed, the Philippines has consistently presented grievances through multilateral forums, while China prefers bilateral negotiation. In other words, China has always opted for one-on-one talks about managing tensions in the absence of external actors. For us, China’s international security activism coupled with maritime gray zone operation, will continue in a multipolar regional security order. The most optimal way to manage this is to adhere to the rule of law while expanding economic connections with reliable trade partners to sustain national security based on national sovereignty and reducing hegemonic dependency. The Philippines must make use of all mechanisms at its disposal before asking for help.

Renewed Tensions Between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.

NPA tactics of dispersal, concentration, and shifting can be viewed from two perspectives: in line with their activities or ideological, political, and organizational (IPO) efforts as well as about that of the enemy, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). To conduct extortion and other malign activities, NPA territorial platoons break up into squads to cover the area of the platoon within the guerrilla zone (GZ) with each squad having an assigned number of 10 barrios at an average.

The SDG (Sentro de Grabidad, which serves as a “rallying point of all other NPA units engaged in military or mass works in the guerrilla front”) disperses with its squads only deployed in a shorter distance from a relative center conducting the same activities. Both platoons consolidate during conferences, training, and assessment exercises. Shifting is done when a platoon transfers to a different area within the same guerrilla front (GF) or to a different front to participate in a new mission or for a more specific reason, like augmenting the forces of the neighboring GF.

The NPA has also been externally linked with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) where financial aid is being used to entice both members of the Lumad ethnicity and others to dig in. Yunit Milisyang Bayan (MBs), a highly acclaimed foothold of NPA, has driven a lot of Lumads to take part in the revolution from the ground. As an organized group, they are being armed by NPA themselves to become rogue members of NPA units. For instance, Surigao’s ALCADEV (Alternative Learning Center for Agricultural Development) secures foreign funding from Europe for a hidden agenda—instilling the belief that the government cannot help them, the only groups that can are CPP cadres disguised as teachers, management committees, and even politicians. As usual, with the support of legal fronts, the issue of confronting this will die down in the process because of the protection and bias of various interest groups in favor with NPA. Legal fronts are composed of the following: the Makabayan bloc—Bayan, Anakbayan, Karapatan, Anakpawis, Act Teachers, Gabriela, and all other related groups.

In the aftermath of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte‘s 2017 State of the Nation Address (SONA), the CPP-NPA exploited the President’s controversial statement that Lumad schools were being run and manipulated by CPP-NPA. According to Armed Forces of the Philippines ‘official website, the CPP-NPA employed an institutionalized self-imposed ‘Taktikang Bakwit’ as a well-versed orchestra of rhetoric directed at the President. Conversely, the Kalumbay Lumad Alliance in Northern Mindanao led by Datu Jomorito Goaynon involved itself the investigation of alleged abuses and violations allegedly committed by army troops under 4ID and the PNP as well in Bukidnon, Surigao, and Agusan Provinces August 15, 2017.

According to a 2017 report by Luke Lischin, sixty-four percent of recorded incidents were armed assaults involving the exchange of small arms fire (at a minimum) between the NPA and other actors, 19 percent were attacks on facilities or infrastructure such as mining sites, plantations, and vehicles, while the remaining incidents entailed abductions, arrests, and assassinations/executions.

Further, the CPP-NPA has also initiated a socio-politico strategy of linkage. The Save Our Schools Network (SOS Network) is essentially an extension of the communist party working to subversively influence target populations by using powerful institutions and personalities in their disinformation operations, masked by the appearance of charitable work. This influence campaign supports the efforts of militants, which routinely violate the CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law).

In part, the rejection of activism as a concept stems from a belief that a sufficient amount of change has already been made. In connection therewith, many lives of promising students recruited into the organization ended too soon and too tragically because they crossed the path to armed struggle. We can see that rebel life was being romanticized by insurgents, adding that in truth, it was a portal to a life of suffering, violence, and crime. Thus, activism and membership in specific organizations could lead to a violent fate. This way of thinking emerges when people frame the righting of great historical wrongs as concessions that one group has personally made, in largesse bestowed in some ongoing negotiation (i.e., peace talks) for which there must be a quid pro quo.

In assessing prominent Communist politicians in government and their prospects for gaining power in a legislative manner, particularly now that national elections are nearing, one could arguably make the case that it would take years to accomplish such a goal. The CPP’s aim has always been to overthrow any individual in a leadership position. Such actions were initiated by during the administrations of three former Presidents—Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III.

The CPP-NPA successfully ousted former President Estrada in January 2001 through the Erap Resign Movement but failed to oust both Presidents Gloria Arroyo and Noynoy Aquino through their Oust Arroyo campaign in 2006, and Kilusang Talsik in 2013. The CPP-NPA is currently engaged in the Oust Duterte Movement under a “Grand Coalition,” and are also working on other anti-Duterte initiatives—the Coalition For Justice (CFJ) and the Tindig Pilipinas.

The Coalition For Justice (CFJ) is composed of a group of judges led by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, the Evangelical Church led by Pastor Caloy Dino, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) with Attorney Susan Villanueva as the lead personalities. Meanwhile, Tindig Pilipinas is composed of the rejectionist (RJ) group, Liberal Party and Magdalo Group with Senator Antonio Trillanes, Congressman Gary C Alejano (who campaigned for a Senate seat), Aleta Tolentino, and Ricky Garchitorena as the lead personalities.

Moreover, now that the national election will happen in the same month when Marawi Siege erupted despite its liberation from the hands of Maute-ISIS inspired terrorists, rumors, hearsays, and atrocious commentaries have been circulating to dissuade the people from believing Government’s efforts regarding Marawi rehabilitation. Recently, members of the House Makabayan bloc filed a Resolution 1973 seeking an investigation into the human rights situation and the status of reconstruction in the Islamic City of Marawi.

The resolution was spearheaded by ACT-Teachers  Reps. Antonio Tinio and Frances Castro, Gabriela Reps. Emmi de Jesus and Arlene Brosas, Bayan Muna Rep.  Carlos   Zarate,  Anakpawis  Rep.  Ariel  Casilao,   and   Kabataan Rep. Sarah Elago specifically asked the House committees on human rights and Muslim affairs to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on reports of human rights violations in Marawi and   other   grave   concerns   of   the   local   people   on   the   government’s   post-siege rehabilitation   plans   in   Marawi.   Meanwhile,   Amnesty   International,   in its report on November 2017 said that the Philippine security forces violated the prohibition on the use of torture and other ill-treatment of people in their custody, adding that most of the violations were carried out against civilians who were escaping from the besieged lakeside town and seeking military protection.

In one case, Bayan Muna Rep. Carlos Isagani Zarate cited an alleged Armed Forces of the Philippine’s (AFP) anomaly wherein the P192.5  million Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) program in Maguindanao is unconstitutional and promoted corruption. Zarate, as is his style, jumped on the bandwagon of Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza’s recent statement that he decided to return the extra amount in exchange for a newer version of the budget resolution to be used for allocating funds going forward. They argued that the Peace Talks are a worn-out psychological warfare tactic designed to project victory while concealing the continuing failure of the AFP to suppress the popular resistance and stem the steady growth of the NPA.

Meanwhile, last year, the CPP trade union campaign was developed by the National Organization Department (NOD)—specifically the National Trade Union Bureau (NTUB)—with former DOLE Undersecretary Joel Maglunsod serving as a critical player. When PRRD declared his intentions to stop the practice of ENDO—the so-called “labor contractualization,” Secretary Bebot Bello and Undersecretary Maglunsod collaborated in coming up with the Department Order 174, which imposed workers regulations. Maglunsod, an active member of the CPP operating inside DOLE, led the national audit and inspection of all labor force situation in big companies and industries, with the dubious participation of a known CPP legal organization, the KMU.

Currently, the CPP-NPA also co-opts the grievances of Marawi residents with grave concerns and frustrations over the lack of a clear and comprehensive rehabilitation plan for internally  displaced   persons, a lack of recognition and   accountability over intelligence failures on the part of the government, inability to stem the flow of terrorist groups into Marawi, an absence of any government statement or commitment to indemnify lost lives or provide compensation for damaged property, no assurance of assistance in rebuilding damaged or destroyed mosques and madrasahs, and the apparent absence of a clear government plan for lifting martial law in Mindanao.

The CPP’s rhetoric advances their interests to position the party at all levels of the political hierarchy—from the individual level to party-list representatives. This strategy is designed to counter the government’s initiatives on charter reform and federalism. Thus, the CPP-NPA are wary over the potential to reform the country’s system of government to a more federalist structure, as this will abolish the Party-list system, which would severely affect the entire organization. This was validated by José María Canlás Sison’s statement citing that “federalism is meant to concentrate executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the hands of Duterte.”

Externally, the European Union’s funding for Communist Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), along with UN Special Rapporteur for the Indigenous People (UNSRIP) and similar EU agencies, reveal that the CPP-NPA has successfully established international alliances through front organizations—purportedly to address social ills afflicting Filipino society.

Through its International Department, infiltrating the UN and engaging the EU through “Lakbay Lumad Europe,” to achieve the eventual revival of the People’s Permanent Tribunal, the CPP-NPA intends to humiliate the Duterte administration in international arena purposely to reinforce the initiative of delegitimizing the President on the international stage. According to CNN Philippines, the CPP-NPA is on EU’s list of terrorist organizations, yet the government’s motion to label communist rebels as terrorists is still pending before a local court.

Among the listed Philippine NGOs were the Alternative Learning Center for Agricultural and Livelihood Development (ALCADEV); IBON Foundation; Karapatan; Mindanao Interfaith Services Foundation, Inc.; the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines; the Salugpungan Ta’tanu Igkanugon Community Learning Center, Inc.; the Alliance of Health Workers; the Kilusang Mayo Uno; Gabriela; and ACT. Meanwhile, the ALCADEV and Salugpungan are identified as CPP-NPA alternative learning centers and schools.

In response, the National Security Adviser and Vice Chairman of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTFELCAC) Hermogenes Esperon formally wrote to the European Union (EU) to “immediately cease” funding to groups serving as legal fronts of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. In a letter to Gilles De Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, dated March 26, Esperon said EU funds are being used to sustain terrorist activities of the longest-lasting existing communist terrorist organization in the world—the CPP-NPA—which is listed as a terrorist group by both the United States and the EU.

On March 28, 2019, the EU received a set of documents concerning the more specific allegations by the Government. As a result, the EU issued a Press Statement stating that “since 2005 the EU considers the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army as terrorist groups, which means, among other things, that no assets can be held in EU by these organizations.”

The European Union’s commitment investigate the government’s allegations that EU funds have been donated to groups acting as legal fronts of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing New People’s Army (NPA) is clear, as outlined in the statement. In April, it was announced that an external firm would be auditing EU grants to non-government organizations (NGOs) in the Philippines that were allegedly funneled to the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). The EU did not just commit to looking into the voluminous documents the NTF (National Task Force) has submitted; it also committed to enlisting a third-party firm to audit the funds they donated to NGOs reported having links with the CPP-NPA.

CPP-NPA and the Duterte Administration: Realpolitik in Insurgency and Terrorism was originally published on Global Security Review.

Five decades of insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines has presented a socio-political dilemma for both the government and the general public. From the perspective of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, New People’s Army (NPA), the platform espoused by the Duterte administration’s tagline of “change is coming” has been not realized until now. The NPA’s actions of late reveal a presumption of justification of its violent struggle, as protracted infighting within its ranks draws increased attention from the authorities and society at-large.

The government’s over-arching strategy is to prevent communist rebels from committing atrocities and acts of violence going forward. Increased engagement on the part of the government highlights the policy guidance of President Rodrigo Duterte, amidst conflicting internal and external factors as well as joint cooperative operations (i.e., AFP-DND’s DSSP Kapayapaan 2017 and an audit request to the European Union over the alleged funding of communist NGOs).

Even after the fiftieth anniversary of Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on December 26, 2018, there are two compelling and competing dilemmas in Philippine political climate that may or may not come to a head until the end of this year. The first is a continued push for charter change (CHA-CHA), vis-a-vis legal reformation, and a restructuring of the political system (i.e., Federalism). The second is finding a resolution over the insurgent and terrorist activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA) through the resumption of peace talks.

The current negotiations, to date, are the longest–running peace talks since the CPP-NPA began its armed struggle. After years of guerrilla warfare, disinformation, and a strategy which is heavily influenced by communism and radical left-leaning ideology, the NPA’s seemingly newfound use of terror tactics attempts to sway the minds of many to favor the group’s cause, as well as to drive recruitment to boost its numbers.

Between January 16 and February 1, 2017—six months after Duterte was inaugurated as president—the NPA was involved in fifteen incidents, nine of which occurred on January 30. Around the same time, talks between the NDFP and GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines) proceeded in Rome from January 19-25, which involved discussion of the implementation of the NDFP’s socioeconomic reform program. Though the talks were considered productive by all parties, it resulted in few concessions by either side. In particular, the GRP maintained its refusal to release 392 NDFP prisoners from custody until the issue of amnesty was fleshed out.

On January 30, 2017, the NPA broke a ceasefire with simultaneous assaults in Mati, Surigao Del Norte, Valencia City, Bukidnon, Pag-asa, Lebe, Sarangani, Union, Compostella Valley, San Isidro, Mahayahay, Hinambangan, Kitcharao, and Agusan Del Norte. Subsequently, on February 1, the NPA unilaterally called off its ceasefire, citing the failure of the GRP to release their political prisoners and generally abide by the terms of the ceasefire. In response, on February 3, Duterte withdrew the GRP from its ceasefire in response. In May 2017, President Duterte suspended peace talks with the NDFP, accusing communist rebels of attacking government forces while engaging in negotiations. Months later, on November 23, 2017, President Duterte signed Proclamation No. 360 that formally terminated the talks. Eleven days later, he issued Proclamation No. 374, declaring the CPP and the NPA to be terrorist organizations.

To counter the Duterte administration’s moves, CPP had a Second International Conference on the Indigenous Peoples in Metro Manila (July 2018). This conference intended to portray the Filipino government as having committed human rights violations. The UN High Commission and European Union acted as third-party assessors for the conference.

Despite its substantial experience with running counter-insurgency campaigns over fifty years, the Philippines remains plagued with insurgent groups. After launching numerous assaults based on purportedly effective methodologies and sound concepts, why is the government unable to defeat the CPP-NPA? Such questions that continue to linger in the minds of not only those in government but of the general public, as well.

The CPP-NPA Theater of Power

An analysis of the works of Jose Maria Sison (JOMA)—such as the Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party! (1968), Our Urgent Tasks (between 1969 and 1975), and Specific Characteristics of our People’s War (1971)—reveals that the main difference between the new communist party founded by JOMA in 1968 to that of its precursor, the old communist party of the Lavas’ and Taruc is the former’s emphasis on the importance of a sound mass base. The works above also provide for the phasing and general direction of the revolution which calls for the adoption of stages in the development of revolution through a protracted war of encircling the cities from the countryside and by concentrating first on building a strong base and a peasant army.

Based on the said works of JOMA, the old party pushed for the immediate overthrow of the “reactionary” government by directly confronting the military. Without a stable base to launch its offensive, the former party became vulnerable to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) counter-offensive. Learning from this mistake, the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) of JOMA and its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA) established Guerrilla Fronts (GFs) all throughout the Philippine archipelago to spread out the AFP and dissipate it away from the seat of national government in Metro Manila purposely to provide initiative and flexibility to the Party and the Army.

The CPP-NPA document Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward! (1991) reveals that an ideological split in the early 1990s among the CPP-NPA’s top leaders over the general direction that the revolution shall follow resulted in a divide between the “Rejectionist” (anti-Sison) bloc and the “Reaffirmist” (pro-Sison) bloc. The “Reaffirmists” accused the “Rejectionists” of leftist adventurism and rightist opportunism that undermined the revolution. The leftist adventurists departed from the protracted war concept and pushed the revolution into the urban centers, while the rightist opportunists espoused legal and parliamentary participation as the primary means of struggle relegating the armed struggle to the backdrop.

The document, together with other CPP-NPA published documents, also called for the implementation of the “back to basics” program to correct deviations and repudiate in particular the strategic counter-offensive (SCO) concept of the “leftist adventurists.” The SCO concept had resulted in large NPA formations decimated by the AFP. Also mentioned in the document is the assertion made by JOMA that the strength of the NPA is still in no match to the AFP. He directed to break down the NPA military formations back into platoons and squads and intensify mass works to recover the lost mass base left unchecked and regained by the AFP. JOMA pointed out that the continued decline of the party’s base would isolate both the party and army, as happened to the old CPP.

An analysis of the CPP-NPA documents previously mentioned as well as to other CPP-NPA Anniversary Statements published over the past two decades would disclose that the “back to basics” program of the 1990s was designed to alter the NPA development from vertical to horizontal in order to enable the NPA platoons and squads to cover a wider area and build as many GFs as possible, necessary for the survival of the Party and the Army.

In terms of ongoing counter-insurgency methodologies, the AFP has come up with Internal Security Operations (ISO) concepts and methods to address the internal security threats. One of these is the triad concept of Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Intelligence, and Combat Operations. There has been much debate over the years as to which triad component shall prevail over the rest.

The Philippine government grappled for the right solution to the country’s communist insurgency problem, while the AFP—with a mandate to conduct ISOs—initiated several campaigns to address this primary threat to the country’s internal peace and security, with little success. The ascent to the presidency by the then Senator Benigno Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III in the 2010 national election through an overwhelming victory gave hope for a speedy resolution of armed conflicts in the country.

The Aquino administration promoted the peace process as the centerpiece of its internal security program anchored on the overarching concept of “Unified Action,” a holistic approach which emphasizes that “the AFP will focus on the military dimension, while it will be supporting and/or assisting other government agencies in the economic and political dimensions” of insurgency (AFP Strategic Intent, p. 12). As regards to ISOs, “a grand plan in dealing with internal threats, including the non-traditional actors, had been laid out through the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) (Ibid., p.10).” While it is indisputablee that the AFP’s success in all of the aforesaid mission areas is crucial, it cannot also be an overstatement that its success in ISO is as critical as ever, for in order to focus on other mission areas especially in Territorial Defense, the current internal threats must be addressed first and foremost.

Defeating the Philippine’s Communist Rebellion was originally published on Global Security Review.

In contrast to its predecessors, the Trump administration has brought about some relevant changes to U.S. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “inter-state strategic competition” has reappeared as the principal threat to U.S. national security.

Similarly, the 2017 National Security Strategy contends that China—together with Russia—threatens to challenge “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” In short, China must be considered a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power” as it is promoting a worldview utterly “antithetical” to U.S. values and interests.

Each subsequent strategic and operational document released by the Trump administration since the National Security Strategy (2018 Nuclear Posture Review; 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0; 2019 Missile Defense Review) has chorused those conclusions. After unveiling the 2017 NSS, the White House imposed tariffs on China in response to allegedly unfair trade practices.

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The United States first imposed tariffs on $3 billion worth of goods and then enacted measures on another $50 billion. In September of 2018, the U.S. imposed a 10% tariff on approximately $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, with a possibility of a rise to 25% in January 2019. The U.S. and China negotiated a temporary truce over further protectionist escalation at the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires in December 2018, averting an increase in tariffs on Chinese exports. Nevertheless, competition between the U.S. and China is expected to endure, primarily in the economic and technological realms, forcing Washington and Beijing into an uneasy peace.

After four decades of economic growth, China today is a great power, eager to pursue its strategic interests. On a global level, however, China is bound by structures, institutions, procedures, and rules that have been promoted by the United States since 1945, and ultimately standardized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Regionally, Chinese expansionism is constrained by the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke security system that binds the United States with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region (primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand). Policymakers should keep the following four points in mind when developing China policies—these four “nots” are essential for understanding Chinese behavior, goals, and interests.

1. The center of political authority in China is NOT Xi Jinping; it’s the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to downplay the role Xi has played in fueling China’s global ambitions—rather, since 1978, it has been the Party that ultimately drives China’s foreign policy and grand strategic goals. It has always been since 1978. If Xi wants to implement a new vision or global agenda, he nevertheless needs the Party’s approval. Additionally, as Rush Doshi contends, concepts usually attributed to Xi such as “national rejuvenation,” “strategic opportunity,” and “China’s great power status,” were laid down before Xi rose to the apex of the CCP in November 2012.
2. China’s revisionist behavior is NOT revolutionary; It’s incremental and selective. As Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory states, there are two plausible paths of systemic revisionism: incremental and revolutionary. Incrementalism aims to implement “continuous adjustments within the framework of the existing system,” while revolution occurs with “intermittent abrupt changes.” Empowered by forty-years of unprecedented economic growth, Beijing eventually became more assertive and demanding of what it perceives is a more accommodating and beneficial international order, but stopped short of attempting a sweeping and radical restructuring of the global order. Thus, as Evan Feigenbaum states, China is carrying out revisionist policies through an incremental and selective approach rather than a revolutionary one.
3. China is NOT a peer competitor to the U.S. at present, but it could be in the future. Today, Chinese economic growth has run aground as Xi Jinping pursues structural reforms to shepherd the country into a more sustainable and domestic-consumption-driven path, a move which will inevitably stimy economic growth. Furthermore, a formidable strand of literature (see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Michael Beckley and Andrea and Mauro Gilli) has flourished in recent years stressing China’s deficiencies while outlining obstacles to reaching parity with the United States. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth accurately identify national military, economic and technological capabilities that are “tailored for superpower status,” but conclude that “the one-superpower [the U.S.] system is not on the cusp of structural change” and that “there has been no transformation in its fundamental operating dynamics,” despite Chinese advances.
4. China is NOT out-of-the-way; it’s in-the-way. Globalization and forty years of normalized diplomatic relations have intertwined Beijing and Washington on multiple fronts: currency reserves, trade, investments, industrial complementarity, cultural exchanges, international security matters in which both parties have interests, and more. As Michael Swaine appraised, disentangling—or decoupling—a relationship of such complexity, while addressing critical nodes, will require more than labeling China as an existential threat and discarding China’s contribution to global security and prosperity.

Beijing is a revisionist power, but it is not necessarily a subversive actor on the global stage. Indeed, as the U.K. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee recently assessed, “China is a force for order, but not liberal order.” For its part, the Trump Administration is advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that, despite promoting strong global cohesion in the face of China’s rise, displays a proclivity for unilateralism. Policymakers should consider the four “nots” as a starting point for developing a long-term strategy for countering Chinese revisionism.

The Four “Nots” to Correctly Interpreting China’s Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the region’s economic and security landscape continues to evolve, and as Chinese interests in the region grow, the United States government must increase its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through two avenues: first, by confirming an ambassador to ASEAN, and second, by sending President Trump as the head of the U.S. delegation to the 2019 East Asia Summit (EAS). These two actions would send a powerful message about American interest in promoting economic partnership, balancing against Chinese influence, and promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia.

The East Asia Summit represents one of the most important diplomatic events in the region. Featuring heads of state and government from ASEAN members and invited guests, the EAS provides a forum for high-level engagement in a key strategic part of the world for American security and trade interests. In recognition of this reality, President Obama attended the event on five separate occasions after the United States first received an invitation to the summit in 2011. In the past two years, however, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Vice President Mike Pence have attended the summit instead of the president. Leading the American delegation to this year’s EAS would allow President Trump to show partners in ASEAN that America remains committed to dialogue and collaboration in the region, even as China increasingly asserts its own interests there.

The president’s attendance at the East Asian Summit would provide the United States with a high-profile opportunity to demonstrate resolve in Southeast Asia. Additionally, filling the vacant position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would expand the number of channels for more sustained engagement. At this pivotal point for the region, the U.S. government must deepen its dialogue with regional partners even as the president attends this year’s summit to convey America’s high-level interest in Southeast Asia. China has recognized the importance of sending an ambassador to ASEAN, maintaining this representation without interruption since 2008. Given last year’s adoption of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, this role will only grow in importance.

These steps forward in American engagement with ASEAN member states are increasingly necessary.

According to the China Global Investment Tracker, a collaboration between the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, Chinese overseas investment in ASEAN member states has exceeded $55 billion since 2017. In Vietnam, for example, Chinese foreign investment has totaled almost $4 billion since the beginning of 2017. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the host country of the U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Chinese investment reached nearly $9 billion in the same time period.

As February’s controversy surrounding the role of Chinese firm Huawei Technologies in the Thai government’s 5G infrastructure initiative demonstrates, however, increased economic integration between China and ASEAN member states can come at a significant cost. In this environment, the United States must utilize diplomatic means to underscore continued economic engagement in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, these actions would send a message to the region: the United States seeks deeper diplomatic, economic, and strategic engagement with the nations of Southeast Asia, both on a more consistent basis and at the highest possible levels. Following last year’s passage of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), confirming a nominee for the position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would also signal continued support for heightened American involvement in the region by both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch. As China seeks to extend its influence among ASEAN member states through the simultaneous uses of inducement and intimidation, protecting U.S. interests in the region needs a whole-of-government response.

ASEAN presents the United States with more opportunities than challenges.

China has recognized the strategic importance of the region and taken action to engage economically and diplomatically. The combined gross domestic product of ASEAN member states exceeds $2.5 trillion. Defense spending among littoral states surrounding the South China Sea will likely reach $250 billion annually by 2020. The president should travel to the East Asia Summit this year in pursuit of those opportunities for partnership, and he should nominate someone to serve as U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN to do the same.

In the past, the United States led the way in engaging with ASEAN. The government sent an ambassador to the organization’s headquarters and established a diplomatic mission there before any other non-member state. President Obama represented the United States at the East Asia Summit five times in six years; President Xi Jinping has yet to attend the gathering, and President Vladimir Putin attended for the first time last year. Confirming a qualified individual for the vacant ambassadorship and sending the president to this year’s summit would signify American leadership in engaging with ASEAN once again.

Two Ways for the United States to Deepen Diplomatic Engagement with ASEAN was originally published on Global Security Review.

In reference to China’s foreign policy strategy, Deng Xiaoping once said: “hide your strength, bide your time.” For three decades, Chinese foreign policy was implemented accordingly. As China realigned itself as a market economy, it seemed content in its role as the  “world’s factory;” at the same time, the rest of the world was content with cheap consumer goods that were produced in China.

In recent years, however, Xi Jinping has overseen a significant shift in China’s foreign policy. China has become increasingly assertive in pursuit of its national security, foreign policy, and economic interests both in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world, from Asia to Latin America. China’s policies and behaviors, from the massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea, are clear indicators that Beijing is done hiding and biding.

Significant amounts of natural resources and secure trade routes for exports are essential to ensure China’s continued economic growth. As the land components of the BRI expand across Central and Southeast Asia, the South China Sea remains a point of geopolitical volatility. The South China Sea is host to some of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. Eighty percent of China’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, strategically positioned between the countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—all of which are American allies.

China seeks to place the South China Sea firmly within its sphere of influence. Doing so would see China move from a position of geopolitical vulnerability to one of strength, effectively maintaining a “Great Maritime Wall” that would ensure China’s unfettered access to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Consolidating and solidifying its sphere of influence will be the most significant Chinese foreign policy challenge of the twenty-first century while maintaining the status quo and retaining its strategic advantage will be that of the United States.

Estimates currently project that China will be operating a fully-fledged blue-water navy by 2030. It is likely that, around this time, China will be pushing to break through the First Island Chain in the East and South China Seas that are currently controlled by U.S. allies. Until China’s hard power capabilities are fully matured, China will continue to vie for influence using diplomacy and other soft power vehicles.

China’s Soft Power Capabilities

The canonical conception of soft power is centered mainly around ideas like constitutionalism, liberal democracy, and human rights, none of which are on offer from an unapologetically authoritarian China.  While Chinese universities are drawing growing levels of international students, the fact remains that, on the whole, China’s cultural pull is meager. Its most famous artist lives in exile, state media outlet Xinhua gets little traction outside of China, and while K-pop and J-pop are widely played outside of Korea and Japan respectively, Chinese popular music has failed to capture international attention.

China may not have much to offer as an alternative to the American Dream for populations around the world, but for the leaders and governments of developing states, China presents an attractive partner. Rather than seeking investment and financial support from the Bretton Woods institutions, which require governance and human rights reforms, many governments are turning to Beijing, which attaches far fewer strings.

While China’s lack of democratization does damage its international reputation, that damage must be viewed in the context of the relative decline of American soft power. The post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have harmed the global impression of the United States as a “bringer of democracy,” to the extent that such a phrase are now mostly invoked in irony.

In Latin America, the United States’ historical sphere of influence, many states are signing bilateral agreements with China on everything from hydropower projects to the development of telecommunication networks. China’s engagement in Central and South America has resulted in it becoming the region’s largest creditor. Furthermore, as U.S. levels of domestic shale production increase, there will be less U.S. demand for foreign energy. China’s thirst for oil, on the other hand, will continue unabated. For many Latin American nations, the choice of China as an economic partner has been a straightforward one.

The appeal of China as an alternative isn’t due to Beijing’s alignment with specific ideological criteria. Instead, China is appealing because it is an alternative. China profits from the extent to which the U.S. influence declines relative to its own, not from the gravitational pull of some cultural or ideological preponderance. This means that even those pursuing Western-style governance structures will see opportunities to engage with China. For these countries, if the United States won’t purchase foreign oil, or the World Bank won’t fund a development project, China will.

China’s Carrot and Stick

The allure of the Chinese alternative is visible in the South China Sea also. In this rather authoritarian region, liberal democratic values are held in lower regard than economic prosperity and political stability. Singapore stands as a shining example that liberalism is not a prerequisite for success in these metrics. To a working class citizen in an underdeveloped province of Indonesia or the Philippines, democracy—or “democrazy” as it is sometimes termed in the region—can seem stultified and inefficient. China, as it would have the world believe, has demonstrated that its model for global engagement achieves results.

China has attempted to satisfy concerns about the nature of its investment and economic policies. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded and led by China, is an attempt to increase engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The AIIB is a signal to countries in the region that Chinese investment isn’t solely for Latin America or Africa. Furthermore, China has been willing to engage in multilateral forums and agreements as it tries to convince its neighbors that its intentions are benign.

However, Beijing has mostly failed in this regard. Chinese military activity has increased in the South China Sea. China’s naval presence in the region has increased dramatically; the Chinese Coast Guard has even escorted fishing trawlers into Indonesian waters. Beijing is working diligently—and successfully—to reduce Taiwan’s international relations.  The Nine-Dash Line (which outlines China’s South China Sea claims) continues to be a significant source of tension; the region is flush with complex, multilateral territorial disputes, any of which could erupt into conflict with little warning. 

China, for its part, never intended to assuage its neighbors’ concerns completely. Instead, China is trying to show that, while it carries a big stick, it can be reasoned with.

Indo-Pacific states are now engaged in a continuous balancing act. Each country is weighing the benefits and costs of their relationship with the established superpower (the United States) against the incipient one (China). While China moves towards the maturation of its hard power, it is perhaps operating within the last phase of biding its time. China has attempted to sell a narrative where it is the reliable power in the Indo-Pacific, rather than a country several thousand miles across the Pacific, from which the echoes of “America first” can be heard.

Alliances are Essential for Maintaining the Status Quo in Southeast Asia

Nevertheless, regional alignment remains with the U.S.—for now. Staring down vociferous Chinese criticism, South Korea placed an American anti-ballistic missile defense system on its soil. Taiwan continues to hedge against a Chinese threat by seeking closer ties with the U.S. as regular arms sales have resumed under the Trump administration. The U.S. has turned a blind eye to Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities and encouraged the evolution of its nominal self-defense force into something more potent.

The United States’ network of alliances in Southeast Asia is intact but fragile. The U.S. must remain credible to each state individually to be credible to all states collectively. Should the U.S. signal a lack of interest—such as by withdrawing from the TPP, publicly questioning the value of a de-facto independent Taiwan, or demonstrating a hesitation to fight alongside South Korea in a conflict with North Korea—its network of alliances may be compromised.

In the twenty-first century battle for influence in the South China Sea, credibility is everything. China currently sees what it perceives as a power vacuum, and it is only too happy to slide into it. Affirming its influence and presence in the Indo-Pacific will be a key U.S. foreign policy objective over the next century. To succeed, the U.S. must act with determination yet delicacy, so that it may maintain the network of alliances that currently safeguards a strategic advantage over an emergent China.  

The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

Donald Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made some surprising remarks about China and the South China Sea during his recent Senate confirmation hearings. He said the US should “send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

His comments created a furor in the international media as it seems the US might resort to force by blockading the Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea.

James Mattis, Trump’s defense secretary nominee, was more circumspect in his remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He identified defense of so-called “international waters” as the “bottom line” for the US, suggesting the US would defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea without challenging the Chinese presence there.

Mattis’ comments were in line with US policy towards the South China Sea while Tillerson’s remarks were not. But why is the South China Sea so strategically crucial to the US anyway?

The Chinese regularly castigate the Americans for “meddling” in the area and have difficulty understanding why the US takes a stand on the issue. In their view, the US is making trouble for China and preventing its rise as a high power. The Chinese want to see the Americans abandon the South China Sea and withdraw from the western Pacific.

Some commentators in the US and elsewhere agree. They argue that this would allow America to forge an accommodation with China, which would remove the prospect of conflict between the world’s two largest economies and bring peace and stability.

Others have called for a G-2 or a US-China accord that would settle global problems. They claim that the US is already overstretched and should return to the “offshore” position that it had before the Korean war broke out in 1950. Why let the South China Sea get in the way of this possible accommodation?

Chinese regional presence

The South China Sea has become critical to the US because of China’s challenge to the liberal rules-based order that America has promoted since the Pacific war. The post-war regional order was based on the American presence, which set the stage for impressive economic growth and regional prosperity without the threat of war or conflict.

It ensured that maritime disputes and territorial claims would be resolved through negotiation and not military power. And it served as the basis for the development of trade and regional economic relations from which all countries in the region benefited.

America’s concern with the South China Sea is a result of China’s effort to secure control over the maritime territory and the resources it contains. China insists on “indisputable sovereignty” over the area but some other claimants – Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines – have the law on their side.

All have exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the South China Sea, which is their right under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which the Chinese dismiss. To clarify the matter, the Philippines appealed to a tribunal convened under UNCLOS to rule on the situation.

In July 2016, the tribunal issued its judgment and upheld the rights of the ASEAN claimants to their EEZs, noting that the Chinese claim had no legal basis. China, however, has ignored legality in this dispute and is prepared to back its claim with military power. If it does not recognize the rules, the regional order that the US has been promoting breaks up.

China has militarized the Spratly Islands by engaging in reclamation projects in the South China Sea. The Chinese have been dredging sand from the ocean floor and extending the size of seven reefs they have occupied.

They have constructed three airfields there; two are 3,000 meters in length, one is 2,600 meters. These airfields can support military aircraft including bombers and large transport aircraft. With this military presence, China would be able to control the South China Sea. And its strengthened position has geopolitical consequences for the US.

The way ahead

The South China Sea has become an essential area for the implementation of China’s naval strategy, including blockading Taiwan, and power projection into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It also has some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

The Chinese often say that they respect freedom of navigation but can they be trusted? The Japanese think not. During a territorial dispute with Japan in 2010, the Chinese banned the supply of rare earth metals, which were necessary for Japan’s electronics industry, to the country.

The Chinese could block Japanese trade, which would need to be diverted elsewhere at considerable cost. Indeed, control of the South China Sea would allow China to interfere with Japanese and South Korean trade conducted through the area.

For America, then, the future of the current regional order and the security of its allies – Japan and South Korea – is at stake. To maintain its geopolitical position in the western Pacific, the US is obliged to defend the regional alliance system and reassure local powers who are concerned about China’s intentions.

Leaving the South China Sea to the Chinese would undermine that alliance system and America’s presence in the western Pacific. China would become the dominant power in the area, and regional countries would gravitate towards it.

In October 2015, the Obama Administration responded to China’s actions by launching “freedom of navigation” naval patrols in the South China Sea, sending a clear signal that America would not be chased out of the area.

By all indications, the Trump administration is likely to be more aggressive in resisting China in the South China Sea and more forceful about preventing the erosion of America’s position in the region.

Trump has already broken with diplomatic convention by speaking with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen over the phone. More can be expected to demonstrate a new American assertiveness.

One possibility is the formation of an American South China Sea naval squadron that would maintain a regular presence in the region to show the Chinese that they cannot dominate the area. The Trump administration might also strengthen security ties with Japan and attempt to orchestrate the creation of a coalition of powers bringing together Australia, India, as well as Japan, to stand up to China.

Why is the South China Sea So Important to the U.S.? was originally published on Global Security Review.