The international system is undergoing a profound global power shift characterized by the resurgence of great power competition and a broad diffusion of technical capabilities. This environment is intensifying security competition across all domains. Concurrently, the proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and other disruptive technologies has fundamentally transformed espionage and defense. The traditional landscape of counterintelligence (CI) is obsolete and requires rapid, systemic overhaul to address the increasingly amplified, technologically enabled threats posed by state and non-state actors.

Specifically, the shift to great power technological competition has expanded CI’s mandate from protecting military secrets to securing critical infrastructure, intellectual property (IP), and the integrity of the information domain. The dual-use nature of AI functions as both in support of automated espionage and a critical mechanism for preemptively anticipating and mitigating threats. The failure of the United States to strategically integrate AI into CI methodologies will result in the systemic erosion of national technological and economic advantage.

The Expanded Mandate of Modern Counterintelligence

CI functions to protect a nation’s secrets, personnel, and systems from foreign intelligence entities (FIEs). Yet today, CI must also confront a threat matrix dramatically enlarged in scope, sophistication, and velocity. The current geopolitical climate has necessitated a significant expansion of the traditional CI mission. In the context of great power competition, the most significant threat has shifted from the theft of classified military and diplomatic secrets to the large-scale acquisition of IP, trade secrets, and technological data, as highlighted in the recently released Annual Threat Assessment.

FIEs are aggressively targeting the private sector, academia, and research institutions, the very engines of national innovation through sophisticated economic espionage. Their strategic goal is not merely to obtain information, but to erode a nation’s competitive advantage and accelerate the adversary’s technological timetable, thereby shifting the global balance of power. CI must establish robust protective mechanisms that extend deep into the non-governmental technology and research ecosystem.

The dissolution of a clear distinction between peacetime competition and active conflict has resulted in a continuous state of confrontation known as the ‘gray zone’. This strategic domain is characterized by persistent, non-lethal, yet tactically damaging activities designed to achieve political objectives without triggering traditional military responses. CI must now defend against a spectrum of subtle subversion, including large-scale cyber operations, persistent penetration of networks for reconnaissance and preparatory measures, and covert attempts to manipulate political discourse and decision-making.

The globalization of commerce and technology has created intricate, interconnected supply chains. These networks present significant CI risks, as adversaries seek to compromise the integrity, trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services. By inserting “backdoors” or creating exploitable “choke points” at various nodes, adversaries establish capabilities for future exploitation. CI efforts are essential to conduct comprehensive due diligence and risk mitigation, securing these complex networks against both hardware and software compromise.

Artificial Intelligence: The Dual-Use Catalyst

AI and emerging technologies are not merely targets of modern espionage; they are simultaneously the most potent tools and the most necessary defenses in the counterintelligence battleground. This dual-use dynamic creates a challenging “AI vs. AI” scenario that demands immediate, radical adaptation. Adversaries are leveraging AI to dramatically enhance the speed, scale, and sophistication of their intelligence operations:

Automated Espionage and Big Data Analysis: AI-powered tools can automate and scale the processing, translation, and analysis of vast, heterogeneous datasets (Big Data), vastly increasing the volume and velocity of intelligence collection from both open-source intelligence and classified sources.

Adaptive Cyberattacks: Machine learning (ML) algorithms enable the development of more elusive and adaptive cyber threats. This includes automated exploitation of vulnerabilities, dynamic creation of polymorphic malware, and rapid penetration of defenses, operating at speeds that effectively outpace traditional, human-centric cybersecurity responses.

Generative AI for Influence: Generative AI can create highly realistic deepfakes (synthetic videos and audio) and synthetic narratives at scale. This facilitates sophisticated disinformation and propaganda campaigns to manipulate public opinion and conduct advanced social engineering, severely compromising the ability of institutions to discern truth from falsehood.

Three interconnected factors fundamentally redefine the scope of CI responsibility: target expansion, the blurring of conflict lines, and supply chain vulnerabilities. To effectively counter these technologically enabled threats, CI must aggressively embrace and integrate these same technologies, transforming them into proactive defensive tools:

Threat Anticipation and Predictive Analysis: AI can process and analyze massive amounts of threat data, identifying subtle, non-obvious patterns, trends, and anomalies. This capability allows CI to transition from merely reacting to threats toward predictive modeling, allowing one to forecast adversary actions before they materialize and enabling preemptive defense.

Enhanced Surveillance and Anomaly Detection: ML algorithms are crucial for the detection of subtle anomalies in network traffic, user behavior, and physical security systems that a human operator would miss. AI-driven monitoring provides real-time, large-scale pattern-of-life analysis that significantly exceeds human cognitive capacity.

Counter-Disinformation and Integrity Checks: CI requires AI-driven tools to effectively identify, analyze, and flag AI-generated propaganda, deepfakes, and synthetic media. Systems designed for content provenance and authenticity verification are essential to safeguard the integrity of the information domain and maintain public trust.

Insider Threat Mitigation: Defensively, AI can monitor internal networks to flag anomalous user behaviors such as unusual data access attempts, large data transfers, or deviations in an employee’s digital pattern-of-life. As such they assist in identifying potential insider threats before significant compromise occurs.

The Strategic Imperative

The shift of global powers and the proliferation of disruptive technologies have thrust counterintelligence into an even more important aspect of national security. The stakes of this technological arms race transcend traditional security concerns, encompassing the integrity of a nation’s innovative ecosystem, its economic competitiveness, and the resilience of its democratic institutions.

CI must rapidly evolve its strategies to prioritize the defense of economic and technological assets, and it must integrate AI as a foundational defensive technology to achieve predictive, scalable threat mitigation. Failure to aggressively master and deploy AI defenses against technologically augmented adversaries risks the systemic erosion of national advantage in a world where technological leadership is increasingly synonymous with global power. The future success of great power competition hinges directly on the adaptive capacity and technological sophistication of CI’s function.

Joshua Thibert is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with over 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and insider risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. The views of the author are his own.

Redefining Espionage: The Unseen War for Technological Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

5GW includes information dominance and manipulation, social engineering, economic coercion, cyber sabotage, and hybrid influence operations. It thrives on ambiguity, exploiting vulnerabilities without traditional combat. In 5GW, the lines between war and peace are blurred. No declarations, no clear enemies, just a relentless assault on stability. The goal is not to conquer land or destroy armies, but to cripple a nation’s spirit, economy, and infrastructure from within.

One of the most potent asymmetric tools of 5GW is economic manipulation. Palau, a serene archipelago of over 500 islands, were untouched by war until 2017. Palau dared to reject Beijing’s “One China Policy.” This move sent shockwaves through its fragile economy in the form of economic strangulation. In a masterstroke of economic coercion, China’s state-backed tour operators erased Palau from the Web.

Travel agencies stopped selling trips. Online searches yielded no results. Palau’s tourism industry, which accounted for 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), collapsed. Hotels emptied, airlines shut down, and the once-thriving economy suffocated.

This was not an anomaly, but a pattern. In 2016, South Korea agreed to facilitate the American THAAD missile defense system. China retaliated not with weapons but with economic muscle. Mysterious “fire and safety” violations suddenly appeared in South Korean businesses across China. A nine-month ban on Chinese tourism cost Seoul $6.5 billion. Retail giants like Lotte crumbled, thousands lost jobs, and yet, no war was declared.

The more interconnected the world economy becomes, the more vulnerable nations are to economic blackmail. Even Venezuela, despite its fiery anti-American rhetoric, was bound to the US economy. In 2018, despite Washington branding Nicolás Maduro a dictator and Caracas calling the US a “white supremacist regime,” the two nations still had $24 billion in trade, a quarter of Venezuela’s GDP.

Yet, when Washington imposed sweeping financial sanctions, Venezuela’s economy shrunk by 35 percent in a single year. After all, the United States does not just impose sanctions; it controls the very financial system that runs the world. The US dollar is the bloodline of global trade, and those who defy it find themselves cut off from international markets, unable to access capital or even conduct basic transactions. However, economic warfare breeds resistance.

Russia and China saw the writing on the wall. Between 2017 and 2020, Moscow slashed its holdings of US Treasury securities from $105 billion to just $3.8 billion and shifted towards China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), sidestepping American financial hegemony.

The true commanding heights of global dominance lie at the intersection of technology, finance, and unchecked ambition. China is not just selling 5G networks, it is embedding itself into the nervous system of global communication. On the other hand, the US does not just dominate finance, it controls the SWIFT banking system, ensuring economic warfare is just a sanction away. Similarly, corporations do not just innovate, they monopolize, influence, and quietly dictate policy behind closed doors.

“Surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.” A battle cry? Indeed. Not from a general on the battlefield, but from Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei, a company waging a war not just against competitors but against entire nations. Britain’s telecom networks are suspected to have Chinese backdoors.

Information is now what oil was in the 1970s, a critical commodity to be controlled. Today, data is the new crude, and the battle to monopolize its flow has already begun. Quantum computing, AI, and machine learning are the new oil rigs, and the nations that dominate these technologies will dictate the future. Unlike oil, information is easily stolen, manipulated, or even weaponized in ways no physical resource ever could.

The first lethal autonomous drone strike in Libya, recorded in March 2020, was a grim reminder of what is to come. A suicide drone, powered by AI, needed no human command—just a target. Fire and forget was the name of the game. Imagine the next phase: terrorist organizations deploying AI-powered swarms, able to strike with precision, invulnerability, and zero risk to human operatives. They would not negotiate, would not retreat, and would prove hard to stop.  

In a world where biological warfare is outlawed, the selective control of food, aid, and healthcare has replaced mass destruction with slow, calculated suffocation. Nations can now deny access to the very essentials of life to break their adversaries in a siege without walls and a war without battlefields. Over 40 percent of the world’s population faces water scarcity, and by 2030, drought could displace 700 million people. The Turkish-backed militias that had control over the Alouk water station in Syria in 2020 was a stark reminder—when resources are weaponized, suffering becomes policy.

Interestingly, the battle of perception is gaining momentum more than ever. In an era of clickbait headlines and disinformation campaigns, lies travel faster than truth. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that false news spreads 70 percent faster than real news. From the Soviet KGB planting the rumor in the 1980s that the US government created AIDS to modern deepfake propaganda, deception is the new artillery.

Even culture is not immune. Hollywood exported American ideals, Bollywood spread Indian influence, and K-pop turned South Korea into a global powerhouse. For instance, the Cold War was not just won by missiles, it was won when a West German band sang “Wind of Change,” which then became the anthem of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.

If hunger, water, and financial systems hare already weaponized, the next battlefield is clear—space and the seabed. Subsea communication cables are responsible for carrying 97 percent of global data traffic and are the arteries of the modern economy. They enable over $10 trillion in financial transactions every single day. Yet, these vital lifelines remain shockingly unprotected and are vulnerable to sabotage, espionage, and strategic disruption. A targeted attack on just a handful of these cables could cripple stock markets, paralyze banking systems, and sever military command structures—all without a single warship being deployed.

Meanwhile, the race for space dominance is accelerating. From $63.66 billion in 2024 to an estimated $74.4 billion by 2028, the global military satellite market is growing, fueled by the realization that power no longer lies in boots on the ground, but in eyes in the sky. Satellites provide precision-strike capabilities, secure communication, and real-time battlefield intelligence. The Pentagon warns that the US is already vulnerable, with China and Russia developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

In this realm, one can say that modern states wage wars without battlefields, where the goal is not to destroy but to subdue—crippling economies, infiltrating cyber networks, and manipulating narratives without a single shot fired. What is never openly begun is rarely officially ended. In 5th-generation warfare, silence is a weapon, perception is the battlefield, and survival means accepting that war never truly ends.

Syeda Fizzah Shuja is a Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College and an Mphil scholar in Peace and Counter Terrorism. Her work focuses on hybrid warfare and maritime terrorism. She can be contacted at fizzasyed2k@gmail.com.

The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.

Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.

In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.

Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare

The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a tailored message, for specific individuals, is possible.

Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. Generative AI is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.

Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises

Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating misperceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, stated that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.

He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s reports on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.

Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia

Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a web across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become ultimate escalation within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are unlikely to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.

Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems

While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is dual-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was blamed for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.

False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation

India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.

The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI

There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.

Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation

It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.

Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.

India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”

Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”

India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.

Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.

Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathic dictators are nothing new. They date back more than two millennia. In their time, the social mechanisms and technology of the day were employed. Ancient Rome’s Emperor Augustus is but one example. The word realpolitik, invented in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, describes the application of diplomacy and force in the pursuit of selfish state interests. Count Otto von Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor,” was another master of ruthless realpolitik.

Fake news is modern slang for purposeful disinformation spread as real news. Fake news makes claims that the maker knows to be false, but intentionally packages and distributes to seem genuine, to serve their political and military purposes. English-language fake news, used as wartime propaganda, was already commonplace by the time of the English Civil War (1642–1651). It also vexed the American founding fathers during the American Revolution (1775–1781).

Sociopathic dictators have a serious psychological disorder characterized by constant deceitful manipulation and a complete lack of regard for other people. When a very ambitious and successful sociopath rises to be head of state, taking control of national armies and arsenals and even nuclear weapons, the results can be devastating.

Infamous examples of twentieth-century dictators who practiced realpolitik, propagated fake news, and were sociopaths include Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Mao Zedong. Between them, their amoral aggression and complete disregard for lives caused the deaths of tens of millions.

Understanding these three historical and contemporary phenomena is essential for America to effectively address national security concerns. Acting together, realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathy shape adversary strategic behavior and work to the United States’ serious detriment. During the nuclear age and the social media era, the risks due to this “trinary weapon” skyrocketed.

Coping with these clear and present dangers calls for a nuanced and multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to deterrence and defense. This approach needs to go well beyond traditional military strategy that focuses on applying force while maintaining secrecy. Three lines of effort are important to help mitigate the above-mentioned trinary aspects of coercive statecraft.

First, multilateral engagement is important for combating the ill effects of enemy realpolitik. Just as in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, collective international efforts by like-minded democracies are vital to resisting expansionist tyranny. Further strengthening multilateral frameworks and alliances, to address common security challenges and deter adversarial behavior, is a useful approach. Important examples include expanding NATO and rationalizing its burden sharing. Expanding AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US, to include Japan and other Asia-Pacific allies, such as South Korea and Canada, is another option.

Second, strategic communication and information resilience is important. These hybrid-warfare, offensive and defensive weapons need further development by the United States. Clear and consistent messaging is indispensable to effectively convey America’s values and goals and to counteract bad-actor manipulation. This can help immunize allies against falling for adversary disinformation and protect victims of repression from enemy brainwashing.

To this end, enhancing resilience against fake news requires expansion within the United States. This can be done using media literacy programs, non-partisan fact-checking mechanisms, and widespread public awareness campaigns. Any information warfare efforts the US employs to target adversary populations needs to meet high legal and ethical standards. It must also be tempered by stark realism about the utility of disinformation. In short, unconstrained free speech requires an informed public.

Third, psychological profiling techniques, now standard practice in law enforcement, need further development to identify and mitigate the influence of sociopathic dictators in shaping strategic events. Such hyper-threatening individuals could, perhaps, be identified mid-career, before rising to lead nations. Overt and covert efforts to remediate or interdict the rise of such dangerously pathological persons is a tricky matter, but one the Pentagon, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency should not neglect. This line of effort can adapt and extend approaches refined since September 11, 2001, to better understand and short circuit mental processes behind progressive radicalization leading to violent terrorism.

These lines of effort need more urgent furthering on a truly whole-of-nation basis. Government officials and private-sector executives can turn their efforts to developing the required capabilities. Social media companies are already expert at manipulating Americans. Perhaps it is time their efforts are employed for the nation rather than against it.

By addressing these new-old challenges head-on and implementing effective countering strategies, America can enhance its defense against the realpolitik and disinformation employed by sociopathic dictators. By doing so, the United States and its allies safely navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics and growing three body problem.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Realpolitik and Fake News Complicate Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, North Korea unexpectedly launches a limited preemptive strike against the American homeland. The United States responds with a decapitating strike against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Through unlikely errors, Russia believes that the United States is attacking them instead of North Korea. In response, Russia launches a large-scale strike. This leads the United States to launch everything. Bing, bang, boom, and we have Armageddon followed by nuclear winter and the death of billions. In interviews with Vanity Fair and Mother Jones, Jacobsen argues that the US has a plan to conduct nuclear warfighting, based on a series of previously adopted requirements that leave the president little leeway to modify his response. This problem is only made worse by the fact that the president has sole authority to employ nuclear weapons. To this point, Jacobsen argues that military “war mongers” have a very “aggressive culture” that has a predilection to “jam” the president toward “quickly launching a massive retaliatory strike.”

Jacobsen asserts that American intercontinental ballistic missiles are on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” Why? She interviewed William Perry who used the term. Bam, nuclear weapons are on hair trigger alert and missileers have itchy trigger fingers.

While admitting that nuclear deterrence has worked for seven decades, Jacobsen warns that deterrence will fail and when it does, any use of a nuclear weapon will result in large-scale nuclear war. Why? Jacobson interviewed Paul Bracken, who participated in government sponsored wargames—four decades ago—that ended in general nuclear war. Ipso-facto, the use of one nuclear weapon leads to Armageddon.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, American missile defenses are a complete failure. Why? She interviewed Ted Postol who said they do not work—case closed. Her conclusion is that missile defense is a farce and a waste of money. And the United States is lying to itself if it thinks they will ever stop an inbound nuclear weapon.

Elsewhere in the scenario, the president is forced to launch a large-scale nuclear response against the Russians within six minutes. Why? Jacobsen was also told by Perry that the president “will not wait” and thus assumed that Ronald Reagan’s memoir, in which he made an off-hand remark about having six minutes to decide on nuclear weapons use, reflects policy. Abracadabra, the president must decide to use nuclear weapons within six minutes.

Jacobsen’s predilection for incorrectly contextualizing the statements of those she interviewed is both stunning and worrying. The conclusions she draws about the present from the statements of former, often Reagan era or earlier, officials boggles the mind. Jacobsen does not seem to grasp the fact that she or her interviewees may be wrong about the relevance of their past experience to the present. Three examples are indicative.

Problems

First, Jacobsen is wrong about the alert status of the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. They are not on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” The United States does not have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy/doctrine. Nothing of the sort exists. Adam Lowther and Derek Williams dismantle this argument and explain that the United States maintains a launch-under-attack option, which allows the president to employ intercontinental ballistic missiles pre-, mid-, or post-strike. The option requires nothing of the president.

A number of variables will influence this decision. What is important to remember is that there is tremendous work that goes into thinking through scenarios well before they ever arise. Thus, the idea that these weapons are on hair trigger alert is ridiculous. Years of planning and analysis take place left of launch.

Second, Jacobsen is clearly unfamiliar with the design and purpose of wargames. They are specifically designed to understand the implications of a concept or capability. This means a scenario is artificially designed to ensure participants achieve the game’s objectives. Thus, when Jacobsen assumes that because a wargame or series of wargames end in general nuclear war, that a real conflict must necessarily end in general nuclear war, she is fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose and arbitrary nature of wargames. Within the wargaming community, it is well understood that they are not predictive of the future but are instructive of potential options.

Third, missile defenses are not worthless, as Jacobsen claims. They are making steady improvements in their ability to destroy targets. Ted Postol, her primary source of information about missile defenses, was wrong about the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome system. Hard data is proving that missile defenses, in this case Iron Dome, are far more effective than Postel believed.

Although there are additional areas where Jacobsen incorporates inaccurate information into her scenario, the point is clear. Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario would be far more accurately titled, Nuclear War: A Novel or Nuclear War: Disarmament Propaganda. The biggest challenge with the book is that Americans with little understanding of nuclear operations will believe the bias with which Jacobsen writes. This makes it imperative that those within the nuclear community speak out and correct the record. Nuclear deterrence is too important to turn over to a journalist with an agenda.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Annie Jacobsen Gets It Wrong about Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The decentralization of the ability to disseminate information at scale poses a challenge in the event of national and global security threats and incidents like terrorism, instability in post-conflict states, natural disasters, and public health crises, such as the pandemic we are currently experiencing. In all the examples above, without exception, individuals use social media to share opinions, news, photos, and videos of the incident and its aftermath. First responders and the relevant authorities—whether defense, intelligence, national security, law enforcement, and public health agencies—require accurate information in real-time, and can use social media as a tool for such information to assist in planning and response.

While social media is already widely used by law enforcement and national security agencies as to gather and disseminate information, this author argues there is an essential need to advance the use of social media in the public sector as a source of real-time information to enhance situational awareness, crisis preparedness, and disaster response efforts.

Social media is already utilized in counter-terrorism, criminal investigations, threat forecasting, and information operations. However, social networks can be even further harnessed by public sector agencies as a continuous, real-time source of intelligence, if leveraged appropriately, particularly given that improvements in technology applications mean that any individual with a basic camera-equipped smartphone can serve as a source of on-the-ground information at the epicenter of a significant incident.

Many would argue that continuous, in-depth analysis of social media content infringes on civil liberties and is invasive to the privacy of individuals, yet such an argument exposes a double standard relating to the use of information on social networks by public sector agencies. Many social media users share content publicly, therefore, analysis of publicly-available social media content by public sector agencies wouldn’t be a violation of user privacy. In the Intelligence Community, the use of social networks as a source of intelligence falls into the OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) category.

Regardless, whether used by law enforcement, defense agencies, the intelligence community, or the general public, social media is an immeasurably powerful tool for reaching and connecting people at scale. Relevant social media content and “hashtags” trend around the globe within minutes of a crisis event—such as an act of terrorism, political violence, a natural disaster, or a public health emergency—particularly when an incident rapidly escalates and is unpredictable in nature.

It’s therefore critical that defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, maintain and have access to continuous monitoring of social media trends as they develop in real-time. In high priority incidents, individuals on the scene are likely to share photographs, videos, and text updates—information of great value in a crisis. Intelligence gathered from real-time analysis of social networks would include, but not be limited to, preliminary assessments of the situation’s complexity and the response required, as well as forecasting future consequences that could arise.

Citizen journalism and “whistleblowing” over social media can also serve as a critical indicator and a warning sign of worsening situations. A recent example of this was Dr. Li Wenliang, the Chinese doctor who issued a warning in a message shared on the Chinese social media platform Weibo on December 30th, 2019 about a “strange new virus,” which is now a pandemic impacting nearly every country in some way. In hindsight, had his post been viewed by intelligence agencies as an early warning sign, many states may have taken stricter measures earlier on to limit the impact of COVID-19.

In addition to systematic social media monitoring, automated text, and sentiment analysis of publicly shared user posts can provide crucial insights into the attitude of the general public and reactions towards an incident. This would further help first responders and security authorities when communicating with the public in an emergency, such as implementing enhanced security screening, border closures, and evacuations. Moreover, automated analysis of social media posts would assist first responders in their response factoring to avoid contributing to a public panic.

Social media in a crisis is a double-edged sword. As a crisis takes hold, a state’s adversaries are likely to take advantage of the situation and unleash a barrage of online disinformation and propaganda through social media channels in an attempt to foment public unrest. Such campaigns, usually initiated with a political agenda in mind to use the general public as unwitting proxy actors, present an additional challenge that further emphasizes the importance of maintaining continuous, real-time monitoring of publicly available user-generated social media content. Such a capability would effectively reinforce the efforts of first responders on-the-ground, and allow for public sector authorities to better mitigate the consequences of malicious disinformation campaigns.

Furthermore, continuous monitoring of social media platforms by a state’s security agencies enables those agencies to anticipate and counter unintentional misinformation. The spread of inaccurate rumors may have an adverse impact on public safety, a possible reason for the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Ghrebreysus, advocated for urgent measures to be taken to mitigate the fallout from the coronavirus “infodemic.”

Social Media’s Role in Disaster Preparedness & Crisis Management was originally published on Global Security Review.

Out of a population of 81 million, there are at least 47 million active social media users in Iran. Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram, which claims to have 40 million users, are also widely used in Iran. This high number of Iranian social media users and a lack of media literacy, provide a fertile ground for vast disinformation campaigns. Propaganda bots, known as “botnets” when working together, are normally used in such campaigns. They can masquerade as humans to amplify political messaging that suit specific agenda by liking, sharing, retweeting, and following genuine accounts. They can also be used to make hashtags trend, which improves the visibility of a political message.

As we approach the run-up to the Majles (parliament) and presidential elections in Iran, more hands from both pro-regime and opposition groups will be on keyboards to read, be read and possibly affect the result of the elections. For the Iranian people who are fighting for a transition from theocracy to democracy, disinformation campaigns—which are designed to sow confusion and reap chaos—are undoubtedly harmful; a look at Iran’s modern history reveals that turmoil has favored authoritarianism rather than democratic movements.

Iranian Opposition Groups’ Bot Toolkit

Supposing these campaigns in Iran are inspired by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) model that was used to polarize the U.S. public, it is not difficult to predict that there will be a focus on the societal cleavages that already exist among the Iranians and an effort to bold them through the twitter botnets’ traffic manipulations. The final goal would be to create as much distrust and chaos as possible; such that could finally lead to a “regime change.” The main target could be religious divide and ethnic minorities like Kurds, Baluch, and Turks. There could also be some Twitter campaigns designed to influence voters to boycott the elections with the main focus on delegitimizing both reformist and conservative parties in Iran. Furthermore, sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and disinformation could be spread among the voters across the political spectrum to dissuade them from voting.

The disinformation and fake news that have already gained sizable audiences in rural areas could also possibly be another target. Residents of these areas in Iran rarely use Twitter, but the content from the platform could quickly enter Telegram or Instagram and influence users on those platforms. Before and during the course of elections, these rural areas could turn into the epicenters of fake news and rumors that are amplified by bots. This, no matter how small the scope, could change the fate of a nation.

The Islamic Republic’s Bot Arsenal

The bots that are most probably handled by the Iranian cyber army or IRGC could be used to amplify any political message that is on the agenda of the ruling forces. They can be used to attack other candidates, harass them, or even spread rumors and fake news to smear their campaign.

Furthermore, in the event of uprisings before or during the elections, the regime in Tehran has its bot methods to fight back. These methods were tested and rehearsed during the nationwide protests of January 2018 to create distrust among the Iranian protestors. One of the tactics used is the creation of the bots whose task is to call the widely shared videos of the rallies fake and to discourage potential protestors from joining the crowds by creating a sense that nothing is going on. These bots were also used to guide the demonstrators to the wrong locations and to create an impression that the protests were on a small scale.

Democracy down

Iran might not be the Switzerland of the Middle East, but has a unique political structure and activism with elections held every four years to choose the president and the members of the parliament. It is these elections that create democratic glimmers of hope for reform to which propaganda bots could be a significant setback. If in 2015 and due to Iranian public’s willingness to join the international community, the P5+1’s primary concern, was Iran’s nuclear activities, now, a non-nuclear but politically polarized Islamic Republic—radicalized by propaganda bot—could raise even more significant concerns.

Furious with Trump’s withdrawal from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and disillusioned with Rouhani cabinet’s mismanagement and inability to deliver economic promises, many Iranians are now anything but moderate. Hardliners, armed to the teeth with twitter bots, will be taking full advantage of this situation to intensively spread their propaganda and rally their supporters for a landslide victory in the next round of elections. A déjà vu of another Ahmadinejad, with a bot army, long-range missiles, and possibly an urge to withdraw from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would then only be one round of election away from all of us. Whether Iran’s fragile moments of democracy can survive is a question that only time can answer.

Iran’s Fragile Moments of Democracy May Not Survive the Propaganda Bots was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2017, Catalonia held an illegal referendum on independence from Spain, despite it having been declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court. While 92% of referendum voters supported independence, only 43% of registered voters voted. Amid police crackdowns and massive protests, the Spanish National Court ordered the imprisonment of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, two Catalan separatist leaders. In spite of this, Catalonian MPs voted to declare independence. In response, Spain imposed direct rule over Catalonia. However, the situation is not as straightforward as many commentators make it seem, as vital information key to understanding the unrest has been overlooked.

Both the United States Senate and an independent study conducted by the George Washington University have claimed that Kremlin-connected media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik created “zombie accounts” or bots to perpetuate a negative perception of Spain in the days leading up to the referendum. Half of the stories shared by RT highlighted police violence to deliberately disrupt internal cohesion in Spain.

Spain is not Moscow’s only target, however. Over the last year, the E.U. East StratCom Task Force reported 993 reports of disinformation cases, 152 of which targeted the E.U. and originated from Russia. Furthermore, eighty-three percent of Europeans believe “fake news” is a danger to democracy.  Disinformation is on the rise, and there is ample evidence that Russian disinformation is part of an orchestrated campaign to overwhelm democracies and free media outlets. Coined by Russian expert Mark Galeotti, the “Gerasimov doctrine” is a colloquial term that refers to the employment of non-kinetic or non-military methods to achieve political ends—to destabilize the E.U. and NATO from within through the exploitation of existing social, ethnic, and religious divisions.  The so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” merely describes an operational concept and isn’t a reference to a Russian military doctrine.

For decades, the trans-Atlantic alliance has remained stable, but history is no guarantee of stability in perpetuity. Despite mostly positive support for NATO amongst the citizens of its member states, Russia seizes upon existing dissatisfaction felt by a minority of citizens and pushes messaging that employs terms like “occupying power” to describe the alliance. The same goes for the European Union. Member states regularly disagree over issues such as refugee resettlement, Russian sanctions, and the resurgence of nationalism across the continent. Such subjects are prime targets for Russian disinformation campaigns, which are disseminated by Kremlin-controlled media outlets like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik, as well as on fringe websites and social media accounts to amplify the message further.

Disinformation is challenging to counter, despite increasing and widespread awareness. Some European states like France have enacted laws that compel social networks to disclose the source of funding for sponsored political content and allow for candidates to sue for the removal of contested news reports during elections. In 2018, the E.U. enacted a non-binding disinformation code of practice, aimed at targeting “fake news” in upcoming European elections.

Such measures, however, are merely reactive and fail to anticipate the continually adapting strategies of disinformation purveyors. To avoid laws that target foreign influence campaigns, state-sponsored actors are buying political ads in local currency. Actors are increasingly adept at masking their locations and are moving towards image-based disinformation campaigns, which are less regulated and significantly more difficult to legislate.

Rather than perpetually being one step behind, Europe should emulate the strategies of states like Estonia that have been dealing with Russian disinformation campaigns for years. Rather than allow for Russian disinformation campaigns to gather steam, the websites such as the Estonia-based Propastop continuously debunk disinformation. The Estonian government also operates a Russian-language news channel to serve as an alternative to RT. Moreover, all Estonian politicians and public administration officers do not give interviews to Russian state-controlled media outlets. This strategy of national resilience is also strengthened by Estonia’s National Center for Defense and Security Awareness (NCDSA), a non-governmental organization that aims to foster a society that is resilient and resistant to hostile foreign influence.

France: The Yellow Vests

Counter-disinformation tactics must be adaptable because disinformation comes in many different forms. Catalonia and Estonia are not the only case studies by far. France, for example, is currently dealing with an enormous surge of anti-government protestors who disagreed vehemently with an increase on the gas tax. These protestors are better known by their moniker “yellow vests.” Although the demonstrators’ original demand of suspending the gas tax increase was met, the next day, more than 125,000 yellow vest protestors took to the streets, clashing with police and looting stores as they went.

According to New Knowledge, 340 pro-Kremlin accounts created and magnified “the brutality of the French police, Macron’s inability to lead the nation, and anti-NATO or anti-migrant sentiments more than 20,000 times.” Since late October 2017, these accounts have posted at least 1,600 times a day on Twitter, retweeting false information to increase its believability. These accounts, as well as others, impersonated journalists and legitimate news outlets to craft a narrative of France being embroiled in a civil war and blaming Macron for its onset.

What does the Kremlin hope to accomplish through its disinformation campaigns in France? Ultimately, Russia wants to undermine the French government’s ability to govern effectively. If the French government’s focus is entirely domestic, it can no longer point fingers at Russia, continue its sanctions regime, and pose any serious threat to Russia. By amplifying societal discontent in France with disinformation through social media, Russia is creating a reality where French democracy is indeed under threat. As the yellow vest protests continue, it remains to be seen whether or not Russia has achieved its goals.

Georgia: Disinformation as the Status Quo

Unfortunately, Russian disinformation in Georgia is nothing new. During the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the former launched an intense pro-Russian propaganda campaign to spread claims that the Georgian government was violating the human rights of Russian speakers in Georgia. Although the accusations were widely discredited, they were used by Russia to justify the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While Georgian politicians are aware of threat Russian disinformation poses, they lack the political will to enact meaningful countermeasures.

According to the Georgia-based Media Development Foundation (MDF), this lack of response may be problematic given that almost 2000 anti-Western messages were detected throughout Georgian media outlets in 2017. In contrast to 2016, when most of the Russian disinformation campaign was centered on human rights, the dominant topic in 2017 was the polarization of the Georgian domestic political landscape. Pro-Kremlin actors focused on targeting everyday Georgian’s perceived loss of national identity paired with demonizing rhetoric of the U.S., NATO, and the E.U.

Russia’s disinformation campaigns in Georgia are based on a three-part strategy. First, create a threat. Second, foster distrust of Georgia’s Western allies and partners. Third, reinstate and reinforce the belief that Russia is the sole trustworthy partner. Russian disinformation campaigns in Georgia used fake photos and videos to encourage conspiratorial thinking and increase radicalism in groups like Georgian Neo-Nazi parties. One example of this tactic is the “lab of death” narrative, where it was claimed that a U.S.-funded laboratory in Georgia which was giving untested drugs to Georgians, causing them to die.

In Georgia, the goal of such disinformation campaigns is quite different than in France. As Georgia is not presently a member of the E.U., the bulk of Russian messaging is intended to ensure that will never happen. Russia sees Georgia as lying within its sphere of influence, and any attempt to align with the West is seen as a threat. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war, for example, is primarily seen as the driver behind Georgia’s push to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan.

Despite the troubled relationship between the two countries, Georgia has adopted a pragmatic approach for its foreign policy, where it has downplayed tensions with Russia and even is in talks to create trade corridors through the frozen conflict zones of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Again, Russia’s disinformation campaigns are having the desired impact. Despite Georgia’s westward orientation, Tbilisi continues to adopt a less aggressive and more pacifist tone towards Moscow.

Europe Needs to Fight Back

From Western Europe to the Eastern Neighborhood, disinformation campaigns are having a severe impact on societal cohesion. In France, the “yellow vest” protests are ongoing. In Georgia, right-wing radicalism is on the rise, threatening Georgia’s turn to the West. Disinformation is even suspected to be involved with Brexit, and the recent German parliamentary election. In this hostile environment, Europe must reorient itself and learn from the E.U. East Stratcom Task Force and Estonia. Otherwise, the E.U. risks further fragmentation within itself and other Western democracies.

Russia’s campaigns are succeeding within Europe because countries are not adopting the appropriate countermeasures. Instead of simply acknowledging that disinformation is a problem, European countries must take proactive measures to debunk Russian propaganda. The E.U.’s East Stratcom Task Force is already doing much of this work, but it could receive further funding and publicity from all E.U. member states.

Counter-disinformation efforts can only be successful if they are marketed effectively. Furthermore, European countries ought to create more societal resilience programs, modeling them off the Estonian model. While not every European country has a Russian-speaking minority, each has segments of disenfranchised people who are vulnerable to disinformation. Put bluntly, the best way to combat the current successes of Russian disinformation is to fight back.

How Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns are Succeeding in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Emblematic of Trump, despite warnings from various journalism watchdog groups that the global trend of his phrase may have restrictive and even deadly consequences – witness the suspected execution of columnist Jamal Khashoggi by the Saudi government, as well as the more recent anonymous delivery of a pipe bomb to CNN’s New York offices – the president seems to be taking the micro-narcissist view of the problem.  He expresses pride that a phrase he coined is gaining popularity around the world instead of focusing on the likelihood that his incessant criticism may likely be contributing to crackdowns by autocratic governments on freedom of expression and the press globally.

Ever resilient against criticism, if also ironically hyper-sensitive, Trump has ignored the United States’ precipitous fall to 45^th place in the World Press Freedom Index because of his anti-news media rhetoric. And while it cannot be proven as causal, there does seem to be a strong inverse correlation between this decline and the increase around the globe of arrests and the physical harassment of journalists.

The strongest sign that “fake news” is more than a passing political fad is the disturbing example of a world leader within the cradle of democracy giving in to the temptation of using it as a weapon.  France’s Emmanuel Macron succeeded in passing a law which takes effect within three months of a general election and allows for emergency governmental action to block ‘manipulative and misleading information’ within 48 hours of it being brought before a judge.

What so disturbed Macron was his sense of being the target during 2017 of a vicious and fallacious disinformation campaign by political opponents.  Sound familiar?

There is no doubt that France feels confident that it has crafted a rational ‘golden middle’ path through the fake news debate by limiting the time frame in which the law can be utilized (strictly before general elections) and by requiring the potential target of government action to be brought before the judiciary for formal legal approval.  But the reality is that this French initiative could create its own unintended consequences, as it no longer allows isolates press restrictions to the realm of dictators.  Indeed, Macron’s move has given flexibility to stable democracies to do similar undemocratic things.

Meantime, what of those nation states that might be defined as decidedly less democratic – perhaps as autocratic or semi-autocratic?  How are they dealing with “fake news”?  Here’s a quick world tour:

• Belarus: passed media laws that permit the government to prosecute people who spread ‘false information online.’ The laws spread further into allowing the government to potentially block websites deemed in violation.
• Brazil: the Federal Police announced the creation of a special task force to identify, locate, and punish authors of fake news.
• Cambodia: in the weeks leading up to the country’s national elections, the government passed measures that gave it the right to block websites and other forms of media it deemed a ‘danger to national security.’
• Croatia: similar to a move pursued in Germany, Croatian officials passed a law meant to stop the spread of hate speech and misinformation on social media platforms.
• Egypt: the government now openly regulates any social media accounts that have large followings in order to make sure misinformation is not spread throughout the country.
• Indonesia: a newly-formed National Cyber and Encryption Agency was tasked to help intelligence and police agencies combat online disinformation and social media hoaxes.
• Kenya: the national government passed laws criminalizing 17 different forms of online activity.
• Russia: despite being the most common target of countries around the world that criticize states trying to foment fake news, it didn’t stop Russia from introducing its own domestic legislation against disinformation.
• Tanzania: the government, growing ever more concerned about the pervasiveness of online misinformation, has levied several possible legal initiatives that would constrict and/or punish online publishers.

While this list is by no means exhaustive, it suggests a general global trend:  governments are actively attempting to regulate, monitor, limit, and restrict citizen impact within online social/political participation.

Through it all, there never seems to be any explicit attempt to define and describe fake news. Keeping terms amorphous and ambiguous allows governments to advantageously use the slippery slope approach to opposition forces: “If you are against me I will just make sure the arguments you make are deemed fake news.”

Indeed, many if not most of the initiatives do not seem to be motivated by a desire to improve the quality of news and resource information for the public. Instead, they are structured to simply provide greater obstacles and legal roadblocks to grassroots organizations that are unwilling to be in lockstep with central authorities. The bottom line: Many of these fake news policies are really just poorly masked proposals to prevent a more significant and healthy development of civil society in nations that are in desperate need of such development.

Finally, it is not a coincidence that in every case, regardless of political system or regime, there is no mention or discussion of repercussions and consequences on the governments or their officials if they are found guilty of spreading fake news themselves – perhaps because governments have been issuing fake news – we used to call it propaganda – for ages.

If you accept all this to be true, then you are left with one very disturbing political conclusion about these fake news initiatives: they are not efforts to improve the quality of political dialogue but ultimately to shut down that dialogue altogether.

When governments seem intent to weaponize alleged fake news and use it to bludgeon opponents and opposition, then the ultimate political consequence is the crippling of public oversight, citizen criticism, and grassroots activism.

Which leads us back to the United States and President Trump.  Many here seem to view President Trump’s tirades against fake news with bemusement, yet a lack of real concern due to their enduring faith in the institutions of American democracy and its innate principles safeguarding freedom of the press, association, and expression. That is all well and good.  But many of the governments around the world, clearly inspired by Trumpian rhetoric, are not beholden to our check-and-balance structural limitations.  As such, their efforts do not bolster the quality of their politics but serve only to solidify their power.

The Unintended Consequences of Fake News was originally published on Global Security Review.