At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is straightforward to see that beyond the deterrent or “last defense” aspect of possessing a nuclear arsenal these weapons are one tool among other strategic options. It is the duty of a military planner to plan for outcomes with the instruments that adversaries possess, however distasteful those weapons (nuclear weapons). It does not require reams of classified intelligence nor deep policy experience to recognize the appeal of a nuclear weapon to achieve winning outcomes. Even the technical specifications of specific weapons, their delivery method, and the effects achieved by their use can take a second seat to the appealing utility of their use in the mind of a foe.

A brief look at two kinds of adversary is instructive. First, there is the ideologically driven actor who seeks to remake the international state system and its associated norms, behaviors, and morals. Second, there is a leader or state-party that seeks to climb politically, economically, and cultural-informationally within the extant Western-built international system.

For the antagonist motivated by an ideology whose primary ambition is the destruction of contemporary norms or who desires to trigger a millenarian kind of resorting, whether secular or religious, a nuclear weapon heralds to fellow adherents the breaking of the status quo by the offer of a new, radicalized future. To achieve such an outcome a nuclear weapon targeted at a populated area, especially a political capital or major religious center, would offer the radical damage and chaos sought.

The size of the nuclear device need not be large. The purpose is to tear down a targeted society by inflicting as many casualties as possible and to wreck the symbols and sinews that symbolized the victims’ way of life and station in the international order. There is no doubt many terrorist organizations that would leap at the chance to exploit a nuclear weapon in this fashion. And there are state challengers who no doubt see the same appeal. The only risk to such leaders is the repercussions they may face. But to the radicalized actor, the repercussions are just another aspect of martyrdom—religious or ideological. One imagines that such a scenario has not occurred more due to lack of opportunity than to a lack of desire.

A nuclear weapon fired by a state’s armed forces is even more likely to occur if for no other reason than governments possess the world’s nuclear arms. State arsenals and their delivery systems continue to proliferate in both number and capability, thus expanding the scenarios for weapons use. The danger of the “mutually assured destruction” problem that occupied many deterrence thinkers during the Cold War is still a threat, but the logic of employment success points towards battlefield use.

A nuclear weapon that struck a key military target could decisively alter the course of a battle and a campaign by inflicting damage at a scale that conventional weapons can only achieve over much longer periods of time. The historical record informs us that winning quickly is a tremendous advantage for an adversary.

The one sure way to suffer a military defeat by the US and any American-led coalition is to wait for American joint and combined forces to deploy, assemble, and wage a maneuver campaign. If the Normandy landings of World War II are too distant, then the overwhelming success of the United States in the Gulf War (1991) is a more recent reminder of the fate of any adversary that simply waits for the United States to come to them. The war in Ukraine is an ongoing example of the grinding, almost interminable, result of fighting when early wins do not occur. Despite the many technological advances that modern armed forces possess, speed in multi-domain operations is still decisive, and elusive.

America’s adversaries are certainly aware that speed matters. Alongside the imperatives of increasing range and the convergence of lethal effects, the rapid way a nuclear weapon can alter battlefield geometries and the correlation of forces gives so called “battlefield nukes” tremendous appeal. There are many creative ways to benefit from a nuclear weapon, not just on land, but also in the maritime and air domains. Sealing an area off from maneuver; denying communications, targeting, and surveillance systems; destroying logistical nodes and stockpiles; damaging vehicles and equipment; and inflicting casualties on the adversary are all additional ways nuclear weapons are useful. This is not to mention the escalatory advantage of skipping rungs on the escalation ladder, thereby intimidating America’s partners and neutral states—foreclosing incremental steps from American policymakers.

Simply put, nuclear weapons present an urgent operational challenge to the joint force of the United States and its military partners. Whether the scenario is in Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or globally, the United States must imagine that adversaries are thinking about, and at least gaming if not planning, nuclear weapons use to achieve their objectives.

Americans must admit that there is a problem and stop hiding behind sincere wishes that nuclear weapons are never used again. The logic of their employment demands that the nation act on the facts as they are. Nuclear weapons are present. They are plentiful. It is also almost certainly only a matter of time before an adversary exploits American reticence to prepare for their use. It is time to prepare for that day.

Major General (Ret.) Bradley T. Gericke, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Operational Logic of Nuclear Weapons Use by an Adversary was originally published on Global Security Review.

On August 3rd, 2019, the United States formally announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, a key Cold War-era arms control agreement, citing “irresponsible actions of Russia.”

Several months before, Russia announced that the spirit of the INF was “dead.” The actions of both nuclear powers have increased fears of an international arms race centered on Asia, where the U.S. has announced it is considering placing intermediate-range conventional missiles in the near term.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: An Overview

In October 1986, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev invited the then US president Ronald Reagan to a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland and proposed a fifteen-year denuclearization timetable. To an extent, the U.S. was responsive to Gorbachev’s proposal, but President Reagan wasn’t prepared give up the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Colloquially known as “Star Wars,” the SDI was first proposed by President Reagan on March 23, 1983. The intended purpose of the SDI was to defend the U.S. from Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by intercepting the missiles mid-flight.

At the next summit between the two superpowers in December of 1987, the U.S. and USSR achieved a historic breakthrough by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. The treaty mandated that all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range conventional and nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles—deployed throughout Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact—be destroyed within four years. Each side was to monitor the other to ensure the requisite number of missiles were being destroyed in accordance with the treaty.

The treaty expressly prohibited land-based cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 311 and 3,420 miles. Air- or sea-launched missiles, such as the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile and Russia’s Kalibr cruise missile were not covered, even though they had ranges similar to the missiles banned in the treaty.

Sources of Conflict Between the United States and Russia

Russia’s violations of the INF treaty have been a key component of rising tensions between the U.S. and Russia. Washington—and its NATO allies—have repeatedly called for Moscow to acknowledge its noncompliance while demanding that the treaty violation be rectified. According to the U.S., Russia’s Novator 9M729 cruise missile was in direct violation of the treaty, a claim that Moscow has strongly denied. The U.S. first brought up the issue of Russian treaty noncompliance regarding the 9M729 cruise missile in the State Department’s 2014 Compliance Report, in which Washington suggested that Russia was violating the treaty and that the U.S. would continue to seek a resolution.

In withdrawing from the agreement, the U.S. displayed a willingness to do away with a landmark arms control treaty—possibly igniting an arms race across not only Europe but in Asia, as well. In a statement announcing Washington’s intention to withdraw from the INF treaty, the White House said: “for far too long, Russia has violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with impunity, covertly developing and fielding a prohibited missile system that poses a direct threat to our allies and troops abroad.”

Russia, for its part, has seemingly demonstrated an eagerness to unshackle itself from the limits of key arms control agreements. In addition to demonstrating a willingness to breach the terms of the INF treaty, Moscow has neglected to push for the renewal of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed by the U.S. and Russia in 2010. New START placed limits on the number of strategic nuclear missile launch systems, and is set to expire in 2021, unless renegotiated. 

In an effort to position the Kremlin as a reasonable actor, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly stated that Russia was open to renewing the treaty. In doing so, he warned that the expiration of the deal could spark an arms race. “If we don’t keep this ‘fiery dragon’ under control, if we let it out of the bottle—God forbid—this could lead to global catastrophe,” Putin said in June of 2019. “There won’t be any instruments at all limiting an arms race, for example, the deployment of weapons in space. This means that nuclear weapons will be hanging over every one of us all the time.”

However, Putin expressed a willingness to let the pact expire—implying that Moscow would not approach renegotiations with a sense of urgency, saying that “if no one feels like extending the agreement—New START—well, we won’t do it then.”

Post-INF: Battleground Asia

The nerve center of great power tensions is shifting to Asia. On August 4th, 2019, newly-confirmed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that Washington was looking at a deploying intermediate-range missiles in East Asia and the western Pacific, a move likely to anger China. 

China wasn’t a signatory of the INF treaty and has developed sophisticated offensive missile systems. While Beijing raised concerns about the collapse of the INF treaty, it seemed unwilling to participate in a multilateral replacement to the agreement, saying the “too complicated” and that prior agreements should be honored. 

For the last three decades, China has dramatically expanded its missile arsenal. According to U.S. government officials, nearly ninety percent of China’s missile arsenal—estimated to be around 2,000 rockets—are classified as intermediate-range missiles.

What lies ahead for the global arms control regime?

The deterioration of international security structures is detrimental to global strategic stability. Although elements of the INF treaty may seem outdated, it played a crucial role in making both the U.S. and Russia accountable. 

The treaty’s collapse has contributed to the development of an ominous atmosphere around the future of arms control. The intention behind these recent developments has been to strengthen compliance and stability, but the likelihood of a more aggressive arms race looms large over the nuclear domain.

Dr. Gregory Kulacki, China Project Manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists, maintains that an arms race-based framework will replace the arms-control based strategic security framework. Lessons learned during the Cold War will again need to be re-learned, albeit in the context of a multipolar order.

Termination of INF Treaty Could Spark Arms Race in Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

China is a rising power. It is agreed that China has the capabilities to eventually significantly surpass the United States regarding global economic and political power. Chinese posturing in the South China Sea is an attempt to gauge and establish its sphere of influence in a region that has been long dominated by the United States.

Relations with the U.S. were tested particularly after Trump’s pre-inauguration phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, which flew in the face of 40 years of diplomatic convention.

Trump’s anti-China stance when it comes to trade is questionable. His businesses have partnered with Chinese investors and banks, and his projects have been built using Chinese steel. It’s unlikely that he would risk jeopardizing his children’s—and his own–long-term business interests.

Some argue that the U.S. and China are on the verge of inevitable conflict. This “Thucydides Trap” says that as one power rises, the other declines and the two are destined for inevitable conflict. Statistically, this isn’t a far-fetched concept; only 4 out of 16 prior great-power transitions have not resulted in war.

Is the Thucydides Trap Inevitable? Not Necessarily.

In this realist view, China is an irresistable force approaching an immovable object—the United States. The U.S.’s commitment
to the Bretton Woods institutions, alliances, and political structures which have supported its global hegemony, it is argued, is proof of the inevitability of this conflict.

The 45th President of the United States, however, may not be so steadfast in those commitments. Nixon’s overtures to China and its subsequent admission to the U.N. marked an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. Anti-Communism was rampant, but the interests of capitalism took precedence over political ideology.

In return for access to Chinese markets, the U.S. recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign authority over China, and supported the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, at Taiwan’s expense.

This rapid departure from the status quo served as a jumping-off point for bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. All the while, Nixon utilized his public abhorrence of communism to distract from his use of realpolitik in a way that sharply contrasted with American ideology.

Trump’s continued self-contradiction and erraticism could serve a similar purpose, however unintentionally. The rhetoric on Chinese economic policy, on the surface, made Trump look tough against China during the election. However, following his taking office, Trump and his advisors have been leaning on China for assistance in dealing with North Korea.

Triangular Diplomacy: a New World Order?

Many have begun to draw comparison’s between the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Nixon’s model of triangular diplomacy. To incentivize Putin, the U.S. would endorse a consolidation of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and parts of central Asia, recognizing a Russian sphere of influence, and support productive bilateral oil partnerships.

A similar strategy would be deployed with regards to China, with the impetus for them being the arrangements created between Trump and Putin. In this scenario, President Trump utilizes American commitments and the existing global power structure as commodities to transact.

Yes, this is a retreat from the current status quo, but it is not isolationism—it is a restructuring of the global order to accommodate a shift in world power—a crude re-establishment of the triangular diplomacy model employed by Nixon and Kissinger with China and Russia.

At present, the United States seems to be in its last days as the leader of a unipolar international order. Rapid technological advancement is contributing to global economic uncertainty, and international security is increasingly threatened. Global influence is becoming increasingly multipolar. Some degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt in the face of changing norms is obligatory.

Trump may recognize this. He may not. Is he a madman theorist, or is he just mad? A comparison to Nixon may not be entirely appropriate, as Nixon was a prolific student of political theory and often read up diplomatic history.

However, madman theory dictates that one’s opponent must be entirely convinced of his opponent’s irrationality. President Trump has even managed to convince long-standing American allies of that. Danish foreign minister Kristian Jensen, when asked about the future of relations with the United States, responded by saying “Donald Trump changes opinions like others change underwear.”

China, the United States, and the Thucydides Trap was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense led by Secretary James Mattis has been given a significant degree of autonomy to operate within. Following a series of missile and nuclear bomb tests in North Korea, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the “era of strategic patience is over,” referencing the U.S. North Korea policy under prior administrations.

In April and May of 2017, the U.S. Navy began increasing its forward-deployed military presence in the region, in a show of force to the North. Concurrently, in attempts to call the United States’ “bluff” regarding a pre-emptive strike, North Korea has taken steps to escalate tensions with aggressive anti-American rhetoric and threats of nuclear war and continued weapons tests in defiance of the UN Security Council.

By May, the U.S. Navy had deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups (formerly referred to as battle groups) to the Korean Peninsula—the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the U.S.S. Carl Vinson carrier strike group.

By June, the Navy confirmed that a third carrier battle group, led by the U.S.S. Nimitz, was en route to the region. Upon its arrival, the United States’ will have three of its aircraft carrier-led battle groups operating in the vicinity of North Korea, almost 30% of the U.S. carrier fleet.

How would war involving the U.S. and North Korea play out?

According to senior Defense Department officials, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be one of the most violent and devastating combat operations in over a generation. Despite that, allied forces led by the U.S. would be victorious. The high levels of projected casualties stem from the proximity of the South Korean capital of Seoul to the North Korean border.

Seoul is one of the most densely populated metropolitan areas in the world. It lies just over 30 miles from the North Korean border and is well in the range of the hundreds of artillery and missile batteries that the North has stationed just north of the demilitarized zone.

South Korea has approximately 625,000 active-duty troops and another 3.1 million troops on reserve. While North Korea has roughly twice those numbers, their equipment is highly outdated, albeit augmented by an asymmetric nuclear capability.

What are the risks and consequences of a pre-emptive strike on the North?

Minor equipment or troop movements on the South Korean border can spark aggression from the North. Therefore, American, South Korean, and Japanese forces preparing to launch a pre-emptive strike would need to do so clandestinely, to catch North Korean forces off-guard.

In this scenario, major military, nuclear research, bunkers, and weapons depots would be targeted, with marines and special forces being deployed from carriers and amphibious assault ships off the North Korean coast. Such an operation would need to be executed swiftly, and with overwhelming force.

Otherwise, risk larger numbers of civilian casualties that would result from an attack—conventional or nuclear—on the Seoul metropolitan area should the North maintain the capability to launch such offense after a pre-emptive strike.

The China Option: Regime Change or Diplomacy

Trump’s attraction to authoritarian heads-of-state could very well lead to a negotiated settlement, or at the very least, some form of detente. China publicly favors a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Alternatively, Chinese political and military leaders may decide that it’s in China’s strategic interest to support or execute a regime change in North Korea.

Economically, the West has much more to offer China than North Korea does. However, China remains wary of uncontrolled destabilization in North Korea as it would likely lead to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with high numbers of refugees flooding into China.

Escalation on the Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chinese foreign policy has a long history of isolationism. By keeping foreigners at a distance and by strictly regulating trade, China maintained its identity in an increasingly globalized world. Currently, its citizens enjoy Western brands and build products created by Western companies, but at its heart, China is very much the Empire it was centuries ago. Chinese foreign policy reflects this, perhaps most notably in the nine-point line.

China’s Ocean Boundaries

Described as vague and sweeping, China’s nine-point line has served as a marker for Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea since the 1940s. However, those claims have not been recognized by international organizations nor by the five countries whose islands are crossed by the uncharted line. The international community has monitored China’s slow dominance over the region and the United States frequently maintains a naval presence there.

Resources in the area include oil and fisheries, but the area is most important for trade. The South China Sea is an international commerce lane. Laying claim to vast swaths of the sea can bring China superpower status. Also, it provides China with a platform upon which to flex China’s maritime strength as well as China’s military positioning.

Economic Power

With the growth of China’s economy, China has positioned itself as a potential superpower. As a superpower, China could realign ocean borders and boundaries in a more aggressive fashion than it has in the past. It can also control commerce throughout the South China Sea, actually cutting off international trade routes. This is similar to what the Chinese have done in the past to curb Western influence and maintain dominance over the region.

Military Power

After the first Gulf War, China paid attention to U.S. military strategy and was primarily concerned with the United States’ ability to traverse the Persian Gulf. China could not plan to match U.S. naval power, but it could, like Iran, develop a strategic resistance in the form of smaller ships, mines, and presence.

To protect the nine-point line, China created islands in the sea and increased its presence by occupying vacant islands. The Philippines, in particular, protested the increased Chinese military presence. China ignores the protestations and international law.

China’s military officials recently unveiled China’s second aircraft carrier, a development that increases China’s military strength in the region. The event also serves to reinforce China’s long history of isolationism and independence from the West.

Chinese Foreign Policy & National Security Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.