The war was not won by overwhelming force—it was won by precision, persistence, and a new kind of visibility. This shift was not just tactical; it was existential. Drones lowered the cost of engagement and shattered the old logic of deterrence. Military planners who once relied on large arsenals and conventional firepower now face a battlefield defined by bandwidth, optics, and algorithms. Nagorno-Karabakh was not an anomaly; it was a preview of what is coming.

Drones Tilt the Balance of Power

Azerbaijan’s drone fleet, led by Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s and Israeli loitering munitions, did more than support ground troops. These drones destroyed tanks, artillery, and air defense systems with surgical precision.

Drone footage flooded social media and state television, galvanizing public support and intimidating adversaries. The battlefield became a stage and drones the lead actors in a performance of technological supremacy.

This was not a remote skirmish; it was a full-spectrum demonstration of how drones can tilt the military balance. Azerbaijan used converted Soviet-era aircraft as bait to expose Armenian air defenses, then struck with precision-guided drones. Air dominance was no longer reserved for wealthy superpowers; it was achieved through strategy and innovation.

Deterrence No Longer Works the Way It Used To

Deterrence did not fail for lack of firepower; it failed because the rules changed faster than anyone could adapt. Armenia’s conventional forces, built on Cold War assumptions, could not withstand the precision and persistence of drone strikes. The belief that large-scale military assets could prevent escalation collapsed under the weight of smaller and smarter systems.

This was not just a tactical failure; it was a conceptual one. Drones lowered the threshold for engagement and allowed Azerbaijan to strike decisively without risking pilots or exposing vulnerable assets. Deterrence, once rooted in overwhelming retaliation, now faces a new reality: speed, precision, and deniability.

Hybrid Warfare Is the New Normal

The war was not fought only in the skies; it unfolded across screens, networks, and supply chains. Azerbaijan blended conventional ground operations with cyber tactics, information warfare, and economic pressure. This hybrid model reflects a broader shift in twenty-first century warfare, where victory depends as much on narrative as on firepower.

Azerbaijan’s goals were clear: reclaim a contested enclave and secure vital energy corridors. But its drone-led offensive carried a deeper message—technological capability is political will. The signal to adversaries was unmistakable: resistance will be met with precision, persistence, and total visibility.

Small States Can Now Challenge Big Powers

            For Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh represents cultural survival and historical identity. Its defense relied on asymmetrical tactics and guerrilla resilience. But against a technologically superior adversary, these methods faltered. Civilians and soldiers alike were left exposed, sheltering under skies that no longer offered cover.

This vulnerability is not unique to Armenia. Small states with access to drones can now challenge larger powers. Taiwan, for instance, is rapidly scaling up domestic drone production to counter China and support Western allies. Its “Drone National Team” initiative aims to produce 15,000 drones per month by 2028, positioning the island as a global hub for secure, AI-enabled drones.

Deterrence Must Be Reimagined

Nagorno-Karabakh may be the first war won by drones, but it will not be the last. The conflict offers a sobering lesson; deterrence must evolve or risk obsolescence. Integrated deterrence—blending military, economic, cyber, and diplomatic tools—is no longer optional. Unlike nuclear weapons, drones are accessible, scalable, and deniable. Their proliferation is horizontal, not vertical, spreading across small states, insurgent groups, and private firms.

As drone technology spreads, so does the risk of escalation, miscalculation, and asymmetric retaliation. The battlefield is no longer bound by geography; it is shaped by bandwidth, optics, and algorithmic intent.

Conclusion

            Nagorno-Karabakh was not just a battlefield; it was a turning point. It exposed how technological agility can dismantle legacy doctrines and how drones, once tactical novelties, now shape strategic outcomes. In this new era, deterrence is not about mass or might; it is about adaptability, integration, and speed. For nations still clinging to Cold War paradigms, the message is clear: evolve or be outmaneuvered. The future belongs to those who understand not just how to fight, but how to think in bandwidths, algorithms, and stories that shape the battlefield before the first shot is fired.

Evolution demands more than procurement; it requires imagination. Nations must rethink not only how they defend, but what they defend and why. As drones blur the line between war and surveillance, between deterrence and provocation, the strategist of tomorrow must be fluent in both geopolitics and code. The age of unmanned warfare is here and it is rewriting the rules faster than most doctrines can keep up.

Vikramaditya Shrivastava is a master’s student in international relations, security, and strategy at OP Jindal Global University.

Drones and the Death of Deterrence: Lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently criticized the US proposal for a nuclear deal, while also expressing his doubts about the success of talks. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff argued that Iran should not be allowed to possess enrichment capabilities and declared such capabilities a red line. Iran, however, rejected the US demand and stuck to the traditional Iranian narrative that Tehran will continue the enrichment process with or without a deal. The divergent positions of the two sides indicated that the talks were likely to reach a dead end, but this time Iran’s nuclear program appeared to have reached a pivotal moment.

As Iran has gained the tools and necessary understanding of enrichment technology, it was unrealistic to think that Iran would completely terminate its enrichment capabilities without the pressure of a war or regime change. Structural realist Kenneth Waltz claimed that if Iran became a nuclear power, nuclear balance and stability vis-à-vis Israel would result. However, it is worth critically reviewing this argument in the context of the South Caucasus region, particularly Azerbaijan, as this challenges Waltz’s notions.

Offensive Realism

In his 2012 article, “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb,” Waltz argued that trying to dissuade a country from seeking a nuclear weapon via sanctions and isolation does not yield a positive result, as the case of North Korea illustrates. Waltz formulated three scenarios regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In the first scenario, Tehran was compelled to end its nuclear program in the face of heightened international sanctions and diplomacy. In the second scenario, Iran developed a breakthrough capability but stopped short of testing a nuclear weapon. In the third scenario, Iran conducted a nuclear test.

It is worth mentioning that in the two decades since Waltz wrote the article, international sanctions and increased diplomatic pressure failed to achieve a meaningful result. Even with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s enrichment continued in exchange for sanctions relief. The second possible prediction that Iran will acquire the capability but not test a nuclear weapon can be applied to the present. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Iran as on the “threshold of a nuclear weapon.”

Waltz’s central argument is based on the assumption that Israel’s nuclear edge in the Middle East creates an imbalance and that Iran’s intention is to provide a nuclear balance, thereby creating deterrence between Israel and Iran. However, considering Iran’s regional policies over the past decades and its foreign policy instruments, such as using surrogates and proxy forces to destabilize its neighbors and the entire region, one can argue that the notion of Iran’s possession of nuclear capabilities would create “stability” through a nuclear balance does not stand scrutiny.

The ideological nature of the Iranian regime alongside its expansionist foreign policy challenges Waltz’s view. Iran’s increasing ballistic missile capabilities and drone production is an indication that the Iranian nuclear program will facilitate Iran’s offensive nuclear capabilities.

Waltz also overlooked the domestic dimension and variables, meaning the imperialist tendencies within Iran, as well as variables in perception, such as the worldview of the Supreme Leader and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders. Moreover, Waltz’s argument that Iran is striving to ensure its own security by possessing nuclear weapons is questionable in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which repeatedly shows that having a nuclear deterrent does not shield a country from attack and loss of territory via conventional means.

While structural realists view the international system as anarchic and see states as striving, at a minimum, to ensure their survival, the offensive realist perspective explains state behavior more accurately. In fact, the anarchic nature of the international system directs states to maximize security, and to do so they maximize relative power. Regardless of specific threats states try to expand power. As security is not guaranteed under the anarchic international system, states maximize power to ensure their security.

As John Mearsheimer argues, states maximise their relative power because having military advantage ensures their security. The notion that Iran possessing nuclear weapons is about ensuring Iranian security and creating a nuclear balance fails to address the offensive nature of Iranian foreign and security policies in the region as well as its expansionist approaches.

An offensive realist perspective explains Iran’s nuclear program strategy accordingly, as Iran’s track record and foreign policy instruments show it takes a hegemonic approach in the region to maximize its influence over neighboring countries and increase its relative power. Waltz viewed Iran’s nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Israel, but a nuclear-armed Iran would have a very different geopolitical role in a region like the South Caucasus, sandwiched between two rogue, imperialist regimes—Iran and Russia.

Considering that Iran and Russia are strategic allies that share common geopolitical views of the West and desire to curtail the Westward-looking foreign policies of the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, a nuclear-armed Iran will not create a balance but push regional actors towards Russia against their will—particularly considering that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unlikely.

According to Robert Gilpin, “As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy.” Thus, a nuclear-armed Iran would engage in solidifying and maximizing its geopolitical goals and interests in its neighboring countries, creating more instability.

Iran’s Nuclear Programs and the Region

The lessons of Russia’s imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine and Russian official narratives such as the rejection of Ukrainian identity and statehood are proof that Iran’s nuclear program, and potential weaponization of it, pose an existential security risk to Azerbaijan as an independent country and the South Caucasus region, in general. Iranian imperial ambitions, coupled with a grudge against Azerbaijani independence, puts the country’s security at risk.

Azerbaijan’s close ally Turkey, which does not possess nuclear weapons, cannot serve as a counterweight for a nuclear Iran. Iran prefers a weak Azerbaijan on its northern border.

Iran also prefers to use Azerbaijan’s neighbor, Armenia, against Baku. A nuclear Iran might further embolden Armenian revanchist circles to seek a change in the status quo, which could start another war.

A nuclear-armed Iran may also increase its efforts to destabilise Azerbaijan via proxy groups, such as the Huseyniyyun Brigade, as Tehran attempts to curtail Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. However, a nuclear deal may still allow Iran to use the lifting of sanctions to increase its political and economic influence in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus via soft power and proxies.

Thus, a nuclear agreement with the United States and fielding nuclear weapons both pose potential risks. The Iran-Russia 20-year strategic pact, which was signed recently, also points to the fact that both Moscow and Tehran will further cooperate and stand against a Western role in the region. Increasing Iranian-Russian military cooperation is also a point of concern. Both countries are heavily sanctioned internationally, but they do not pose an obstacle to the growing trade and military ties between the two states.

Azerbaijan’s position as a link between the West and Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran, is an irritant in Moscow and Tehran. Iran’s staunch opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is evident in its stance against the Zangezur corridor as Tehran does not want to lose leverage in the South Caucasus as Armenia’s close ally. The facilitation of the transfer of Indian weapons to Armenia and the transfer of Russian weapons to Armenia via Iranian soil illustrates the fact that the Iranian regime continues to be a source of destabilization in the region. In short, a nuclear Iran allied with Russia cannot establish a nuclear balance in the South Caucasus region; rather it will increase security risks and pose an existential threat to the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Contrary to Kenneth Waltz’s argument that a nuclear balance would lead to stability, this analysis suggests it will instead lead to instability—particularly in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s war on Ukraine shows, direct imperialist activities by a nuclear Iran cannot be precluded from the future of a nuclear-armed Iran. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran is bad for the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the World. It will not bring Kenneth Waltz’s stability.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Nuclear Iran Would Pose an Existential Threat to the South Caucasus was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Armenia’s biggest vulnerability is that it relies on Russia for defense, which has been a noncommittal security guarantor since at least 2016’s Four Day War. After Armenia was attacked by Azerbaijan on sovereign territory, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan pleaded for help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian dominated defense treaty alliance. In response the CSTO led sent a civilian delegate on “fact finding mission” damaged areas.

Following the week of attacks U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visited Yerevan and stated  Azerbaijan attack as “illegal and deadly”. This diplomatic serendipity to Armenia was a tremendous step for Washington’s advancing relations with Yerevan. However, the Speaker of the House is only one significant leader in the U.S. Government. Nations and non-state actors do not begin formal bilateral cooperation with the U.S. overnight. Cooperation requires many actors in diplomacy, private sector, military, law enforcement, lawmakers, and intelligence, to name some, who share common interest.

The U.S. probably has interests to work with Armenia due to shared democratic values, a bustling tech sector which cooperates with American companies, and diaspora members who carry a significant voice in domestic politics. Armenia very likely has interests to work with the U.S. for the sake of maintaining its sovereignty.  Yet one major point of concern for cooperation with Washington is that only Armenia recognizes the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) based on the Soviet Oblast’s referendum in the 1990s. The rest of the world, including Russia and the U.S., recognize Stalin’s redrawn borders placing the Armenian dominate population firmly within Baku’s authority.

The following are opportunities for Yerevan to press for its highest defense needs while soliciting the White House, Pentagon, and Congress for security assistance. Engaging these American actors probably will take more time, which is a luxury Yerevan does not have. Warm weather in the Caucasus is here again and Azerbaijan may attack again.

Need for Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)

The most significant threat Armenia faces from Azerbaijan are Turkish-made TB-2 drones (UAVs). According to some war fighting experts, the TB-2 and other drones give Azerbaijan a tremendous attack advantage, providing air-to-ground missile fire, while simultaneously giving real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to troops. The Turkish-made drone was so successful after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenian procured Russian defense systems that Ukraine decided to use the same weapons system in its war against Russia. Azerbaijan’s seemingly uncontested attack capability from the air can strike infantry vehicles, tanks, and deny logistics to the front lines.  Judging from sources online, Armenian Armed Forces and Nagorno-Karabakh Self Defense Forces do not seem to have a viable alternative to counter this great threat from the air.

Yerevan needs to understand that only IADS are the most capable counter to Azerbaijan’s threat from the air. To oversimplify, there are several air defense systems which can deny a threat including, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), surface to air missiles (SAMs), air artillery guns (AAGs), and air-to-air denial from jets.

One option for Yerevan’s new IADS is the Mistral, a French MANPADS which can counter Azeri threats from the air. It operates in many countries outside France, such as Cyprus, Georgia, Serbia, and others. Although the Mistral has yet to be proven in combat against Turkish drones, it could provide a barrier in the air against Azerbaijan’s greatest weapons. France is the highest favored country by Armenians, according to a U.S. think tank poll, and President Macron’s pro-Armenian rhetoric could lead to an air defense deal. As the TB-2 and other Turkish UAVs are some of the most popular in the world today, a counter weapons system would arguably find great demand.

Every Armenian engineer and defense manufacturer should focus on IADS procurement, and domestic research and development right now, from tracking incoming threats to eliminating them.

Soviet Era Doctrine & Personnel Reform 

It logically follows that Russian warfighting doctrine heavily influences Armenian warfighting doctrine. Both borrow from the Soviet Union. In 2011, then-Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe Mark Hertling and an unnamed Russian General held a conversation on training personnel. General Hertling told his counterpart that without an effective non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, Russian troops will never be trained effectively. Sure enough, lack of Russian NCOs have been one of the biggest operational issues during their Ukraine campaign. Russian NCOs “Are not in charge of tactics,” Russian military expert Michael Kofman opined to American defense news outlet Defense One “That’s why the Russian military is officer top-heavy. The officer corps handles all those issues that NCOs might.”

Armenia’s conscript-dependent military may desire to emulate the principles of a “professional military” (or “all-volunteer military” – these terms are used interchangeably). Yet, a significant overhaul in doctrine with war potentially imminent likely requires much more dedication in time, resources, and training to overcome critical personnel vulnerabilities. Yerevan can instead task its Ministry of Defense to train a robust NCO corps borrowing from Western doctrine such as the U.S. Call them, for example “Vartan’s Volunteers”, and establish prestige with joining a volunteer all-year NCO corps.

U.S. Medal of Honor Recipient and Afghanistan War Veteran Clint Romesha offered thoughts on what makes efficient NCOs to Task and Purpose, an American military news outlet,

While officers are the ones who put the plan together, it’s those enlisted leaders, the NCOs, who implement it. Even before those orders come down from the officers, the NCOs are moving proactively and preparing the troops, and they are usually the ones fighting with their junior soldiers on the front lines, leading them in combat.

This is not to suggest that Armenian NCOs, officers, or others are not competent. Rather, as some Armenian analysts call for Armenia to become a “Garrison State”, a strong, modern, defense doctrine needs to have “suits” (political and private sector), “stars” (generals and commissioned officers), and “stripes” (NCOs and conscripted) all understand their responsibilities and carry it out effectively. Immediate reform with NCO corps could be a short-term improvement to better improve command and control from the bottom-up, while doctrine is reformed top-down.

For recruitment and conscription guidance, Yerevan can look to nations which have successful programs. Singapore’srelations with Washington are strong and likewise with Yerevan. Singapore’s military has extensively trained with the U.S. and could probably provide insight on personnel, training, and logistics from a civilian to solider mentality. Furthermore, Armenia can utilize contractors from eclectic backgrounds, such as diaspora Armenians from U.S., France, Russia, Lebanon, Greece, or elsewhere. The Armenian government could expand its robust diaspora work-live programs for contractors to train conscripted soldiers, thereby increasing the rate of trained civilians. Moreover, a diaspora group of military experts could perhaps work with the Ministry of Defense as an affiliate council to study and suggest micro and macro-Armenian military inquiries.

Above all, Yerevan must think beyond “pro-Moscow” or “anti-Moscow”. The best militaries in the world borrow strategies, doctrine, operational planning, and more from others to enhance assets to their greatest potential. They do not prepare to fight the last war.

Training 

India’s major arms deal to Armenia may be the first step in a blossoming Armenian relationship. Azerbaijan is strongly allied with Pakistan. India and Pakistan historically share animosity.  Moreover, India views Armenia as a vital link to for its trade route from Iran through the Black Sea region. Indian Mountain Brigades are some of the best mountain troops in the world. It can be argued that Indian President Modhi could find training Armenia for combat in high terrain to test his best operational and tactical methods for the ongoing challenges with China in their own disputed territory.

French President Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have spoken over the phone many times since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. French Sniper Schools are some of the most well-respected institutions in the world. French sniper training to Armenian long-range fighters could prove to be vital for another defensive conflict judging from the rugged terrain and long lines of sight within Armenian territory.

South Korea is a nation which always must consider border security. Perhaps Armenia could learn from South Korean defense against neighboring North Korea, utilizing training programs, expertise on surveillance and counter surveillance, mining, reconnaissance, and communications to headquarters from the forward line of troops.

Equipment & Arms Procurement 

Yerevan needs to look beyond Russian suppliers for equipment and arms procurement. Diplomatic loyalty to allies and financial cost can often be problematic factors for nations who desire to bulwark defense capabilities. If Armenia’s ultimate goal is to earn Washington’s trust and purchase arms from the American private sector, Yerevan should engage US friendly countries to procure “surplus” while diaspora and Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs press American private companies and Congress to procure from the “source”.

Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan declined in relations during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War when Saudi Arabia called for peace instead affirming the Azeri position on territorial claims. Saudi Arabia might be under the impression that a crippled Armenia would mean Turkish dominance over the Caucasus region, and therefore may be inclined to send equipment and defensive weapons to Armenia. Yerevan can argue to Riyadh, perhaps making a case that a Turkish dominated Caucasus region would mean that Sunni Muslim nations in the central Asian steppe would be more inclined to follow Turkey rather than Saudi Arabia.

Greece shares over 2,000 years of mostly positive relations with Armenia. Today, Athens confronts hostile rhetoric from Turkey’s President Erdogan. In 2020, Greece accused Turkish troops of making an incursion within Greek territory. In 2022, Athens sent millions of dollars in defense equipment to Ukraine, according to a speech given by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to the U.S. Congress. A revamped Greek military considering perceived Turkish aggression and NATO duties to Ukraine could also aid Armenia.

Brazil just concluded the closest election in its history. Armenia can play to the new President Lula da Silva under the guise as the first Christian nation who desires to prevent another genocide on the grounds of protecting democracy and human rights. Lula may want a quick foreign policy victory as an ecumenical issue while Brazil remains divided domestically. The small but impactful Brazilian-Armenian diaspora can be utilized to this degree.

Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Christian minority (which shares ties to Armenian Apostolic Christians) recently suffered a tragic deadly loss of 41 believers in a fire. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi may be seeking an opportunity of good will to his non-Muslim supporters, assisting Armenia could be one. Furthermore, Egyptian-Turkish relations have gone through a rough patch since 2013. Yerevan could leverage Egypt if El-Sisi desires to press Turkey in the tense Eastern Mediterranean.

The above are just a few examples. Yerevan should indiscriminately look to the broader US community of allies. Yet most important, the Armenian Diaspora should focus all efforts on one primary goal: earning the trust of the US military defense industry and carry out private sector deals to Yerevan.

The Armenian Diaspora’s extensive networks were instrumental in pushing the recognition of Armenian Genocide by the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and state governments. Yet for all the Diaspora’s merits to raise awareness in history, new history can arguably be made if Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are ethnically cleansed from their homes. Armenian Diaspora can use their tremendously organized body to engage U.S. blue-chip defense contractors. Diaspora education can encourage the American private sector to push Congress for Yerevan to eventually procure American equipment. Once permission is granted, private sector defense contractors can immediately begin selling systems to the now-democratic former Soviet republic for self-defense purposes.

If Armenia Wants Western Defense Support, Doctrine and Partner Engagement Reform Must Happen Now was originally published on Global Security Review.

The West needs to understand that Armenia, a rising democratic state, strongly linked to Western businesses in IT and ranked 11 out of 165 in the world for economic freedom, is significantly vulnerable to larger powers of the region and dependent on authoritarian Russia and Iran for assistance. Each is facing its own domestic issues and cannot be depended on by Yerevan for certain defense assistance.

Armenian suffered military and civilian casualties in the thousands since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (“2^nd N-K War”). Armenia is an allied treaty member with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, CSTO’s most powerful member is also allies with Azerbaijan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Azerbaijan a “strategic ally” two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, any media labeling that Russia and Armenia are exclusive allies in the South Caucasus misses the mark.

How did Armenia’s security situation become so dependent on Russia?

The relationship formed as an Armenian short-term solution during the turbulent post-Soviet 1990s, through today and exacerbated into long-term weakness. The year was 1993. Armenia was strongly positioned after winning the 1^st N-K War following a Soviet referendum in the N-K Oblast to separate from Stalin’s incorporation into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Soviet Russia was the target of heavy discontent due to Azerbaijani nationalism.

According to the memoirs of former Greek Ambassador to Armenia, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Armenia’s modern security dependence on Russia was conceived under the guise of thwarting a Turkish invasion in October 1993. The Ambassador writes:

[Armenian] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was convinced, based on information that he had received from serval sources, that Turkey would try to take advantage of serious events within Russia in order to occupy Armenia, using as a pretext either the Kurdish question or the protection of the Nakhichevan enclave. He had intelligence reports that the Turkish National Security Council had recently examined the possibility of the Turkish army’s making incursions into Iraq and Armenia in order to eliminate PKK guerillas. That same evening, Turkish Armed Forces penetrated Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK fighters.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a historian, son to Armenian Genocide survivors and raised outside his homeland, probably was biased to think that Turkey (which at that time and today denies the Armenian Genocide’s existence) would use Kurdish insurgents as casus belli to attack Armenia. Boris Yeltsin, President of the new Russian Federation, was seeking political legitimacy from the broken former Soviet republics, so the two found common interest. Armenia garnered Russian troops on the Turkish-Armenian border while Yeltsin gained a political ally from one of the first post-Soviet republics. This short era likely marked the highest point in Armenian-Russian relations.

What Ter-Petrosyan did not conceive, probably, was a long-term trade of security for Armenia’s sovereignty and prosperity. Armenia throughout the 1990s and into the 2010s essentially became a de facto client state of Russia. To oversimplify many studies and books written on the “Age of the Oligarchs”, Russian-Armenian relations were very friendly, but at the cost of corruption and crime (including one Russian soldier’s murder of Armenian civilians).

Then in 2018 ascended the Moscow skeptic and reformer journalist Nikol Pashinyan in the “Velvet Revolution”. Once he was elected Prime Minister under a new constitutional system, Pashinyan focused attention on reforming systemic Russian corruption. Yet Moscow became less enthusiastic about their Armenian relationship as Pashinyan levied the power of the state to go after his former rivals. Some of Pashinyan’s critics today cite his focus on defeating rivals over strengthening the national security situation.

Azerbaijan’s 2020 Gambit

Armenia under the rule of Russian loyal leaders never solved its paramount security priority to protect ethnic brethren in the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In spring 2020, when Azerbaijan and Armenia fought in the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia, Tavush province, Moscow was absent to support Yerevan. Could this have been due to Pashinyan’s anti-Russian reforms?

The answer is irrelevant. The most import takeaway is that Russian apathy towards its treaty-ally arguably led Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev to rationally conclude: If Russia was absent to defend Armenian recognized territory, Russia would almost certainly not defend Armenian “self-proclaimed” territory of in the “Republic of Artsakh”. So brutal realpolitik enabled Azerbaijan’s attack on ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in the fall of that same year, the 2^nd N-K War.

However, Azerbaijan did not secure an outright strategic victory on the claimed territory. Today Russian “peacekeepers” permeate what remains of the “Republic of Artsakh”, but it is impossible for Armenian citizens to reach Armenian ethnic population in the Republic of Artsakh without crossing into Azerbaijani territory. The blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the region’s only Armenia to “Republic of Artsakh” route has almost daily been cutoff, as many inside the unrecognized country called for a Berlin Wall airlift of humanitarian aid.

In 2020, Baku had to decide if it was willing to risk attacking Russian military to secure a strategic victory. Yet, in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine, morale turned in President Aliyev’s favor.

The already non-committal ally Russia arguably became distracted to either diplomatically or militarily thwart Azerbaijani aggression in Baku’s effort to take Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, this past September, Azerbaijan launched successful attacks on Armenian civilian locations, occupied more land, and according to human rights groups, committed war crimes such as desecration of a female soldier and execution of a prisoner of war.

The Price of Force for Perceived Gain

Could the matter become worse for Yerevan if Baku concludes that the cost of attacking Armenia and seizing Nagorno-Karabakh is less than the perceived gain?

The answer is grim when analyzing the situation from a Westphalian point of view. Ethnic cleansing of Armenians just over a century after the Genocide is dependent on authoritarian Russia. Moscow is allied with Azerbaijan and Armenia and calls itself a “peacekeeper”, yet the term “piece keeper” may be more appropriate (See work by Thomas De Waalon how Moscow prefers frozen conflicts in its near abroad to exert maximum influence).

If for the sake of argument, Russia is presently “neutral” in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the following are 4 notional scenarios wherein Russia moderately or highly supports Armenia or Azerbaijan (note: these scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

Scenario A: Russia Strongly Supports Armenia to Save CSTO Prestige

Assessed to be the least likely scenario.

Russia’s war in Ukraine may not only cost their sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, but also in Central Asia. The unequivocal CSTO leader President Putin and the Kremlin may decide that an Armenian defeat would destroy CSTO’s legitimacy to Russia’s other security dependents like Kazakhstan to flee to alternatives such as Turkey or China.

In 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered security support to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s riots. Turkey would have deployed troops through the “Organization of Turkic States”, a rising fraternal coalition of Turkic nations which may play spoiler to Russia and China in Central Asia for decades to come. This year, China backed Kazakhstan for its refusal to support Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Kazakhstani President Tokayev changed his country’s alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin which may indicate a desire to break from the Russian socio-political sphere.

Russia in this scenario would deploy all available integrated air-defense systems (IADS) including MiGs to shoot down any Azerbaijani drones in the N-K area of responsibility.  Russia would declare itself the guarantor power of what remains of Armenian held N-K territory, including the Lachin corridor, while threating Azerbaijan with force or trade standstill for any further encroachment. Moscow would not seek concessions from Yerevan because it would view saving CSTO’s other members from fleeing its sphere of influence as a higher priority than re-claiming dominance in Armenian politics.

Scenario B: Russia Moderately Supports Armenia to Reclaim Influence over Yerevan

A plausible scenario.

In a notional grand bargain, Armenian Prime Minister and Moscow skeptic Nikol Pashinyan would resign to acquire Russian permanent guarantor power status of remaining “Republic of Artsakh” territory. Russian President Putin would threaten Baku of retaliation should Azerbaijan take another meter of territory. Moscow would also permanently control the Lachin Corridor.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan would use the power of the state to drop all investigations of Armenian-Russian corruption past and present and curtail any sentences against the convicted. Finally, Pashinyan could unilaterally proclaim that the Armenian Government would not recognize the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which recently warranted Russian President Vladimir Putin for arrest.

However, the major problem for Pashinyan’s trade of justice for security cuts through his very own life experience, where he was jailed as a political prisoner during a very Moscow loyal era of Armenian politics. To drop his legacy for the sake of Armenian territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of his political persecutors and rivals, would highly contrast the former journalist’s revolutionary identity. But even a forgiving Pashinyan himself probably could not rebuild the damage done to Russian-Armenian relations, which have never been more distrustful. These could resume once again, but it would be highly suspect by the Kremlin and the disapproving domestic Armenian population. Western-Armenian economic relations could also destabilize.

Scenario C: Russia Moderately Supports Azerbaijan to Retain Regional Power Broker Status

Assessed to be the most likely scenario.

Moscow would negotiate directly with Baku to tacitly support Azerbaijani military advance into the Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia may also use negotiations as an opportunity for Azerbaijan to tamper harsh rhetoric or action against Iran.

Most importantly, the deal would be caveated for Russia to retain a permanent Russian military base in N-K. Russia would establish a humanitarian corridor through Lachin to evacuate +100,000 Armenians to the Republic of Armenia. Moscow would claim to the international community that it prevented ethnic cleansing through guaranteed safe passage and now is a major broker of tranquility in the South Caucasus, using the “resolved” Nagorno-Karabakh question as the final lynchpin for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan’s government would be overthrown and replaced by a new one. Yerevan would probably be run by a very fragile caretaker government in combination of Moscow friendly political parties and Western friendly parties supported by the influential tech sector. Humanitarian calamities would be unaccounted for and rampant if the West allowed this scenario to play out.

Scenario D: Russia Strongly Supports Azerbaijan to Conspire and Annex Armenia

 A plausible scenario.

Russia would support Baku to use military force to seize the remaining Armenian population centers of Nagorno-Karabakh and would order peacekeepers to stand down. Moscow would only demonstrate mercy to Armenia through the coercion to join the Union State of Russia and Belarus – an outright annexation.

This nightmare ultimatum for Armenian sovereignty could unfold if (1) Azerbaijani operational success severely cripples the moral of the Armenian Armed Forces, (2) Baku made rapid gains in Nagorno-Karabakh, (3) Armenian civilian casualties are high, and (4) Azerbaijan connects its exclaves in northwestern Republic of Armenia territory. Baku’s success would set the stage for an all-out assault from both Azerbaijani sides of the “Zanzigur” Corridor in southern Republic of Armenia.

The logic to trade sovereignty for security would follow if Moscow suddenly gained the leverage to offer Yerevan an off-ramp: join the Union State of Russia and Belarus or suffer another genocide and territorial forfeiture.

Russia would recoup its 60,000 ethnic citizens who reside in Armenia since the start of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia War (about 780,000 have passed through the country), including many who restarted tech businesses which now cooperate with the West. Moreover, Moscow would reclaim strategically important territory it once controlled during the Soviet Era which borders Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Georgia, another nation whose land is under partial control by Russian proxy.

Although Iran has made many rhetorical guarantees to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation as permanent, Moscow could save Tehran a hot war with Baku as the status quo of the new Iranian-Russian border would operate the same as the Iranian-Armenian border.

Russia could also garner a tariff through a newly constructed road between Azerbaijan’s west exclave and eastern mainland. The United States and Europe would also lose a deeply embed and vital Armenian partner in the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design and data science. Russia would annex former Soviet Union territory without firing a shot and President Putin could bolster his legacy as a revanchist hero.

Wildcards and Gaps

Many unknowns surround how Turkey, the European Union writ large and the United States each individually play into these scenarios.

We have seen reports of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, but it seems that drivers point to anything except full normalization. The question on Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in the region should not be phrased as “if” but “how much”. Turkish election season is ramping up for incumbent and Neo-Ottoman ideologue President Erdogan. His previous unconcealed rhetoric towards assisting Azerbaijan has been well received domestically and throughout the Turkic world.  The Turkish-Armenian land border partially opened when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Turkey. Yet, Turkey and Azerbaijan are close in military and ideology.

It should not be hard for a Westerner to conclude that Turkey prioritizes relations, trade, weapons sales, and influence with Azerbaijan over normalization with Armenia – especially if it came to a zero-sum issue such as another Azerbaijan-Armenia war. For those that disagree, they should research the nations who do and do not recognize the Armenian Genocide as a historical fact.

The European Union faces hurdles in securing peace because of its economic dependence on Azerbaijan as a non-Russian gas supplier. Any attempts by the EU or individual member states to economically sanction Baku would net increased gas prices. It is also highly unlikely that any member state would challenge the status quo to replace Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh with EU member states, given EU members’ overlapping commitments to Ukraine via NATO.

This leaves the US with a once-in-a-century opportunity to secure peace and balance of power in the South Caucasus.  Armenia’s strategic desire to incorporate with the Western world has not been seen since the Armenian Genocide survivors and France in the aftermath of WWI. Failure to garner peace would probably cost the West a rising Armenian democracy to Russian oligarchy and furthermore, a vital partner to the tech sector including software, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor design, and data science.

Peace in Caucasus as Beginning to the End of the Russia-Ukraine War?

Current US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy, previously the US Ambassador to Armenia, once stated the US is ready to work with Russia bilaterally on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal. Though the comment did not make headlines in major Western news outlets, Ambassador Tracy’s long-shot idea may be the best confidence-building measure between the West and Russia as everyone benefits from peace and stability.

If the West remains idle on this issue, Russia may emerge the victor of the 2022-2023 Ukraine-Russia War with new territory in not only one but two former Soviet republics.

Azerbaijan Coerces Nagorno-Karabakh While Armenia Plays Russian Roulette was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The E.U. first decided to impose sanctions in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which were expanded a few months later after Russia began a destabilizing hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, and after a Russian-made missile destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukrainian territory controlled by separatist forces backed by the Kremlin.

In 2018, E.U. members states joined the United Kingdom and the United States in expelling a record number of Russian diplomatic and intelligence personnel in response to the reportedly Kremlin-ordered attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, in which the nerve agent Novichuk was used on U.K. soil.

At the turn of the century, Russia saw itself as European. However, as E.U.-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated over the past decade, Russia has turned away from Europe, identifying instead as a Eurasian power. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promoted the idea of E.U. integration for Russia, and upon becoming president in 2000, Vladimir Putin pursued a similar path.

Russian-European Integration

The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, a whitepaper produced by the Kremlin that defines Russia's foreign policy, identified the E.U. as being critically important for Russia as one of Moscow's primary "political and economic partners." While the Kremlin still perceived NATO and the U.S. as Russia's foremost national security threats, in addition to impeding Russia's long-term goal of restoring its status as a "great power," the European Union was viewed favorably.

However, this perception did not last. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the U.S., Putin became increasingly vocal about the necessity for Russia to reestablish itself as a "great power" to adequately defend its interests in the post-Cold War era. Concurrently, the Kremlin, in both rhetoric and action, became increasingly assertive about what it considered its right to dictate the foreign policy of neighboring states, located in what Russia historically regards as its sphere of influence.

In 2004, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia (former Soviet republics) joined the E.U. along with multiple former members of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland. In response, the Kremlin denounced the E.U.'s expansion, accusing the bloc of creating divisions across the European continent.

The expansion of the E.U. into what Russia viewed as its sphere of influence, combined with the wave of "color revolutions" in several former Soviet republics between 2003 and 2005, led the Kremlin to begin regarding the E.U. as a power with expansionist ambitions that threatened Russian sovereignty and strategic foreign policy aims.

European Expansionism

Under Putin, Russia grew convinced that both the E.U. and the U.S. played a part in the "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which either could have—or did—shift the alignment of those states towards Europe, at Russia's expense.

The perception in Moscow of the E.U. as a distinct and separate entity from NATO and the U.S. faded between 2004 and 2008. From Russia's point of view, all three actors were working to impede Russia's foreign policy, and undermine its sovereignty by imposing on Russia an international order that was at odds with Russia's interests.

Less than eight years after desiring greater integration with Europe, Putin regularly accused the U.S. of unipolar hegemony and argued that the post-Cold War order was unfair. In a speech delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin asserted that the U.S. "overstepped its boundaries in all spheres—economic, political, and humanitarian." As a consequence, he stated that Russia would follow an "independent foreign policy."

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept released in 2008 subsequently downgraded the E.U. from a "main political and economic partner" to "one of the main trade-economic and foreign policy partners." In the same year, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied the regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia, situated along Georgia's border with Russia.

In response, the E.U. halted negotiations on what would be a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that would define Moscow-Brussels relations. In 2009 the E.U. launched its Eastern Partnership initiative with six former republics of the Soviet Union.

The following year, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was formed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The ECU was intended as a counterweight to the E.U. and was designed to consolidate Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space to guarantee its national interests better and increase its global standing.

Russia Turns Away from Europe—to Eurasia

In 2012, Moscow was overwhelmed by large-scale protests over the reported rigging of the 2011 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin, again, saw the protests as being part of a Western plot to destabilize Russia's political system and foment regime change. Putin, having returned to the presidency that year, began instituting structural reforms that would impede Western influence within Russia, while simultaneously promoting Russia as the conservative defender of traditional values.

The 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine that toppled the pro-Russian government of President Viktor Yanukovych was seen by Putin as yet another example of Western interference in Russia's historical sphere of influence. Just months after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea from Ukraine and stoked a devastating civil war in eastern Ukraine.

In recent years, Russia has gone on the offensive against the West, interfering in multiple elections and exploiting political divisions in Europe and the United States. From the Russian perspective, this is only logical. The Kremlin maintains that the E.U and the U.S. were engaged in a plot designed to destabilize and weaken Russia, so it attempts to do the same.

Relations between the E.U. and Russia largely reflect the broader relationship between Russia and the West. Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept eliminates any reference to the European Union, instead emphasizing "Eurasian integration," a reference to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the successor to the ECU. Currently, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are members.

The EAEU is intended to facilitate the economic integration of former Soviet republics into a single economic entity. Russia's reorientation towards Eurasia through the EAEU is a signal that it now sees the E.U. as something that, instead of cooperating with, must be confronted.

As Russia Identifies as a Eurasian Power, It Turns Away from Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Sasna Tsrer, the gunmen behind a bloody 2016 rebellion, are forming a political party and positioning themselves as allies of the new government.

Among liberals, Sasna Tsrer may have the reputation of being a group of violent radicals, but in Armenia’s flamboyant political culture, its leader Jirair Sefilian presents a markedly sober image.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, a young liberal democrat, recently threatened to smash his opponents against the wall. The leader of the second-largest faction in Parliament, oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, is a former world arm-wrestling champion who keeps a private zoo with lions. His party chair, Naira Zohrabyan, recently wore a Dolce & Gabbana dress in a farfalle pasta print to the floor of parliament. In Armenia, politics is one the most popular forms of entertainment, on par with football and Bollywood.

In this environment, Sefilian’s self-disciplined figure stands apart. The Lebanese-born military-commander-turned-opposition-figure is the leader of Armenia’s newest political party, Sasna Tsrer. The party takes its name from one of the most notorious episodes in Armenia’s recent history: the 2016 drama in which a group of armed men close to Sefilianseized a police station in Yerevan and held officers hostage; several were killed.

Belying that violent heritage, however, Sefilian himself presents a calm, measured image. He is soft-spoken, and, outside of TV studios – where he appears in a formal suit and white shirt – his sense of fashion can best be described as normcore, a “dad style” channeling deep indifference to all things sartorial.

On TV, Sefilian has two modes: When he speaks about the former ruling regime of presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan – his sworn enemies – he is serious, but never raises his voice. When interviewers ask about his own views and plans, he responds with a wry half-smile.

His plans now include leaving his direct-action days behind and running for office. Sasna Tsrer intends to hold its founding convention on September 29, after which it will formally file the paperwork to become a registered political party. It is a development that would have been impossible to imagine before April, when massive street protests led to Sargsyan stepping down after 10 years in office, and propelled Pashinyan into power.

What significance Sasna Tsrer will have is up for debate. Sefilian and his allies point to fundraising success, fueled by small donors, and a recent, enthusiastic town hall meeting in the city of Martuni, to indicate that they are poised to be the second-leading political force in the country behind Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party. “Even our worst enemies consider us number two,” said Garo Yegnukian, a lawyer and activist who is also one of Sasna Tsrer’s leaders.

But others are skeptical. “I think they’re overestimating themselves,” said Mikayel Zolyan, a Yerevan-based political analyst. “It’s not 2016 anymore, when they enjoyed popular support. I don’t expect them to get more than 5 to 10 percent of the vote” in upcoming parliamentary elections.

But Zolyan added that the emergence of Sasna Tsrer as a political party still portends significant political shifts in Armenia. “First, it’s always better to coopt hardliners into the system then leave them out of it,” he said. “Also, Sasna Tsrer brands itself as a force defending Armenia’s sovereignty, and that includes standing up to Russia. This can be convenient for Pashinyan. There’s already a number of pro-Russian actors. [..] If there’s no counterweight, Pashinyan could be forced to make concessions to Moscow.” With Sasna Tsrer in parliament, though, “Pashinyan can become a centrist figure.”

Hrachya Arzumanian, a Stepanakert-based political scientist, echoed this forecast. During negotiations with Russia, Pashinyan “can always point out that there are more radical political forces,” Arzumanian wrote on Facebook. “That gives the new prime minister room for maneuver. He wouldn’t need to advocate radical views and approaches. Sasna Tsrer will do that.”

From Beirut to Karabakh

Sefilian was born in Lebanon in 1967 and fought with Armenian militias in the civil war there. Sefilian still speaks Western Armenian, the dialect spoken among descendants of the Armenians who lived in what is now Turkey; Eastern Armenian is the language spoken in modern Armenia. To Yerevantsis, the dialect sounds like a Southern U.S. drawl to a Londoner: comprehensible, yet deeply foreign. (As a compromise, he writes Facebook posts in Eastern Armenian.)

In 1990, as part of the nationalist group Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Dashnaktsutyun, he went to Armenia, which was just embarking on a war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. With his military experience from Lebanon he served as a military trainer, teaching soldiering basics to local volunteers.

That war, ultimately won by the Armenian side, produced the first generation of post-Soviet Armenian political leaders: former presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan were both prominent Karabakh leaders. Even the current Armenian Church leader, Catholicos Karekin II, as a young bishop helped raise funds (and, some say, supply arms) for the cause.

While his former comrades-in-arms were capitalizing on their credentials and concentrating power, Sefilian found himself in a new struggle, this time a political one. “I never wanted to be a politician. I don’t enjoy politics,” Sefilian told Eurasianet in an interview. “But at some point I realized that the country needs people like me to go into politics.”

After Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire in 1994, Sefilian returned to Beirut. He was unable to return to Armenia for several years because the country’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, had banned the ARF. In 1997 he made it back and upon his return he served briefly as a brigade commander in the de facto armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Armenian government was actively working on a peace deal with Baku, which would include the return to Azerbaijan of some territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that the Armenian forces also had seized during the war. Sefilian acted as spoiler, coordinating two initiatives: Defense of the Liberated Territories and Union of Armenian Volunteers. Both sought to mobilize Armenian society against any compromise. “We made our concession to Azerbaijan in 1994, when we stopped our offensive on its request. Otherwise that state would have already fallen apart,” he said at the time. He coordinated efforts to settle the territories in question with ethnic Armenians. He also tried to mobilize Armenians inJavakheti, a region in Georgia with a large ethnic-Armenian population.

Together with a close circle of like-minded nationalist activists, in 2012 Sefilian created a movement they called Founding Parliament, holding hundreds of rallies and traveling the country demanding regime change. While still focused on Karabakh, he also opposed Sargsyan’s domestic agenda, protesting widespread voter fraud and corruption. Successive governments responded by cracking down, and Sefilian has on and off spent more than three and a half of the last 12 years in prison.

Hardline figure

Throughout more than a decade of political activism, Sefilian had repeatedly said that he opposed the use of force. But his long years of nonviolent activism gained him only scant support in the country.

That all changed in July 2016. In April of that year, aresumption of fighting with Azerbaijan resulted in the deaths of 94 Armenian soldiers, including volunteers and reservists. Armenian forces lost three square miles of territory – insignificant strategically, but as the first substantial Azerbaijani advance since 1994, it was a psychological blow. Sefilian accused Sargsyan of downplaying the defeat. (The president said the lost territories were “of no strategic importance.”)

Sargsyan responded by cracking down. Sefilian was arrested and sentenced to over a decade in prison on charges of planning a coup and possessing illegal weapons. Pashinyan, at the time an opposition member of parliament, called the ruling a “a bogus verdict” and argued that Sefilian was a political prisoner.

A month later, an armed group of Sefilian allies calling itself Sasna Tsrer – “the Daredevils of Sassoun,” after an ancient Armenian epic – seized a police precinct on the outskirts of Yerevan. The gunmen demanded that Sargsyan step down. In the scuffle, they allegedly killed three policemen. The group admits to killing only one, saying he had opened fire after disregarding their calls to drop his weapon. (Last week, the father of one of the other officers said that he believed it was the police who killed his son, and not Sasna Tsrer.)

Although the gunmen claimed to act independently from Sefilian, they were known to be close to him and tried to negotiate his release while holding policemen hostage. As a result, his political allies suffered. “That was a weak argument, and the regime used the occasion to arrest me,” Andrias Ghukasyan, one of Sefilian’s former allies and founder of the Armenian Constructive Party, told Eurasianet.

During the crisis, Ghukasyan spoke at rallies in support of the takeover. At one rally, he said that “Yerevan showed that our society supports Sasna Tsrer’s demands. [… Sasna Tsrer] know what they are doing and how they’re doing it. […] Don’t forget who they are. Don’t worry, trust them. I trust them.”

In an interview, however, he expressed regret at his cooperation. Ghukasyan, along with dissidents Paruyr Hayrikyan and Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovannisian had made an alliance in 2015 to try to stop a controversial rewriting of the constitution, but they pledged to oppose the government without violence.

“The police precinct takeover was a violation of our agreement,” he told Eurasianet. Ghukasyan spent nearly two years in prison as a result. “National-revolutionary forces of a particular Middle-Eastern blend are always ready to sacrifice themselves, but also to sacrifice others.”

Today Sefilian embraces the legacy of the takeover. He is confident the gunmen eventually will be acquitted, arguing that their actions qualify as “rebellion against tyranny and oppression” as envisaged in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Asked about those who died as a result, he has said, “Serzh Sargsyan is guilty of bloodshed. This tragedy happened because of the oppressive system he built.”

Uncompromising positions

Since Pashinyan came to power, Sasna Tsrer’s leadership has consistently endorsed the new government and offered full cooperation. But they also have called on Pashinyan to dismiss the constitution, dissolve parliament and form a new provisional government, of which they would be part. In terms of geopolitics, Sasna Tsrer aims to launch a sort of Armexit, or “the liberation of Armenia from Russian colonial rule,” withdrawing Armenia from Russia-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. “Russia can’t be our strategic ally. We can’t be allies. Armenians should understand that,” Sefilian said.

The group instead advocates for a strategic alliance with the West. Armenia should “ally itself with the United States and the West and regain its traditional role as a bridge-mediator for Iran and the region,” the group’s current four leaders said in a 2017 statement. They, however, said they opposed Armenia joining NATO.

The movement also holds irredentist views about Armenia’s borders. Sefilian said that he envisages an Armenia that includes the territories of Nakhichevan – an exclave of Azerbaijan that once had a large Armenian population – and eastern Turkey, or “Western Armenia,” the territories formerly inhabited by Armenians until the genocide of 1915.

Sefilian says that is a long-term goal, but some of his erstwhile allies aren’t so sure. Sasna Tsrer “cannot openly promote launching a new war, so they try to mask their rhetoric in order to avoid looking like the war party,” Ghukasyan said.

“Sasna Tsrer fits into the framework of populist parties on the rise in Europe, sometimes presenting a mix of leftist and nationalist ideas, but in general right-wing,” said Zolyan, the political analyst in Yerevan.

War hero, illegal alien

One significant obstacle to Sefilian’s political ambitions: his citizenship.

Born a Lebanese citizen, he has applied for Armenian citizenship repeatedly since 2003, but says his applications are always denied without explanation. His applications for permanent residency also have been denied, and technically he lives in Armenia illegally. He believes the authorities have been waiting for him to leave the country and then bar him from re-entering. So he hasn’t left Armenia in 18 years.

Sefilian reapplied for citizenship on August 1. In his application, he asked for it to be granted retroactively, overturning previous presidents’ decisions. “Armenian law doesn’t include a provision on issuing citizenship retroactively – but it doesn’t bar authorities from doing so, either,” Yegnukian said.

The decision will be crucial to his political career – one needs to be an Armenian citizen and permanent resident for at least four years to run for parliament. Thus, any outcome of Sefilian’s petition will have political ramifications. Pashinyan has not been shy about awarding Armenian citizenship to other prominent ethnic Armenians, including the Canadian-Armenian actress-director power couple Arsinee Khanjian and Atom Egoyan.

Neither an ally nor a competitor

Pashinyan and Sefilian had a common enemy in the old regime and have made a number of cooperating gestures over the years. In 2008, when Pashinyan first took the national stage to lead protests against fraudulent elections, Sefilian supported his cause in an open letter from jail. But the two have never directly collaborated.

“It was always a respectful attitude from both sides as far as I can remember,” Sefilian said. “We didn’t publicly disagree in those years, but rather tried to understand each other.”

When the two disagreed, it was about tactics rather than principles, Sefilian said. “There are two ways to make change – through elections and through civil disobedience,” Sefilian said. “We supported the second option. Nikol [Pashinyan] always tried to convince us that no, it’s possible through elections. Time proved that it was only possible through civil disobedience. Fortunately, Nikol succeeded in it.”

Sefilian was released this June with the help of a bond signed by thirteen members of parliament, including one member of Pashinyan’s party. Sefilian said he has met Pashinyan once since his release, and there have been a few occasions when he had to call the prime minister’s aides.

At least one vocal Sasna Tsrer supporter now has a high-level government job: David Sanasaryan led rallies in support of the group in 2016 and spent a month in jail as a result. He now heads the State Oversight Service, a watchdog that reports to the prime minister’s office.

“We have a constructive relationship,” Sefilian said of Pashinyan. “But we hope to deepen our relationships. We have to be together until there is a new, legitimate National Assembly.”

He also lobbied for a Sasna Tsrer role in the new cabinet. “We’re ready to be engaged,” Sefilian said, adding that the group envisions itself in the “power bloc” that includes the military, police, and the National Security Service. Another Sasna Tsrer leader, Colonel Varujan Avetisyan, served in different roles at the Ministry of Defense from 1994 to 2013, including as deputy chief of the ministry’s Defense Policy Center.

A spokesperson for Civil Contract told Eurasianet that “the question of collaboration hasn’t been discussed.” An op-ed in TASS, the Russian state news agency, suggested that if Sasna Tsrer joined the cabinet, it could be interpreted as “a move against Russia, which would be followed by an immediate response from Moscow.”

“The fact that he hasn’t stretched out his hand means that he’s afraid of the competition,” said Yegnukian, referring to Pashinyan.

Pashinyan is proving to be a troublesome ally. Not only is he reluctant to engage with new partners, but he has alienated some in his parliamentary faction, who in response have publicly criticized him and hinted that they may withdraw their support.

“Pashinyan now sees other political leaders as not worthy of partnering with him, as marginal figures,” Karen Aghekian, an editor for Hamatext, an online magazine covering Armenian politics, told Eurasianet.

But in the case that Pashinyan decides to build a coalition, it’s still highly unlikely he would invite Sasna Tsrer, Aghekian said. “I don’t think that of all parties, Nikol would associate himself with them. First, they’re vehemently anti-Russian, and some voters reject them based on the bloodshed,” he said, noting that Pashinyan had crusaded against Kocharyan for his use of violence in breaking up protests in 2008, making it tricky to fully embrace Sasna Tsrer.

Political scientist Zolyan agreed: “I think cooperation with Nikol is unrealistic. [Pashinyan] has little to gain from such a partnership.”

With or without Pashinyan, Sasna Tsrer’s leaders say they’re strategizing for the long term. Their headquarters in downtown Yerevan is open for visitors. One recent visitor, a Western official, said the bustling office “felt like Smolny in 1917.” The Smolny Institute was the Bolshevik headquarters during the Russian Revolution.

Armenia’s Hardliners Try Going Mainstream was originally published on Global Security Review.

This story was originally published by Eurasianet.

Amid a period of heightened tensions between Yerevan and Moscow, Armenia has charged the head of the Russia-led security bloc with the crime of “subverting public order.”

Yuriy Khachaturov, the head of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was freed on bail after a late-night court appearance past midnight on July 28. He has been charged as part of an investigation by Armenia’s Special Investigative Service into a bloody crackdown on protesters in 2008. Former president Robert Kocharyan was arrested on July 28 as part of the same investigation, also charged with “subverting public order.”

Armenian officials emphasized that the charges have only to do with Khachaturov’s role in the 2008 events – he was the head of the Yerevan military garrison at the time of the crackdown – and had nothing to do with the CSTO.

“This is purely an internal process, within the framework of a criminal case under investigation in Armenia involving an Armenian citizen,” said Tigran Balayan, spokesman for Armenia’s foreign minister.

Khachaturov was named secretary-general of the CSTO last year, only the second person to hold the position, taking over from longtime head and high-ranking Russian intelligence officer Nikolay Bordyuzha.

Armenia has the right to choose a new secretary-general. “Secretary generals are appointed from member states in alphabetical [order],” Valery Semerikov, a deputy CSTO secretary-general, told Armenian news site Tert.am. “That authority is vested with Armenia until January 1, 2020.”

Armenia was moving to find a replacement for Khachaturov. “Placing great importance on the authority and ensuring uninterrupted work of the organization, Armenia has proposed to the CSTO countries to start the procedure of replacing the secretary-general,” Balayan said. “Armenia is loyal to its responsibilities to strengthen and increase the power of the CSTO.”

It’s not clear how important the CSTO secretary-general is now that it is no longer in the hands of Russia. Khachaturov was a very low-profile leader compared to Bordyuzha, who regularly spoke to the press and was one of Russia’s most prominent foreign policy voices.

Armenia’s new leadership has a delicate relationship with the CSTO. On the one hand, it is a conservative organization and has made an explicit priority of trying to prevent “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space; Pashinyan’s “Velvet Revolution” is a color revolution in pretty much every respect except Russia’s decision not to oppose it head-on.

On the other hand, the CSTO is a key element of Russia’s security guarantee for Armenia, which will be crucial in the case that a large-scale war breaks out with Azerbaijan. If that happens before 2020, Yerevan will be choosing the person who – at least nominally – will be managing the alliance’s response.

The reactions from Russia to Khachaturov’s legal troubles were mixed.

The Russian foreign ministry issued a statement commenting only on the bureaucratic next steps, without commenting on any political ramifications: “In accordance with the procedural rules of the CSTO, the Armenian side itself must officially initiate the recall of its citizen from the post of secretary-general of the CSTO, if such a decision has been made in Yerevan.”

But a “high-ranking diplomatic source” told the Russian news agency Tass that Balayan’s statement was “unprofessional.”

“To hear something like this is especially strange considering that the recent changes in Armenia did not affect the working of the foreign policy apparatus, which not long ago presented to the CSTO Khachaturov’s candidacy, and most importantly knows very well the procedure” of replacing a secretary-general, the Tass source said.

Fyodor Lukyanov, the leading Russian foreign affairs analyst, told the newspaper Vedomosti that Khachaturov’s legal issues were purely related to Armenia and so “no one will interfere.” But military analyst Ruslan Pukhov told the paper that “the arrest of the CSTO secretary-general would undoubtedly lead to a decrease in trust in Russian-Armenian relations, including in the military sphere.”

For those Russians inclined to see the worst in Armenia’s new government, this was just more evidence of Yerevan’s untrustworthiness. “Imagine that, for example, Norway without warning put on trial the secretary-general of NATO. But with Russia, something very similar has happened – Armenia has charged the current head of the CSTO, the most important military-political bloc for Moscow,” wrote the news site Vzglyad.

“Pashinyan’s claims that he wants to continue the policy of good neighborly relations with Russia are not true,” the analyst Sergey Markov told Vzglyad. “We see that he speaks about friendship, but persecutes political figures oriented toward Russia. The persecution of an official figure in the CSTO is a manifestation of bad relations with the Russian leadership.”

Looking on the bright side, Markov concluded that “losing” Armenia wouldn’t be that bad for Russia. “It’s good that Russia has no vital interests in Armenia. Even if Pashinyan invites American soldiers to Armenia I’m not sure that it would be a significant blow to Russian interests.”

Armenian Investigators Charge Head of Russia-Led Security Bloc with “Subverting Public Order” was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the wake of former Armenian President and Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian’s resignation on April 23, a shift in of policy might have been expected.

At the meeting, Pashinian not only supported maintaining the current Russian-Armenian relationship but also suggested a “new impulse” for political and trade relations.

Interestingly, Pashinian does not precisely have a history of supporting Russian-Armenian relations. His party, the Yelk Coalition, submitted legislation last year to leave the Eurasian Union. Further, he has spoken out against the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In response to these claims, Pashinian has claimed that now that he has accepted the prime minister position, his focus is on the country rather than maintaining loyalty with his old party positions.

Where did the revolution in Armenia come from?

The demonstrations against Sarkisian were fueled by a number of factors, including electoral fraud in 2008, changes in pensions and municipal services, a hike in energy bills in 2014, Sarkisian’s re-election as president in 2013 and his subsequent run towards prime minister this year.

Although there was no suggestion that a protest bringing such a radical change in government would come, within weeks, Sarkisian had resigned. This is primarily because there were widespread protests, including more than 100,000 people gathered in Yerevan’s main square the day before his resignation.

Perhaps more blatant Russian interference was expected, as Pashinian actually praised Russia’s “balanced position… it was a very constructive position. And I think this is highly valued not just by our government but in Armenian society in general.”

Where are new Russian-Armenian relations headed?

Pashinian’s new government position on crucial matters such as the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory are as of yet unknown. Despite this populist win in Armenia that was very much sought by the people, right now the country remains at a crossroads.

Pashinian has stated he wants to work with the old governing party but also fight ingrown corruption. Confrontations in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region have reached an all-time high since 1994 when more than 200 people died in April 2016. Since then, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been building up military might on both sides of the border.

The simmering conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh might prove to be one of the factors in the maintenance of the Russian-Armenian relationship. Since the beginning of the tensions, Russia has acted as Armenia’s security guarantor, providing training and weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia also has been dependent on Russia for financial aid, military development and protection in general.

Notably, in Sochi, Pashinian told Putin that he wanted Armenia to buy more Russian weaponry. So, despite this revolution against a ruler that was supported by the Kremlin – how much can really change? Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh implies that Armenia must continue to turn to Russia for regional security and assistance.

As tensions rise in the region and there are signs of Azerbaijani destabilization, will the ceasefire and uneasy peace continue to hold? Armenia’s estrangement from Azerbaijan and Turkey means that they remain dependent on Russia.

Beyond that, as this change in government continues to grow and develop, wouldn’t this be a convenient time for Azerbaijan to decide to take back some territory?

“Velvet Revolution” in Armenia Indicates a Stronger Russian-Armenian Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.