Bulgaria identified its Border Police General Directorate as lacking sufficient armored vehicles to safeguard the country’s borders. To address this issue, the Bulgarian army is currently providing transportation equipment. Additionally, the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior’s “wartime tasks” were not adequately taken into account before receiving approval from parliament. 

The Bulgarian president stated that the protection of the Bulgarian border is of utmost importance. While this action should not be seen as a reduction in support for Ukraine by NATO or Bulgaria, the Bulgarian border security forces will be better equipped to secure Bulgaria’s borders if the Ukraine conflict spills over the border. To achieve this, the formally mothballed equipment will be incorporated for domestic use instead of being transferred to Ukraine. 

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg issued a warning yesterday that there is a growing concern of a stalemate with Russia, and the allies may discuss whether to provide more aid to Ukraine. Each NATO member will continue to consider their individual national interests, such as their own border security, while also weighing in on the collective effort to support Ukraine’s fight, which may not result in a victory. Wars are an expensive way to reset the geopolitical situation. It is likely that the Bulgarian president, whose primary responsibility is to ensure Bulgaria’s security, is now assessing the requisite means of pursuing his own national interests. 

NEW-Bulgaria Asserts Own Security Needs Over Ukraine’s was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, Chinese state-run media, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, CNN, and the Federation of American Scientists all claim that the DF-41 may carry up to 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). A MIRVed system aims to increase the missile’s counterforce capability and/or ensure penetration of American missile defense networks. Reportedly, the DF-41 has a payload of 2,500 kilograms—assuming 30 percent for the post boost vehicle and 70 percent for the warhead reentry vehicle (RV). This would provide 1,750 kilograms (kg) for warheads, or each of the 10 warheads could weigh up to 175 kg, which is feasible for a light RV.

The estimate of 1,500 warheads assumes that China will not add more DF-31AG, JL-3 SLBM, rail- or road-mobile DF-41 missiles, or additional silo-based DF-41 missiles beyond what is currently in the inventory. However, it is possible that the number could be much larger. If DF-41 ICBMs are deployed with an average of 5 warheads per missile—in the 360 new silos recently built—and there is a projected 25 percent increase in the assumed baseline of 400 other missiles, China could field an estimated 2,300 long-range strategic nuclear warheads.

This would be a significantly larger force than that of the United States. There is a concern that Chinese President Xi Jinping will use such a nuclear force to coerce or blackmail the US into capitulation during an attack on Taiwan. Given that 2035 is still over a decade away, the time is now to rectify this challenge.

Is America Underestimating the DF-41 Risk? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Diplomatic efforts toward addressing these modern national security challenges can “enhance integrated deterrence, global stability, and international security,” but only if these efforts result in favorable outcomes for America. Therefore, it is crucial that this renamed organization reorients its purpose and metrics accordingly. Pursuing many agreements, even if they are bad, is not a reliable way to measure success. The success of any agreement should only be measured by how effective it is. The three maxims to successful arms control agreements are:

1. Any agreement that does not satisfy the national security needs of the parties will eventually be cheated on and thus fail
2. Any agreement that does not have rigorous and regular verification procedures will eventually be cheated on and thus fail
3. Any agreement that is not symmetrically desired by all parties will yield asymmetric results that benefit one party over another; the perception of any lopsided agreements will eventually be rejected and thus fail

The Bureau’s name change not only addresses “emerging 21st-century national security challenges,” but acknowledges the important role deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence, plays in achieving and maintaining global stability. The National Institute for Deterrence Studies congratulates the ADS’s recognition that it “must modernize [its] approaches and expand [their] thinking to help build a more stable, peaceful world” and we stand ready to assist!

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Has Been Renamed to Acknowledge the Value of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

What about potential nuclear weapon employment via the use of the Air Forces’ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)? An unmanned, autonomous, AI-piloted aircraft, the CCA will fly alongside crewed fighters, presumably to fly combat sorties resulting in casualties and battle damage. CCAs are intended to cost-effectively augment and enhance USAF combat capabilities and capacities without aggravating the fighter pilot shortage. These CCAs must be able to operate as loyal robotic wingmen tethered to manned fighter jets, as well as fly untethered with a high level of autonomy and trust when required. The real value of the untethered CCAs is the potential to deliver the most consequential weapons, through the most contested environments, against the most significant of targets without risking aircrew. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) plans to build about 1,000 CCAs by the end of the next decade.

As conveyed by SECAF Frank Kendall in his Sept 5^th, 2023 memo to Airmen and Guardians, the Department is “not optimized for great power conflict” and the Department must devise and “implement the changes needed to meet our pacing challenge.” The SECAF’s clarion call to reorganize and reorient the Air Force must also encourage innovative and bold forms of integrated deterrence that include deploying AI-empowered CCAs with appropriate “strategic” capabilities like the new B61-13 intended to hold hard-to-reach targets at risk. Now is the time to begin crafting the prerequisite planning and acquiring to ensure this capability is possible in the future to avoid the much more costly retrofitting after delivery. Hermann Kahn once said, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.” This is essential for maintaining America’s nuclear deterrence and assurance credibility beyond 2030.

AI-Empowered Collaborative Combat Aircraft Can Enhance US Nuclear Deterrence Beyond 2030 was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, General Tim Ray in his testimony to the HASC Strategic subcommittee on 1 May 2019: “The vast majority of targets covered by the bomber leg of the triad require the employment of stand-off weapons.” The LRSO missile will ensure that the bomber force can target high-value threats deep within an advanced integrated air defense system (IADS), reducing risk to aircrew and aircraft.

The LRSO is key to American deterrence credibility. Flexible, survivable, and recallable, America’s bomber force forms the third leg of the strategic nuclear triad. Coupled with the bomber, the LRSO ensures the viability of the air leg which arguably is the most stabilizing force. The LRSO is a valuable tool in maintaining strategic stability because it does not pose a short-notice threat of disarming attack.

However, recognizing and fearing America’s ability to hold at-risk strategic targets deep behind enemy lines regardless of IADS efficacy is a key concern for any autocrat seeking to attack American interests. The LRSO is good news for deterrence.

USAF Seeking 1,000 LRSO Nuclear Cruise Missiles by 2030 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Furthermore, the RAND/ASAN study associated with this report states that North Korea has already established a nuclear weapon force that could pose an existential threat to the ROK and is on the verge of posing a serious threat to the United States. The North hopes to use its nuclear weapon threat to the United States to help break the ROK-U.S. alliance. Additionally, KJU hopes to dominate the ROK without having to actually invade it, presumably through the use of nuclear “blackmail.”

In spite of the “Washington Declaration” made on April 26, 2023, where the ROK expressed its full confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence commitments, bipartisan South Korean and U.S. think tanks are urging the U.S. to modernize almost 100 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which were initially planned to be dismantled, at the ROK’s expense. These weapons could be stored in the United States but would be committed to supporting the ROK and could be quickly deployed to the country.

It is crucial for South Korea to effectively deter a nuclear-armed and hostile North Korea. Therefore, the United States must take more decisive actions to reassure its ally and deter an adversary that not only poses an existential threat to South Korea but an increasingly catastrophic threat to the American homeland.

Think tanks recommend 100 nukes for South Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.