Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.

Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on Nigerian soil and the deployment of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.

The Mosul Parallel

Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly 50,000 ghost soldiers on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. Leaked UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. Transparency International gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.

The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years deployed without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.

ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor

ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically destroyed forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP intercepted his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.

The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved Lakurawa, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded attack on Nigerian soil in 2025.

The Air Power Deficit

The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians killed in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The February 2026 Woro massacre showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.

External Partners and the Limits of Assistance

The United States launched 16 Tomahawk cruise missiles against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. CSIS assessed that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.

The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus

Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.

A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an estimated $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated $1.42 billion in ransom in a single year.

Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.

Outlook

The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes 5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion). However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.

Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.

Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic & Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hollow Ranks & Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria’s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

The core of Iran’s strategy is its desire to build two major corridors of influence. The first stretches west to the Mediterranean via Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah plays a central role. This “Shia Crescent” provides Tehran with a direct line of influence and military capability near Israel’s borders.

The second strategic corridor runs through Yemen to the southern Red Sea, where Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels positions it to disrupt maritime traffic and challenge Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. Both corridors are critical to Iran’s broader objective of positioning itself as a dominant power in the region, capable of challenging Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Western interests.

In the current conflict with Israel, both the West Bank, bordering Jordan, and Gaza, bordering Egypt, serve as crucial strategic pressure points for Israel. Iran views Gaza as a key element in its wider strategy to surround Israel with hostile forces. Although Iran does not directly control the armed Palestinian groups in Gaza, their shared objectives make them natural allies.

This presents Iran with the opportunity to capitalize on such a situation and continue to provide support to groups like Hamas, despite their current ineffectiveness and only increasing the likelihood of a wider-scale war in the region. For years, Egypt, with an emphasis on regional stability and peace, indirectly managed Gaza’s political agenda. However, in recent years, Hamas increasingly aligned itself with Iran, a country primarily focused on regional destabilization and triggering armed confrontations.

Iran’s increased backing for Hamas in Gaza in recent years reflects a comprehensive strategy aimed at surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, projects influence from both Lebanon and Syria. Iran’s engagement in Yemen strategically places it adjacent the Red Sea, positioning Iran as a potential threat to international maritime routes as well as to most of the nations in Yemen’s vicinity.

Gaza, situated along Israel’s southwestern border, forms a crucial point in this intricate web of tension. While Egypt exercises stringent oversight of its border with Gaza and consistently opposes Iranian influence, Tehran’s backing of Palestinian groups aligns with its overarching strategy to apply pressure on Israel from multiple fronts. However, the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained—since the 1970s—particularly given the enduring peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions illustrates a significant shift in the behavior of non-state armed groups. In Syria, various rebel factions fought against the government, which is supported by Iran, but often harboured animosity toward one another, as their objectives and alliances are/were not unified. By contrast, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the non-state actors—Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions—share a common enemy (Israel) and a broadly unified goal: weakening of Israeli military and political control.

This alignment of interests made Iran’s role in supporting these groups more influential and effective, even if Tehran does not have direct command over them. However, the regional threat posed by this situation stems from Iran’s lack of genuine concern for the Palestinian cause and its failure to support the Palestinians in achieving a peaceful resolution with Israel, including the two-state solution that most Western and Arab nations proposed over the past decades. This further supports the claim that Iran’s main objective is to disseminate its ideology and expand its regional power through persistent destabilization tactics.

While the current Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank share common goals with Iran, they were neither previously nor currently formal proxies to it, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran’s ability to support and influence these groups through financial and military aid allows it to project power in the region indirectly. For Iran, Gaza serves as a crucial point in its strategy of regional influence, even though the Palestinian factions maintain their independence from direct Iranian control.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a strategically more complicated case for Iran given the fact that Cairo has always perceived any Iranian presence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security. This has led to a long-standing Egyptian policy of limiting Iranian influence in Gaza and rejecting any Iranian foothold in its immediate vicinity.

However, Iran has sought to circumvent this by expanding its influence in Libya and Sudan. By supporting and arming militias and armed groups present in Egypt’s neighbouring countries, Iran would ultimately aim to surround Egypt with allies or proxies, potentially allowing it to exert pressure on Cairo from multiple fronts. This strategy could eventually create openings for Iran to influence Egypt’s policies regarding Gaza and its relations with Israel.

Despite that Iran’s regional ambitions have always been clear to Egypt, the unprecedented level of war risk presented to the Middle East region further presents Egypt with increasing challenges concerning Iran’s regionally backed groups.

Iran’s possible sway in Libya and Sudan places Tehran in a strategic position to constrict Egypt from the west and south, resulting in a geopolitical pressure point. Nevertheless, the circumstances in Sudan demand greater attention. While Egypt and Iran back the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Iran’s unrestrained backing of the SAF presents a potential risk to Egypt, as it may result in a rise in Iranian influence and connections within Sudan, ultimately advancing Tehran’s objectives.

The recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthis in the Red Sea have profoundly affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal over the past 10 months, presenting an ongoing danger to global shipping routes that traverse the Bab al-Mandeb Strait followed by the Red Sea then the Suez Canal. Consequently, Tehran has the potential to exert greater control or cause disturbances in maritime traffic through this vital passage, particularly during periods of increased tension, due to Iran’s expanding presence in Sudan, which is also situated close to the southern gateway of the Red Sea.

In parallel, Iran has pursued diplomatic engagement with Egypt, recognizing the potential benefits of normalized relations. Iran’s foreign minister recently visited Egypt to discuss Gaza-related regional tensions. Tehran apparently hopes to use soft power tools to build ties with Egypt.

A clear goal for Iran would be to create a network of influence with Egypt that complements its broader regional strategy in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in building a stronger relationship with Egypt, it would be better positioned to influence events in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan, further consolidating its regional presence.

In contrast, Iran’s prospects of success in Jordan appears to be more limited. The Jordanian government’s strong ties with the United States and its historical enmity with Iran make Amman a more difficult target for Iranian influence. However, Iran may still view the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan as a potential pressure point.

By appealing to Palestinian nationalist sentiments and leveraging its support for Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Iran could attempt to destabilize Jordan or at least pressure its government into altering its policies regarding Israel and the Palestinians. While this is a more challenging front for Iran, it remains a part of its broader geostrategic calculus.

Iran’s regional strategy capitalizes on building and supporting a complex web of alliances, proxy forces, non-state actors, and soft power tools, all aimed at expanding its influence and challenging its adversaries. Through direct military backing for entities such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as indirect sway over Palestinian groups and diplomatic interactions with regional players like Egypt and the KSA, Iran persistently seeks to establish itself as a pivotal force in the geopolitics of the Middle East, while simultaneously exacerbating regional tensions and engaging in destabilizing activities.

Dr. Mohamed ElDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

The Geostrategic Mind of Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 led to the restructuring of the Wagner Group into several new entities. At least four new groups reorganized thousands of former Wagner fighters, with a significant portion now operating under the Russian Defense Ministry and other intelligence services.

The entity operating as Africa Corps continues Wagner’s operations across Africa, including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Libya. Estimates suggest that these reconstituted paramilitary groups have around 5,000 members stationed across Africa. These forces are a mix of former Wagner operatives, new recruits, and other mercenaries. They are involved in a variety of roles such as providing security, training, combat operations, support to local regimes, and support to specific factions—like the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar forces in Libya. Generally, they have contracts to provide security to unstable regimes in the region.

The presence of Russian troops in certain African nations is a cause for concern. As an illustration, it is worth noting that Russia recently bolstered its military presence in Libya. This includes the deployment of significant military equipment and personnel to provide support for General Khalifa Haftar with towed artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and rocket launchers. Russia is very clearly attempting to bolster its strategic position in the region as it supports aspirations for a naval base in Libya.

This move will amplify Russian influence in North Africa and pose a potential threat to Europe from the southern Mediterranean. In eastern Libya, there are air bases, such as al-Jufra, that serve as refuelling stations for Russian military flights before continuing to other African countries.

There are reports suggesting that Russia is close to setting up a naval base in Sudan, specifically in the vicinity of Port Sudan. In Sahel countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Russian forces, including those from the Africa Corps, are helping military juntas. They also participate in operations against insurgencies and safeguard governments. The Russian presence in the Sahel significantly increased after French forces departed from the area. In the CAR, for example, there is a significant paramilitary presence from Russia, and there are plans to establish a formal Russian military base in Berengo. It is anticipated that this base will accommodate a maximum of 10,000 Russian soldiers, bolstering its influence in the region.

The increasing involvement of Russia in Africa has numerous adverse consequences on a global level. In the case of the European Union (EU), the exploitation of migration routes by Russian-backed forces intensifies the issue of irregular migration to Europe, resulting in political and social tensions within EU countries. In addition, the control that Russia can potentially exercise over the oil and gas resources in Libya, for example, gives it the ability to manipulate energy supplies, which undermines the efforts of the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

For the United States, there are concerns about Russia’s strategic relationship with African regimes, which have the potential to undermine American influence and complicate its counterterrorism and military operations in the region, especially in the Sahel, where extremist groups are growing more active. The US has already taken steps to address security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb by implementing initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

These efforts aim to strengthen the ability of countries in the region to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Nevertheless, the current initiatives fall short in addressing the magnitude and intricacy of the violence and governance shortcomings. The involvement of the Russian military in countries like Sudan and Libya has far-reaching consequences for the overall security situation in the Middle East. It has the potential to disrupt neighbouring regions and shape geopolitical decisions. Furthermore, the presence of Russian influence on African resources brings about fresh contenders for control and export of gold, oil, and gas.

To counter the growing presence of Russian forces and influence in Africa, the US and the EU, in coordination with key regional African and Arab partners, must adopt a multi-faceted strategy focusing on military, economic, diplomatic, and soft power measures. Strengthening military cooperation with a selected set of African nations, namely those who share borders with those who experienced a coup over the past three years. Joint exercises, training programs, and the provision of military aid and equipment are crucial, particularly in light of the noticeable decline in Western influence in most Sahel states and the eastern states of Sudan.

In Niger, for example, following the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, the military junta rejected all US and regional diplomatic initiatives. As a result, we are emphasizing the importance of increasing Western cooperation with countries bordering Niger. Every year, the US conducts Flintlock, the largest annual special operations forces exercise by US Africa Command, with the aim of enhancing combined partner force collaboration in Africa alongside international and NATO special operations forces.

Exercise Africa Lion is also a large-scale US-led annual exercise that involves multiple African and allied nations, focusing on enhancing military readiness and interoperability. However, given the unprecedented level of political instability in Africa over the past few years, as well as the growing influence of Russian groups, it is now a critical time to intensify the West’s security cooperation with regional African partners.

It is essential for the West to strengthen its economic ties with Africa as a means of countering Russian influence in the short term as well as that of the Chinese in the long term. By prioritizing investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other development projects, the West can tackle the underlying issues that contribute to instability. This approach will not only bring tangible benefits to local populations, but also foster domestic goodwill. In doing so, it can diminish the appeal of external support from countries like China and Russia, which have been making significant infrastructure investments in Africa. Providing targeted expertise in mining, agriculture, and energy sectors to strategic African countries will contribute to sustainable development and reduce dependency on foreign entities.

Regardless of its declining effectiveness, diplomatic efforts continue to play a crucial role in countering Russian influence in Africa. Strengthening partnerships with important African nations and regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, along with specific political groups in unstable African countries, can support the diplomatic efforts of the West and influence the overall narrative. Efforts in the realm of diplomacy should prioritize the promotion of positive governance, human rights, and democratic institutions. This will also enable the implementation of targeted sanctions against entities and individuals engaged in destabilizing activities in Africa with support from Russian groups.

Addressing the challenge of countering Russian influence in Africa requires recognizing the significance of soft power and cultural diplomacy. These aspects play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of disinformation campaigns that aim to manipulate African information systems. It is worth noting that such campaigns have seen a significant rise, nearly quadrupling since 2022.

It is crucial to counter Russian disinformation by supporting independent media and promoting accurate information about the benefits of partnerships with the US and EU. This encompasses a range of initiatives, such as providing financial support for media literacy programs, bolstering the skills of local journalists, and backing civil society organizations and grassroots movements dedicated to promoting democratic reforms in Africa.

It is also crucial to prioritize the expansion of educational and cultural exchange programs. These initiatives aim to foster lasting connections with African youth and future leaders, ultimately contributing to the development of strong relationships. This becomes particularly significant in the context of a changing world, where younger generations are increasingly influenced by Western cultures. Educational scholarships, academic partnerships, and cultural initiatives can contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Engaging in a clear dialogue with African leaders to gain insight into their viewpoints and consistently addressing the geopolitical concerns of African countries will help ensure that their interests are considered in international policies. Thus, this approach should help foster a relationship that aligns more closely with Western values and principles. To address the issue of Russian influence in Africa, it is crucial to establish a collaborative international effort.

This would involve the cooperation of various international partners, including the US and EU, as well as key regional African and Arab nations. Collaborative efforts can greatly enhance the effectiveness and present a united front. Emphasizing regional security initiatives and frameworks that foster stability and cooperation among African countries, including capacity-building programs, will continue to be crucial in addressing the increasing presence and influence of Russian forces on the continent.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed are his own. 

Countering Russia’s Influence in Africa: Strategy and Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

In March 2023 Azerbaijan finally opened its embassy in Israel, despite establishing bilateral relations in 1992. Baku opted to open its embassy in Tel Aviv after restoring its territorial integrity. The next month, in April 2023, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, making it the closest Israeli embassy to Iran, just 17 km from the Iranian border. Iran followed all these diplomatic moves with annoyance and concern.

Normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations was also widely discussed as an extension of the Abraham Accords. Momentum similarly grew in 2022 for Israel and Turkey to normalize their strained relations. At the next meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed to continue developing bilateral relations and to pay official visits to each other.

Azerbaijan’s initiative to set a new trilateral format for cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey was advancing rapidly in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty for Tehran. The October 7, 2023, attack on Israel gave Iran the chance to derail possible Saudi-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties and stop the Azerbaijani initiative for trilateral cooperation in its tracks.

Tehran seized the opportunity of the war in Gaza to pursue its grand, multidimensional strategy. It is using economic means, via a set of coercive actions, to achieve foreign policy objectives, something widely overlooked. Iran’s multidimensional strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian strategy prioritizes using economic means to isolate Israel by derailing its relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s subtle, calculated, approach also intends to inflict an economic blow on Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which makes substantial revenue from the export of oil via Turkey to Israel.

Considering the global nature of the modern economy, economic power plays a significant role in shaping geopolitical outcomes and foreign policy. In this case, Iran’s usage of political, diplomatic, and media instruments, as well as its regional proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, merits analysis. The use of economic means to shape geopolitical outcomes and achieve foreign policy goals is the cornerstone of Iran’s multidimensional strategy. Iran does not possess the necessary economic means, by itself. However, the Islamic Republic does possess significant geopolitical assets in the form of proxy groups and diplomatic and media resources, which it is using to hinder or shut down global navigation and prevent the flow of strategic commodities to Israel.

The late Iranian foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, called on Muslim-majority countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel and expel its envoys in October 2023. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Muslim countries to cease trade, particularly food and oil with Israel, the following month. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, followed Ayatollah Khamenei’s call and appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel.

The call for an economic boycott of Israel by Muslim-majority states gives an insight into Iran’s multidimensional strategy. The late Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, also reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s call for a boycott of Israel at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2023. President Raisi argued that Islamic countries must cut diplomatic relations as well as refuse to buy Israeli goods, echoing Khamenei’s call. Weeks after his call for an economic boycott, Ayatollah Khamenei had urged Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel to halt diplomatic ties for a limited period. In January 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his call for a total blockade of Israel by Muslim countries.

The official rhetoric of Iran’s leaders clearly shows Tehran’s multidimensional strategy of using the war in Gaza to isolate Israel economically, impose an oil embargo, destroy economic and diplomatic ties between Israel and Muslim-majority countries, and position Iran as a major geopolitical force in the region. To implement this strategy Iran has employed coercive media propaganda against many countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Iranian media has intensified criticism of Turkey for its trade and economic ties with Israel and Azerbaijan for oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which meet 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil.

Iranian media has also targeted Turkish president Erdoğan for not cutting trade relations with Israel, which was actively used within Turkey by Islamist circles including the leader of the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), Fatih Erbakan, in recent local elections. The New Welfare Party, which sympathizes with Iran, managed to get 6.1 percent of the nationwide vote—contributing to Erdoğan’s first election loss in decades. When Erdoğan’s ruling party suffered the election setback, he launched economic measures against Israel, halting trade. Iranian media propaganda and the active shaping of the narrative in the run-up to elections in Turkey yielded a significant result by creating strain in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. The multidimensional Iranian strategy of achieving goals in multiple theatres has so far succeeded in two places: Turkey and Yemen. Using the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping, Iran positioned itself as a key player that can shut down trade not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Bab al Mandab Strait.

Iran’s strategy of using economic means to achieve its goals also entails containing and weakening Azerbaijan by inflicting significant revenue losses. Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed were awarded a license to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have long been a primary concern for the Iranian establishment. The military-technical partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan helped Baku boost its national security and defense, as well as to retake control of its territory from occupying Armenian forces. Changes in the realities of South Caucasus politics since 2020 are a security concern for Tehran. Constant Iranian media attacks against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline are part of the multidimensional Iranian strategy.

Better understanding Iran’s strategy is important if the United States desires to counter those efforts. Iran’s use of hybrid warfare, proxies, media propaganda, and blackmail—to force neighboring countries to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Israel—is having some success but is not in the interest of the region. Iran’s primary goal is to derail the normalisation process under the Arab-Israeli Abraham Accords; to strain Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic ties; to damage Azerbaijan’s independence by targeting its primary source of revenue; to prevent the emergence of the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey trilateral cooperation; and to prevent further diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. It is only through understanding Iranian efforts that the United States, Israel, and the larger region can prevent Iran’s success.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Multidimensional Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, the Trump administration’s 2018 “Africa Strategy” specifically targets Russia as a key geopolitical rival, presenting the United States’ potential African partner countries with an apparent choice between Cold War-style enemies. Again in March, the U.S. pointed to Russia as a threat in Africa, when Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan warned Angola of Russia’s interests in Africa. The U.S. media environment has also fostered an ascendant vision of Russia in Africa, quoting “alarmed” U.S. officials who speak of Russia being “highly active” in the region.

This growing narrative pushes an inflated interpretation of Russia’s real capabilities while ignoring or footnoting the broader context. The relative size, scope, and trajectory of Russia’s gradual increasing economic involvement in Africa indicate an approach fitting with the behavior of other similarly sized economies. Russia’s military footprint and economic connections remain comparably marginal in Africa, while the French, Chinese, and U.S. hold entrenched positions. Meanwhile, Russian military adventurism on the scale of with its involvement in the Syrian Civil War is unlikely in Africa, owing to a Russian population increasingly vocal over domestic issues and opposed to foreign entanglements. 

Russian global military posture skips Africa

The Kremlin’s military priorities are planted firmly in Russia’s elongated peripheral regions of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. Insofar as Russia leaves these spaces, it is usually to counter the United States and allies (who are actively involved in Russia’s neighborhood themselves) with low-level incursions designed for disruption. 

In terms of intentions, the Russians, unlike the Americans, do not fight a Global War on Terror across the Sahara/Sahel, requiring a lily pad strategy of U.S. drone bases for thousands of miles. There is not an internal security dimension to Russian involvement in Africa, precluding similarly scaled military deployment. 

In terms of capabilities, Russia lacks a significant military or political command in Africa. Many African countries do not have a Russian embassy or even a small diplomatic mission, and Russia’s military footprint—outside of small contingencies of mercenaries—remains marginal, with no bases to bivouac within, and no host governments agreeing to allow them space.  Meanwhile, the United States has 5-6,000 soldiers across Africa and around 34 bases. 

While the United States and ally France fulfill air-land-sea campaigns across multi-country theaters, Russia fills niche support roles with countries the United States does not have significant military relationships with—such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan. 

It is worth noting that the two most high-profile instances of Russian influence in Africa in recent years were borne out of economic enterprises for Russian businessmen. In 2017, mercenaries—not Russian soldiers—from the Wagner Group outfit began advising Central African Republic (CAR) on how to defend against militias in the country’s seven-year-long civil war.  In 2018, it was reported that Russian individuals arrived as consultants in several African countries to influence their elections, such as South Africa and Madagascar. As with the Wagner Group, it was possibly money that drew in the operatives, rather than clear strategic objectives from Moscow. 

Russo-African Economic Normalization is…Normal

In addition to a smaller military presence, Russia is also a minor economic player in the region. Russia retreated from Africa after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested in a sharp increase over the past 20 years. The increases are notable not for their scope but rather their steep return from much lower levels. 

Russian trade with Africa makes up less than 1% of global trade with Africa, which is comparable to economies of its own size, though far behind the United States, China, and especially Europe. 

Foreign wars are increasingly unpopular in Russia, reducing the risk of major interventions beyond Russia’s periphery

Russia will continue attempts to drum up economic integration with Africa to bring life to its weak economy, but military interventions involving long-term ground deployments to active conflicts, especially at the levels seen by the United States and France, are unlikely—owing to the growing unpopularity of foreign wars among Russians. Refocusing inward, Russia is less likely to afford attention to far-reaching foreign entanglement in the future, moving Africa further to the bottom of the Kremlin’s limited agenda. 

Moving forward, and with this context in mind, the Cold War-esque U.S. government and media perspective may incur negative policy implications and misconstruing the United States’ geopolitical rivals’ roles risks miscommunication with current or potential African allies. The United States has the benefit of strong favorability in many Africa states. The U.S. should market itself as a productive partner irrespective of other outsiders, and remind African countries of their agency, rather than force a choice between supposed zero-sum competitors.

Don’t Buy the Hype on Russia in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring brought about renewed optimism in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, it ended in catastrophic failure. Over 180,000 individuals were killed, and over six million were displaced—a solemn reminder to demonstrators and activists today. While the defiance of demonstrators is laudable, lives were lost as the death toll increased to seemingly little avail as negotiations between the military government and opposition in Sudan seemed destined for failure, until talks brokered by the African Union yielded a breakthrough agreement.

The United States dispatched an envoy to facilitate ongoing talks in Sudan, and the African Union suspended the country’s membership. While the situation in Sudan appears to have stabilized to a degree, the unrest in Sudan and Algeria has spread to other North African states, in a reverberating echo of the 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt. As economic discontent spreads throughout the Middle East, political unrest is growing. 

In Morocco, a BBC survey has revealed that more than half of respondents in the country seek immediate political change. Whether mass protests will erupt in Morocco is unknown; however, grievances are palpable, signaling a possible rerun of the unrest experienced in the Arab Spring protests. Eight years after the failure of the mass protests of 2011 to affect meaningful reform, lessons must be learned to avoid similar outcomes—or worse.

With the removal of the Mubarak dictatorship, came the election of Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Just as Morsi’s election symbolized the dawn of a new era for many, his demise by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup and recent unexpected death was emblematic of democracy’s often brutal fate in the Middle East and North Africa—a statement which does not imply support for the Muslim Brotherhood or deflect from the short-lived hopes for a chaotic presidency, but rather highlights its reverse effect: the emboldening of military dictatorships. Except for Tunisia, many states in the region have seen the implementation of greater autocratic control or have spiraled into anarchy since the Arab Spring. 

The convoluted role of the United States in the Arab Spring, whereby President Obama sanctioned regime change in Libya while supporting the military-backed coup in Egypt, arises from the contention between abiding by America’s foreign policy and national security interests and aligning with local democratic movements. 

One conspicuous feature of the United States’ approach to recent unrest is resounding silence. This could reflect the Trump’s antipathy to foreign intervention or precautionary measures after the inefficacy of U.S. involvement in 2011. Nonetheless, the protests in Sudan and Algeria are organic movements of ordinary citizens, many of whom are young people—the nemesis of autocratic dictatorships. The large-scale involvement of youths was illustrated in the successful attempt to block 82-year-old Algerian President Bouteflika from running for a fifth term. 

Almost seventy percent of Algeria’s population is under the age of 30, resembling the demographic profile of the Arab Spring protests, aided by social media and propelled by economic hardships seeking to topple military-backed regimes. These similarities present similar obstacles with a decentralized opposition being unsustainable in the long-term. Meanwhile, the presence of social media as a weapon for democracy remains a concern for Arab governments, evidenced by the internet blackout in Sudan, which only served to further fuel public grievances. 

A case study of Egypt reveals that deposing the front-facing leadership is merely a smokescreen to the power structure that remains—mainly bureaucrats, members of the security and military establishments, and oligarchs loyal to the old regime. While delaying elections in Algeria favors protestors in buying time to prevent Army Chief Gaid Salah’s preferred candidate taking office—a remnant of Bouteflika’s regime—the action highlights how a lack of organization amongst the opposition impedes progress. The militaries in both Sudan and Algeria are the repositories of power. Salah’s description of protestors who opposed the army as being “enemies of Algeria,” reinforces the brevity of hope instilled by the protests, before being silenced by the military. 

Revolutions enthuse the masses with optimism, however, the experiences of the 2011 protests reveal an illusory and temporal effect in the face of a powerful military and security establishment. The Sudanese and Algerian cases highlight growing dissent in the Middle East and North Africa. Without an organized opposition with overwhelming international support, political unrest in the MENA region is likely to bear an uncanny resemblance to the events of the first Arab Spring, potentially resulting in anarchy, civil war, or the imposition of stronger autocratic rule.

The Return of the Arab Spring was originally published on Global Security Review.

The seemingly omnipotent regimes in each of these countries are on increasingly shaky ground after years of corruption, public deception, and coercion. Protests in Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan have laid the groundwork for potentially positive changes in those countries. In Iran, many wish for a similar movement towards reform. However, they face critical challenges ahead if any changes are to be realized. Going forward, it would behoove policymakers, particularly those in Western countries, to closely monitor events in Iran.

From the outset, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran undermined the functioning of an effective government in the country. Revolutionaries established parallel institutions alongside each government apparatus which imposed obstacles on nearly every decision-making process in Iran. The Islamic Revolution enmeshed itself in domestic, economic, and foreign policymaking to ensure its interests were upheld. For example, the religious Guardian Council of the Revolution can impede the Parliament, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) meddles with the country’s economy and interferes with the Iranian armed forces whenever it deems necessary to do so.

Today, parallel institutions in Iran have amassed substantial power, and it’s unlikely they will relinquish it voluntarily. The Guardian Council is a hindrance to parliamentary decision-making on critical matters like international anti-money laundering bills, while the IRGC provides support, funding, and resources to foreign militia groups, and brings them into Iran.

During the 2009 Iranian Green Movement, the IRGC deployed armored vehicles into volatile cities alongside anti-riot security forces and attacked protestors, arresting and subsequently torturing them. When it came to fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iranians were never fully supportive of the IRGC’s actions. Many disregarded Tehran’s strong support for the Assad regime in Syria and disapproved of money that was badly needed at home being spent on expansionist programs.

Presently, Iranians are even more furious with the IRGC following widespread flooding in several Iranian provinces, further underscoring the regime’s inability to manage a crisis effectively. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of infrastructure and economic development projects in Iran are awarded to firms connected to the IRGC. Many projects have been entirely unnecessary or were improperly planned.

During a visit to areas affected by the flooding, IRGC commanders were confronted by angry and disappointed residents, in some cases being on the receiving end of “long live the Shah” chants. Their solution is to bring in al-Hashd ash-Sha’abi—or the Iraqi Shia Militia of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—to the province of Khuzestan under the guise of providing aid. In reality, the group is there to suppress protesters and dissenters. Khuzestan is home to a significant population of Iranians of Arab descent, so it’s ironic that foreign Arabs are charged with suppressing dissent.

During the 2009 Green Movement, protests across Iran in 2017, and in the aftermath of the 2019 flood, the IRGC has repeatedly shown that it holds no reservations about using brutal tactics to oppress the Iranian people. Thus, once the IRGC begins to feel that it is losing its grip on power, it’s likely Iran will descend to the verge of civil war. Practically speaking, any foreign actors intent on constraining the IRGC should establish an agile taskforce to monitor, identify, and block every IRGC financial transaction and trade deal from North Africa to East Asia.

The Islamic Republic’s long and tragic record on human rights has been overlooked by the West—primarily Europe—for the sake of business and commercial opportunities in Iran. Iran’s rank of civil and political rights was stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, Iran’s human rights ranking out of a score of one hundred) improved by just eleven points over two decades—from six to seventeen. It is a false hope to believe that the current system in Iran will bring about any positive or substantive changes to both Iran and the broader region.

With or without sanctions, with or without the nuclear deal, with or without the IRGC being officially designated as a terrorist organization, the theocratic regime in Tehran will continue as it has for forty years. The Iranian presidency was held first by a moderate, then by a reformist, then by a fundamentalist, and now by a moderate—yet any case for true peace within the country or with the rest of the world is nonexistent. Real reform in Iran would mean the release of imprisoned members of the Baha’i faith, journalists, women’s rights activists, and citizens of the U.S. and U.K. accused of espionage. This is, however, unlikely as the regime’s survival is increasingly dependent upon the repression of dissent.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iranian opposition groups increasingly felt that the international community was turning a blind eye to the regime’s repressive policies. For some time, the Iranian opposition movement appeared to stagnate. In recent years, however, the Iranian diaspora has led to a resurgence of opposition. As older generations hold meetings and conferences around the globe, younger groups such as Iran Revival are breathing new life into the fight against the regime of the Islamic Republic.

Iran Revival’s members are primarily younger Iranians who have left the country. The group has established a ten-point transition path for Iran. Since the group’s establishment in September, it’s social media following has grown substantially and the group’s Instagram features numerous videos filmed by Iranians residing in Iran. The U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, met with representatives of the group during Nowrooz, the Iranian New Year. Officials in other Western governments would do well to engage with groups that have a vision for Iran such as Iran Revival. Engagement with opposition groups is essential if the country is to have a peaceful path to political transition.

Iran—similar to Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan—displays the right criteria for a possible regime change. The country is facing severe economic woes, Iranian opposition groups are organizing themselves more effectively over issues like corruption and women’s rights, and possible alternatives to the current regime are emerging. No authoritarian regime in history has survived indefinitely, and the one currently ruling Iran will be no exception.

Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Venezuela Have One Major Similarity was originally published on Global Security Review.