Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.  

From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing  

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the global system has evolved into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.  

New Drivers of Competition  

The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors. 

 Technological innovation: Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce new uncertainties about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long‑range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.  

Regional rivalries: Regional military competition between India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.  

Erosion of arms control: The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear‑strategic thinking.  

Great‑power competition: The almost inevitable arrival of China as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two‑sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China’s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.  

Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races  

The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.  

Strategic Instability: As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision‑making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI‑enabled early‑warning systems—could increase the likelihood of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI‑enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.  

Economic and Opportunity Costs: Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long‑term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the costs of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.  

Normative and Ethical Concerns: The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—would be catastrophic. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.  

Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?  

As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.  

Technological Governance: Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, cyber operations, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber‑nuclear interactions could be a starting point.  

Regional Security Architectures: In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence‑building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non‑strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.  

The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions: Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.  

Conclusion  

In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has compressed decision-making timelines and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.  

Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.  

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

American allies are unanimous in rejecting extended deterrence that does not include the potential use of nuclear weapons. NFU would give a nuclear-armed adversary, such as Russia, a sanctuary from which to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Removing American nuclear forces as a credible deterrent cedes all bargaining power to Moscow, China, and any other would-be nuclear or conventional adversary.

Associated with this campaign is an effort to remove the president’s authority to employ nuclear weapons without at least two additional officials supporting such a decision. They also claim the president would have very little time to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should the US face a nuclear first strike. Of course, ending the president’s “sole authority” would only exacerbate the challenge.

There is a false argument often repeated that American nuclear weapons are on “hair trigger alert” and the president might make a reckless decision to launch, given the assumed minimal time available to determine whether a nuclear response is warranted. It is of course clear how such a decision-making process is significantly impeded if the president must receive concurrence from other officials to make a decision. Such a move reduces the credibility of American deterrence in the minds of adversaries.

Three other factors are also being brought to bear in this campaign to adopt a NFU strategy. First, there is an assertion that the president could be reckless and impetuous and might unnecessarily order the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is an assertion that a president’s order may be illegal and thus having a “second confirmation authority/opinion” is a good thing. Third, there is an assertion that American deterrence strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons against cities and urban areas—with the objective of killing millions of civilians.

All three assertions are false. The first assertion is belied by the fact that every president understands the dangers of nuclear war. President Donald Trump made several statements to this effect, so the notion he, or any president, would be “reckless and impetuous” does not bear scrutiny. His administration’s major investments in deterrence illustrate the seriousness with which the country seeks to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

The second assertion on the “illegality” of ordering nuclear use ignores the constitutional role of the president as commander in chief. States wage war regardless of whether the United Nations says it is illegal. Nuclear weapons are merely tools of war. They are not special. They simply pack more explosive energy in a smaller package than a conventional weapon.

The third assertion ignores the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which explicitly states that attacks against unarmed civilians and non-combatants violate just war principles and are prohibited. American nuclear deterrence strategy explicitly rules out the purposeful targeting of civilian populations and cities, a posture many nuclear abolitionists oppose as they advocate city busting.

Given US deterrence strategy strictly forbids the targeting of cities and civilian populations, there is no basis for believing that carrying out the president’s order to employ weapons will be or be seen as illegal by either civilian or military officials. Thus, there is no need for multiple individuals involved in releasing weapons, all while the president is working through an already compressed and stressful timeline.

A recent “study” by the University of Massachusetts and the Human Security Lab cooked the books by asking both military and civilian officials whether they would oppose an “illegal” presidential order requiring the US to launch nuclear weapons against civilians. Many respondents, having been coached to believe such orders were realistically probable, said they would oppose such orders or at least seek to question the orders. These results were then hijacked to create a false narrative that even military officials now doubt President Trump’s leadership and would not obey the commander in chief if ordered to employ nuclear weapons. Given the survey was conducted during the Israel and US military strikes against Iran, the results were designed to call into question the reasonableness of conventional strikes on Iran.

The campaign to call into question American deterrence policy is based on a willful misrepresentation of states policy and strategic reality. Annie Jacobsen dramatized this misinformation in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario, in which she described US nuclear deterrence strategy as crazy. She proposed jettisoning the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, whether used first or second, and taking such capability completely off the table. When asked what replacement she recommended, Jacobsen claimed such a question was beyond her expertise.

Leaving the nuclear deterrent off the table is part of a concerted disarmament campaign pushed by nuclear abolitionists. These groups were able to ensure the United Nations passed a treaty that bans nuclear weapons, which is as valuable as a treaty which bans war. While 73 nations signed the treaty, none are nuclear weapons states.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is seeking to stop nuclear modernization in the United States, which is strange considering Russia and China are in the midst of major modernization programs. There is nothing less effective than taking a knife to a gunfight, which is exactly what advocates of nuclear disarmament would impose on the free world. For nearly 80 years the US has made sure the nation fields the systems needed to ensure deterrence works. Now is not the time to abandon a successful strategy for the sake of feel-good activism.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Campaign to End Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.

Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.

President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.

From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.

The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.

Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls

While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.

When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.

Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.

By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (Ohio-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.

It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.

The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.

By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of Ohio-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.

As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.

The Challenge Ahead

The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.

Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Decline of Bilateral Trust and Regional Diplomacy

The breakdown of already fragile India-Pakistan diplomatic relations was the most immediate strategic victim of the Pahalgam assault. India’s quick charge that Pakistani-backed terrorists planned the assault brought up historical complaints. Within days, both countries cancelled diplomatic talks, visa access, and expelled officials.

While Islamabad reacted by stopping trade, suspending the Shimla Agreement, and restricting its airspace to Indian flights, New Delhi repudiated the Indus Waters Treaty—long thought a bedrock of bilateral cooperation. These responses show a rising lack of confidence between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

Formal diplomatic channels are now frozen, therefore removing avenues for crisis de-escalation. Especially along the unstable Line of Control, an area quite prone to miscalculations and without institutionalized communication. The assault has not only weakened confidence-building initiatives but also confirmed every country’s geopolitical position, hence lowering the probability of near-term rapprochement.

Rising Nationalism and Domestic Political Fallout

Both India and Pakistan used the Pahalgam disaster as a political fulcrum. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India used public anger to support its strong-on-security image. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi reacted with militarized rhetoric and increased security operations in Kashmir. Among Indian voters, the story of avenging the martyrdom of civilians solicits a strong appeal and increases the political capital of Modi’s desire for greater internal security, including increased police authority in Kashmir.

The government of Pakistan characterized India’s claims as slander and a diversionary strategy. Denying complicity, Pakistan’s government mobilized internal support against fear of Indian aggression, accusing India of orchestrating a “false flag” strike. These stories polarize both sides and provide little space for moderation or bilateral diplomacy. The assault strengthened a populist-nationalist cycle in which every government raises internal power by means of external dangers.

Strategic Setbacks and Economic Disturbance

The Pahalgam attack has several financial repercussions. Most directly, Kashmir’s tourist industry suffered. An attack on tourists diminished confidence precisely when the area was recovering from low confidence in security by tourists. Cancellations of travel already resulted in significant losses for local companies relying on tourism—hotels, guides, and transporters.

The psychological effect of the assault will dissuade not only internal mobility but also investment in Kashmir’s faltering economy. Regionally, the decrease of commercial connections between India and Pakistan, already limited since 2019, further compromises economic integration.

Visa cancellations by Pakistan and restriction of flight access interfere with trade flows and logistical infrastructure. In industries like energy and infrastructure needing cross-border collaboration, the diplomatic conflicts have a cooling impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). Multilateral projects like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), already under pressure from India-Pakistan rivalry, now confront an existential crisis. Stagnation and lost chances for cooperation, especially in commerce, water sharing, and digital connectivity, hurt the regional economy.

Increasing Social Division and Insecurity

The attack’s societal effects are equally grave. It set off a flood of anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim feeling in India. Some right-wing Indians see the whole Kashmiri community as terrorists. Among Indian Muslims and Kashmiris, the incident has heightened feelings of alienation and helped to create a divided national identity. In the days following the assault, reports of harassment, stereotyping, and hate speech skyrocketed.

The government’s counter-narrative of Indian aggression also generated nationalism and skepticism about cross-border communication in Pakistan as well. As distrust rises, civil society projects encouraging people-to-people communication struggled. Both cultures are thus being driven into echo chambers, where polarization and rhetoric distort nuance and cause more chaos.

Issues in Counterterrorism and Security Realignment

The Pahalgam incident shows major shortcomings in regional security systems. The attack exposed India’s shortcomings in intelligence and the protection of soft targets. The Indian government reacted by dispatching more soldiers to Kashmir, raising checkpoints, and vowing to eradicate the last militant networks. Such actions, however, can irritate locals and aggravate conflicts.

The assault also highlights a tactical change in insurgency strategy, specifically the intentional targeting of visitors and civilians to undermine the narrative of peace. This implies a desire to create broad concern and provoke a socio-political response, marking a departure from assaults primarily directed at military or security institutions.

Counterterrorism initiatives, therefore, must evolve to fit this evolving threat profile by balancing military responses with intelligence-based interventions and community involvement. On the other hand, Pakistan is attracting more outside attention over the existence of terror organizations inside its borders. The assault raises questions about Islamabad’s claims to be a responsible actor and could compromise its attempts to draw international investment or receive preferential treatment from organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The scenario calls for a recalibration of Pakistan’s internal security strategy to neutralize non-state actors and reassure the world community of its commitment to counterterrorism.

Regional Cooperation in Crisis

The Pahalgam incident could set off a shift in South Asia’s regional security framework despite the grave effects. Though India and Pakistan vary, the entire regional community, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, has a stake in preserving stability. These nations may suggest fresh security pacts emphasizing crisis management and counterterrorism; bring back SAARC talks; or work together to encourage de-escalation.

Furthermore, countries like the United States, China, and the Gulf states have a special chance to intervene quietly. The United Nations’ appeal for caution and regional collaboration emphasizes the prospect of global involvement in lowering tensions. After all, it was between India and Pakistan that many analysts thought would see the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945—prior to Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats over Ukraine. Civil society, think tanks, and academic conferences can also help to fill the diplomatic vacuum by providing frameworks for communication, conducting collaborative danger assessments, and promoting cross-border awareness.

A Crossroads for South Asia

Undoubtedly, the Pahalgam terror incident altered South Asia’s security scene. Its effects are being felt well beyond the blood-soaked fields of Kashmir—disturbing governments, economies, and cultures throughout the subcontinent. It has revived old conflicts, exposed new weaknesses, and challenged regional players to face the fragility of peace.

Within this uncertainty is a chance to rethink security in terms of trust, inclusion, and cooperation rather than only in military ones. South Asia’s challenge is to make sure this tragedy propels a more stable, secure, and cooperative regional order rather than just another chapter in a cycle of retribution that always has the chance of going nuclear. Whether that vision comes true relies on the decisions its leaders make in the next weeks and months.

Arman Ahmed is the Founder and President of Dhaka Thinks, a Research Analyst at the Spykman Center, and a Research Fellow, International Council on Human Rights, Peace, and Politics. Views expressed by the author are their own.

The Pahalgam Attack and Its Impact on South Asia’s Security Landscape was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Podcast – Future-Proofing National Security: We Can’t Just Wish for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Canyon begins her article by employing the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where diplomacy rather than military force carried the day. Her explanation is simple disinformation and misunderstands how nuclear deterrence works.

Early in the crisis, President John F. Kennedy moved nuclear-armed bombers to Air Force bases in Florida, lining them up wing tip to wing tip, as a visible display of the nuclear hell both Cuba and the Soviet Union would face if Nikita Khruschev did not remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. That signal was seen by the Soviets.

President Kennedy also called the then-recent deployment of Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) his “ace in the hole.” He credited his ICBMs with forcing the Soviets to back down. Minuteman I was very much American escalation dominance that the Soviets could not match.

He also implemented a blockade around Cuba. When the Soviet submarine B-59 attempted to run the blockade, the USS Beale depth charged the submarine. Rather than launching its nuclear torpedoes against the Beale, B-59 retreated.

Contrary to Canyon’s assertion that diplomacy carried the day, it was military strength and nuclear superiority that carried the day. General Secretary Khruschev knew that the United States had a superior nuclear arsenal and backed down.

Arms Racing

Canyon is also concerned that the United States will invite an arms race should it develop the full spectrum of capabilities that are required to effectively deter China, North Korea, and Russia. The reality is the race has already begun. The only participant that is yet to leave the starting block is the United States.

Russian strategic nuclear modernization is nearly complete, with Russia also maintaining at least a 10 to 1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons. China is adding at least 100 new nuclear weapons per year and will soon outmatch the United States.

North Korea is now capable of striking the homeland with intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Kim Jung Un, North Korea will build an arsenal of 500 nuclear weapons.

It is only the United States that is yet to field a new nuclear delivery system. The newest American nuclear delivery vehicle, the B2 bomber, is three decades old.

Contrary to the aspirations of nuclear disarmament advocates in the United States, not a single nuclear-armed adversary is willing to follow the United States down the path of disarmament. The post–Cold War era, three decades now, is a glaring example of the failures of the disarmament delusion.

Canyon is completely wrong when she asserts that China and Russia are modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals because of American nuclear modernization. They began their own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts long before the United States began its effort to replace aging weapons with new variants.

It was not American nuclear weapons that drove Chinese and Russian modernization to begin with. It is American superiority in conventional precision-guided weapons, which neither adversary can match, that led them to follow a strategy like President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look Policy.

For some reason, Canyon claims that the ability to maintain nuclear escalation dominance is advocating “unchecked militarization.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Nuclear forces are a deterrent to conventional military aggression. Historically, great powers wage war four to six times per century, killing millions in the process. Nuclear weapons put an end to great power war and led to a more than 90 percent decline in conflict-related casualties. Lest Canyon forget, the last great power war, World War II, led to the death of 70 million people and saw the United States spend almost half of its gross domestic product fighting the war.

Canyon, like many in the disarmament community, mistakenly believes that weakness leads to peace. They incorrectly impose their own aversion to conflict onto Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jung Un. In reality, these authoritarians, who are actively seeking to topple the American-led international order, only see American passivity as weakness and an opportunity to coerce the United States.

Peace through strength is no mere slogan. It is the most accurate and effective way to deter America’s adversaries and ensure they never believe that they can achieve their objectives through conflict.

Defense Spending

Canyon also argues that defense spending is too high and the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad is wasteful. Instead, she proposes increasing spending on social programs. Any examination of federal, state, and local budgets illustrates that Canyon is again incorrect.

In 2024, the federal budget was $6.75 trillion. Of this, $841.4 billion, 14 percent, went to defense spending. Of defense spending, about $50 billion was dedicated to current operation and modernization. This was about 6 percent of defense spending and less than 0.1 percent of federal spending.

Federal, state, and local governments spent more than $10 trillion in 2024. The federal government alone spent 69 percent of its budget on social programs. That is approximately $4.6 trillion—more than all federal revenue collected ($4.4 trillion) in 2024. Excluding federal pass-through funds, state and local governments spent an additional $4 trillion in 2024. State and local governments spent 65 percent of their budgets on social programs—another $2.6 trillion. Federal, state, and local governments spent $1.8 trillion just on anti-poverty programs—more than twice the defense budget.

According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that runs these two programs, Medicare and Medicaid lose more than $100 billion every year to waste, fraud, and abuse. That is twice the cost of the entire nuclear enterprise. Surprisingly, Canyon is not bothered by this and other waste, fraud, and abuse in federal, state, and local programs. They are affordable. In her mind, it is nuclear spending that is breaking the bank.

The simple fact is that social justice warriors have never seen a dollar they do not want to spend. After all, more than 100 percent of federal revenues are already spent on their preferred programs. State and local governments spend two-thirds of their budgets on social programs. Americans also spend more than $450 billion a year in charitable donations. Despite the spending on social programs, the demand only grows.

Defense spending, however, is at a 70-year low. At 3.4 percent of gross domestic product, these rates of defense spending have not been seen since prior to World War II.

Thus, when Canyon argues that too much is spent on defense and nuclear modernization, she is flat wrong. It is just the opposite.

Americans now live in a nation where social programs crowd out defense spending at a time when avoiding war is only possible by fielding a military and a nuclear force that is powerful enough to not only deter Russian aggression, but Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian as well. That can never be done by good intentions. Weakness is provocative. Peace comes through strength and an unwillingness by aggressive adversaries to challenge the United States.

Canyon is wrong in her reading of history, wrong in her understanding of strategy, and wrong about government spending. The time is now to have a guns-versus-butter debate because it may soon be too late.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Escalation Dominance Does Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, adversaries, ranging from Imperial Japan to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, badly miscalculated American resolve. This was, in part, because the US did not effectively communicate national will and the country’s ability to generate combat power.

While nuclear deterrence held during the Cold War, a worrisome erosion of America’s nuclear deterrence appears underway. A combination of unilateral cuts to the American arsenal, sluggish nuclear modernization, and “nuclear psychosis” (fear of one’s own nuclear arsenal) likely led Russian President Vladimir Putin to develop an escalate to win nuclear doctrine. The same factors may also contribute to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia issuing mounting conventional and nuclear threats against the West.

Americans need to remember that escalation dominance is an essential ingredient in effectively maintaining deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies. Escalation dominance means having the option to retaliate up or down the escalation ladder—at America’s choosing. This means developing and fielding capabilities that at least achieve parity, if not superiority, at each rung of the escalation ladder.

Without the US investing in the needed capabilities for full-spectrum conflict, all-domain escalation dominance, adversaries can study America’s capabilities and identify gaps. They can then develop and execute successful strategies that exploit those gaps. They can also incorrectly believe gaps exist, because of a failure of American messaging. Either way, American deterrence might fail.

The US once understood the art and science of escalation dominance—including how to weigh and manage uncertainties and unavoidable risks. At the most dangerous point in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US out-thought, outmaneuvered, and overmatched the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed down. President Ronald Reagan successfully escalated an arms race while also waging economic warfare. The Soviet Union collapsed.

America now faces multiple adversaries it must engage across the spectrum of conflict. Both horizontal and vertical escalation are certain. With the potential for conflicts to start in the cyber or space domain, the United States must have the ability to limit damaging incursions and malicious interference, while out-escalating an adversary.

History shows that America’s enemies, whomever they might be, tend to be relentless, brutal, casualty acceptant, and even genocidal. Current events, in conflict zones around the world, prove that this has not changed. Appeasement is as ill-advised today as it was with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Restraint is also as ill-advised now as it was then.

Sound theories of American victory need to be developed. Sound American strategy requires the proper matching of objectives to means. Without these in place, deterrence might not hold.

The stakes could not be higher. Conventional war is still almost always a prolonged and very bloody business, in which civilians are caught in the middle and have no safe refuge. If America’s strategic deterrence ever fails, the homeland might suffer devastating attack. Destruction in Ukraine is a small example of what such destruction could look like.

Nuclear war would likely prove unimaginably worse. Nuclear deterrence demands the ability to respond with proportional retaliatory strikes. It also requires the ability to match enemy escalation. The US cannot allow itself to be self-deterred by either a lack of will or a lack of capability. Self-deterrence is to give license to adversaries.

Yet some in the US continue to advocate for policies that eschew escalation at any cost.  This is a theory of defeat, not victory. Attempts to avoid risks only increase the cost of risk.

Such advocates need to be reminded that bullies will always test those they despise. Saving face and taking safe off-ramps are not a priority. For the US to be unable or unwilling to respond with sufficient force when necessary will only invite further and far worse aggression.

In the Cold War now underway, there is a danger of rapid escalation. To cede the military initiative to adversaries, to abandon America’s time-honored strategic culture of retaining full-spectrum escalation dominance, is to invite a nuclear strike against the nation and/or its allies. Adversary malign-influence campaigning is underway and now pervades American information.  Succumbing to these efforts to convince American society that isolation and pacifism are the nation’s best option is a mistake.

Appeasement never satisfies autocratic aggression. The United States must instead invest in the capabilities required to re-master the art and science of strong-stomached escalation dominance. This will support deterrence of America’s adversaries, assurance of America’s allies, and defense of the homeland. Now is the time to act.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Essays:

1. Extended Deterrence and No First Use Policy:
   • The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, emphasizing nuclear abolition.
   • The U.S. policy of extended deterrence involves the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, biological, or chemical attacks.​
   • The Biden administration considered a “No First Use” policy, which could undermine the U.S. extended deterrent strategy.​
2. Nuclear Security Challenges:
   • The U.S. faces nuclear threats from China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
   • Significant investments in both conventional and nuclear forces are necessary.​
   • The U.S. must address the coordinated campaign of unrestricted warfare by these nations.​
3. Cost of Nuclear Modernization:
   • The U.S. plans to spend $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years on nuclear deterrence.​
   • Modernization is essential to replace aging systems like the MMIII ICBMs, B52 and B2 bombers, and Ohio-class submarines.​
   • The annual cost of modernization is around $19 billion, which is 3.5% of the current defense budget.

Quotes of the Week:

• “President Zelenskyy says Ukraine expects N. Korean troops to be deployed in battlefield in few days” and also sees the choice between joining NATO or going nuclear.
• Congressman Don Bacon: Emphasized the need to strengthen U.S. nuclear command and control due to the Russia-China alliance.​
• Sen. Mike Rounds: Highlighted the importance of preparing for the B-21 stealth bomber at Ellsworth AFB.​
• Noah Robertson: Reported on China’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion.​
• Wang Zhen: Criticized the U.S. for misrepresenting China’s nuclear development.

Strategic Developments:

• Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Some essays support Iran acquiring nuclear weapons to establish deterrence against the U.S. and Israel.
• China’s Nuclear Strategy: China maintains a minimum deterrent strategy and proposes a “No First Use” treaty.

Budget Comparisons:

• Medicaid Costs: The cost of Medicaid to illegal aliens over three years is $16.2 billion, nearly equal to the annual cost of U.S. nuclear modernization platforms for FY25 ($16.4 billion).​

Important Commentary:

• AEI Essay: Urges the next U.S. president to address the aging nuclear arsenal and consider stop-gap measures to mitigate long-term issues.​
• Chinese Disarmament Stance: China calls for the U.S. to stop misrepresenting its nuclear policy and emphasizes its no-first-use stance.​

To read the report visit the Global Security Review ICBM EAR report.

​

ICBM EAR Report – Summary for October 25th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eight recent assessments of future prospects for strategic stability in light of growing nuclear dangers have been brought forward for consideration including (1) a Brookings Institute essay by Caitlyn Talmadge on the Biden and Trump approaches to nuclear deterrence; (2) Representative and Intelligence Chair Mike Turner’s nuclear and space related remarks at CSIS; (3) Joe Cirincione’s description of the Biden and Trump nuclear agenda’s as dangerously bad and worse, respectively; (4) Professor Wittmer’s complaint that everything Trump might do or has done on nuclear deterrence has accelerated the “arms race”; (5) Brad Robert’s top-notch look into the future about what the LLNL program director describes as “unwelcome” truths  that must be faced; (6) Mark Schneider’s welcome assessment of what French President Macron is trying to do with extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the related pitfalls; (7) Mathew Kroenig and Mark Massa review the value of ICBMs and particularly what is required for future ICBM related nuclear deterrence–and in their usual scholarly manner; and (8) commentary by Mike Albertson of LLNL and (9) Con Coughlin of Gatestone about what the US  and its allies are facing over the next few decades in the nuclear arena and why meeting the deterrent challenge is both very interesting but also absolutely challenging. Coughlin’s top concern is the US non-confrontational policy with respect to Iran and the relative loss of credible US deterrent capability.

The Critics

Talmadge, Wittmer, and Cirincione portray former President Trump as some kind of nuclear Mad Hatter or Dr. Strangelove who will bring about nuclear Armageddon, although all three largely get  recent nuclear deterrent history wrong. However, their narrative is common with Hollywood and reflected in both the new Oppenheimer film, as well as in Annie Jacobson book that describes current US nuclear deterrent strategy as “Mad” and immoral. Cirincione even describes the Biden nuclear modernization program as highly dangerous even though its entirety fits within the confines of the New START agreement of 2010.

As for Whitmer’s claim the “arms race” accelerated after 2017, the facts are that as of 2010, Russia had already planned the deployment of some 29 new types of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, which have remained on schedule and are now over 90% complete.

As for whether the US should have shown restraint, an amendment to kill the ICBM leg of the Triad was offered by Representative Garamendi in June 2021 in the HASC and House floor, with the Democrats in the majority, and lost 49-9 in Committee and 308-119 on the House floor. And as Dr. David Trachtenberg has shown in a previous essay, the idea that US restraint in US deployments of nuclear weapons will generate similar restraint among our adversaries is debunked by history. As former defense secretary Harold Brown once quipped, “We build, they build. We stop, they build.”

Steady as You Go & Enhancements Needed?  .

Another perspective comes from the essays of Dr. Roberts, Dr. Kroenig and Mr. Massa. They both are excellent contributions to the growing proposals of how to meet the challenge of what Admiral Charles Richard described as a projected two peer nuclear armed enemies of the United States by 2035. Both analyze the program of record which is based on the force structure planned in 2010 and which fits within the New START agreement which has been observed for the past three administrations, including that of President Donald Trump for 2017-21.

Kroenig and Massa explore former HASC Chairman Smith’s proposal to eliminate all ICBMs. Their unique contribution is to point out if ICBMs are so needed they might be launched promptly during an attack, it makes no sense to eliminate their capability, especially as it would eliminate a key required deterrent capability while also leaving the US with roughly 12 targets on land and at sea which if eliminated would put the US out of the nuclear business. As former NDU President General Mike Dunn once explained, “Why would we make it easier for our enemies to disarm us?”

Dr. Brad Roberts explains the positive days of 2010 are now gone, and the unwelcome truths are that we are entering a very dangerous nuclear era but which we must squarely face. He is concerned a future US administration might fail to continue the US extended deterrent over NATO and our Pacific allies, with the possible consequence that our allies seek their own nuclear deterrent, which could have serious consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And his top concern is the relative lack of urgency with which US national leaders take to the nuclear table, as the consequence of inaction or delay could be deadly.

NIPP’s Mark Schneider looks at what President Macron is proposing for extended deterrence in Europe as wholly inadequate for NATO’s security but should be fully examined. It is important to note when discussing the US relationship with NATO that under the previous administration, the DoD resources devoted to defending our NATO allies increased significantly, as did the number of NATO members that met the 2% spending target for defense, completely consistent with previous President Trump’s recent declaration that he is “100%” with NATO.

House Intelligence Chair Mike Turner explores with Dr. Kari Bingen of CSIS the big threats facing the US (which the critics reviewed here hardly mention). The Russian deployment of ASAT nuclear forces is a serious threat says Turner to US space assets, while the Posture Commission support for widespread missile defense capabilities is a big breakthrough and hopefully will lead to rapid new US deployments says the Ohio representative.

The highlight of the new NIPP study by Schneider is the chart on what Russia is currently building or has in development—some 26 new nuclear types of weapons while the US has five. The Russian force moderation is near 93% complete according to the Kremlin while the US modernization effort has yet to place its first SNDV or strategic nuclear delivery vehicle into the force.

Program of Record Plus

The three critics of current modernization are primarily concerned with four augmentations to the program of record, as well as the rhetoric and diplomatic actions of the former President, even in the case of Cirincione thinking even the Obama era current program of record is highly dangerous.

As the Strategic Posture Commission report emphasized, the current program of record is necessary even critical but it is not adequate to the deterrent task before us. One thing being proposed by Brad Roberts, for example, is the development of a Navy cruise missile that would be nuclear armed, a Tomahawk technology removed from the theater nuclear force inventory by President Herbert Walker Bush but then dismantled by the Obama administration.

The stealthy, prompt and survivable at sea theater system would meet all the criteria needed for a sound theater deterrent and would meet the current gap between US vs Russian and Chinese theater systems in the European and Pacific theaters. The number that might be deployed would probably be in the intermediate dozens of such weapons, but certainly not anywhere near the 1900 Russian theater systems identified by the US intelligence community, to say nothing of what the Chinese may have deployed. But as Franklin Miller writes July 10^th, “a U.S. nuclear sea-launched cruise missile would enhance deterrence and reassure allies in peacetime and crisis, and, in wartime, provide a President with additional options to prevent enemy nuclear escalation. The W 76-2 is an excellent weapon, but any President deserves more than one option; the combination of the ballistic W 76-2 and the airbreathing SLCM-N would provide a President with significant flexibility to manage a crisis.’

Another augmentation has been completed and that has been adding low-yield nuclear weapons to the D-5 missiles, again for a total number of such weapons in the low dozens at most, an added capability endorsed by the current administration. Both the low-yield D-5 and a SLCM-N would help rectify the current theater imbalance and be able to deter the use of such weapons at the low end of the nuclear spectrum, which itself enhances deterrence, avoiding what then Senator John Kennedy declared in 1959 was the bad choice between all out Armageddon, (massive retaliation), or surrender (standing down.) .

Additional elements of enhancing the US deterrent posture especially after New START expires would be adding warheads to the US ICBM and SLBM force of 692 missiles as envisioned by the 12 Columbia class submarines (the minimum needed) and 192 D-5 missiles and the 400 Sentinel missiles, although there are proposals on the table for also deploying the 50 reserve ICBMs allowed as a hedge under New START. As well as to upload our B52s and other bombers.

Implementing the Hedge?

When taken together, the US has a hedge capability of around 1000 additional warheads the US could add to its strategic nuclear posture and could do so over a period of 3-4 years depending on how fast the US could deploy additional ICBM warheads on either the legacy MMIII ICBMs or the new Sentinel system. Whatever is the case, the roughly 2800+ warheads the US could have in its strategic nuclear force by 2035 would be dwarfed by the projected Russia and China nuclear forces, which Professor Chris Yeaw, at the 20^{th of} June Triad Symposium at LSUS,  has projected will reach some 10,000 warheads.

In short, what proponents of nuclear enhancements vs nuclear restraint are arguing over is the deployment of some 1000 US warheads or an augmentation of the US strategic force of some fifty percent of the current US strategic, long-range force. Even if one adds in a force of 300 theater systems including the current gravity bombs in Europe and the projected new SLCM-N theater forces, the total buildup for the United States would at best reach 3000 warheads by the middle of the next decade. Or more likely the following decade some 20 years hence if the fully modernized force of 12 Columbia class submarines and SLEP D-5 missiles, 20 B21 bombers and associated cruise missiles and 400-50 Sentinel missiles, is fielded.

Given the breathtaking expansion of Russian and Chinese forces already underway, such a US response is nothing but practical and proportionate and well within a reasonable calculation of what is required, as Franklin Miller has noted, to right the current deterrent imbalance, without necessarily matching warhead for warhead the projected deployed Russian and Chinese forces.

The critics of enhancement, however, spend almost no time doing an informed review of how they would correct the current imbalance except to claim the US is unnecessarily leading a new arms race (demonstrably wrong), or as Cirincione put it, seeking to wage nuclear war (again demonstrably absurd).

The next US Administration and the JCPOA, North Korea, INF and Arms Control.

What the critics concentrate on is the rhetoric and diplomatic action of the previous administration. These actions include withdrawal from the JCPOA, the joint nuclear agreement with Iran, the withdrawal from the INF treaty, and the US relationship with North Korea and its nuclear and missile forces.

North Korea and the Button

The former President did remind the leader of North Korea that the US did have a more formidable nuclear deterrent than the DPRK and that our deterrent after decade of testing actually worked. Both comments were perfectly consistent with the time-honored point of the US deterrent strategy: (1) our deterrent is very large and (2) we have the will to use it should North Korea attack the United States. Interestingly, the NPRK did not test a nuclear weapon or test an ICBM range missile during 2017-20.

Iran & The JCPOA

The United States never ratified the Iranian JCPOA as the votes were not there in the US Senate. The deal could not be ratified because it was a bad deal. Instead, the previous Obama administration used a clever rube goldbergian strategy to secure an occasional review of the agreement by the US Senate. The agreement allowed the Iranians to build up an enhanced capability to produce weapons grade nuclear fuel, with the requirement that the low-level produced fuel be exported—primarily to Russia. However, since all the provisions in the deal expire soon, where are the diplomatic efforts over the past 2 ½ years to extended the agreement or make it permanent if its provisions are so demonstrably good? The fact that Iran may have been adhering to the provisions of the deal does not magically change the terms of the deal from terrible to good!

And where is the diplomatic effort for the US  to sign back up to the JCPOA and this time get the Senate to agree? In fact, much of the opposite has occurred including the US dropping sanctions against Iran, which then provided to Tehran tens of billions in hard currency. On top of which, despite the US restraint, Iran has attacked the US some 170 times between October 2023 and January 2024.

Including killing and wounding US servicemen and women, to saying nothing of planning, arming and financing the horrible Hamas slaughter of Israel’s last October and the launching of hundreds of missiles and rockets against Israel this spring. No such attacks occurred during the previous administration as Iranian hard currency reserves fell to around $10 billon, which is near 1/10^th their current level, and contributed significantly to the Iranian lack of resources to conduct its serial terrorist activities.

Even more dangerous is that Iran in cooperation with China, Russia, and the terrorist group Houthis, has engineered a  new form of piracy where ocean borne freight traffic, including oil tankers are denied access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal unless they agree to abide by new Chinese rules, a kind of ocean toll road regime, as outlined recently by the group Committee on the Present Danger-China.

And as a former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress about the Somalia based “pirates,” they could only locate ships at sea with the use of GPS—which as only the US and Russia could provide such technology it was obvious with what country  the pirates were doing business.

INF & Arms Control Prospects?

The previous administration did try and bring China and Russia do the arms control table but were harshly criticized for thinking China would agree to any such warhead ceilings while trailing the US inventory—although the Soviets did just that in SALT I with respect to the balance in strategic forces in 1972. And despite being outgunned 2000/1 by the Soviets SS-20 deployments, President Ronald Reagan successfully secured the removal of all Soviet SS-20 missiles from both Europe and Asia, while strengthening NATO and our Pacific alliances.

As for the INF treaty, it is widely known the Russians were serially cheating on the agreement. Having only one party to a treaty that is complying with is hardly the way international agreements work, although perhaps the critics have some suggestions which were absent from their essays.

The Record of Arms Control Deals

The tendency for the critics of former President Trump is to claim those with whom they disagree are somehow “against arms control,” in favor of arms races and want to fight nuclear war. These claims were made against President Reagan, who in fact once quipped his domestic critics were harsher in their opposition to his nuclear modernization plans than was the USSR!

In hosting some multiple hundreds of arms control seminars from 1983 through 2024, the actual facts are startling: Republican Presidents cut US strategic long-range nuclear forces from over 10,000 to roughly 2200, and reduced theater nuclear forces by additional multiples of ten thousand warheads, while also securing –for a multiple of reasons– massive reductions in Soviet and then Russian nuclear weapons amounting to also multiple tens of thousands.

Where and When Did Modernization Start?

Unfortunately, as retired General John Hyten explained during the last ten years of his military leadership as Deputy Commander of the USAF Space Command, then  as Commander of US Strategic Command, and then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Putin had a plan to fully modernize his forces starting in 2004 and not continue on the path of further nuclear reductions but to actually augment the Russian force to multiples of the New START allowable force.

According to Rick Fisher and Bradley Thayer and Mark Schnieder, the Chinese too had plans to build up to over 1500 strategic nuclear warheads, fully adopted in the 2008-9 timeframe, both demonstrably before the Trump administration, which completely obliterates Professor Wittmer’s complaint that the Chinese and Russian nuclear buildups are all Trump’s fault.

The Great Unravelling

Indeed, the arms control progress assumed to be holding from START I to New START has come unraveled. Although it’s tempting to “always blame America” for the rogue behavior of Xi and Putin, their nuclear transgressions are all their own as the Posture Commission explained—to them nuclear weapons are instruments of coercion and blackmail, to serve not to deter the interests of military aggression.

But on the current administration’s watch as Ms. Talmadge admits, things no longer hold: “Iran is now closer to a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s arsenal can more directly threaten the United States. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding as it becomes increasingly confrontational toward Taiwan…and Russia is now engaged in a major conventional war on NATO’s border.’ The origin of the relative loss of US deterrent capability may be a complicated subject, but that the US has lost some deterrent strength is unquestioned. The key will be, as the Strategic Posture Commission boldly explained, to restore US deterrent strength on a bipartisan, lasting basis so we can successfully meet the challenges of the new nuclear era.

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The Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence in the Next American Administration was originally published on Global Security Review.

Capabilities Assessment

The possible introduction of SLCM-N to the attack submarine fleet creates an imperative that requires assessing the weapon’s efficiency in enhancing the United States’ ability to both deter an adversary and defeat it, if necessary. From a tactical standpoint, the deployment of SLCM-N offers enhanced flexibility and responsiveness, enabling targeted precision strikes against key adversary assets.

Additionally, the versatility of SLCM-N enables credible deterrence across a spectrum of threats, bolstering the United States’ strategic resilience in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. By utilizing and retrofitting existing or in-process systems, it is possible to make SLCM-N a variable-yield, stealthy, and surgically precise tactical-/battlefield-employable nuclear system. Furthermore, the necessity for a more regionally targeted nuclear weapon capability is necessary, now more than ever, to deter aggression in both EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters and potentially provide greater assurance to partners and allies.

Cost Implications

A key focal point in deliberations surrounding the re-establishment of non-strategic nuclear capabilities is an evaluation of the associated costs—financially and politically. While the deployment of SLCM-N entails large financial investments, its strategic value in offsetting deterrence capabilities warrants consideration. It is important to ensure the cost efficiency of SLCM-N deployment without compromising critical Navy readiness and modernization initiatives. Despite the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review calling for the cancellation of the SLCM-N program, Congress expressed its consternation with that decision by funding the program anyway.

This is key to understanding some of the nuances of shared power within the federal government. Additionally, the geopolitical cost implications must be addressed as well. Adding new capabilities to the American arsenal could drive significant costs for arms control globally. Both near-peer and pacing competitors could see this as an expression of aggression and escalation. This could increase tensions surrounding global arms control and nonproliferation. However, continuing to ignore pacing challenges could potentially threaten arms control and the credibility of ally assurance.

Communication Strategy

Effective communication lies at the heart of strategic decision-making, particularly concerning sensitive topics such as nuclear deterrence. Transparent communication that emphasizes the importance of clarity between military leadership, policymakers, and the public regarding the rationale and implications of reestablishing non-strategic nuclear capabilities is critical. Effective communication also includes proactive engagement with international partners and allies, which is important in fostering cohesion and avoiding misperceptions in a world of continuously evolving threats. Proper messaging to adversaries is equally vital to ensuring the efficacy of adding a new capability to the toolbox. The delicate nature of communication must not be overlooked. American leaders must place this facet of military strategy at the forefront of their minds when addressing not only nuclear but also any decision that is likely to have second- and third-order effects whether intentional or unintentional. Due to the historic nature of American involvement in conflict around the world, the ability to communicate effectively on the world stage is imperative to ensuring the success of this task.

Conclusion

The re-establishment of a non-strategic nuclear capability within the US Navy, bringing SLCM-N to the fleet, represents a nuanced proposition that warrants meticulous scrutiny from a tactical perspective. Keeping an eye on the capability provided, system and modification cost, and a broader communication strategy is essential for informed decision-making when navigating such a complex topic. Nuclear weapon experts Robert Soofer and Walter Slocomb write, “The House and Senate appropriations committees have not provided adequate funding for the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). This is a mistake. The United States needs this capability to deter Russia, China, and North Korea, and to assure its allies.”

SLCM-N enhances deterrence by providing the United States with a flexible and credible deterrent against nuclear-armed adversaries. Fielding an additional nuclear response option also improves allied assurance. A breadth of nuclear capabilities, including sea-launched cruise missiles, gives the American nuclear arsenal the depth required for adversaries that are growing their own capabilities. This aids in ensuring deterrence holds, while reaffirming American commitment to ally security.

TSgt William Atkins is an instructor at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirtland AFB. The views expressed are his own.

Re-Establishing Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities in the United States Navy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

These ominous developments did not happen overnight but are made worse by bad American security policy decisions just as China and Russia were simultaneously deciding to confront the United States leadership role in the world. Critical to a growing China and Russia threat is bad American nuclear policy choices.

Key to this decline were ten bad American policy decisions. These policies began in the wake of the Soviet Union’s decline and continue to the present. Let me explain.

First, America began by buying Francis Fukuyama’s flawed “end of history” thesis and believed that the “liberal international order” of the early post–Cold War period would remain in perpetuity, with authoritarian regimes collapsing as democracy and capitalism triumphed. This, as we know, proved untrue.

Second, the United States unilaterally eliminated almost its entire theater nuclear weapons arsenal, the very type of nuclear forces where there is now a serious and growing imbalance between the United States and China and Russia.

Third, after terrorism took the place of the Soviet Union as America’s top threat, the United States identified the solution to terrorism as democratization through force. The attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), US embassies in Africa (1998), and USS Cole (DDG-67) were the kindling that served, in part, to justify the later invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, despite the extraordinary take down of Saddam’s Iraqi forces in Gulf War I (1991), the deterrent value of liberating Kuwait disappeared by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were then followed by two more decades of futile efforts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fifth, the United States long assumed a cooperative arrangement with China and Russia would prevent nuclear proliferation. American leaders failed to recognize that both nations played an important role in enabling North Korea’s successful nuclear program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with a 1982 decision by Deng Xiaoping and Yuri Andropov to transfer nuclear technology to client states.

Sixth, for three decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US took a holiday from modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Now, as the US attempts to reverse course, the entire nuclear establishment requires refurbishment to make modernization possible.

Seventh, the US ignored Russian incursions into Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine during 2008–2014. Then, just prior to the 2022 invasion, the US compounded these mistakes by both declaring that the US response would depend upon how much Ukraine territory was taken or, later during the war, Ukraine could negotiate an end to the war by ceding additional territory to Russia—a country responsible for the deaths of many millions of Ukrainians during the Soviet Union’s existence. This only encourages Russian aggression.

Eighth, the US abandoned Afghanistan and left significant military equipment behind for the Taliban to use. A billion-dollar embassy and $14 billion worth of military equipment was quickly incorporated into the new Taliban-led government’s arsenal or sold to terrorist organizations around the world. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a humiliating action that undermined respect for the United States.

Ninth, the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Iranian regime allowed Tehran to continue its ballistic missile and nuclear program with increased funding from a return of assets previously seized by the United States. The Trump administration brought Iran under some semblance of control by cutting its foreign exchange reserves by over $100 billion. The killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ General Qasem Soleimani was a clear signal that then-President Donald Trump would not tolerate Iranian-backed terrorism.

The Biden administration backtracked on efforts to deter Iran. Since October 2023, Iran has conducted 170 attacks, primarily against US and assets in the region. Iran combined forces with Houthi rebels to largely shut down commercial freight and crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran also rebuilt its foreign exchange reserves, while becoming more closely allied with Russia and China. This all took place as Iran moved closer to a nuclear weapon.

Tenth, the United States long dismissed warnings about the rise of Chinese military power and the threat it posed to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s massive investment in cyber, space, conventional, and nuclear weaponry will soon make China a peer of the United States. Asian allies of the United States are increasingly worried by China’s actions.

The United States must act to alter its course before it is too late. A return to a strong military, capable of fighting two peer competitors is necessary. It may also be time for a second Manhattan Project to implement the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s  recommendations. With nuclear modernization facing regular delays, there may be no other option. Whatever the solutions are, the time to act is now.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

America’s Downward Slide was originally published on Global Security Review.

Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, testified, “The Chinese will continue to develop weapons that they believe have advantage and deliver vulnerabilities to the United States.” What is interesting here is how, in less than a year, Admiral Aquilino’s discourse evolved from a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis China, to downright alarmist, albeit realistic, warnings.

As the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Aquilino leads the nation’s oldest and largest combatant command, responsible for US military activities in the Indo-Pacific region. The command includes over 380,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, coast guardsmen, and Department of Defense civil servants. When, back in May 2023, Admiral Aquilino delivered a keynote address to the National Committee on US-China Relations, his exchanges with the audience focused on Sino-American military policy in the context of the overall bilateral relationship. They followed the diplomatically conciliatory script “that conflict is not inevitable and that both countries seek peace and prosperity.”

Emphasizing peaceful relations and cooperation between the US and China, the admiral highlighted the importance of dialogue and adherence to international rules. He expressed concerns over China’s actions that undermine the rules-based international order, particularly regarding the law of the sea and attempts to replace it with self-defined rules.

While advocating for military exercises, Aquilino insisted on the need for collaboration and communication to manage competition responsibly and prevent potential conflicts. The discussion, which also covered surveillance flights and cooperation in humanitarian efforts and climate change, was replete with calls for transparency and adherence to international norms. The discussion on surveillance and military dialogue further underscored the importance of risk mitigation and crisis management to avoid escalations in regional tensions.

Fast forward to the March 2024 House Armed Services Committee hearing and Aquilino struck a much different tone. China, Aquilino suggested, is investing in military technologies to exploit American vulnerabilities and assert dominance. This is taking place while China focuses on assimilating Taiwan (peacefully, if possible, through force, if necessary). China is also actively attempting to displace the US as the world’s leading superpower.

China keeps increasing its defense budget despite a relative economic decline, further investing in nuclear and hypersonic weapons. There are concerns about China and Russia cooperating. This adds pressure on the US and its allies on several fronts. Aquilino warned Congress about potential challenges to American deterrence efforts against the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Having assessed the intensifying competition between the US and China in military capabilities and strategic influence, Admiral Aquilino focused on the enhancement of US conventional and nuclear defense capabilities to counter hypersonic weapons and the rapidly growing Chinese nuclear arsenal. If diplomatic efforts are to succeed, strengthening alliances and partnerships mitigating the influence of the China-Russia cooperation, increased attention must be paid to Taiwan’s security and to strategies to deter Chinese coercion without escalating into conflict.

While the continuous monitoring and adaptation of defense policies to address evolving threats from China and its partners is warranted, Admiral Aquilino concluded that “we need to negate those vulnerabilities, and we need to take advantage of our capabilities that outmatch theirs.” Indeed, China aims at more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and has already increased its arsenal from at least 300 to 500 weapons.

There is nothing particularly disruptive in what Admiral Aquilino advocates. He echos what a congressional commission concluded in 2023: that the US should work to expand and enhance its nuclear arsenal to compete with the combined threat posed by China and Russia. The Biden administration and its successor need to respond positively to multiple recommendations to modernize and expand the American nuclear arsenal. While this in itself is not sufficient, it is absolutely necessary, lest the nation allow American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific to falter, and, ultimately, American global leadership to unravel. The clock is ticking.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Indo-Pacific Command: US Must Improve Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group also provides participating allies a forum to discuss and develop the alliance’s nuclear policies, demonstrating a unified view on nuclear weapons. Today, six of NATO’s 30 European allies store nuclear weapons in their countries. These sites are vital to NATO’s strategic deterrence posture. With the end of the Cold War, NATO made the proper choice to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe from more than 5,000 in 1991 as a means for building goodwill and assurances with Russia.

However, the current state of NATO’s nuclear posture and its ability deter aggression is seriously weakened. First, recent British failures with their Trident submarine ballistic missile forces is a major concern for NATO. If the United Kingdom’s (UK) single nuclear deterrent appears unreliable, then British leaders must look to expand the nuclear arsenal beyond the four submarines they currently field.

Downplaying recent failures is a mistake. Indeed, British Trident missile failures are leading defense experts to call for radical changes in the UK’s deterrent posture. While the United Kingdom is increasing the size of its nuclear stockpile, the UK should no longer rely on its single nuclear system to deter aggression. Developing an additional warhead and delivery system to ensure the success of this no-fail mission is the right decision. With Russia making overt threats against the United Kingdom, maintaining a visible and credible nuclear deterrent is not only vital for British survival but for NATO’s survival.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent nuclear-use declaration appears to undermine alliance nuclear deterrence. While France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, the alliance does rely on France’s strategic weapons to deter aggression.  President Macron stating that France will only employ nuclear weapons to defend its interests creates doubt among alliance members.

Finally, the ongoing political turmoil in the United States is causing serious concerns among NATO member-states. Looking beyond political rhetoric during an election year, NATO should be more concerned with the United States’ ability to modernize its nuclear forces. American adherence to a defunct arms control treaty and a deemphasis on the utility of nuclear weapons leaves the US unable to produce nuclear weapons at the speed and scale required to meet today’s security environment.

Reports concerning the high costs of manufacturing plutonium pits, largely due to divestment of manufacturing capability, threatens to create undue delays in the modernization programs which will place the country and NATO at risk. With British failures, French questionable commitment, and American modernization struggles, NATO’s nuclear deterrent appears hollow. It is no wonder Germany and Turkey are engaged in political discussions surrounding the pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent.

Current realities require NATO to make a serious assessment of its nuclear deterrence strategy.  For instance, NATO’s continued pursuit of arms control limits its deterrence strategy. And with Russia claiming 95 percent modernization of its nuclear forces, NATO’s limited nuclear force places the alliance at a serious strategic disadvantage.

Moreover, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) fails to fulfill its intent as more nations seek to acquire nuclear weapons or grow their current arsenals. While NATO made significant strides in global stability through nuclear reductions and adherence to the NPT and other arms control agreements, NATO’s adversaries violate these agreements at will to gain strategic advantage.

NATO needs to reverse course from the “three nos” from the 1990s to policies that increase the alliance’s credibility. Allies must say yes to reintroducing strategic weapons across NATO territory. Moreover, more allies accepting a direct role in nuclear deterrence will go far in addressing the “burden sharing” question.

Member-states could meet the 2 percent defense spending requirement, which could support nuclear deterrence. Demonstrating a willingness to support nuclear sharing by dispersing nuclear capabilities and forces throughout the European theater would silence burden-sharing critics.

Since these weapons would remain under US or UK control, NATO would continue to abide by arms control treaties. While there would undoubtedly be objections from that anti-nuclear groups or those who want their nations to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, today’s strategic environment requires NATO to pursue a realistic nuclear strategy that will address threats from Russia and emerging nuclear powers while sharing the deterrence burden across the alliance.

When the next Secretary General of NATO takes the helm, the new leader should state, “As long as nuclear weapons exist and hostile powers threaten the alliance, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance and maintain a robust deterrent shared by member-states.” Possessing a credible, reliable, survivable, and redundant strategic deterrent, shared by all allies, is how NATO deters future conflict.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

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NATO’s Fledgling Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a security climate where problems must be tackled in weeks, months, or a year rather than decades or centuries, decision-makers need to prioritize and focus on end-states that are delivered in a finite time horizon with a limited budget and achievable outcomes. A Sum Greater Than Its Parts: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition, a recent report by MITRE and the Aspen Strategy Group, addresses this issue.

The abstract is promising, claiming that integrated deterrence offers a strategy for “managing strategic competition, maintaining peace, and, if necessary, prevailing in conflict” during competition with China. The report also promises “actionable recommendations for policymakers, military leaders and private sector stakeholders” and delivers a laundry list of 31 major initiatives to enhance deterrence.

While a few of the recommended initiatives are sensible and would be useful for deterring China, like modernizing military capabilities to provide assurance and demonstrate resolve, several others are unproven and their implementation could distract from a laser-focused deterrence strategy needed for China. Indo-Pacific nations are acutely affected on a regular basis, either by economic coercion or the looming possibility of conflict over Taiwan or other contested territory. As a result, effective deterrence of China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior must initially rely upon regional solutions to limit China’s most dangerous ambitions.

For a document proposing a China strategy, there is a strange obsession with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European issues. The term NATO appears nine times in the report, including a recommendation to consider internal dynamics in the alliance, while front-line allies in the Indo-Pacific that are key to deterrence (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) are mentioned as mere afterthoughts.

While there are good reasons to consider NATO, as part of any global strategy that includes deterring Russia, the emphasis on NATO seems misplaced given likely targets of Chinese aggression. The report also focused a large set of recommendations on developing public-private partnerships for deterrence, going as far as to “encourage all companies from allied nations to actively participate in strategic initiatives.” While portions of the private sector play a critical role in national security initiatives, it is unclear how a restaurant owner in Latvia could actively contribute to deterring Chinese aggression, for example.

Another group of recommendations suggests the broader use of economic levers including the use of “economic warfare” to undermine an adversary’s willingness to wage war. This ignores the fact that a broad range of economic measures aimed at isolating Russia had a limited impact on the Russian economy and proved to be an abject failure in deterring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The utility of economic sanctions in deterring adversaries has historically proven to be questionable. One study shows the use of sanctions leads to a higher probability of future conflict for democracies, as sanctions tend to signal weakness rather than strength. The utility of economic sanctions and other types of economic warfare to deter remains unproven.

The final grouping of recommendations in the report proved the most useful, suggesting that we must understand the adversary, define clear objectives, and build a grand strategy to win a strategic competition with China. MITRE needed to lead with clear objectives and an understanding of China’s goals and decision calculus. Instead, a long list of potential actions that might deter China is presented without sufficient links to China’s objectives. Rather than utilizing a strategy-to-task framework that links ways and means to the ends in a logical fashion, the report presents a broad range of ways and means primarily focused on integration.

Allies and diplomatic measures should play a crucial role in the realization of integrated deterrence, but policymakers must have clear and pragmatic options available. Prioritization of resources and initiatives to maximize deterrence requires a strong appreciation for the Indo-Pacific region, its unique dynamics, and China’s role in the region. Allies and partners must work bi-laterally and multi-laterally to operationalize deterrence in the region.

China is a significant and well-resourced adversary. To compete with and deter China effectively, the United States and its allies must be thoughtful about what initiatives are pursued and what resources are expended. Integration can improve outcomes, but only when it improves outcomes as part of a unified deterrence strategy. In a world where deterrence of China is urgently required, proven and effective measures that deliver deterrence must be brought together under a unifying strategy. This is the type of integration which should be implemented.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

 Leigh Ramsay is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

The views of the authors are their own.

Integrated Deterrence: Which of These Two Words Is More Important? was originally published on Global Security Review.